LIGAYA MANIAGO vs ATTY. LOURDES I.

DE
DIOS,
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint
dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for
engaging in the practice of law despite having been
suspended by the Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case
against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City,
Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
603, docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The
accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with
office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo
City. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff
that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension
order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was,
therefore, prohibited from appearing in court.
Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case
(Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case
(Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against
Miyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134,
where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel.
Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be
disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant
violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful
order of the Supreme Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there
were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She,
however, denied that she was under suspension when
she appeared as his counsel in the cases.
Respondent explained that an administrative case was
indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman,
docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the
penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the
suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts
Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16,
2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001,
respondent formally informed the Court that she was
resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001,
which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her
capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC,
Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on
March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from
practicing law and revoking her notarial commission
for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the
directive was rather questionable, respondent,
nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due
deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent
filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme
Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all
courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities
in Zambales, which gave the impression that Atty. De
Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of law
and that her notarial commission for the years 2007
and 2008 is revoked. Acting on the said motion, the
Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this
wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I.
De Dios) Respondents Urgent Motion for
Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the
Court declare her to have served her six (6) months
(sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice
on 17 November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court
resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have
SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her

recommencement of law practice on 17 November

2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30
January 2002.

Respondent averred that for the period stated in the

affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she
allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended
nor in any way prohibited from practice. The
complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious,
and should be dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the
Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the
complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating
therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De
Dios and the particular courts where respondent
appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1)
Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 3550-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a
Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which
reads:
2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang]
mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9,
2003, na [naka-]attach ang Certification mula sa
Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang]
mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October 10,
2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa
Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. At
sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty.
de Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggang
ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang
Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the Session ng
Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay
nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No. 04201 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versusSimeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001.
5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni
Atty. de Dios, x x x 5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios
noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs.
Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito
ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1) araw pa lamang
mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g]
May 16, 2001.
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May
18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. Perla
Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil
Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang (2) araw mula
magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong
May 16, 2001.
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a)
affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista noong
May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica
Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c) isang
Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May
16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawa
noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios
noong May 16, 2001.

6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito

bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa aking
personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak
ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de Dios ang
kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of
Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na
may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni
Atty. de Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspension
noong May 16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by
respondent, stating that there were no new matters
raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting
that the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina
B. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12
February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution
dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court.
According to her, the resolution should be the final
nail to the coffin of this case.
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its
Memorandum for the Courts consideration.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by
complainant in her affidavit was the OBCs reply to
an inquiry made by the Office of the Court
Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.
[1] Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of
the suspension order was not automatic, following
the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus
and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty.
Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al.
and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G.
Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands
until he would have satisfactorily shown his
compliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat that
his suspension could thereby extend for more than six
months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not
automatic upon the end of the period stated in the
Courts decision, and an order from the Court lifting
the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in
order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his
profession.[2]

Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer

must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he
has indeed desisted from the practice of law during
the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after
evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation
from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order
of suspension and thus allow him to resume the
practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was
unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in
A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to
resume her practice of law without submitting the
required certifications and passing through the OBC
for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and
conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC
recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy
on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension
of a lawyer from the practice of law.
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of
the OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not
a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court
to exact compliance with the lawyers public

responsibilities.[3] Whenever it is made to appear

that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes
not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw that privilege.[4] However, as much as the
Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer,
it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer
may not be deprived of the freedom and right to
exercise his profession unreasonably.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby

RESOLVED that the following guidelines be
observed in the matter of the lifting of an order
suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1)
After a finding that respondent
lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law,
the Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;
2)
Unless the Court explicitly states
that the decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which
to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final
and executory;
3)
Upon the expiration of the period
of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the
Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has
desisted from the practice of law and has not
appeared in any court during the period of his or her
suspension;
4)
Copies of the Sworn Statement
shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and
to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5)
The Sworn Statement shall be
considered as proof of respondents compliance with
the order of suspension;
6)
Any finding or report contrary to
the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall
be a ground for the imposition of a more severe
punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
SO ORDERED.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR.,
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
OF IBP DUES.
This is a request for exemption from payment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner
sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the
amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged
that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service
from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was
working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's
profession while in government service, and neither

can he be assessed for the years when he was

working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the
IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its
comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the
IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of
Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of
the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is
the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the
Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of
imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld
as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar
Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of
Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is
but an implementation of the Court's directives for all
members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of
integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no
rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual
dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed
is voluntary termination and reinstatement of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could
have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of
his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership
in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It
also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing proposals for the creation of an
inactive status for its members, which if approved by
the Board of Governors and by this Court, will
exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the
annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner
contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board
of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in
active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the
due process clause. He also posits that compulsory
payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he
has been in an inactive status and is without income
derived from his law practice. He adds that his
removal from nonpayment of annual membership
dues would constitute deprivation of property right
without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that
non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners,
to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the
community where the inactive lawyers-members
reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is
entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of
law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 19862003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by

which every member of the Bar is afforded an

opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under
the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject
to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility,
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of
every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to foster the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and in the integration
of the Philippine Bar8 - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they belong.
It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as
a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of
integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained
in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the
members does not mean that the Court is attempting
to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an
exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate
the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public
interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member
resulting from his required payment of the annual
dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of

membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of
dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the
IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or
the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows
exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have
informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have
been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated
that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive
status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound
to comply with his obligation to pay membership
dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the
penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on
one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re
Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in
the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause
to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law
is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of
the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,11 one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption
from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered
to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt
of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so
will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE
LAWYER'S
ASSOCIATION,
petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director
of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's
Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a
circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the
said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said
office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are
qualified to take the said examination. It would
appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine
Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the
cat of the respondent Director requiring members of
the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass
an examination given by the Patent Office as a
condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before said office, such as representing applicants in
the preparation and prosecution of applications for
patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the
Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the
practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so
much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only
by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training who pass
the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent
Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the
Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from
requiring further condition or qualification from
those who would wish to handle cases before the
Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding
paragraph, requires more of an application of
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with
Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United
States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a
similar examination as that prescribed by respondent.
...
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent
law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations
to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in

the past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a
required qualification to practice before the Patent
Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the
right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as
regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have
given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and
constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to
whether or not appearance before the patent Office
and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and social proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law
corporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
(1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179
A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such

appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for
patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases. In the first place,
although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical
and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such
business has to be rendered in accordance with the
Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation
and application of other laws and legal principles, as
well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.
For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides
that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health
or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not
be considered new or patentable if it was known or
used by others in the Philippines before the invention
thereof by the inventor named in any printed
publication in the Philippines or any foreign country
more than one year before the application for a patent
therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in
the Philippines for more than one year before the
application for the patent therefor. Section 10
provides that the right to patent belongs to the true
and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or
assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any
mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the
grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although
any person may apply for such cancellation, under
Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to
petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30
mentions the requirements of a petition for
cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice
of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the
patent by the Director of Patents in case the said
cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any
time after the expiration of three years from the day
the patent was granted, any person patent on several
grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not
being worked in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines is not being
met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if
by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license
on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition
attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or
machine of production, the establishment of a new
trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if
the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or
is necessary to public health or public safety. All
these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal
knowledge, training and experience for which a
member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the
business and many of the act, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a
reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61,
provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration
of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a
patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any
party to any other proceeding in the Office may

appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or

decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If
the transaction of business in the Patent Office and
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body,
but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or
technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the
consideration of the nature of the functions and acts
of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding
patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public
records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to
give authenticated copies to any person, on payment
of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis
supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original
initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting
and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide
whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper
subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or
refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on
an application the commissioner should decide not
only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of
the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis
supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial
or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal
knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or
necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of
technical men and scientist in the preparation of
papers and documents, such as, the drawing or
technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer
filing an application for the registration of a parcel of
land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a
plan and technical description of said land, prepared
by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly
authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an
examination, even if they are already members of the
bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent
Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which
he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He
invites our attention to the following provisions of
said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of
an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the
Patent Office on which are entered the names of all
persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants
before the Patent Office in the preparation and
prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in
the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice
before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good

standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of
these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will

be admitted to practice and register unless he shall
apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and
furnish all requested information and material; and
shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner
that he is of good moral character and of good repute
and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical
qualifications necessary to enable him to render
applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
presentation and prosecution of their application
before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory
proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
matters must be submitted and an examination which
is held from time to time must be taken and passed.
The taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules
of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent
Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules
and regulations governing the recognition of agents,
attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or
other parties before his office, and may require of
such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or other
persons, that they shall show they are of good moral
character and in good repute, are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are
likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants
or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of
their applications or other business before the Office.
The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either
generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or
attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or
guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply
with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or
threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word,
circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any
such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.
The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed
upon the petition of the person so refused recognition
or so suspended by the district court of the United
States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the said

court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis

supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions
of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to
prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit
to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of
comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by
far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold
examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While
the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess
the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their
clients in patent cases, which showing may take the
form of a test or examination to be held by the
Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent
on this important point. Our attention has not been
called to any express provision of our Patent Law,
giving such authority to determine the qualifications
of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code
authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not
inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service
and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section
608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the
Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of
said code. Section 338 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and
regulations have been promulgated not only for the
Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for
other bureaus of the Government, to govern the
transaction of business in and to enforce the law for
said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of
an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to
and pass on examination prescribed by it before they
are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then
there would be no reason why other bureaus specially
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where
the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation,
etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also

require that any lawyer practising before them or

otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law,
members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, for
the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasijudicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition
is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine
Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
same before being permitted to appear and practice
before the Patent Office. No costs.
VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY.
CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL
MARIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the April 30,
2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68080 which modified the order2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D.
Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner
Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151,
docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was
represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de
Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a
settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights
over their minor child and the separation of their
properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner
and both parties subsequently filed a motion for
approval of their agreement. This was approved by
the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage
between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared
null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels
were well-compensated.3 They, including their
relatives and friends, even availed of free products
and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic.
This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional
legal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which the
latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner
issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as
"full payment for settlement."6
Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial
court7 a motion

for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.8

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to
pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty.
Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount
as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to
Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
recourse.
The issues raised in this petition are:
(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had
jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees
and
(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional
legal fees.
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by
filing the necessary petition as an incident of the
main action in which his services were rendered or in
an independent suit against his client. The former is
preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.9
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the
declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had
jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal
fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million
which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the
properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly,
what respondents were demanding was additional
payment for legal services rendered in the same case.
Second, the professional engagement between
petitioner and respondents was governed by the
principle of quantum meruit which means "as much
as the lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of attorneys
fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where
there is no express agreement for the payment of
attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism
which prevents an unscrupulous client from running
away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel
without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids
unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies
with clients concerning their compensation and to
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be
avoided and should be filed only when circumstances
force lawyers to resort to it.11
In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of
their lawyers fees was not meant to collect what was
justly due them; the fact was, they had already been
adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums
and perks already given to them was an act of
unconscionable greed which is shocking to this
Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that
they are members of an honorable profession, the
primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents
despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad
name in the minds of some people. The vernacular
has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law
is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.12

Respondents claim for additional legal fees was not

justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based
on percentage, absent an express agreement to that
effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free
products and services from petitioners business
all of which were not denied by respondents more
than sufficed for the work they did. The "full
payment for settlement"13 should have discharged
petitioners obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the
award of attorneys fees cannot be denied. Lawyers
are officers of the Court and they participate in the
fundamental function of administering justice.14
When they took their oath, they submitted themselves
to the authority of the Court and subjected their
professional fees to judicial control. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 2002 in CAG.R. CV No. 68080 is
hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional
attorneys fees in favor of respondents is hereby
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial
A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then
President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article
III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency
and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name
from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to
the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP

President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3,
1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the
respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of
Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court
to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of
the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject
to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
SECTION 1.
Organization. There is hereby
organized an official national body to be known as
the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of
all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in
the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member
of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of
the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not

among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is

rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached
the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice
of law, define the conditions of such practice, or
revoke the license granted for the exercise of the
legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same
issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter
of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The
Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is
'perfectly
constitutional
and
legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture
of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying
out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to
bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar
is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject
to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously
dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more
than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the
personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of

the State the administration of justice as an

officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected
with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to
the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New
York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in
the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress
in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of
the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the
IBP into a body corporate through Presidential
Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted
by fundamental considerations of public welfare and
motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin
maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The
public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams,
70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5)
of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5)
Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Bar ...,

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even

without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of
the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests
the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the
legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise
of the said profession, which affect the society at
large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations
as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with
an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must
already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension,
however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1.
The first objection posed by the respondent
is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
right of freedom to associate (and not to associate).
Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the welldefined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a
sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of
this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

2.
The second issue posed by the respondent is
that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing
in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power
the respondent acknowledges from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to

pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses

of regulation of the profession to which they belong.
It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11
3.
The respondent further argues that the
enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and
hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause
to consider at length, as it clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law
is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of
the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
4.
Relative to the issue of the power and/or
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name
of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient
to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in
which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners
in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to
regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court
as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the
proper administration of justice ... the argument that
this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative
likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is
an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and
to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that
the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X,
Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of
Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are

neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the
unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE
USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ.
GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN
JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL
A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA,
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and
ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON,
MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO,
BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA,
JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC,
EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1)
by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,
who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving
partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names
of partners who had passed away. In the Court's
Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were
ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following
arguments:
1.
Under the law, a partnership is not
prohibited from continuing its business under a firm
name which includes the name of a deceased partner;
in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last
paragraph that: t.hqw
The use by the person or partnership continuing the
business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself
make the individual property of the deceased partner
liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership. 1
2.
In regulating other professions, such as
accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any
restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the
name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice
of accountancy a profession requiring the same
degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as
that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client
to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates
that there is no fundamental policy that is offended
by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a

firm name which includes the name of a deceased

partner, at least where such firm name has acquired
the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3.
The Canons of Professional Ethics are not
transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law
partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this
use. ... 4
4.
There is no possibility of imposition or
deception because the deaths of their respective
deceased partners were well-publicized in all
newspapers of general circulation for several days;
the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective
deceased partners were connected with the firm;
petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories of the fact of their
respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5.
No local custom prohibits the continued use
of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the
Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area,
which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the
firm. 7
6.
The continued use of a deceased partner's
name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an
accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came
under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law
firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of
including in its firm name that of a deceased partner,
C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this
Court advising the firm to desist from including in
their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston,
who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958
as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register
of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation.
The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to
intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the
Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it
"would like to be informed why the name of Perkins
is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is
already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21,
1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile,
raising substantially the same arguments as those
now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the
continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce
Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given by
Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for
their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G.
Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the
policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required
Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu
City to desist from including in their firm

designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased.

The Court believes that, in view of the personal and
confidential nature of the relations between attorney
and client, and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give
rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS"
from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the
policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from
the rulings thus laid down.
A.
Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use
in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil
Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1815.
Every partnership shall operate
under a firm name, which may or may not include the
name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership,
include their names in the firm name, shall be subject
to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in
a firm name of a partnership must either be those of
living partners and. in the case of non-partners,
should be living persons who can be subjected to
liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code
prohibits a third person from including his name in
the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of
a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law
firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the
creditors of a firm particularly where they are nonlawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the
payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer
of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees
received from the future business of the deceased
lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such
division are not lawyers and because such payments
will not represent service or responsibility on the part
of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered
into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There
being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical
objections to allowing the use by law firms of the
names of deceased partners. The public relations
value of the use of an old firm name can tend to
create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's
reputation established by deceased partners.
B.
In regards to the last paragraph of Article
1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the
first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of
Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the
exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person
or partnership which continues the business using the

partnership name or the name of the deceased partner

as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is
a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will
but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has
been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a
commercial partnership and cannot arise in a
professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.
hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a
commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under
the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the
good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115)
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which
depends or; the individual skill of the members, such
as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no
good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its
dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill
and reputation may be, especially where there is no
provision in the partnership agreement relating to
good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115)
(Emphasis supplied)
C.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot
be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law
on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade
name in connection with the practice of accountancy.
10 t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal
entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed
for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of
holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name
in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of
conduct being applicable to the practice of law from
those pertaining to business is that the law is a
profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to
the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer
from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a
profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art
as a common calling in the spirit of public service,
no less a public service because it may incidentally
be a means of livelihood."
xxx

xxx

2.
A relation as an "officer of court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.
3.
A relation to clients in the highest degree
fiduciary.
4.
A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness
to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege
or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose
in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature
of a public trust." 16
D.
Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association"
in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical
the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner in the firm name of a law partnership
when such a practice is permissible by local custom
but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local
custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names
of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom,
Identify the more active and/or more senior members
or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history
of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in
this country would show how their firm names have
evolved and changed from time to time as the
composition of the partnership changed. t.hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of
one or more of the partners designated by it is proper
only where sustained by local custom and not where
by custom this purports to Identify the active
members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the
working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding
the name of a new partner and at the same time
retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a
partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit.,
supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or
consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
search of legal counsel might be guided by the
familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a
firm title.

xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal

profession from business are:
1.
A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much
money.

E.
Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have
consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships.
But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which
petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their
memorandum, the New York Supreme Court
sustained the use of the firm name Alexander &

Green even if none of the present ten partners of the

firm bears either name because the practice was
sanctioned by custom and did not offend any
statutory provision or legislative policy and was
adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction
of custom and offends no statutory provision or
legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of both the American Bar
Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use." There is no question as to
local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of
deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The
Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached The conclusion
that such practice should not be prohibited.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law

prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm
name herein is also sustainable by reason of
agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local
custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been
defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no
judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A
local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a
local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because
something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes
of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical
custom must be differentiated from social custom.
The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the
latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the
Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued
its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from
including the names of deceased partners in their firm
designation, it laid down a legal rule against which
no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven,
can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law
which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved
by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are
contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not
be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly
related to the administration of justice and should not
be considered like an ordinary "money-making
trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is
practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the
exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the

era of wide free opportunity, we think of free

competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely
competing with their fellows in their calling in order
each to acquire as much of the world's good as he
may within the allowed him by law. But the member
of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging
the products of his skill and learning as the farmer
sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as
a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of
the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his
pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his
profession even if done with no expectation of
reward, This spirit of public service in which the
profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a
prerequisite of sound administration of justice
according to law. The other two elements of a
profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a
learned art have their justification in that they secure
and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of
their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal
and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are
denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm
names. Those names may, however, be included in
the listing of individuals who have been partners in
their firms indicating the years during which they
served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez,
Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes
for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the
contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in
the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo
started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip,
and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.
For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the
attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners,
to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip
and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing
of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm,
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in

their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to

continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding
the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5,
1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of
the firm which was originally known as the Sycip
Law Office.

attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners,

to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip
and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing
of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the

law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed
that they be allowed to continue using the said firm
name notwithstanding the death of two partners,
former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio,
on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a
continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and
that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has
acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the
use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to
justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a
deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom,
is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or
deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted
with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that
Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they
served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing
the use of the names of their deceased founders is to
retain the clients who had customarily sought the
legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to
benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of
those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That
is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That
practice was followed before the war by the law firm
of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge
Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence,
Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the
firm name with an indication of the year when he
died. No one complained that the retention of the
name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or
unethical.

# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes
for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the
contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in
the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo
started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip,
and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.
For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm,

Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to
continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding
the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5,
1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of
the firm which was originally known as the Sycip
Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the
law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed
that they be allowed to continue using the said firm
name notwithstanding the death of two partners,
former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio,
on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a
continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and
that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has
acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the
use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to
justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a
deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom,
is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or
deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted
with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that
Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they
served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing
the use of the names of their deceased founders is to
retain the clients who had customarily sought the
legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to
benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of
those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That
is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That
practice was followed before the war by the law firm
of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge
Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence,
Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the
firm name with an indication of the year when he
died. No one complained that the retention of the
name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or
unethical.

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a
District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a
District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and
used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.);
and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December
15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and
notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and
your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro
City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by
gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent
which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales
agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests. He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for
the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I
inform you that I categorically state on record that I
am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have
to resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled.
I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the
need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President
of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which
actually went through the post, bore no stamps.
Instead at the right hand corner above the description
of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26,"
had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also
wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit
& Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for
cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary deductions
at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,
he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as
I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
"manipulated contract" entered into between me and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented
by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said

contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the

housing loan without my authority and against my
will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds between me and
the swindling sales agent who concealed the real
facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in
some detail what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the
NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996,
and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same
reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation
of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions
from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote
on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez,
Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office,
and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation
to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales
agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC
wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May
1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "
for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . .
the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of
December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996
to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the
above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten
words, "Free Postage - PD 26." 1 In that complaint,
she accused Alauya of:
1.
"Imputation of malicious and libelous
charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2.
"Causing undue injury to, and blemishing
her honor and established reputation;"
3.
"Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of
free postage . . .;" and
4.
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which
only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as
"unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings
with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately
desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on
the complaint, Conformably with established usage
that notices of resolutions emanate from the
corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice

of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo

P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in
which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan
to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst.
Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk
of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a
"strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of
him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court
and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District
Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this
time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,
5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of
the complaint in order that he might comment
thereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court
were done in good faith and within the confines of
the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature,
fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his
salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date
of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who
had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering," considering that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He
declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely
acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of
the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00
plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the
words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on
the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had
given for postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest
mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title
of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken
for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that
what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a
blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would
show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite
"numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not
know where the property subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co.
is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS

policy from his wife, and although she promised to

return it the next day, she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims that in connection
with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged
his signature on such pertinent documents as those
regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,
none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done
without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2)
letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated
April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 all of
which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" in
his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the
title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M.
ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator
for
evaluation,
report
and
recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his
aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her
honor and established reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:
1)
Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts
in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2)
Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . .
illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . .
(his) rights and interests;"
3)
Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and
"swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;" and
4)
Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these
statements, he was merely acting in defense of his
rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering, considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands
that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times
respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public

interest." 17 More than once has this Court

emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to
the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that

any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with

good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed however sincerely
to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law
requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals,
good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a
Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than for most
other government workers. As a man of the law, he
may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As
a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had
been grievously wronged.

RESOLUTION

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this

Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
"counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term,
or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use
of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is
hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for

SO ORDERED.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE
OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in
March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention
for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free
medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume
his law practice. There is a question, however,
whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this
petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the
Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys
and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar
Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has
again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his
retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine
bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the
Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
(through this Court) to control and regulate it in order
to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness,

maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal
profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by
a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of
the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing
is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications.
The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must
also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various
phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing
the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers oath9 and
signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the
clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license
to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law
membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and,
concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues
in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of
the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being
continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his
Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who

become citizens of another country shall be deemed

not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship
if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
"(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice."18
Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume
his law practice, he must first secure from this Court
the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially
significant
to
refresh
the
applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not
only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew
his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his
good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M.
Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and
submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by
Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo
(Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyers oath,
docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.
The Facts
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo
through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon).
Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria
that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of money
and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand
pesos (PhP 250,000) from her (Victoria). Shortly
thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a
meeting with Atty. Espejo where they discussed the

terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced

to her as her godmothers lawyer, Victoria found no
reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same
meeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo
and there and then handed to the latter the amount of
PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty.
Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to
Victoria a check1 dated February 2, 2009 for two
hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000)
covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due
date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the
deposit of the check for the reason that she was still
waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan
to fund the check. However, after a couple of months
of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty.
Espejo as to whether or not the check was already
funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an
Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)2
representing the interest which accrued due to the late
payment of the principal obligation. Victoria
deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the check
bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo
failed to pay despite Victorias repeated demands.
Worried that she would not be able to recover the
amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to her
account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000,
but without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact.
However, the said check was also dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter became
more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money.
She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a
demand letter dated August 3, 2009.3
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a
criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on August
18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office.4
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas
issued by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office which
she personally received and continued to ignore
Victorias demands. She attended only one (1)
scheduled preliminary investigation where she
promised to pay her loan obligation.5
In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check
dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of two
hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.).
However, to Victorias chagrin, the said check was
again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.6 Atty.
Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or pleading
to answer the charges against her. On November 17,
2009, the case was submitted for resolution without
Atty. Espejos participation.7 Victoria thereafter filed
the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo
before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD,
through Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. RisosVidal, issued an Order8 directing Atty. Espejo to
submit her Answer to Victorias administrative
complaint failing which would render her in default.
The warning, notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not
submit any Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBP
Commissioner
Rebecca
Villanueva-Malala
(Commissioner Villanueva-Malala) notified the
parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on
June 2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearance
of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of
her right to participate in further proceedings.9
At the mandatory
appeared.10

conference,

only

Victoria

Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an

Order11 noting Atty. Espejos failure to appear during
the mandatory conference and her failure to file an
Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in
default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to
file her verified position paper, which she filed on
June 11, 2010.12
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15,
2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of Atty.
Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of
the Bar for a period of five (5) years.
The CBD reasoned:
The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for
disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the
scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance
to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his
deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which
deserves disciplinary sanction.
Moreover, respondent[s] acts of issuing checks with
insufficient funds and despite repeated demands [she]
failed to comply with her obligation and her
disregard and failure to appear for preliminary
investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to
answer the charges against her for Estafa and
Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that
also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors
passed a Resolution14 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification
lowering Atty. Espejos suspension from five (5)
years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered
to return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with
legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was
made. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondents grave
misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years and Ordered to Return to complainant the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the
time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court
the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to Resolution
No. XX-2012-419 along with the records of this
case.15
The Courts Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its
recommendation in part. Atty. Espejo did not deny
obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations
that she issued unfunded checks to pay her
obligation. It has already been settled that the
deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned.16

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform

their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained
that the prompt payment of financial obligations is
one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary
obligations to the complaint but offered no justifiable
reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant
made several demands, both verbal and written, but
respondent just ignored them and even made himself
scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial
obligations to complainant, respondent never offered
nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On the
contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doing
nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an
act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must
be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to
faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his
duties, he must promptly pay his financial
obligations.17
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and
issued the worthless checks in her private capacity
and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment.
As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may be
disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession but also for gross misconduct outside
of his professional capacity. While the Court may not
ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non- professional or private
capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or
removing him as an attorney where his misconduct
outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so
gross in character as to show him morally unfit and
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the
law confer.18
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of
a series of worthless checks, which is exactly what
Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a
lawyers low regard for her commitment to her oath,
for which she may be disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which were
later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the
trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack
of personal honesty and good moral character as to
render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows
the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyers
low regard to her commitment to the oath she has
taken when she joined her peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she
should hold in high esteem.
xxxx
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent
who issued worthless checks for which he was
convicted in the criminal case filed against him. In
Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to
pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on
the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having
been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad
checks in payment of a piece of property the title of
which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant.19

Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated

by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the
IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of
Victoria and to appear at the scheduled mandatory
conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the
IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer
must maintain respect not only for the courts, but also
for judicial officers and other duly constituted
authorities, including the IBP:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his
unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP
requiring him to file an answer to the complaintaffidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory
conference. Although respondent did not appear at
the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to
defend himself through a position paper. Still,
respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant
disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged
with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is
expected to uphold the law and promote respect for
legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and
maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to
judicial officers and other duly constituted
authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP
to conduct proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless
checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives
of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the IBP
contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03;
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL
AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT
THE
ACTIVITIES
OF
THE
INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 A
LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two (2) years, as recommended by the IBP,
commensurate under the circumstances. We,
however, cannot sustain the IBPs recommendation
ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she
borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer
of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
determination of respondents administrative liability.
Our findings have no material bearing on other
judicial action which the parties may to choose me
against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of
an action, but rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. The only question
for determination in these proceedings is whether or
not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as

a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on

the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to the complainant.22
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo
GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons
1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for two (2) years affective
immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the
personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding
examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged
him with having falsely represented in his application
for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. The matter was in due
course referred to the Solicitor General who caused
the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a
report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the
allegations in his petition for examination in this
Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up
law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education,
specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training;
and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and
never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which
contradicts the credentials he had submitted in
support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint,
Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge:
but he claims that although he had left high school in
his third year, he entered the service of the U.S.
Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a
high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian
life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high
school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this
claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the
proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate
(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had

obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University

in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified,
due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing
College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that
the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having
obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby
showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester
of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests, because our
Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous
to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not
qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it,
luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the
Bar. Such admission having been obtained under
false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The
fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll
of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the
latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within
thirty days. So ordered.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the
Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations
with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old
college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he

had not signed in the roll, and that what he had

signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just
an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already
working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not
actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had
already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion,
and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for
his MCLE compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioners gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no
valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant
Medados prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of the
Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action
is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good
moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that
it was not a third party who called this Courts
attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was
Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long
to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly
replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the
time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna
happen. At the same time, its a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen.
And, finally its the right thing to do. I have to come
here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any
action for disqualification from the practice of law,17

which is more than what we can say of other

individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession,
and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent
and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron,
Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company,
and
the
Energy
Development
Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1wphi1
While the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly
withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the
rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate
petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law
since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He
justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
"neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado
may have at first operated under an honest mistake of
fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was merely an attendance
record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of
signing therein that would have made him so.26
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission
to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a
finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect

contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has

been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by
the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty
likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.
As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous
violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to
fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one
year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the
Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay
a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of
law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must
possess the requisite moral integrity for membership
in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity
is of greater importance than possession of legal
learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed

only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is

morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes
the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was
among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members
of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie
Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized
practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law,
and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking
on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized
practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant
alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed
with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office
of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and
signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan
("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims
that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of
acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution
allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to
comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan
sought his "specific assistance" to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer
but as a person who knows the law." Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not

sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself

as an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of
the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation
dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint
is politically motivated considering that complainant
is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll
of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to
respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was
only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily
Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not
taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is "motivated mainly by political
vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared
before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise
found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on
22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents
misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes
that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a
ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.
The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant
failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was
accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by
Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the
OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission
to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared
as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before

respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading

entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office
of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that
he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14
May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L.
Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D.
Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana
has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the
legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on
14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily EstiponaHao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May
2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the
lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the
Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the
law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that
"practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which
are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any
kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law
when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to
do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called
himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not
a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to

practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to

be a member of the Philippine Bar.3
The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right
to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that
can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license.5
The regulation of the practice of law is
unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not
taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He
was held in contempt of court for practicing law even
before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e)
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable
for indirect contempt of court.7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath.1wphi1
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys
that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8
Respondent should know that two essential requisites
for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant
contends that the law does not allow respondent to
act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained
of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his
letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon
Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was
resigning "effective upon your acceptance."10 ViceMayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does
not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel
before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there
was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless
had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is
DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.

HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding

Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique,
and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's
motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13,
1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we
held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private
respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that
time, sufficient reason was shown why private
respondent Javellana should not be detained at the
Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court's order
specifically provided for private respondent's
detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario.
However, private respondent was not to be allowed
liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention
prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied
with because private respondent was not detained in
the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his
normal activities as if he were a free man, including
engaging in the practice of law. Despite our
resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private
respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No.
4262,1 the latter accepted cases and continued
practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion
seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1)
Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from
appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No.
4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del
Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3)
Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario
never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as
prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana
considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for
which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be
issued?"2
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the
above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on
September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2,
1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion
seeking the revocation of the trial court's custody
order and the imprisonment of private respondent
Javellana in the provincial jail.1wphi1.nt
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana
filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion
seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997
resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion
for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April
7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based
on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such
arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the
law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario

the custody of private respondent Javellana with the

obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del
Rosario's residence in his official capacity as the
clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when
Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to
be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and
the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the
custodian under the same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private
respondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus, the
trial court's order dated August 8, 1989 giving
custody over him to the clerk of court must be
recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial
Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a
detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary
consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The
trial court's order was clear that private respondent "is
not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be
held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to
practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No.
4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases
where private respondent would appear in court to
defend himself.

PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's
conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September
1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The
eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and
upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered
judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each
of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from
two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein
petitioner's application for probation.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an

offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law.1wphi1 He is placed in actual
restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense.3 He must
be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance.4 Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice
their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence
of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused
in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined
in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order

approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by
the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's
discharge from probation.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases

Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten
(10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all
deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner

submitted
no
less
than
fifteen
(15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two
(2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had
been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's
family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial

court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T.
Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered
detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,
Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be
allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise,
except, upon prior written permission of the trial
court for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the
Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police
Office, San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail
Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,
Antique.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE
LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a

petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based
on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior
Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to
submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty.

Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty.
Camaligan states that:
a.
He still believes that the infliction of severe
physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense
therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b.
He consented to the accused's plea of guilt
to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the
accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused

who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and

Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,
crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion.
They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of
his son's involvement in the incident.
c.
As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner
and his co-accused for the death of his son. However,
as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had
hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still
feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma
of the gruesome manner of his death.
d.
He is not in a position to say whether
petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar.
He therefore submits the matter to the sound
discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to
those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have
become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits"
from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in
recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required
weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing
or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice
of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

practice the legal profession with the following

admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,
the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and
public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted
all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of
youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is
NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will
continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's
oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll
of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.
SO ORDERED.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was
then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above.

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL

MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA,
ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA,
VICENTE CAEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO
CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Regional
Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

Before anything else, the Court understands and

shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The
death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death is
due to causes other than natural or accidental but due
to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The
feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.

Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Courtmanifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less
than praiseworthy and commendable. It is
exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in
this case, to find room for forgiveness.

Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al.,

instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition,
relief from judgment, as well as declaratory relief,
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction,
asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court
("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist
from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203CV.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not

in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to
be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we
resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and

Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed

Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private
respondent Vicente Caeda ("Caeda"), then as

plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants,

with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch
X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered
judgment; thus:

proclaimed an area for priority development by the

National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by
authority of Presidential Decree 2016.
The petition is totally without merit.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering the defendants and all persons
claiming right under them to vacate the premises and
to remove their house/apartment and surrender
possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a month from
January 1987 as the reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises until the land is
actually vacated, and the costs of suit. 1
No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment
became final and executory. On 22 August 1985,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII)
seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the
ejectment case and to set aside an order of its
execution. The petition was in due time dismissed.
Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.
On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of
Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed
by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the
nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case.
The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. This time, petitioners appealed the dismissal
to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of
execution was issued by the MTC for the
enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was
held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the
Court of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash plus
an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month
beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of
the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court
was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and an
entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC
for execution. When petitioners refused to remove
their house on the premises in question, upon motion
of private respondent, an order of demolition was
issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began.
Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining
order was issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for
certiorari, with preliminary injunction and restraining
order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the
trial court dismissed the petition.

In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our

resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446,
entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is
intimately related, where we ruled:
. . . The singular question common to both cases
submitted for resolution of this court is the
implication of Presidential Decree No. 1517,
otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law,"
and its amendments or ramifications embodied in
Proclamation No. 1893, as amended by Proclamation
No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016. All the
above statutes are being implemented by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council,
Office of the President.
There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs
the resolution of this case. On May 20, 1992, this
Court required the National Housing Authority to
submit a Comment on the status of the program of
acquisition by the Government of the land area which
includes the disputed property, as part of the Areas
for Priority Development (APD), under the
aforementioned decrees and proclamations.
In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr.
Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro Manila
Project Department of the National Housing
Authority, submitted the following report on the
status of Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890
Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the
Carlos Estate, an APD site. Pertinent portions of the
report read:
Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located
at No. 1890 Obesis St., Pandacan, Manila which is
the subject matter of the case and located within the
Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 1967, is not for
acquisition by NHA.
The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA
projects under the Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP)
and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,
however, is under the administration of the
Presidential Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) for
acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)

Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their

complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew
the MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, with
preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief
(docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV),
which, again, issued a restraining order. 2

The above information answers the uncertainty

concerning the status of the alleged negotiation for
the acquisition by the government of certain areas in
Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT acquiring
the said lot for its program.

Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias

writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion
of petitioners for the issuance of a second restraining
order was this time denied by the RTC (Branch
XXV). 3 On 23 August 1990, 4 the trial court,
ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs against
petitioners.

It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for

Review is to set aside the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
lower courts, in order to avoid eviction from the
disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the
same allegedly under the Community Mortgage
Program of the National Housing Authority, we find
the petition without merit and deny the same.
Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED. 5

In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of

Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its
decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No.
107203, when the property in question was

What immediately catches one's attention to this case

is the evident predilection of petitioners, through
different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another,

from which not even this Court has been spared. The
utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions
simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to
prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a
decision that has long become final and executory.

Present:

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of

counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before
different branches of the court, trifling with judicial
processes. Never, again, should this practice be
countenanced. 6

Acting Chairperson,

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in

solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the
pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold
and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here
reminded of that pledge; thus -

REYES, JJ.

LAWYER'S OATH
I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent
to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay
any man's cause for money or malice and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon
myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)
We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that
any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court,
which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and
degrade the administration of justice is contumacious
calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and
warranting application of the contempt power. 7
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly
CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction
of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with
most severely. Double costs against petitioners.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City,

Petitioner,
- versus JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro
Manila,
Public Respondent.
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
Private Respondent.
G.R. No. 154464

TINGA, J.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA, and

Promulgated:
September 11, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing
the Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and July 31,
20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the
plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party
litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent,
Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself
from trying the case. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner)
sought permission to enter his appearance for and on
his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City,
as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for
Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law
student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court3 that a non-lawyer may appear
before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required
the petitioner to secure a written permission from the
Court Administrator before he could be allowed to
appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty.
Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief
to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected
alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after
the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then
remarked, "Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending
Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing
on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,4 praying for the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion
alleged that expected partiality on the part of the
respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be
inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge
Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge,
in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative
frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice
will not be served.5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares

denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing
tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said
remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary
inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to
the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration7 of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion
with finality.8 In the same Order, the trial court held
that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the
promised document and jurisprudence, and for his
failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was
denied.
In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated
that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A,
but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the
two Rules were distinct and are applicable to
different circumstances, but the respondent judge
denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an
Order10 dated July 31, 2002.

the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take

cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.13
Considering, however, that this case involves the
interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance
of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is
cautioned not to continue his practice of filing
directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65
when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch
by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants
who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it
necessarily delays more important concerns before
us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading
of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,
provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with

this Court, the instant petition and assigns the
following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED
AND
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION
WHEN
IT
DENIED
THE
APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND
IN THE LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO.
01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138,
SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NONLAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID
NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE
ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH
AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE
PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE
COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1)
whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the appearance of the petitioner as party
litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself
from trying the case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court
where the application therefor will be directed.11 A
becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed
with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts
is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional
cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law

student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum
and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could
not appear for himself and on his behalf because of
his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying
petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds
refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this
Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually
became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove
on record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools
clinical legal education program and is under
supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his
appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which
provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the
Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention
of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of
an individual to represent himself in any case to

which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may

conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an
attorney, and that his appearance must either be
personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar.
The individual litigant may personally do everything
in the course of proceedings from commencement to
the termination of the litigation.14 Considering that a
party personally conducting his litigation is restricted
to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law,15 petitioner, not being a
lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares
and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as
plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct
the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would
then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a
party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that
the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be
subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice
Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis
of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138.
The former rule provides for conditions when a law
student may appear in courts, while the latter rule
allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party
representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A
superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is
misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule
138 when it released the guidelines for limited law
student practice. In fact, it was intended as an
addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may
appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of
Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the
constitutional right of an accused to be heard by
himself and counsel,16 this Court has held that
during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be
waived.17 The rationale for this ruling was
articulated in People v. Holgado,18 where we
declared that "even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence."
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the
petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern
that the Constitution accords the accused in a
criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a
civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who
insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance,
effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his
claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case,
petitioner alleges that he is a law student and
impliedly asserts that he has the competence to
litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the
perils incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar
Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without need of the supervision of a
lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law
student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent
himself in court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the
respondent judge committed manifest bias and
partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for
her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative
demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay

naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?"

Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the
respondent judge already manifested conduct
indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing
petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and
confidence in the respondents impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the
petitioner filed an administrative case19 against the
respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts
findings of fact in the administrative case and rule
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself
from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the
ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from
participating in a particular trial,20 as voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The
decision on whether she should inhibit herself must
be based on her rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case before her.21
Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule
in favor of the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are
MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,
Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410
as a party litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN,
accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a
member of the Philippine Bar during trial, the
judgment should be set aside and the case remanded
to the trial court for a new trial. A person who
misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable
for indirect contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated
October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant
of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with
the crime of rape 1 of a girl less than nine (9) years

old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of

Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented as
its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) yearold playmate, and the medico-legal officer who
examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German
Toriales and himself. Appellant denied committing
the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the
two girls, the victim and her playmate, from
quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a
decision 2 finding appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together its accessory penalty. The accused
is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the
complainant and another amount for costs, without
subsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civil
liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and he has
agreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with
the full duration of his preventive imprisonment;
otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 of the
same.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other

hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact that
appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of
the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he
has been given an opportunity to be heard and the
records reveal that said person "presented the
evidence for the defense with the ability of a
seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of
appellant in a professional and skillful manner."
However, the right of the accused to be heard by
himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much
deeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies at
the heart of our adversarial system of justice. Where
the interplay of basic rights of the individual may
collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need
a professional learned in the law as well as ethically
committed to defend the accused by all means fair
and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member
of the bar, we had occasion to resolve a similar issue
in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals. 6 In
Delgado, petitioner and two others were convicted by
the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification
of public and/or official documents. One accused did
not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her remaining coaccused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted her coaccused. After entry of judgment, petitioner
discovered that her lawyer was not a member of the
bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence,
she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The
Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded
the case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining
that

SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal. 3 In
his brief, 4 appellant made the following assignment
of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE
ERROR
IN
FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
RAPE
INSPITE
OF
CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES
OF
THE
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON
MATERIAL POINTS.
II.
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN
TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED
TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right
to counsel, we shall now first resolve the issue of
proper representation by a member of the bar raised
by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during
trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who
for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and
even conducted the direct examination and crossexaminations of the witnesses. On appeal, however,
appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty.
Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto
C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar.
Further verification with the Office of the Bar
Confidant confirmed this fact. 5 Appellant therefore
argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel
should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime
charged.

This is so because an accused person is entitled to be

represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case
filed against her before the Regional Trial Court.
Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great
danger that any defense presented in her behalf will
be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process. 7
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial
importance that even if an accused was represented
by three successive counsels from the Public
Attorney's Office, the Court has ordered the remand
of a rape case when it found that accused was given
mere perfunctory representation by aforesaid
counsels such that appellant was not properly and
effectively accorded the right to counsel. In the recent
en banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420,
April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice
Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for failing
to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and
for having fallen much too short of their
responsibility as officers of the court and as members
of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the
accused was not even duly represented by a certified
member of the Philippine Bar, no matter how zealous
his representation might have been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly. 8 Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in
the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. 9 The right of
an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the
imbalance in the adversarial system where the
accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory

machinery of the State. 10 Such a right proceeds

from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a
part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. 11

posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well

as appear for and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or
defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf
of a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to
administrative liability.

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no

less than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the
1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is
reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the
accused at the trial to be present in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the
arraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In turn,
Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
vests the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law to the Supreme
Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
explicitly states who are entitled to practice law in the
Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides
for the requirements for all applicants for admission
to the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that "the right
to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
The right does not only presuppose in its possessor
integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public
trust." 12 Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the
practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 13 a Bar
candidate who has already successfully hurdled the
Bar examinations but has not yet taken his oath and
signed the roll of attorneys, and who was caught in
the unauthorized practice of law was held in
contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court for assuming to be an attorney and
acting as such without authority.

A Complaint1 dated January 3, 2002, was filed by

Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto H.
Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In the
Complaint, the judge was charged with "gross
ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct"
for failing "to observe and apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure" in Civil Case No. 252.2

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE,

and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by
the person named Gualberto C. Ompong in
connection with this case, the local Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is
DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough
investigation regarding this matter and to report its
recommendations to the Court within ninety (90)
days from notice of this, order. Let all concerned
parties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be
each furnished a copy of this Decision for their
appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant,
vs.
Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a firstlevel court may -- without having to resign from their

The Case and the Facts

On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the

12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo -presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for
forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and
damages3 covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of
court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited
herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito
Gustilo designated respondent judge to hear and
decide the case.
In an Order4 dated September 13, 2001, respondent
required the defendants in the civil case to show
cause why the preliminary injunction should not be
granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing on
September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a
Manifestation5 on September 17, 2001, praying that
they be given an additional period of ten days to file
an answer. After the September 21 hearing,
respondent reset the hearing to September 28, 2001.6
Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition7 to
complainants prayer for preliminary injunction and
TRO. The September 28 hearing was held in
abeyance after the defendants lawyer questioned the
authority of complainant to appear on behalf of and
as counsel for her co-plaintiff.8 Respondent gave the
defendants ten days9 to file a motion to disqualify
complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter
to complainant to file her opposition thereto.
In his Order10 dated October 19, 2001, respondent
denied the defendants Motion11 to disqualify
complainant from appearing on behalf of and as
counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions12 praying
for judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In an
Order13 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied
complainants Motions because of the pending
hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an
injunction. He likewise denied the defendants
Motion for extension of time to file an answer.14
Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of the
denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment15 on the Complaint, respondent
contends that complainant filed a Petition for his
inhibition after filing two administrative cases against
him. He argues that the mere filing of administrative
charges against judges is not a ground for
disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the
exercise of their discretion, however, they may
voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth noting
that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil
Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to Judge
Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San MiguelAlimodian-Leon, Iloilo.

Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of

the case cannot be attributed to him, considering that
he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to
pass upon every motion presented before him.16
Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present
evidence necessary for the immediate resolution of
her prayer for preliminary injunction.17 Moreover,
she supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies
available to her to question the validity of his Orders.
Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision
on the case.18
Respondent likewise refutes complainants assertion
that she appeared as counsel on her own behalf
because she could not afford the services of a lawyer.
Such claim was allegedly without basis, since her
compensation and other benefits as clerk of court
were more than enough to pay for the services of
counsel.19 He further alleges that she did not secure
authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and
that she failed to file her leave of absence every time
she appeared in court.20
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court
Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of
the preliminary injunction prayed for in the
Complaint should first be resolved before judgment
should be rendered in the principal action. However,
it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction
should have been decided within 30 days from the
filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for
preliminary injunction and the principal action for
forcible entry remained unresolved even after four
months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil
Case No. 252.1a\^/phi1.net
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent
judge be fined in the amount of P1,000 with a stern
warning that a similar infraction in the future would
be dealt with more severely.21
It did not, however, find complainant completely
faultless. It therefore undertook another round of
investigation, the subject of which was complainants
appearance in court as counsel for herself and on
behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of
the judiciary must devote their full time to
government service to ensure the efficient and speedy
administration of justice. Although they are not
absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or
a profession, they should do so only with prior
approval of this Court. The OCA added that
"[e]ngaging in any private business, vocation or
profession without prior approval of the Court is
tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to
malfeasance in office."22
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be
fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as
counsel without authority from this Court, with a
stern warning that any similar infraction in the future
would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also
recommended that she be directed to file her
application for leaves of absence on the days she had
appeared in court to litigate her case.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendations of

the OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to the
rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.23 These actions are summary
in nature, because they involve the disturbance of the
social order, which should be restored as promptly as
possible.24 Designed as special civil actions, they are
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to
disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of
ordinary actions.25 Accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure that may cause unnecessary
delays should be carefully avoided.26 The actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to
provide expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. Both are "time procedures" designed to
bring immediate relief.27
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an
action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
an agency or a person to refrain from doing a
particular act or acts.28 It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case
it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.29
Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment or
final order, we agree with both the OCA and
respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction
should first be resolved before the main case of
forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the
Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days
from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear
command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
"Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may
grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the
defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
"A possessor deprived of his possession through
forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five
(5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a
motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession. The court shall decide the motion within
thirty (30) days from the filing thereof." (Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the
provision uses the word "shall" to evince its
mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the
belief of respondent that since there was a prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main
case for forcible entry would have to wait until after
he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter
how long it took. If that were so, then the main case
would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer
for preliminary injunction is merely a provisional

remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend

itself to the summary nature of the main case. This is
the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that
a preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be
decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary
injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies
provided by law for the speedy adjudication of an
ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party
from further damage during the pendency of the
original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon
judges the need to decide, promptly and judiciously,
cases and other matters pending before their
courts.30 To a large extent, the publics faith and
confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the
judicious and prompt disposition of cases and
undermined by any delay thereof.31 Judges are thus
enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency
and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. Often have we ruled that their
inability to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.32 To
avoid sanction, they should ask this Court for an
extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is
mandated to rule on every motion, he cannot use this
excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that
cases should be decided within the prescribed period.
This Court notes with concern the plethora of
motions and pleadings filed in this case, which
should have been tried under the Rules of Summary
Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed
since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible
entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the
main case remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the
deadlines set for deciding cases, judges should at all
times remain in full control of the proceedings in
their sala.33 They should not be at the mercy of the
whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters
convenience that should be the primordial
consideration,
but
the
administration
of
justice.341awphi1.nt
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the
courts business promptly and to decide cases within
the required period. They are called upon to observe
utmost diligence and dedication in the performance
of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this
Court in Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila:35
"We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge
especially at a time when the clogging of court
dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose
present leadership has launched an all-out program to
minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion
and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges
are called upon to observe utmost diligence and
dedication in the performance of their judicial
functions and duties."36
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more
pronounced when a municipal trial court is called
upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of
Summary Procedure. As eloquently put by Justice
Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v.
Judge Joven:37

"x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first

instance, a municipal trial court judge, more than any
other colleague on the bench, is the immediate
embodiment of how that trust is carried out. In the
evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary,
there can likely be no greater empirical data that
influences it than the prompt and proper disposition
of cases before the courts."38
We have often held that failure to decide cases and
other matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions against erring
judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000
is appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence39
and Rule 140.40
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA
recommended that she be fined in the amount of
P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation
or profession without prior approval of the Court.
The Office of the Court Administrator held that her
appearance as counsel for herself and on behalf of her
co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a
species of malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a
private vocation or profession when she appeared on
her own behalf in court, the necessary implication
was that she was in the practice of law. We clarify. A
partys right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the
court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar."
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may
personally do everything during its progress -- from
its commencement to its termination.41 When they,
however, act as their own attorneys, they are
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure
as those qualified to practice law; otherwise,
ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.42
Individuals have long been permitted to manage,
prosecute and defend their own actions; and when
they do so, they are not considered to be in the
practice of law.43 "One does not practice law by
acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself."44
The practice of law, though impossible to define
exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by
acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others.45 Private practice
has been defined by this Court as follows:
"x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or
employees of the superior courts or of the Office of
the Solicitor General from engaging in private
practice] has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a

lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x

x."46 (Citations omitted)

service once she appears for the latter without

permission from this Court.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not

customarily or habitually holding herself out to the
public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said
to be in the practice of law.

We cannot countenance any act that would

undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first
time complainant appeared in court, that she
appeared for her own sister, and that there was no
showing she did so for a fee. Again we should be
reminded that everyone connected with an office that
is charged with the dispensation of justice carries a
heavy burden of responsibility.50 Given these
circumstances, the penalty of reprimand51 is
sufficient.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the

collective sense as referring to "the members of such
a vocation."47 In turn, vocation is defined as "a
persons regular calling or business; ones occupation
or profession."48
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by
profession to litigate their own case in court. The
right of complainant to litigate her case personally
cannot be taken away from her. Her being an
employee of the judiciary does not remove from her
the right to proceedings in propria persona or to selfrepresentation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a
right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus,
we need not go into a discussion of the Courts ruling
in Cayetano v. Monsod49 regarding the extent of the
practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that
complainant had appeared on behalf of her coplaintiff in the case below, for which act the former
cannot be completely exonerated. Representing
oneself is different from appearing on behalf of
someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent
themselves in court will not apply when a person is
already appearing for another party. Obviously,
because she was already defending the rights of
another person when she appeared for her coplaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was
merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be
interrelated will not give complainant authority to
appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she
and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The
former may be impairing the efficiency of public

This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or

condone any conduct, act or omission that falls short
of the exacting norms of public office, especially on
the part of those expected to preserve the image of
the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its
responsibility of imposing discipline upon its
employees in order not to diminish the peoples faith
in our justice system. But when the charge has no
basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court
employee from any groundless accusation that trifles
with judicial processes,52 and that serves only to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration
of justice.53
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H.
Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross
inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary
periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the
amount of P10,000 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or of a similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand,
Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff
without court authority and is likewise warned that a
future similar act shall be sanctioned more
severely.1awphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
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