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PublicGoodsandExternalities,byTylerCowen:TheConciseEncyclopediaofEconomics|LibraryofEconomicsandLiberty
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Home|CEE|1stedition|PublicGoodsandExternalities

[AnupdatedversionofthisarticlecanbefoundatPublicGoodsinthe
2ndedition.]

osteconomicargumentsforgovernment
interventionarebasedontheideathatthe
marketplacecannotprovidepublicgoodsorhandle
externalities.Publichealthandwelfareprograms,
education,roads,researchanddevelopment,national
anddomesticsecurity,andacleanenvironmentall
havebeenlabeledpublicgoods.

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QuoteoftheDay

Publicgoodshavetwodistinctaspects"nonexcludability"
and"nonrivalrousconsumption."Nonexcludabilitymeansthat
nonpayerscannotbeexcludedfromthebenefitsofthegood
orservice.Ifanentrepreneurstagesafireworksshow,for
example,peoplecanwatchtheshowfromtheirwindowsor
backyards.Becausetheentrepreneurcannotchargeafeefor
consumption,thefireworksshowmaygounproduced,evenif
demandfortheshowisstrong.

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Thefireworksexampleillustratesthe"freerider"problem.
Evenifthefireworksshowisworthtendollarstoeach
person,noonewillpaytendollarstotheentrepreneur.Each
personwillseekto"freeride"byallowingotherstopayfor
theshow,andthenwatchforfreefromhisorherbackyard.If
thefreeriderproblemcannotbesolved,valuablegoodsand
services,onesthatpeoplewantandotherwisewouldbe
willingtopayfor,willremainunproduced.
Thesecondaspectofpublicgoodsiswhateconomistscall
nonrivalrousconsumption.Assumetheentrepreneurmanages
toexcludenoncontributorsfromwatchingtheshow(perhaps
onecanseetheshowonlyfromaprivatefield).Apricewill
bechargedforentrancetothefield,andpeoplewhoare
unwillingtopaythispricewillbeexcluded.Ifthefieldis
largeenough,however,exclusionisinefficientbecauseeven
nonpayerscouldwatchtheshowwithoutincreasingthe
show'scostordiminishinganyoneelse'senjoyment.Thatis
nonrivalrouscompetitiontowatchtheshow.
Externalitiesoccurwhenoneperson'sactionsaffectanother
person'swellbeingandtherelevantcostsandbenefitsare
notreflectedinmarketprices.Apositiveexternalityarises
whenmyneighborsbenefitfrommycleaningupmyyard.IfI
cannotchargethemforthesebenefits,Iwillnotcleanthe
yardasoftenastheywouldlike.(Notethatthefreerider
problemandpositiveexternalitiesaretwosidesofthesame
coin.)Anegativeexternalityariseswhenoneperson'sactions
harmanother.Whenpolluting,factoryownersmaynot
considerthecoststhatpollutionimposesonothers.Policy
debatesusuallyfocusonfreeriderandexternalities
problems,whichareconsideredmoreseriousproblemsthan
nonrivalrousconsumption.
Whilemostpeopleareunawareofit,marketsoftensolve
publicgoodsandexternalitiesproblemsinavarietyofways.

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PublicGoodsandExternalities,byTylerCowen:TheConciseEncyclopediaofEconomics|LibraryofEconomicsandLiberty
Businessesfrequentlysolvefreeriderproblemsby
developingmeansofexcludingnonpayersfromenjoyingthe
benefitsofagoodorservice.Cabletelevisionservices,for
instance,scrambletheirtransmissionssothatnonsubscribers
cannotreceivebroadcasts.Boththroughouthistoryand
today,privateroadshavefinancedthemselvesbycharging
tollstoroadusers.Othersupposedpublicgoods,suchas
protectionandfireservices,arefrequentlysoldthroughthe
privatesectoronafeebasis.
Publicgoodscanalsobeprovidedbybeingtiedtopurchases
ofprivategoods.Shoppingmalls,forinstance,provide
shopperswithavarietyofservicesthataretraditionally
consideredpublicgoods:lighting,protectionservices,
benches,andrestrooms,forexample.Chargingdirectlyfor
eachoftheseserviceswouldbeimpractical.Therefore,the
shoppingmallfinancestheservicesthroughreceiptsfromthe
saleofprivategoodsinthemall.Thepublicandprivate
goodsare"tied"together.Privatecondominiumsand
retirementcommunitiesalsoareexamplesofmarket
institutionsthattiepublicgoodstoprivateservices.Monthly
membershipduesareusedtoprovideavarietyofpublic
services.
Lighthousesareoneofthemostfamousexamplesthat
economistsgiveofpublicgoodsthatcannotbeprivately
provided.Economistshavearguedthatifprivatelighthouse
ownersattemptedtochargeshipownersforlighthouse
services,afreeriderproblemwouldresult.Yetlighthouses
offthecoastofnineteenthcenturyEnglandwereprivately
owned.Lighthouseownersrealizedthattheycouldnotcharge
shipownersfortheirservices.Sotheydidn'ttryto.Instead,
theysoldtheirservicetotheownersandmerchantsofthe
nearbyport.Portmerchantswhodidnotpaythelighthouse
ownerstoturnonthelightshadtroubleattractingshipsto
theirport.Asitturnsout,oneoftheeconomicsinstructors'
mostcommonlyusedexamplesofapublicgoodthatcannot
beprivatelyprovidedisnotagoodexampleatall.
Otherpublicgoodsproblemscanbesolvedbydefining
individualpropertyrightsintheappropriateeconomic
resource.Cleaningupapollutedlake,forinstance,involves
afreeriderproblemifnooneownsthelake.Thebenefitsof
acleanlakeareenjoyedbymanypeople,andnoonecanbe
chargedforthesebenefits.Oncethereisanowner,however,
thatpersoncanchargehigherpricestofishermen,boaters,
recreationalusers,andotherswhobenefitfromthelake.
PrivatelyownedbodiesofwaterarecommonintheBritish
Isles,where,notsurprisingly,lakeownersmaintainquality.
Welldefinedpropertyrightscansolvepublicgoodsproblems
inotherenvironmentalareas,suchaslanduseandspecies
preservation.Thebuffalonearedextinctionandthecowdid
notbecausecowscouldbeprivatelyownedandhusbanded
forprofit.Today,privatepropertyrightsinelephants,whales,
andotherspeciescouldsolvethetragedyoftheirnear
extinction.InAfrica,forinstance,elephantpopulationsare
growinginZimbabwe,Malawi,Namibia,andBotswana,allof
whichallowcommercialharvestingofelephants.Since1979
Zimbabwe'selephantpopulationrosefrom30,000toalmost
70,000today,andBotswana'swentfrom20,000to68,000.
Ontheotherhand,incountriesthatbanelephanthunting
Kenya,Tanzania,andUganda,forexamplethereislittle
incentivetobreedelephantsbutgreatincentivetopoach
them.Inthosecountrieselephantsaredisappearing.The
resultisthatKenyahasonly16,000elephantstodayversus

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140,000whenitsgovernmentbannedhunting.Since1970,
Tanzania'selephantherdhasshrunkfrom250,000to61,000
Uganda'sfrom20,000toonly1,600.
Propertyrightsarealesseffectivesolutionforenvironmental
problemsinvolvingtheair,however,becauserightstotheair
cannotbedefinedandenforcedeasily.Itishardtoimagine,
forinstance,howmarketmechanismsalonecouldprevent
depletionoftheearth'sozonelayer.Insuchcases
economistsrecognizethelikelynecessityofaregulatoryor
governmentalsolution.
Contractualarrangementscansometimesbeusedto
overcomeotherpublicgoodsandexternalitiesproblems.If
theresearchanddevelopmentactivitiesofonefirmbenefit
otherfirmsinthesameindustry,thesefirmsmaypooltheir
resourcesandagreetoajointproject(antitrustregulations
permitting).Eachfirmwillpaypartofthecost,andthe
contributingfirmswillsharethebenefits.Inthiscontext
economistssaythattheexternalitiesare"internalized."
Contractualarrangementssometimesfailtosolvepublic
goodsandexternalitiesproblems.Thecostsofbargaining
andstrikinganagreementmaybeveryhigh.Somepartiesto
theagreementmayseektoholdoutforabetterdeal,and
theagreementmaycollapse.Inothercasesitissimplytoo
costlytocontactanddealwithallthepotentialbeneficiaries
ofanagreement.Afactory,forinstance,mightfindit
impossibletonegotiatedirectlywitheachaffectedcitizento
decreasepollution.
Theimperfectionsofmarketsolutionstopublicgoods
problemsmustbeweighedagainsttheimperfectionsof
governmentsolutions.Governmentsrelyonbureaucracyand
haveweakincentivestoserveconsumers.Therefore,they
produceinefficiently.Furthermore,politiciansmaysupply
public"goods"inamannertoservetheirowninterests,
ratherthantheinterestsofthepublicexamplesofwasteful
governmentspendingandporkbarrelprojectsarelegion.
Governmentoftencreatesaproblemof"forcedriders"by
compellingpersonstosupportprojectstheydonotdesire.
Privatesolutionstopublicgoodsproblems,whenpossible,
areusuallymoreefficientthangovernmentalsolutions.
AbouttheAuthor
TylerCowenisaneconomicsprofessoratGeorgeMasonUniversityand
directoroftheJamesM.BuchananCenterandoftheMercatusCenter.
FurtherReading
Benson,Bruce.TheEnterpriseofLaw.1990.
Cowen,Tyler.TheTheoryofMarketFailure:ACriticalEvaluation.1988.
Klein,Daniel."TieinsandtheMarketProvisionofPublicGoods."
HarvardJournalofLawandPublicPolicy10(Spring1987):45174.
McCallum,SpencerHeath.TheArtofCommunity.1970.
Rothbard,MurrayN.ForaNewLiberty.1978.
Woolridge,WilliamC.UncleSam.MonopolyMan.1970.
Returntotop

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