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the target spaces, controlled through metonymy. Mendoza actually offers two views
of the relation between metaphor and metonymy: an Aristotelian view of metaphor,
where metonymy is clearly subsumed under metaphor (and argued to occur either
referentially or predicatively), and another where interaction between the two is
argued to be mediated by metonymy, which is more or less reminiscent of the
continuum versions proposed by Barcelona or Radden.
In Metaphor, metonymy and binding, Turner and Fauconnier argue that
mappings are not only inherited from the source domain into the target one, but seem
to function as a blend drawing on both domains, which seems to shake up the
foundation of the Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff, 1993). According to conceptual
blending, the inferences related to the blend are inherited neither from the source nor
the target domains.
Panther and Thornburg, in The EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy, discuss
two types of EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymies: RESULT FOR ACTION
metonymy in some action verbs, and PERCEPTUAL EVENT FOR ITS CAUSES.
Discussing the Whats that N construction, they explain that in its taxonomic sense
such a construction requires the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy (Whats that
bird? a titmouse) or the PERCEPTUAL EVENT FOR ITS CAUSES metonymy in its
causal sense (Whats that bruise? I bumped into the deck). Such constructions are
reported to be frequent in expressions of hearing, seeing, smelling, and tasting, though
Panther and Thornburg mostly use fabricated examples to show the pertinence of their
point to grammar.
In Metaphorical extension of may and must into the epistemic domain,
Pelyvas rejects Sweetsers (1990) account of the interface between deontic and
epistemic modality, suggesting an account in line with Langackers (1991)
subjectification. The alternative account for may consists in assuming counteracting
forces of different strength instead of strong barriers, and in treating deontic and
epistemic may as deriving from an extinct ability meaning of may. One important
factor which, Pelyvas argues, is missing from Sweetsers account of deontic must and
may is, respectively, the fact that the doers reluctance to perform the action may
arise in many contexts (p. 243), and the fact that the speaker is not strong enough or
doesnt find it necessary to mobilize a force that is strong enough to prevent the action
from taking place (p. 238). To carry reluctance to perform actions further, it is not
always the case that the doers reluctance is not known to the speaker. Experience
with people is often relied upon to access some form of knowledge of their degree of
compliance or reluctance. Further, it is not clear whether people use should because
they want to be polite to the doer or because they think that the doers compliance is
not guaranteed. There are cases where the compliance with must is not guaranteed,
either (cases where power is challenged). In deontic situations, compliance may be a
function of the (im)balance of power between speaker and hearer or doer, where the
hearer weighs the consequences of not complying and where the speaker may have to
weigh the consequences of having issued the directive altogether.
Freeman, reacting to the practices of literary criticism, offers a cognitive
theory of literature in Toward a cognitive theory of literature. The basic tenets of
such a theory are metaphor, embodiment, and system mappings. Through the analysis
of Dickinsons poetry, Freeman delineates a cognitive theory that takes full advantage
of advances made in cognitive linguistics, concentrating on the language of literature
and avoiding the imposition of ideological stance on texts. In the last part of her
paper, Freeman compares her proposed cognitive theory of literature to three other
cognitive theories (discourse theory, possible worlds theory, and schema theory).