FAMILY HOME

Prepared by: Michael Joseph Nogoy, JD 1

CASE No. 129

G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999

PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA CATUBIG &
HUSBAND, CILIA MORING & HUSBAND, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS & ABDON GILIG, respondents.

PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
Lazaro Ba-a owned a land which he sold to Pablo Taneo,
father of Pablito on Sept 18, 1941 by virtue of an
Escritura de Venta.
July 19, 1951: Gilig & wife filed case for recovery of
property against Pablo.
March 7, 1964: Pablo constituted house in question
erected on land of Plutarco Vacalares as family home
but notarized only on May 2, 1965 and registered with
Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966.
June 24, 1964: Judgment in favor of Gilig, ordering
Pablo to pay Gilig P5,000 for damages.
Nov. 22, 1965: Writ of Execution issued against Pablos
properties.
Dec.1, 1965: Notice of Levy executed wherein
properties in dispute were among those levied. One
land was about 5 hectares while the other was a family
home. Both are located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental.
Feb. 12, 1966: lands were sold in public bidding where
Gilig was highest bidder.
March 2, 1966: Certificate of Sale registered with
Register of Deeds.
April 20, 1966: Rufino Arriola filed case against Gilig for
recovery of property and/or annulment of sale with
damages. RTC & CA dismissed case declaring alleged
sale executed by Gilig in favor of Arriola as null & void
for being fictitious & executed in fraud of creditors.

Feb. 9, 1968: Taneo failed to redeem land so final deed

of conveyance was executed, definitely selling,
transferring & conveying property to Gilig.
Oct. 13, 1973: Pablos application for free patent on
land in question was approved. Such was unknown to
Gilig. Patent & title were issued on Dec. 10, 1980.
Nov. 5, 1985: Taneo, et al., filed action to declare deed
of conveyance void and quiet title over land with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that:
1. They were children & heirs of Pablo Taneo & Narcisa
Valaceras who died on Feb. 12, 77 & Sept 12, 84
respectively.
2. Property acquired through free patent & as such, its
inalienable and not subject to encumbrance for
payment of debt pursuant to CA No. 141.
3. They continuously, openly and peacefully possessed
lands until Feb. 9, 1968 when Sheriff Yasay issued
deed of conveyance in favor of Gilig, including their
family home which was extrajudicially constituted in
accordance with law.
4. Gilig was able to obtain tax declaration and such
cast doubt over their title and ownership.
Respondents contentions:
1. He lawfully acquired properties through Sheriffs
sale on Feb. 12, 1966.
2. Sale became final as no redemption was made
within 1 year from registration of certificate of sale.
3. CA confirmed validity of sale in case, Arriola v. Gilig.
4. Lazaro Ba-a, original owner of land, sold land to
Pablo Taneo on Sept. 18, 1941 proven by an
Escritura de Venta. Even if it was a private land,
Taneo filed an application for free patent which
became final only in 1979.
5. He presented counterclaim that petitioners still
possessed land and thus he has been deprived of
acts of ownership and possession and prayed for
payment of rentals.
RTC Ruling: DISMISSED. Declared null & void OCT & Free
Patent under Pablo Taneos name & directed Register of
Deeds to cancel such. Likewise declare Gilig as absolute
& legal owner of land & house in question and is

entitled to possess same and ordering petitioners

vacate house and to refrain from disturbing Giligs
peaceful possession. Ordered petitioners to pay
reasonable rental.
CA Ruling: RTC Ruling AFFIRMED.
Taneo, et al., invoke Sec. 118, Commonwealth Act No.
141, claiming that land under free patent, such as land
in dispute, cant be alienated or encumbered. Cited
Oliveros vs. Porciongcola and Gonzaga vs. CA. Ratio of
law: give homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family land which the State
had gratuitously given to him as reward for his labor in
cleaning and cultivating it.

ISSUES and RATIO:

1. WON land in dispute cant be encumbered pursuant
to Sec. 118 of CA No. 141
NO. Intent of the law is clear as SC has ruled in Republic
vs. CA: Homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of State to land-destitute
citizens for their home and cultivation. State prohibits
sale/encumbrance within 5 years after grant of patent.
Alienation is impliedly permitted after that 5 year
period. But such is subject to right of repurchase by
homesteader, his widow/heirs within 5 years. It aims to
preserve and keep in family of homesteader that
portion of public land State had gratuitously given to
him.
But the prohibition in the provision does not apply to
the Taneos which provides that prohibition on
alienation begins on date of approval of application and
it will end 5 years after the issuance of the patent
(affirmed in Amper v. Presiding Judge).
Thus, conveyance thru Sheriffs sale was not violative
of law because the judgment obligation of Taneos
against Gilig arose on JUNE 24, 1964, properties were
levied & sold on FEB. 12, 1966 and final deed of
conveyance was executed on FEB. 9, 1968. But the
application for free patent was approved only on OCT.
19, 1973. Meaning, prohibition on alienation only began

on OCT. 19, 1973 and lasted until Dec. 10, 1985 or 5

years after free patent was issued on Dec. 10, 1980, all
of these took place after property was sold. In fact,
when application was approved, Pablo was no longer
the lawful owner and he no longer had rights over the
property that he could transfer to his heirs. Debts
contracted prior to the application are not covered by
the prohibition.
2. WON the family home was constituted by Pablo and
thus exempt from execution
NO. Family home: dwelling place of a person and his
family. Its a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable &
free from attachment, constituted over dwelling place
and land on which its situated. It confers upon family
the right to enjoy property which must remain with
person constituting it and his heirs. It cant be seized by
creditors except in special cases.
CC Art. 224-251: Family home may be constituted
judicially (by filing petition and with court approval) or
extrajudicially (recording of public instrument in proper
registry of property declaring establishment of family
home).
FC Art. 153: Registration no longer needed. Family
homes deemed constituted on house and lot from time
its occupied in the family residence and continues as
long as beneficiaries actually reside therein. Its exempt
from execution, forced sale/attachment, except as
provided and to extent of value allowed by law.
Petitioners claim that Pablo constituted home as early
as 1964.
But SC ruled in Manacop vs. CA: doesnt mean that
Article 153 has retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted
as family home at time of their occupation prior to
effectivity of FC & are exempt from execution for
payment of obligations incurred prior to FC effectivity.
Proper interpretation would be that all existing family
residences at the time of FC effectivity are considered
family homes & are PROSPECTIVELY entitled to benefits
accorded to family home under FC. Thus, for debts

incurred prior to FC effectivity, property is not exempt

from attachment.
Applicable law would be CC which required registration.
CC provides for some instances when family homes
NOT EXEMPTED from execution, forced sale/attachment
and among these is for debts incurred before the
declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property.
Since money judgment/debt was rendered/incurred on
JAN. 24, 1964 before the house was erected on MAR. 7,
1964 and instrument constituting it as family home was
registered on JAN. 24, 1966, the family home is not
exempted from execution or forced sale.
Besides, constitution was violative of law since it was
erected not on the land of Pablo but on land of Plutarco
Vacalares. House should be constructed on a land NOT
belonging to another. Shows that constitution was just
an afterthought to escape execution of property but to
no avail

.
RULING: Petition denied for lack of merit.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Prepared by: Michael Joseph Nogoy, JD 1
CASE No. 130
G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
BELEN
SAGAD
ANGELES,
petitioner,
vs.
CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA, respondent.

ALELI

PONENTE: GARCIA, J.:

FACTS:

Corazon Angeles-Maglaya filed a petition for letters of

administratix and her appointment as administratix of
the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She claims that
she is the sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado, and together with Belen Angeles,
second wife of Francisco, they are the surviving heirs.

Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leaving behind 4

parcels of land and a building.
Belen opposed this petition and prayed that she, instead
of Corazon, be proclaimed the admistratrix of Franciscos
estate.
After establishing the circumstances of her marriage to
Francisco (i.e. married before a Judge and ratified two
months later in religious rites; Francisco presented
himself to be single that time), Belen attacked the
legitimacy of Corazon, saying that her birth certificate
was not signed by Francisco. She has also failed to
present the marriage contract between her parents,
Francisco and Genoveva.
Furthermore, Belen averred that she and Francisco legally
adopted Concesa Yamat during their marriage.
Corazons reply:
a) records of parents marriage in the Civil Registrar of
Bacolor, Pampanga were destroyed.
b) She has been in open and continuous possession of
the status of legitimate child as testified by 4
witnesses.
c) Her birth certificate was presented containing a
handwritten word Yes under the question
Legitimate?
RTC Ruling: DISMISSED petition for lack of proof of filiation
as legitimate child.
CA Ruling: REVERSED RTC ruling on the grounds that
Belens motion being a demurrer (under Sec 1 Rule 33)
thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence,
and that Corazon has sufficiently established her filiation.
ISSUE: WON Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco
and Genoveva?
HELD: NO. Article 164: Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Tison vs. Court of Appeals: A legitimate child is a
product of and therefore implies a valid and lawful
marriage. A child is presumed legitimate only if
conceived or born in wedlock. The presumption of
legitimacy in the FC actually fixes a status for the child

born in wedlock and that civil status cannot be attacked

collaterally. Only the husband can contest the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. The intent of the
law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock
from being uncertain.
Presumption of legitimacy may only be availed upon
proof of the factual basis that childs parents were
legally married and that his/her conception of birth
occurred during the marriage.
In the case at bar, there is no absolute proof of
Franciscos marriage to Corazons mother Genoveva.
No marriage certificate or contract was offered in
evidence. No solemnizing officer was called to witness.
Also, respondent never questioned what would
necessarily be a bigamous marriage between Belen and
Francisco. In fact, in her petition, she alleged that
petitioner is the surviving spouse of the decedent.
Under Article 172, the court concedes that even in the
absence of direct evidence of marriage of parents,
legitimate filiation of the child can be established by
the following modes: 1. Record of birth in civil registry
2. Admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or private handwritten instrument signed by parent
concerned. In the absence of these foregoing evidence,
filiation is proved by: 3. Open and continuous
possession of the status of legitimate child 4. Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court.
Evidence that respondent showed: 1. Birth certificate 2.
School and government records 3. Photographs of her
wedding and testimonies.
Although respondent was able to show a birth
certificate, this was not signed by Francisco or
Genoveva. It was signed only by the attending
physician. This document is only evidence of the birth
of the child, and not conclusive proof of her legitimate
filiation. The signature of the father is a necessary
requirement in determining legitimate filiation and it
can not be made dependent on the declaration of the
attending physician or midwife or mother of the
newborn child. The same holds true for the school and
government records which were unsigned by Francisco

and the execution of which he had no part in. Lastly,

photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation as
settled in jurisprudence.
However, due to these evidences, court conceded that
Corazon might be natural child of Francisco and
Genoveva. However this is not the issue in this case,
since Corazon predicated her petition for administration
on her being a legitimate child who was legally married
to her mother.
Corazon also filed a petition against the adoption of
Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the legitimate child of
Francisco, she should have been notified of the
adoption proceedings. Since the lower court has ruled
with finality that she is not legitimate since no proof
has been given as to the marriage of her parents, this
petition has become moot and academic.
On the matter of administration, it should be noted that
the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of
decedent. Next of kin refers to the heirs.

RULING: Decision of CA is REVERSED and the order of the

trial court REINSTATED.

PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Prepared by: Michael Joseph Nogoy, JD1
CASE No. 131
GR No. 132305 December 4, 2001
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO,
AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

FACTS:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land.
Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his
name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago,
sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property.
RTC Ruling: In favor of the sisters, recognizing their
right of ownership over portions of the property. (April
20, 1981)
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984.
Thereafter, the Nicolasa and Amanda filed an action
before the RTC of Manila seeking to recover Joses 1/3
share over the property. They claim that Joses share in
the property ipso jure belongs to them because they
are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died
intestate and without issue. They allege that it is highly
improbable for Ida to have paid the supposed
consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject
property because Ida was unemployed and without any
visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged
sale.
Ida, on the other hand, claims that she is the daughter
of Jose and argued that the purported sale of the
property was in fact a donation to her.
RTC Ruling: While there was indeed no consideration for
the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of Ida, but
said deed constitutes a valid donation. (Ida was the
owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share). According to the RTC,
Ida was the daughter of Jose given the following
evidences:
1) The decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by
the Santiago's which stated that Ida was his
daughter;
2) Joses income tax return which listed Ida as his
daughter.
CA Ruling: REVERSED the decision of the RTC. Apart
from the Santiagos testimonies, CA noted that the birth
certificate of Ida showed that Ida was born of different
parents, not by Jose and his wife.

ISSUES and RATIO:

1. WON the Santiagos could still impugn the filiation
of Ida as the daughter of Jose in this action for
recovery of title and possession
NO. The reliance of Ida on Article 263 of the Civil Code
is misplaced. This article should be read in conjunction
with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity
and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading would
reveal that it contemplates situations where doubts
exists that a child is a mas child by his wife, and the
husband denies the child filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at
all of a particular couple. (Meaning, the Santiagos were
not impugning Idas legitimacy as a child of Jose, they
are outrightly denying that she is a child of Jose.) In this
case, the Santiagos are not assailing Idas legitimate
status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all
their brothers child.
o Birth certificate supports this allegation: Ida was
the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas. Ida denies she is Ida
Labagala but she is Ida Santiago. If this is not
her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did

not present any though it is the easiest thing to

do to contest the allegations.
o During her testimony before RTC, Ida denied
knowing Cornelia Cabrigas (mother of Ida
Labagala in the birth certificate), but in her
petition in SC, she stated that Cornelia is the
sister of her mother, Esperanza (wife of Jose).
Conflicting statements that affect her credibility
2. WON the purported deed of sale was valid
NO. There is no valid sale. Clearly, there is no valid sale
in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3
thereof belonged to his sisters. Ida could not have
given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the
time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the
essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale,
absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover,
Ida admittedly did not pay any centavo for the
property, which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the
Civil Code provides: If the price is simulated, the sale is
void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality
a donation, or some other act or contract.
RULING: The petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.