SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

The sino- Indian border dispute dates back to the British period. The Britishers while annexing parts of
India, also annexed parts of china and ruled them. The 1914 Shimla Agreement between British India and
china delineated Mc Mohan line and Tibet.
The gain of independence for India made border dispute complex. But, the panchasheel Agreement in
1954 between India and china somehow controlled the air of suspicion and conflict. However, the refugee
given to Dalai Lama in 1959, again deteriorated the relations and led to the 1962 Indoa-china war., where
china occupied Arunachal and Aksa chin. Consequently the troops were withdrawn from Arunachal but
continued to hold Aksa chin.The aftermath of 1962 witnessed a strain in bilateral relations. But, later on
relations improved significantly.
However, there are some skirmishes along the LAC. The recent 'Depsang
incident' is a case in point. Also, the stapled visas issued by china authorities to Arunachal people, to
signal that it is a part of china is also an example.
The Sino Indian border dispute comprises of the dispute in the northern side over Aksai Chin, and to the
south over the McMahon Line.
Origins
The dispute over Aksai Chin originated after the Sino Indian war of 1962, where it was captured by the
Chinese. Since then, both sides have signed agreements to respect the Line of Actual Control which
demarcates the borders as they stand now.
To the South, China refuses to accept the McMahon line which demarcates the border, since in believes it
did not agree to the Shimla Agreement of 1912.
Dimensions:
These areas are the world biggest border disputes without any bloodshed, since the Indo Chinese war.
That is not to say that they are in any way settled. There are frequent violations, as seen recently in the
Daulat Beg Odie and Depsang incidents, where Chinese forces transgressed into the Indian side, and later
on retreated and issues like stapled visas.
This can be seen as the Chinese border strategy, where they do not accept to cede the territory to India,
and at the same time want any settlement to be postponed to future generations.
Implications:
India believes in the settlement of disputes to be based on "ground realities". The Chinese military
modernization plan by 2050, its ever accelerating growth, may constrain the negotiating space for India in
the future.
But at the same time, any settlement negotiations for the time being have reached an impasse with both
sides refusing to bulge.
There have been developments, in form of Common Border Mechanisms, signed in 1993, 1998 and more
recently in 2013, which provide mechanisms for peaceful settlement of territorial violations, and help
stymie escalation of disputes and build trust.

But this does not mean that India can cut back on its preparedness. The incessant building of
infrastructure by the chinese on its side for greater army mobility and bridging the trust deficit with its
people should be met by reciprocal measure by India.
The best way for India to increase its negotiating space will be to keep at par with the Chinese with stable
and inclusive development, along with a capable military. The stability of our democracy is our greatest
strength, and it should be used to bridge the trust deficit, provide inclusive growth and build greater
people to people contacts.
Recently concluded BDCA is a step ahead in the CBM measures.