IN RE: GERTRUDIS ABANGAN vs .

ANASTACIA ABANGAN

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 13431. November 12, 1919.]
In re will of Ana Abangan. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrixappellee, vs. ANASTACIA ABANGAN ET AL., opponents-appellants.

Filemon Sotto for appellants.

M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.
WILLS; ATTESTATION. In a will consisting of two sheets the rst of
which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by
the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged.
2.
ID.; ID; TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE. The testator's signature is not
necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains
only to the witnesses and not to the testator.
3.
ID.; DIALECT IN WHICH WRITTEN; PRESUMPTION. The
circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of
Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is
enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew
this dialect in which her will is written.
DECISION
AVANCEA, J :
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On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to

probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the
opponents appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets,
the rst of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the
bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the
testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental
witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix

and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions,
according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will
should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted
to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on
the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other,
Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object
(referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said
sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions
are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said
sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the
margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will
written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the
testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A dierent
interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already
signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an
intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses
in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of
the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would
be unnecessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, axed on another
part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute
regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must
sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the
bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the
margin, give sufficient security.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear
that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been
removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written .on one sheet
only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single
sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore,
without considering whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we
hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the
testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the
pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover,
referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not
necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains
only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but
executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the
rst of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the
bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is
not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator

and the witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on
the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that
the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance
appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the
dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the
absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in
which this will is written.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.