United States vs Pons

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 10, 1915 the steamer
Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The
said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels
to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25
barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso
not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby
discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained 520 tins of opium
(amounting to 125 kg of opium valued P62,400). Since the act of trading and
dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally
and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the
Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while
the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses
claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special
session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this
is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to
determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD:
Act No. 1679 provides the Sec of the Commission to perform duties required of the
recorder of commission under the existing law.
Rules 15 & 16 provides that proceedings of the commission shall be briefly and
accurately stated in the journal.
Therefore, the Philippine Assembly must keep a journal of its proceedings which
then should be published. And it appears in the journal that Act 2381 was signed
on February 28, 1914 when the assembly adjourned.
Section 275 of Code of Civil Procedure provides that official acts of legislative,
executive and judiciary shall be judicially recognized by the court w/o introduction of
proof, may receive subjects to which they may resort to find aid, through
appropriate documents, books or evidence.
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due

weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28,
1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond
these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this
particular case.
CASCO Philippine Chemical Co. vs Gimenez
FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange margin Fee
Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% foreign
exchange transactions. Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., a
manufacturer of resin glues, had bought foreign exchange for the importation of
urea and formaldehyde raw materials for the said glues and were thus paying for
the margin fees required.
Relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring
that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said
fee, the petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees that had been paid. This
was denied by the Auditor of the said Bank stating that the claim was not in accord
with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. 2609.
ISSUE: Whether urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of
the aforesaid margin fee
HELD/RULING:
Urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from law.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section
one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. (Emphasis provided.)
Urea formaldehyde is different from urea and formaldehyde, the former being a
finished product. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts
as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. The courts cannot speculate that there had been an error in the printing
of the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there have

been any error in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.
Astorga vs Villegas
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department
heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of
Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense,
Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and
Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered
to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the
lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to
the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then
Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred
back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino
made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate.
The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the
latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was
later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the
lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong
version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the
version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this
fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of
the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains
that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal
can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC

can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate
such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC
also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made
into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that
the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring
about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
PHILIPPINES JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its
title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the
bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage;
and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that
if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies
is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207,
PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or
House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee
Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners
also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences
thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among
the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a governmentcontrolled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit
of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and
the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be
prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that
need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
Vera vs Avelino
FACTS

It was stated in the report submitted concerning the national elections, that certain
acts of terrorism and violence were recorded in provinces of Pampanga, Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac and the voting in the said region does not reflect thetrue
expression of the popular will. (They were coerced or intimidated to vote for the
candidate that these lawless elements are vying for)
A resolution was approved referring to the said report, which orders the termination
of protest against the election of Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero (who
was included to those who received the highest number of votes), which hinders
them from taking oath and be seated in the Congress. These protest were filed in
the electoral tribunal of the Senate of the Philippines
The petitioners prayed for an order to annul the said resolution and to permit them
to occupy their seats.
The court ruled that they have no jurisdiction over the said case, as decided in
Alejandrino vs Quezon. The court cannot decide or impel the legislative in
actions/decisions that are purely legislative in character, which pertains to their
functions where they have the exclusive control. They cannot do so without
usurping the power of their co-equal branch (which is unconstitutional , by virtue of
separation of powers). This includes the decisions of expelling a member of the
House, whether it was right or wrong. [Hands-off policy]
The court asserted the validity of Pendatun Resolution
Vera vs Avelino Case Digest

FACTS:
Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the
Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the
previous month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and
violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum
resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on
Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the
termination of the of the protest lodged against their election.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues
responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling
respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial

prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over
contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the
validity of the pendatun resolution.

ISSUES:
1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or
not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.
2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and
Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests
lodged against their elections.

RULING:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers,
holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
Case dismissed.

Abbas vs SET
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the
time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators.
Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking
in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to
said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair
play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To
accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may
adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who
would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no SenatorMember of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that
no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
BONDOC VS PINEDA
In the elections held on May 11, 1987,Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio
Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth
District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9
members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the
House of Representatives (5members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the

NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the
promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP
members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart
the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest
pending therein
Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral
Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As
judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to
party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of
the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is thatit violates
Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole
judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member
may