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I.

G.R. No. 183805 Capili v. People

July 3, 2013

Facts: 1. On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. On or about December 8, 1999, accused being previously united
in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
2. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that the pendency of
the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question
in the instant criminal case.
3. RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of
the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent
marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning. Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the
second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the
RTC.
4. RTC of Pasig City granted the motion. CA reversed.
Issue: W/N subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal
of the criminal case for bigamy.
Decision: NO
1. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
2. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that
the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
3. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

4. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
5. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the
crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage,
so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists.
6. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
7. Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the
time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.

II.

G.R. No. 166836

San Miguel v Perez

Sept 4, 2013

Facts: 1. Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes,
Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly
authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque, containing a total area of
44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The transactions were
embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and
second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41
parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale,
executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of
P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
2. On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of
land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its
rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver
by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF
Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel
Properties filed a complaint-affidavit.
3. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San
Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias
City (OCP Las Pias) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery
of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957.
4. At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183), praying to compel BF Homes to release the
20 TCTs in its favor.
5. Aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the
Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific
performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the
sales transactions involving the lots in questionand entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in
behalf of BF Homes.
Issue: W/N the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be
a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
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Decision: NO
1. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisions.
2. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to
speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for
specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action
civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction
over the action was exclusive and original.
3. The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a
prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific
performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former
would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case.
4. The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San
Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while
the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously
precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to
the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF
5. Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis
for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
6. A prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations
in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who
raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have
rested its case.
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III.

G.R. No. 159823

Reyes v. Rossi

Feb 18, 2013

Facts: 1. On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation
Construction Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project
Director, respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the
purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth
P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as
downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes
complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under the deed of
conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post- dated checks that would
include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the obligation
on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October 31, 1998.
2. On July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in
the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). His complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q9835109 and entitled Teodoro A. Reyes v. Advanced Foundation Construction Systems
Corporation, sought judgment declaring the deed of conditional sale rescinded and of no further
force and effect, and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the P3,000,000.00 downpayment
with legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to pay to him attorneys fees, and
various kinds and amounts of damages.
3. On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the
dishonor of Checks No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and No. 79125. Another
criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802.
4. Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the suspension of the criminal
proceedings by the City Prosecutor of Makati on account of the existence of a prejudicial
question, and in sustaining the dismissal of the complaints for estafa.
5. CA ruled that there was no prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.
Issue: W/N the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial question that
required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Decision: NO
1. The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the
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Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the
buyer issued in connection with the sale.
2. It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory
relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission
is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their status before
the celebration of the contract. However, until the contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the
concomitant obligations subsist.
3. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following
elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonour for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks
knowing them to be without funds upon presentment.
4. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach
in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional
sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have
committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not
necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the
dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the
violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale
was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make
arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of
extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the offense in itself.
Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional sale.
5. The pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the proceedings in the
preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial question. Considering that the
contracts are deemed to be valid until rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof
are also deemed to have been validly made, thus demandable. Consequently, there was no failure
of consideration at the time when the subject checks were dishonored.

IV.

GR 183349

F&E De Castro v. Olasco

Sept 14, 2011

Facts: 1. Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) is the registered owner of the 114hectare Villa Olympia Subdivision in Barrio San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. On August 25,
1985, Forfom entered into a Subdivision Project Agreement with petitioner F&E De Castro
Corporation (F&E Corporation) by which agreement the latter undertook to finance the
development of Villa Olympia Subdivision into a first class residential subdivision.
2. On August 23, 1989, a Supplemental Agreement was further concluded between the parties
whereby F&E Corporation undertook to complete the development of Phase I and I-A of the
project within 120 days, in accordance with the original plan and amendments approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). With the development of said phases still
ongoing, Forfom entered into yet another contract with F&E Corporation, this time for the
development of Phase II of the same project. As F&E Corporation incurred delays in the
completion of said phases of the project, Forfom decided to rescind the Subdivision Project
Agreement, the Supplemental Agreement and the contract relative to the development of Phase II
of the same subdivision project.
3. On March 22, 1990, at the instance of F&E Corporation, HLURB ordered Forfom, in a
cease and desist order, from further selling the lots/units within the subdivision project until and
unless expressly permitted to do so.
4. In view of said developments, F&E Corporation demanded payment from Forfom for the
expenses it purportedly incurred in the development of the subdivision project, including its 40%
share in the price of the 407 developed lots already sold as well as 37 more lots as its share in the
remaining 94 lots then unsold. Charging that Forfom refused to heed its demands, F&E
Corporation instituted an action for Delivery of Lot Titles, Sum of Money and Damages which
was docketed as Civil Case No. SPL-0356.
5. On November 18, 2003, as buyers of Lot 10, Block 30, Phase IV of the Villa Olympia
Subdivision which had already been registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 164843, the Olasos filed a complaint for Damages, Cancellation of Lis Pendens and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against F&E Corporation, Elisa De Castro and her husband, Federico De
Castro, as well as the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. SPL-0991.
6. F&E Corporation filed a motion to dismiss for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
failure to implead Forfom as an indispensable party to the controversy, forum shopping, and litis
pendentia in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. SPL-0356.

7. On January 5, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed order[3] granting F&E
Corporations motion to suspend proceedings in Civil Case No. SPL-0991. On October 22,
2007, the CA rendered its decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed order of the RTC.
Issue: W/N a stay in the proceedings in Civil Case No. SPL-0991 in order to give way to the
proceedings in Civil Case No. SPL-0356 is judicious as there is a prejudicial question.
Decision: NO
1. First, the subject matter or res involved in Civil Case No. SPL-0991 is different from
those in Civil Case No. SPL-0356. F&E Corporation seeks to recover subdivision lots located in
Phase 1 and 1-A of Forfoms subdivision while the Olasos seek to recover their fully paid lot in
Phase VI of the same subdivision.
2. Second, the parties in both cases are different. The litigation in Civil Case No. SPL-0356
is between the developer, F&E Corporation, and the subdivision owner, Forfom, while the parties
in the proceedings in Civil Case No. SPL-0991 are F&E Corporation, as annotator of the Notice
of Lis Pendens and the Olasos, as fully paid lot buyers.
3. Third, the prayers are different. In Civil Case No. SPL-0991, the Olasos want to cancel the
annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendensstamped on their certificate of title over the piece of
property described as Lot 10, Block 30, Phase VI of the Villa Olympia Subdivision, which they
bought from Forfom. In Civil Case No. SPL-0356, the prayer was for the delivery of the
certificates of title over 37 lots situated in Phase 1 and 1-A of the same subdivision and the
payment of a sum of money and damages.
4. For said reasons, the proceedings in Civil Case No. SPL-0991 can continue independently
of Civil Case No. SPL-0356.

V.

GR 172060

Pimentel v. Pimentel

Sept 13, 2010

Facts: 1. On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to
Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
2.On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392
(Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
3. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City.
4. Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did
not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage
is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Issue: W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
Decision: NO
1. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August
2004. Respondents petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed
on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide.
2. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The relationship
between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or
homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
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the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
3. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.

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VI.

GR 174168

Shiou v. Velasco

March 30, 2009

Facts: 1. On 30 May 2003, four criminal complaints were filed by Sy Chim and Felicidad
Chan Sy (Spouses Sy) against Sy Tiong Shiou, Juanita Tan Sy, Jolie Ross Tan, Romer Tan,
Charlie Tan and Jessie James Tan (Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.) before the City Prosecutors Office of
Manila. The cases were later consolidated. Two of the complaints, I.S. Nos. 03E-15285 and 03E15286, were for alleged violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation
Code. In these complaints, the Spouses Sy averred that they are stockholders and directors of Sy
Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation) who asked Sy Tiong Shiou, et al., officers of the
corporation, to allow them to inspect the books and records of the business on three occasions to
no avail. In a letter dated 21 May 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied the request, citing civil and
intra-corporate cases pending in court.
2. In the two other complaints, I.S. No. 03E-15287 and 03E-15288, Sy Tiong Shiou
was charged with falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), and perjury under Article 183 of the RPC. According to the Spouses Sy, Sy Tiong
Shiou executed under oath the 2003 General Information Sheet (GIS) wherein he falsely stated
that the shareholdings of the Spouses Sy had decreased despite the fact that they had not
executed any conveyance of their shares.
3. Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argued before the prosecutor that the issues involved in the civil
case for accounting and damages pending before the RTC of Manila were intimately related to
the two criminal complaints filed by the Spouses Sy against them, and thus constituted a
prejudicial question that should require the suspension of the criminal complaints.
4. The appellate court ruled that the civil case for accounting and damages cannot be
deemed prejudicial to the maintenance or prosecution of a criminal action for violation of
Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code since a finding in the civil case that
respondents mishandled or misappropriated the funds would not be determinative of their guilt or
innocence in the criminal complaint. In the same manner, the criminal complaints for
falsification and/or perjury should not have been dismissed on the ground of prejudicial question
because the accounting case is unrelated and not necessarily determinative of the success or
failure of the falsification or perjury charges. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that there
was probable cause that Sy Tiong Shiou had committed falsification and that the City
of Manila where the 2003 GIS was executed is the proper venue for the institution of the perjury
charges. Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but their
motion was denied
Issue: W/N the civil action and the criminal cases do involve any prejudicial question.
Decision: NO
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1. The civil action for accounting and damages, Civil Case No. 03-106456 pending before
the RTC Manila, Branch 46, seeks the issuance of an order compelling the Spouses Sy to render
a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds and fund paid to, received and
earned by the corporation since 1993 and to restitute it such amounts, proceeds and funds
which the SpousesSy have misappropriated. The criminal cases, on the other hand, charge that
the Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting inside company premises and from
inspecting company records, and that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS, specifically
the Spouses Sys shares in the corporation. Surely, the civil case presents no prejudicial question
to the criminal cases since a finding that the Spouses Sy mishandled the funds will have no effect
on the determination of guilt in the complaint for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section
144 of the Corporation Code; the civil case concerns the validity of Sy Tiong Shious refusal to
allow inspection of the records, while in the falsification and perjury cases, what is material is
the veracity of the entries made by Sy Tiong Shiou in the sworn GIS.
2. In a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of the Corporation Code, the defense
of improper use or motive is in the nature of a justifying circumstance that would exonerate those
who raise and are able to prove the same. Accordingly, where the corporation denies inspection
on the ground of improper motive or purpose, the burden of proof is taken from the shareholder
and placed on the corporation. However, where no such improper motive or purpose is alleged,
and even though so alleged, it is not proved by the corporation, then there is no valid reason to
deny the requested inspection.
3. In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the denial of inspection was predicated
on the pending civil case against the Spouses Sy.
4. Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. did not make any allegation that the person demanding to examine
and copy excerpts from the corporations records and minutes has improperly used any
information secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes of such corporation
or of any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making
his demand. Instead, they merely reiterated the pendency of the civil case. There being no
allegation of improper motive, and it being undisputed that Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied Sy
Chim and Felicidad Chan Sys request for inspection, the Court rules and so holds that the DOJ
erred in dismissing the criminal charge for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of
the Corporation Code.

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VII.

GR 188920

Roque v. Atienza

Feb 24, 2010

Facts: 1. On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz
(Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally
at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in
by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
2. Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
3. Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006,
August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for being moot and
academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
4. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed
with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily
dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
5. The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, docketed as I.S. No.
06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
Issue: W/N issues presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a prejudicial question to the
criminal case against Cadiz.
Decision: NO
1. The existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend proceedings in
a criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be made only
upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot
take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since
a petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal action, the determination of the pendency
of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not
before this Court in an appeal from the civil action.
2. In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not
categorically require respondent to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a
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substantive evil which warrants the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates
that the action taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The
appellate court went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the
freedom of expression and of public assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged
permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are
allowed without permit.

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VIII.

GR161075

Jose-Consing v. People

July 15, 2013

Facts: 1. Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz
(de la Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans
were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to.
2. Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount
of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of
Unicapital.
3. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title
to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng,
the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599
held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
4. On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of
April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter
ignored the demands.
5. On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of theP41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted
as a mere agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for
estafa through falsification of public document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati
City Prosecutors Office.
Issue: W/N the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal
cases
Decision: NO
1. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz;
while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the
question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the
amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely
an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
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adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public document.
2. Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the
lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case
for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso
facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public
document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the
purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal
case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
3. In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of
the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar
4. An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise
a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
5. The transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the issue of the respondents
culpability for the questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals
with the same parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.

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IX.

GR 159186

Yap v Cabales

June 5, 2009

Facts: 1. Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate
business through their company Primetown Property Group. Sometime in 1996, petitioner
purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said
purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to
Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita
Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
2.The first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the
remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that
the "Account is Closed."Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to
the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.
3. On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of
money, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.
4. Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City
filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the
petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City.
5. In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account
of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from
participating in the proceedings. Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be
suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.
Issue: W/N Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution
of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Decision: NO
1. The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22,

while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the
petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.
2. The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or

innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil
case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
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3. In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the

payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.
4. The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even

as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum. To determine the reason for which
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the
public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.
5. It is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238

for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

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X.

GR 184861
Jr., J.

Dreamwork v. Janiola

June 30, 2009

Velasco,

Facts: 1. On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and
Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit
dated October 5, 2004 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private
respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case
was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information
for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
2.On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5 for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed
with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration
of the construction agreement.
3. MTC granted the Motion to Suspend on ground of prejudicial question.
4. RTC ruled that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to
obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any
intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial
stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the
criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in
character.
Issue: W/N there is a prejudicial question in the case
Decision: NO
1. It must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the
criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a
party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to
delay the proceedings in the latter.
2. We cannot agree with private respondent who argues that the phrase "before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial
question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or
during the pendency of the criminal action.

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3. In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature
of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term
criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal
action.
4. The filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal
proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
5. Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint
and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site.
Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years
from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for
no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction
agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the
construction agreement.
6. It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad
check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking
communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum.
7. Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement
between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of
private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed
issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is
subject of prosecution under BP 22.

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XI.

G.R. No. 188767

July 24, 2013 PEREZ, J.:

SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO vs.SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,

Facts: 1. Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano (Florida), who
were engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased beer
products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of P285, 504.00 on 7 April 2000.
Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovans Asia Trust Bank
Current Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13 April 2000, the check was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written
demands,1 petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners, docketed as I.S. No.
01-4205 with the Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon City on 14 March 2001.
2.On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages
against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42386.
Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited their
bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished by payment; and that Fatima
issued a forged check.
3. On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the criminal
proceedings be suspended pending resolution of Civil Case No. Q-00-42386.
4. SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging the
Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. In a Resolution dated 3 June 2004, the DOJ
dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied.
5. SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 88431. On 11 March 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the
petition.
Issue: W/N a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Held: NO
1. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
2. The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully
garnished the P378,000.00 from petitioners savings account.
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3. The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation
being conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the
dishonor of another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check
leading to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners savings account. The source
of the funds of petitioners savings account is no longer SMCs concern. The matter is between
petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is
whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer products.
4. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the unlawful
garnishment of petitioners savings account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free
from criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of
worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself
the offense.

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XII.

G.R. No. 173183

November 18, 2013 BRION, J.:

SYCAMORE VENTURES CORPORATION and SPOUSES SIMON D. PAZ AND LENG

LENG PAZ, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
Facts: 1. Sixteen years ago (or sometime in 1997), Sycamore and the spouses Paz obtained from
respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) a credit line
of P180,000,000.00, secured by 10 real estate mortgages 4over Sycamores 11 parcels of
land,5 together with their improvements.6 Sycamore and the spouses Paz withdrew from the
credit line the total amount of P65,694,914.26, evidenced by 13 promissory notes.7
2.Because the petitioners failed to pay their loan obligations and for violations of the terms
and conditions of their 13 promissory notes, Metrobank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings over the six real estate mortgages.
3. but the sale did not take place because Sycamore and the spouses Paz asked for
postponements.
4. Metrobank subsequently restructured Sycamore and the spouses Pazs loan, resulting in the
issuance of one promissory note denominated as PN No. 751622 736864.92508.000.99, in lieu of
the 13 promissory notes9previously issued, and the execution of a single real estate mortgage
covering the 12 parcels of land.
5. Despite reminders, Sycamore and the spouses Paz still failed to settle their loan
obligations, compelling Metrobank to file a second petition for auction sale, which was set for
October 25, 2002.
On October 16, 2002, Sycamore and the spouses Paz once again asked for the postponement
of the October 25, 2002 public auction sale; they asked that the sale be moved to November 26,
2002, but this time Metrobank refused to give in.
6.On November 25, 2002, Sycamore and the spouses Paz filed before the RTC, Branch 43,
San Fernando Pampanga, a complaint for the annulment of the contract and of the real estate
mortgage.
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. CA dismissed petition for certiorari filed by
Metrobank.
7. Meanwhile, the proceedings in the main case continued. At the trial, Sycamore and the
spouses Paz moved for the appointment of independent commissioners to determine the
mortgaged properties appraisal value.16 They mainly alleged that Metrobank arbitrarily and
unilaterally reduced the mortgaged properties appraisal value; hence, the need for their
reappraisal to determine their true value.
In an order dated August 5, 2004, the RTC granted the petitioners motion, and again Metrobank
was unsuccessful in securing a reconsideration.
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Metrobank thus again went to the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the RTC for issuing the questioned order.
This time, CA granted petition.
Issue: W/N the determination of the mortgaged properties appraisal value constitutes a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings.
Held: NO
1. We have held in a long line of cases that mere inadequacy of price per se will not
invalidate a judicial sale of real property. It is only when the inadequacy of the price is grossly
shocking to the conscience or revolting to the mind, such that a reasonable man would neither
directly nor indirectly be likely to consent to it, that the sale shall be declared null and void. This
rule, however, does not strictly apply in the case of extrajudicial foreclosure sales where the right
of redemption is available.
2. Whether Metrobanks reduced valuation is valid or not, or whether the valuation is
outrageously lower than its current value, has nothing to do with the foreclosure proceedings.
From this perspective, we cannot but conclude that that the recourses sought in this case have
been intended solely to delay the inevitable the foreclosure sale and the closure of the
collection action -and are an abuse of the processes of this Court. Under these circumstances the
maximum allowable triple costs should be imposed on the petitioners for this abuse in
accordance with Section 3 Rule 142 of the Rules of Court to be paid by counsel for the
petitioners. Let counsel also be warned that what happened in this case is a practice that in a
proper administrative proceeding may be found violative of their duties to the Court.

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