K of QPQ

QPQ K Index
QPQ K Index....................................................................................................................... 1
1NC................................................................................................................................. 2
1NC................................................................................................................................. 3
Link 2NC Block.............................................................................................................. 4
Link 2NC Block.............................................................................................................. 5
Link - Reconstruction / Development.............................................................................. 6
Link - Foreign Assistance................................................................................................. 7
Link Behavior Modification............................................................................................ 8
Impact 2NC................................................................................................................... 9
Impact QPQ Economy Violence..............................................................................10
Impact Epistemology Argument................................................................................. 11
AT: Perm........................................................................................................................ 12
AT: Perm........................................................................................................................ 13
AT: Link Turn.................................................................................................................. 14
AT: Realism.................................................................................................................... 15
AT: Realism.................................................................................................................... 16
AT: Realism.................................................................................................................... 17
Representations Matter................................................................................................. 18
Representations Matter................................................................................................. 19
Framework Cards.......................................................................................................... 20
1NC
The affirmatives offer of assistance is based on an exchange
paradigm which engages a narcissistic economy that guarantees
extinction
Vaughan, Director of the Foundation for a Compassionate Society, 1998
Genevieve, Jacob Wrestles with the Angel, http://www.gifteconomy.com/articlesAndEssays/jacobWrestles.html
Since the gift paradigm is based on giving to the other it allows or encourages giftgivers to give to those who are practicing the other paradigm - the exchangers.
the exchange paradigm encourages giving to the self, it fosters mirroring of the self
and re-cognition of the self. A kind of socio-economic narcissism is created in which external
images of exchange validate its point of view over and over. This hall of mirrors effect
makes it possible for the exchangers to see and give value only to themselves and their own
Since
processes while receiving from the giftgivers without recognizing them and without giving back to them. The equation 'x = y' appears to be fair and neutral because
we do not see how many gifts are being given to exchange. The world view of exchange receives a great deal of energy from those practising the gift paradigm, but
neither group re-cognizes the importance of what the giftgivers are doing. The gift paradigm encourages us to take the point of view of the other, while the exchange
paradigm promotes the ego's self confirming point of view. Thus the exchangers assert their superiority while considering the giftgivers inferior and the gift givers
internalize this attitude - because they take the point of view of the exchangers (their 'others') about themselves. Because of our growing participation in the labor
market, many women are now in the situation of maintaining both paradigms at the same time internally. This creates an internal conflict. Although we women may
behave in giftgiving ways and feel the emotions arising from others' unsatisfied needs, we discount our own values and motivations, giving credit to the point of view
of the exchange paradigm-which validates me-first behavior. I believe that women are socialized to be mothers. Since babies cannot 'pay back' for what they receive,
someone must satisfy their needs free, without an exchange. This functional other-orientation is made necessary not by the 'nature' of women but by the nature of
babies who cannot satisfy their own needs. Society reads the biological differences to mean that women must mother. The job is so difficult and time consuming, and
The
exchange paradigm has created a large number of interlocking mis perceptions which
together make up a sort of many faceted fly's eye lens through which we collectively see
reality, misunderstand it and act upon it according to our misunderstandings. Then we
construct reality in the image of our image of it. In our society the gift paradigm seems to have many defects, even to be
its values so foreign to the values of exchange, that we must be encouraged in that direction from childhood, taking our own nurturing mothers as models.
dysfunctional. I submit that its defects are all due to its forced coexistence with the exchange paradigm. For example, giftgiving is difficult, even self-sacrificial in
scarcity. However, if we look at it in another way, we can see that scarcity serves the exchange paradigm by keeping its patterns in place. If abundance existed there
would be no need to exchange because giving would become easy. It would be enjoyable for people to satisfy each others' needs directly. Therefore abundance
threatens exchange, and it is not allowed to accrue. For example abundant peaches are plowed under when they would flood the market and lower the price. But on a
larger scale 18 billion dollars is spent every week on armaments world wide while that amount of money would be enough to feed all the hungry people on earth for a
year. The military and the arms business do not produce any nurturing good. Humanity's effort to maintain itself has to come from other sources, doing without the
wealth that has been wasted. Over the years a huge drain on the economy occurs through military and other make-waste spending. Because there is also a short
cycle of money through a few pockets, the arms business itself (like the drug business) is lucrative for those who engage in it. However because they do not produce
any nurturing good, these businesses drain the economy as a whole, causing scarcity and thus ensuring the ability of the exchange economy to prevail. Another
The exchange
paradigm seems to be the 'human' way to behav e. Getting to the top of the heap appears
to be the way to survive and thrive in 'reality'. Actually we are creating the heap ourselves.
Our validation of patriarchal competitive values only operates because we are inside the
paradigm and therefore cannot see the exchange economy for what it is - an artificial
parasite which derives its sustenance from the gift economy. If we can understand how the
parasite is created we can liberate ourselves and humanity from it. If we cannot we will
continue proposing the same wrong solutions to our socio-economic problems until we
finally destroy life on earth.
consequence of the coexistence of giftgiving and exchange is that the giftgivers do not see that what they are doing is valuable .
The insistence on American involvement in zones of conflict is

based on an attempt at global integration which replicates
discourses of danger
Campbell, Intl Boundaries Research At Durham, et al, 2007 David, Political Geography
26.4, ScienceDirect
Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies;
specifying the ways the world is and,
actively (re)making that same world. This

indicates a wider concern
with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular
imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper
in so doing,
goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that governments follow, but
Our concern lies specifically with the ways in which the US portrays
certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as
threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, states of concern, as global hotspots, as well as
the associated suggestion that by bringing these within the integrated zones of
democratic peace, US security both economically and militarily can be preserved . Of
course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is
never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these
strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long
constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as
a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats and enemies that emerged
and will re-occur throughout it.
and over the past decade has portrayed
to fill the post-Soviet void from radical Islam through the war on drugs to rogue states (for a critical analyses see, among
others, Benjamin and Simon, 2003 and Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of rogue states see Blum, 2002 and
Litwak, 2000).
1NC
Our alternative is to refuse the politics of the 1AC this political act
is key to exposing the fissures of the dominant ideology which is
the most productive mechanism of dissent
Burke, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland,
2002
(Anthony, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1 page InfoTrac OneFile)
It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have
proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they
are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced.
opening
There is
also
a crucial political
within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed
as truth, consented to and desired--which
creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon

argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the
governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a
technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive
movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we
are. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these
We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented

by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions
deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web.
This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency,
both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic
implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero
overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of
social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an
individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so,
discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously
seemed invincible." (62)
Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels--that empower individuals to recognize the
levels that we can intervene.
larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter,
to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being,
is to open up
aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self,
society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police.
The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive
forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose,
exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this
William Conolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not
on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown
and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"--an encounter that
involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. (63) Thus while the sweep and power of
security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual
identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on
"ourselves"--a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns
to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.
Link 2NC Block

Extend the Campbell evidence from the 1NC the ideology of
constructive engagement requires incessant American intervention
in the name of inclusion the flip side to this coin is radical
exclusion and violence more evidence that the consequences of
refusing to be with us is all out exclusion of the Other
26.4, ScienceDirect
As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of
It is telling that Bush's claim of either you

are with us, or you are with the terrorists (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary ,
as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but
with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, shoulder to
shoulder (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of
threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule
integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy.
of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian
state (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004)
about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious axis of evil speech did not
simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that states like these, and their terrorist allies,
A comparison of
the like, alongside the with the terrorists is actually a more complicated approach to the
choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited . Simple binary
oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and
the policy of integration.
These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by
certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal representative democracy and
market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world . The place of US allies
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added).
in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and
reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about
Europe's Old and New a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG the dissent of (even
some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not
surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a
bridge-building tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but the great alliance of freedom that unites the
United States and Europe (Bush, 2005).
QUID PRO QUO the affirmatives logic of conditional offers flips the
standard binary to include the ultimate justification for violence
countries can either work beside us or suffer the consequences of
opposing American-centric ideologies
26.4, ScienceDirect
It is important to highlight the way performativity's idea of reiteration calls attention to changes in historically established
imaginative geographies. While US foreign policy has been traditionally written in the context of identity/difference
expressed in self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in recent strategic performances a different articulation of
Signified by the notion of integration we identify elements in the

formation of a new imaginative geography which enable the US to draw countries into its
spheres of influence and control. We show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been
America's relationship to the world.
enunciated over the last 15 years through popular-academic books, think-tank documents, policy programmes and security
integration, we argue, is enacted through a

number of practices of representation and coercion that encourage countries to adopt a
raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else suffer the consequences. As such, we
strategies, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This concept of
are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires critical

perspectives to move beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order
to account for more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of
new, mobile geographies of exclusion.
THE EXCHANGE ECONOMY tit for tat politics engage in a sacrificial

economy which justifies infinite violence
Genevieve, A Radically Different World View is Possible
http://www.gifteconomyconference.com/pages/confstate.html
The stage seems to have been set for the millennium by Patriarchy and Capitalism with wars
and counter wars at the personal and at the political levels. Attack and reprisal seem to be the pattern of interaction
of all. Even suspicion of intent to attack is thought to justify counterattack. The cycle of violence is based upon
exchange, tit for tat, which is a development of the logic of the market, giving in order to
receive a quantitative equivalent.
There is another logic, the logic of unilateral gift giving, that has not been considered, yet it is practiced in society at many
levels all the time. First, the gift logic is necessary for mothering: satisfying the needs of children who cannot give an equal
payment in return. Housework is itself an immense free gift that women give to the market economy. In fact it has been
estimated that housework would add 40% to the GNP in the US if it were calculated in monetary terms. Directly satisfying
exchange, which is
adversarial, with each trying to get more and give less, creates competition and hierarchy.
Exchange is "ego" oriented because one satisfies the need of the other only to satisfy h/er
own need, while giving directly to the other is "other" oriented. Capitalism is built upon exchange and
incorporates the Patriarchal values of competition and hierarchy. In fact Capitalism needs Patriarchal
needs of all kinds, whether material, psychological or spiritual, creates community, while
individuals to carry out its self aggrandizing agendas.
Link 2NC Block

DESIRE FOR CERTAINTY the process of constructive engagement is
a violent search for rational certainty which uses a technology of
control to produce unnatural stability in the international arena it
replicates violence
Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR, University of New South Wales, 2007 Anthony,
Theory & Event, 10.2

In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid
geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for
order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this
anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the
British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the
machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order . In
his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions
of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts
Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability'

and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress
no longer brought untroubled control : the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated
of the machine'.60
rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61
We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a
machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines
and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a
machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said:
This form of rationality makes humans instruments for destruction

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of
the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system
of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound
ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic
force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin
Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely
utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold
War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so
often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor
anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic
spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and
Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas
(that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however,
explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons
'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own
substance'. 21
Link - Reconstruction / Development

Attempts at reconstruction and energy development create an
empire over creation used to justify the violence of rationality
Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil.
empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of
the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon
claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been
consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened
its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security
Man's
policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a
rational weapon.
Link - Foreign Assistance

Conditional foreign assistance follows an exchange economy which
necessitates scarcity and justifies Iraq war style intervention
Genevieve, A Radically Different World View is Possible
http://www.gifteconomyconference.com/pages/confstate.html
The gift has been ignored by those who study the economy but actually from our perspective, surplus labor, the labor above
the value of the workers' salary, in other words profit, is a gift to the capitalist from the worker. The motivator of the market,
all the gifts of humanity and nature are being

siphoned off at an alarming rate and passed into the hands of the few who miss-spend
them on armaments or otherwise waste profit gifts instead of using them to satisfy human
and environmental needs. Patriarchal Capitalism has to create the scarcity that makes gift giving
difficult in order to maintain its control. In a situation of abundance the system of domination would not be
profit, is itself a gift though it is not called that. In fact
necessary. Capitalist patriarchy accords privilege to the few and wastes 'excess' wealth to maintain scarcity.
Within Capitalism there are many areas of gift giving, beginning with those in which people are trying to satisfy the big
picture needs of society for systemic change. For example there is the anti globalization movement, which is trying to save
the collective gifts of the common people from the corporations. There is the peace movement, there is the movement
against domestic violence; there is even a movement of the capitalists themselves to satisfy the need to change the system:
the funding movement for social change.
There are also cross-overs in these movements, for example anti global Native American funders for social change,
matriarchal goddess spirituality artists, people working on domestic violence, who see how it is connected to war and
All of these attempts to satisfy needs, and to give gifts, are discredited by the
ideology of exchange and self interest. That ideology ignores the importance of needs and of giving to satisfy
them. Instead it privileges 'effective demand' , a market category which privileges the needs that people must
international violence.
pay to satisfy and for which they possess the necessary money. Even education and the media which should satisfy the
needs of the people for knowledge are becoming commercialized to the extent that they only satisfy the needs of Capital
At most Patriarchal Capitalism permits band aid

charitable giving which allows the system to continue unchanged by addressing some of its
most cruel inequities. On the other hand it also advertises its own manipulative 'gifts' - thus foreign
'aid'- or uses the satisfaction of needs as a pretext for its aggressions- thus the invasion of Iraq to
'help' the Iraqi people.
and the governments' needs for propaganda.
Link Behavior Modification

International relations are based on a hegemonic masculinity
constructive engagements attempt at behavior modification
replicates this patriarchal norm
2002
These insights have direct relevance to the international conduct of states. Christine Sylvester has argued that
there is a pernicious "normativity of sex" structuring international relations , while Tickner
argues that statecraft is dominated by an image of "hegemonic masculinity" that is "sustained through its
opposition to various subordinated and devalued masculinities such as homosexuality . . . and through its
relation to various devalued feminities." In international policy, the characteristics of hegemonic
masculinity "are projected onto the behaviour of states whose success as international
actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and
autonomy." (53)
What this achieves is a whole series of exclusions (and norms of action) based on the
dichotomy between masculine and feminine . This generates a chain of analogous
oppositions that align maleness with reason, activity, objective truth, and the mind, and
woman with passion, passivity, subjective truth, and the body--realms and values
constructed as perpetually threatening, backward, and disruptive. By then aligning these with
two other crucial dichotomies--between savage and civilized, and the commonwealth and the state of nature-this chain of oppositions gives life to the progressive movement of being central to a post-Enlightenment
politics of security.
In the liberal chain that links subjectivity, economy, and geopolitics, gender is simultaneously a work on the
self, a principle for the participation of individuals in society, and one for the conduct of the state in managing
subject populations and constructing geopolitical space. Hegemonic masculinity has also been crucial
to universalizing the liberal mode of economic subjectivity based around the subjugation,
control, and exploitation of nature--with the implicit exclusion of other possible modes of
economic life. (54) A pivotal figure here is Descartes, whose philosophical account of method and the
division between mind and body has underpinned many characteristics of the modern liberal order: its
obsession with political and epistemological certitude (stability and equilibrium), the vision of nature implicit in
modern economics, and the control and production of international space. Genevieve Lloyd emphasizes how
the separation of mind and body was essential to his vision of a "unitary pure thought" t hat secured the
foundations of modern science, yet simultaneously separated it from the rest of life. Lloyd also draws out the
links between Cartesian method and Hegel's association of male attainments with universality. Maleness
becomes a technical attribute achieved by breaking away from the nature associated with
woman, and thus analogous to modern theories of technological, political, and economic
progress based on the manipulation and control of nature . (55)
10
Impact 2NC
The drive for ontological certainty closes off the ability to contest
the truth claims of the aff guarantees infinite violence

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number
of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it
amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that
limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed
system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The
second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and
conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of
violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we
consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone
(and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its
escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context
violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it
permeates being.
Constructive engagement makes violent intervention inevitable

26.4, ScienceDirect
As for Robert Kagan, for Barnett the United States' role is predicated upon, above all, a privileged knowledge of the rule sets
(the ability to define good and bad states), a privileged understanding of the ways the world works, but also the
willingness to enforce those rule sets. America is the Gap's Leviathan: if other Core powers want a greater say in how we
exercise that power, they simply need to dedicate enough defense spending to develop similar capabilities. Absent that,
America earns a certain right for unilateralism in the Gap (Barnett, 2004: 173, 174). Similarly echoing Robert Kagan's
dismissal of Europeans' Kantian illusions, Barnett is even more resolute in affirming that such illusions have no place in
today's chaotic and dangerous world. In justifying the United States resistance to the International Criminal Court, Barnett
suggests that it is not a question of American exceptionalism but rather the fact that America needs special consideration
for the security roles it undertakes inside the Gap. In effect, we don't want fellow Core members applying their Kantian rule
Barnett suggests that the stakes are

high One of us must die. Either the Core assimilates the Gap, or the Gap divides the
Core and that the only response is to exterminate the cancer; shrink the gap and thus
face up to the reality of the new world situation (Barnett, 2004: 249, 250). As Roberts et al. (2003: 888)
suggest, this geopolitics of absolutes is at play beneath the talk of global integration and
sets to our behavior inside the Hobbesian Gap (Barnett, 2004: 174).
neoliberal world vision.
Conflict is therefore inevitable: it is a foundational truth confirmed by the severed map.

Barnett's cartography thus serves as both a description of today's world and a prescription for its proper ordering. As Roberts
et al. (2003: 890) argue, the map is both that which is to be explained and the explanation itself, descriptive of the recent
Insecurity comes not from a specific threatening other but from all those
unwilling to integrate; all those refusing their (prescribed) place on the map . As Monmonier puts
past and predictive of future action.
it, the map's lines and labels not only rationalize the current [Iraqi] occupationbut also argue for future interventions
throughout the Gap (Monmonier, 2005: 222). This understanding was clearly articulated in Barnett's first book (Barnett,
US
interventions are thus presented as inevitable, until the messiness of the world is made to
match the geometries of the Pentagon's New Map.
2004), but is even more explicit in the follow-up volume, revealingly entitled Blueprint for Action (Barnett, 2005).
11
Impact QPQ Economy Violence

Exchange economy makes war inevitable
In exchange, our gifts return to ourselves - by giving X we get Y in return. The way of exchange separates us by
not allowing the flow of gifts and value from one person to the next. It turns the attention of some away from
needs and towards profit while the many are kept in a survival mode through scarcity.
Exchange creates adversaries, every man for himself, as each person tries to corner the gifts and
to 'have more'. The hierarchies spawned by the imposition of the artificially constructed male gender upon the
nurturing generic human make a sick and distorted social structure appear to be normal. Nations held in place
internally by such hierarchies make war with one another as each tries to become the
'one' or prototype nation, its leader the necessarily male top 'human'. The US has basically won this battle to be
first in this part of the twentieth century. It dominates the community of nations, and uses policies such as embargoes and
wars upon other smaller nations with strong 'one' leaders. The attempt to weaken Cuba by creating scarcity there through a
decades-long US embargo, is one such case. Another is that of Iraq. (Actually situations of scarcity strengthen hierarchy,
while abundance makes them unnecessary. Ironically US embargoes are probably strengthening the hierarchies our
our exchange-based nation applauds making war

against a 'one' who might be dangerous as the prototype of another culture , especially of
another patriarchal way of being human. The fears of those who participate in our
psychotic patriarchy are easily fanned to fury against the missiles of males from other
countries who indeed are probably psychotic as well. Symbolic phalluses have taken over
the capacity for violence once reserved for individual dominant phalluses in the home. The
missiles' arena is wider than the family and can destroy the 'many' who might oppose the
'one'.
government wants to destroy.) It appears that
Exchange economy leads to mass suffering and war

In
spite of many important changes in the political world - the end of the nuclear arms race, the fall of the
Soviet Union, the end of apartheid in South Africa- human suffering and environmental degradation
have increased. Under the guise of good business patriarchal capitalist corporations invade, plunder
and pollute other countries now with barely a ripple in public opinion. Millions (who are always
'elsewhere' as far as the comfortable classes and first world countries are concerned) die
of hunger and disease while we fill our plates with their food , our homes with their cheap
products. Our arms industries are so out of control that wars are created to provide a
market for their products. Our society is so violent that parents kill their children and children kill each other. Those
The problems I thought were so urgent when I was young have not been solved but have only grown more grievous.
at the top of the economic wheel often find that their lives are barren while those in the middle pursue the illusion of 'having
more' and those at the bottom struggle to barely survive.
When I came back to the US in 1983 I was determined to use my money for social change according to the theory I had
developed. Now after 15 years and having used up most of my money, I have finally published the book which contains the
theory.
12
Conditional offers destroy a value to life and creates a politics of

hierarchy
For-Giving is an attempt to describe this state of affairs, to explain why it happens and how it works in order to make it
The gift paradigm requires other- orientation and gives value to

the other by satisfying needs. The exchange paradigm promotes ego orientation and gives
value to the ego by the logic of the kick back - by using the needs of the other as a means
for the satisfaction of the ego's own needs. The gift paradigm creates bonding and co operation while the
exchange paradigm creates isolation and competition. In the competition between the paradigms, the
possible to change it consciously.
exchange paradigm is at an advantage because it promotes the values of competition. The gift paradigm is at a
disadvantage because it promotes the values of cooperation. In fact those who practice it appear to lose the competition
while actually they are simply not competing.
13
Impact Epistemology Argument

The construction of the affirmatives arguments is based on a
technology of domination the certainty of their impact claims is
not only a faade but also an attempt to prevent examination of
foundational truth claims the affirmatives arguments will sound
persuasive but they are simply a rhetorical ploy meant to stifle
dissent which makes violence inevitable
The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about
techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied
in practice, technique quickly passes

into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of
insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity
are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an
equally essential predicate of its perpetuation . In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a
positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing
being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state
by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However
power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which
technology becomes being;

epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen
have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms,
in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army
and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought.
Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as
saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as
being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that
unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's
sunrise.' 22
these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and

decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be
examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also
The danger obviously raised here is that
obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only
path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from
strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the
Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive
ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques
rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up
without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual

harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.
choice in that way. However
Current epistemology always fails doesnt question root of

political violence
the
available critical, interpretive or performative languages of wa r -- realist and liberal
international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of
strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the
I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that
14
underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite
nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought
and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state . Both liberal
internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of
decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war,
but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims
of political community or strategic theory.82
15
AT: Perm
All of our link arguments are Disads to the plan their double bind
argument is arbitrary and not logical our alternative doesnt have
to overcome the status quo it only has to create the conditions for
productive politics extend the Burke evidence from the 1NC
The current political enframing makes change in the system
impossible the permutation does not challenge the structures of
truth that create our impacts
My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates
against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a
neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political
action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation.
Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international
society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact
dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have
come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger
argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being
itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything
that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with
the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a
more primal truth.'87
What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern
the challenge is posed not merely by a few

varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and
understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the
most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive
diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not
merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but
from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful
enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural
universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities,
and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which
ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that
builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained
It creates both discursive constraints -- available

choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that
derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then
preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective,
dysfunctional or chaotic.
through that reasoning's very operation and existence.
Working within the system is not an option it is impossible to

overcome violence from inside the space of international politics
The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism.
On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh
on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships
16
and national security institutions --
are utterly trapped
within the Clausewitzian paradigm,
within the
instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly
tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.
But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the
outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the
responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to
Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and
limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following
Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and
consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was
searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to
technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is
somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable
clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.
When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice
and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully)
within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy
choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and
peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from
outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought , by being aware of its
presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and
action.90
17
AT: Perm
No net benefit to the permutation our epistemology arguments
prove that the affirmative advantage is a construction the plan is
not necessary to solve the aff the alternative alone creates the
only political arena that can hope to solve international violence
extend the Burke evidence
THEORY the permutation either severs or is intrinsic our
alternative rejects the politics of the 1AC severance of that
strategy is a voting issue because it denies us any link arguments
and if they add co-operation to refusal that is a political act that is
in neither the 1AC nor 1NC voting issue because it allows them to
add infinite political strategies
The permutation is the politics of integration that we criticize
radical politics will become technologies of control and Iraq proves
that the incorporation of radical politics creates the stability
necessary to justify violence
26.4, ScienceDirect
In the aftermath of September the 11th it has become commonplace to argue that the world has fundamentally changed.
President Bush claimed as much when he declared the attacks of that day meant the doctrine of containment just doesn't
hold any water and the strategic vision of the US had to shift dramatically (Bush, 2003). As a result, integration into a
western and American set of values and modus operandi has become the new strategic concept. Distinct from the
integration nonetheless involves its own set of exclusions, with

forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated .
superficial binaries of the Cold War,
This paper has traced the emergence of integration as the basis for the imaginative geography of the war on terror. It has
the production of this imaginative geography should be understood in

terms of performance rather than construction. That is because we are dealing with an
assemblage of practices state policy, non-state scribes and the representational
technologies of popular geopolitics which together produce the effect they name,
stabilizing over time to produce a series of spatial formations through the performance of
security. Given the manner in which this emergent imaginative geography has materialized in the
invasion and occupation of Iraq which was carried out in the name of terror and has created the very terror it
named it is clear when we speak of performance we are dealing with much more than just
thinking, writing or speaking differently.
done so by maintaining that
Yet in practice the materialization of such strategies and imaginations has rarely been straightforward. In fact, in many
instances the opposite of the intention has been created. We could point, for example, to the ways in which territorial
integrity was repeatedly mobilized as a war-aim in the invasion of Iraq and yet the consequence has been the creation of a
state which is unable to protect its borders, cannot project its power effectively within them and is in danger of
The self-serving apologetics of many

of those integrally involved in the framing of such policies Barnett (2005) and Fukuyama (2006), for
two indeed indicate the resilience of the imaginaries we describe, clear and present failures
notwithstanding; it is not that they got things wrong, for the basic analysis still holds it
only needs to be enacted more effectively.
fragmentation into ethnically or religiously created regions (Elden, 2007).
18
19
AT: Link Turn

The affirmative leaves the central force of security claims in tack
attempting to move beyond the aporia of security through state
politics only strengthens the ontological violence enacted by the
security mindset
2002
My particular concern with humanist discourses of security is that, whatever their critical value, they
leave in place (and possibly strengthen) a key structural feature of the elite strategy they
oppose: its claim to embody truth and fix the contours of the real. In particular, the ontology
of security/threat or security/insecurity--which forms the basic condition of the real for
mainstream discourses of international policy--remains powerfully in place, and security's
broader function as a defining condition of human experience and modern political life
remains invisible and unexamined. This is to abjure a powerful critical approach that is
able to question the very categories in which our thinking, our experience, and actions
remain confined.
This article remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than
pushing into the spaces that lie beyond. The contours of this project are already becoming clearer.
(15) What is still required is a properly genealogical account of security's ability to provide
what Walker calls a "constitutive account of the political" : as Walker says, "claims about
common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the
contradictions written into the heart of modern politics: we can only become humans or
anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the
greater good of citizenship." (16)
Thus, before we can effectively rewrite security, we have to properly understand how
security has written us-how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities
for our selves, our relationships, and our available images of political, social, and economic
order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity
establishes between our "humanity" and a secure identity bounded and defined by the
state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political,
technological, philosophic, and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive
events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings.
Securitys strongest when it is shifting attempting to reconstruct

the ontology of security will fail to produce less violent results
2002
I am serious in arguing that the aporias of security do create important room to move, to disrupt its claim to
universality and truth, to imagine new possibilities that escape its repressive dialectic of self and other. Yet
here we also encounter a disturbing irony. Security forms a political technology whose power
partly derives from its aporetic structure. A generalized opposition between society and its
others has worked as an effective technology of fear to construct and police forms of
national and ethnic identity; while illusions of universal security have simultaneously
worked as a smokescreen for a realpolitik that purchases the security of the self at the
20
expense of the other. In short, security's power lies in the very slipperiness of its
significations, its ironic structure of meaning, its ability to have an almost universal appeal
yet name very different arrangements of order and possibility for different groups of
people. This is why it is pointless to try and stabilize security's ontology . It is better to
track security's tactical and discursive power though its development as a constitutive
account of the political-one that is simultaneously structured, enabled, and fissured by its
aporias.
The political orientation of security ideologies is not relevant its

the creation of external enemies that creates violence
2002
This opens up significant questions about the structure and operation of security as a concept: however
much they disavow it, Derrida reminds us that all such metaphysical ideals exist in a relation
of
dependence to a subordinated term they claim to supersede or expel . Security is no
different. While betraying pretensions to absolute self-presence, security only ever exists
in relation to "insecurity": it thus operates according to the Hegelian economy that incorporates this
dichotomy into a "dialectical" movement that poses the second term as the anathema of the first, which
becomes an ideal state, or goal, toward which one aspires in a movement away from the second. Security
then becomes a powerful signifier of an ideal political, economic, and cultural order,
opposed to "others" designated as inferior or threatening. Yet its promise breaks down
when we consider that, because "security" is bound into a dependent relation with
"insecurity," it can never escape it: it must continue to produce images of "inse curity" in
order to retain meaning.
21
AT: Realism
Realism is a reductionist falsehood its overarching theory is not
universal and it produces mass sacrifice of life
Richmond, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, 2007 Oliver,
Alternatives 32.2, OneFile

This means that much of orthodox IR theory is actually anti-peace. Its reduction and abstraction of
human life within "international relations," instead made up of "actors, anarchy,
interdependencies, threats, rationality," power, and interests leads to dangerous rational
calculations that ultimately sacrifice human life. (72) IR represents its knowledge
systems as universal, when in fact they are local to the West/North. (73) Such representational habits
and knowledge systems are prone to isolating themselves in order to maintain their belief
in universality. (74) For example, Sylvester has shown how Waltzian neorealism led to a form of IR in which,
"parsimonious explanatory power traded off the gender, class, race, language, diversity, and cultural multiplicities of life."
(75)
Realism is a choice not an inevitability their argument is simply an

attempt to create a homogenous interpretation of international
relations which assures technological oppression
Jabri, Centre for International Relations, Department of War Studies, King's College,
University of London, 2004
Vivienne, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29.3, Academic OneFile
There is much in the present condition that centers on a conception of the past that naturalizes and reifies. As Michel
the establishment of a hegemonic discourse requires a

uniform rendition of past and present, where, in a sense the past comes to serve the
present, is brought into the service of the present. Political discourses based on categories such as
homogeneous community, the right to sovereignty, family, the literal reading of religious doctrine, appear to seek
legitimacy through renditions of the past where the subject is uniform and content within the
confines of family and community. History is rendered a technology, deployed in the practices of
exclusion that identify exclusively those agencies that may possess legitimacy in
renditions of past and present. Such historical technologies are not only aimed at the glorification of the past, but
also at the reversal of particular social and political turning points of the past. Relations of power come to be
formative of the historical process and the discursive practices that surround it. For Foucault,
Foucault's analytic of power has shown, (2)
analyses of such relations must move beyond the dichotomy between structure and event, for "the important thing is to
avoid trying to do for the event what was previously done with the concept of structure" since events differ in their "capacity
to produce effects." (3)
Realism is methodologically unsound the inclusion of natural

science into international relations fails to address the central
concerns of the security system
This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an
intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to
the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's
foreign policy and

Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the
hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient
Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy,
Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key
figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and Ren Descartes, who all combined a hunger for
22
political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a nave faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to
create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a
harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive
hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar
move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved
progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely
granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its
strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier,
Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only
by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65
Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of
systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome
scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the
this new scientific

power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter
afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons
themselves, into political utility and rational strategy. 66
most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet
23
AT: Realism
Their argument is wrong realism does not explain the
international arena it sanitizes violence and erases the suffering
caused by state centric ideologies aesthetic and emotional
ideologies rule the current political order
Bleiker, School of Political Science and Intl Studies, University of Queensland, 2006
Roland, Alternatives 31.1 OneFile

And yet, the actual policy analyses of terrorist threats are advanced in a highly detached and
rationalized manner. (57) The very presentation of contemporary warfare, from sanitized
video-images of satellite-guided missiles to the abstract language of defense experts
(exemplified through terms like collateral damage and clean bombs) not only eliminates suffering from our
purview, but also fails to take into account emotional issues when assessing threats and formulating policy.
Although unacknowledged by experts in security studies, there is an extensive body of literature that deals with emotional
Nussbaum's impressive study on the topic is particularly significant here since she demonstrates
that emotions do not just highlight our vulnerability toward events that lie outside of
control, such as terrorist attacks. They are also important forms of knowledge and
evaluative thought. Literature, music, and other works of art offer possibilities to express these emotional insights in
ways that cannot easily be achieved through conventional accounts of events. This is why, Nussbaum stresses,
emotional intelligence and aesthetic ways of representing them should be accepted,
alongside more conventional sources, as legitimate elements in the formulation of ethical
and political judgment. (58)
insight. Martha
The international system is shaped by the actions of states

realism is not a fixed entity it is a performative choice
Howard, Assistant Professor in International Service, American University, 2005
Peter, 11/17 Constructivism and Foreign Policy,

http://nw08.american.edu/~phoward/isane_05.doc.
One of the central constructivist insights is that the international system is not a fixed, external,
material structureit is instead a socially produced structure of shared meanings (rules or
norms) (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999). The rules of the system are produced by the interactions of
states and in turn shape state practice . Security is not a favorable distribution of material capabilities
(Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979), but rather a particular regime of rules (Howard 2002; Kratochwil 1989). Kratochwil argues
Any foreign policy movenegotiation,

appeasement, threat, commitment, or challengerequires a shared framework to make
the action understandable to all participants. Actors rely on background knowledge as a
basis for interpreting others moves (Kratochwil 1978). For a foreign policy to produce security, it must be able
that even the most basic of security agreements constitute a regime.
to somehow contribute to the shared understandings that constitute a security regime.
24
AT: Realism
Realist enframing of international relations guarantees universal
destruction of life in the name of scientific certainty their theory
makes persons means to ends
Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth,
unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise
this has not prevented

technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but
as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers,
strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science
and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it
turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth.
profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet
Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological
force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in
the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end' . Rather
technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to
order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a
'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the
potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77
This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that
'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and
remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as
means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and
humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where
he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to
the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over
In strategy, warfare and

geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted
by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles,
useful or obstinate matter.
This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic
thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical
strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy
short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning
economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy,
and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in
the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by
targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so
there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'. 80 Similarly a retired Israeli
the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource.
army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and
Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to
work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward
shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81
25
Representations Matter
In the context of Cuba representations shape political realities
domination of Cuba
Brenner professor of international relations at American University 2010 Philip The
Power of Metaphor: Explaining U.S. Policy toward Cuba Diplomatic History 34.2 wiley
online
The central premise of Cuba in the American Imagination is first that the metaphors U.S. officials used to
describe Cuba defined their reality regarding Cuba. Second, while the depictions of
Cuba changed over time, their messages were roughly constant: the United States is
superior to Cuba, has a natural right to possess it, and is morally responsible for
shaping Cuba's affairs.
Political leaders do not use metaphors merely to make their speeches more lively. They are an efficient
means of communicating a complex reality in commonly accepted terms that
then provide the basis for acceptable action. As George Lakoff observes, they limit what
we notice, highlight what we do see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we
reason with.1 While officials may not always use metaphors with intentionality, Prez notes, in the case
of Cuba they were not deployed randomly. . . . Metaphorical constructs provided
a normative grounding for a version of reality and validation of conduct (p. 36).
The domination of Cuban affairs became the reasonable discharge of North
American moral conduct. This mode of relating to Cubans became so normal
that Americans rarely questioned whether it was appropriat e, which Prez argues
provides corroboration of the power of metaphor to reproduce premise as
proof (p. 22).
Metaphors alone do not explain U.S. policy. But they are an appropriate starting point for
considering political and economic factors, because nearly all of the metaphors,
Prez concludes, functioned in the service of U.S. interests. . . . Americans came to
their knowledge of Cuba principally by way of representations entirely of their
own creation (p. 22). Their Cuba, he remarks, was, in fact, a figment of their own
imagination and a projection of their needs (p. 23).
Language and representations give meaning to material reality it

creates the norms and conditions which produce the social world
Howard, Assistant Professor in International Service, American University, 2005
Peter, 11/17 Constructivism and Foreign Policy,
http://nw08.american.edu/~phoward/isane_05.doc.
Language is the key to unlocking this process , for it is how actors share meaning. Language is not
just a medium for communication through which ideas flow. Language is not just a
pictorial representation of reality. Language is itself the set of shared understandings that
produce the social world (Fierke 2002; Howard 2004b; Onuf 1989; Wittgenstein 1953). The central insight of
language based constructivist is that we cannot get beyond our language to a more objective reality
language constitutes our reality. This does not mean that any actor can talk any reality into existence.
Language only has any meaning as a shared set of rulesthe more who speak a language, the more who understand and
follow the rules, the more powerful the language. Moreover, a speaker cannot randomly string words togetherhe must
follow the understood rules of speech in order to make sense. There is no way to determine what a speaker will sayagency
an analyst can determine

what is possible for an actor to say in order to be understood. As this realm of possibility
becomes constricting, actors find themselves entangled in the rules of a language (Howard
is preserved because each actor retains creative control over his own actions. However,
26
The material reality of security studies is given meaning and purpose by the
language that enables its use.
2002).
Representations create violence if we win a link argument we

have won a DA that has already occurred they cannot sever from
these arguments because the language of the 1AC created a system
of violence.
Zizek 2006 Slavoj, Dimmed Tide is Loosed, The Symptom Volume 7, spring,
http://www.lacan.com/zizantinomies.htm
This simple and all too obvious fact should compel us to render problematic the idea
(propagated lately by
Habermas, but also not strange to a certain Lacan) of language, symbolic order, as the medium of
reconciliation/mediation, of peaceful co-existence, as opposed to the violence of immediate
raw confrontation: in language, instead of exerting direct violence on each other, we debate, we exchange
words, and such an exchange, even when it is aggressive, presupposes a minimum of recognition of the other.
The idea is thus that, insofar as language gets infected by violence, this occurs under the influence of
contingent empirical pathological circumstances which distort the inherent logic of symbolic communication.
What if, however, humans exceed animals in their capacity to violence precisely because
they speak? [7] As already Hegel was well aware, there is something violent in the very
symbolization of a thing, which equals its mortification; this violence operates at multiple
levels. Language simplifies the designated thing, reducing it to a unary feature; it dismembers the
thing, destroying its organic unity, treating its parts and properties as autonomous; it
inserts the thing into a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it.
27
Representations Matter
The study of international relations has little to teach us outside of
questions of representation
Jabri, Senior Lecturer in IR at King's College, U of London, 2003 Vivienne, Borderlands
ejournal Vol2 No2 online
10. International Relations, as discipline, and as orthodoxy, seeks predominantly to describe
events in global politics, where the term theory is often applied to what are essentially descriptive
accounts of interactions at the global level, descriptions that are often framed in causal terms. Even where
structural continuities are taken into account as, for example, in constructivist approaches to the subject, the
discourse is representational, assuming a form of correspondence, even as such correspondence is
recognised to be a product of the constitutive role of language. In many senses, International Relations the
discipline, with all its taken for granted, formulaic representations of the world, is far removed from the
world, specifically where this world remains unrepresented, somehow beyond easy predictability.
International Relations with its givens, the state, order in international society, strangely has little to
contribute to politics and how we might conceive of the political.
Where it becomes political is when

it recognises the complex interplay between the social, economic, and political spheres, as these penetrate the everyday
lived experience of the subject through the institutionalisation of regulatory practices that produce particular subjects and
that inhibit or constrain particular others. International Relations as discipline becomes political when it recognises the
contested nature of political authority, of legitimacy, and the parameters of what might constitute community. It becomes
political when it recognises the multiplicity of locations wherein the political comes into play, where the subject of politics
emerges.
28
Framework Cards
Resorting to solely notions of policy making marginalizes all
alternative insights leads to reliance on military intervention
Bleiker School of Political Science and Intl Studies, University of Queensland, 2006
Roland, Alternatives 31.1 OneFile

The tendency to resort to old thinking patterns in times of crises is as entrenched in
international relations scholarship as it is in the domain of policymaking . Most approaches to the
study of world politics remain dominated by social-scientific principles. This is even the case with many
authors who seek to open up new perspectives . Alexander Wendt, for instance, one of the leading
constructivist contributors to scholarly debates, stresses that "poetry, literature and other humanistic disciplines are not
designed to explain global war or Third World poverty, and as such if we want to solve those problems our best hope, slim as
The resulting tendency to marginalize alternative insights, such as

those emanating from aesthetic sources, is particularly prevalent in the specific domain of
security studies. The exclusive reliance on social science marks even those approaches
that seek a broadening of the security agenda , such as advocates of human security, who
urge policymakers to view security beyond the conventional military-based defense of the
state and its territory. (11)
it maybe, is social science." (10)
The divisions they create within debate are a form of bio-political

control and while some bio-politics is productive their arguments
create a matrix of war which assures the constant policing of
borders and violence by the inside against all of those deemed
outsiders
Jabri, Centre for International Relations, Department of War Studies, King's College,
University of London, 2004
Vivienne, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29.3, Academic OneFile
The totality described above is hence also a matrix of war. Thinking of totality in this way enables us to
understand how the operations of power in the present condition limit politics, produce particular subjectivities, and
Politics in late-modernity is about the government (surveillance,

confinement, pacification) of groups and populations conducted at the transnational/global
level. This is a "biopolitics" that recognizes no boundary, that sees the entire global
population within its remit of control. (10) Such government may, at times such as the present
juncture, involve war, it may involve the manufacture of threat, and it may involve the
predominance of a discourse of fear and insecurity. (11) The difference in late-modernity is that such
circumscribe agency.
practices of government (defined as is evident here in Foucault's understanding of governmentality) occur at local, national,
The "inside" and

"outside" are no longer delimited by the boundaries of the sovereign state but are
inscribed in terms of subjects identified as "other" through the social/juridical/political
matrix of regulation. This system is not constituted by one state alone but transcends states and international
and regional, as well as global, levels, involving a complexity of interactions between these levels.
institutions, making use of military forces and networks of intelligence, as well as domestic jurisdictions. (12)
The political subject that emerges is one that is uniformly defined, differentiated from its
unacceptable other, molded as the perfect subject of global capital , content to put up with
struggles relating to lifestyle and impervious to or ignorant of the impoverishment of the
other. Hegemonic order requires such compliant subjectivity if it is to succeed. It further requires
the dissolution of the political subject into an entity that is both participant in and object of
a focus-group orientation to technocratic governmentality . Through such practices, efficiency and
certainty are ensured as the bedrock of a form of a Third Way politics that seeks to reconcile the late-modern welfare state to
neoliberal imperatives. (13)
The exercise of power globally is hence centered on the capacity to
29
order conduct, a capacity that has its base in institutionalized rationalizing practices
ranging from the regulation of exchange relations to policing across borders.
30

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QPQ K Index

The insistence on American involvement in zones of conflict is

specifying the ways the world is and,

actively (re)making that same world. This

and over the past decade has portrayed

as truth, consented to and desired--which

creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon

We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented

Link 2NC Block

It is telling that Bush's claim of either you

Signified by the notion of integration we identify elements in the

integration, we argue, is enacted through a

are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires critical

THE EXCHANGE ECONOMY tit for tat politics engage in a sacrificial

individuals to carry out its self aggrandizing agendas.

Link 2NC Block

Theory & Event, 10.2

Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability'

rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

This form of rationality makes humans instruments for destruction

Link - Reconstruction / Development

Link - Foreign Assistance

all the gifts of humanity and nature are being

At most Patriarchal Capitalism permits band aid

Link Behavior Modification

Theory & Event, 10.2

Constructive engagement makes violent intervention inevitable

Barnett suggests that the stakes are

neoliberal world vision.

Conflict is therefore inevitable: it is a foundational truth confirmed by the severed map.

Impact QPQ Economy Violence

our exchange-based nation applauds making war

Exchange economy leads to mass suffering and war

Conditional offers destroy a value to life and creates a politics of

The gift paradigm requires other- orientation and gives value to

Impact Epistemology Argument

in practice, technique quickly passes

technology becomes being;

these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and

without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual

Current epistemology always fails doesnt question root of

the challenge is posed not merely by a few

It creates both discursive constraints -- available

Working within the system is not an option it is impossible to

and national security institutions --

are utterly trapped

within the Clausewitzian paradigm,

integration nonetheless involves its own set of exclusions, with

the production of this imaginative geography should be understood in

The self-serving apologetics of many

AT: Link Turn

Securitys strongest when it is shifting attempting to reconstruct

The political orientation of security ideologies is not relevant its

Alternatives 32.2, OneFile

Realism is a choice not an inevitability their argument is simply an

the establishment of a hegemonic discourse requires a

Realism is methodologically unsound the inclusion of natural

foreign policy and

this new scientific

Roland, Alternatives 31.1 OneFile

The international system is shaped by the actions of states

Peter, 11/17 Constructivism and Foreign Policy,

Any foreign policy movenegotiation,

to somehow contribute to the shared understandings that constitute a security regime.