1. The Unites States vs.

Ancieto Barrias,
G.R. No. 4349, September 24, 1908
FACTS:
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the
Collector of Customs to regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage
is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or
cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the
Collector may promulgate such rules to implement Act No. 1136.
Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it
should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector
of Customs promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River
using a lighter which is manually powered by bamboo poles (sagwan).
Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular,
only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig
River. However, in the information against Barrias, it was alleged that
the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding
P500.00 at the discretion of the court this was pursuant to Circular
No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons
offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more
than P500, in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular
as it is entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136
which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that
time the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 397 of the Collector of Customs, imposing
a penalty higher than that provided by Congress in Act No. 1136, is in
accordance with the delegated legislative power.
HELD:
No. The Commissioner cannot impose a range of penalty different from
that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in
effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by
that department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power
of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by
the constitutional agency alone that the laws must be made until the
constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not
relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon
which the power shall be developed, nor can it substitutes the
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to
which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a power
exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in
accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this
case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.
2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and the HONG
KONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) v. JOSE
VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16,
1937
A. FACTS:
Mairano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime
filed against him. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
5yrs and 6mos of prision correccional to 7yrs, 6mos and 27days of
prision mayor. Final judgment was entered.
On appeal, the SC denied Cu Unjiengs petition and likewise his
petition for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration
or new trial, then remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of judgment.
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court,
under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature.

He stated that he is innocent of the crime; he has no criminal record;

and that he would observe good conduct in the future.
CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation.
HSBC, the private complainant, questioned the authority of Judge
Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the constitutionality of the
Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives
unlawful and improper delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards.
Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.

B. FACTS:
Mariano Cu Unjieng applied for probation under the provisions of Act
No. 4421, otherwise known as The Probation Act upon the finality of
the Judgment of his conviction. Original action for certiorari and
prohibition was filed by HSBC to prohibit the Court of First Instance
of Manila from taking further action in entertaining the aforementioned application for probation on the ground that Act No. 4421
is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
The challenged provision of the said Act was Section 11 thereof which
reads: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in question
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power

constitutes

an

HELD:
Yes. For the purpose of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may
be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine
when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. An
examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance
but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the
presence or absence of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency
thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted
discretion.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid
if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it. The Probation Act does
not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. By Section 11 of the Act, the legislature,
does not seemingly, on its own authority extend the benefits of

the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply
to their provinces or not at all.
The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act
is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to the SC
justices minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.
The true distinctions, says Judge Ranney , is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned
with the simple transference of details of execution or the
promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. It is true that
laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a
particular community. The legislature may delegate a power not
legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is
nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
The legislature, then may provide that a law shall take effect upon the
happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other
person or body the power to determine when the specified
contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has
not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon
specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board.
It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-

operation of the law upon the provincial board. The discretion vested
is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited.
A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any
fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is
bound by no rule limited by no principle of expediency
announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration
certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have
any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason
whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the
salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely
at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time we cannot say
when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the
salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation
in the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its
taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon
the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of
certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than
legislature itself.

3. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, et al.

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the
Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Executive Order No.
797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter.
Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of Memorandum
Circular No. 21 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
1

It prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the
hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the
National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a violation of the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power.
Whether or not Eastern Shipping was denied due process because the
same POEA which issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also
sustained and applied it.
HELD:
None. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there
is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three
major powers of the Government but is especially important in the
case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its
delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or
judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they
legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such
occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This
had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified
its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the

legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct
and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and
more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known
as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been
applied in a significant number of cases without challenge by the
employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National
Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited
as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in
the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasilegislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate
implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau
of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the
Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange

Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office

and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on
ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an
arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern
governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long
as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations2 are observed.

4. Dionisio Rabor v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995
FACTS:
Dionisio Rabor was advised by Ms. Pagatpatan, an official of the Office
of the Mayor of Davao City, to apply for retirement, considering that he
had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7)
months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government
service.
Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership" issued by the Government Service Insurance System
("GSIS") where at the bottom is a typewritten statement of the
following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts."
This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following
date "2/28/91."
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte was advised by Director Cawad (CSRO-XI) that
Mr. Rabors extension of service is contrary to Memorandum Circular
No. 65 of the Office of the President providing the compulsory
2

The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that it can in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

retirement age of 65 years old for government officials and employees

and that they should not be retained in the service except for
extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months. Director Cawad further advised Mayor Duterte
that Mr. Rabors service is already non-extendible.
Accordingly, Mr. Rabor was advised to stop reporting for work in
accordance with the letter of Director Cawad. Mr. Rabor sought
reconsideration invoking the Cena doctrine, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 is a valid exercise
of delegated legislative power
HELD:
Yes. "It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively
to
Congress,
nevertheless,
the
latter
may
constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying
the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that
the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes."
This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect to CSC MC No.
27. The SC considered Administrative Code of 1987 (Civil Service Law)
and PD No. 1146 as the enabling statutes that should be
approximately examined. For the matter of extension of service of
retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is
covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146.
This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the
present civil service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987
Administrative Code provides the powers and function of the CSC and

it was on the bases of said powers and functions of the 1987

Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated
its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was
acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered
to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient,
responsive and effective personnel administration in the government."
It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement
program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing]
qualifications for retirement."
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987
Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in the
development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the
Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the
constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the
regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of
government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).
The SC find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of
permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not
germane to the [foregoing] provisions of the present Civil Service
Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated
with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency
and quality of the service that may be expected from individual
persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil Service
Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable
for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her
dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service
Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for
longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in
the government service and in effect discriminate against those who
enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter
and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for
employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have
already passed the various government examination but must wait for
jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory
retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service
to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension.

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in

Cena, very strange results follow. Under these combined
doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed
to the government service and one (1) year later may demand
extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would
retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the
general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five
(65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes
unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to
embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turnover in the government service and that opportunities for
government service should be distributed as broadly as possible,
specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our
population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general
policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still
significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in
Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby
modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby
declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,
accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We
reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the
government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to
allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee
who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen
(15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

5. ABAKADA vs. PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

FACTS:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau

of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC

officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in
excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any
incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR
and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Department Of Finance (DOF), Dept. of Budget and Management
(DBM), National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), Bureau Of Customs (BOC) and the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
ABAKADA Guro Party list, et al., invoking their right as taxpayers filed
this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation.
They contend, among others, that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least
7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be
achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for
the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to
dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Further, ABAKADA Guro Party List assailed the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President
HELD:
No. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:
(1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative
policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy
of the law, Section 4 fix revenue targets, while Section 7 specifies the
limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under
which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of
the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in
the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role
in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national
policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can
itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in

conformity with those standards. In the latter case, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or
the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and
regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary
rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making).
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce
have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding
as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have
the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of
RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.