SPS. GUANIO v.

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL

GR No. 190601, February 7 2011
FACTS:
For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna HernandezGuanio (petitioners) booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati.Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel &
Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an initial and final food tasting. The parties eventually agreed on a
final price P1,150 per person.On July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and signed their contract.
Petitioners claim that during the reception, Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales Manager
Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would. Their guests complained of the
delay in the service of the dinner, certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable, the hotels
waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted about the delay, and despite Alvarezs promise that
there would be no charge for the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and
paid P8, 000 per hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day. They further
claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement, but these were not
served to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks.
Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc.and
received an apologetic reply from Krister Svensson, the hotels Executive Assistant Manager in charge of
Food and Beverage. They nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the
RTC of Makati City. Respondents averred that it was the increase in number of the unexpected guests that
led to the shortage claimed by the petitioners.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and was reversed by the CA, upon appeal,
the latter holding that the proximate cause of petitioners injury was an unexpected increase in their
guests.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that the proximate cause of petitioners injury was an
unexpected increase in their guests.
HELD:
The Court finds that since petitioners complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate
cause finds no application to it, the latter applicable only to actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions
involving breach of contract.
Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a
contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the
whole or part of the contract. The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were
remiss in their obligation to inform respondent of the change in the expected number of guests. The
observation is reflected in the records of the case. Petitioners failure to discharge such obligation thus
excused respondent from liability for any damage or inconvenience occasioned thereby.

PEOPLE VS HASHIM
June 13, 2012
Facts:
The accused were charged as having been engaged in the recruitment and deployment of workers
without having previously obtained from the POEA a license or authority to do so. They promised
employment abroad particularly in Brunei and Malaysia, thus causing and prompting the persons of BBB
and AAA to apply which employment however did not materialize because in truth and in fact, the
promised employment is non-existent, in flagrant violation of the above-mentioned law and causing
damage and prejudice to said complainants. Instead of getting decent jobs, they were forced to become
sex workers to earn money and became prostitutes. The lower court found the accused guilty of illegal
recruitment defined under Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 , as principals by direct
participation, committed by a syndicate, against BBB and AAA, and SENTENCES each of said accused
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 each; to pay each of the
above victims P50,000.00 as moral damages; P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification that the amount of exemplary damages in favor of the
victims (private complainants) to be reduced to P25, 000.00 each.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages was proper?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court modified the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It held that Congress passed
R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. Such law was approved on 26 May 2003. Ironically,
only a few days after, victims found themselves in a situation that the law had sought to prevent.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute
without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is
horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation
when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.
The Supreme Court found no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and exemplary
damages in the case at bar. Neither is there any logical reason why we should differentiate between the
victims herein and those in that case, when the circumstances are frighteningly similar. To do so would be
to say that we discriminate one from the other, when all of these women have been the victims of
unscrupulous people who capitalized on the poverty of others. While it is true that accused-appellant was
not tried and convicted of the crime of trafficking in persons, this Court based its award of damages on
the Civil Code, and not on the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act.
Hence the Decision of the Court of Appeals in is affirmed with modifications. Accused-appellant
Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a. Neneng Awid is ordered to pay AAA and BBB the sum of P500,000 each
as moral damages and P100,000 each as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Fausto Barredo vs. Severino Garcia

G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942
73 PHIL 607
FACTS:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and he was convicted
and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correctional.
The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the
plaintiffs for P2, 000.00 plus legal interest from the time the action was instituted.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, as there has been no civil action against Pedro
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals expressed that the liability sought to be imposed
against Fausto Barredo is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor, but an obligation
imposed in Article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of
his servant or employee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primary and directly responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as the employer of
Pedro Fontanilla?
HELD:
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate and distinct legal institution under the Civil Code
with substantivity of its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. Upon this principle, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
To hold that there is only one way to make the employers liability effective, and that is, to sue
the driver and exhaust his properties is tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also an
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the employer under Article
1903 of the Civil Code.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be
carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of their servants. It is but right that they should
guarantee the latters careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of the others.

SPOUSES FRANCISCO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118749
APRIL 25, 2003
FACTS:
On 3 February 1984, the spouses Lorenzo and Lorenza Francisco and Engineer Bienvenido C.
Mercado entered into a Contract of Development for the development into a subdivision of several
parcels of land in Pampanga. Under the Contract, respondent agreed to undertake at his expense the
development work for the Franda Village Subdivision. Respondent committed to complete the
construction within 27 months. Respondent also advanced P200,000.00 for the initial expenses of the
development work. In return, respondent would receive 50% of the total gross sales of the subdivision
lots and other income of the subdivision. Respondent also enjoyed the exclusive and irrevocable authority
to manage, control and supervise the sales of the lots within the subdivision. The Contract required
respondent to submit to petitioners, within the first 15 days of every month, a report on payments
collected from lot buyers with copies of all the contracts to sell. However, respondent failed to submit the
monthly report.
On 27 February 1987, respondent filed with the trial court an action to rescind the Contract with a
prayer for damages. Petitioners countered that respondent breached the Contract by failing to finish the
subdivision within the 27 months agreed upon, and therefore respondent was in delay.
ISSUE:
Did Engr. Mercado incur delay in the case at bench?
RULING:
The petitioners breached the Contract by: (1) hiring Rosales to do development work on the
subdivision within the 27-month period exclusively granted to respondent; (2) interfering with the latter's
development work; and (3) stopping respondent from managing the sale of lots and collection of
payments. Because petitioners were the first to breach the Contract and even interfered with the
development work, respondent did not incur delay even if he completed only 28% of the development
work. Further, the HSRC extended the Contract up to July 1987. Since the Contract had not expired at the
time respondent filed the action for rescission, petitioners' defense that respondent did not finish the
development work on time was without basis. The law provides that delay may exist when the obligor
fails to fulfill his obligation within the time expressly stipulated. In this case, the HSRC extended the
period for respondent to finish the development work until 30 July 1987. Respondent did not incur delay
since the period granted him to fulfill his obligation had not expired at the time respondent filed the action
for rescission on 27 February 1987.
Moreover, since petitioners stopped respondent from selling lots and collecting payments from lot
buyers, which was the primary source of development funds, they in effect, rendered respondent
incapable, or at least made it difficult for him, to develop the subdivision within the allotted period. In
reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply
with what is incumbent upon him. It is only when one of the parties fulfills his obligation that delay by
the other begins.

DR. FERNANDO PERIQUET, JR. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-69996
DECEMBER 5, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Fernando Periquet and Petra Francisco were left childless after the death of their only
child, Elvira, so they took in a son out of wedlock of Marta Francisco-Reyes, sister of Petra. Though he
was not legally adopted, the boy was given the name Fernando Periquet, Jr. and was reared to manhood
by the spouses Periquet. On March 20, 1966, Fernando Periquet died. When Petra died, she was survived
by her siblings, nieces and nephews and by the petitioner. But a few days before her death, Petra asked
her lawyer to prepare her last will and testament. However, she died before she could sign it. In the said
will, Petra left her estate to petitioner, Fernando Periquet, Jr. and provided for certain legacies to her other
heirs. Felix Franciso, brother of Petra, assigned his hereditary rights to the petitioner. However, later on,
he filed an action for annulment of the Assignment of Hereditary Rights claiming "gross
misrepresentation and fraud," "grave abuse of confidence," "mistake and undue influence," and "lack of
cause and/or consideration" in the execution of the challenged deed of assignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Assignment of Hereditary Rights is tainted with fraud?
RULING:
The kind of fraud that will vitiate a contract refers to those insidious words or machinations
resorted to by one of the contracting parties to induce the other to enter into a contract which without
them he would not have agreed to. In the case at bench, no such fraud was employed by herein petitioner.
Resultantly, the assignment of hereditary rights executed by Felix Francisco in favor of herein petitioner
is valid and effective.
Felix Francisco could not be considered to have been deceived into signing the subject deed of
assignment for the following reasons: The assignment was executed and signed freely and voluntarily by
Felix Francisco in order to honor, respect and give full effect to the last wishes of his deceased sister,
Petra. The same was read by him and was further explained by Atty. Diosdado Guytingco. Furthermore,
witnesses for petitioner, who also served as witnesses in the execution and signing of the deed of
assignment, declared that Felix Francisco was neither forced nor intimidated to sign the assignment of
hereditary rights.

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE vs. SPS. GUECO

G.R. No. 141968
FEBRUARY 12, 2001
FACTS:
The Gueco Spouses obtained a loan from petitioner International Corporate Bank (now Union
Bank of the Philippines) to purchase a car. In consideration thereof, the Spouses executed promissory
notes which were payable in monthly installments and chattel mortgage over the car to serve as security
for the notes. The Spouses defaulted in payment of installments. After some negotiations and
computation, the amount of car loan was lowered. Finally, Dr. Gueco delivered a managers check in the
amount of reduced car loan but the car was not released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner, however, insisted that the joint motion to dismiss is standard operating procedure in
their bank to effect a compromise and to preclude future filing of claims, counterclaims or suits for
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was fraud in the part of herein petitioner?
RULING:
Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. It is the
voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or a willful omission, knowing and intending the effects which
naturally and necessarily arise from such act or omission. We fail to see how the act of the petitioner bank
in requiring the respondent to sign the joint motion to dismiss could constitute as fraud. True, petitioner
may have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a joint motion to dismiss is a standard
operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this can not in anyway have prejudiced Dr. Gueco. The
motion to dismiss was in fact also for the benefit of Dr. Gueco, as the case filed by petitioner against it
before the lower court would be dismissed with prejudice. The whole point of the parties entering into
the compromise agreement was in order that Dr. Gueco would pay his outstanding account and in return
petitioner would return the car and drop the case for money and replevin before the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Petitioner's act of requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss can not be said to be a
deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the parties. It
should, likewise, be noted that in cases of breach of contract, moral damages may only be awarded when
the breach was attended by fraud or bad faith. The law presumes good faith. Dr. Gueco failed to present
an iota of evidence to overcome this presumption. Necessarily, the claim for exemplary damages must
fail. In no way, may the conduct of petitioner be characterized as wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent.

RCPI vs. VERCHEZ

G.R. No. 164349. JANUARY 31, 2006
FACTS:
Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined in the hospital due to an ailment. Her daughter
Grace immediately went to the Sorsogon Branch of RCPI whose services she engaged to send a telegram
to her sister Zenaida. As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no response
was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding
her for not sending any financial aid. Immediately after she received Graces letter, Zenaida, along with
her husband left for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later. On inquiry from RCPI why it took
that long to deliver it, RCPI claimed that delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of
circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RCPI is negligent in the performance of its obligation.
RULING:
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable
for damages. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force
of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.
Considering the public utility of RCPIs business and its contractual obligation to transmit
messages, it should exercise due diligence to ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at the
given address and should provide a system whereby in cases of undelivered messages the sender is given
notice of non-delivery. Messages sent by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent
than those which can wait for the mail. RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the
delivery of the telegram, as well as the basis for the award of moral damages. RCPIs arguments fail. For
it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it bears repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its
contract, the presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut this presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages. RCPIs liability as an employer could of
course be avoided if it could prove that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.

G & S Transport Corporation vs. Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa

(G.R. No. 170125 March 9, 2011)
FACTS:
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, husband of respondent Ruby B. Ochoa, died on the night of March 10,
1995 while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation,
petitionercommon carrier. Ruby Ochoa and her children, Micaela and Jomar, through counsel, filed a
complaint against G & S for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was
raffled to Branch 164 of said court. On December 27, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the
vehicular mishap caused by the negligence of Bibiano Padilla, the driver. It likewise found the evidence
adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the trial court declared G & S civilly liable to the
heirs. However, for lack of receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual damages, the trial
court denied the heirs claim for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal basis.
G & S filed a Notice of Appeal while the heirs filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. After G
& S filed its Opposition (To Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Reconsideration), the trial court favored the
heirs Motion for Partial Reconsideration and thus declared them entitled to moral and exemplary
damages. Padilla was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide in an MTC Decision but
was later on acquitted in the RTC Decision. Before the CA, G & S continued to insist that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. G & S also
argued that the proximate cause of Jose Marcials death is a fortuitous event and/or the fault or negligence
of another and not of its employee.
On the other hand, the heirs maintained that Padilla was grossly negligent in driving the Avis
taxicab on the night of March 10, 1995. In a Decision dated June 29, 2005, the CA ruled in favor of the
heirs. With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity, the CA
declared the same unwarranted. It found the Certification issued by Jose Marcials employer as
selfserving, unreliable, and biased. Anent moral damages, the CA reduced it to P200,000.00 as to make it
proportionate to the award of exemplary damages which is P50,000.00.
CA denied both parties respective motions for reconsideration. Hence, G & S and the heirs filed
their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The heirs petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 170071 and that of G & S as G.R. No. 170125. These petitions were later
consolidated pursuant to this Courts Resolution of November 21, 2005. One of the grounds in the
petition of G & S is that CA gravely erred in not taking note of the fact that the petitioners employee had
been acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting (in) homicide.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals made an error by not taking note of the fact that Padilla, an employee of
the petitioner, has been acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide?
Held:
NO. According to Article 31 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, When the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. The Supreme
Court decided that in this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages
arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S.
The Court further said that As a common carrier, G & S is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances. However, Jose Marcial did not reach his destination due to the
accident and G & S failed to prove that it exercised diligence, thereby making it liable to the heirs of Jose
Marcial for breach of contract of carriage. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from contract

which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed
by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident.
Hence, regardless of Padillas acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no bearing in
the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this
case without regard to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case.
Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal case, we however
find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S claim that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even
without those quoted portions, the appellate courts ultimate finding that it was Padillas negligence which
was the proximate cause of the mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in fact,
already made this declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision
from which the subject quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is therefore
immaterial.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION VS. BAKING

GR No. 57435 May 25, 2007
FACTS:
Sebastian Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Dr. Sy
gave respondent two medical prescriptions Diomicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the
prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription Diamicron as a prescription for
Dormicum. Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of
dormicum on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, and he figured in a vehicular
accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Jose Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while
driving he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of
the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find
that what was sold to him was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron
The RTC and CA rendered their decision in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
respondents accident.
RULING:
Article 2176 states that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relationship between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling respondent domicrum, instead
of the prescribed diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a
buying patient, the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. Petitioner contends
that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in driving. The court disagrees. The
accident could have not occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading the prescription.
Article 2180 in complementing the preceding article states that the obligation imposed by
articles 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the
damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer either in the
selection of the employee or the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however,
may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove such exercised of due diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of employee, thus making the petitioner solidarily liable for the damages.

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On June 2, 1992, Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born with an imperforate anus. Hence, two days
after his birth, he underwentcolostomy which enabled him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to
the side of his body.
Three years later or on May 17, 1995, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through
operation. The surgical team consisted of Dr. Resurreccion, Dr. Luceo, Dr. Valea, and Dr. Tibio. The
anesthesiologists included Dr. Abella, Dr. Razon and herein Petitioner Dr. Solidum. It was during the said
operation that Gerald experienced bradycardia or an abnormally slow heart rate of less than 60 beats per
minute. He subsequently went into a coma which lasted for two weeks. When he regained consciousness
after a month, he could no longer see, hear, or move. Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries against the attending physicians.
The RTC found Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. The CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case? Whether the CA correctly affirmed
the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence?
HELD:
The Court of Appeals decision is overruled. The Court held that the application the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in the case at bar is inappropriate. Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as he thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926 laid down that, here the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care.Hence, the requisites for the doctrine to apply are as follows: (1) the accident was of the kind that
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
Elements 2 and 3 were present in the case at bar. However, the first element was undeniably wanting.
The Prosecution failed to prove the existence of the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable
doubt. Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636 defined negligence as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The following are the elements of medical negligence: (1) the duty owed by the physician to the patient,
as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession; (2) the breach of the duty by the physician failing to act in accordance with
the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal
connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered
by the patient.

Most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, therefore, witnesses with special medical
qualifications must impart the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. In the case at bar,
there were no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia presented. Hence, it is difficult
to assess whether the first three elements of medical negligence were present.
Ospital ng Maynila could not be held civilly liable because it was not a party to the case. To hold it so
would be to deny it due process of law. Furthermore, before it can be held subsidiary liable, the conditions
therefor must first be established:(1) it must be a corporation engaged in any kind of industry; (2)
defendant must be shown to be an employee of the corporation engaged in industry for profit; and (3)
defendant must be insolvent.
Applying the conditions in the case at bar, Ospital ng Maynila cannot be held subsidiary liable because:
(1) Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but
purely in charitable and humanitarian work; (2) Dr. Solidumwas not an employee of Ospital ng Maynila
but a consultant; and (3) Dr. Solidum was not insolvent.
GRANTED.

VDA. DE MISTICA VS. NAGUIAT

GR. No 137909 December 11, 2003
FACTS:
Eulalio Mistica, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioner, is the owner of a parcel of land. A
portion thereof was leased to [Respondent Bernardino Naguiat] sometime in 1970. On 5 April 1979,
Eulalio Mistica entered into a contract to sell with Respondent Naguiat over a portion of the
aforementioned lot containing an area of 200 square meters.
Pursuant to said agreement, Respondent Bernardino Naguiat gave a downpayment of P2,000.00.
He made another partial payment of P1,000.00 on 7 February 1980. He failed to make any payments
thereafter. Eulalio Mistica died sometime in October 1986.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed a complaint for rescission alleging inter alia: that the failure
and refusal of respondents to pay the balance of the purchase price constitutes a violation of the contract
which entitles her to rescind the same; that [respondents] have been in possession of the subject portion
and they should be ordered to vacate and surrender possession of the same to petitioner. Respondents
contended that the contract cannot be rescinded on the ground that it clearly stipulates that in case of
failure to pay the balance as stipulated, a yearly interest of 12% is to be paid. Likewise alleged that
sometime in October 1986, during the wake of the late Eulalio Mistica, he offered to pay the remaining
balance to petitioner but the latter refused and hence, there is no breach or violation committed by them
and no damages could yet be incurred by the late Eulalio Mistica, his heirs or assigns pursuant to the said
document.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may rescind the contract.
RULING:
Disallowing rescission, the CA held that respondents did not breach the Contract of Sale. It
explained that the conclusion of the ten-year period was not a resolutory term, because the Contract had
stipulated that payment -- with interest of 12 percent -- could still be made if respondents failed to pay
within the period. According to the appellate court, petitioner did not disprove the allegation of
respondents that they had tendered payment of the balance of the purchase price during her husbands
funeral, which was well within the ten-year period.
Moreover, rescission would be unjust to respondents, because they had already transferred the
land title to their names. The proper recourse, the CA held, was to order them to pay the balance of the
purchase price, with 12 percent interest.
Petitioner claims that she is entitled to rescind the Contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
because respondents committed a substantial breach when they did not pay the balance of the purchase
price within the ten-year period.
We disagree. The transaction between Eulalio Mistica and respondents, as evidenced by the
Kasulatan, was clearly a Contract of Sale. A deed of sale is considered absolute in nature when there is
neither a stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved to the seller until the full
payment of the price; nor a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the
moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. The CA further ruled that rescission in this case
would be unjust to respondents, because a certificate of title had already been issued in their names.

RACQUEL-SANTOS v. CA
G.R. No. 174986
July 7, 2009
FACTS:
Finvest is a stock brokerage corporation duly organized under Philippine laws and is a member of
the PSE with one membership seat pledged to the latter. Armand O. Raquel-Santos (Raquel-Santos) was
Finvests President and nominee to the PSE from February 20, 1990 to July 16, 1998. Annalissa Mallari
(Mallari) was Finvests Administrative Officer until December 31, 1998. In the course of its trading
operations, Finvest incurred liabilities to PSE representing fines and penalties for non-payment of its
clearing house obligations. PSE also received reports that Finvest was not meeting its obligations to its
clients. Consequently, PSE indefinitely suspended Finvest from trading. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) also suspended its license as broker. On June 17, 1998, PSE demanded from Finvest
the payment of its obligations to the PSE in the amount ofP4,267,339.99 and to its (Finvests) clients
within 15 days. PSE also ordered Finvest to replace its nominee, Raquel-Santos. As of August 11, 1998,
Finvests total obligation to PSE, representing penalties, charges and fines for violations of pertinent
rules, was pegged at P5,990,839.99. Finvest promised to settle all obligations to its clients and to PSE
subject to verification of the amount due, but Finvest requested a deadline of July 31, 1999. PSE granted
Finvests request, with the warning that, should Finvest fail to meet the deadline, PSE might exercise its
right to sell Finvests membership seat and use the proceeds thereof to settle its obligations to the PSE, its
member-brokers and its clients. On February 3, 1999, PSE inquired from Finvest if it had already settled
all duly acknowledged claims of its clients and its liabilities to PSE. PSE also demanded that Finvest
settle its liabilities to it not later than March 31, 1999.
PSE points out that it has made several demands on Finvest for the payment of its obligations and
the amount due has been computed after consultation with Finvests representative, Mr. Ernesto Lee.
Considering, therefore, that Finvest already acknowledged and ascertained its obligations with PSE and
yet it defaulted in the payment thereof, PSE had the right to sell at public auction Finvests pledged seat
pursuant to the Pledge Agreement and in accordance with Article 2112 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Finvest incurred delay in its obligations.
HELD:
NO. Under the law on contracts, mora solvendi or debtors default is defined as a delay in the
fulfillment of an obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor. There are three requisites
necessary for a finding of default. First, the obligation is demandable and liquidated; second, the debtor
delays performance; and third, the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtors performance.
In the present petition, PSE insists that Finvests liability for fines, penalties and charges has been
established, determined and substantiated, hence, liquidated. However, both trial court and CA have ruled
otherwise. The findings of fact of both the trial court and the CA are fully supported by the records and
that they plainly show that the parties were negotiating to determine the exact amount of Finvests
obligations to PSE, during which period PSE repeatedly moved the deadlines it imposed for Finvest to
pay the fines, penalties and charges, apparently to allow for more time to thresh out the details of the
computation of said penalties.
A debt is liquidated when the amount is known or is determinable by inspection of the terms and
conditions of relevant documents. Under the attendant circumstances, it cannot be said that Finvests debt
is liquidated. At the time PSE left the negotiating table, the exact amount of Finvests fines, penalties and
charges was still in dispute and as yet undetermined. Consequently, Finvest cannot be deemed to have
incurred in delay in the payment of its bligations to PSE. It cannot be made to pay an obligation the
amount of which was not fully explained to it. The public sale of the pledged seat would, thus, be
premature.