G.R. No. 100150. January 5, 1994.

*
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Human Rights; Commission on Human
Rights; Creation of.The Commission on Human Rights was created by the
1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise
of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as
well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase human rights
is so generic a term that any attempt to define it could at best be
described as inconclusive.It can hardly be disputed that the phrase
human rights is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not
a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human
rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individuals
social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to
closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of
an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent
and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Rights, defined.The term civil
rights, has been defined as referring(to) those (rights) that belong to
every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration
of government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in
a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to
rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. Also quite
often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and
imprisonment for debt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Rights, explained.Political
rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government,
the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition
and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitutional Commission delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention
to the more severe cases of human rights violations.Recalling the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the (1)

protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and

the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious. While the enumeration has not likely
been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In
any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHRs scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that Congress
may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia does not fall within the compartment of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights intended by the Constitution.In the
particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a Peoples Park. More than that, the land
adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that
a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude
that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights intended by the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; The CHR is constitutionally
authorized to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt.On its
contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court. That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could
be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body,
or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An order to desist, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that
the CHR does not possess.The order to desist (a semantic interplay for
a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not

investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it

does not possess.
Prohibition; Moot and Academic; Prohibition not moot simply because the
hearings in the proceedings sought to be restrained have been terminated
where resolution of the issues raised still to be promulgated.The public
respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners
has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 901580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting
final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain
the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished. Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580.
The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also
prevent CHR from precisely doing that.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private

respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHRs own ocular inspection, and
convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of
private respondents stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its
resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial
assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private
respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commissions supervision and again directed the petitioners to desist
from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would
lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHRs
jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1.this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of
the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila
Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
*

3.* * *, a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium

referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures
of poor dwellers;

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with
prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners
ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and
investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et
al.

4.that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted
in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed
vendors;

The case all started when a Demolition Notice, dated 9 July 1990, signed
by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive
Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under
the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July, 1990) within which to vacate
the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the Peoples
Park.2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo,
filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents stalls, sarisari stores, and carinderia along NORTH EDSA. The complaint was docketed
as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an order,
directing the petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties
at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint
before the Commission and ordering said petitioners to appear before the
CHR.

6.that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business establishment
(should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to
revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified
by law and ordinance.8

5.that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly

the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; * * * and

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for

postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September
1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they
would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990, a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commissions authority should be understood
as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political
rights, and that the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil
and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business. 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed
by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by the petitioners
on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved. 10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in

contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia despite the order to desist, and it imposed a fine of P500.00
on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners motion
to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional
mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors
who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional
rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.13
The CHR opined that it was not the intention of the (Constitutional)
Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil
and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body
with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines * * *. It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to ones right to development,
to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled
upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights
of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions
have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were
witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Mans inhumanity
to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it
was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991,
in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to
CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580. 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
1

a)to investigate the alleged violations of the business rights of the

private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b)to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c)to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors

affected by the demolition.
In the Courts resolution of 10 October, the Solicitor General was excused
from filing his document for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its
own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners.
The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private
respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the
resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987 Constitution. 19
It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive
Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative
power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to
(1)Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violation involving civil and political rights;
(2)Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3)Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights
of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4)Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5)Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information
to enhance respect for the primary of human rights;
(6)Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human
rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;
(7)Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8)Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;
(9)Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions;
(10)Appoints its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11)Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the
CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional
Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has
not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Carino v. Commission on
Human Rights,24 The Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment, but that resemblance can in no way be
synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

* * * (T)he Commission on Human Rights * * * was not meant by the

fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the
order kernel of this controversy and, it is, to determine the extent of CHRs
investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase human rights is so generic a
term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best
be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human
rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in
1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is (w)hat do you
understand by human rights? The participants representing different
sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his
humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the
Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or
Japan, Kenya or Indonesia * * *.
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and
property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom,
and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as
the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form
political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the
right to an education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person
from the sheer fact of his humanity. * * * Because they are inherent,
human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and
protected by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and
cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is
human. They are part of his natural birth right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope
of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an
individuals social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus
seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and
attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be
his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of
our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on
human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard
these rights? It may be of value to look back at the countrys experience
under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the
inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have
been heard. Among those voices, aptly representative perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a
respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper,
entitled Present State of Human Rights in the Philip-pines, 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill
of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International
Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of
Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule.
Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and
were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without
charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this
representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became
useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and
other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing.
Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the
Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and
were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions
were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission,
we can see the following discussion during its 26 August 1986
deliberations:
MR. GARCIA. * * *, the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in
view of the importance of human rights and also because civil and
political rights have been determined by many international covenants
and human rights legisla-tions in the Philippines, as well as the
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse
its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity
would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delineate the parameters of its task so that the
commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political
rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and
political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil

right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear
in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on
the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public
hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered
enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we
want to defend here.

rights. I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime

invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came
with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended
rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a
consistent with human dignity.

we
out
the
life

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political
rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points
raised by the previous speaker.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of

Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could
act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases
of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes
committed against the religious.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we

have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes because the other rights will encompass social and
economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens
which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
* * *
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its
functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized
to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment
are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial
agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to
define the specific parameter which cover civil and political rights as
covered by the international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of
citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular
aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now
like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore,
what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we
could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that
we envision here?

* * *
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that
we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective,
delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The
coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term hu-man
rights. I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made
without qualification to the rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and
political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned
or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in
other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct? MR. GARCIA. Is
Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy
of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are
rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified
here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of
human rights to general terms like convention, rather than specify
the rights contained in the convention.

* * *

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human

Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments,

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights
under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?

could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within
the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including
these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the
Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice
to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite
reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to
marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil
and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this
provisionfreedom from political detention and arrest prevention of
torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it
is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are
not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is
no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on
Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every
specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and
politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human
Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the
distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International
Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant
contains all the different rightsthe rights of labor to organize, the
right to education, housing, shelter, etcetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
* * *
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human
rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on
Human Rights. * * *
* * * human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and
very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the
ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved

are very delicatetorture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of

arrest, massacreand the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in
power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this
Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission,
especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of
help and cannot get it And I think we should concentrate only on civil and
political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we
will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. * * *30
(italics supplied.)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987
Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights
to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights (Sec. 1).
The term civil rights,31 has been defined as referring
(to) those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or,
in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of government. They include the rights of
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.
Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by
virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer,
in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a
civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary
servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and
imprisonment for debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right
of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis
the management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted,
it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on
Humans Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such
areas as the (1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious. While the enumeration has not likely
been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In
any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHRs scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that Congress
may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation.35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a Peoples Park. More than that, the land
adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that
a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude
that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights intended by the
Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to adopt
its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court. That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could
be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body,
or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The order to
desist (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before
us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the preventive
measures and legal aid services mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary
injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction
may only be issued by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of
the Supreme Court. * * *. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary
remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and

for no other purpose. (footnotes omitted)

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate
action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government.37
The challenge on the CHRs disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by
way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an
appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus
standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but,
more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative
agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR
Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is
merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended
to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said
Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case
No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things,
to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The
Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding
with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for
contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court
is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., See dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I reiterate my separate opinion in Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on
Human Rights, et al., G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in
relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al., G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the
considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain the status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an
alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order may be
necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights,
which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties
owned by the private respondent as posing prima facie a case of human
rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said
private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the

majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned
authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive
displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what
count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very
constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with
maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to
look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately)
involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to
the CHR for further proceedings.

Soriao vs. Pineda

CA-G.R. SP No. 31546 August 10, 1994
Facts:
Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan,
Aurora (S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school
authority during the past years, he was refused readmission to complete
his fourth and final year of high school through a verbal notice not to
readmit. Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a
hearing on the matter and thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right
to due process. The administration ignored the students plea to reconsider
its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was their prerogative.
Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to
the CA.

Petition granted.
Notes.The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed
to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ
of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It
is never derived by implication (Export Processing Zone Authority vs.
Commission on Human Rights, 208 SCRA 125 [1992]).
In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction.
Thus, such authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the
Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that
jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Garcia vs. De
Jesus, 206 SCRA 779 [1992]).
o0o

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education.

Ruling:
YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C.
Angara Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after he
was meted out a disciplinary action without due process. The Court of
Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II, Sections 13 and
17 of the 1987 Constitution provide: Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible
to all. Section 2: The State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated
system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the
elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of
parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for
all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan
programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to
deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the
under-privileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as
well as self-study programs particularly those that respond to
community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with
training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.
Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and

technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,

accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.

Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of

education, he may only deprived of such right with due process of law as
stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws.G.R. No. 101083. July
30, 1993.*
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents
SIGFRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents
ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by
her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.
MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID
IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MABILIN,
MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL
and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their
parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents
JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL
and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines; All the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and
the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless,
We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the

parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally

impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition,
the latter being but an incident to the former.

determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is

not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of
a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It
must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners personality to sue in behalf of the

succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.This case, however, has a special and
novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Same; Contracts; Non-impairment Clause; A timber license is not a

contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution.Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes at the same time the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generation to come.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental
legal right; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology.The complaint
focuses on one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Same; Same; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.The right
to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty to protect and advance the said
right.Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs dutyunder its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987to protect and advance the said right.
Same; Political Question; The political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777
cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or

Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting
it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause cannot be invoked.Since timber licenses are not
contracts, the non-impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The non-impairment clause must yield
to the police power of the state.In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the state.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; The protection of the environment including the forest
cover of our territory is of extreme importance for the country.I vote to
grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the
country.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari of the dismissal order of the RTC of
Makati, Br. 66.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of inter-generational responsibility and
inter-generational justice. Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the

unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support systems and

continued rape of Mother Earth.
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers class
suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment
of the natural resource treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical
rainforests. The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court. The minors
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generation yet unborn.4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:
x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2)
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs x x x such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000.00)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the countrys land area should be utilized on the basis of
a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent
(46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the aquifer, as well as of rivers, brooks and streams,
(b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of

Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annumapproximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the countrys unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipinos
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence
of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of
the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the
purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation
of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earths capacity to process
carbon dioxide gases which had led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic
changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as
the greenhouse effect.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7.Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8.Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the countrys land
mass.
9.Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than
1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
countrys land area.
10.More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin oldgrowth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11.Public records reveal that defendants predecessors have granted
timber license agreements (TLAs) to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex A.
12.At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per

annum or 25 hectares per hournighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and

holidays includedthe Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after
the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
3

13.The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and

irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestration to the plaintiff
minors generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14.The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffsespecially plaintiff minors and their
successorswho may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.

15.Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity
as the parens patriae.

16.Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the

defendants office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a
final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex B.

17.Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLAs, to

the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18.The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLAs is an

act violative to the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may
be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of
the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines
has been abundantly blessed with.

19.Defendants refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLAs is manifestly

contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental
Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State

(a)to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;

(b)to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;

(c)to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive

to a life of dignity and well being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendants continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLAs is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the

State to
a.effect a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth
and make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic). (Section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution);
b.protect the nations marine wealth. (Section 2, ibid);
c.conserve and promote the nations cultural heritage and resources (sic).
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d.protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Section 16,
Article II. id.)
21.Finally, defendants act is contrary to the highest law of humankind
the natural lawand violative of plaintiffs right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22.There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than
the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital
life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by
the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendants abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendants claimthat the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political questionsustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the
land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside
the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents
and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to
a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code

(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the
DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of mans
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondents correlative
obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the peoples right to
a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretarys alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitutions nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if
TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that
they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any allegations concerning an environmental right
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae. Such allegations, according to them, do not
reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners recourse is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that
the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of timeusually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry
laws and regulations. Petitioners proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative
of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for

the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition,
the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources
to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall
now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced
by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judges challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order read as follows:
xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) feel short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent
and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based
on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of Separation of Powers of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we

stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
impairment of contracts abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial courts conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to
a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuationaptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitionersthe advancement of which may even
be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the wellfounded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
comegenerations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in
question:
MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of poll
air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries
the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be p
for impairment of environmental balance.12
The said right implies, among many other things,
management and conservation of the countrys forests.

the

judicious

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be

irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of
the countrys natural resources,13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the countrys environment
and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of
the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos. Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the
quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments
of the population to the development and use of the countrys natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to
their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy.(1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of
the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,

development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible

to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to
the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment. Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference
to the fact of the agencys being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:
SEC. 2. Mandate.(1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out
the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the countrys
natural resources.
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
environmental right of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being. 16 As its goal, it speaks of the responsibilities
of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations.17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs dutyunder its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:

x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights

of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint?20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano,21 this Court laid down the rule that
the judiciary should exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the
legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute.
After a careful examination of the petitioners complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of
the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,22 Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law.
The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power
to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden

territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the

government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions
of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of grave abuse of
discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson,23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that
the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: x x x.
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the
non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
impairment of contracts abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would
have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides:
x x x Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President
may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x x.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected
by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry,25 this Court held:
x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare

is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the

due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary:26
x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by
its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp.,28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant
to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety
and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general

welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
29

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state.31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect
to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners
may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders
or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa (C.J.), No part; related to one of the parties.
Feliciano, J., Please see separate opinion concurring in the result.
Puno, J., No part in the deliberations.
Vitug, J., No part; I was not yet with the Court when the case was
deliberated upon.
FELICIANO, J.: Concurring in the result
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court,
Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important
cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction
and course of the protection and management of the environment, which
of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi
necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision,
pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners claim that their suit
is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to
the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the
suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of class here involved
membership in this class appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the futureit appears to me that everyone who
may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to
require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries
right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such a
beneficiaries right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the
part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown (prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies), is not discussed in the decision
and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate ca se.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused
upon one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and
healthful ecology (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is fundamental and that, accordingly,
it has been constitutionalized. But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be
characterized as specific, without doing excessive violence to language.
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to a balanced and healthful
ecology. The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this
rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after stripmining or
open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977all appear to
be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 (the rightto a
balanced and healthful ecology) and 15 (the right to health).
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled The Philippine Environment
Code, is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more specific
environment management policies and environment quality standards
(fourth Whereas clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:

(a)air quality management;

(b)water quality management:

(c)land use management;

(d)natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i)fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii)wild life;

(iii)forestry and soil conservation;

(iv)flood control and natural calamities;

(v)energy development;

(vi)conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii)mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of
guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in
other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons
who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on
a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the
Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature
even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show
a more specific legal righta right cast in language of a significantly lower
order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitutionthat is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent
by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting
all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights
may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners
an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather
than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is

that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is
given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are
due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge considerationwhere a specific violation of
law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology and the right to health are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy
making departmentsthe legislative and executive departmentsmust be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLAs petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners entitlement to the relief demanded is
not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements
(and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence
of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of
the claimed factual nexus between petitioners specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Courts decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
Petition granted. Challenged order set aside.

o0o

Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ. May 5, 1976.*

DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B.
DIMAANO, respondent.
Judges; Constitutional law; Courts; Access to judicial records may not be
prohibited; however, a judge may regulate examination of such records.
As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the
complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent under
certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been
shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were
unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in
a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance. In an earlier case, this Court held that mandamus
would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to
examine the records of the latter office. Predicating the right to examine
the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general
principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the
Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which
persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may
exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
Same; Same; Same; While public is entitled to information on matters of
public concern, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed
by law.The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people
are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are
expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official
acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by
law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of
the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems,
nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. x x x
However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law.
Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been
permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that
renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal
Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano,
of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records
of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their
contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said

municipality. Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has

never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that
although court records are among public documents open to inspection not
only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have
legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be
inspected. He further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power
to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing
of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not
motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or
fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public
scandal.
In his answer, the respondent significantly observed:
Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise
of the right. For fear that the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be
at play. Some of the cases filed and decided by the Court after the
declaration of Martial Law and years after the election still bore the stigma
of partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.
Without casting aspersion on any particular individual, it is worth
mentioning, that the padlocks of the door of the Court has recently been
tampered by inserting papers and matchsticks.
Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited
exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the
citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very
essence of their request. The undersigned is just as interested as Mr.
Baldoza in the welfare of the community and the preservation of our
democratic principles.
Be that as it may, a request of this magnitude cannot be immediately
granted without adequate deliberation and upon advisement, especially so
in this case where the undersigned doubts the propriety of such request.
Hence, it is believed that authority should first be secured from the
Supreme Court, through the Executive Judge, for the formulation of
guidelines and policies on this matter.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for
investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975,
Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caiza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to
preserve harmony and cooperation among officers in the same
municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after
formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.
Pertinent portion of his report reads as follows:
* * * When this case was heard, complainant Dominador Baldoza informed
the Court that he is aware of the motion to dismiss filed by Mayor Corazon
A. Caiza and that he is in conformity with the dismissal of the
administrative charge against Judge Rodolfo Dimaano. The Court asked him
if he could prove his case and he said he can. So, the Court denied his oral
motion to dismiss and required him to present his evidence. Complainant
only manifested to the Court that he has no oral evidence. The only

evidence he has are the exchanged communication which were all in

writing and attached to the record between him and the respondent. The
Court asked the respondent what he has to say on the documentary
evidence of the complainant. He manifested that all his answers to the
complaint are all embodied in his answers filed with the Court.
A careful perusal, scrutiny, and study of the communications between the
complainant and the respondent, together with the answers filed by the
latter, reveal that there is no showing of abuse of authority on the part of
the respondent. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view
the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and under his
control and supervision. Complainant admitted that he was aware of the
rules and conditions imposed by the respondent when he went to his office
to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in his communication.
He also agreed that he is amenable to such rules and conditions which the
respondent may impose. Under these conditions, therefore, the Court finds
that the respondent has not committed any abuse of authority.
The complainant was warned to be more cautious in filing any
administrative charge against any public official especially, members of the
judiciary, considering that an administrative charge against a member of
the judiciary may expose the latter to public ridicule and scandal thereby
minimizing if not eradicating public trust and confidence.
After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, We find that the
respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premises. As found by the
Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and
view the docket books of respondent under certain conditions and under
his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and
conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to
public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the
public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. In an earlier case, 1 this Court held that mandamus would lie to
compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the
records of the latter office. Predicating the right to examine the records on
statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general principles of
democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds
has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to
inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights,
such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit. Citing with approval
People ex rel. Title Guarantee & T. Co. vs. Railly,2 this Court said:
The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, to his (register of
deeds) discretion as to how much of the conveniences of the office are
required to be preserved for the accomodation of these persons. It is not
his duty to permit the office to be thronged needlessly with persons
examining its books of papers, but it is his duty to regulate, govern, and
control his office in such a manner as to permit the statutory advantages
to be enjoyed by other persons not employed by him as largely and
extensibly as that consistently can be done * * *. What the law expects and
requires from him is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment,
by which all persons resorting to the office, under legal authority, and

conducting themselves in an orderly manner, shall be secured their lawful

rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner in which
the relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either
by searches, abstracts, or copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.
Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is
unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the
law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives,
reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not
their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is
not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be
wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not
the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a
remedy. As to the moral or material injury which the publication might
inflict on other parties, that is the publishers responsibility and lookout.
The publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.
The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on
statutory grounds merely but on the constitutional right of the press to
have access to information as the essence of press freedom. 3
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled
to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted
access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. 4 The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There
can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. 5 However, restrictions

on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access

restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon
a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary
means of control inadequate to maintain order.6
WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.
Fernando (Actg. C.J.), Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Aquino and Martin,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division
Case dismissed.
Notes.Where the loss of the records of a judicial proceeding sought to be
reconstituted occurred in 1945, and the application for reconstitution was
made on June 24, 1947, said application is not belated, because Act No.
3110 provides that records of judicial proceedings in the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the Court of First Instance may be reconstituted as soon as
practicable, after the occurrence of any fire or other public calamity
resulting in the loss of all or part of the records of judicial proceedings.
(Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1294).
In a petition for the reconstitution of the decision of the Supreme Court in a
case already decided, neither Republic Act No. 441 nor Act No. 3110 is
applicable because these refer to pending judicial proceedings. Courts
have inherent power to reconstitute at any time the records of their
finished cases in accordance with Rule 124, Section 5 (h) of the Rules of
Court. (Yatco vs. Cruz, 6 SCRA 1077).
Where destroyed documentary evidence in court are reconstituted by
means of secondary evidence pursuant to Act 3110, the reconstituted
exhibits constitute competent evidence to be considered in arriving at a
decision of the case. (People vs. Lava, 28 SCRA 72).