G.R. No.

154259
2005

February 28,

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and

RUBY
LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO
REYES,
a.k.a.
"AMAY
BISAYA," respondent.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the resolution and the decision of the
Court of Appeals whereby making the
petitioners liable for moral and exemplary
damages.
Amay Bisaya was having a
coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when an
old friend, Dr. Filart, asked him to join the
party of the former manager of the said
hotel, Mr. Tsuruoka. When he was helping
himself at the buffet table, Ms. Lim
approached him and said to leave the
party for it was intended for a number of
guests. Amay Bisaya claimed that he was
humiliated by the manner Ms. Lim asked
him to leave. He alleged that Ms. Lim
asked him to leave in a loud voice enough
to be heard by the other guests. He was
accompanied by a Makati policeman in
leaving the penthouse. He was more
embarrassed when Dr. Filart denied that
she invited him on the said party.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF MS.
LIM CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF
RIGHT TO MAKE THE PETITIONERS
LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED TO
AMAY BISAYA.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any
damage which Amay Bisaya might have
suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a
legitimate right done within the bounds of
propriety and good faith, must be his to
bear alone.
It is unlikely to happen that Ms.
Lim exposed him to ridicule and shame

because admittedly, Amay Bisaya stated

that Ms. Lim was very close enough for
him to kiss when she asked him to leave
the party. It was intended to be heard only
by Amay Bisaya.
Nevertheless , his
reaction to the request must have made
the other guests aware of what transpired
between them. Ms. Lim, not having
abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave
the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all
human hurts and social grievances. Article
19 states:
Art. 19. Every person
must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the
performance
of
his
duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due,
and observe honesty
and
good
faith.1awphi1.nt

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a

right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must
be responsible." The object of this article,
therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise
of ones rights but also in the performance
of ones duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good
faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a

legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised

in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. When
Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21
of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a violation of
law which does not obtain herein as Ms.
Lim was perfectly within her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other
hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes

loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus

mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and (3) it is
done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19
and 21, and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.

DISCUSSION
INJURIA :

ON

VOLENTI

NON

FIT

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend

that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable
for damages as respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in
the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to
which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury") refers to self-inflicted

injury or to the consent to injury which

precludes the recovery of damages by one
who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even if he is
not negligent in doing so. As formulated
by petitioners, however, this doctrine does
not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave
the party, petitioners, under Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
under obligation to treat him fairly in order
not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule
and shame.

G.R. No. L-15674

1921

October 17,

CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own

right and as guardian ad litem of her
three children, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso
Gayetano took a carromata with a view to
going to a cockpit. When the driver of the
carromata had started in the direction
indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta,
stopped the horse, at the same time
protesting to the driver that he himself
had called this carromata first. The driver,
Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not
heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya
pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the
horse from the control of Araneta, in order
that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to
the looseness of the bridle on the horse's
head or to the rottenness of the material
of which it was made, the bit came out of
the horse's mouth; and it became
necessary for the driver to get out in order
to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the
passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the
other,
Gayetano,
had
unfortunately
retained his seat, and after the runaway
horse had proceeded up the street
Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and

in so doing received injuries from which he

soon
died.
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the
accident was the stopping of the horse by
Araneta.
RULING: No, defendant was absolved
from the complaint
The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too
remote from the accident that presently
ensued to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by
getting out and taking his post at the head
of the horse, the driver was the person
primarily responsible for the control of the

animal, and the defendant cannot be

charged with liability for the accident
resulting from the action of the horse
thereafter. The evidence indicates that the
bridle was old, and the leather of which it
was made was probably so weak as to be
easily broken. According to the witnesses
for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked
the rein, thereby causing the bit to come
out of the horse's mouth; and that after
alighting, led the horse over to the curb,
and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that
in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely
off, when the horse, feeling himself free
from control, started to go away as
previously stated.