DR. DIOSCORO CARBONILLA v.

MARCELO ABIERA and MARICRIS ABIERA PAREDES, SUBSTITUTED

BY HER HEIRS
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review are the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 18,
2006 and the Resolution dated April 17, 2007, which dismissed petitioners complaint for ejectment against
respondents.
The case arose from the following antecedents:
Petitioner, Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents, Marcelo Abiera and
Maricris Abiera Paredes, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Maasin City. The complaint alleged that
petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land, located in Barangay Canturing, Maasin City, identified as Lot No.
1781-B-P-3-B-2-B PSD-08-8452-D, Maasin Cadastre. The land is purportedly covered by a certificate of title, and
declared for assessment and taxation purposes in petitioners name. Petitioner further claimed that he is also the
owner of the residential building standing on the land, which building he acquired through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership. He maintained that the building
was being occupied by respondents by mere tolerance of the previous owners. Petitioner asserted that he intends to
use the property as his residence, thus, he sent a demand letter to respondents asking them to leave the premises
within 15 days from receipt of the letter, but they failed and refused to do so. Conciliation efforts with
the Barangay proved futile.[2]
To corroborate his claim, petitioner presented copies of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3784; Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership dated November 10,
2002, executed by the heirs of Jovita Yanto Garciano; Tax Declaration (TD) with ARP No. 07020-000019; and Demand
Letter dated November 20, 2002. TCT No. T-3784 shows that the land was originally registered on January 30, 1968
in the name of Diosdado Carbonilla, petitioners father, under Original Certificate of Title No. 185.
In their defense, respondents vehemently denied petitioners allegation that they possessed the building by
mere tolerance of the previous owners. Instead, they asserted that they occupied the building as owners, having
inherited the same from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, respondent Marcelos parents and respondent
Maricris grandparents. They maintained that they have been in possession of the building since 1960, but it has not
been declared for taxation purposes. As for the subject land, respondents claimed that they inherited the same from
Francisco Plasabas, grandfather of Alfredo Abiera. They pointed out that the land had, in fact, been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Francisco Plasabas under TD No. 4676, before the Second World War. This TD was
later cancelled by TD No. 8735 in 1948, TD No. 14363 in 1958, and TD No. 16182 in 1963. Respondents averred that
the building was previously a garage-like structure but, in 1977, Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano repaired and
remodeled it, for which reason, they obtained a building permit on April 11, 1977 from the then Municipality of
Maasin. Finally, respondents contended that the case should be dismissed for failure to implead as defendants
respondent Marcelos siblings, who are co-heirs of the subject properties. [3] Respondents presented copies of the two
TDs in the name of Francisco Plasabas and the Building Permit dated April 11, 1977.
The MTCC decided the case in favor of respondents. It opined that petitioners claim of ownership over the
subject parcel of land was not successfully rebutted by respondents; hence, petitioners ownership of the same was
deemed established.[4] However, with respect to the building, the court declared respondents as having the better right
to its material possession in light of petitioners failure to refute respondents claim that their predecessors had been in
prior possession of the building since 1960 and that they have continued such possession up to the present. [5] In so
ruling, the court applied Art. 546[6] of the Civil Code which allows the possessor in good faith to retain the property until
he is reimbursed for necessary expenses. Thus, in its decision dated March 15, 2004, the MTCC pronounced:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the collated evidences at hand [have]
preponderantly established, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants DECLARING
the defendants to have the better rights of (material) possession to the assailed building and deemed
as possessors in good faith and are legally entitled to its possession and occupancy.
The plaintiff judicially affirmed as the land owner is enjoined to respect the rights of the
defendants pursuant to the provisions of Art. 546, Chapter III, New Civil Code of the Philippines[,
w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of Arts. 547 and 548, New Civil Code of the Philippines. No
pronouncement as to costs as defendants predecessors-in-interest are deemed possessors and
builders in good faith.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 12, 2004, the RTC reversed the MTCC
decision. The RTC agreed with the MTCC that the land is owned by petitioner. The two courts differed, however, in
their conclusion with respect to the building. The RTC placed the burden upon respondents to prove their claim that
they built it prior to petitioners acquisition of the land, which burden, the court found, respondents failed to
discharge. The RTC held that, either waywhether the building was constructed before or after petitioner acquired
ownership of the landpetitioner, as owner of the land, would have every right to evict respondents from the land. As
theorized by the RTC, if the building was erected before petitioner or his predecessors acquired ownership of the land,
then Article 445[8] of the Civil Code would apply. Thus, petitioner, as owner of the land, would be deemed the owner of

the building standing thereon, considering that, when ownership of the land was transferred to him, there was no
reservation by the original owner that the building was not included in the transfer. On the other hand, if the building
was constructed after petitioner became the owner of the land, it is with more reason that petitioner has the right to
evict respondents from the land. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
1.

Reversing the decision of the court a quo;

2.

Ordering defendants to immediately vacate the residential house/building subject of

this litigation;

3.

Ordering defendants to pay attorneys fee in the amount of P30,000.00; and

4.

To pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the CA. Finding no evidence to prove that respondents possession of
the building was by mere tolerance, the CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioners
complaint. Because of this, the CA, following this Courts ruling in Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v.
Cruz, categorized the complaint as one for forcible entry. It then proceeded to declare that the action had prescribed
since the one-year period for filing the forcible entry case had already lapsed. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision dated September 18, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision promulgated on July 12, 2004 of Branch
25 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Maasin City, Southern Leyte in Civil Case No. R-3382 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID for failure of the plaintiff (herein respondent) to prove that the case at bar is
for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.
[11]
Hence, petitioner came to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
On September 3, 2007, respondents counsel informed this Court that respondent, Maricris Abiera Paredes,
died on June 25, 2006 of asphyxia due to hanging, and moved that the latters heirs be allowed to substitute for the
deceased.[12] In the Resolution[13] dated November 14, 2007, the Court granted the motion.
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his ownership of the subject properties; consequently, he
asserts the right to recover possession thereof.
The petition has no merit.
To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no
other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to
substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the
Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the
owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents proof of possession
of the building since 1977, petitioners evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot
simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment casesforcible
entry and unlawful detainerare summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. [14] The only question that the courts resolve in
ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. [15] For
this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of
the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the
complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the building was by mere tolerance of
petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding from
another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the
formers right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied. [16]
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful,
and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.[17] It must be shown
that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this
case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.

Petitioner failed to prove that respondents possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He did not offer
any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting that they tolerated respondents entry to and
occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show overt
acts indicative of his or his predecessors permission to occupy the subject property. Thus, we must agree with the CA
when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent miserably failed to prove his
claim that petitioners possession of the subject building was by mere tolerance as alleged in the
complaint.Tolerance must be [present] right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to be
within the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always carries with it permission and not
merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance. [18]
In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the very
start of the possessionfrom entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action
for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.[19] Notably, no mention was made in the complaint of how entry by
respondents was effected or how and when dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence showing such
details.
In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of his property by
filing an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion
reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the pronouncement in this case
as to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land. [20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 18, 2006
and Resolution dated April 17, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RAMON ARANDA v. REPUBLIC
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated April 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73067 which reversed and set aside the Decision [3] datedJanuary 31, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Reg. Case No. T-335 (LRA Record No. N-69447).
Subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of land situated in San Andres, Malvar,
Batangas with an area of 9,103 square meters and designated as Lot 3730, Psc 47, Malvar Cadastre. The
petition[4] was originally filed by ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI) represented by its Chairman, Enrique K. Razon,
Jr. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its opposition [5] on grounds that the land
applied for is part of the public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title thereto under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.
ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application citing the following reasons: (1) the petition was not
accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping; (2) the statement of technical description was based merely on
the boundaries set forth in the tax declaration; and (3) due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant
corporation cannot push through and consequently the tax declaration is still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda
and the land cannot be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI. [6]
The trial court admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title, [7] this time filed in the name of Ramon
Aranda, herein petitioner. Petitioner prayed that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable to this case, he
invokes the liberal provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, having been in continuous
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years
prior to the filing of the application.[8]
In support of the application, petitioners sister Merlita A. Enriquez testified that in 1965 her father Anatalio Aranda
donated the subject land to his brother (petitioner), as evidenced by documents Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng
Lupa which she and her siblings executed on June 7, 2000.[9] She came to know the land for the first time in 1965
when she was eight years old and his brother Ramon has been tilling the land since then, planting it with rice and
corn. His brother did not introduce any permanent improvement and also did not hire a tenant to work on the land. As
to the donation made by his father to his brother Ramon, she recalled there was such a document but it was eaten by
rats.[10]
Another witness, Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land and that he had known about
this property since he was six (6) years old as he used to accompany his father in going to the land. His father farmed
the land and planted it first, with rice, and later corn. They had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of
the land in the concept of owner until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio Aranda. The children of Anatalio then
took over in tilling the land, planting it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not have any copy
of the document of sale because his mother gave it to Anatalio. [11]
On January 31, 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision [12] granting the application and ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration in favor of petitioner.
The Republic appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court. The CA held that petitioners evidence does not
satisfactorily establish the character and duration of possession required by law, as petitioner failed to prove specific
acts showing the nature of the possession by his predecessors-in-interest. The CA also did not give evidentiary weight
to the documents Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa and Pagpapatunay ng Bilihang Lampasan ng Lupa,[13] both
prepared only in the year 2000 when the application for registration was filed, as factual proof of ownership by the
parties to the compromise agreement.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

Hence, this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 alleging that the decision of the CA is
based on a misapprehension of facts with regard to compliance with the required 30 years of open, exclusive, public
and adverse possession in the concept of owner. Petitioner argues that the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale in
favor of Anatalio Aranda and the 1965 donation to petitioner are competent proof of transfer of ownership
notwithstanding that these were executed only in the year 2000. He asserts that the testimonies of witnesses Merlita
Aranda-Enriquez and Luis Olan on the fact of loss and destruction of copies of the aforesaid deeds constitute
secondary evidence of the contents thereof based on recollection of persons who are adversely affected. Such
testimonial evidence coupled with the deeds of confirmation warrants the application of the exception from the best
evidence rule. Petitioner thus contends that the CA had no legal basis to doubt the veracity of the donation and sale of
the subject property, and to conclude that the confirmation deeds can be treated as compromise agreement
considering that the transactions had been previously completed and perfected by the parties.
We deny the petition.
The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original registration of land in an ordinary registration
proceeding. Under Section 14(1)[14] thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the following requisites: (a)
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.[15]
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [16] The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
[17]

In this case, the Assistant Regional Executive Director For Operations-Mainland Provinces of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), in compliance with the directive of the trial court, issued a certification
stating that the subject property falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 22-A of Lipa, Batangas per
LC Map 718 certified on March 26, 1928.[18] However, in the Certification[19] dated January 14, 2000 issued by the
DENR CENR Officer of Batangas City, Pancrasio M. Alcantara, which was submitted in evidence by the petitioner, it
states that:
This is to certify that based on projection from the technical reference map of this Office, Lot
No. 3730, Ap-04-009883, situated at Barangay San Andres, Malvar, Batangas containing an area of
NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THREE AND FORTY SEVEN (9,103.47) SQUARE METERS and
shown at the reverse side hereof has been verified to be within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
ZONE under Project No. 39, Land Classification Map No. 3601 certified on 22 December
1997 except for twenty meters strip of land along the creek bounding on the northeastern portion
which is to be maintained as streambank protection.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of classification [20] mentioned in the foregoing government
certifications. Consequently, the status of the land applied for as alienable and disposable was not clearly established.
We also agree with the CA that petitioners evidence failed to show that he possessed the property in the
manner and for the duration required by law.
Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale from the original owner (Lucio
Olan) to Anatalio Aranda and the 1965 donation made by the latter in favor of petitioner. But as found by the CA, the
history of the land shows that it was declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1981. On the other hand,
the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar stated that petitioner, who supposedly received the
property from his father in 1965, had been paying the corresponding taxes for said land for more than five consecutive
years including the current year [1999], or beginning 1994 only or just three years before the filing of the application
for original registration. While, as a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession they constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.[21]
Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest. His witness Luis
Olan testified that he had been visiting the land along with his father Lucio since he was 6 years old (he was 70 years
old at the time he testified), or as early as 1936. Yet, there was no evidence that Lucio Olan declared the property for
tax purposes at anytime before he sold it to Anatalio Aranda. There is also no showing that Anatalio Aranda declared
the property in his name from the time he bought it from Lucio Olan. And even assuming that Lucio actually planted
rice and corn on the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish possession in the concept of owner as
contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that
would give rise to ownership.[22] Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant.
We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself
and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title

and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. [23] Furthermore, the court has the
bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of
evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which
he is attempting to register.[24] Since petitioner failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law, the CA was correct
in reversing the trial court and dismissing his application for judicial confirmation of title.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated July 26, 2005 and
Resolution dated April 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73067 are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
his is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining
order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim
portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving
such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed
land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No.
1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" 2 under the ManilaCavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with
CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be
agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items
of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of
PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by
CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise
disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5
and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888)
square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the
Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit." 3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to
PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square
meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty
One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On
April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. 5 On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. 6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. 7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, 8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the
Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going
renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these
reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the
negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA.
The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the
case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25,
1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to
submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to
set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26,
1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On
May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional
and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." 14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON
ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE
TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE
1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of
subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations for a new
agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing
any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a
copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA
has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March
30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and
approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to
moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA.

The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to
annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to
367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now
becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a
provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the
instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and
ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public. 17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, 18 covered agricultural lands sold to
private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed
or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141
("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed
lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA)
and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for
the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired
on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible
transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as
the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entirereclaimed area
to raise financing for the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the
hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of
hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public.22 The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain information without
first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the petition for mandamus even if
the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2
of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was,
therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the
instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of
the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79
of the Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public
bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of
its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone.
PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of
a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The principal issue in the instant case is
the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands
of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit

PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution.
PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel
PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the
Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA
to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court
upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus "Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of
'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral
well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which
have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of
mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in
interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the
laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid
case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling
for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under
the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container
Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in
the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official
records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites
laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2)
espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern in this
manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution,
thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its

official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will
be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to
"definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or interagency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the
transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or
treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring
government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making
in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there
is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and
information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of
the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being
disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar
information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process,
long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If
PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding
process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this
moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information
leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and
its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intraagency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are
still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe
the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information."
(Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right
to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction."Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may
be too late for the public to expose its defects.1wphi1.nt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended.
Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposedcontract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a

constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used
in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of
government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government
agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached
to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to
records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right
must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the
separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be subject to
other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation
of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closeddoor Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open
by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39 This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiationsbefore a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government
and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds
that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 42 The King, as
the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines
except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the
King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the timehonored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil
Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed
lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on
November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On November 7,
1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and
individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands
of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of
the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. 44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the
reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."

Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation,
provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the
State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public
service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but
employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although
employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into private property,
to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must
declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or
alienate the property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and
foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all
Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights
and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by
the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets
and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with
the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the public that
such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for
commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject
to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis
supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The Act
also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed
by the government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandatedpublic
bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in
that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available
only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit
private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from
the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act. 46 The salient provisions
of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other

than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes
or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same
are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain into x x x alienable
or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall be classified" as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the GovernorGeneral the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These
provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the public domain into
government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.Section
58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare
that the lands were "not necessary for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to
sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act
No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for nonagricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other
non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural
purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing
their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law
of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution,
in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the
only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural
resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25
years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being
neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural lands. 50 However, government
reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be
leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935
Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands
in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by
purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and
twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not
exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association."
(Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for
sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature
continued the long established State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this
day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands.51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or
disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only
lands that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,53 for the purpose of
their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved
for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may
be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President must first officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must
be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, are
as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is
intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive
purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under
the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes
or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person,
corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are
open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or
lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874
prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these
lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61
allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling

under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became
inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes
lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for nonagricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, 54 unless a subsequent law amended or
repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55 Justice
Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the
government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the
foreshore and lands under water remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of
reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed
by the government were to be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing,
however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must
have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water
were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by
lease. The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at
present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands
of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took
effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935
Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the
government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain
continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. 56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not
authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under
Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural
purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that
the government previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of
CA No. 141 declares that
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is
requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation
shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of
the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so
granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section
56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities
from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities
should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations.
Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to
circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same
manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation
of law a lien on these lands.57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63
and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the
Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural
Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall
give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public
land, x x x.

Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest
bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land
could become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to
disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in the Civil Code of
1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or
public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of
their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those properties of the
State which, without being for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national
wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public
service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With
the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of "agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the
alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the
1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain. 60 If
the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land
of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of
the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and development
requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may
be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the
conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands
by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twentyfour hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber
or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However,
such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became
absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban
extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly
government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with
the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or
to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient, economical and
beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is
created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume
x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the purposes
and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore areas
are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. 61 Submerged areas are those permanently under
water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide. 62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public
domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared
no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not
apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied
then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to
hold lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus,
PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be
legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of
CA No.141, which states
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable
lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987
Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands
of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state
that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations fromacquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain is still CA No. 141.

The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban

The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of
the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973
Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not
been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and
1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this
provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni
Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme
Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private
corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by
corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size
of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under
the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation
would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided
parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from
one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more
than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual
could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable
lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an evergrowing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in
Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to regularize the
configuration of the reclaimed area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of
about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x." 66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas
forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be
reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable
area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas.
Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section
5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the
title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing
by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering

AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the
titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the
titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land
pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory
authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended
JVA states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and
Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and
exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development
Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental
agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5
hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum, 67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its Report
and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of ownership and
disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly
convey the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3,
Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by
statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
"lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As
such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the
public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of
the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover,
these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or
quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel
vs. Garcia,73 the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired
by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had
transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 74 of the Civil Code, a
property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to
be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)

PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA
from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom
Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309,
7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of
title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands
although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom
Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private
parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the
public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the
islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party
constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may
not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only with "proper
permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State
because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the
reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private
person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land
which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. 76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of
public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public
purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under
water and revested solely in the National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared
that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water,
whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could
now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private
parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or
permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Government's implementing
arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives
compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind
consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is
first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public
service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still
submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these
submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged

areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form
part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State,"
forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these
submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources
that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or
operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such
systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be
necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private
parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or
collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would
actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute
essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same section
also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and
shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus,
under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the
National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as
the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting
public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public
service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from
those still needed for public service.1wphi1.nt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by the PEA," could
not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable
once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and
any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of
such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions,
lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization
of the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country
and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes
which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and
titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies." 80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises "supervision and control
over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR
before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR
decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 81 and 782 of CA No. 141.
Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the
issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with
the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors.
DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the

approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere
transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the
public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83of CA No. 141
and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands
shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141,
admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x
x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government
by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the Government. The Court
declared that "It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive
and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the
reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973
and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and
assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to
PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of the Republic
of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said
shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall execute such
contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the
Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his
assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the
above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall
issue the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that "Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible
for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands
shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA
should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter
of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial
properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with the
legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not
apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative
authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the
"contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals
because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these
lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence
of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is
issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, 89 which authorizes
PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA
from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in
kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is
required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it
shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or
unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction
to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the
presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising
by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper
of general circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by
notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In
the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may
be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must
approve the selling price.90 The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code
through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be
disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public
auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition
that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the
Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.92 No one,
however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public
bidding on December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares
still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10,
1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double
the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three
years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly
improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even
Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed
lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any
infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share
in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a
portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to
the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments in land
reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects
by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant
of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the
constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local
Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can
only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions
of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in
view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and
the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA
transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that
the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land
of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that
with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares
comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite
the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part
of the public domain and became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared "After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all
the safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court
ruled "While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the
land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is
registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were issued
covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain
and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the
Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly
sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple'
title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which
governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines
are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding certificates of titlesissued
to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or
that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case
cited involves the registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National
Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National
Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities
of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare
public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of
a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued
to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the
thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these
certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.

Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of
the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred
by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than
what the registrant had prior to the registration. 102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The
transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in
Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of
land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof."
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60
of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that
are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No.
1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104Alienable
lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because
they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress,
however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because
of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public
lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore
and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in
various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy to provide
for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which shall ensure
a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government
corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting
public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to reorganize the
national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the
following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the
PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects
of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation
with the PEA upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell
reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed
lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same
manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of
the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the
hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the
public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and
all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable

lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of
title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several
hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now
numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can
"acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are
private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating
the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of
constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more
than 1,024 hectares of public lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of
public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically
become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered
under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section
122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government of the Philippine
Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall
be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or
conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes
conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or
subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens
System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in
Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain
from becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be registered under the
Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by
the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the
name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the
National Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to
administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may
likewise be titled in the name of the municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if
already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in
any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become unquestionably part
of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name
of the National Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529
states
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or
taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the
judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular property or interest
expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right
or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple
is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province, city,

municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal
expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the
account of the authority taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands.
Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to
be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint
venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and
construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a
sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the
certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI." 107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations
"shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to
AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and
ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No.
141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public
domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably
among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have
barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to
dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of
lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title
in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which
are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares 111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the
commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and
uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides,
the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is
hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.

Native Title and Possession Since Time Immemorial

Indigenous Political Structures refer to organizational and cultural leadership systems, institutions, relationships,
patterns and processes for decision-making and participation, identified by ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to,
Council of Elders, Council of Timuays, Bodong Holders, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature;
Time Immemorial refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to
have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of
customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.
Modes of Acquiring Title
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original
registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the
registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be
substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited
by the instrument creating the trust.

REPUBLIC v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review
the Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The
appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), [2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated
February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998,
which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC
of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an
area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the
aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the
government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. [4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano

executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights
to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.
[5]
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to
existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.
At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial
decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without
any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend
to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to
appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the
subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. [6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October
15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated
February 18, 1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8.
On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. [9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and
affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4,
2000.[10]
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding
that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be
considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of
Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period. [11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in arguing that the property
which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared
alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or
disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close
examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.. . . .

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since
June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership.
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. [13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted that
to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [15] In that case, the subject
land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable
status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before
1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits
that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR. [16]
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that while the claimant
had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in
1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands, [18] such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. [20] It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21] forest land is
not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such
lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. [22] In the case at bar, the property in question was
undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by
the Court of Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The
right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at
least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.
1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public
domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It
must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June
12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. [25] There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [26] With such conversion, such property may
now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced
on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural.
There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of
owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be
unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was
declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to
apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since
1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by
lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees
at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State

and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of
doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any
opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and
deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF BATIOG LACAMEN v. HEIRS OF LARUAN

Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 738 entitled "Heirs of Batiog Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan" "... declaring
the contract of sale between Lacamen and Laruan null and void [for lack of approval of the Director of the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes] ..."
Petitioners-appellants are the surviving heirs of Batiog Lacamen, while respondents-appellants are the heirs of
Laruan. 1
Sometime on January 28, 1928, Laruan executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Batiog Lacamen 2 conveying for the sum
of P300.00 his parcel of land situated in the sitio of La Trinidad, Benguet, Mountain Province, comprising 86 ares and
16 centares 3 and covered by Certificate of Title No. 420 of the Registry of Benguet. The deed was acknowledged
before Antonio Rimando, a notary public in the City of Baguio. 4
Immediately after the sale, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to Lacamen. Thereupon, Lacamen entered in
possession and occupancy of the land without first securing the corresponding transfer certificate of title in his name.
He introduced various improvements and paid the proper taxes. His possession was open, continuous, peaceful, and
adverse. After his death in 1942, his heirs remained in and continued possession and occupancy of the land. They too
paid the taxes.
After the last Global War, Lacamen's heirs "started fixing up the papers of all the properties" left by him 5 In or about
June, 1957, they discovered that Laruan's heirs, respondents-appellants, were able to procure a new owner's copy of
Certificate of Title No. 420 by a petition filed in court alleging that their copy has been lost or destroyed. Through this
owner's copy, respondents-appellants caused the transfer of the title on the lot in their names. 6 Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-775 was issued to them by the Registry of Deeds of Benguet.
Refused of their demands for reconveyance of the title, petitioners-appellants sued respondents-appellants in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City on December 9, 1957, prayings among other things, that they be declared
owners of the subject property; that respondents-appellants be ordered to convey to them by proper instruments or
documents the land in question; and that the Register of Deeds of Benguet be ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-775 and issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in their names. 7
In answer, respondents-appellants traversed the averments in the complaint and claim absolute ownership over the
land. They asserted that their deceased father, Laruan, never sold the property and that the Deed of Sale was not
thumbmarked by him. 8
On 5 April 1962, the Court of First Instance of Baguio City found for respondents-appellants and against petitionersappellants. Forthwith, petitioners-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 7 December 1966, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
In this review, petitioners-appellants press that the Court of Appeals erred

I... IN DECLARING THE SALE BETWEEN LACAMEN AND LARUAN TO BE NULL AND VOID.
II... IN APPLYING STRICTLY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 118 AND 122 OF ACT NO. 2874 AND SECTIONS
145 AND 164 OF THE CODE OF MINDANAO AND SULU.
III... IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY.
which assignments could be whittled down into the pervading issue of whether the deceased Batiog Lacamen and/or
his heirs, herein petitioners-appellants, have validly acquired ownership over the disputed parcel of land.
The 1917 Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu declares in its Section 145 that no contract or agreement relating
to real property shall be made by any person with any non-Christian inhabitant of the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu, unless such contract shall bear the approval of the provincial governor of the province wherein the contract was
executed, or his representative duly authorized for such purpose in writing endorsed upon it. 9 Any contract or
agreement in violation of this section is "null and void" under the succeeding Section 146. 10
On 24 February 1919, Act No. 2798 was approved by the Philippine Legislature extending to the Mountain Province
and the Province of Nueva Vizcaya the laws and other legal provisions pertaining to the provinces and minor political
subdivisions of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, with the specific proviso that the approval of the land
transaction shall be by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. 11
Then on 29 November 1919, came Act No. 2874 otherwise known as "The Public Land Act". It provided in Section 118
thereof that "Conveyances and encumbrances made by persons belonging to the so-called 'non-Christian tribes',
when proper, shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes." Any
violation of this injunction would result in the nullity and avoidance of the transaction under the following Section 122.
During the regime of the Commonwealth, C.A. 141 otherwise known as "The Public Land Act" was passed
November 7, 1936 amending Act No. 2874. However, it contained a similar provision in its Section 120 that
"Conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christians shall not be valid unless duly approved by the
Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu.
The contracting parties, Lacamen and Laruan, are bound by the foregoing laws, since both of them are illiterate
Igorots, belonging to the "non-Christian Tribes" of the Mountain Province 12 , and the controverted land was derived
from a Free Patent 13 or acquired from the public domain. 14
The trial court did show cordiality to judicial pronouncements when it avoided the realty sale between Lacamen
andLaruan for want of approval of the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. For jurisprudence decrees that
non-approved conveyances and encumbrances of realty by illiterate non-Christians are not valid, i.e., not binding or
obligatory. 15
Nevertheless, the thrust of the facts in the case before Us weakens the gathered strength of the cited rule. The facts
summon the equity of laches.
"Laches" has been defined as "such neglect or ommission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity." 16 It is a delay in the
assertion of a right "which works disadvantage to another" 17 because of the "inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or parties." 18 It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, 19 ordains
that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. 20 It is different from and applies
independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a
question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition
of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not. 21
Laruan's sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were it not for the sole fact that it lacked the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. There was impressed upon its face full faith and credit
after it was notarized by the notary public. 22 The non-approval was the only "drawback" of which the trial court has
found the respondents-appellants to "have taken advantage as their lever to deprive [petitioners-appellants] of this
land and that their motive is out and out greed." 23 As between Laruan and Lacamen, the sale was regular, not infected
with any flaw.Laruan's delivery of his certificate of title to Lacamen just after the sale symbolizes nothing more than a

bared recognition and acceptance on his part that Lacamen is the new owner of the property. Thus, not any
antagonistic show of ownership was ever exhibited by Laruan after that sale and until his death in May 1938.
From the transfer of the land on January 28, 1928, Lacamen possessed and occupied the ceded land in concepto de
dueo until his death in April 1942. Thereafter his heirs, petitioners-appellants herein, took over and exercised
dominion over the property, likewise unmolested for nearly 30 years (1928-1957) until the heirs of Laruan,
respondents-appellants, claimed ownership over the property and secured registration of the same in their names. At
the trial, petitioners-appellants have been found to have introduced improvements on the land consisting of houses,
barns, greenhouses, walls, roads, etc., and trees valued at P38,920.00. 24
At this state, therefore, respondents-appellants' Claim of absolute ownership over the land cannot be countenanced. It
has been held that while a person may not acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse
possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right
to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches. 25 Much more should it be in
the instant case where the possession of nearly 30 years or almost half a century now is in pursuance of sale which
regrettably did not bear the approval of the executive authority but which the vendor never questioned during his life
time. Laruan's laches extends to his heirs, the respondents-appellants herein, since they stand in privity with him. 26
Indeed, in a like case, 27 it was ruled that
Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce
another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making
improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the
possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.
For notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the vendor Laruan suffered the vendee Lacamen to enter, possess and
occupy the property in concepto de dueo without demurrer and molestation, from 1928, until the former's death in
1938; and when respondents-appellants succeeded to the estate of their father, they too kept silent, never claiming
that the lot is their own until in 1957 or after almost 30 years they took "advantage of the [non-approval of the sale] as
their lever to deprive [petitioners-appellants] of this land" with a motive that was "out and out greed." Even granting,
therefore, that no prescription lies against their father's recorded title, their quiescence and inaction for almost 30
years now commands the imposition of laches against their adverse claim. (Miguel, footnote 27)
It results that as against Laruan and his heirs, respondents-appellants herein, the late Batiog Lacamen and his heirs,
petitioners-appellants herein, have superior right and, hence, have validly acquired ownership of the litigated
land. Vigilantibus non dormientibos sequitas subvenit.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court is hereby
reversed and set aside.
The petitioners-appellants are hereby declared the lawful owners of the land in question. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-775 in the name of respondents-appellants is hereby cancelled and in lieu thereof the
Register of Deeds of Benguet is ordered to issue a new transfer certificate of title in the name of petitionersappellants.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SIMPLICIO BINALAY v. GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of
twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than
that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western portion would
periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The
submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under
water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.

The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959, respondent
Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land
sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500 hectares, more or
less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva and
on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of
Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired
the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45
hectares. The second piece of property was more particularly described as follows:
. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000 square meters,
more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R.
Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax
Declaration No. 3152. . . . 2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land
belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot
307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and
(b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a
rainy month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not
included in Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan 3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent Manalo shows that
the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branchesthe western and the
eastern branchesand then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch
of the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The
bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo.
For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its
ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry
and is susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked
very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. 4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822
is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is
separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry
season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo
claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is
adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer
edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural
products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This situation compelled
respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the
Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo
again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6 before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3
for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land
he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be
entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise
prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then set for trial for
failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts. 7 On 10 November 1982,
the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the defendants and
in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821,
Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They filed a
motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the Cagayan River, the
Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot
be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up
for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with
the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the
depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they carry even more
weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial
court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise
settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such
findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that periodically
at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial
court held:
The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for it
appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821,
Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina
Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its
widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court
that "the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an
express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:
As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since the
eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during
summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season especially from
September to November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen
due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be
inundated with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water
level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that
According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest depth of the
waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during
the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which
occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule,
order and measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by
Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by
their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground
covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that is up to the northeastern
boundary of the two parcels of land in question.
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the waters of the
Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot
[822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the
small stream already in existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to
cultivation and uneroded. 13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San
Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court
applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the
natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is
involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the case at bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest
floods. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters
during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming
of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed
substantially dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical
swelling of the waters ( i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river
waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record.1wphi1 Firstly,
respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot
307. 15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred
to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as
well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the
eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is
separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but
also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as a
river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed
becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit
"W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than
Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward
and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through
the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to
go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion.
The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters. 17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of the earth.
However, Exhibit "E" 18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of
Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words
"old bed" enclosed in parenthesesperhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the
submerged portionis an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property

made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep
dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed
of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public
dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the running
waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:
La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario considerar en su
relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta
agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de
dominio publico, como las aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que los rios
son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que
integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1,
donde dice: son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo
que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de
los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la
extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it were alleged and
proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and
Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of
private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his
landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on
rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated
by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened that instead of
increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there was no
evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a
mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast). 22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited
on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307
but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land
to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of
factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the
aver in a slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods
that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding
is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible
accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip
of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821
resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent
Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and
1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey
showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were
accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the
Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes
separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other
things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow
and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion
coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge
Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the
property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he
twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent
Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their respective names.
They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or
the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she
was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same
manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of
the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the
Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither
petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of
the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be
determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION,
CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Here,
the Court is confronted with a case commenced before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Rizal in Pasay City, in 1961, more than 3 decades back, that has spanned six administrations of the Republic and
outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief Justices of the Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the Decision, dated January 29, 1992
and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals [1], which affirmed with modification the Decision
of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) in Civil Case No. 2229-P, entitled Republic of the
Philippines versus Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation.
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore
lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their
own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such

municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the aforecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No.
121, for the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City
Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said
Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate
Corporation(RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement [2] for the reclamation of the foreshore lands
in Pasay City.
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a Complaint[3] for Recovery of Possession
and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
2229-P before the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City).
On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint [4] questioning subject Agreement
between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit P) on the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the
commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed
without any public bidding.
The Answers[5] of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962, respectively, averred that the
subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the phrase foreshore lands within the
contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and
in the Websters Third New International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were
approved by the authorities concerned.
On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch
7, Pasay City) issued an Order[6] the dispositive portion of which was to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their agents, and all persons claiming under them, to
refrain from further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the
Manila Bay or the Manila Bay Beach Resort, until further orders of the court.
On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction [7] which enjoined the defendants,
RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons claiming under them from further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession.
Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene [8], dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L. Bautista, Emiliano Custodio,
Renato Custodio, Roger de la Rosa, Belen Gonzales, Norma Martinez, Emilia E. Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin
M. Oreta, Sixto L. Orosa, Pablo S. Sarmiento, Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises, Inc., Industrial and Commercial
Factors, Inc., Metropolitan Distributors of the Philippines, and Bayview Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that they were
buyers of lots in the Manila Bay area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would be affected by whatever decision
to be rendered in the case. The Motion was granted by the trial court and the Answer attached thereto admitted. [9]
The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss [10] the Complaint of the Republic, placing reliance on
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south boundary of the City of Manila
to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles,
province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged areas: Provided,
That priority in the construction of such seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shall be given to
any corporation and/or corporations that may offer to undertake at its own expense such projects, in which
case the President of the Philippines may, after competitive bidding, award contracts for the construction of
such projects, with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid in terms of
percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor
and shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law concerning
disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the
foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the
reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected. x x x. (underscoring ours)
Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be respected, movants contended that the issues raised
by the pleadings have become moot, academic and of no further validity or effect.

Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLCU) moved to intervene[11], alleging as legal interest in
the matter in litigation the avowed purpose of the organization for the promotion of good government in Pasay City. In
its Order of June 10, 1969, the lower court of origin allowed the said intervention [12].
On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a Decision, disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original complaint, (2) the first Amended Complaint, (3) the
Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to the first Amended Complaint, (4) the Answer of
Defendant Pasay City to the first Amended Complaint, (5) the Second Amended Complaint, (6) the Answer of
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to the Second Amended Complaint, (7) the Answer of
Defendant Pasay City to the Second Amended Complaint, (8) the Memorandum in Support of Preliminary
Injunction of Plaintiff, (9) the Memorandum In Support of the Opposition to the Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction of Defendant Pasay City and Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (10) the Answer in
Intervention of Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (11) Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Intervene, (12) the Reply to
Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et. al. , (13) the Stipulation of Facts by all the
parties, (14) the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (15) the
Opposition to Motion For Leave to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (16) the Reply of Intervenor
Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (17) the Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of
Defendant Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation, (18) the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor
Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation,
(20) the Answer of Intervenor Jose L. Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in Intervention, (21) the Motion to Dismiss
of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of
Plaintiff to said Motion to Dismiss, (23) the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc.,
(24) the Memorandum of the Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (25) the Memorandum for the
Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (26) the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, and all the documentary evidence by the parties to wit: (a) Plaintiffs Exhibits A to YYY-4, (b)
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporations Exhibits 1-RREC to 40-a and (c) Intervenor Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Incs., Exhibits A-PLACU to C-PLACU, the Court hereby:
(1) Denies the Motion to Dismiss filed on January 10, 1968, by Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., as it is the finding of this Court that Republic Act No. 5187 was not passed by Congress to
cure any defect in the ordinance and agreement in question and that the passage of said Republic Act No. 5187 did
not make the legal issues raised in the pleadings moot, academic and of no further validity or effect; and
(2) Renders judgment:
(a) dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint;
(b) Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc.,
(c)Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City to have all the plans and
specifications in the reclamation approved by the Director of Public Works and to have all the contracts and subcontracts for said reclamation awarded by means of, and only after, public bidding; and
(d) Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April 26, 1962, as soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the Director
of Public Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as the corresponding public bidding for the
award to the contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (See Court of Appeals Decision dated January 28, 1992; pp. 6-8)
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. However, on
January 11, 1973, before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree No. 3-A issued, amending Presidential
Decree No. 3, thus:
SECTION 1. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated September 26, 1972, is hereby amended by the
addition of the following paragraphs:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or
inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the State without need of judicial action.

Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been accepted by the National Government shall
be taken over by the National Government on the basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of the project
involved by administration.
On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) signed a Contract[13] for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II) which contract
included the reclamation and development of areas covered by the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC. Then,
there was issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 which transferred to the Public Estate Authority (PEA) the rights and
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP.
Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives of the Republic, on the one hand, and those of
Pasay City and RREC, on the other, did not work out. The parties involved failed to hammer out a compromise.
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a Decision [14] dismissing the appeal of the Republic and
holding, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of RRECs plans and specification to the
Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation
work is deleted for being moot and academic;
2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession over all vacant spaces in
the twenty-one hectare area already reclaimed by Pasay City and RREC at the time it took over the same. Areas
thereat over which permanent structures has (sic) been introduced shall, including the structures, remain in the
possession of the present possessor, subject to any negotiation between Pasay City and the said present possessor,
as regards the continued possession and ownership of the latter area.
3. Sustaining RRECs irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the Twenty-One (21) hectares of land
already reclaimed by it, to be exercised within one (1) year from the finality of this decision, at the same terms and
condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining appellee Pasay City to respect
RRECs option.
SO ORDERED.
On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for Reconsideration of such Decision of the
Court of Appeals, contending, among others, that RREC had actually reclaimed Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only
Twenty-one (21) hectares, and the respondent Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to them, movants.
On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the said Motion for Reconsideration, by amending the
dispositive portion of its judgment of January 28, 1992, to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated January 28, 1992 is hereby AMENDED to read
as follows:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of the RRECs plans and specification to the
Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation
work is deleted for being moot and academic.
2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession of the above enumerated lots
(1 to 9).
3. Sustaining RRECs irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the land referred to in No. 2 of this
dispositive portion, to be exercised within one (1) year from the finality of this Decision, at the same terms and
condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining Pasay City to respect RRECs
irrevocable option.
SO ORDERED.
From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals aforementioned, the Republic of the
Philippines, as well as Pasay City and RREC, have come to this Court to seek relief, albeit with different prayers.
On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former thirteenth Division of Court of Appeals to hear and
receive evidence on the controversy. The corresponding Commissioners Report, dated November 25, 1997, was
submitted and now forms part of the records.

On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) filed a Petition in Intervention, theorizing that it
has a direct interest in the case being the owner of subject nine (9) lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent
Court of Appeals ordered to be turned over to Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor, was allowed to present its
evidence, as it did, before the Court of Appeals, which evidence has been considered in the formulation of this
disposition.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes, by way of assignment of errors, that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PASAY CITY ORDINANCE NO.
158 DATED APRIL 21, 1959 AND THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PASAY
CITY AND RREC;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC HAD RECLAIMED 55 HECTARES AND IN
ORDERING THE TURN-OVER TO PASAY CITY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF NINE (9)
LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF CCP.
In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC, contend, that::
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-A
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PASAY CITY AND
RREC.
Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.
On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158 dated April 21, 1959 and the
Agreement dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay City and RREC, we rule in the negative.
Section 1 of RA 1899, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out
at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no foreshore lands along the
seaside of Pasay City[15]; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man
which could not be a proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area
affected is within the National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41,
dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, continuous and peaceful
possession since time immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be considered foreshore land through the
following disquisition:
The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to a request for an opinion from the then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications as to whether the term foreshore areas as used in Section I
of the immediately aforequoted law is that defined in Websters Dictionary and the Law of Waters so as to
make any dredging or filling beyond its prescribed limit illegal, opined:
According to the basic letter of the Director of Public Works, the law of Waters speaks of shore and
defines it thus: that space movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit in the line reached by
highest equinoctial tides.
Websters definition of foreshore reads as follows:
That part of the shore between high water and low-water marks usually fixed at the line to which the
ordinary means tide flows: also, by extension, the beach, the shore near the waters edge.
If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore or foreshore lands should be confined to but a
portion of the shore, in itself a very limited area. (p. 6, Intervenors-appellees brief).

Bearing in mind the (Websters and Law of Waters) definitions of shore and of foreshore lands, one
is struck with the apparent inconsistency between the areas thus described and the purpose to
which that area, when reclaimed under the provision of Republic Act No. 1899, shall be
devoted. Section I (of said Law) authorizes the construction thereat of adequate docking and harbor
facilities. This purpose is repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands normally extend only from 10 to 20 meters along
the coast. Not very much more if at all. In fact, certain parts in Manila bordering on Manila Bay, has
no foreshore to speak of since the sea washes the sea wall.
It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had in mind. Websters limited concept of foreshore
when it enacted Republic Act No. 1899, unless it intends that the wharves, piers, docks, etc. should
be constructed parallel to the shore, which is impractical.
Since it is to be presumed that Congress could not have intended to enact an ineffectual measure
not one that would lead to absurd consequences, it would seem that it used foreshore in a sense
wider in scope that that defined by Webster. xxx
To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-appellant could not offer any refutation or
contrary opinion. Neither can we. In fact, the above construction is consistent with the rule on context in
statutory construction which provides that in construing a statute, the same must be construed as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole (see Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, the force and significance of particular expressions will largely depend upon the
connection in which they are found and their relation to the general subject-matter of the law. The legislature
must be understood to have expressed its whole mind on the special object to which the legislative act is
directed but the vehicle for the expressions of that meaning is the statute, considered as one entire and
continuous act, and not as an agglomeration of unrelated clauses . Each clause or provision will be
illuminated by those which are cognate to it and by the general tenor of the whole statute and thus
obscurities and ambiguities may often be cleared up by the most direct and natural means. Secondly, effect
must be given, if it is possible, to every word and clause of the statute, so that nothing shall be left devoid of
meaning or destitute of force. To this end, each provision of the statute should be read in the light of the
whole. For the general meaning of the legislature, as gathered from the entire act, may often prevail over the
construction which would appear to be the most natural and obvious on the face of a particular clause. It is
by this means that contradiction and repugnance between the different parts of the statute may be
avoided. (See Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., pp. 317-319).
Resorting to extrinsic aids, the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 3630, which was subsequently enacted as
Republic Act No. 1899, reads:
In order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the Philippines, it is necessary that
harbor facilities be correspondingly improved, and, where necessary, expanded and developed. The
national government is not in a financial position to handle all this work. On the other hand, with a
greater autonomy, many chartered cities and provinces are financially able to have credit position
which will allow them to undertake these projects. Some cities, such as the City of Bacolod under
R.A. 161, has been authorized to reclaim foreshore lands bordering it.
Other cities and provinces have continuously been requesting for authority to reclaim foreshore
lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern, and to undertake work to establish, construct on the
reclaimed area and maintain such port facilities as may be necessary. In order not to unduly delay
the undertaking of these projects, and inorder to obviate the passage of individual pieces of
legislation for every chartered city and province, it is hereby recommended that the accompanying
bill be approved. It covers Authority for All chartered cities and provinces to undertake this work. x x
x (underscoring supplied)
Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and construing the provisions of R.A. 1899, then
Secretary of Justice Mabanag opined:
It is clear that the Bacolod City pattern was the basis of the enactment of the aforementioned bill
of general application. This so-called Bacolod City pattern appears to be composed of 3 parts,
namely: Republic Act No. 161, which grants authority to Bacolod City to undertake or carry out ... the
reclamation ... of any [sic] carry out the reclamation project conformably with Republic Act No. 161;
and Republic Act No. 1132 authorizing Bacolod City to contract indebtedness or to issue bonds in
the amount not exceeding six million pesos to finance the reclamation of land in said city.
Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the precise space therein referred to as foreshore
lands, but it provided that docking and harbor facilities should be erected on the reclaimed portions
thereof, while not conclusive would indicate that Congress used the word foreshore in its broadest

sense. Significantly, the plan of reclamation of foreshore drawn up by the Bureau of Public Works
maps out an area of approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the boundaries of which clearly extend
way beyond Websters limited concept of the term foreshore. As a contemporaneous construction by
that branch of the Government empowered to oversee at least, the conduct of the work, such an
interpretation deserves great weight. Finally, Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 1132
(supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and approved the Bureaus interpretation of the term
foreshore when instead of taking the occasion to correct the Bureau of over extending its plan, it
authorized the city of Bacolod to raise the full estimated cost of reclaiming the total area covered by
the plan. The explanatory note to House Bill No. 1249 which became Republic Act No. 1132 states
among the things:
The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a plan for the reclamation of about 1,600,000 square meters of land at
an estimated costs of about P6,000,000.00. The project is self-supporting because the proceeds from the sales or
leases of lands so reclaimed will be more than sufficient to cover the cost of the project.
Consequently, when Congress passed Republic Act No. 1899 in order to facilitate the reclamation by local
governments of foreshore lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern and in order to obviate the passage of
individual pieces of legislation for every chartered city and provinces requesting authority to undertake such projects,
the lawmaking body could not have had in mind the limited area described by Webster as foreshore lands. x x x.
If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the strict literal meaning of foreshore lands which
may be reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities, Congress would have excluded the cities of Manila,
Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA 1899 as suggested by Senator Cuenco during
the deliberation of the bill considering that these cities do not have foreshore lands in the strict meaning of
the term. Yet, Congress did not approve the proposed amendment of Senator Cuenco, implying therefore,
that Congress intended not to limit the area that may be reclaimed to the strict definition of foreshore lands.
The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was at that time the chief law officer and legal
adviser of the government and whose office is required by law to issue opinions for the guidance of the
various departments of the government, there being then no judicial interpretation to the contrary, is entitled
to respect (see Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 68 Phil. 912).
We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated February 3, 1965 in Ponce vs. Gomez (L21870) and Ponce vs. City of Cebu (L-2266 , by a unanimous vote of six (6) justices (the other five (5)
members deemed it unnecessary to express their view because in their opinion the questions raised
were not properly brought before the court), which in essence applied the strict dictionary meaning of
foreshore lands as used in RA 1899 in the case of the city of Cebu. But this was promulgated long after the
then Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered the above opinion on November 16, 1959 and long after RREC
has started the subject reclamation project.
Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the Supreme Court issued the aforementioned
Resolution, enacted RA 5187. In Sec. 3 (m) of said law, Congress appropriated money for the construction
of the seawall and limited access highway from the South boundary of the city of Manila to Cavite City, to the
South, and from the North boundary of the city of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan,
to theNorth (including the reclamation of foreshore and submerged areas ... provided ... that ... existing
projects and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged
lands shall be respected... This is a clear manifestation that Congress in enacting RA 1899, did not intend to
limit the interpretation of the term foreshore land to its dictionary meaning.
It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction given to a
former statute on the subject, and that the statute on the subject, and that the statute was enacted having in
mind the judicial construction that the prior enactment had received , or in the light of such existing judicial
decisions as have direct bearing upon it (see 50 Am. Jur., Sec. 321, pp. 312-313). But notwithstanding said
interpretation by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in the Ponce cases, Congress enacted a law covering the
same areas previously embraced in a RA 1899 (as mentioned earlier, cities without foreshore lands which
were sought to be excluded from the operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing that respect be
given the reclamation of not only foreshore lands but also of submerged lands signifying its non-conformity
to the judicial construction given to RA 1899. If Congress was in accord with the interpretation and
construction made by the Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have mentioned reclamation of foreshore
lands only in RA 5187, but Congress included submerged lands in order to clarify the intention on the grant
of authority to cities and municipalities in the reclamation of lands bordering them as provided in RA 1899. It
is, therefore, our opinion that it is actually the intention of Congress in RA 1899 not to limit the authority
granted to cities and municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands in its strict dictionary meaning but rather in its
wider scope as to include submerged lands.
The Petition is impressed with merit.

To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA 1899, the term
foreshore lands includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted,
the respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of foreshore lands, beyond the intentment of the
law, and against the recognized legal connotation of foreshore lands. Well entrenched, to the point of being
elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application. [16] So also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law being plain and unambiguous. [17] Then, too, opinions of the
Secretary of Justice are unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the law. [18] To repeat, the term
foreshore lands refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases, Foreshore)
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water
line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually
marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Websters Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the
term foreshore lands.
Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court dated February 3, 1965 in Ponce v.
Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) despite the enactment of Republic Act No. 5187 (RA 5187),
the relevant portion of which, reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south boundary of the City of Manila
to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of
Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged areas:
Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shall
be given to any corporation and/or corporations that may offer to undertake at its own expense such
projects, in which case the President of the Philippines may, after competitive bidding, award contracts for
the construction of such projects, with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid
in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the
contractor and shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law
concerning disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, finally,
that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the
reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected. x x x.
There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to broaden the scope of
foreshore lands. The said law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It is an Appropriations Act, entitled AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR PUBLIC WORKS, SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC
WORKS APPROPRIATIONS.
All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was said in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v.
City of Cebu (L-22669) that the term foreshore refers to that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. As opined by this Court in said cases:
WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Dizon and
Jose P. Bengzon) opine that said city ordinance and contracts are ultra vires and hence, null and void,
insofar as the remaining 60% of the area aforementioned, because the term foreshore lands as used in
Republic Act No. 1899 should be understood in the sense attached thereto by common
parlance; (underscoring ours)
The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his opinion dated December
22, 1966, in a case with analogous facts as the present one, to wit:
December 22, 1966
The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:

xxx
I. Facts 1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1899, the Municipality of Navotas
enacted Ordinance No. 1 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into a reclamation contract with Mr.
Chuanico.
2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded between the Municipality of Navotas,
represented by the Municipal Mayor, and Mr. Chuanico in accordance with the above
ordinance. Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in prosecuting the
reclamation project and shall advance the money needed therefor; that the actual expenses incurred shall
be deemed a loan to the Municipality; that Mr. Chuanico shall have the irrevocable option to buy 70% of the
reclaimed area at P7.00 per square meter; that he shall have the full and irrevocable powers to do any and
all things necessary and proper in and about the premises, including the power to hire necessary personnel
for the prosecution of the work, purchase materials and supplies, and purchase or lease construction
machineries and equipment, but any and all contracts to be concluded by him in behalf of the Municipality
shall be submitted to public bidding.
xxx
3. On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed Resolution No. 22 approving and ratifying
the contract.
xxx
III. Comments 1. The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis of Navotas Ordinance No. 1 which, in turn,
had been enacted avowedly pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899. This being so, the contract, in order to be
valid, must conform to the provisions of the said law.
By authorizing local governments to execute by administration any reclamation work, (Republic Act No.
1899 impliedly forbids the execution of said project by contract. Thus, in the case of Ponce et al. vs. Gomez
(February 3, 1966), five justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul the contract between Cebu
Development Corporation and Cebu City for the reclamation of foreshore lands because the provisions of
said ... contract are not ... in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 1899, as against one
Justice who opined that the contract substantially complied with the provisions of the said law. (Five Justices
expressed no opinion on this point.)
Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially similar to the Cebu reclamation contract, it is
believed that the former is likewise fatally defective.
2. The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction of a channel along the Manila Bay periphery
of that town and the reclamation of approximately 650 hectares of land from said channel to a seaward
distance of one kilometer. In the basic letter it is stated that practically, all the 650 hectares of lands
proposed to be reclaimed under the agreement do not constitute foreshore lands and that the greater portion
of the area . . . is in fact navigable and presently being used as a fishing harbor by deep-sea fishing
operators as well as a fishing ground of sustenance fisherman. Assuming the correctness of these
averments, the Navotas reclamation contract evidently transcends the authority granted under Republic Act
No. 1899, which empowers the local governments to reclaim nothing more than foreshore lands, i.e., that
part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the
tides. (26 C.J. 890.) It was for this reason that in the cited case Ponce case, the Supreme Court, by a vote of
6-0 with five Justices abstaining, declared ultra vires and void the contractual stipulation for the reclamation
of submerged lands off Cebu City, and permanently enjoined its execution under Republic Act No. 1899.
xxx
In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the view that the Navotas reclamation contract
is not binding and should be disregarded for non-compliance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE
Secretary of Justice
The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate Justice, and later Chief Justice, of this
Court, did, in our considered view, supersede the earlier opinion of former Justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag,

aforestated, as the cases, in connection with which subject opinions were sought, were with similar facts. The said
Teehankee opinion accords with RA 1899.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158,
and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
thereforeultra vires and null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public bidding.
Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had really reclaimed 55 hectares. The
letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by RREC is no proof at all that RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said
letter was just referring to a tentative schedule of work to be done by RREC, even as it required RREC to submit the
pertinent papers to show its supposed accomplishment, to secure approval by the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways to the reclamation plan, and to submit to a public bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for subject
reclamation project but RREC never complied with such requirements and conditions sine qua non.
No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or specifications of the reclamation project
were presented to reflect any accomplishment. Not even any statement or itemization of works accomplished by
contractors or subcontractors or vouchers and other relevant papers were introduced to describe the extent of RRECs
accomplishment. Neither was the requisite certification from the City Engineer concerned that portions of the
reclamation project not less than 50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished or completed obtained and
presented by RREC.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done by RREC, and extent thereof, as of
April 26, 1962. Not a single contractor, sub-contractor, engineer, surveyor, or any other witness involved in the alleged
reclamation work of RREC testified on the 55 hectares supposedly reclaimed by RREC. What work was done, who did
the work, where was it commenced, and when was it completed, was never brought to light by any witness before the
court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay City to show and point out the as yet unidentified 55
hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But this burden of proof RREC and Pasay City miserably failed to discharge.
So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the complaint of plaintiff-appellant, now
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, the lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would
become effective only as soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have
submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public Works, and shall have obtained
approval thereof, and as soon as corresponding public bidding for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor that
will undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected. (Rollo, pp. 127-129, G.R. No. 103882)
From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City never complied with such
prerequisites for the lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction. Consequently, RREC had no authority to resume its
reclamation work which was stopped by said writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962.
From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked Exhibit 21-A for RREC before the lower
court, and Exhibit EE for CCP before the Court of Appeals, it can be deduced that only on November 26, 1960 did
RREC contract out the dredging work to C and A Construction Company, Inc., for the reclamation of the 55 hectares
initially programmed to be reclaimed by it. But, as stated by RREC itself in the position paper filed with this Court on
July 15, 1997, with reference to CDCPs reclamation work, mobilization of the reclamation team would take one year
before a reclamation work could actually begin. Therefore, the reclamation work undertaken by RREC could not have
started before November 26, 1961.
Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from proceeding any further with its reclamation work, it
had barely five (5) months, from November, 1961 to April, 1962, to work on subject reclamation project. It was thus
physically impossible for RREC to reclaim 55 hectares, with the stipulated specifications and elevation, in such a brief
span of time. In the report of RREC (Exhibit DD for CCP), it was conceded that due to the writ of preliminary injunction
issued on April 26, 1962, C and A Construction Co., Inc. had suspended its dredging operation since May, 1962.
The graphical report on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of April 30, 1962, attached to the Progress Report
marked Exhibit DD, is a schematic representation of the work accomplishment referred to in such Progress
Report,indicating the various elevations of the land surface it embraced, ranging from 0.00 meters to the highest
elevation of 2.5 meters above MLLW. Such portrayal of work accomplished is crucial in our determination of whether
or not RREC had actually reclaimed any land as under its Contract for Dredging Work with C and A Construction
Company (Exhibit EE), the required final elevation for a completely reclaimed land was 3.5 meters above MLLW, as
explicitly provided in said Contract for Dredging Work. So, the irresistible conclusion is - when the work on subject
RREC-Pasay City reclamation project stopped in April, 1962 in compliance with the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court of origin, no portion of the reclamation project worked on by RREC had reached the stipulated
elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW. The entire area it worked on was only at sea level or 0.00 meter above MLLW. In
short, RREC had not yet reclaimed any area when the writ of preliminary injunction issued in April 1962.
On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio, Architect and Managing partner of Leandro V.
Locsin and partners, Architect and City Planner Manuel T. Maoza, Jr. of Planning Resources and Operation System,
Inc., Rose D. Cruz, Executive Assistant, Office of the President, from 1966 to 1970, and Dr. Lucrecia Kasilag, National
Artist and member of CCP Advisory Committee, come to the fore. These credible, impartial and knowledgeable

witnesses recounted on the witness stand that when the construction of the Main Building of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface land available was the site for the said building (TSN, Sept. 29,
1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could be seen in front of and behind it was all water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages
127-128). When the CCP Main Building was being constructed, from 1966 to 1969, the land above sea level thereat
was only where the CCP Main Building was erected and the rest of the surroundings were all under water, particularly
the back portion fronting the bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp. 181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr. Lucrecia R. Kasilag stressed
that on April 16, 1966, during the ground breaking for the CCP Main Building, it was water all around (TSN, Sept. 30,
1997, pp. 320, 324, 325).
There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order and declare that the requirement by
the trial court on public bidding and the submission of RRECs plans and specification to the Department of Public
Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for
being moot and academic. Said requirement has never become moot and academic. It has remained indispensable,
as ever, and non-compliance therewith restrained RREC from lawfully resuming the reclamation work under
controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the decision in its favor.
Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed any area with the prescribed
elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much so that in 1978, it (RREC) opted to file with the former Ministry of Public
Highways, a claim for compensation of P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly done before the CDCP started
working on the reclamation of the CCP grounds. On September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to settle
its subject claim for compensation at the same amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June 10, 1981, guided by the cost
data, work volume accomplished and other relevant information gathered by the former Ministry of Public Highways,
the Solicitor General informed RREC that the value of what it had accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was
only P8,344,741.29, and the expenses for mobilization of equipment amounted to P2,581,330.00.The aforesaid
evaluation made by the government, through the then Minister of Public Highways, is factual and realistic, so much so
that on June 25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor General, stated:
We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of P10,926,071.29, based on 1962 cost data, etc., as
compensation based on quantum meruit. The least we would consider is the amount of P10.926,071.29 plus
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We feel that 6% is very much less than
the accepted rate of inflation that has supervened since 1962 to the present, and even less than the present
legal rate of 12% per annum.[19]
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was payment for what it had done, and for the dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic
meters it used, on subject reclamation project.
Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the following titled lots, to wit:
LOT NO. BUILDING AREA OCT/TCT
42 Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the Restaurant name of GSIS
3 Asean Garden 76,299 sq.m. OCT 10251 in the
name of CCP
12 Folk Arts Theater 1.7503 sq.m. TCT 18627 in the
and PICC parking name of CCP
space
22 landscaped with 132,924 sq.m. TCT 75676 in the
sculpture of Asean name of CCP
Artists-site of
Boom na Boom
23 open space, back 34,346 sq.m. TCT 75677 in the
of Philcite name of CCP
24 Parking space for 10,352 sq.m. TCT 75678 in the
Star City, CCP, name of CCP
Philcite
25 open space, 11,323 sq.m. TCT 75679 in the
occupied by Star name of CCP
City
28 open space, 27,689 sq.m. TCT 75684 in the
beside PICC name of CCP

29 open space, 106,067 sq.m. TCT 75681 in the

leased by El name of CCP
Shaddai
We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor. In the first place, in their answer to the Complaint and
Amended Complaint below, RREC and Pasay City never prayed for the transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to
which had long become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP and GSIS, respectively.
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the said lots is of no moment. It did
not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right superior to the absolute ownership thereover of CCP and
GSIS.Besides, the nature of the action did not really warrant the issuance of a notice of lis pendens.
Section 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. - In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the
plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said
notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a
purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the
pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery
of possession or ownership of a parcel of land. In the present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the
main case, did not counterclaim for the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned.
What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether
fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. (Halili vs. National
LaborRelations Commission, 257 SCRA 174; Cimafranca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA
611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of
title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding instituted in accordance with law.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area within subject
reclamation project, it appearing that something compensable was accomplished by them, following the applicable
provision of law and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one, not even the government, shall unjustly enrich
oneself/itself at the expense of another [20], we believe; and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the
said actual work done and dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29, as verified by the former Ministry of Public
Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted letter dated June 25, 1981.
It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of tears, the court, for its herein historic
disposition, will be exalted by the future generations of Filipinos, for the preservation of the national patrimony and
promotion of our cultural heritage. As writer Channing rightly puts it: Whatever expands the affections, or enlarges the
sphere of our sympathies - Whatever makes us feel our relation to the universe and all that it inherits in time and in
eternity, and to the great and beneficent cause of all, must unquestionably refine our nature, and elevate us in the
scale of being.
WHEREFORE:
In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision, dated January 28, 1992, and Amended Decision,
dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals, are both SET ASIDE; and Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6,
1958, and Ordinance No. 158, dated April 21, 1959, as well as the Reclamation Agreements entered into by Pasay
City and Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) as authorized by said city ordinances, are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires, and contrary to Rep. Act 1899.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the trial court a quo in Civil Case No. 2229-P is
made permanent, and the notice of lis pendens issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered
CANCELLED. The Register of Deeds of Pasay City is directed to take note of and annotate on the certificates of title
involved, the cancellation of subject notice of lis pendens.
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to pay Pasay City and Republic Real Estate
Corporation the sum of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND SEVENTY-ONE AND TWENTYNINE CENTAVOS (P10,926,071.29) PESOS, plus interest thereon of six (6%) percent per annum from May 1, 1962
until full payment, which amount shall be divided by Pasay City and RREC, share and share alike.
In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO.
INC., ETC.

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public
Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this
wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties
pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary
purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe
and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on
October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed
and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel
and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public
from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant
bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular
investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the
donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the
Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which
donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution
to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on
July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and
since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims,
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30
years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and
affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and
Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since
time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the
right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension
that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in
1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was
already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration
proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the
other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set
of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of
which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been
possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a
juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be
given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand)
alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b).
The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2 thruSusi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed,
the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree,
but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through
his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said
Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land
over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela
Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and
affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land
Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and

registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put
in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme
had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that
matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land
Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in
the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public
land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only
limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested
before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held,
in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of
Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time
the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII
of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change
in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to
doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as
simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting
the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of
Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either
the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases
already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act,
as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it

was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition
against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of
the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves
applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to
Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no
precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as
the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect
title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV,
Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be
considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the
time (from July 26, 1894 in Susiunder the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent
to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an
effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-

cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views andratio
decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of
the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but agrant of
the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi hadacquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and hadbecome private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his
authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words
'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to
do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to
adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982
(when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription
of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a
certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed inHerico supra,
"the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the
aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit
of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous
assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time
immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments
redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon,
Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had beenipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the
Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and
issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been
the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to
recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish
and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on
December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a
technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The
ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to
conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public

Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and
sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the
majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the
particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal
question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in
the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the
application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such
disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are
sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner
and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation
or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required
statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully
transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as
stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because ofacquisitive prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by
the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so
converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about
way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the
technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of
five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly
applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of

Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the
Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts
for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. CastroBartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of
the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and
now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply
for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d
688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or
the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the
general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may
be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied,
where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is
general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs.
Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to
take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or
defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982]
and related cases.