POLITICO

ADMINISTRA
TIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUES

Add : D/108, Sec-2, Noida (U.P.), Pin - 201 301

Email id : helpdesk@campus100.in
Call : 09582948810, 09953007628, 0120-2440265

CONTENTS
FRs AND DPSPs: THE QUESTION OF SUPREMACY ....................................................... 2

2.

GOVERNOR: HEAD OF STATE OR AN AGENT OF THE CENTRE ..................................... 5

3.

POWERS OF CIVIL SERVANTS- REFORMS REQUIRED ........................................................ 8

4.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS-UTILITY AND CRITICISM ............................................... 11

5.

GROWING REGIONALISM AND SMALLER STATES ........................................................... 14

6.

DEVELOPMENT AND ITS MURKY RELATIONS WITH POLITICS & ADMINISTRATION ........ 16

7.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND ELECTORAL REFORMS ................................................... 19

POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AND PEOPLE-CENTRED GOVERNANCE .............. 22

9.

GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGING POLITICS ..................................................................... 25

C
IA H
R
S
O
AC N
I
A CL
D
E
EM
Y

1.

10. CIVIL SOCIETY : ITS ROLE IN POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION................................. 28

11. CITIZENS CHARTERS .................................................................................................................. 32

12. SOCIAL AUDIT ................................................................................................................................ 35

13. WOMEN IN PANCHAYATI RAJ ................................................................................................... 39

14. CHALLENGES FOR POLICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY ........................................................ 44

15. GLOBALIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY ..................................................... 47

16. INDIAN PARTY SYSTEM TOWARDS COALITION GOVERNANCE ................................... 51

17. SOCIAL INCLUSION STRATEGIES & NREGS ........................................................................ 55

CHRONICLE IAS ACADEMY

FRs AND DPSPs

C
IA H
S RO
AC N
I
A CL
D
E
EM
Y

THE QUESTION OF SUPREMACY

he Constitution of India is a large body of legal

guidelines and written sanctions which have
been divided into several parts and Articles for
making it simple to understand. However all these
parts of the Constitution though separate in respect to
their references are still very much a part of an
integrated monolith whose core philosophy is very
well captured in its Preamble. This is because the
preamble contains the very distillate of the ideals
which were a part of our freedom struggle and which
are also the core pillars of making India the land of
truth and justice as we envisage it to be.
However after the Preamble if we look out for the
next most important part of the Constitution of India,
it has to be the Part III and Part IV which contains the
reference to Fundamental Rights and the Directive
Principles of State Policy (DPSP), respectively. This is
particularly true because the importance of both
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of state
policy are linked to those aspects of human life which
are almost indispensable for a peaceful and dignified
existence and hence, could be construed as the very
foundation to the idea of social, economic and political
freedoms.
Fundamental Rights mentioned in Part III of the
Constitution are named as the corner stone of Indian
democracy by Granville Austin. They are regarded as
Fundamental Rights because these are regarded
essential for an individual to attain his intellectual,
spiritual and physical development. These are Rights
enjoyed by the individual against the state except for
some Rights like the right against untouchability or
against exploitation. Fundamental Rights are construed
as negative obligations of the state primarily because
most of them are negatively worded, they restrict the
powers of the state vis--vis the citizens. Thus may
could be construed as acting against the state. Further
they are enforced legally by the Judiciary of the country
and neither the executive nor the legislature but the
judiciary is expected to protect them. In fact the
Fundamental Rights are meant to prevent the executive
and the legislature from becoming totalitarian. Most
CHRONICLE IAS ACADEMY

of these Rights are not absolute but are restricted and

are thus worded along with restrictions. However
though the Constitution authorizes the parliament to
restrict these Rights. It explicitly mentions that any
such restriction shall be subjected to the scrutiny of
the Judiciary.
These Fundamental Rights are often seen in
juxtaposition with the DPSPs. While Fundamental
Rights are negative obligations of state in the form of
injunctions, DPSPs are positive obligations of the state
or in other words affirmative directions to the state.
Fundamental Rights spell out the character of political
democracy in the country while the DPSPs stand for
the character of social and democratic Principles in
the country. Further most importantly Fundamental
Rights are enforceable in the Court of law while
DPSPs are non-justiciable in character and cannot be
enforced. So much so about the differences but the
most important question is that if a law is passed to
implement DPSPs and it clashes with one or more of
the Fundamental Rights, then what is the legal validity
of the law passed by the legislature.
This question is has been clarified by the Supreme
Court through a number of its judgements. In the
Champakam Dorairajan Vs. The State of Madras case
1950, the Supreme Court held that the reservation of
seats in educational institutions and public
employment provided by the government of Madras
was unconstitutional and void because it violated one
or more Fundamental Rights, though the policy of
reservation is believed to have been envisaged in
conformity with the Article 46 of the Constitution.
Similarly many land reforms were also declared void
due to their violation of Article 14, 19 and 31, though
they were passed to bring Articles 39(b) and (c) in
function. The apex Court declared that Directive
Principles of state policy shall conform to the
Fundamental Rights and run subordinate to them and
any law passed to implement the Directive Principles
shall not contradict the Fundamental Rights, that is to
say that the Fundamental Rights had precedence over
the Directive Principles of State Policy.
3

violated Articles 14 ,19, and 31, it shall not be held

unconstitutional and void merely on this ground.
Further it stated that any such law giving effect to
Articles 39 (b & c) cannot be questioned in a Court of
law.
Thus the 25th Amendment Act not only tried to
reinstate the Bank Nationalization Act as well as the
Privy Purses Abolition Act, but also sought to make it
immune to judicial review. This attempt of the
government was further reviewed by the Supreme
Court in the Keshvananda Bharati V The State of
Kerala case in 1973. In this case the Court upheld the
constitutional validity of Article 31-C partly but struck
down the latter part of Article 31-C as unconstitutional
and void as it violated the basic structure of the
Constitution i.e. the idea of the judicial review.
Therefore following this case Articles 39 (b & c) can
take precedence over Articles 14, 19 and 31.
In 1976 the 42nd Amendment Act was passed
which sought to extend this precedence beyond Articles
39 (b & c) to all the Directive Principles over Articles 14,
19 and 31. The Act amended Article 31-C and declared
that if a law is passed to give effect to one or more of
the Directive Principles and in the process if the law
violated Articles 14, 19 and 31, the law shall not be
declared as void merely on this ground. However this
provision of the 42nd amendment was further struck
down by the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills Vs
UoI case. The Court declared it unconstitutional and
void on the grounds that it disturbed the balance
between Part III and Part IV, which is also one of the
basic features of the Constitution. Therefore the present
position of Fundamental Rights vis--vis Directive
Principles of state policy is that only Article 39 (b & c)
can take precedence over Articles 14 and 19 as Article
31 was removed from the Constitution by the 44th
Amendment Act.
Though the Constitutional and legal position do
not give all the Directive Principles precedence over
the Fundamental Rights, nevertheless Directive
Principles are as important as any other part of the
Constitution. Though some Constitution experts name
them as mere 'window shopping' or 'post dated
cheques' yet in practice no government can ignore
them because the government would be answerable to
the people in the next elections. Dr. Ambedkar, infact
unambiguously called them as important as
Fundamental Rights. The importance of the Directive
Principles of state policy can be best described in the
following points:
1. Directive Principles are in the form of economic
rights of the individual. The more the Directive

C
IA H
R
S
O
AC N
I
A CL
D
E
EM
Y

But the issue was not resolved here and continued

to bother policy makers as well as Constitutional
experts as there are numerous areas where we find
that the ideals of the Directive Principles are used to
formulate other Articles. For example under Article 37
Directive Principles are fundamental to the governance
of the country. This issue once again came into
prominence when in the historic Re Kerala Education
Bill case 1957 the Supreme Court formulated the 'theory
of harmonization' between the Fundamental Rights
and the Directive Principles of state policy. The Court
declared that there is no inherent conflict between the
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State
Policy. Instead they together constitute an integrated
scheme in which a comprehensive social and
administrative programme for a modern democratic
state is inbuilt. Therefore they are supplementary and
complementary to each other and thus should; as far
as possible avoid any conflict between them. They
actually run parallel to each other and none is
subordinate to the other. Further the Court added that
if two interpretations of a law are possible and if one
interpretation leads to a conflict and the other to
harmony, the Court shall prefer the latter to the former.
However if there is only one interpretation and that is
conflicting then the Court shall implement the
Fundamental Rights over the Directive Principles
because the Supreme Court is duty bound to implement
Fundamental Rights.
Though this decision was a landmark decision in
the history of Supreme Court's pronouncements, in
which the Court very sagaciously tried to strike a
balance between the two most important tenets of the
Constitution, yet the matter was to come again before
the Court, though in a different context. In 1969, the
Government of India nationalized a number of private
banks and also abolished the privy purses of the
erstwhile princely states, acting under the provisions
of Article 39 (b & c) of the Directive Principles of State
Policy. Both these policy decisions i.e. the Bank
Nationalization Act, 1970 and the Privy Purses Act,
1970 were challenged before the Supreme Court on the
grounds of violation of the Fundamental Rights under
Article 14, 19 and 31. The Supreme Court struck these
laws as unconstitutional and void on the grounds
that they violated the Fundamental Rights under
Articles 14, 19 and 31. In reaction to this judgement,
the government passed the 25th Constitutional
Amendment Act, 1971 which added Article 31-C to
the Constitution. According to Article 31-C, if a law is
passed in order to give effect to the two Directives
under Article 39 (b & c) and in the process if the law

CHRONICLE IAS ACADEMY

2.
3.

8. Directive Principles act as a lighthouse constantly

reminding the government of the day and the
people of the country to take the country towards
an egalitarian society.
9. They also act as the datum to test the performance
of the government of the day.
10. Legal validity of some of the laws made by the
legislature can be judged in relation to the Directive Principle of State Policy.
Justice H. J. Kania once said that the Directive
Principles of State Policy represent not the temporary
will of the constituent assembly but they are the
considered wisdom of the people expressed through
the constituent assembly. The ultimate emancipation
of the people can come only after they achieve freedom
from want however such freedom from want can only
be extended through the Directive Principles of State
Policy.

C
IA H
S RO
AC N
I
A CL
D
E
EM
Y

4.

Principles are implemented, greater will be the

effort to establish a welfare state.
Directive Principles are the best election manifesto
that any party can have.
Implementation of Directive Principles takes the
government closer to the people.
It is the duty of the government to incorporate the
Directive Principles in the policies and legislations.
If they have not been given a Constitutional status
it is not because they are less important rather
because they are positive obligations of the state
and the government needs time and resources to
implement them.
They may lack legal sanction but they enjoy political sanction.
They are enforceable in the Court of people.

5.

6.
7.

CHRONICLE IAS ACADEMY

HEAD OF ST
ATE OR AN
STA
AGENT OF THE CENTRE

C
IA H
R
S
O
AC N
I
A CL
D
E
EM
Y

GOVERNOR

he office of the state governor is one of the most

important institutions under the Indian constitution. But it is also one of the most controversial
offices. No doubt, that only a very few people have
been able to do justice to the dignity of the office of the
Governor in more than the sixty year period after
independence. However to understand why such
statements are passed about the office of the Governor,
we need to go step by step, first into the provisions of
the Constitution vis--vis the governor, thereafter the
factors which make the office of the Governor
controversial and finally we shall try to give some
suggestions by which any misuse of the office can be
prevented and the office can serve its duties in the
best apolitical sense.
The Constitution of India has secured the position
of the Governor far more strongly than that of the
President of India. Whereas the President enjoys
discretionary powers only by implicit interpretation
of the Constitution and broadly his office is ceremonial,
the Governor under the constitution wields both
ceremonial and functional powers. He enjoys almost
all the discretionary powers of the President and in
addition the Constitution has conferred some
discretionary powers to his office as well. Any
treatment of the office of the Governor in the politicoadministrative setting would however be incomplete
without a brief description of such powers, which are
also the basis of the functions discharged by the
Governor. Under Article 163, the governor has to act
on the advice of the Council of Ministers, however if
any question arises whether any matter is or is not a
matter as respects which the Governor is by or under
the Constitution required to act in his discretion, the
decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be
final, and the validity of anything done by the
Governor shall not be called in question on the ground
that he ought or ought not to have acted in his
discretion. This is to say that the discretionary powers
of the Governor are so broad so as to even supersede
the advice of the Council of Ministers as the discretion
as to whether any matter is worth asking for a advice

CHRONICLE IAS ACADEMY

of the Council of Ministers is itself subjected to the

discretion of the Governor.
Further under Article 200 of the Constitution when
a bill is presented to the Governor for his assent the
Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill
or that he withholds assent in which case the non
money bills do not become law. However there are
certain modifications in respect to the money bills and
in case of bills which are forwarded to the house for
reconsideration by the Governor where it remains that
the powers of the Governor even vis--vis the passage
of bills is far more extensive as compared to that of the
President. Then there are provisions under Article 356
of the Constitution under which the Governor can
invite the President to take-over the administration of
the state on the grounds that the administration of the
state cannot be carried out in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. Under this convention
he exercises his discretion while sending a fortnightly
report to the President about the affairs of the state.
In the same reference it is worth mentioning that
the Governors of some states enjoy special
responsibility under which they are obliged to consult
the Council of Ministers on certain issues but after
such consultation they can act on their own. Example
Under Article 371-A, the Governor of Nagaland has
the special responsibility for maintaining law and
order in the state as long as the security threat posed
by the Naga rebels exists. Similarly the Governor of
Maharashtra has a special responsibility for the
development of the Vidharbha region.
All these provisions go to show that the Governor
who is appointed by the centre and is not elected or
nominated from within the state has been vested with
enormous discretionary powers which indicate a
strong centre than the states. This deduction however
though not sacrosanct, has led to a situation where
most appointees, see themselves as an agent of the
centre rather than as a head of the State who is
expected to neutrally govern the affairs of the state in
consonance with the spirit of the constitution rather
than acting on the aid and advice of the political
bosses sitting in Delhi.
6

exercise control of the centre over the states but as an

agent of the political party in power at the centre
against the opposition party which has been in power
in the states. The best example of this phenomenon
has been the frequent usage of Article 356, particularly
in the period before the S.R. Bommai Vs UoI case.
Further the central government has also been found to
show an apathetic attitude to the periodic reports of
the Governor, if the contents of the reports are not
found to serve the larger interest of the ruling party at
the centre. For example in case of the implementation
of the IMDT Act the subsequent reports of the Governor
mentions about the growing discontent within the
students of Assam against the IMDT Act. Yet the
government of the day chose to overlook it as it asked
for discontinuance of the Act which could have
offended the minority vote bank of the party in power.
Though after the verdict of the Supreme Court in
the SR Bommai V UoI case, the misuse of Article 356
has been curtailed to a large extent yet not everything
has been sorted out with the institution of the Governor,
still there are instances when the Governors have been
found to unnecessarily delay bills and at times cause
undue interference in some other matters of
administration, on the behest of the party in power at
the centre. In this context some suggestions of the
Punchhi commission on Centre-State relations on
bringing reform to the institution of the Governor
become worth mentioning.
The Sarkaria Commission looked into centre-state
relations in great detail in the eighties, however since
then a lot of water of socio-economic and political
change has flown under the bridge. Following are the
major recommendations of the Punchhi Commission
appointed to look into the centre-state relations in
April 2007:
1. There should be an amendment in Articles 355
and 356 to enable the Centre to bring specific
trouble-torn areas under its rule for a limited period. The commission has proposed "localising
emergency provisions" under Articles 355 and
356, contending that localised areas either a
district or parts of a district be brought under
Governor's rule instead of the whole state. Such
an emergency provision should however not be of
a duration of more than three months.
2. The commission however supports their right to
give sanction for the prosecution of ministers
against the advice of the state government.
3. Among the significant suggestions made by the
Commission is, laying down of clear guidelines
for the appointment of chief ministers. Upholding

C
IA H
S RO
AC N
I
A CL
D
E
EM
Y

The most recent case in the series of such instances

has been the case of the Karnataka Governor who got
into a spate with the state government and unilaterally
recommended President's rule in the state, without
properly ascertaining the political climate in the state.
The Governor had cited that extensive allegations of
corruption against the Karnataka government which
had made it impossible to run the affairs of the state
under the provisions of the constitution. The Governor
further said that the Chief Minister and the Speaker of
the state assembly, had manipulated the constitutional
provisions during the trust vote in October 2010.
Hence, the support of the eleven rebel BJP MLAs,
whose membership had earlier been restored by the
Supreme Court and had returned back to the BJP, was
thus irrelevant now. However, while making such
recommendations the Governor ignored the fact that
most of the allegations of corruption against the state
government were yet to be proved conclusively and
that after the BJP government had won the 3 assembly
by-elections and after the eleven rebel MLAs had
returned with their restored membership, the
government had comfortably crossed the half way
mark needed to stay in power.
However in the subsequent drama that unfolded
after such recommendation by the Governor, ultimately
the Yeddyurappa government remained seated in
power, and the Governor was peppered with extensive
criticisms of acting malafide on the directions of the
party in power at the centre and to dislodge the state
government of the party which was also the main
opposition party at the centre.
There are numerous such instances in which it
seems that the Governor is misusing his powers under
the influence of the political party to which he belongs
or that which is in power at the centre. As a result
there have been demands about abolishing the
institution of the Governor altogether particularly from
the southern state of Tamil Nadu where the DMK has
been categorical in its stand for increasing the
autonomy of the state governments.
However it is not the institution of the Governor
which needs to be abolished. Neither the DMK or any
other party wants to abolish the institution of the
Governor per se. Rather at the root of all this is the
style in which the Governors have been acting
themselves i.e. showing scant regard to the principle
of neutrality which has to be the hallmark of the
institution under the Constitution and also because of
the casual ways which successive central governments
have displayed in dealing with the institution of the
Governor. In most instances he has not been used to
CHRONICLE IAS ACADEMY

of governors, saying, "the practice of treating governors as political football must stop." There should
be critical changes in the role of the governor including fixed five year tenure as well as their
removal only through impeachment by the state
Assembly. It has also recommended that the State
Chief Minister have a say in the appointment of
governor.
7. Underlining that removal of governor be for a
reason related to his discharge of functions, it has
proposed provisions for impeachment by the state
legislature along the same lines as that of President by Parliament. This, significantly, goes against
the doctrine of pleasure upheld by the recent Supreme Court judgment.
8. Endorsing an NCRWC recommendation, it says
appointment of the governor should be entrusted
to a committee comprising the Prime Minister,
Home Minister, Speaker of the Lok Sabha and
Chief Minister of the concerned state. The VicePresident can also be involved in the process.
Though these recommendations hold the promise
of going a long way in restoring the dignity of the
institution of the Governor yet it is only possible if the
government of the day shows the resolve to implement
them in the first place.

C
IA H
R
S
O
AC N
I
A CL
D
E
EM
Y

the view that a pre-poll alliance should be treated

as one political party, it lays down the order of
precedence that ought to be followed by the Governor in case of a hung house:
a) Call the group with the largest prepoll alliance commanding the largest number;
b) the single largest party with support of others;
c) the post-electoral coalition with all parties joining the government; and last
d) the post electoral alliance with some parties
joining the government and remaining, including Independents supporting from outside.
4. The panel also feels that Governors should have
the right to sanction prosecution of a minister
against the advice of the Council of Ministers.
However, it wants the convention of making them
chancellors of Universities done away with.
5. As for qualifications for a governor, the Punchhi
Commission suggests that the nominee should not
have participated in active politics at even local
level for at least a couple of years before his
appointment. It also agrees with the Sarkaria recommendation that a governor be an eminent person and should not belong to the state where he
is to be posted.
6. The commission also criticises arbitrary dismissal

CHRONICLE IAS ACADEMY