Sie sind auf Seite 1von 6

People vs.

Maceran

October 18, 1977

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.
Electro fishing is not Poisonous and obnoxious. and not provided in the old Fisheries law
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
SMART vs. NTC

August 12, 2003

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of
Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive,
confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular
service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable.
Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results
in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.[17] They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as
with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute
it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must
prevail.[18]

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is


its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an
act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.[19]
Cia. Gral. De Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility

March 6, 1916

An act of the Philippine Legislature giving the Board of Public Utility Commissioners power to
require every public utility to furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in
such form and containing such matters as the board may from time to time by order prescribe is
invalid for the reason that it is a delegation of legislative power to the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners and is in violation of the Act of July 1, 1902
People vs. Vera

November 16, 1937

The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or .guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may
use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission"
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the
legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any
other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.
Ynot vs. IAC

March 20, 1987

The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing.
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches
in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options
are apparently boundless.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not

"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine
of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General

December 24, 1965

The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.


Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 2
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be
any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his
opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a
total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special
duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA

October 18, 1988

What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of cases without challenge by the
employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Edu vs. Ericta

October 24, 1970

What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down
fundamental policy.
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health

November 25, 2005

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any
other appointee or delegate of the Legislature.[38] Except as to matters of detail that may be left
to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board
may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.[39]
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear
from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of
the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase
out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.[40] The Secretary of
Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of
said Act.
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial
blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 "based on the result of a
careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety." This power to
ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of
extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the
power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.[41]

Carbonilla vs. Board of Airlines Representatives

September 14, 2011

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over BAR's petition stems from Section 1 in relation to
Section 3, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that appeals from "awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi judicial functions[,]" which includes the Office of the President, may be taken
to the Court of Appeals. BAR's petition for review to the Court of Appeals from the 12 March
2007 Decision and 14 March 2008 Resolution of the Office of the President falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
The jurisdiction over the validity and constitutionality of rules and regulations issued by the
Commissioner under Section 608 of the TCCP lies before the regular courts. It is not within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President or the CTA. Hence, the Office of the President erred in
holding that BAR's appeal was filed late because BAR can still raise the issue before the regular
courts.
BPI Leasing Corporation vs. CA

November 18, 2003

Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and substance:


legislative and interpretative. A legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation,
designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative
rule, on the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative
agency is in charge of enforcing.
revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly
states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section
244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules
and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. In Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[16] the Court recognized that the application of
Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of quasi-legislative or rule-making authority.
Verily, it cannot be disputed that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rulemaking power of the Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as
alleged by BLC.
The doctrine enunciated in Fortune Tobacco, and reiterated in CIR v. Michel J. Lhuillier
Pawnshop, Inc.,[18] is that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly informed, before the
issuance is given the force and effect of law. In Lhuillier and Fortune Tobacco, the Court
invalidated the revenue memoranda concerned because the same increased the tax liabilities of
the affected taxpayers without affording them due process. In this case, Revenue Regulation 1986 would be beneficial to the taxpayers as they are subjected to lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is
invoking Revenue Regulation 19-86 as the very basis of its claim for refund. If it were invalid,
then petitioner all the more has no right to a refund.

CIR vs. CA
a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary

legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of
public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be
hearing.
On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing."
A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been
issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking
in the process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section
142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to
place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.
Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured
cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to
the issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes
were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad
valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate
consequence on private respondent's products.
Evidently, in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the
scope of the amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-93
had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its
quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of
publication should not have been then ignored.
All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a
valid and effective administrative issuance.
Requisites for validity of exercise of delegation of power
1.
2.
3.
4.

its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature


it must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribe procedure
it must be within the scope of authority given by the legislature
it must be reasonable.