SPECIAL ARTICLE

Religion, Caste and Conversion

Membership of a Scheduled Caste and Judicial Deliberations
Padmanabh Samarendra

The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the

two amendments of 1956 and 1990 posit a direct
correlation between religion and caste. Only a Hindu,
Sikh or Buddhist, according to these acts, can be a
member of a Scheduled Caste; caste thus is assumed to
exist and survive only within the specified religious
communities. This assumption has been a source of
litigations often involving those Christian converts and
their descendants whose membership of a Scheduled
Caste was disputed on account of a change in their
religion. The Supreme Court had upheld the assumption
that the presence of caste was contingent on religion.
However, its understanding of the relationship of caste
with religion in the subsequent decades witnessed
major shifts. The influence of this new understanding
was reflected in its recent judgments when it
adjudicated on the pleas of those descendants who
were trying to recover the membership of castes which
their ancestors had seemingly lost following their
conversion to Christianity.

n 26 February 2015, a bench of the Supreme Court

delivered judgment in a lawsuit in which one K P Manu
had pleaded that following his conversion to Hinduism,
he had become a member of the Pulaya caste. Manus grandfather was a Pulaya before he became a Christian through
conversion; his parents were also Christians. The Pulaya
community is classified in Kerala as a Scheduled Caste. The
bench accepted Manus plea about being a Pulaya and allowed
him to receive the benefits of reservation meant for the members of the Scheduled Castes.
The Supreme Courts judgment comes at a time when many
organisations professing the ideology of Hindutva are actively
engaged in a campaign for what is called ghar wapsi (homecoming). Ghar wapsi stands for a drive to reconvert those Muslims or Christians, who or whose forefathers, in the opinion of
these organisations, were erstwhile Hindus. In the given milieu, some votaries of Hindutva have gone to the extent of interpreting the ruling as a seal of approval from the highest
court of the land in favour of their campaign.1 Those opposed
to the Hindutva ideology fear that it could be used as an incentive to allure specific groups to convert to Hinduism. My objective in this article, however, is not to explore the impact of the
verdict on the campaign for ghar wapsi. Rather, the article discusses the context in which the verdict was delivered and the
implications that it carries. The apex court gave its judgment
in a dispute that arose out of a specific provision in the acts
the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the two
amendments to this order introduced in 1956 and 1990relating to the subject of reservation for the Scheduled Castes. I illustrate below how the judgment actually contradicts the premise implicit in that specific provision. The contradiction, I argue,
makes a review of the acts necessary.

Colonial Roots

I am grateful to Sangeeta Dasgupta and Tanika Sarkar for their

comments on the manuscript. I am also thankful to the ICSSR, New
Delhi, for the award of a postdoctoral fellowship, which gave me the
time to work on this article.
Padmanabh Samarendra (psamarendra@hotmail.com) is with the
Dr K R Narayanan Centre for Dalit and Minorities Studies, Jamia Millia
Islamia, New Delhi.

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The Government of India (GoI) has reserved a certain proportion

of jobs in the state-controlled organisations and seats in public
bodies for members of the Scheduled Castes.2 The Constitution does not define the term scheduled castes;3 however,
Article 341(1) entrusts the President with the responsibility of
specifying the Scheduled Castes. Accordingly, on 10 August 1950,
the President issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order,
1950, where he identified certain castes from across the country
as Scheduled Castes. The most critical part of this order, from the
point of view of the present article, appears in paragraph 3 which
mentions: no person who professes a religion different from
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Hinduism shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled

Caste.4 In order to understand why, when the President issued
the order, in 1950, the membership was restricted to the Hindus,
we have to move back into the colonial past and trace the roots
of the category called Scheduled Caste.
The presidential order of 1950 was based on the Government
of India (Scheduled Castes) Order, 19365 which in turn, had
resulted from a follow-up of the Government of India Act,
1935. In the 1935 Act, the classes of persons formerly known as
the depressed classes were designated as the Scheduled
Castes.6 The term depressed classes was used in the colonial
records not to denote poor communities, though many of these
were indeed poor. Its use in the late 19th century was linked to
a debate within the project of the census operations over the
identity of the Hindus. The term was used to classify those
castes, which, despite being called Hindu, were regarded by
other Hindus as impure. In the course of the Census of India,
in 1911, Edward Gait, the Census Commissioner, had issued a
10-point circular to identify those Hindu classes which were
subject to certain disabilities, such as not being served by
Brahmins, being denied access to temples, and being regarded
as polluting (Gait 1913: 117). In the course of the next two decades, the approach of the colonial state towards the depressed
classes underwent a process of gradual secularisation. For instance, instead of investigating these castes merely to know
their status within the Hindu community, the government, in
1931, proposed to collect information about these to address
problems connected with their present and future welfare
(Hutton 1933: 471). Similarly, in place of employing primarily
religious markers associated with the Hindu community, John
Hutton, the Census Commissioner of India, in 1931, issued a
nine-point questionnaire, where he inserted, in addition,
indicators connected with the denial of civic facilities, that is
denial of access to wells or schools (Hutton 1933: 472), in
order to identify the depressed classes. From the point of view
of the State, he added, the important test is the right to use
public conveniencesroads, wells and schools, and if this be
taken as the primary test, religious difficulties and the social
disabilities indirectly involved by them may be regarded as
contributory only (Hutton 1933: 472). Despite the secularisation
of the approach, the connection initially made between the
depressed classes and the Hindu communitysuch castes
being found only among the Hinduswas not altered. Thus,
with regard to the Census of 1931, Hutton stated, It was decided
that Muslims and Christians should be excluded from the term
depressed class (Hutton 1933: 471). Two decades later, in the
first annual report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes for the period ending December 1951,
L M Shrikant (1952: 1011), while referring to Huttons emphasis
on the right to use public conveniences as the test, commented
that the criterion appears to hold good for the purposes of
specifying the Scheduled Castes. But, even when the officers
of the state were acknowledging the right to use public
conveniences, in other words, access to secular resources, as
the indicator, the Presidents order of 1950, chose to identify
the Scheduled Castes only within a religion-based community
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Hindus.7

of the
In fact, even after the two amendments to this
order in 19568 and 1990,9 making the Sikhs and later the Buddhists also eligible to be considered members of a Scheduled
Caste, the assumption about the association of caste with specific religions remained undisturbed.
Legal Premise: Religion the Entry Point

Shaped by historical legacies, the acts dealing with the subject

of reservation for the Scheduled Castes take into account the
religious and caste identity of the person. However, between
the two, religion functions as the entry point; without being a
Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist, one cannot be a member of a Scheduled Caste. According to the acts, then, the presence of caste is
contingent on religion; the Scheduled Castes are assumed to
exist and survive only within and not outside the specified
religious communities.
The circumstances prevailing in society call into question
the assumption about the contingency of caste on religion. For
instance, while the doctrines of Christianity and Islam do not
recognise caste, the presence of such communities among
Christians and Muslims is attested both in academic researches
(Robinson 2014; Ahmad 1973) and the surveys conducted by
the state (Misra 2007). In this article, however, I discuss the
challenge posed to this assumption by the judicial verdicts
delivered in the lawsuits involving those Christian converts
and their descendants whose membership of a Scheduled
Caste was disputed on account of a change in their religion.
These verdicts were delivered by the Supreme Court while
dealing with the following questions: what happens if a member of a community recognised as a Scheduled Caste converts
to Christianity? Does she/he cease to be a member of that
caste with the consequent loss of the benefits of reservation?
And what happens if the same person converts again to Hinduism? Can the person recover her/his membership of that caste?
And what happens in cases where a Christian, after converting
to Hinduism, claims a caste identity that she/he was not even
born with but which was a part of her/his ancestors profile
two generations ago?
At the root of these questions lies the relationship of caste
with religion which the Supreme Court, while deliberating over
these for four decades and more, was drawn into elucidating. In
this elucidation, I identify three stages characterised by three
overlapping yet separable notions of the relationship of caste
with religion. In the first stage, the Court conformed to the
assumption about the presence of caste being contingent on
religion. In the next stage, caste was perceived to be connected
with and yet separable from religion. Finally, in its recent
judgments, the apex court has held caste to be autonomous of
religion; an opinion that actually contradicts the assumption
implicit in the acts relating to the subject of reservation for the
Scheduled Castes. The Courts conception of the relationship
of caste with religion shaped its response to the questions
about the impact of conversion on ones membership of a caste.
I illustrate with the help of a few lawsuits, dating between the
late 1960s and the present, the three stages in the Supreme
Courts understanding of this relationship. However, before I
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move further, I must draw readers attention to a limitation of

this article: while I propose to discuss the question of the
membership of a Scheduled Caste in the wider ambit of judicial deliberations, I have drawn only upon the judgments
delivered by the Supreme Court.
Conversion and the Loss of Caste

Let us begin with the judgment delivered by the Supreme

Court in 1968 in the case of S Rajgopal v C M Armugam and
Others. The background of the case is as follows. In 1967,
Rajgopal and Armugam were rival candidates from the Kolar
Gold Fields constituency in the election for the Mysore
Legislative Assembly. Rajgopal came out victorious. The result
was challenged by Armugam before the Mysore High Court on
the ground that while the constituency was reserved for the
members of the Scheduled Castes, Rajgopal was not one of
them. Rajgopal, Armugam contended, had converted in 1949 to
Christianity and had hence ceased to be an Adi Dravida, the
community in which he was born and which indeed was listed
as a Scheduled Caste. Accepting the arguments of Armugam,
the high court set aside the result of the election.
Challenging the verdict, Rajgopal filed a petition before the
Supreme Court. In the petition he stated that in 1967, at the
time of election, he was professing (S Rajgopal v C M
Armugam 1968: 4) Hinduism; therefore, he contended, he
should be recognised once again as an Adi Dravida. There
were two episodes in the life of Rajgopal the implication of
which the Court had to consider: his initial conversion to
Christianity and his avowal again of Hinduism. Regarding the
first, the two-judge bench of Justices Vishishtha Bhargava and
J C Shah, in its judgment, observed: The Christian religion
does not recognise any caste classifications. Hence, Rajgopal,
after embracing Christianity, had lost the membership of the
Adi Dravida Hindu caste and had ceased to belong to the Adi
Dravida caste. Apropos the second episode, the bench accepted
that at the time of the election, Rajgopal was professing Hinduism.
The situation gave rise to two questions: could reconversion to
Hinduism automatically lead to a recovery of the membership
of ones caste; if not, then, on what grounds would a recovery
be possible? On the first, the judges were undecided:
Ordinarily, the membership of a caste under the Hindu religion is acquired by birth. Whether the membership of a caste can be acquired
by conversion to Hinduism or after reconversion to Hinduism is a
question on which we have refrained from expressing our opinion
(S Rajgopal v C M Armugam 1968: 14).

Nevertheless, they were convinced that mere conversion to

Hinduism [did not] enable a person to revert to his previous
caste. They added that even if it be assumed that such a possibility existed the recovery of the membership of a caste
would ultimately depend on the consent of the community
concerned. Referring to several cases decided by various high
courts, where a similar question was raised in different contexts, they wrote: if the members of the caste accept the reconversion of a person as a member, it should be held that he
does become a member of that caste, even though he may have
lost membership of that caste on conversion to another religion.
40

A caste, they declared, was the supreme judge in matters

concerning its membership. The opinion of a caste, however,
had to be demonstrated with the help of evidence. In the case
of Rajgopal, the judges noted, that he had not given evidenceto establish that he did become a member of Adi Dravida Hindu caste by the time of general elections in 1967.
Hence they concluded that he could not be treated as an Adi
Dravida; the petition filed by him was rejected.
The recognition of a caste as the supreme judge in matters
relating to its membership had a far-reaching impact on judicial
understanding about the nature of caste and its relationship
with religion. The authority now attributed to caste came to
contest the authority of religion on the issue. Irrespective of
what a religion ordained, a persons interaction with her/his
community would henceforth be taken into account by the
judiciary before adjudicating on the issue of membership. In
other words, the implication of an act of conversion to
Christianity or Islam for ones caste could no longer be foretold;
it had to be assessed.
Conversion and the Recovery of Caste

Going by its citations as precedence in legal deliberations, the

lawsuit that I discuss below would rank among the most
important ones on the question of the recovery of caste after
reconversion. It represents perhaps the first instance, in the
context of the debate over the membership of a Scheduled
Caste, when the Supreme Court accepted the claim of a person
of having regained the membership of his caste after converting
back to Hinduism. It heralds a change in judicial thinking on the
relationship of caste with religion. And by a strange coincidence,
the lawsuit involved the same two gentlemen, the old rivals,
whom we have met before: S Rajgopal and C M Arumugam
(only the spelling of the names, as given in this case, differs
slightly). Let us begin with a brief outline of the case.
In the elections to the Mysore Legislative Assembly in 1972,
Rajgopal and Arumugam returned again to the Kolar Gold
Field reserved constituency, as rival candidates. However,
taking note of the objection filed by Arumugam, the returning
officer rejected the nomination papers of Rajgopal on the
ground that after conversion to Christianity he had ceased to
be an Adi Dravida and his reconversion to Hinduism did not
entitle him to claim the benefits meant only for the members
of the Scheduled Castes. In the election, which Rajgopal could
not contest, Arumugam came out victorious. Rajgopal challenged the outcome of the election before the Mysore High
Court stating that he was an Adi Dravida and that his nomination papers were improperly rejected. The high court in its
decision of July 1973 set aside the outcome of the election observing that at the time of election Rajgopal was indeed an Adi
Dravida, and that his nomination papers had been wrongly rejected. Contesting the decision of the high court, Arumugam
filed a petition before the Supreme Court; Rajgopal appeared
as the first respondent in the case.10
Before commenting specifically on the issue of Rajgopals
membership of the Adi Dravida caste, the bench of the Supreme
Court comprising Justices P N Bhagwati, Y V Chandrachud
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and Ranjit Singh Sarkaria disposed of two big questions. These

questions were, first, whether it was possible to recover, after
reconversion to Hinduism, the membership of ones caste; second, on what grounds that recovery would be possible. Shedding off the hesitation shown by the judges in the previous
case, the bench, now, answered the first question firmly in the
affirmative. It observed that the high courts in various instances
had held that on reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once
again become a member of the caste in which he was born and
to which he belonged before conversion to another religion
(G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal 1975: 15). Explaining the rationale behind this view, it elaborated:
A person, in the judicial reckoning, thus could recover the membership of a caste; the question however remained who had the authority
to grant that membership, whose opinion would count on the issue.

Confirming the views expressed in the previous case, the

bench led by Justice Bhagwati declared that the issue of
membership fell within the jurisdiction of the caste concerned:
a person would be deemed a member only if the other
members of the caste are prepared to readmit him.
The Courts response to the two questions underlines a
fundamental shift in its approach to the subject of caste. In the
previous case discussed above, Justice Bhargava and Justice
Shah had opined that a person on conversion to Christianity
would lose her or his caste as this religion did not recognise
that institution. They had viewed caste from the standpoint of
the scriptures of Christianity; the presence of caste therefore
was deemed to be contingent on religion. Their opinion thus
was in conformity with the conception of the depressed classes
or the Scheduled Castes in the state policies in colonial and
postcolonial India. And yet now the apex court decided to
leave the question of membership exclusively in the hands of
the caste concerned. How did the judiciary justify its choice of
going by the collective opinion of a caste in place of religious
injunctions? It did so by declaring that caste was a social
institution and thus not subject to scriptural sanctions. Justice
Bhagwati, heading the bench, observed that a caste was a
social combination of persons governed by its rules and
regulations (G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal 1975: 14). It had the
prerogative to admit a new member or expel an existing one
as per its rules. These rules, he added, might not be formalised
and might consist only of practices and usages. The focus of
the judiciary thus started moving away from religious texts to
caste practices. The shift becomes clearer if we look into what
the bench wrote about caste.
When we speak of a caste, the bench observed distancing
itself from a textual notion of this institution, we do not
mean to refer to the four primary castes (Brahman, Kshatriya,
Vaishya and Shudra, first mentioned in early Sanskrit texts).
Rather, the word was used to denote those multiple castes
and sub-castes which are found in society. These castes and
sub-castes, the bench elaborated, were formed on various
grounds: religion was not the only factor; occupation, migration, etc, also played an important role in its formation. In fact,
a caste was more a social combination than a religious group.
Religion, though, the judges clarified, was not absent from the
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life of a caste. A castes sense of ethics and morality was

derived from religion. In this manner, religion was inevitably
mixed up with social conduct; and that is why caste has
become an integral feature of Hindu society. Caste, as interpreted by the bench, thus, was primarily a social combination;
Hinduism became linked with caste as the source of ethical
values. Conceived in this manner, caste became an entity
separable from religion; the new conception brought significant
change in the apex courts understanding of the consequence
of conversion. For one thing, it was now convinced that a
change of religion could not invariably lead to a loss of caste.
Caste Separable from Religion

The general rule, the bench acknowledged, was that conversion operates as an expulsion from the caste or, in other words,
the convert ceases to have any caste because caste is predominantly a feature of Hindu society (G M Arumugam v
S Rajgopal 1975: 10). Yet, the bench interjected, the issue could
not be decided on the basis of scriptural provisions. For, ultimately it must depend on the structure of the caste and its
rules and regulations whether a person would cease to belong
to the caste on his abjuring Hinduism (G M Arumugam v
S Rajgopal 1975: 10). In such cases where the structure of the
caste is such that its members must necessarily belong to
Hindu religion, a member who ceases to be a Hindu, would go
out of the caste (G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal 1975: 10). But,
then, there were also castes, the bench pointed out, particularly
in South India, which comprise both Hindus and Christians.
And conversion of a Hindu to Christianity, when it takes place
within such a community, would not entail any loss of
membership. In addition, the bench referred to such instances
where the cohesion of caste as a social group is so strong that
conversion into another religion does not operate to snap the
bond between the convert and the social group. These
instances, where even after conversion to Christianity, a
person is regarded [by other members] as continuing to belong
to the caste, were taken note of by different courts of law and
were indeed not an infrequent phenomenon in South India
(G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal 1975: 11). These instances
testified, the bench declared, that conversion leading to a loss
of caste could not be an invariable rule: It cannot, therefore,
be laid down as an absolute rule uniformly applicable in all
cases that whenever a member of a caste is converted from
Hinduism to Christianity, he loses his membership of the caste.
Rather, the prospect of losing or retaining the membership of
ones caste following conversion, it concluded, would depend
on the opinion of the other members of that community.
Having declared that the decision about membership rested
with the caste concerned, the bench, in the final part of the
judgment, moved to assess whether the Adi Dravidas treated
Rajgopal as one of their own or not. Rajgopal, whose reconversion to Hinduism had already been acknowledged by the apex
court in the earlier case, had submitted a number of evidences
to corroborate his claim of membership of the Adi Dravida
caste. From these, the bench selected 12 evidences to examine
and accepted the following seven as authentic indicators
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supporting Rajgopals claim: (1) Rajgopal was invited to lay

down the foundation stone for the construction of a wall of an
Adi Dravida temple. (2) He was asked to take part in the
celebrations connected with an Adi Dravida temple. (3) He
was requested to preside at a festival connected with an Adi
Dravida temple. (4) He was a member of the executive committee of the Scheduled Caste cell within the Congress Party.
(5) His children were registered in the school as Adi Dravidas.
(6) He was treated as a member of the Adi Dravida and was
never disowned by the members of the caste. (7) A Scheduled
Caste conference was held where a purificatory ceremony was
performed with a view to clearing the doubt about his membership of the Adi Dravida caste.11 On the basis of these evidences, the bench concluded that Rajgopal, after his
reconversion to Hinduism, was indeed recognised and accepted
as a member of the Adi Dravida caste by the other members of
that community. The appeal filed by Arumugam against the
decision of the Mysore High Court was thus dismissed.
The recognition of caste in judicial deliberations as primarily
a social institution allowed it to be separated from religion and
thereby shielded from any inevitable impact of conversion. As
a social institution, which was connected but not subjected to
religious canons, it came to enjoy a degree of autonomy attributed to it never before. It was recognised as the supreme judge
having the ultimate authority to decide questions regarding its
membership. The assumption regarding the autonomy of caste
however brought new questions before the judiciary. If a caste
was free to admit or expel any person, then, what would be the
role of birth in deciding its membership? Could a caste give
membership to someone who was not even born within its
fold? The answer to the questions would have a bearing on the
understanding of caste and its relationship with religion in
judicial deliberations. Let us move to the next lawsuit to find
out how the apex court responded to these questions.
The question whether a person could get the membership of a
caste when she/he was not even born within its fold came up in
the context of a lawsuit brought before the Supreme Court in 1975.
This was a petition by the principal of Guntur Medical College,
against Y Mohan Rao. Mohan Rao was born after his parents
had converted to Christianity. Before conversion, they belonged
to the Madiga community, a Scheduled Caste in Andhra Pradesh.
Could Mohan Rao, after converting to Hinduism, which he had
done in 1973, become a Madiga and avail the benefit of reservation meant for the members of the Scheduled Castes?
Justice P N Bhagwati, who had led the bench in the case of
G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal (1975), was once again heading
the five-judge bench dealing with the present lawsuit; hence,
the imprint of the earlier judgment was amply visible on the
deliberations taking place now. Reiterating the view expressed
in the previous case, the bench, on the question of the recovery
of membership of a caste, observed that
the consistent view taken in this country since 1886 was that on reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again become a member
of the caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before
conversion to another religion, if the members of the caste accept him
as a member (Principal, Guntur Medical College, Guntur v Y Mohan
Rao 1976: 6).

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The case of Mohan Rao, however, was a little different. Mohan

Rao was born a Christian. Hence, despite the fact that his parents were Madigas before conversion, it could be argued that
he was neither born in nor did he belong to the Madiga community.12 This leads us to a crucial question: can one regain
what one has never lost, or recover what was never ones own?
Mohan Rao had not lost the Madiga identity; it was never his.
Could he then reclaim it? These implications of the case never
figured in the deliberations of the bench. Why did the bench
fail to take note of these complexities? Or, is it that to the judges, these complexities did not appear to be relevant? I suspect
the latter to be the case.
As evident from the deliberations that took place in the case
of G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal (1975) discussed above, the emphasis placed on the autonomy of caste had diluted, in judicial
perception, the significance of birth in deciding the membership of such a community. The bench in that case had approvingly quoted several legal luminaries observing that it could
not be said that the membership of a caste was determined only
by birth and not by anything else (G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal
1975: 14); that, it was within the power of a caste to admit into
its fold men not born in it as it is within the power of a club to
admit anyone it likes as its member; and that, not recognising
this power of caste would tantamount to striking at the very
root of caste autonomy (G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal 1975:
1415). The principle of the autonomy of caste was applied,
perhaps even more strongly, in the case of Mohan Rao. The
reasoning that had guided the judges in G M Arumugam v S
Rajgopal (1975), the bench contended, was equally applicable
in a case where the parents of a person are converted from
Hinduism to Christianity and he is born after their conversion
(Principal, Guntur Medical College, Guntur v Y Mohan Rao
1976: 6). Mohan Rao, though not born a Madiga, could still
become one, the bench concluded, if the members of the caste
to which the parents belonged prior to their conversion accept
him as a member within the fold.
The stance adopted by the bench led to an awkward
problem. Despite all the pronouncements that a caste was like
a club and that it had its own rules, regulations and autonomy,
the apex court would not like to be seen to be postulating that
any person could become, provided the concerned community
consented, an Adi Dravida or a Madiga. Conferring membership could not be an act of free will by the caste concerned. An
explanation was needed to justify how a person could still
recover the membership of a caste that was lost by the parents
due to their conversion to Christianity. In the two lawsuits that
I discuss below, we find the judges bringing back the issue of
birth to explain the autonomy of a caste. While this explanation
acted as a check on autonomy, it simultaneously made caste
more autonomous vis--vis religion.
Conversion and the Continuity of Caste

In December 1983, two separate benches of the Supreme Court

delivered judgments in two similar cases called S Anbalagan v
B Devarajan and Ors and Kailash Sonkar v Maya Devi. In both
cases, the appellants challenged the eligibility of Devarajan
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and Maya Devi to contest election from constituencies that

were reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes. The
appellants in their respective pleas had claimed that the parents of these candidates were Christians; that the candidates
themselves were Christians and hence they could not be members of the Scheduled Castes. The judges, while dismissing the
appeals of Anbalagan and Kailash Sonkar, observed that the
candidates, even if they were Christians in the early part of
their lives, had since become Hindus and were accepted as
members by the castes to which their parents had once belonged. Hence, Devarajan and Maya Devi, they concluded,
should indeed be recognised as members of the Scheduled
Castes. Rather than the final outcome, we are concerned here
with the observations made in the judgments on the status of
caste amidst acts of conversion and reconversion.
In this article, we have so far encountered two situations in
which claims over membership of a caste were made. In the
first, represented by the case of Rajgopal, we find the same
person, who had seemingly lost the membership of his caste
earlier due to conversion to Christianity, now trying to recover
it following his reconversion to Hinduism. In the second situation, illustrated by the lawsuits involving Mohan Rao, Devarajan
and Maya Devi, the children, the descendants from the next
generation were trying after becoming Hindus to recover the
membership of castes which their parents had seemingly lost
following their conversion to Christianity. However, in the two
verdicts, delivered in December 1983 no distinction was sought
to be made between the two situations. Thus, the bench headed
by Justice Chinnappa O Reddy did not see the necessity of
applying any different principle (S Anbalagan v B Devarajan
1983: 7) in the lawsuit it was dealing with than the one applied
in the case of G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal (1975). Yet, the
status of Rajgopal was not the same as that of Mohan Rao,
Devarajan or Maya Devi. Rajgopal was initially an Adi Dravida,
who apparently lost the membership of his caste following
conversion, and was trying to reclaim after reconversion what
was once his. Mohan Rao or Maya Devi had never lost their
memberships of any caste; they were never a Madiga or a
Katiya, having been born Christians. Therefore, how could
they recover the membership of a caste when they had never
lost one in the first place? This would be fine only if it could be
assumed that the parents of Mohan Rao and Maya Devi had
continued to be Madigas and Katiyas after becoming Christians,
that caste was not lost despite conversion, and that it could
therefore be bequeathed to the next generation. This precisely
was the explanation that the apex court now offered to justify
its verdict in favour of those who claimed the membership of a
caste they were not born in.
Commenting on the question of recovery of the membership
of a caste by a person following his reconversion to Hinduism,
Justice Chinnappa Reddy wrote that
it may not be correct to say that he [after reconversion to Hinduism]
regains his caste; it may be more accurate to say that he never lost
his caste in the first instance when he embraced another religion. The
practice of caste...is so deep-rooted...that its mark does not seem to
disappear. The mark of caste does not seem to really disappear even
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after some generations after conversion (S Anbalagan v B Devarajan

1983: 6).

In Andhra Pradesh and in Tamil Nadu, he elaborated,

there areChristian Reddies, Christian Kammas, Christian Nadars,
Christian Adi Andhras, Christian Adi Dravidas and so on. The practice
of their caste is so rigorous that there are intermarriages with Hindus
of the same caste but not with Christians of another caste (S Anbalagan vs B Devarajan 1983: 67).

Doctrine of Eclipse

The belief that the membership of a caste continues unremitted

by an act of conversion was reiterated again in the judgment
delivered in the case of Kailash Sonkar v Maya Devi (1983). Thus,
Justice Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali, heading the bench, observed:
In our opinion, when a person is converted to Christianity or
some other religion the original caste remains under eclipse
and as soon as during his/her lifetime the person is reconverted to the original religion the eclipse disappears.
Thus, amidst acts of conversionfrom Hinduism to Christianitythe caste of the converts in the opinion of the judges as
expressed in the preceding two cases was not lost; at the most,
it was eclipsed. The change of religion thus seemed to have no
impact on caste; it continued independent of its immediate
religious environment. This, then, justified in the eyes of the
apex court the claim made over Christian converts castes by
their children. Yet, the Court was now faced with a new
question: for how many generations could caste continue to
survive in a non-Hindu environment? The dilemma is evident
in the thoughts of Justice Ali when he was writing about the
doctrine of eclipse. We might pause here to add a rider, he
wrote; if the ancestor, whose caste identity a descendant might
be claiming, had been converted to Christianity since several
generations, it may be difficult to apply the doctrine of eclipse
to the revival of caste (Kailash Sonkar v Smt Maya Devi 1983:
14). The apex court had accepted that the children of the
Christian converts could lay a claim to their parents castes.
However, instead of the children, could even the second or the
third generation of descendants make this claim? Could the
descendants of the converts from any generation make this
claim? The answer would specify how long caste could survive
unaffected by religious changes brought by conversion; in
other words, it would explain how autonomous of religion the
caste had become in judicial perception. In order to know the
answer, we move to the analysis of the case with which this
article started, the one on which the Supreme Court delivered
its judgment on 26 February 2015.
In February 1984, one K P John, hailing from Kerala,
converted to Hinduism; he secured a certificate in which he
was called K P Manu, belonging to the Hindu Pulayan caste
(K P Manu v Chairman, Scrutiny Committee 2015: 35). Many
years earlier, Manus grandfather, belonging to the local Pulaya
community, had embraced Christianity. Manus parents were
Christians, as Manu himself was for the first 24 years of his life,
till he chose to become a Hindu. The caste certificate of Manu
was challenged before the scrutiny committee constituted under
the Kerala (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation
of Issue of Community Certificates Act 1996. After an inquiry,
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in February 2006 the committee decided to cancel Manus certificate. Following this decision the state government removed
Manu from service in the Malabar Cement Company. Manu
had secured the job in the company under the benefit of reservation; he had claimed to be a Pulaya, which is a Scheduled
Caste in Kerala. The order of removal from service and the
findings of the scrutiny committee were challenged by Manu
before the Kerala High Court. In March 2006, the Kerala High
Court upheld the findings of the scrutiny committee; by
implication, the order of removal of Manu from service was
also allowed. Challenging the verdict of the Kerala High Court,
Manu filed an appeal before the Supreme Court in 2008.
It was taken up by the bench of Justices Dipak Misra and
V Gopala Gowda. The question was whether Manus claim to
be a Pulaya was valid or not. Certain precedents relevant to
the case had already emerged through judgments in similar
lawsuits earlier. For instance, it was already accepted in the
lawsuits involving Mohan Rao (1976), Devarajan (1983) and
Maya Devi (1983) that the children, after fulfilling other
conditions, that is, after becoming a Hindu and securing the
consent of the community concerned, could lay a claim to the
caste identity that belonged to their parents before their
conversion to Christianity. Manus situation, however, was
different in one critical respect. His parents as the Kerala High
Court stated in its verdict did not enjoy the caste status of
Pulayan (K P Manu v Chairman, Scrutiny Committee 2015: 37),
born Christians as they were. The point was made with greater
clarity by the scrutiny committee in its report: Ordinarily one
gets his/her caste on the basis of his/her parents. In other
words, one shall be, on birth deemed to be belonging to the
caste of his/her parents. In the facts and circumstances of the
claimants case, the claimant and his parents were devoid of
any caste identity right from their birth. Manu, thus, could
not inherit his parents caste. However, could he stake a claim
to the Pulaya identity that belonged to his grandfather before
his conversion to Christianity? The implicit question was
whether the Pulaya caste identity had continued to survive
through roughly two generations (grandfathers after conversion and fathers) in a non-Hindu environment which alone
could allow its reclamation by the grandson.
Caste across Generations

The bench began deliberating the question by submitting that

if a son could inherit the caste which his parents belonged to
before their conversion to Christianity, then, there cannot be
a soundness of logic in not allowing him to inherit the caste of
his grandparents. The fact that Manu was born to the parents
who were Christians should not come in the way simply because, the bench claimed, they too must have belonged to that
caste. The judges were aware that while making these observations, they were accepting the premise that caste could survive
through generations even in a non-Hindu environment. They
cited both the outcomes in the earlier lawsuits as well as academic researches on the subject to support their interpretation.
They wrote that in the case of Principal, Guntur Medical College,
Guntur v Y Mohan Rao (1976), the bench, when allowing the
44

recovery of caste by the son, did not lay down that the example would apply only to parents and exclude grandparents. Similarly, in the case of S Anbalagan v B Devarajan
(1983), the bench had argued that even after conversion, the
caste of the convert did not disappear; rather, it continued
generation by generation. Justices Misra and Gowda said that
in addition, the evidences from society collected in a number
of scholarly researches indicated a similar continuity.
After asserting that as in the case of the son, the grandson or
for that matter descendant coming from any generation could
not be debarred from claiming the caste identity of the ancestor who might have converted and moved out of Hinduism, the
bench laid down three conditions for the acceptance of such a
claim. Of these, the apex court had already discussed, in previous cases, the following two: first, the conversion of the claimant to Hinduism; second, the consent of the caste concerned.
Justices Misra and Gowda added a third condition keeping in
mind that there could be a gap of many years if a descendant
from any generation was allowed to make such a plea. They
specified that an applicant must provide evidences to establish beyond a shadow of doubt that his forefathers belonged
to the caste that was being claimed. Manu, in the opinion of
the court, fulfilled all the three conditions: he had become a
Hindu, he had submitted a caste certificate as the evidence of
consent of the community concerned,13 and, his claim that his
grandfather belonged to the Pulaya community before conversion was not disputed. Hence, the bench accepted, in February
2015, the plea of Manu to be a Pulaya.
There are a few aspects of the judgment that can be taken
up for scrutiny. First, the bench assumed that Manus parents
must have belonged to the Pulaya caste. But how could they
do so when they had never converted to Hinduism and thus,
at least judicially, had never fulfilled one of the conditions
for claiming their ancestors caste? Second, in the text of
the judgment, Manus adoption of Hinduism is often directly
and also indirectly referred to as an act of reconversion.
Manu, however, was born a Christian and had never changed
his religion before becoming a Hindu. His movement from
Christianity to Hinduism, therefore, was logically an act of
conversion, not reconversion.
The purpose of the scrutiny here is not to question the validity
of the verdict; rather, it is to understand how the verdict was
reached. The stance of the judges on both the issues, I believe,
was shaped by their acceptance of the idea that caste survived
across generations even in a non-Hindu environment. Hence,
when they wrote about the caste of Manus parents, they assumed
that it existed irrespective of their religious status. The same
explanation applies to the use of the word reconversion. The
term reconversion carries within it a link to the past; implicit
in it is a reference to the event of conversion that might have taken
place at some point of time. Reconversion, like renaissance in
history, can provide the rationale for reclaiming the past. The
use of the word reconversion for Manus one-time act of changing
his religion thus reconfirms the emergence, in judicial deliberations, of the view that the movement of a person out of Hinduism because of conversion does not lead to any loss of caste;
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that, caste survives across generations independent of changes

in religion; and that, it can therefore be reclaimed.
Caste, Conversion and Judicial Inconsistency

The final case that I take up for analysis in this article is Soosai
v Union of India which was brought before the Supreme Court
in 1983. The case is controversial for having a negative bearing on
the demand of Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims to be recognised as Scheduled Castes. In the pages below, though, I examine
it to illustrate an inconsistency in the stance of the apex court
on the issue of conversion and its implication for caste.
In 1982, the Tamil Nadu government initiated a scheme to allot
bunks free of cost to cobblers, who are members of communities
classified as Scheduled Castes. The order however debarred
those cobblers from free allotment who had converted to Christianity. Challenging the order of the Tamil Nadu government,
one Soosai, a cobbler, filed a petition which went before a bench
headed by Justice R S Pathak. Soosai was born an Adi Dravida;
his community was listed as Scheduled Caste in Tamil Nadu.
Later in his life, he became a Christian through conversion. In
the petition Soosai asserted that despite conversion he continued
to be a member of his caste and hence he could not be denied the
benefits extended to other Scheduled Caste persons.
The bench, in its judgment, delivered in 1985, did not agree
with Soosai. It held that as a Christian, Soosai was barred
(Soosai v Union of India 1985: 5) by paragraph 3 of The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 from being regarded
as a member of a Scheduled Caste. Whether Soosais caste
identity had continued or not after conversion to Christianity
was a point that the bench did not deem relevant for the case.
For, it argued that in order to claim the benefits of reservation, it
was not sufficient to show that the same caste continues after
conversion. What must be shown further was that the disabilities and the handicapscontinue in their oppressive severity
in the new environment of a different religious community.
Elaborating the point, the bench wrote that paragraph 3 of
the Presidents order was not inserted arbitrarily; that, the
Hindu and the Sikh Scheduled Castes (the Sikhs had been
made eligible by now through the amendment of 1956) suffered from exceptional disabilities. However, the bench noted, no authoritative and detailed study dealing with the present conditions of Christian society have been place on the
record by the petitioner to show that the Christians suffered
from similar disabilities. His petition was therefore rejected.
The main question that Soosai had raised in his lawsuit
and which the judges themselves had noted was whether or
not a Hindu belonging to the Adi-Dravida caste could, following conversion to Christianity, continue to be a member of
that caste. However, instead of providing an answer, the
judges tried to sidestep the issue. First, they thought it unnecessary to enter upon that question; and even when they
agreed to assume, for the purposes of this case, that the caste
is retained on conversion, they immediately added that the
real question was not the continuation of caste but the
extent of disabilities suffered by the Christians vis--vis the
Hindu and the Sikh Scheduled Castes.
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The approach was inconsistent with the prevailing judicial

understanding on the subject. The discrepancy can be
illustrated if we compare the present verdict with that given by
the Supreme Court two years earlier in 1983 in the case of
S Anbalagan v B Devarajan & Ors (also that of Kailash Sonkar v
Maya Devi). Devarajan was born a Christian; his parents were
Adi Dravidas before they embraced Christianity (S Anbalagan
v B Devarajan & Ors 1983: 2). Subsequently, following his
conversion to Hinduism, Devarajan declared himself to be an
Adi Dravida, staking a claim on the caste identity of his parents
before they became Christians. The apex court accepted his
claim to be an Adi Dravida and confirmed his election from a
constituency reserved for the members of Scheduled Castes to
be valid on the ground that a persons caste, despite her/his
conversion to a non-Hindu religion, was not lost and thus
could be reclaimed. In contrast, in the case of Soosai who unlike
Devarajan was born an Adi Dravida, the judges, at the most,
were only willing to assume that his caste identity had continued to survive after his conversion to Christianity.
Devarajan could become an Adi Dravida; Soosai only assumedly continued to be so. What accounts for this inconsistency in judicial pronouncements? I believe the explanation is to
be found in paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
Order, 1950. An unqualified acknowledgement of the continuation, after conversion, of Soosais caste identity would have
created a legally anomalous situation. As an Adi Dravida he
would be eligible for what as a Christian he could not get.
Hence, the judges, while not completely disregarding the judicial precedence existing on the subject, assumed the continuation of the Adi Dravida identity of Soosai; at the same time,
however, they rendered the criterion of caste itself irrelevant
by linking, in the case of the Christians, the benefits earmarked for the Scheduled Castes with the quantum of deprivation.
The acts relating to the subject of reservation for the Scheduled Castes, The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950
and the two amendments brought in this order in 1956 and
1990 posit a direct correlation between religion and caste.
Only a Hindu, Sikh or a Buddhist, according to these acts, can
be a member of a Scheduled Caste; caste thus is assumed to
exist and survive only within the specified religious communities. The assumption has been a source of litigations often involving those Christian converts and their descendants whose
membership of a Scheduled Caste was disputed on account of a
change in their religion. When adjudicating on such a dispute,
in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court had upheld the assumption that the presence of caste was contingent on religion.
Viewing the institution from the standpoint of scriptures, it
concluded that caste did not exist within Christianity. Hence,
in the case of S Rajgopal v C M Armugam (1968), it declared
that conversion to Christianity would lead to a loss of membership of caste for the convert.
The Supreme Courts understanding of the relationship of
caste with religion, in the subsequent decades, witnessed
major shifts. The shifts started when the apex court was
asked whether a Christian convert could, following reconversion to Hinduism, recover the membership of her/his caste.
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After accepting the possibility of recovery, the Court had

to specify who had the jurisdiction over the question of
membership and whose opinion would count on the issue.
It came to the conclusion that whether a person was a
member or not could be decided only by the caste concerned.
The question of loss or recovery of membership following
conversion or reconversion would henceforth be settled not
with reference to religious scriptures but, as illustrated in
G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal (1975) the opinion of the concerned caste. A process of distancing of caste from religion
and its reconceptualisation as a social institution thus started
in judicial thinking.
Keeping Caste within Hinduism?

The recognition of a caste as the supreme judge in matters of

membership shifted the gaze of the Court, when arbitrating on
the impact of conversion on the caste status of a convert, from
religious texts and scriptures to community traditions and
practices as followed in society. It thus took note of the fact
that within the caste of the Reddys, there are both Hindu as
well as Christian members; the same was the case with the
Kammas, the Nadars, the Adi Andhras, the Adi Dravidas, etc.
Evidently, the presence of caste was not restricted to the
Hindus; it existed and survived even in the midst of those
communities whose religious doctrines rejected such an
institution. The influence of this new understanding was
reflected in recent judgments of the apex court when it adjudicated on the pleas of those descendants who were trying to
recover the membership of castes which their ancestors had
seemingly lost following their conversion to Christianity. In its
verdict in S Anbalagan v B Devarajan & Ors (1983), Kailash
Sonkar v Smt Maya Devi (1983) and K P Manu v Chairman,
Scrutiny Committee (2015), the Court declared that conversion
to Christianity did not lead to any loss of caste for the converts;
that, caste continued even in a non-Hindu environment; and
hence, it could be reclaimed by the descendants of the
Christian converts after fulfilling certain conditions.
The recent judgments of the Supreme Court contradict the
assumption implicit in the acts relating to the subject of
reservation for the Scheduled Castes. The acts submit that
caste exists only within the specified religions. The verdicts of
the Court, in contrast, affirm that caste remains unaffected by
a change of religion and thus its presence is not contingent on
religion. The situation has generated a fundamental discrepancy
in the context of the policy of reservation for the Scheduled
Castes. According to the acts, no person who is not a Hindu,
Sikh or Buddhist can be a member of a Scheduled Caste. Yet,
the apex court, in its recent judgments implied that the ancestors of Devarajan, Maya Devi and K P Manu, even after their
conversion to Christianity, remained members of Adi Dravida,
Katia and Pulaya castes. The Adi Dravida, Katia, Pulaya are
listed as Scheduled Castes in their respective provinces. The
question, then, is on what grounds the benefit of reservation,
extended to other Adi Dravidas, Katias and Pulayas can be
denied to those Christian converts who continue to be members
of these castes?
46

It is necessary, at this juncture, to revisit the verdict in

Soosai v Union of India (1985). As mentioned earlier, Soosai,
despite converting to Christianity, had claimed to be an Adi
Dravida and had thereby asserted his eligibility to receive the
benefits meant for the Scheduled Castes. Rejecting his claim,
the bench had argued that even if it was assumed that his
membership of the Adi Dravida was retained on conversion
(Soosai v Union of India 1985: 6), this would not entitle him to
get the benefits of reservation. For, what was required was to
demonstrate that as Christians, the converts suffered from
similar disabilities and handicaps as they did when under
Hinduism (Soosai v Union of India 1985: 7). What were the
handicaps suffered by a Hindu Scheduled Caste? Elucidating
these, the bench wavered between the unique and the general.
Thus, the judges explained that caste was a social phenomenon peculiar to Hindu society; within this social structure,
those who occupied the lowest rung were not even considered touchable (Soosai v Union of India 1985: 6). This social
attitude, and here the elucidation takes a general turn, subjected the lowest castes to severe social and economic disabilities and cultural and educational backwardness (Soosai v
Union of India 1985: 6). Let us examine the two types of disabilities, put forward by the bench, which would decide ones
eligibility to receive the benefits of reservation earmarked for
the Scheduled Castes.
The bench had justified its verdict in the case of Soosai by
first arguing that since the ideology of purity and pollution
operates only within Hinduism, its victims, the so-called
untouchables or the Scheduled Castes, could exist only within
the Hindu community. However, if only the victims of the
ideology of purity and pollution are to be identified as the
Scheduled Castes, then, on what grounds the Sikhs and the
Buddhists could be eligible for the membership of such
communities? After all, neither Sikhism nor Buddhism subscribes to that ideology or sanctifies untouchability. This
brings us to the second set of disabilities. The question that the
bench asked, counterpoising the Hindu members and the
Christian converts of a Scheduled Caste, was whether the
latter suffer from a comparable depth of social and economic
disabilities and cultural and educational backwardness
(Soosai v Union of India 1985: 7)?
The judicial deliberations and the surveys sponsored by the
state provide some answer to this question. In its verdict in
K P Manu v Chairman, Scrutiny Committee (2015), the bench
wrote: the Scheduled Castes persons belonging to Hindu
religion, who had embraced Christianity with some kind of
hope or aspiration, have remained socially, educationally and
economically backward (K P Manu v Chairman, Scrutiny
Committee 2015: 30). Similarly, Justice Rangnath Misra, Chairperson of the National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities, set up by the GoI, mentioned in his report:
The position of persons of Scheduled Castes origin converted
to Christianity remains the same as beforeThey continue
to be both poor and socially and educationally backward
(Misra 2007: 140). Finally, in a related observation, Satish
Deshpande, in a report prepared in 2008 for the National
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Commission for Minorities, GoI, pointed out that the Dalit

Muslims were unquestionably the worst off among all Dalits
(Deshpande 2008: ix).
What is significant here, however, is not so much that as per
the criteria of socio-economic, cultural and educational backwardness, the Christian converts from the Scheduled Castes
seem to fare as badly as their Hindu counterparts. The significant point is the choice of the criteria itself. It indicates that
notwithstanding their religious affiliation, the Scheduled
Castes, in the opinion of the bench in the case of Soosai v Union
of India (1985), would be identified on the basis of secular disabilities they suffer from. The situation illustrates the conflict
between judicial deliberations and the acts relating to the subject of reservation for the Scheduled Castes in its totality. The
recent judgments of the Supreme Court when read together
with the verdict in the case of Soosai v Union of India (1985)
seem to suggest that caste is not specific to any religious
community and exists independently; hence, socio-economic,
cultural and educational backwardness should be used as
the markers to identify the Scheduled Castes. The acts, on
the other hand, imply that caste survives only within the
specified religious communities and therefore religion must
be the entry point for any process aimed at selecting the
Scheduled Castes.
I should add here that apart from conflicting with recent
judicial opinions the provision in the acts, which privileges
certain religious identities when specifying communities in
the category of the Scheduled Castes, is also at variance with
the practice of the officers of the state on the ground. I have
traced above the emergence, since the 1930s, of a trend within
the operations of the colonial state wherein the emphasis
gradually started shifting onto secular markers to identify the
Scheduled Castes. The trend continues in independent India
where the officers of the state, when writing about the disabilities suffered by the Scheduled Castes have, instead of referring
to the denial of access to temples, Sanskrit scriptures or the
services of Brahmins, underlined other denials: denial of
access to schools, roads, wells, jobs, etc. Even when they
refer to the practice of untouchability in their reports, they
record its incidence not in the performance of rituals but in
the refusal to allow certain communities from sharing public
goods. However, a lack of access to public goods is experienced not only by castes among the Hindus, Sikhs or Buddhists
but also those from other religious communities. The situation once again questions the assumption implicit in the
acts that Scheduled Castes exist only among the specified
religious groups.
By insisting that Scheduled Castes exist only among the
specified religious groups, the acts, in fact, have implicated
the judicial and administrative apparatuses in a process that
turns religion into a tool of manipulation. Let me illustrate
the situation by going back to the lawsuit of Principal, Guntur
Medical College, Guntur v Y Mohan Rao (1976). Mohan Rao,
born of parents who were Madigas before conversion to
Christianity, had applied for admission in the medical college
of Guntur, the first time as a member of a backward class
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(Principal, Guntur Medical College, Guntur v Y Mohan Rao

1976: 3). The Madigas who convert to Christianity are not
recognised in Andhra Pradesh as Scheduled Caste persons;
they are treated as belonging to backward class (Principal,
Guntur Medical College, Guntur v Y Mohan Rao 1976: 3).
Mohan Rao failed to get admission. Thereupon, the same
year, he converted to Hinduism, claimed the Scheduled Caste
status, reapplied and was admitted. If Mohan Raos conversion to Hinduism does not seem to be inspired by a change
in his religious convictions, he is not to be blamed. Rather,
we should ask, when religious disabilities suffered by the
Scheduled Castes are not even considered relevant enough to
be mentioned in the surveys of the state or proceedings of the
judiciary, when their disabilities are actually measured in
secular terms, and when the provisions of reservation are
also aimed at bringing secular improvements in their lives,
then, what role religion could have in the process of selection
of these communities?
Conclusions

Before I conclude, let me add that these lawsuits, apart from

helping us reflect on the acts dealing with the subject of
reservation for the Scheduled Castes, also tell us something
about the contemporary Indian society as well as the academic understanding of caste. Certain impression about the social
situation can be formed if we remember that almost all of
these lawsuits had their origin in the southern states of India;
these involved mostly men and not women from Scheduled
Castes; all those who chose to become a Hindu in order to
claim the Scheduled Caste status were erstwhile Christian
converts or their descendants, not one instance of a Muslim
following the route appears in these lawsuits; finally, the
act of becoming a Hindu by these Christian converts, an act
seemingly representing a spiritual choice, was actually followed by them engaging in material pursuits: admission in
educational institutions, jobs in state enterprises, participation in elections.
The lawsuits on the question of membership of a Scheduled
Caste also push us to think afresh about the relationship
bet ween caste and religion. The assumption of caste being
an entity specific to Hinduism, which shaped the concept
of depressed classes in colonial India and is implicit in
the category of Scheduled Castes in independent India, is
widely shared in contemporary academic writings and
beyond. Whether it is a project of tracing the origin of caste
from the Purusha Sukta of Rig Veda, or that of proposing its
annihilation through the delegitimisation and disfiguration
of Manusmriti, Hinduism has been central to the institution
of caste. And yet, these lawsuits indicate that caste has been
existing even amongst the non-Hindu communities; that, it
has been thriving even in those environments where religious canons rather than endorsing it were unequivocal in
its rejection. Evidently, there is a need to rethink the relationship between caste and religion, which, I believe, is
not possible without rethinking the concept of caste itself
(Samarendra 2014).
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notes
1

6
7

10

11

12

13

48

http://www.firstpost.com/india/sc-ruling-onreconversion-its-a-stamp-of-approval-for-gharwapsi-says-vhp-2126461.html, accessed on 1
March 2015.
At present, 15% of the seats in direct recruitment are reserved for the Scheduled Castes.
After the attainment of independence, the
Government of India, in its order dated 21 September 1947, had fixed this quantum at 12.5%,
see, http://ncsc.nic.in/files/ncsc/new6/264.pdf,
p 141, accessed on 13 March 2015.
The Scheduled Castes are communities which
suffer from various deprivations; many scholars
attribute these deprivations to their low status
in the traditional Hindu caste hierarchy or the
state of untouchability (Galanter 1984: 121;
also, Dushkin 1967: 627; Jodhka 2015: 11, 22
23).
The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order,
1950, The Gazette of India, Extraordinary,
Part II, Section 3, No 27, 11 August 1950, p 163.
The criterion, in fact, was not strictly followed.
The order mentioned that every member of
the Ramdasia, Kabirpanthi, Mazhabi or Sikligar
caste resident in Punjab [shall] be deemed to
be a member of the Scheduled Castes whether
he professes the Hindu or Sikh religion,
ibid: 163.
The Government of India (Scheduled Castes)
Order, 1936, in Orders in Council Under the Government of India Act, 1935, Delhi: 1937, pp 22431.
The Government of India Act, 1935, Delhi: 1935,
p 308.
I am not trying to suggest that the continuation
of the connection between the depressed classes and Hinduism was not linked to the politics
of the national movement or the concerns that
played out in the debates of the Constituent
Assembly. For an insightful discussion on the
stand taken by the Christian representatives in
the Constituent Assembly: their preference to
secure minority rights, and yet, their unease
over leaving out caste claims, see Robinson
(2014).
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
Orders (Amendment) Act, 1956, http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/textofcentralacts/1956II.pdf, p 856, accessed on 13 March 2015.
The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Orders
(Amendment) Act 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/
legislative/textofcentralacts/1990.pdf, p 114,
accessed on 13 March 2015.
G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal and Others, Civil
Appeal No 1171 of 1973, the Supreme Court of
India, Date of judgment 19 December 1975,
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?
filename=5754, accessed on 8 March 2015.
The following evidences were rejected by the
bench as non-indicators: (i) Rajgopal celebrated the marriages of younger brothers in Adi
Dravida manner, (ii) he enjoyed the status
as a peace-maker among the Adi Dravida
Hindus of Kolar Gold Field area, (iii) funeral
ceremonies of his father were performed in
accordance with the Adi Dravida Hindu rites,
(iv) he participated in the annual death ceremonies of another Adi Dravida, (v) he took
part in an All India Scheduled Castes Conference (G M Arumugam v S Rajgopal 1975: 3).
The bench had indeed mentioned that We may
assume that, on conversion to Christianity, the
parents of the respondent [Mohan Rao] lost
their membership of Madiga caste and that
the respondent was, therefore, not a Madiga
by birth (Principal, Guntur Medical College,
Guntur v Y Mohan Rao, 1976: 5).
The first caste certificate was issued to Manu
by Akhila Bharatha Ayyappa Seva Sangham;

though it is not clear from the judgment,

perhaps this certificate played a role in getting him another one from the tehsildar, a
local revenue official (K P Manu v Chairman,
Scrutiny Committee 2015: 3). The Akhila Bharatha
Ayyappa Seva Sangham is a registered body in
Kerala which aims to serve the Ayyappa
devotees (http://ayyappasevasangham.in/about.
aspx, accessed on 8 March 2015); it is also recognised by the Kerala Public Service Commission
as the agency that could issue conversion
certificate to those Christians who convert to
Hinduism (http://www.keralapsc.gov.in/index.
php?option=com_content&id=47&Itemid=41,
p 5, accessed on 8 March 2015). However, what
must be noted here is that the Sangham is not
a representative organ of the Pulayas; yet, it
certified that Manu was a Hindu
Pulayan (35).

References
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Hutton, J H (1933): Census of India, Vol I: India,
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Jodhka, Surinder S (2015): Caste in Contemporary
India, New Delhi: Routledge.
K P Manu v Chairman, Scrutiny Committee for
Verification of Community Certificate, Civil Appeal No 7065 of 2008, the Supreme Court
of India, Date of judgment 26 February 2015,

http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/FileServer/2015-02-26_1424948955.pdf, accessed on
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Kailsah Sonkar v Smt Maya Devi, Civil Appeal
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Misra, Rangnath (2007): Report of the National
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