NUMBER, GENDER AND TENSE

Santillon v. Miranda, G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965

In the Matter of the Instestate Estate of Pedro Santillon,Claro SANTILLON,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
Perfecta MIRANDA, Benito MIRANDA and RosarioCORRALES,
oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

Facts: Lines & Spaces, represented by Eleanor Bahia Sanchez, order from
petitioner Amon Trading Corporation, and from JulianaMarketing bags of
cement for Tri-Reality development and construction, but it found out that
both

cannot

deliver

all

its

balance

and

refunded

the

amount

of

undelivered bags of cement to Lines and Spaces in representation of Eleanor

Sanchez, but Sanchez had already fled abroad, private respondent filed this

FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta
Miranda and one son, Claro.
Four years after Pedros death, Claro filed a petition for letters of
administration which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda
and Rosario Corrales. The court appointed commissioners to draft a project of
partition and distribution of all properties of Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to
declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties invoking
Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting from the
conjugal properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be
divided as follows: for her and for him. On the other hand, Perfecta
claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC
to another of the remaining half. After due notice and hearing, the court
held that Perfecta is entitled to shares and the remaining share for Claro
after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when
the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or
intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our conclusion
(equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas
Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which Art. 996 was taken, contained
two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second,
where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996
omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislators
desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

Amon Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158585

Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half

of the intestate estate.
When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with
only one legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to onehalf of the estate of the deceased spouse under Art. 996 of
the Civil Code.

case for sum of money against petitioners and Lines & Spaces.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, found Lines & Spaces solely liable to
private respondent and absolved petitioners of any liability. Tri-Realty partially
appealed from the trial courts decision absolving Amon Trading Corporation
and Juliana Marketing of any liability to Tri- Realty. In the presently assailed
Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held
petitioners Amon Trading Corporation and Juliana Marketing to be jointly and
severally liable with Lines & Spaces for the undelivered bags of cement.
Issue: Whether or not Lines & Spaces is the Tri-realtys agent
Held: No contract of agency between Tri-realty and Lines & Spaces, but rather
a supplier for the latters cement needs. All the quibbling about whether Lines
& Spaces acted as agent of private respondentis inane because Amon took
orders from Eleanor Sanchez who, after all, was the one who paid them the
managers checks for the purchase of cement. Sanchez represented herself to
be from Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty, purportedly a single entity. Amon didnt
knew that Lines space and tri-realty is a separate entity.
Since line space is not agent of tri-realty, no vinculum could be said to exist
between amon and tri-realty.
Therefore Lines & Spaces solely liable to private tri-realty.
USE OF SHALL AND MAY
Office of the Ombudsman v. Macabulos, G.R. No. 159395

CONJUNCTIVE AND DISJUNCTIVE WORDS

FACTS: Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged Dr. Mercedita J. Macabulos

1.

(Dr. Macabulos) who was then holding the position of Medical Officer V at the

6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) as a prescriptive period on the

Department of Education, Culture and Sports - National Capital Region (DECS-

Ombudsman administrative disciplinary cases is correct

NCR) or the Chief of the School Health and Nutrition Unit with dishonesty,

2.

grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest

private respondent is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule

of the service and acts unbecoming a public official in violation of the Civil

of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary

Service Laws and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public

cases

Officials and Employees. Dr. Virtudes alleged that Dr. Macabulos incurred a
cash advance of P45,000 and she was required by the latter to produce dental
and medical receipts for the liquidation of the cash advance. Taking into
account that Dr. Virtudes was not yet assigned at School Health and Nutrition
Unit, DECS-NCR, she did not submit the receipts and invoices.
Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr. Macabulos allegedly subjected her to
several forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the accusations and
claimed that it was Dr. Antonia Lopez-Dee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist,
who used the money to purchase medical and dental supplies. In support of
her claim, she attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee admitting said
purchase using the cash advance of Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that
it was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advance by improperly spending it
and that she tried to liquidate the same by submitting a tampered invoice in
conformity with the amount of the cash advance.
Graft Investigation Officer I Ulysis S. Calumpad rendered a decision absolving
Dr. Macabulos from the administrative charge. However, Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. disapproved the decision. He found out
that Dr. Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit but the contents of the first page
were entirely different from the affidavit submitted by Dr. Macabulos in her
counteraffidavit. A new memorandum by the Ombudsman was released
finding Dr. Macabulos guilty imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from
the government service. Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion for
consideration before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decision
of the Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman can no longer
investigate the complaint since the acts complained of were committed one
year from the filing of the complaint and that the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman is not immediately executory.
ISSUES:

Whether or not CAs interpretation of Section 20(5) of Republic Act No.

Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on the

HELD: The Court of Appeals should have granted the motion for intervention
filed by the Ombudsman. In its decision, the appellate court not only reversed
the order of the Ombudsman but also delved into the investigatory power of
the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party when
the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to
move for intervention and reconsideration of the decision in order to prevent
the undue restriction of its constitutionally mandated investigatory power.
The Court of Appeals held that under Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770, the
Ombudsman is already barred by prescription from investigating the
complaint since it was filed more than one year from the occurrence of the
complained act. The Court found this interpretation by the appellate court
unduly restrictive of the duty of the Ombudsman as provided under the
Constitution to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
The use of the word may is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory,
indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word may, when
used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion. The use of the word
may in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 indicates that it is within the discretion of
the Ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation when a complaint is
filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the
penalty of dismissal is not immediately executory. The Court of Appeals
applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all other decisions of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of
RA 6770 are neither final nor immediately executory.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the

TITLE

Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a

Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil 883

petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in

FACTS:

accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1, 1919,
the latter contracted with the petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the

Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the

years all sugar cane produced upon her plantation. Said contract was
recorded in the Registry of Property. In the interim the execution of said
contract,Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land

penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he

Act," became effective. The respondent, while admitting said contract and her

shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be

obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto, bases her refusal

paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason

so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the

of the suspension or removal.

petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be

Islands or of the United States.

executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure

that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon.
Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not RA 2874 applies to agricultural lands held in private
ownership.
(2) Whether or not complies with the constitutional requirement "That no bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

A.O. 17 provides for execution of the decisions pending appeal, which

provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service.

HELD:
(1) No. It is held that Act No. 2874 was intended to apply to and regulate the
sale, lease and other disposition of public lands only. The title of the Act,

More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the

primary issue was whether the decision of the Ombudsman suspending
petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was immediately
executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that

always indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to amend and compile
the laws relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes. Said
act, by express provisions of Sections 4, 5, 67 and 105, does not apply to

the pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded

lands privately owned by the government. The Act nowhere contains any

by the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.

direct or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. The

Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that decisions of the

court holds, therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No.

Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal.

2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and that

INTRINSIC AIDS

lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected
in any manner whatsoever.

(2) No. The objects of the constitutional requirement under Section 3 of the Jones
Law are first, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to

Are the Information filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized
under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of

which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and , third, to fairly apprise the
people of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's
residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a
necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection

they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if

with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or

they shall so desire.' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.) This

public disorder.

constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory. In the said Act, the

The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous

words "and for other purposes" contained in its title, must be treated as nonexistent, held to be without force or effect whatsoever and have been
altogether discarded in construing the Act. That the use of the words "other

weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a
case of statutory construction.
HELD:

purposes," can no longer be of any avail as they express nothing and amount
to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement. The phrase
expresses no specific purpose and imports indefinitely something different

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL
DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

from that which precedes it in the title.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

PREAMBLE

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it

People v. Purisima, G.R. Nos. 42050-66

becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which

FACTS OF THE CASE:

enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the

and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila,

the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid

are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of

presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a

law.

legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused

susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,

with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree

indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned
above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which
will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations,
on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed
to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:

PUNCTUATION MARKS
U.S. v. Hart, 26 Phil. 149, November 21, 1913
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE
This case is about vagrancy

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hart, Miller and Natividad were accused of Gambling and Vagrancy
where they all appealed.
Hart had ran gambling games in his saloon ever night one in Angeles
and one in the Bario of Tacondo. He also operated a hotel Angeles in which he
did a business. He was also a proprietor He raised hogs which he sold to the
Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg. He was also authorized to sell several
hundered hectarcs of land owned by one Carrillo in Tacondo. With the power of
an attorney, he furnished the same property and paid for the 1st public school
in Tacondo.
Miller had the reputation of being a gambler and that he was fined for
gambling and was seen in houses of prostitution. Miller was discharged from
the Army last year. He had the position of Sergeant and received a rating as
"excellent" on being discharged. He had a partnership with one Buckered and
invested P1000. The business netted him P300 per month.
Natividad was also a gambler. During his visits to saloons, he
sometimes acted as a banker. His occupancy is that of a tailor which was
sufficient enough to support his family.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the
Court of First Instance of
Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provision of Act No. 519, found
guilty, and were

when found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or in

any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute
person of associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders
about the country at unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle
person who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or
place other than such as is kept for lodging purposed, without
the permission of the owner or a person entitled to the
possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person who
lives in and about houses of ill fame; every common prostitute
and common drunkard, is a vagrant."
It is insisted by the Attorney General (AG) that visible means of
support, which are evident in the occupations of the accused, would not be a
bar to the conviction under any one of the last four (4) clauses of the said act.
The AG contends that "visible means of support" only applies to those "staying
through the country".
The courts decided that the mere missing of the punctuation cannot
hold bar the argument of the AG, since the intention of the legislators was to
prevent "loitering". It was stated that loitering was idling or wasting one's
time. The time spent in saloons drum shops, and gambling houses is anything
but that.
The three defendants were earning a living by legitimate means in a degree of
comfort higher than the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which the
legislature has yet to make a subject of penal law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
For these reasons, the defendants are ACQUITTED, with the costs de oficio.

each sentenced to six months imprisonment. Hart and Miller were further
sentenced to a fine
of P200, and Natividad to a fine of P100. All appealed.

DEFINITION SECTIONS AND INTERPRETATION CLAUSES

People v. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536

ISSUE: Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad have committed the act of
Vagrancy.
RULING: Defendants are AQUITTED
Act No. 519 states that:
"(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence,
who had the physical ability to work, and who neglects to
apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every
person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling housed, or tramping or straying through the country
without visible means of support; (3) every person known to
be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own
confession or by his having been convicted of either said
offenses, and having no visible or lawful means of support

CAPITALIZATION OF LETTERS
Unabia v. City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253
EXTRINSIC AIDS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PRIOR TO ENACTMENT
Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Custom, 51 Phil. 131

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SATUTE

Oliva v. Lamadrid, G.R. No. 23196

FACTS:

5 of RA 720.

Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security

HELD:

for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the
property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under RA 720, the

No. Petitioner, as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and

land could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale, Feb. 4 1963. No

a torrens title, is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore

redemption was made within that time. On May 31 1963, Plaintiff offered to

not subject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. In July 30, 1951, the

repurchase, claiming that under C.A. No. 141, he was entitled to repurchase

Court had already decided that Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 is applicable to

the land, not two (2), but five (5) years after the title was sold because he was

foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent; therefore,

a holder of a free patent and torrens title.

the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. Where the general law is
the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act, they should

ISSUE:
W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 of Sec.

be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the times.