Hearing Transcript - April 8 2010

1
2 Military Police Complaints Commission

3
4
5 AFGHANISTAN PUBLIC INTEREST HEARINGS
6 held pursuant to section 250.38(1) of the National Defence
7 Act, in the matter of file 2008-042
8
9
10 LES AUDIENCES D'INTÉRÊT PUBLIQUE SUR L'AFGHANISTAN
11 tenues en vertu du paragraphe 250-38(1) de la Loi sur la
12 défense nationale pour le dossier 2008-042
13
14 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
15 held at 270 Albert St.
16 Ottawa, Ontario
17 on Thursday, April 8, 2010
18 jeudi le 8 avril, 2010
19
20 VOLUME 3
21
22BEFORE:
23
24Mr. Glenn Stannard Acting Chairperson
25
26Mr. R. Berlinquette Commission Member
27
28Ms. R. Cléroux Registrar
29
30
31APPEARANCES:
32
33Mr. R. Lunau Commission counsel
34Ms. Catherine Beaudoin
35Me Nigel Marshman
36Me Matthew McGarvey
37
38Mr. A. Préfontaine For Maj Bernie Hudson, Maj
39Ms. H. Robertson Michel Zybala, Maj Ron Gribble,
40Mr. V. Wirth LCol (Ret'd) William H. Garrick,
41Ms. E. Richards CWO Barry Watson, MWO Jean-Yves Girard, Maj John Kirschner
42
43Mr. P. Champ For Amnesty International and
44Me S. Jodoin B.C. Civil Liberties Association
45
46Mr. M. Wallace
47Me Bill Carroll For Capt(N) (Ret'd) Moore, CFPM
48
49 A.S.A.P. Reporting Services Inc. © 2010
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51 200 Elgin Street, Suite 1105 333 Bay Street, Suite
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53 Ottawa, Ontario K2P 1L5 Toronto, Ontario
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2 (613) 564-2727 (416) 861-
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4 INDEX
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7 PAGE
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10SWORN: CAPTAIN (RET'D) NAIPAUL 8
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12 Examination-in-chief by Ms. Beaudoin 8
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Champ 38
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Wallace 59
15
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17SWORN: WARRANT OFFICER STEEVE CHAMBERLAND 64
18
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Mcgarvey 64
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Jodoin 91
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Wallace 112
22 Cross-examination by Ms. Richards 114
23 Re-examination by Mr. Mcgarvey 116
24
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26ASSERMENTÉ: MAJOR FRANCIS BOLDUC 120
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28 Interrogation Par Me Marshman 120
29 Cross-examination by Mr. Champ 193
30 Examination by the Chair 243
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1 Ottawa, Ontario
2--- Upon resuming on Thursday, April 8, 2010
3 at 9:05 a.m.
4 THE CHAIR: Good morning. In
5terms of counsel, I think everybody knows everyone.
6We have no new counsel from previous days.
7 The first order of business for
8today is that the decision relative to reasons to
9proceed in camera was posted yesterday afternoon on
10the MPCC website, and what I'd like to do today is
11read it into the record, and then from there I'll
12have a few comments beyond that.
13 The reasons for order to proceed
14in camera:
15 At the resumption of the
16Commission's public interest hearings on April 6,
172010, counsel from the Department of Justice made
18an oral request pursuant to section 250.42 of the
19National Defence Act, and Rule S14 of the
20Afghanistan Public Interest Hearing Rules, for an
21Order that certain evidence from non-subjects be
22received in camera. The Order requested by counsel
23was that the hearings conducted on April 6, 2010
24and April 7, 2010, be conducted in private to
25protect certain specified security interests.
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1 After hearing the representations
2made by counsel for all parties, the Commission
3granted the request that the hearings on April 6th
4and 7th proceed in camera. In so doing, the
5Commission was satisfied that the statutory
6requirements for proceeding in camera were met.
7 Parliament has enacted section
8250.42 of the National Defence Act, which provides
9as follows:
10 "250.42 A hearing is to be
11 held in public, except that
12 the Complaints Commission may
13 order the hearing or any part
14 of the hearing to be held in
15 private if it is of the
16 opinion that during the
17 course of the hearing any of
18 the following information
19 will likely be disclosed:
20 (a) information that, if
21 disclosed, could reasonably
22 be expected to be injurious
23 to the defence of Canada or
24 any state allied or
25 associated with Canada or the
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1 detection, prevention or
2 suppression of subversive or
3 hostile activities;
4 (b) information that, if
5 disclosed, could reasonably
6 be expected to be injurious
7 to the administration of
8 justice, including law
9 enforcement; and
10 (c) information affecting a
11 person's privacy or security
12 interest, if that interest
13 outweighs the public's
14 interest in the information."
15 Rules S14 and S15 of the
16Afghanistan Public Interest Hearing Rules
17accordingly provide:
18 "S14(1) A person may request
19 the Complaints Commission to
20 hold a part of the hearing in
21 private if he or she believes
22 that any information
23 described in paragraphs
24 250.42(a), (b) or (c) of the
25 National Defence Act will
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1 likely be disclosed.Y
2 S15(1) The Complaints
3 Commission shall convene in
4 private to consider a request
5 under section S14, and may
6 convene periodically for this
7 purpose."
8 Parliament has thus directed, in
9the National Defence Act, that in the course of the
10Commission's public hearings some information will
11likely be disclosed that would reasonably prove
12injurious to Canada's defence and security
13interests, the enforcement of Canada's laws, or to
14a person's privacy and security interests, if it
15were made public. In such cases, a request may be
16made that the information be received in camera to
17protect the interests that Parliament has deemed to
18be of overriding importance.
19 The above provisions generally
20reflect accepted common law principles and
21procedures under which Courts may be asked to hear
22evidence, in private, as to why substantial reasons
23exist for keeping certain information confidential
24notwithstanding the "open court" principle: see
25e.g., Named Person and Attorney General of Canada
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1on behalf of the Requesting State v. Vancouver Sun
2et al.
3 In the circumstances of this case,
4counsel for the Department of Justice relied on all
5three subsections of section 250.42 of the National
6Defence Act to submit that the hearings in question
7should be conducted in camera. In assessing
8counsel's request, the Commission applied the test
9and principles established by Parliament in section
10250.42 of the National Defence Act, and was
11satisfied on the facts that the requirements of
12section 250.42 were met. The Commission
13accordingly issued a verbal Order, from the bench,
14directing that the proceedings on April 6th and 7th
15would be conducted in camera. The hearings
16immediately resumed thereafter.
17 In arriving at its decision, the
18Commission also took into account the public nature
19of the hearings, and the principle that any
20derogation from the public nature of its hearings
21must be minimal. Factors that the Commission took
22into account included:
23 No party opposed the request.
24 Granting the request was
25 considered by the parties to
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1 be the most expeditious way
2 to allow the hearings to
3 continue without delay in
4 accordance with section
5 250.14 of the National
6 Defence Act.
7 The unredacted transcripts of
8 the evidence in question
9 would be made public.
10 The Commission's reasons for
11 proceeding in camera would be
12 made public.
13 For the sake of clarity, the
14Commission's Order to proceed in camera applies
15only to the evidence being received on April 6 and
167, 2010. To date, no other request to proceed in
17camera has been presented. If such a request were
18subsequently presented, then it would be considered
19on its own merits.
20 That decision was forwarded to
21parties and it is part of the record.
22 Having read our reasons for
23proceeding in camera, I will make a few additional
24comments on behalf of the panel.
25 This panel has not lost sight of
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1the need for this hearing to proceed with the eyes
2and ears of the public. Faced with a motion
3dealing with security issues, the decision to close
4the two days of testimony was not taken lightly.
5It was unfortunate with the timing of the motion
6and the position of the hearing for the first two
7witnesses. We have expressed our concern to
8counsel as to the timing of the request, and the
9circumstances were such that Commission counsel had
10scheduled the first two witnesses, those being the
11ones most affected. That being said, unless there
12is an unknown reason, as was said in the decision,
13the remaining witnesses will be heard and seen in
14the public forum.
15 We have read and we have watched
16over the past couple days the media accounts, and
17we recognize the media's frustration with being
18excluded. We know and appreciate they are the
19conduit to the public to ensure the public has the
20ability to hear and read the testimony presented.
21We apologize for the timing, as you were set to
22report and you were unable to do so.
23 As stated earlier, the decision to
24go in camera was not taken lightly, and it should
25be noted that the decision was not opposed by
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1parties.
2 I wish to proceed with today's
3testimony. Providing there are no other comments
4from counsel, we'll hear from the first witness.
5 No issues from counsel?
6 Thank you.
7 MR. LUNAU: The next witness is
8Captain Naipaul, and he will be examined by my
9colleague Ms. Beaudoin.
10 THE CHAIR: Thank you.
11SWORN: CAPTAIN (RET'D) NAIPAUL
12 THE CHAIR: Welcome. I would
13assume you have been sworn.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, he has.
16 Please proceed.
17EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. BEAUDOIN:
18 Q. Good morning, Mr. Naipaul.
19 A. Good morning.
20 Q. You began your military
21career in September 2004 as an infantry officer,
22correct?
23 A. With the reg force, yes.
24 Q. Then you became a military
25policeman in 2006?
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1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. You are currently retired
3from the Canadian Forces?
4 A. Yes I am.
5 Q. You were deployed to
6Afghanistan during roto 5, correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. That was February 2008 to
9August 2008?
10 A. To September 2008.
11 Q. You served as the GSMP
12platoon commander for part this rotation, correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. From February 2008 to April
152008?
16 A. Till the end of April, yes.
17 Q. After April 2008 what was
18your position?
19 A. I was the senior police
20mentor for in Zhari District with the OMLT, with
21the Operational Mentoring Liaison Team.
22 Q. But during your whole
23rotation you were located at KAF?
24 A. For my time with the GS
25platoon I was located at KAF. When I moved to the
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1OMLT, I located to a forward operating base.
2 Q. As the GSMP platoon commander
3who did you report to?
4 A. Major Ron Gribble.
5 Q. And he was the task force
6provost marshal at the time?
7 A. Yes, he was.
8 Q. How much contact did you have
9with him?
10 A. I spoke with him daily during
11my tenure as is GS platoon commander.
12 Q. Was your operational chain of
13command and technical chain of command the same?
14 A. Yes, at that time.
15 Q. The TFPM. Who reported to
16you?
17 A. My 2IC for the platoon was
18MWO Annie Andrews.
19 Q. And who became the GSMP
20platoon commander after you made the switch to the
21OMLT?
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. What were your duties as the
24GSMP platoon commander?
25 A. As the GS platoon commander I
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1was responsible -- it was twofold. First, I was
2responsible for policing the task force or
3providing the personnel to police the task force.
4My second duty was to administrate and run the
5detention transfer facility.
6 Q. So as part of your duties did
7you have an investigative role?
8 A. I could have had an
9investigative role. During my tenure there were no
10investigations for me to conduct.
11 Q. So you weren't involved in
12any investigations regarding detainee issues
13whatsoever?
14 A. No, I was not.
15 Q. Are you aware of any
16investigations that were conducted with respect to
17detainee issues?
18 A. Yes, I was.
19 Q. Who conducted those?
20 A. The NIS.
21 Q. Were you privy to any of the
22information relating to the investigations?
23 A. Just initially at the front
24end as far as identity of the detainees and the
25general nature of the complaint.
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1 Q. In general terms, what were
2your duties in your role on the POMLT?
3 A. I was responsible for the
4mentoring of Afghan army and police personnel.
5 Q. Did you deal with any
6detainee issues in that position?
7 A. Yes, I did.
8 Q. In what respect?
9 A. I was responsible for
10detainee handling -- instructing the Afghan
11personnel on detainee handling, and was present on
12some occasions when they took detainees themselves.
13 Q. So were you involved at all
14in that respect with the NDS or just the Afghan --
15the police force and the army?
16 A. I'm not sure of your
17question.
18 Q. I just wondered, as I
19understood your answer, you were mentoring Afghan
20authorities and I think you mentioned the army and
21police force.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. But did that include any
24members of NDS?
25 A. If you're asking if I
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1mentored the NDS, no, I did not.
2 Q. When you first arrived at KAF
3in February 2008, were the transfers still
4suspended?
5 A. Yes, they were.
6 Q. Did you have any knowledge of
7the circumstances surrounding the suspension of
8transfers in November 2007?
9 A. Other than to be told when I
10arrived in theatre that they were suspended and
11that any detainee brought in was currently being
12held at the DTF, that was the extent of the
13information that I was provided.
14 Q. Were you given any reasons
15for the suspension?
16 A. In general terms I was told
17that it was as a result of the questions regarding
18detainee handling and torture, but beyond that I
19didn't know the exact reasons why the transfers
20were suspended.
21 Q. Did you know who had made the
22decision to suspend the transfers?
23 A. At the highest level, no. I
24simply assumed it was the task force commander who
25had made that decision from the previous roto.
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1 Q. Were you aware of the
2conditions that had to be met in order for
3transfers to resume?
4 A. No, I wasn't.
5 Q. Do you know who made the
6decision to resume transfers?
7 A. Once again, I can only assume
8it was the task force commander, but I'm not sure
9at what level.
10 Q. Transfers resumed a few weeks
11after your arrival, correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And without providing any
14details or classified information, could you please
15describe the process with respect to detainees
16after they were captured in the field and taken to
17KAF?
18 A. Once detainees were captured
19in the field it was a responsibility of the MPs to
20handle the detainees. For our roto, roto 5, there
21were some situations where MPs went out to the
22field and some situations where we just accepted
23detainees into our facility. In either event, once
24a detainee came to the facility they were processed
25in; for security reasons, searched; and essentially
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1lodged in the facility to await either transfer or
2release.
3 Q. Was the 96-hour rule still in
4effect when you were there?
5 A. Yes, it was.
6 Q. Who was notified about the
7fact that detainees had been taken into custody?
8 A. I'm not sure of everyone that
9was notified. I know within the scope of my duties
10I notified the task force provost marshal -- he
11usually knew before I did -- and the detainee
12officer for KAF. Those are the two individuals
13that I ensured that knew that we had detainees
14coming in other present at the facility.
15 Q. Did you file any notification
16to the International Red Cross or the Afghan
17Independent Human Rights Commission?
18 A. Once a detainee was processed
19into the facility and the 96 hours had started, we
20did advise the Red Cross that there were detainees
21that had been brought in.
22 Q. And did you personally notify
23them or did somebody else?
24 A. On some occasions it was me
25personally; on other occasions it was the 2IC.
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1 Q. What was your understanding
2about the purpose for notifying these
3organizations?
4 A. As far as notifying -- in
5general terms notifying the Red Cross, they would
6eventually, at some point while the detainee was in
7the facility, make every -- take an opportunity to
8come and ensure the well-being of the detainee. As
9far as I was personally concerned, it was more of a
10courtesy call to let them know that we had
11detainees. They didn't often come within the 96
12hours to come check.
13 Q. Again without providing any
14classified information, what was the process that
15was followed for detainees that were transferred to
16Afghan authorities from KAF?
17 A. Once again, with respect to
18myself, I was notified, usually by the task force
19provost marshal or the operations officer for the
20MP company, that the documentation was going to be
21received that there would be a transfer, at which
22time we would start prepping the detainee for the
23transfer; an administrative process essentially.
24Once we received the hard copy of the paperwork, we
25organized the personnel that were required to
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1facilitate the transfer.
2 Q. And at what point would the
3detainees be told they were being transferred?
4 A. Usually within minutes of me
5being advised they would be advised. I would
6advise my personnel and subsequently they would
7advise the detainee.
8 Q. Were they specifically told
9who they were going to be transferred to?
10 A. In some occasions -- first of
11all, this was done through a translator, so on some
12occasions they were told specifically that they
13were being transferred to the NDS; on other
14occasions they were told they were be transferred
15to Afghan officials.
16 Q. In the cases they were told
17they were being transferred to the NDS was there
18any reaction from these detainees?
19 A. Yes, there were reactions.
20Their reactions ranged from nothing at all to some
21concern about leaving the facility.
22 Q. And why were they concerned?
23 A. Once again, through a
24translator, typically most detainees did not want
25to leave the facility. They felt that they were
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1well treated at the facility and were uncertain
2where they would go, what they would be faced with
3once they left.
4 Q. Was there any fear that you
5could see in terms of being associated with the
6NDS?
7 A. I'm not sure "fear" would be
8the correct word. I mean, there was some concern
9of being transferred to Afghan officials. Whether
10that was specifically because it was the NDS I can
11only speculate.
12 Q. Were you physically present
13at the actual transfer to the NDS?
14 A. On most occasions, yes.
15 Q. What was your role during
16that handover?
17 A. I was to ensure that the
18process went smoothly, ensure that all the key
19players were present, the administration had been
20done and that the detainee was ready to be
21transferred, both medically and physically.
22 Q. When you say "key players,"
23who were the key players?
24 A. Usually at a transfer there
25would of course be the NDS representative, the task
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1force provost marshal or his designate, and on most
2occasions the detainee officer, and on some
3occasions the political adviser, and of course the
4MP personnel facilitating the process.
5 Q. The detainee officer, was he
6a member of the Canadian Forces?
7 A. Yes, he was.
8 Q. But he wasn't an MP?
9 A. No, he was not.
10 Q. What was his role, I mean, in
11general terms but also specifically in terms of --
12 A. In general terms I was made
13to understand that he was to oversee the detainee
14process specifically for the task force commander.
15He was to ensure that the administration, the flow
16of the process was conducted properly, and of
17course he was there at transfers.
18 Q. And the POLAD; he was a
19civilian, correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Did you know what department
22he was from?
23 A. I believe it was DFAIT, but I
24couldn't be sure.
25 Q. At the time you didn't know?
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1 A. At the time I did know. I
2was introduced to him at the beginning of my tour
3and it slipped my mind if that was his department.
4 Q. What was his role?
5 A. Once again, I believed it was
6to oversee the process, ensure that it was being
7done properly in accordance with the agreement.
8 Q. Do you know who he reported
9to?
10 A. No, I don't, no.
11 Q. So in terms of the process
12that you're talking about and in terms of the
13agreement, what are you referring to there in terms
14of what actually happened at the actual handover?
15 A. I'm not sure --
16 Q. I heard you say that the
17POLAD, and the detainee officer, for that matter,
18were there to see if the process and the agreement
19were -- to oversee that process. So what was that
20process?
21 A. They advised the detainee of
22the agreement that was in place between the
23Canadian government and the Afghan government.
24They essentially read the agreement, and of course
25it was translated.
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1 Q. Was there any discussion
2about the treatment of detainees post transfer
3during that whole process with the NDS, with the
4detainee?
5 A. Specifically not that I can
6recall.
7 Q. Now, in terms of your contact
8with the NDS, did you speak with them directly?
9 A. Yes, I did.
10 Q. Through an interpreter?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And what was your impression
13of their personnel?
14 A. Of the personnel that I met,
15I found them to be professional and quite aware of
16the situation of their end of the bargain, their
17involvement in the agreement.
18 Q. Did anything they say or do
19give you any cause for concern in terms of how
20detainees would be treated post transfer?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Was there any physical
23resistance by any of the detainees when you handed
24them over to the NDS?
25 A. No.
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1 Q. Any emotional outbursts or
2reactions of any kind?
3 A. I would say no, not in front
4of the NDS. Any demonstration of emotion would
5have occurred when we told them that they were
6leaving the facility. In front of the NDS there
7was nothing.
8 Q. With previous witnesses we've
9seen examples of paperwork that was filled out with
10respect to the detainees. They were mainly annexes
11to the Theatre Standing Order. You're familiar
12with that kind of paperwork?
13 A. Yes, I am.
14 Q. Just so we make sure we're on
15the same page, if you could go to the witness book,
16document A21, Volume 2.
17 MR. CHAMP: Which volume again?
18 MS. BEAUDOIN: Volume 2, Tab 2,
19document A21.
20 BY MS. BEAUDOIN:
21 Q. Mainly beginning at page 18
22of that tab. Do you see it?
23 A. I see the documentation.
24 Q. So the one that I'm looking
25at first is Annex C on page 18 and following. So
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1were you familiar with this documentation?
2 A. Yes, I was.
3 Q. This was the documentation
4that was filled out for each detainee when they
5were taken into custody and eventually either
6released or transferred?
7 A. Yes, in general terms. This
8is not exactly the one that we used in theatre for
9our roto.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. But the one we use is based
12on this.
13 Q. Did you actually fill out
14some of these forms or the equivalent of what you
15guys had at the time of these forms?
16 A. Personally? Yes, I have
17filled out the forms from the very beginning.
18 Can I just stop; a question
19regarding the completion of these forms and whether
20or not that's of a sensitive nature.
21 Q. I don't need the details in
22that respect. I just wanted -- one the previous
23witnesses did speak about the forms and the
24paperwork that had to be filled out, so just in
25general terms I wanted to understand that you were
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1involved in that.
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. So once the paperwork was
4done with respect to the detainees, what did you do
5with that paperwork?
6 A. I submitted it to the
7detainee officer. I personally hand delivered it
8to him, and if he wasn't present I left it with the
9MP company that he would pick it up at a later
10date.
11 Q. To your knowledge, was the
12detainee officer the custodian of the paperwork
13that you provided to him?
14 A. I'm not sure if he was the
15custodian of the paperwork.
16 Q. Do you have any knowledge of
17what happened to the paperwork after you gave it to
18him?
19 A. No. I know that there were
20several other pieces of the process that needed to
21be conducted, and he facilitated that. As far as
22the documentation, once it came back to us we held
23the documentation on file.
24 Q. So you mean it went to him
25and went somewhere else and then eventually it came
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5
1back?
2 A. Right.
3 Q. And it was held by you at the
4detainee transfer facility?
5 A. That's right.
6 Q. Was there some kind of
7management system in terms of reporting on detainee
8information?
9 A. Management system? I don't
10understand.
11 Q. You're not aware of any kind
12of data management system?
13 A. I'm not sure of the question,
14what you mean by "management system."
15 Q. Well, as I understand, data
16-- maybe a computer system or any kind of system to
17hold the paperwork.
18 A. I believe that's of a
19sensitive nature.
20 Q. Okay. Now, overall did you
21feel the process, including the transfer process,
22was working well?
23 A. Yes.
24 THE CHAIR: The issue of SAMPIS or
25something like that is not a sensitive issue, is
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1that correct?
2 MR. PREFONTAINE: No, not SAMPIS
3itself.
4 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Does that
5change the answer?
6 A. No, it doesn't.
7 BY MS. BEAUDOIN:
8 Q. Just to clarify, you were
9aware of SAMPIS but there was also another system
10that is of a sensitive nature?
11 A. Yes. SAMPIS was not used to
12record detainees.
13 Q. After detainees were
14transferred to the NDS, were you aware of any
15follow-up that was done regarding the detainees
16post transfer?
17 A. In general terms I was aware
18that both DFAIT and Corrections Canada were
19following up at the prisons, but anything beyond
20that I wasn't aware of.
21 Q. So you didn't have any
22knowledge about the follow-up?
23 A. Specifically, no.
24 Q. Was there any discussion
25amongst the MPs about any kind of obligation that
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1MPs had in terms of keeping track of the treatment
2of detainees post transfer?
3 A. No, not that I was privy to.
4We were concerned strictly with the handling of
5detainees while in Canadian hands, and once the
6transfer occurred we no longer saw that there was a
7responsibility for the MPs at that point, that
8another government agency would be involved.
9 Q. Would it be fair to say that
10you and the MPs in general saw post transfer issues
11as a policy government issue as opposed to a
12Canadian Forces issue?
13 A. I would say that the MPs in
14general didn't see it as an issue that affected
15MPs. I personally would say that, yes, it was a
16whole-of-government issue as opposed to a Canadian
17Forces issue.
18 Q. So what role did you see the
19Canadian Forces playing in terms of post treatment
20of detainees -- post transfer?
21 A. I would say more of a support
22role in that, if we get specific, to move around
23the country you would need the Canadian Forces to
24be able to move personnel around, whether they
25belonged to Corrections, DFAIT or the CF. So in
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1that respect the Canadian Forces played a role by
2supporting movement, supporting operations, but
3beyond that to say that I knew that they were
4specifically involved in post transfer, no, I was
5under the impression that there were other agencies
6involved.
7 Q. Were you privy to any
8discussions about the obligations of any MPs in
9terms of conducting investigations regarding post
10transfer issues?
11 A. No, I was not privy to any
12type of discussion.
13 Q. Do you recall any discussions
14amongst MPs about any concern regarding the
15treatment of detainees post transfer?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Did you personally have any
18concerns about how the NDS might be treating
19detainees after transfer?
20 A. While I was the GS platoon
21commander, no.
22 Q. But afterwards?
23 A. Afterwards, when I was with
24the POMLT, I wasn't sure the level of detainee
25handling on the part of the Afghans, mainly because
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1that's the role that I was mentoring in. I would
2say that the process wasn't as professional as the
3Canadian Forces process of handling detainees.
4 Q. In what respect?
5 A. They just weren't as well
6versed in it; they didn't have all the facilities
7that we had; they didn't have all the key players
8in place. The people that I was mentoring were,
9for the most part, illiterate, so none of the
10documentation really applied. So in that respect
11the handling of detainees was at a different level.
12 Q. But did you have concerns
13about actual physical abuse or mistreatment on the
14part of NDS during your role in the POMLT?
15 A. In general terms, no.
16 Q. Were you aware of the
17allegations of potential mistreatment by Afghan
18authorities during your rotation, allegations in
19the media, for instance?
20 A. You mean allegations that
21came out before I went on rotation or allegations
22that occurred while I was --
23 Q. Either.
24 A. I was aware of allegations
25prior to going on rotation. While I was in theatre
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1there was one allegation of mistreatment while I
2was the GS platoon commander, and that was
3investigated by the NIS.
4 Q. An allegation of mistreatment
5by the NDS?
6 A. No.
7 Q. In terms of your awareness
8prior to your rotation, this was through media
9articles and so on?
10 A. Yes, initially. I was aware
11of the media's take on the torture and the
12treatment of detainees by the NDS or Afghan
13officials. As a result of that, the task force
14provost marshal, Major Gribble, made us aware, as
15MPs in general, made us aware that these
16allegations had occurred and that he didn't want to
17have any of these issues arise in our roto.
18 Q. Were you aware of any of the
19reports issued by the Department of Foreign
20Affairs?
21 A. No.
22 Q. The U.S. State Department?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Reports by the Afghanistan
25Independent Human Rights Commission?
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1 A. No.
2 Q. Or any of the UN/Amnesty
3International reports?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Were you aware of the Amnesty
6complaints that had been filed?
7 A. In general terms through
8media, but specifically, no.
9 Q. Were you aware of any reports
10or emails by Mr. Richard Colvin of DFAIT?
11 A. No.
12 Q. How about any of the reports
13that were issued by DFAIT regarding the follow-up
14visits?
15 THE CHAIR: You'll have to -- so
16that the record --
17 A. No.
19 BY MS. BEAUDOIN:
20 Q. I know you said you didn't
21have any concerns about the treatment of detainees
22post transfer, but if you had had concerns, what
23would you have done about that?
24 A. I understood the process to
25be that I would speak with the NIS and, because of
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1the sensitive nature of such an investigation, they
2would be the ones responsible for such an
3investigation.
4 Q. So you would have spoken with
5them or would you have filed a written report of
6any kind?
7 A. I would have spoken with them
8and, based on what they required to initiate an
9investigation, if they decided to initiate an
10investigation, then I would just follow through.
11 Q. Can you think of any
12circumstances under which you would have questioned
13the fact that you were being ordered to transfer
14these detainees to NDS?
15 A. Certainly as a commissioned
16officer in the Canadian Forces, if I was presented
17with an order that I felt was unlawful, I would
18certainly -- I would certainly question the order,
19but during my tenure as the GS platoon commander
20and while I was on roto 5 I was never faced with an
21order that was -- that I felt was unlawful. I
22simply trusted the chain of command from my
23superiors that what they were doing was right, what
24they had ordered me to do was lawful, and I carried
25on with the mission.
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1 Q. But in terms of -- let's say
2you had heard something specific in terms of the
3mistreatment of detainees post transfer. What kind
4of information would have -- could have -- could
5you have -- what kind of information or what level
6of information would have been sufficient for you
7to actually question an order to transfer might be
8unlawful?
9 A. Obviously we're talking
10hypothetically.
11 Q. M'hm.
12 A. Any situation where I felt
13there was evidence for us to conduct an
14investigation would be a situation where I would
15follow through on the process of advising the task
16force provost marshal and the NIS in order to
17commence an investigation.
18 Q. So I guess what I'm trying to
19understand is what kind of evidence would have been
20sufficient for you --
21 A. Well, as a -- I would say
22that as a police officer in general evidence that
23would give credible evidence to the fact that
24something occurred, and if you're talking about
25torture, for instance, that there was some sort of
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1credible evidence present that I personally was
2aware of that I could act on.
3 Q. So what would have been
4considered credible in your view as a police
5officer?
6 A. I would say that certain
7things we didn't have in theatre at the time, that
8in general terms, DNA, photos, physical evidence,
9testimony, statements, any of the natural things
10that a police officer would look for to give -- to
11round out an investigation, to conduct an
12investigation, whether physical or evidentiary,
13would be considered.
14 Q. So let's say if a detainee
15had reacted in a fearful way to the fact that the
16NDS -- that he was going to be transferred over to
17the NDS, would that have been credible evidence?
18 A. In and of itself I would
19suggest it would not be enough to simply -- based
20on the fear or based on the reaction of a detainee,
21I don't think that I would be able to conduct an
22investigation based on that information alone.
23 Q. But if you had seen fear on
24the part of any of the detainees, would you follow
25it up with them to speak with them, to get more
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1information?
2 A. I think that's a hypothetical
3question that I can't answer. I wasn't faced with
4that situation and, as such -- perhaps if I was I
5would know exactly how to react to it, and I think
6every situation would dictate accordingly, but I
7could not hypothesize on that.
8 Q. So the last set of questions
9I wanted to discuss with you was your training
10prior or during your deployment. Could you
11describe the kind of training you received before
12you went on your rotation?
13 A. Once again, in general terms,
14as the MPs, we received all the basic training that
15an individual soldier would have received prior to
16commencing workup training. We received all the
17basic workup training that was required; and you
18can imagine weapons handling, vehicles, the basic
19skills.
20 As MPs, we received MP-specific
21training. For the GS platoon, as I said
22previously, our role was twofold. We were to
23police the task force and we were to handle
24detainees.
25 With regards to policing the task
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1force, our training involved police-related tasks;
2conducting investigations of various kinds, use of
3SAMPIS and that sort of thing. As far as detainee
4handling, we essentially practised detainee
5handling.
6 Q. Did you receive any training
7relating to the domestic and international laws
8that applied, specifically to the process of
9capturing, handling and transferring?
10 A. Yes. As part of our basic
11workup training and our MP-specific training we
12received instruction and direction from task force
13provost marshal Major Gribble, and I recall on
14three different occasions he provided lectures to
15the entire MP company regarding law of armed
16conflict, Geneva conventions, handling of
17detainees, status, things of that nature.
19of the kinds of issues that would give rise to
20breaches of international law or domestic law?
21 A. Any mistreatment of a
22detainee would be a contravention, was my
23understanding. Mistreatment could be in a number
24of different forms.
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1of the Canadian Forces or MP obligations regarding
2detainees post transfer in terms of international
3and domestic law?
4 A. Post transfer?
5 Q. M'hm.
6 A. I didn't -- unless it was an
7incident that occurred while they were in our
8custody or related to an MP, I didn't see that
9there -- for the GS platoon I didn't see that there
10was as role for the GS platoon to play post
11transfer.
12 Q. So there wasn't any
13discussion in your training about obligations post
14transfer?
15 A. No, there was no training; no
16discussion regarding that.
17 Q. So it would be fair to say
18that all the discussion relating to obligations in
19terms of international law or domestic law was with
20respect to while detainees were in your custody and
21it ended once they were transferred to the NDS?
22 A. Yes.
23 MS. BEAUDOIN: Thank you. Those
24are my questions.
25 THE CHAIR: Mr. Champ?
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1CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAMP:
2 Q. Would you like a break,
3Captain Naipaul?
4 A. No, I'm good, thank you.
5 THE CHAIR: We probably will go
6till about quarter after or so, unless that's going
7to interrupt your -- we'll pick a spot around that
8time.
9 MR. CHAMP: That's fine. Thank
10you.
11 BY MR. CHAMP:
12 Q. Captain Naipaul, my name is
13Paul Champ and I'm counsel for Amnesty
14International and the B.C. Civil Liberties
15Association where the complaints in this matter. I
16want to thank you for appearing today and providing
17us with the information of what you knew when you
18were in theatre. We know it was a difficult
19situation and difficult mission.
20 A. Thank you.
21 Q. I'd just like to start from
22kind of where you ended about some of the training
23that you received regarding Geneva conventions from
24Major Gribble and wanted to ask you, what was your
25understanding of the comfort level that the
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1Canadian Forces must have in the receiving power
2treating a detainee humanely before they could hand
3over that detainee? Was that an issue that you
4received any training on at all?
5 A. As I alluded to before, as
6far as the training goes, that was training
7conducted as a group, as an MP company, and Major
8Gribble addressed us as a company. On occasions
9where he and I spoke directly about
10responsibilities, the agreement between the two
11governments was made aware -- he made it aware to
12me; he gave me a copy initially. And basically the
13understanding, the way I understood it based on
14what he explained to me, was that we, as the
15Canadian government, the transferring power, needed
16to be sure that the receiving power would in no way
17torture the detainee or mistreat the detainee,
18contrary to the conventions.
19 Q. And --
20 A. Sorry, I should say that was
21not made aware in those specific terms to all of
22the MP company. I don't think that members of the
23MP company were made aware of the level that they
24were looking for. I think that was something more
25between task force provost marshal and myself.
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1 Q. So, for example, the Canadian
2government, including the Canadian Forces, part of
3the role of the mission is to provide training and
4support for development in Kandahar so that Afghan
5authorities can develop capacity to meet standards.
6That's part of what you're doing in OMLT, correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. So obviously there's concern
9that they're meeting standards in those contexts,
10but was Major Gribble explaining to you that
11there's a little bit of an -- there's an extra
12responsibility on the Canadian Forces and Canadian
13government if they initially capture the detainee
14and deprive that person of their liberty and then
15hand it over to a detaining power, or a receiving
16power?
17 A. Yes. He made it aware that
18it was a different standard because we were a
19professional army as opposed to the Afghans.
20 Q. And you spoke a bit about, in
21your testimony, that you and Major Gribble would
22have these conversations and Major Gribble
23explained to you that there were these concerns and
24that it wasn't going to happen during your roto.
25Did he ever express to you what level of knowledge
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1that he had about some of the information
2concerning the risk of torture in Afghan --
3 A. Not in specific terms, no.
4 Q. Not in specific terms. You
5explained that you had never seen any of the
6international reports by the United Nations or the
7United States State Department or the Afghan Human
8Rights Commission --
9 A. That's right.
10 Q. -- or the DFAIT reports?
11 A. I had never seen any of
12those.
13 Q. Did Major Gribble ever give
14any indication to you that he had some level of
15knowledge?
16 A. Not that I recall. I mean he
17was quite knowledgeable. Whether he had knowledge
18of those documents I'm not aware.
19 Q. Did he ever give you any
20indication of whether he believed that the concern
21about the risk of torture was legitimate or valid?
22 A. In so much as we trained for
23that to be able to deal with that, I would assume
24that he felt it was credible; credible enough to
25train. Whether or not he believed it specifically,
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1I don't know.
2 Q. I'm going to go back and ask
3you some questions about your role in the actual
4handoff, or handover, of detainees. You indicated
5that some detainees did express some reluctance or
6unwillingness to be transferred to the NDS. How
7would they express that?
8 A. That's not exactly what I
9expressed. It wasn't specifically about being
10transferred to the NDS; it was about leaving the
11facility. They would often joke about leaving the
12facility, that they had good food, that they could
13see that they were getting bigger. Ones that had
14been there for the four days could see that -- they
15enjoyed the food quite a bit.
16 As far as concerns about being
17transferred to Afghan officials, they would
18basically question why. They hadn't done anything
19to indicate that -- they don't know why they were
20being held, they were simply farmers, they were
21just picked up. But like I said, nothing specific
22about being transferred to the NDS.
23 Q. That's fine. So it was
24transfer to Afghan authorities generally that was
25some of the concern that was raised?
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1 A. As far as why; their question
2was why more so than anything else.
3 Q. Right. And were there any
4demonstrations of emotion by some of those
5detainees when they were informed they would be
6transferred?
7 A. On a few occasions, yes, but
8nothing that I felt -- nothing that I felt was
9directed specifically at the NDS or because of the
10NDS.
11 Q. Okay. Could you give us an
12example of an expression or demonstration of
13emotion?
14 A. On one or two occasions the
15detainee would get upset, raise his voice, question
16why he was being transferred. He was -- he hadn't
17done anything wrong.
18 Q. And would that ever make its
19way -- you would do daily reports, I gather, or
20every couple of days on the situation with
21detainees, who has been transferred when and so
22forth?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And would those kinds of
25concerns -- would those kinds of expressions by
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1detainees ever make it into your reports?
2 A. I don't think I can --
3without getting into specifics of the reports, I
4don't think I can answer that question.
5 Q. And you're aware that it was
6the commander of Task Force Afghanistan who would
7make the decision to transfer or release?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And were you ever asked,
10through your platoon, to consult with the detainee
11to see if the detainee had any concerns or fears
12about being transferred? Were you ever asked to do
13that?
14 A. I can't speak to that.
15That's a sensitive -- that would lead me in a
16direction that would be sensitive information. I
17can't provide that information.
18 Q. And for which reason?
19 A. I can explain to you that as
20the GS platoon commander I was responsible for
21running the detention transfer facility. The
22detainee remained in our custody the entire time,
23at least the 96 hours, if not more.
24 Q. I'm just wondering if you had
25any knowledge in any way whether the detainee was
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1asked at any time if he or she had concerns or
2fears about being abused if transferred.
3 A. I wasn't privy to that other
4than, as previously described, when we were
5advising them that they were being transferred or
6released.
7 I should note that even when we
8told them they were being released they were
9reluctant to leave, and release was us calling them
10a cab and releasing them.
11 Q. No, I understand. I guess if
12it got well known in Kandahar that maybe, if
13captured, you'd stay in KAF for a month or two,
14that might lead some insurgents to surrender more
15readily perhaps.
16 A. I wouldn't even try to
17speculate on that.
18 Q. Or, alternatively, I guess,
19if some insurgents became concerned that they would
20pass through the hands of the Canadian Forces into
21Afghan authorities' hands who would torture them,
22that might also present some --
23 A. Once again, I couldn't
24speculate on that.
25 Q. You spoke about the detainee
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1officer. Who was the detainee officer while you
2were in theatre?
3 A. Unfortunately I can't
4remember his name.
5 Q. Okay, that's fine.
6 Do you have any knowledge; why was
7that detainee officer not a military police
8officer? Do you know?
9 A. Once again, I don't know. I
10don't know.
11 Q. The Theatre Standing Orders
12that Commission counsel took you to, she took you
13to some of the annexes and so forth, but would you
14have ever been aware of the Theatre Standing Order
15in full?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Yes?
18 A. You mean --
19 Q. Volume 2.
20 A. You mean TSO-321?
21 Q. Precisely.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So you were aware of that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You were asked some questions
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1about your duties while you were in OMLT.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And that you were providing
4mentoring to Afghan National Army and Afghan
5National Police units?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And you had concerns that
8they weren't very professional and were unable to
9meet the standards. They simply didn't have the
10capacity to meet the standards that a professional
11army could provide?
12 A. Exactly. They were not at
13that level.
14 Q. They were illiterate?
15 A. During my rotation they were
16not at that level.
17 Q. Right. But basic humane
18treatment, that doesn't require literacy, would you
19agree with me?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Did you ever have concerns
22about those units' capacity to provide basic humane
23treatment?
24 A. No, I didn't have concerns
25about it. I think it was a point that had to be
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1mentored in order to achieve a professional army
2standard, but other than an issue of mentoring, no,
3I had no concerns.
4 Q. If you're saying it needed to
5be mentored, that means there was a lack of some
6kind. Am I wrong?
7 A. When we talk about
8mistreatment or being treated humanely from a
9detainee point of view, after being the GS platoon
10commander and knowing the process of handling,
11searching, securing of a detainee, those are things
12that need to be mentored in order that the detainee
13be treated properly and be treated humanely. For
14instance, if an Afghan police officer or soldier
15didn't have handcuffs, what would he or she -- what
16would he use. They had a number of -- they had
17ropes, lots of things that they could use, but
18handcuffs would be the most humane way to treat a
19detainee, so that had to be mentored.
20 Q. So you were mentoring them
21more on the nuts and bolts of the process when you
22take an individual into custody, that sort of
23process?
24 A. Yes. When I was mentoring a
25soldier or police officer, yes.
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1 Q. But would your mentoring go
2further into areas of questioning of a witness --
3pardon me, questioning of a detainee or a prisoner
4or anything like that?
5 A. When I dealt with essentially
6the officers, yes, those topics would be brought
7up; the reason for detaining someone, the process,
8what happens after they're brought back to a secure
9facility. Those things would be mentored, but
10specifically to the officers, or to the commanders.
11 Q. And what kind of guidance did
12you provide in that regard?
13 A. Just the manner in which or
14the reason why someone would be secured and brought
15back to a secure facility, explaining what the
16reason for that is and its importance overall to
17the mission.
18 It should be noted that we had to
19explain to the Afghan personnel the concept of
20conducting a mission and the purposes of a mission.
21So in that respect handling a detainee was just one
22part of successfully completing a mission.
23 Q. And did you believe they had
24the sort of level of knowledge and willingness that
25they couldn't beat an individual in their custody?
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1 A. I'm sorry?
2 Q. The people that you were --
3the units that you were mentoring, do you think
4that those individuals were aware that they
5shouldn't beat people in their custody?
6 A. Yes, we mentored that.
7 Q. Did it seem to some of them
8like a surprise that a person in authority can't
9beat someone in their custody?
10 A. In my opinion it was a
11different process. When you look at the entire
12process, it was different than what they were aware
13of. The process of holding someone in order to get
14information or get them off the battlefield was
15almost an unknown concept to them. I think they
16had a different concept of what you do. None of
17them, as far as I was concerned, were soldiers --
18particularly the police -- were soldiers and were
19aware of the process of, once you conduct a
20mission, what's the responsibility after the
21mission is completed. So, no, I wouldn't say that
22they were surprised; I think it was just learning.
23 Q. You would have dealt with
24some higher level people who might have had some
25background or experience?
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1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And would some of them ever
3express to you, well, look, this is part of our
4culture, if I get someone in our custody this is
5what we do?
6 A. Some of the higher ranking
7older commanders made it clear that this is not
8what they used to do, and they alluded to certain
9previous governments that were in the country.
10 Q. When you say this is not what
11they used to do, would "this" be treating someone
12humanely is not what they used to do?
13 A. The type of war that we were
14fighting, the type of war that they were fighting
15with us, was not what they used to do.
16 Q. Keeping prisoners at all?
17 A. I mean more in the sense of
18the type of war that they were fighting. We as a
19professional army were mentoring them on
20professional tactics in war.
21 Q. Right.
22 A. Previous to Canadians --
23previous to us being there, most of them that were
24older fighters fought a different type of war
25previously.
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1 Q. And what did you understand
2that to mean?
3 A. In general terms, an
4insurgency as opposed to counter-insurgency
5operations.
6 Q. Well, getting back to the
7original question I had on that, did any of them
8ever express to you that humane treatment of a
9prisoner was generally not something they used to
10do?
11 A. No. No one specifically
12addressed that to me.
13 Q. Not specifically. Not in an
14indirect way or anything like that?
15 A. No, other than the fact that
16they fought an insurgency in the past and now we
17were fighting counter-insurgency.
18 Q. And when they expressed to
19you that they fought an insurgency in the past, did
20they ever give you any indication of what -- and
21I'm talking about older officers now -- any
22indication of what they would do with prisoners in
23the past?
24 A. The dealings I had with some
25of the older officers, they wouldn't specifically
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1tell me what they had done, but they would talk
2about how they fought an insurgency.
3 Q. I guess what I'm trying to
4get at, Captain, I apologize; when you were
5deployed, you obviously were aware Afghanistan is a
6developing country. It's a country that hasn't
7been able to meet human rights standards for a long
8time. That was your general understanding?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And the fact that prisoners
11might be abused in officials' custody, that
12wouldn't be an entire surprise?
13 A. No, it would not be.
14 Q. So it's that kind of issue
15that I'm looking at. It's my understanding that
16that's part of the lack that Afghanistan had that
17Canada and other allies are trying to assist, so I
18was just trying to probe you about what specific
19knowledge did you ever have about those
20inadequacies, shall we say, or deficiencies in
21Afghan authorities. Is there any direct
22information that you might have had about that?
23 A. I would say no; direct
24information, no. If you're speaking to the
25personnel involved directly, no.
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1 Q. You were asked a bit about
2whether you were aware a little bit of the
3controversy, I guess, before you went into theatre.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. About detainee handling. You
6were aware of it?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you were aware that there
9was allegations that some detainees had been abused
10in Afghan custody?
11 A. Yes, I was aware of that.
12 Q. And did you ever get any
13indication from others whom you served with whether
14those allegations were credible or not credible?
15I'm not talking formal discussions because I
16appreciate at your level that wouldn't have been
17something that would come up necessarily, but
18surely it's a topic of discussion at times in the
19lunch tent or whatever?
20 A. I would say in general terms
21the allegations were discussed previous to
22deployment and while we were working as the GS
23platoon. The allegations certainly came up in
24conversation, but whether or not there was any
25evidence, whether or not there was any proof,
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1certainly not that I was privy to. Everything I
2had heard was either gossip or speculation.
3 Q. Right. And that's kind of
4what I'm wondering. What was the general sense of
5people whom you served with; that there was really
6anything to it or it was just a bunch of busy
7bodies raising non-issues?
8 A. My general sense with the
9people that I served with was, yeah, those
10allegations, that they occurred and we're doing the
11best we can to not have them happen in our custody.
12That was the concern, that we didn't want to be
13involved in mistreating detainees.
14 Q. Right. We're not talking
15here, though, about allegations that Canadian
16Forces are mistreating detainees directly; it's
17about Afghan authorities mistreating detainees and
18Canadian Forces delivering those detainees to the
19Afghan authorities. What could you do to prevent
20Afghan authorities from abusing detainees? There
21was nothing that you could do in your role, was
22there?
23 A. Me personally?
24 Q. Yeah.
25 A. No.
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1 Q. Because you had indicated
2that Major Gribble, he would have these lectures
3with you saying we're going to ensure that this
4doesn't happen on our roto.
5 A. Yes, he talked to us.
6 Q. And did he give any
7indication of how he or you --
8 A. Training and awareness were
9his concerns, that we were properly trained and we
10were aware of the situation.
11 Q. So, in terms of being aware
12of the situation, would that not include being
13aware of the details of what some those allegations
14were?
15 A. Maybe at his level. I can
16only speculate. At my level and what was
17disseminated to myself and my troops it was more a
18matter of, these are the allegations that are out
19there, accept that it happens and now what do we do
20about it to mitigate any discussion of Canadians
21mistreating. The concern really was about
22Canadians mistreating detainees, from our point of
23view.
24 MR. CHAMP: I'll just be a moment.
25 BY MR. CHAMP:
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1 Q. Just a couple more questions,
2Captain, and I'll be done. Thanks.
3 One was you indicated that at the
4meeting that would occur at the time of transfer
5the NDS would come in, the TFPM would come down
6sometimes, the political adviser would be there.
7You indicated that sometimes the political adviser
8would not be there. Would there be someone who
9would replace him?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Who would that usually be?
12 A. Either the detaining officer
13or there was another person that I just took as
14another representative to work with the POLAD.
15 Q. And you explained, or said,
16that the political adviser at the time of transfer
17would read part of the agreement, or all of the
18agreement?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And what was the purpose of
21that, to your understanding?
22 A. To make the detainee aware of
23the transfer and the reason for the transfer as
24well as the process that they were going through.
25 Q. And that they were to be
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1protected from inhumane treatment; that was part of
2it?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. When the political adviser
5wasn't there someone else would do it in that
6person's stead?
7 A. Yes. It was always read.
8The detainee was always made aware of that.
9 Q. And during your rotation did
10you ever hear any allegations that detainees had
11been abused post transfer, during your rotation?
12 A. No.
13 Q. You talked about an
14investigation of an allegation of mistreatment, but
15that wasn't concerning Afghan authorities?
16 A. No, it wasn't.
17 Q. That's fine. That's all I
18need to know on that one.
19 And were transfers suspended at
20any time during your rotation?
21 A. Just at the beginning.
22 MR. CHAMP: Thank you very much,
23Captain Naipaul, for coming and answering my
24questions.
25 THE CHAIR: Mr. Wallace, are you
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1going to have any questions?
2 MR. WALLACE: Yes, I'm going to
3have a few; not very long. If you're watching the
4clock, I'll probably be five minutes.
5 THE CHAIR: And Mr. Prefontaine or
6Ms. Richards?
7 MS. RICHARDS: I don't anticipate
8anything right now, subject to what Mr. Wallace
9asks.
10 THE CHAIR: Mr. Lunau?
11 MR. LUNAU: No, we have no further
12questions.
13 THE CHAIR: Why don't we continue
14on with Mr. Wallace, if we can, then we're able to
15finish with the witness and allow him to proceed.
16CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. WALLACE:
17 Q. Captain, my name is Mark
18Wallace. My client is the former Canadian Forces
19provost marshal, Captain Moore, who was the provost
20marshal for the forces when you were serving in
21Afghanistan. I just have a couple of rather
22general questions for you.
23 When you were serving in your
24capacity in the transfer facility, you reported to
25Major Gribble, correct?
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1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And he was the task force
3provost marshal, correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And he in turn reported to
6the task force commander, correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And both the two of you were
9subject to the military chain of command, correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. Now, the National
12Investigation Service, the NIS, they were also
13military police officers, correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. However, they had a different
16chain of command than the one that you were subject
17to, correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And part of their -- well,
20the significant portion of their mandate was to
21investigate allegations of a serious and/or
22sensitive nature, correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And in the context of the
25Afghan theatre, detainee mistreatment would be
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1covered by both descriptive, serious and/or
2sensitive, correct?
3 A. Yes, I would say so.
4 Q. And as you've told us, as you
5saw it, if you became aware of any concerns of
6detainee abuse by anyone, your obligation, as you
7saw it, was to report that to the NIS, correct?
8 A. My obligation was to report
9it to my chain of command. Part of that
10expectation would be to also, out of courtesy,
11report it to the NIS, but it would be the task
12force provost marshal who would officially commence
13an investigation through the NIS.
14 Q. And your notification to the
15NIS would have been, I guess more colloquially,
16along the lines of a heads up; here's what's coming
17down the pipe?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And I think you made it quite
20clear that your boss, Major Gribble, was acutely
21aware of the obligations to ensure the humane
22treatment of the detainees?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And there's no doubt in your
25mind that, if you had made any report to him, that
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1he would have in fact passed that report on to the
2NIS?
3 A. There's no doubt in my mind.
4 Q. And during your time in
5theatre, at no time did you make such a report to
6Major Gribble, correct?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Nor obviously give the NIS a
9heads up?
10 A. With regards to --?
11 Q. Detainee abuse.
12 A. Post transfer?
13 Q. Correct.
14 A. No.
15 MR. WALLACE: Those are my
16questions. Thank you.
18 Any questions, Ms. Richards?
19 MS. RICHARDS: No. Thank you.
20 THE CHAIR: Mr. Lunau, as you
21said, you had none.
22 MR. LUNAU: No.
23 THE CHAIR: I want to thank you
24for your testimony today. Congratulations on your
25retirement. I don't know if you're still working
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1or retired, but enjoy. Thank you for your
2forthright testimony.
3 Mr. Berlinquette, anything?
4 MR. BERLINQUETTE: No.
5 THE CHAIR: We'll break until 20
6to 11:00. Will our next witness be ready at that
7time?
8 MS. RICHARDS: We had made
9arrangements with Commission counsel to have the
10next witness come at 11:00. We've called him and
11asked him to come sooner, so I don't know if he'll
12be here by 20 to, but we'll do our best to get him
13here.
14 THE CHAIR: We'll break until
15quarter to, and if the witness is not here we'll
16break until such time as you tell me we're ready to
17go. Thank you.
18--- Upon recessing at 10:23 a.m.
19--- Upon resuming at 10:50 a.m.
20 THE CHAIR: Mr. McGarvey.
21 MR. McGARVEY: Good morning
22members of the panel. My name is Matthew McGarvey
23for anybody who has not yet seen me in these
24proceedings.
25 The next witness this morning is
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1Warrant Officer Steeve Chamberland. Perhaps I
2could just advise you that the bulk, if not the
3entirety, of references to documents from Warrant
4Officer Chamberland will to be what are called the
5NIS witness documents, two volumes.
6SWORN: WARRANT OFFICER STEEVE CHAMBERLAND
7 THE CHAIR: I understand the
8witness has been sworn.
9 MR. McGARVEY: Yes.
10CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. McGARVEY:
11 Q. Good morning, Warrant
12Officer. Thank you for coming a bit early this
13morning.
14 A. Thank you.
15 Q. First, if I could just get a
16little bit of your background. You're a warrant
17officer with the Canadian Forces. How long have
18you been with the Canadian Forces?
19 A. Twenty-five years.
20 Q. And you're a military police
21officer?
22 A. Yes, I am.
23 Q. Since when?
24 A. 1999.
25 Q. And you're also a member of
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1the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. And can you just tell us
4briefly what is the National Investigation Service?
5 A. It's an investigative branch
6unit of the military police branch where we
7investigate more serious and sensitive matters.
8 Q. Okay. So it's a branch of
9the military police?
10 A. It is.
11 Q. And the duties are to
12investigate serious and sensitive matters. How
13long have you been with the NIS?
14 A. Since 2002.
15 Q. Okay. We have a relatively
16narrow focus for your evidence this morning. First
17I could ask you, are you familiar with what is
18known as Operation Centipede, a set of NIS
19investigations?
20 A. I am.
21 Q. Could you just describe how
22and when you first got involved with Operation
23Centipede?
24 A. I was lead investigator on an
25investigation called Operation Camel Spider, which
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1was the first investigation into detainee
2allegations. And then once we started that
3investigation we were receiving all kinds of
4complaints that resource could not permit Camel
5Spider to investigate, so they initiated another
6task force called Op Centipede to investigate these
7allegations.
8 Q. Okay. Do you know
9approximately when that process would have started?
10 A. This would have started -- we
11started getting further allegations beginning, I
12would say, April '07.
13 Q. Okay. And Operation
14Centipede itself I believe was started as its own
15general occurrence in March of 2008, is that --
16 A. I was not part of the initial
17Centipede, so I don't know when exactly that was
18started.
19 Q. Fair enough. There are two
20general occurrences that I would like to direct
21your attention to. The first one would be general
22occurrence number -- and just to clarify, a general
23occurrence number, what does that refer to? Is
24that just an investigative file number basically?
25 A. It's just a number that's
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1assigned in our data bank to generate an
2investigation.
3 Q. Okay. And the first set of
4numbers after GO, so, for instance, we have
5GO2008-6919. What does the 2008 refer to?
6 A. That would be the year.
7 Q. The year that the GO was
8initiated?
9 A. Yeah, is created.
10 Q. So if I could ask you to -- I
11think you have the NIS witness volumes there.
12Volume 1, which is the larger of the two, and if
13you go to Tab 21, this is general occurrence
142008-6918. Were you involved in investigating this
15matter?
16 A. Yes, I was.
17 Q. Could you briefly describe --
18I think if you look at page 5 of 45 -- briefly
19describe what the subject matter of this
20investigation was?
21 A. Well, this was part of an
22affidavit that Colonel Noonan had put in in regards
23to a challenge by B.C. Civil Liberties, and for
24some reason an investigation was initiated of what
25was in that affidavit. This stemmed from a
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1newspaper article, so an investigation was
2initiated regarding that.
3 Q. Okay. When you first began
4your work on the investigation -- we've got a
5screen capture, I guess, at page 5 of 45, which was
6authored, I believe, by a Sergeant Scowen.
8 Q. Is this the totality of the
9information you would have had when you initiated
10your part of the investigation?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. This screen seems to
13indicate that in Colonel Noonan's affidavit, which
14was apparently in the news on May 4 of 2007, that
15abuse had taken place -- and I'm quoting directly
16from it -- after a detainee was handed over and
17Canadian Forces persons observed it and took no
18action.
19 THE CHAIR: One moment. We're
20just locating the document.
21 BY MR. McGARVEY:
22 Q. At that tab I just read that
23the information contained on this screen from
24Sergeant Scowen is that in the affidavit abuse had
25taken -- there was a disclosure that abuse had
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1taken place after a detainee was handed over and
2Canadian Forces persons observed it and took no
3action, and then a question: Why did chain of
4command not report this to MP -- which would be the
5military police, I take it?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Could you tell us what you
8then did in response to reading this; what
9investigative steps you took?
10 A. I look at the newspaper and
11it referred to the affidavit, so I went and
12reviewed the affidavit, and from the affidavit I
13concluded that in fact the military police did take
14action because they took the detainee back, so
15therefore I deemed that it was appropriate action
16that they did. Knowing that this guy beared signs
17of abuse, they took him back to prevent further
18abuse.
19 Q. Okay. So the affidavit
20itself is also included in this excerpt from the
21general occurrence?
22 A. Yes, it is.
23 Q. Did you scan that into the
24occurrence? Is that how that --
25 A. Yes, I did.
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1 Q. So you went directly to the
2source of the information, Colonel Noonan's
3affidavit?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And could you turn to page 31
6of 45. Just to save us from reading a lot of
7information that's not particularly pertinent to
8your conclusions, is it essentially paragraphs 55
9and 56 that led you to your conclusions?
10 A. Yes, I believe that was the
11two paragraphs. I would have written the paragraph
12that I referred to.
13 Q. Sure. And did you also read
14the newspaper article itself?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. And was your conclusion based
17also on the reading of the newspaper article?
18 A. No, my conclusion was based
19on the affidavit.
20 Q. Okay. The newspaper article
21itself is also scanned into this general
22occurrence?
23 A. Yes, it is.
24 Q. Now, when you first see the
25screen put in by Sergeant Scowen, could you tell us
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1what sorts of offences or misconduct it would have
2triggered in your mind a desire to investigate?
3 A. What page was that?
4 Q. That's at page 5 of 45. So
5when you first see this, as a police officer, what
6is it that you are looking into in terms of --
7 A. Well, the fact that CF
8persons took no action.
9 Q. What kind of offence might
10that constitute if it were true?
11 A. It could be all kinds of
12offence. It could be a negligence of performance
13of duty; it could be what we call conduct to the
14prejudice, section 129 of the National Defence Act.
15 Q. Now, this does not disclose
16any abuse by Canadian Forces members?
17 A. Absolutely not.
18 Q. Would it still be your view
19that there is something to investigate even if
20there was no abuse by a Canadian Forces member?
21 A. If the detainee came from
22Canadian and they took no action, I would think
23that, yeah.
24 Q. Okay. However, in your
25conclusion you determined there was no misconduct,
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1no offence disclosed, and that was based on what's
2in Colonel Noonan's affidavit about what really
3happened?
5 Q. In his view anyway.
6 Were there any further
7investigative steps other than the review of the
8affidavit? In other words, did you try to contact
9personnel in Afghanistan or things of that nature?
10 A. No, I did not.
11 Q. And could you advise us --
12this occurrence would have been opened, I believe,
13in -- if we turn to page 3, it looks like it was
14opened March 19, 2008. Page 3 of 45, that is.
15 A. M'hm.
16 Q. When did you actually take
17your investigative steps of reviewing Sergeant
18Scowen's screen and then following up by reviewing
19the affidavit and so on?
20 A. It was in January 2009.
21 Q. Okay. Could you tell us
22what, if anything, happened between Sergeant
23Scowen's entry, which is dated July 10, 2008 and
24January 2009 when you were actually reviewing it?
25 A. I don't know if anything
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1happened. I wasn't there, so --
2 Q. Where were you?
3 A. I was training for
4Afghanistan in Valcartier.
5 Q. Based on what you can see in
6this -- this is called a SAMPIS report; is that
7correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. SAMPIS is the data base used
10by the military police, the electronic data base to
11store non-classified information; is that correct?
12 A. Yes, it is.
13 Q. So based on your review of
14this SAMPIS printout, were there any particular
15investigative steps, to your knowledge, taken
16between July 2008 and your involvement again in
17January 2009?
18 A. I don't know.
19 Q. Okay. Is it fair to say you
20were basically given the task of following up on
21this once you got back from training; is that what
22happened?
23 A. I was tasked to review.
24 Q. Okay. The affidavit itself
25stems from May of 2007 and your review is finished
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1in early 2009. Can you tell us, just as a police
2officer, would it be preferable if an investigation
3could be conducted sooner than that, in a more
4timely fashion?
5 A. It's always better to conduct
6an investigation as soon as possible when resources
7permit.
8 Q. In terms of resources, could
9you advise in general what kind of resource
10challenges -- or were they resource challenges for
11the NIS during this period of time?
12 A. We had several major projects
13on the go at the same time. We had a project
14called Camel Spider, which this was the very first
15detainee that came to light. And then from that,
16because it was in the news, a lot of people were
17starting making allegations left, right and centre,
18so they created Centipede. And then during
19Centipede another unrelated investigation occurred,
20so they had to take the resource from Centipede to
21populate that other investigation. So manning
22issues at CFNIS during that time.
23 Q. And operation Camel Spider,
24were you aware, did that wrap up eventually?
25 A. It did.
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1 Q. And can you advise the gist
2of that? Was that the initial, what's referred to
3I think as the Adoran (ph) complaint?
4 A. It was.
5 Q. And a report was issued by
6the Military Police Complaints Commission in regard
7to that?
8 A. Well, we submitted a report
9and the MPs were conducting a parallel
10investigation into that.
11 Q. How deeply involved with that
12were you? Were you --
13 A. In Camel Spider?
14 Q. Yeah.
15 A. I was the lead investigator.
16 Q. So that obviously would take
17up a lot of your time?
18 A. Absolutely.
19 Q. Just in terms of the offences
20you were looking for, one of the things that's
21raised in Sergeant Scowen's screen is a question:
22AWhy did chain of command not report this to the
23military police?” Can you advise whether there is,
24in your view as a military police investigator, a
25problem if something like this was not reported?
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1In other words, is failure to report in and of
2itself an offence that you might investigate?
3 A. Yeah, failure to report,
4yeah, an NDA criminal offence.
5 Q. Could you clarify that
6acronym?
7 A. NDA, National Defence Act.
8 Q. So under the National Defence
9Act that might be?
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. And your duties include
12investigations under the National Defence Act?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. As well as under what other
15statutes?
16 A. Criminal Code.
17 Q. Okay. Now, in terms of abuse
18by Afghanis, which is a concern raised in this
19occurrence, would you as an investigator have any
20jurisdiction over the Afghani personnel who might
21be accused of abusing somebody?
22 A. No.
23 Q. If we could move on then to
24the other general occurrence that I believe you had
25a significant degree of involvement, that would be
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12008-6919. Do you recall this occurrence and the
2general nature of the issue in this occurrence?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Okay. Can you briefly tell
5us when you first became involved in 2008-6919?
6 And just for everyone's
7information, this starts at Tab 22 and there are
8several documents that I'll refer you to through
9this volume and a couple in the second volume that
10relate to this occurrence.
11 A. Your question was again?
12 Q. Just to give us a general
13outline of the nature of the complaint, or the
14nature of the issue you were investigating in 6919.
15 A. Okay. This happened --
16received an email in early stage of Camel Spider
17where there were some concerns about TQ, which is
18tactical questioning, raised by a captain. These
19were brought forward to people in the tactical
20questioning world and eventually made its way to
21the army provost marshal, and because it involved
22detainees, this was a very sensitive matter at that
23time. We're talking about, I think it was April
242007. They forwarded it to the CF NIS. Because I
25was the lead investigator on Camel Spider, I think
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1initially it was sent to a Major Bell or
2Lieutenant-Colonel Bell and then it was forwarded
3to me.
4 Q. Okay. Do you know when you
5would have first received information relating to
6this investigation?
7 A. It would have been in April
82007.
9 Q. Okay. So early on in --
10 A. Camel Spider, yeah.
11 Q. What was the nature of the
12concerns raised, so far as you can tell us from the
13unredacted portions? If you want to look -- the
14emails themselves appear starting at Tab 26 of
15Volume 1. Or it may be just as easy if we refer to
16Tab 25 in your investigative activity at page 3 of
174, Tab 25, to give us a summary of the issues.
18 So this is basically an excerpt.
19You ended up interviewing Lieutenant-Colonel
20Michaud, who I believe was a recipient of the email
21from the captain in question, correct?
22 A. Yes, and he had two concerns.
23The first one we cannot talk about. So the second
24one was that some issues in regards to a detainee
25who was in the custody of the Afghans, who had been
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1tactical questioned by Canadian soldiers, had been
2raised, and then later the captain provided a
3written submission to explain the situation.
4 Q. And I believe one of the
5concerns raised within the second concern, the
6Canadian Forces member who was observing a tactical
7questioning -- I think if you look at the bottom
8paragraph of page 3 of 4 it says: "Prior to
9conducting the session the questioner observed that
10the detainee bore signs of injury and was engaged
11in labour," and in brackets, "stacking bricks."
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Again I might ask, based on
14what you read and heard from Lieutenant-Colonel
15Michaud, what sort of offences might you have been
16looking for in trying to ascertain if they could be
17made out or not made out?
18 A. Okay. I'm not sure I
19understand your question.
20 Q. Again, simply asking you,
21what law might be violated if facts as disclosed
22here are raised with you? What were you
23investigating? You're a police investigator; you
24investigate National Defence Act and Criminal Code
25offences. What offences raise themselves as
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1possibilities?
2 A. Okay. This is after. This
3is during -- I learned this information during the
4interview of Lieutenant-Colonel Michaud, this
5paragraph here.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. So initially when we received
8that email from the army provost marshal, we're not
9sure what we had because it involved detainees. We
10didn't know if he was captured by Canadians and
11then turned over or anything like that. So
12initially we didn't know what we had, but once I
13talked to him, who had received a written
14submission from Captain Parker, it was clear that
15this detainee had never been in Canadian custody
16nor they took him. So this CF member was just
17doing him a favour by assisting them in tactical
18questioning this guy, which he had been cleared by
19his chain of command.
20 Q. So the questioner in
21question, which was not Captain Parker himself, if
22I understand?
23 A. No, it was not him.
24 Q. So Captain Parker receives
25information that a tactical questioner made these
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1observations?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Sought permission to engage
4in tactical questioning --
5 A. To assist the Afghan
6nationals.
7 Q. -- to assist the Afghan
8nationals, and you were investigating whether there
9was any sort of problem with --
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. -- the issues that had
12occurred in light of the fact that it dealt with a
13detainee and it also had some disclosure of injury
14and potential problems?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. Your conclusion was that
17there was no offence disclosed in this?
18 A. I don't have any jurisdiction
19over Afghan, so -- like, this detainee was never --
20I have no information that he was captured by
21Canadians and I have no information how he obtained
22these injuries.
23 Q. Now, if I could direct you to
24Tab 11 of this book, which is the overview
25occurrence records of Camel Spider -- sorry,
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1Centipede, not Camel Spider -- at page 19 of 66
2we've got, I think, a little more complete version
3of the two concerns in the middle of that page, 19.
4 The first concern raised by
5Captain Parker's email is there were occasions when
6the detainee knew they couldn't go any further, and
7something which is redacted, which actually opened
8the detainee up when everything else wasn't
9working.
10 This is from this general
11occurrence; do you agree?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And the second concern from
14Captain Parker's email is "Huge prob" -- which I
15expect means problem -- "here as the detainee in
16the ANSF custody and they don't necessarily follow
17our policies on detainee handling, if you know what
18I mean." Correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. When you first would have
21read that in Captain Parker's email to
22Lieutenant-Colonel Michaud -- would it be a concern
23of yours if a Canadian Forces member was an
24observer to this but not a participant?
25 A. I had no information to that,
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1so I don't know what he means by "if you know what
2I mean," so I don't want to speculate on what he
3means by that.
4 Q. Okay. Did you yourself ever
5interview Captain Parker?
6 A. I did not.
7 Q. And were you ever able to
8find out who the tactical questioner was who made
9the initial observations?
10 A. I did not.
11 Q. Could you advise perhaps why
12you weren't able to, or why you didn't interview
13Captain Parker or that person?
14 A. I was satisfied when -- back
15in January 2009 when I was tasked to review this
16file, I went to interview Lieutenant-Colonel
17Michaud who provided a written submission that
18Captain Parker had sent, and I was satisfied that
19the concerns were answered.
20 Q. Just to be clear about the
21origins of the emails, the origins of the emails
22are from the chain of command, not from the
23military police, correct?
24 A. The email, yeah, was from the
25chain of command within the tactical questioning
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1world, and then eventually it made its way to the
2army provost marshal.
3 Q. My point being the conduct
4disclosed in these emails was not conduct in
5relation to a military police officer; it was in
6relation to this --
7 A. No.
8 Q. -- tactical questioning
9squad?
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. And the emails themselves
12were generated outside of the MP chain and then
13sent to the army provost marshal for review and
14possible investigation?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So the facts disclosed in
17this email would then have been disclosed both
18within the MP structure, when it was sent to the
19army provost marshal, and would have been within
20the army chain of command where they originated?
21 A. I'm not sure if -- it would
22be this guy, the captain's chain of command, so I'm
23not sure if it's the army chain of command but --
24 Q. Fair enough. Whatever branch
25of the military he was in, they would be aware of
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1these problematic concerns, if I could put it that
2way, and the military police also would be made
3aware of it when it was forwarded to the provost
4marshal -- to the army provost marshal?
5 A. The army provost marshal,
6yes.
7 Q. Just to clarify as well, you
8received the assignment from the army provost
9marshal or his designate at what point in time, I
10guess is what I'm really interested in?
11 A. The initial email?
12 Q. When you first got involved
13in this, yes.
14 A. In April 2007.
15 Q. Okay. And do you know who
16tasked you with this? Not necessarily the name,
17but which -- was it the commanding officer of the
18NIS or deputy or somebody in that chain?
19 A. You mean in April 2007?
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. What happened in April 2007
22is I wasn't tasked with it. I brought it to my
23supervisor at the time and said we have another
24allegation, because I had my hands full with Camel
25Spider. And then the chain of command -- my unit
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1chain of command was aware of this and eventually
2it made its way to Op Centipede. So once I passed
3it off to my chain of command I didn't take any
4action until again when I came back in January 2009
5after training, where I was involved again.
6 Q. Okay. When you first
7received this information in April of 2007, did you
8start a general occurrence in 2007 or not?
9 A. I did not.
10 Q. Okay. And do you know if
11anybody else did in 2007?
12 A. I do not know.
13 Q. You do not know?
14 A. I don't know.
15 Q. Okay, fair enough. And you
16did your investigation and interview with
17Lieutenant-Colonel Michaud at what point in time?
18 A. In January 2009.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. I'm not sure if it was in
21January 2009, but I believe the interview was in
22January 2009 some time.
23 Q. Would it be fair to say that
24in an ideal world, again, had you the time or
25resources, it would have been preferable to conduct
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1the investigation earlier than January 2009 when
2the matter first comes to your attention in April
32007?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You indicate in your
6conclusions to this -- these are in book number 2
7at Tab 4. You conclude that the detainee had not
8been captured or detained by the Canadian Forces
9and the military police have no jurisdiction over
10members of the ANSF.
11 How did you know that the person
12was not captured or detained by the Canadian
13Forces?
14 A. I had no evidence of that.
15 Q. No evidence one way or the
16other?
17 A. No evidence, yeah.
18 Q. Okay. And you follow that
19line by saying that there are no indications that
20detainees were being abused after they had been
21turned over to the Afghan authorities when captured
22by Canadian Forces.
23 When you state that conclusion in
24this occurrence, were you stating that as a general
25proposition, that there's no evidence whatsoever
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1anywhere to your knowledge, or are you saying that
2in this occurrence there's no evidence of that
3nature, or do you know?
4 A. I would have stated because
5of this event, I had no evidence of that.
6 Q. And again, it seems from the
7occurrence itself there are observations of injury
8and the stacking of bricks, but your conclusion, I
9take it, is based on the fact that you don't have
10any evidence he was ever in Canadian Forces
11custody?
12 A. I don't believe he was,
13because I don't think the technical questioner
14would have had to ask permission to tactical
15question this guy.
16 Q. In fairness, I think Captain
17Parker does indicate in his email that the person
18was not.
19 A. He does.
20 Q. But you weren't in a position
21to or you did not take steps to ascertain that?
22 A. No, I did not.
23 Q. Okay. Do you think you would
24have been able, in early 2009, to even discover
25whether that person had been a Canadian Forces
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1detainee in March or earlier of 2007?
2 A. I didn't pursue that avenue
3because I didn't think he had been in custody.
4 Q. Okay. I asked you about
5distribution of the information in this to some
6extent, but perhaps I could ask you, do you know
7where the report, perhaps following the
8conclusions, would be distributed in a matter like
9this? Would it be --
10 A. At my rank level I don't take
11care of distribution.
12 Q. Okay. So that happens
13further up the chain of command?
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. Do you recall when you -- I
16think you entered the emails on SAMPIS yourself?
17 A. I believe I did, yes.
18 Q. And do you know when you
19would have done that?
20 A. I think it would have been in
21January because there was no GO created -- well,
22there was a GO created, but when I first received
23the email there was no GO created.
24 Q. That would have been
25following the interview with Lieutenant-Colonel
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1Michaud?
2 A. I'm not sure. I don't
3remember.
4 Q. Okay. Once the matter was
5entered on SAMPIS, can you just advise your
6understanding -- and you may not know all of the
7answers, fair enough, you're not a SAMPIS expert,
8I'm sure -- but who would have access to National
9Investigative Service SAMPIS entries generally
10speaking, to your knowledge?
11 A. Depending on the level that
12it's classified, sometimes SAMPIS you can be all
13NIS members or you can be just a few select
14personnel, that need-to-know basis type
15information.
16 Q. Now, this investigation was
17placed under the umbrella, if I can put it that
18way, of Operation Centipede in March of 2008 along
19with the other investigations in Operation
20Centipede, correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Are you aware, and you may
23not be, but if you are please tell us, whether
24Lieutenant-Colonel Garrick would have been made
25aware of the general nature of this investigation
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1or 6918, the other investigation we've been
2discussing this morning?
3 A. I don't want to speculate,
4but as the commanding officer he would have a
5general idea of what these investigations were all
6about.
7 Q. Okay. Thank you. Those are
8all my questions. Some of my friends may have some
9questions for you.
10 THE CHAIR: Mr. Champ?
11 MR. CHAMP: Mr. Jodoin will
12conduct the cross-examination.
13CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JODOIN:
14 Q. Bonjour. Merci d'être venu
15témoigner ici aujourd'hui. Voulez-vous que je pose
16les questions en anglais ou en français?
17 A. English is fine, sir.
18 Q. You mentioned that you were
19involved in the Camel Spider investigation; is that
20correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. During that investigation,
23did you have any concerns about collaboration by
24the Canadian Forces with the NIS?
25 A. No.
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1 Q. No. No concerns about
2obtaining relevant documentation?
3 A. There was occasion where we
4could not find documents, but it wasn't because of
5lack of collaboration.
6 Q. Okay. So it's not the case
7that you were prepared to seek a judicial order
8compelling production under the Criminal Code to
9obtain some of those documents?
10 A. You're referring to a
11particular unit?
12 Q. CF NIS.
13 A. We were prepared to do that
14because we wanted to get the best evidence, but an
15agreement was reached and we did obtain the
16documents that we needed.
17 Q. So the agreement was reached
18after there was initial resistance to producing the
19documents?
20 A. It was a matter of secrecy,
21and that was the main concern about it.
22 Q. So the NIS doesn't have the
23level of authority to review secret documents?
24 A. The concern was that if we
25were going to apply for a production order, that
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1eventually these documents would become a public
2matter.
3 Q. But before having to apply
4for a production order, you weren't given an
5opportunity to look at the documents that you were
6looking for?
7 A. I'm not sure I understand
8your question.
9 Q. So you've mentioned that
10there were security concerns in terms of the
11production order?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Right. But you also --
14initially when you requested documents --
15 A. We didn't request documents;
16we just made known our intention that we were
17preparing to do that, and then once we sat down
18with the unit we came to an agreement and they
19provided all the documents that we needed.
20 Q. So from your perspective
21there was no resistance of any kind or any lack of
22cooperation in these investigations?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Have you ever encountered
25resistance or lack of cooperation in other
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1investigations that you've conducted?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Not in 6918 or 6919?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Turning to investigation
66918, the MPIR investigation was launched in July
72008; the Globe and Mail story was from April 2007;
8and you were tasked with reviewing the complaint in
9January 2009. I know you've mentioned that good
10practice would require earlier initiation of the
11investigation, but do you know why it took so long
12to initiate the investigation?
13 A. I believe it was because of
14manning issue at the unit, resource.
15 Q. And were those resource
16issues a common occurrence throughout your
17deployment in Afghanistan?
18 A. During my deployment, no,
19because I wasn't there to -- my unit -- I'm still
20part of the unit when I'm in Afghanistan, but we're
21four persons only in Afghanistan and that's our
22manning, so I'm not sure what you're referring
23about.
24 Q. You're saying that the delay
25in initiating the investigation was due to a
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1resource issue?
2 A. Yes, that's what I believe.
3 Q. So then it's your view that
4the NIS was under-resourced during that period?
5 A. The NIS back in Canada, yes.
6 Q. But not in Afghanistan?
7 A. There were only four members
8in Afghanistan.
9 Q. So your view is that was
10sufficient, or was that an adequate level?
11 A. I'm not sure where you're
12getting with your question here, or I'm not sure
13what I understand.
14 Q. So you've mentioned there was
15a lack of resources in NIS. That was in
16headquarters, in Ottawa?
17 A. The NIS in Ottawa, yes, there
18was, because we had all kinds of different projects
19and that's what the manning problem was.
20 Q. That's where the backlog was?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Okay.
23 MR. PREFONTAINE: I think we've
24explored this as much as this witness can assist.
25As entertaining as Mr. Jodoin's foray into the
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1government's allocation of resources is, I don't
2think it assists greatly the MPCC in deciding
3whether there's a failure to investigate here. And
4I can say that to the extent that my friend has
5concerns about the NIS's allocation of priority, I
6understand that the next witness is going to speak
7to that. So having covered this witness's
8knowledge, I think we can move on to something
9else.
10 MR. JODOIN: I was going to move
11on, yeah.
13 MR. JODOIN: I do think it's a
14relevant factor to assessing whether the officers
15had the resources to comply with their duties.
16 BY MR. JODOIN:
17 Q. In terms of looking now at
18the evidence you considered in that investigation,
196918, you've mentioned that your conclusions were
20drawn on the basis of the affidavit and the Globe
21and Mail article. That's correct?
22 A. The affidavit.
23 Q. The affidavit. So why did
24you feel that it was not necessary to consider
25other evidence?
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1 A. This is a sworn affidavit, so
2I hope he's telling the truth.
3 Q. Okay. And there was no need
4to clarify anything in the affidavit, from your
5perspective?
6 A. Not that I can see, no.
7 Q. While you were investigating
8this file, did you have any knowledge of any of the
9decisions rendered by the Federal Court in that
10case?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. Do you recall any
13assessments made by the Federal Court as to the
14seriousness of some of the allegations?
15 A. I don't remember the
16assessment made by the court, no.
17 Q. You concluded in this
18investigation that CF soldiers in fact took
19appropriate action by taking the detainee back to
20the ANP. Are there other appropriate actions that
21the Canadian Forces should have taken in a general
22matter following from that allegation? Did you
23consider the issue of other appropriate measures
24apart from those that would have focused on that
25individual detainee?
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1 A. Okay. At my rank level I
2don't make these types of decisions or any other
3step other than my investigation, so I'm not sure I
4understand clearly your question here.
5 Q. What I'm asking is, you have
6an allegation here in relation to one specific
7transfer where the detainee wasn't transferred, and
8what I'm wondering is, did you consider how that
9allegation might have affected transfers in
10general, or other transfers.
11 A. Once again, I don't make
12those decisions. I compile my report and I send it
13to my chain of command and, I mean, there were the
14facts.
15 Q. When you state that the
16military police have no jurisdiction over the
17Afghan National, do you mean the detainees or
18Afghan authorities?
19 A. Afghan -- all Afghan.
20 Q. All Afghans. So you used the
21term "jurisdiction." I'm wondering, is it your
22view that the military police would have
23jurisdiction over the conduct of Afghan authorities
24within KAF?
25 A. That would be under the
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1different unit. It would be under NATO military
2police.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. And I don't -- I don't know
5what their jurisdiction or power is in regards to
6that, but as Canadians we only have jurisdiction
7over Canadians over there.
8 Q. And what directions or
9guidelines did you receive or use to assess that
10you did not have jurisdiction over Afghan
11nationals?
12 A. This is in our policies. I
13mean, this is in our National Defence Act in
14regards to jurisdiction over -- like we don't have
15any -- I don't have any jurisdiction over what
16Afghanis do to Afghanis. I have a restriction of
17what Canadian soldiers do to other people,
18regardless of their nation.
19 Q. Okay. Warrant Officer
20Dinesen eventually endorsed your conclusion?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. What factors are you aware
23that he considered and what evidence do you know
24that he might have considered to assess your
25conclusion?
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1 MR. PREFONTAINE: I'm sorry, I
2think it's difficult for a witness to speak to
3what's in another witness's mind.
4 THE CHAIR: Maybe you could
5rephrase your question.
6 BY MR. JODOIN:
7 Q. Sure. Did he ask you any
8questions -- what conversations did you have about
9the adequacy of your investigation?
10 A. I would have sat down and
11briefed him on my conclusion, and I'm not sure what
12he did, but I would assume that he would have read
13what I've put in the SAMPIS reports.
14 Q. But as far as you're aware he
15didn't have -- he didn't consider other evidence?
16 A. As far as I'm aware, no.
17 Q. Are you aware that the Chief
18of the Defence Staff called a board of inquiry into
19this issue a few months ago?
20 A. In regards to -- there's
21several boards of inquiries.
22 Q. Regards to this specific
23incident.
24 A. No, I was not aware of that.
25 Q. And finally on 6918, were you
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1aware of whether this investigation, this
2allegation, might have been fed into the assessment
3process for transfers, for suspending or making
4decisions on transfers?
5 A. I don't know.
6 Q. Okay. So turning now to
76919, you mentioned that you didn't have any views
8on what Captain Parker's statement implied when he
9said that they did not necessarily follow our
10policies on detainee handling. Did you not think
11it prudent to follow up with him as to what he
12meant by that statement?
13 A. After reading his written
14submission, no, it was clear.
15 Q. What, in your view, would be
16the responsibility of a soldier, a Canadian
17soldier, who participated in an interrogation that
18involved torture or cruel and inhumane treatment
19committed by an external --
20 MR. PREFONTAINE: I'm sorry, is my
21friend putting to the witness a hypothesis or is he
22representing that's what the evidence demonstrates?
23 THE CHAIR: Maybe just ask the
24question --
25 BY MR. JODOIN:
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1 Q. You mentioned that you didn't
2have any information about how the detainee in
3question had received those injuries.
4 A. Excuse me?
5 Q. Sorry. Captain Parker's
6initial email mentions a lack of comfort on the
7part of the specific soldier in continuing with the
8interrogation, and I'm just wondering what your
9view was on --
10 A. I think it was based on the
11fact that he had observed sign of injuries.
12 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Michaud's
13assessment that he did not see in Captain Parker's
14email any indication that detainees were abused
15after being turned over to Afghan authorities, is
16that something you took into account in arriving at
17your conclusion?
18 A. It's a question I would have
19asked him during the interview.
20 Q. Right. And as far as you're
21aware Lieutenant-Colonel Michaud was not on the
22scene?
23 A. No, he was not in
24Afghanistan.
25 Q. So what was the value of his
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1assessment? How much did it weigh in your
2conclusions vis-à-vis understanding what Captain
3Parker had alleged?
4 A. His assessment?
5 Q. Yeah.
6 A. I'm not sure what you're
7getting at here about his assessment. I asked him
8questions and based on what he told me, that's how
9I -- in documents that he provided me.
10 Q. Okay. In document C333,
11which the witness does not have in the witness
12documents; it's in the collection.
13 I'm looking at Collection F.
14 THE CHAIR: The registrar is
15indicating Volume 6.
16 MR. JODOIN: Volume 6, Tab 18.
17 THE CHAIR: The witness can have
18mine.
19 BY MR. JODOIN:
20 Q. Do you recognize this
21document?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. What is the document?
24 A. That's the investigation
25plan.
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1 Q. So in this investigation plan
2you set out possible offences that are relevant to
3Captain Parker's email of February 2007?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So what are the offences that
6you consider relevant to that email that you've set
7out here?
8 A. I would have to see that
9email again.
10 Q. I mean, in your investigation
11plan.
12 A. Okay. It says the
13investigation plan is always -- it doesn't mean
14that we're looking at -- we always look to see if
15there was an offence, but in this case -- like when
16we first received the email we didn't know what we
17were looking at, so these are the basic offences
18that I thought might have been relevant to this.
19 Q. Okay. So the two offences
20are conduct to the prejudice of good order and
21discipline and negligent performance of military
22duty.
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. Did you consider any other
25offences during your investigation, as far as you
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1can recall?
2 A. No.
3 Q. And did you, during your
4investigation, ever consider the possibility of
5other breaches of international law?
6 A. No.
7 Q. No? Okay.
8 I'd like to take you to the main
9witness documents, Volume 1. It's those binders
10there.
11 THE CHAIR: Are we done with this
12document?
13 MR. JODOIN: Yes, we are. Tab 3.
14 THE CHAIR: We've been going with
15the witness for some time. I want to get an idea
16how long you might be so we can -- and it doesn't
17matter how long you are.
18 MR. JODOIN: Maybe 10 minutes.
19 THE CHAIR: Okay, thanks.
20 BY MR. JODOIN:
21 Q. If you look up at Tab 3, you
22have the military police technical directives.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. If you can turn to page 6 of
2543, or 3 of 8 -- 6 of 43 would be the --
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1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. Okay. So you have here on
3paragraph 11 the occurrences that require
4investigations. If you look at 11(c), it mentions
5allegations of violations of the laws of armed
6conflict or international law.
7 MR. PREFONTAINE: Sorry, since
8this is a new document put to this witness, it
9might be best if the questioner asks the witness if
10the witness recognizes the document.
11 BY MR. JODOIN:
12 Q. Are you familiar with this
13document or other versions of this document?
14 A. I'm not sure of the dates,
15but I would be familiar with other versions maybe,
16depending. A lot of them change dates for new
17rotos and whatnot, but yeah, these are the military
18police technical directives.
19 Q. And paragraph 11, setting out
20occurrences that would normally require
21investigations, as far as you're aware that
22remained the same in your time in the NIS?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Okay, for this mission. So
25paragraph 11(c) refers to allegations of
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1violation --
2 THE CHAIR: One moment, please.
3 BY MR. JODOIN:
4 Q. So paragraph 11(c) refers to
5allegations of violation of the laws of armed
6conflict or international law. Based on your
7training and background, what did you understand as
8being included in violations of international law?
9 A. I think it's pretty
10self-explanatory. It's any violation of
11international law that's broken, then we may
12consider looking into an offence under these
13statutes.
14 Q. Okay. Would you consider
15that -- did your training ever -- through your
16training would you consider that that included the
17convention against torture?
18 A. Which training are you
19referring about?
20 Q. Your training as a military
21police officer.
22 A. I don't remember receiving
23any training in regards to international law. We
24received training in Canadian law, which barely
25touched on the Geneva convention, but that's over
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110 years ago, so --
2 Q. So you received training on
3the laws of armed conflict?
4 A. I believe we did, yeah.
5 Q. But you never received any
6specific training on international law?
7 A. Not that I recall, no.
8 Q. And so did your --
9 Okay. Finally I'd like to take
10you to document C332, which is in the NIS
11documents, Volume 2. This is a series of emails
12from Lieutenant-Colonel Michaud.
13 THE CHAIR: Which tab number?
14 MR. JODOIN: Tab 1.
15 BY MR. JODOIN:
16 Q. Did you review or have access
17to these documents during your investigation, as
18far as you can recall?
19 A. You're talking about the
20emails?
21 THE CHAIR: Well, there's quite a
22few documents in Tab 1 so you might want to take a
23minute to look at them.
24 BY MR. JODOIN:
25 Q. You've had a chance to look
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1at the emails and, as far as you can recall, you
2had access to these during your investigation?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Can you turn to page 15 of
5100. That's the number at the lowest right-hand
6corner.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. The penultimate paragraph,
9and I'll read it -- this email is from
10Lieutenant-Colonel Michaud to Major Scott, and the
11penultimate paragraph refers to the fact that "the
12interrogation and tactical questioning are old CF
13capabilities that we are resurrecting following a
14long moratorium imposed in the mid-nineties. We
15must be very careful that these capabilities are
16well harnessed and remain under control at all
17times. I'm sure Captain Parker can explain the
18context of his email and clarify the issue for us
19and allow the decision makers to make the proper
20decisions for the way ahead."
21 Did you read that email in terms
22of -- how did you read that email in terms of
23affecting willingness to look into this issue?
24 A. I'm not sure I understand the
25question.
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1 THE CHAIR: Are you saying how did
2he understand this email?
3 BY MR. JODOIN:
4 Q. Yes. How did you interpret
5the concerns about resurrecting interrogation and
6tactical questioning after a long moratorium?
7 A. At that time I didn't know
8anything about tactical questioning, so quite
9frankly I'm not sure.
10 Q. Okay, that's fine. One last
11question. Page 41 of 100, an email from Major
12Farrag to, it's blanked out. In the first
13paragraph the major mentions that this sort of
14overzealous work in areas in which members are
15neither trained nor qualified is not helpful to
16developing capabilities for the CF.
17 There's a later email in which
18Captain Parker comments on his overzealousness.
19 Did you view these kinds of
20exchanges as giving an indication that inquiries
21into these practices were not encouraged or
22welcome?
23 A. This email refers to tactical
24questioning, so, I mean, I didn't even know -- when
25I first received -- like first received in April of
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12007, until I was involved in Camel Spider I didn't
2even know what technical questioning was until I
3was involved with Camel Spider. So the concern
4that they had to me didn't raise any issue other
5than are they using tactics that they're not
6supposed to use. So that was my only concern when
7I viewed that.
8 Q. So you didn't have any
9impression that 6919 was a particularly sensitive
10file in terms of resurrecting the Canadian Forces
11capabilities in engagement?
12 A. No, not at all.
13 MR. JODOIN: No more questions.
15 It's 12 o'clock. I don't know,
16Mr. Wallace, do you have much?
17 MR. WALLACE: No, I don't, and I'd
18really appreciate doing them because, as I think
19I've mentioned -- as I know I mentioned yesterday,
20I can't be here this afternoon. I wouldn't think
21it be would very fair to have Mr. Carroll plop
22himself down and ask him to dream up some questions
23on the fly here.
24 THE CHAIR: Please proceed.
25 MR. WALLACE: Thank you.
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1 THE CHAIR: Do you need five
2minutes?
3 MR. WALLACE: No, I'm good, sir.
4CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. WALLACE:
5 Q. Sir, my name is Mark Wallace.
6I am here acting on behalf of the former Canadian
7Forces provost marshal Captain Moore, and I just
8have a couple of questions for you, really more of
9a general nature.
10 When you were working in your
11capacity as an NIS investigator, I gather, as we've
12seen, you receive an assignment; you're tasked to
13go out and conduct an investigation as you see fit,
14correct?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And over the course of an
17investigation if you encounter problems in the
18sense that you aren't really sure what direction
19the investigation should go, you have a supervisor
20that you can consult, correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. As well, you'd also have
23colleagues that you work with that you could seek
24their advice if you thought it necessary?
25 A. Yes.
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1 Q. Now, at the conclusion, or at
2least what you think is the conclusion of an
3investigation, you generate a report that is
4prepared and presented to your supervisor?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. And as I understood your
7evidence earlier this morning, you actually sit
8down with the report and discuss the investigation
9and the conclusions you have come to?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And I gather that in that
12process it's open to your supervisor to question,
13number one, the adequacy of have you gone far
14enough in the investigation, correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Or suggest other angles that
17might be looked at, correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Or ultimately question the
20conclusion you've come to, correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And in connection with the
23investigations that you've been presented with this
24morning, I assume that when you presented your
25final product to your supervisor he went through
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1the same process we've just discussed right now?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And after presenting those
4investigations, that was the end of it from your
5perspective, correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 MR. WALLACE: Thank you. Those
8are my questions.
9 THE CHAIR: Ms. Richards or Mr.
10Prefontaine?
11CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. RICHARDS:
12 Q. Thank you, Warrant Officer.
13I just have a couple of questions. The first is,
14you were asked about the NIS records on SAMPIS.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Am I correct that MPs who are
17not a member of the National Investigation Service
18do not have access to the NIS files on SAMPIS?
19 A. Depending on the -- that
20would depend on the sensitivity of the file, but if
21it was -- I didn't -- all SAMPIS or GO created are
22assigned a sensitivity. Usually an NIS file, it
23would be up to a number which would be only NIS
24person would have access. And you can even go
25further, that if there's an investigation that is
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1more sensitive than regular, then you can have it
2access to just people that need to know only.
3 Q. And so if I understand you
4correctly, the usual practice is for access to NIS
5files to be restricted to NIS members?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You were asked some questions
8about those two particular investigations and the
9issue of investigating a failure to report
10observing a criminal offence. Do you recall that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I just want to be clear that,
13as far as you're aware, what you would be looking
14at as an MP is whether or not a CF officer had
15failed to report a breach by another CF member;
16that's correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And that if you were
19investigating such an offence in these case you'd
20be looking first to see whether or not an offence
21had actually been committed?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. And whether or not a CF
24officer had witnessed or was aware of that offence?
25 A. Yes.
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1 Q. And whether or not that same
2CF officer had failed to report it?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. And in both of the cases that
5you were taken to today you concluded that there
6was no such evidence which would support a
7conclusion that such an offence had been committed?
9 MS. RICHARDS: Thank you, those
10are my questions.
11 MR. McGARVEY: I just have a
12couple of brief clarifying questions that I think
13follow, but there are only about three. If we can
14do that I can --
15 THE CHAIR: Please go ahead.
16 MR. McGARVEY: -- finish before
17the lunch break for this witness and let him go on
18his way.
19RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. McGARVEY:
20 Q. Just following up to Ms.
21Richards' question, in your view is there any
22potential offence disclosed if a Canadian Forces
23member observes and fails to report abuse committed
24by a non-Canadian Forces member such as appears to
25have occurred in the 6918 disclosure?
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1 A. Okay, your question is --
2 Q. If a Canadian Forces member
3is -- if there's an offence disclosed, if they fail
4to report an observation, for instance, of an
5Afghan national abusing another Afghan national in
6the circumstances such as are disclosed in these
7two GOs.
8 A. Your question is would that
9be considered an offence?
10 Q. The failure of the Canadian
11Forces member who observes it to report it, would
12that potentially be an offence?
13 A. I don't think so, but I'm not
14a lawyer so if that would have arose I would
15probably get legal counsel to assist me in making
16that decision.
17 Q. Okay. Just in terms of Mr.
18Wallace's questions about concluding the files and
19their sufficiency, do you personally make any
20decision about when to close and conclude a file,
21or is that someone else's responsibility?
22 A. I make my report and I submit
23it. Whether or not they might come back to me and
24say, hey, I think you need to do a little bit more,
25but, no, they're the ones that close the file.
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1 Q. So the ultimate decision to
2close is somebody above your rank?
3 A. It's not mine.
4 Q. And just a question about the
5resources and timing, because I think there might
6have been a bit of confusion in terms of when you
7were in Afghanistan.
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. When you were investigating
10these two general occurrences, where were you
11investigating them from, Canada or Afghanistan?
12 A. Canada.
13 Q. And my final question; you
14were referred to the technical directives. Are
15those directives applicable across the Canadian
16Forces or are those specific to people deployed --
17 A. It's a deployment technical
18directive.
19 MR. McGARVEY: Thank you. Those
20are my questions.
21 THE CHAIR: Any questions;
22clarification questions? Mr. Wallace, none. Mr.
23Champ, Mr. Prefontaine?
24 Okay, well, thank you very much.
25We kept you up there a little longer with little
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1break, but thank you very much for your time and
2your service. We appreciate that.
3 A. Thank you, sir.
4 THE CHAIR: And I believe we're
5completed with you so you can be excused as a
6witness.
7 A. Thank you, sir.
8 THE CHAIR: For our next witness,
9will we be ready to go by 1:30?
10 MR. MARSHMAN: That was the
11intention. Major Bolduc will be appearing at 1:30.
12 THE CHAIR: Okay, we're adjourned
13until 1:30. Thank you very much.
14--- Upon recessing at 12:04 p.m.
15--- Upon resuming at 1:31 p.m.
16 M. BERLINQUETTE: Est-ce que tout
17le monde est prêt? On procède en français cet
18après-midi?
19 Me MARSHMAN: Cet après-midi, on
20procède en français. On a avec nous, Major Francis
21Bolduc, qui a déjà été assermenté. Bienvenue.
22 M. BERLINQUETTE: Avant qu'on
23débute, juste faire la connaissance de Me Carroll.
24 Me MARSHMAN: Je me présente
25aussi, je m'appelle Nigel Marshman, pour ceux qui
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1ne me connaissent pas. Monsieur McGarvey est à côté
2de moi.
3ASSERMENTÉ: MAJOR FRANCIS BOLDUC
4INTERROGATION PAR Me MARSHMAN:
5 Q. Bonjour. On va commencer avec
6un petit survol de votre carrière, peut-être une
7concentration sur votre rôle avec le Service
8national d'enquête.
9 R. J'ai commencé ma carrière
10dans les Forces canadiennes en 1988. Je suis rentré
11au Collège militaire de Saint-Jean, j'ai étudié au
12collège de 88 à 93, d'où j'ai gradué avec un bac en
13administration. Ensuite, j'ai été muté à la base
14des Forces canadiennes, Montréal, en 93, jusqu'en
1596. En 96, j'ai fait une mission des Nations Unies
16en Haïti. À mon retour en avril 97, j'ai été muté
17au Service national d'enquête à la région de l'Est,
18ça a été au début du Service national d'enquête, de
19la façon qu'on le connaît maintenant.
20 J'ai été commandant du détachement
21de la région de l'Est de 97 à 2003, donc six ans.
22Pendant ces six années-là, j'ai fait une mission
23avec l'OTAN en Bosnie-Herzégovine comme commandant
24de détachement du service des enquêtes là-bas, de
25septembre 2001 à avril 2002. À mon retour, j'ai été
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1une dernière année au service national des enquêtes
2à Québec. J'ai été muté de Québec en 2003 au
3quartier général de la force terrestre, région du
4centre, à Toronto, pour quatre ans, de 2003 à 2007.
5 J'ai été promu major en 2007 et
6j'ai été réaffecté au Service national d'enquête
7comme commandant du détachement de la région du
8centre, ici à Ottawa. J'ai occupé cette fonction de
9juillet 2007 à octobre 2008. Ensuite, j'ai remplacé
10le commandant adjoint à ma position actuelle
11jusqu'à présent.
12 Donc j'ai tout près de neuf ans
13d'expérience avec l'unité du Service national
14d'enquête. J'ai occupé trois fois la position de
15commandant de détachement, dont une fois en
16opération en Bosnie-Herzégovine.
17 Q. Merci. Nous avons entendu
18parler ce matin de ce qu'on appelle Opération
19Centipede. Vous étiez le gérant de dossier pour
20Opération Centipede. Est-ce que c'est exact?
21 R. Oui.
22 Q. S'il vous plaît, décrivez
23pour nous un peu le but d’Opération Centipede, et
24puis le fait que ça mettait ensemble plusieurs
25dossiers différents. Vous pouvez nous éclaircir
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1là-dessus un peu?
2 R. Oui. À mon arrivée à Ottawa,
3en 2007, il y avait déjà un dossier majeur, sur les
4détenus, qui était en cours. C'est la première
5plainte, le dossier, l'Opération Camel Spider, qui
6était en cours. Ce dossier-là, c'est un dossier
7d'envergure qui prenait beaucoup des ressources du
8Service national d'enquête, pour enquêter, c'était
9un dossier majeur. Au cours de l'enquête, Camel
10Spider, il y a eu sept allégations qui sont
11arrivées par différents moyens, soit par courriel,
12soit par différentes façons au Service national
13d'enquête, mais il n'y avait tout simplement pas
14les ressources pour procéder à faire l'enquête de
15ces allégations-là, de ces dossiers-là. Ils ont
16essayé de débuter une enquête, qu'on va voir tantôt
17là, mais ils étaient pas capables de gérer les deux
18dossiers en même temps, pas capables d'avoir les
19ressources pour se concentrer et le dossier Camel
20Spider était jugé beaucoup plus important à cette
21époque-là.
22 Q. Est-ce qu'on peut juste
23clarifier c'est quoi le dossier Camel Spider? Si je
24comprends bien, c'est la plainte du professeur
25Attaran et c'est relié --
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1 R. C'est relié à des détenus,
2c'est relié à des actions que les membres des
3Forces canadiennes auraient pu avoir commises
4envers les détenus.
5 Q. Eux-mêmes?
6 R. Eux-mêmes, les Forces
7canadiennes. Le dossier était en cours quand je
8suis arrivé en 2007. Mon commandant, à l'époque, le
9lieutenant-colonel Garrick avait ces plaintes-là,
10il était concerné par rapport qu'il avait pas les
11ressources pour enquêter ces plaintes-là. J'ai
12proposé de monter un projet, qui est l'Opération
13Centipede, pour amalgamer tous ces dossiers-là,
14faire une enquête majeure, major case, avec ces
15dossiers-là puis à partir du détachement du centre,
16gérer ces enquêtes-là.
17 Pour se faire, étant donné qu'on
18était le détachement de la région du centre,
19j'avais des mandats, j'avais des responsabilités à
20enquêter les dossiers qui arrivaient dans mon
21secteur de responsabilités, que ce soit Kingston,
22que ce soit Petawawa, j'avais des dossiers qui
23rentraient. J'ai dit à mon patron que je pouvais
24pas faire ce projet majeur-là en même temps que
25continuer à répondre aux plaintes qui arrivaient au
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1détachement.
2 J'ai proposé un plan. J'ai dit: *
3Je peux continuer à supporter le projet Camel
4Spider avec les ressources qu'ils ont besoin. + On
5avait déjà un dossier majeur de fraude qui était en
6cours, qu'on devait continuer à supporter, puis
7débuter un troisième dossier majeur qui est
8Opération Centipede pour enquêter les allégations
9qui avaient pas pu être enquêtées à ce moment-là.
10Le colonel Garrick a accepté ma proposition et on a
11débuté l'Opération Centipede.
12 Q. Puis ça reliait quoi, le
13sujet des différents événements, des différents
14dossiers de Opération Centipede, à votre avis, il
15s'agissait de quoi exactement?
16 R. C'était différents dossiers
17reliés à des allégations face aux détenus. Soit que
18ça impliquait peut-être la police militaire, ça
19impliquait des membres des Forces canadiennes, des
20choses qu'ils avaient vues. Ça impliquait aussi
21dans sa liste de dossiers qui devaient être
22étudiés, c'étaient les deux articles de journaux,
23qui ont paru en mars et, je me souviens plus, en
24mai, je crois, 2007. Ça incluait tout -- Il y avait
25une gamme de séries, une liste de sept allégations
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1qui se devaient d'être regardées.
2 Q. Et comment est-ce que vous
3avez priorisé les différentes allégations?
4 R. Dans ma position au
5commandant, j'ai expliqué que je pouvais faire
6cette opération-là, mais avant que je puisse
7commencer à faire ces opérations-là, je devais
8terminer les dossiers qui étaient en cours au
9détachement. J'avais un certain nombre de dossiers
10qui étaient en cours que je devais terminer. Alors
11je devais terminer ces dossiers-là, ensuite monter
12l'opération, monter le plan d'opération, monter
13l'équipe, choisir l'équipe appropriée, faire les
14plans d'enquête des dossiers. Alors tout ça,
15c'était la première étape, de monter ça.
16 Ensuite, on a regardé qu'est-ce
17qu'on faisait face, les différentes allégations. On
18croyait que toutes les allégations étaient
19peut-être reliées l'une d'entre elles, mais on
20s'est vite aperçu que chaque allégation était un
21dossier différent avec des gens qui étaient
22peut-être pas, qu'on devait rencontrer différentes
23personnes pour différents dossiers. On a amalgamé
24tous les dossiers sur un dossier majeur puis on les
25a enquêtées, les allégations, individuellement
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1 Q. Est-ce qu'on peut parler un
2peu du timing de tout ça? Si vous retournez à
3l'onglet 11 du Volume 1, du NIS witness documents,
4l'onglet 11, à la page 25 de 62?
5 R. Oui.
6 Q. On voit là que vous êtes
7justement le gérant du dossier. Votre enquêteur
8principal, c'est le sergent Cournoyer. Est-ce que
9c'est exact de dire, on regarde juste en haut, que
10Opération Centipede a commencé le 20 mars 2008?
11 R. Oui puis non. Je m'explique.
12Les discussions avec mon patron ont eu lieu en
132007, à l'automne 2007. Le plan a été approuvé, il
14a dit: *Oui, va de l'avant avec ce plan-là+. On a
15terminé les dossiers en octobre 2007, jusqu'à mars
162008.
17 Q. Les autres dossiers?
18 R. Les autres dossiers. On a
19fait la planification des ressources qu'on avait.
20On a choisi l'équipe pour mettre en place, pendant
21cette période-là, tout en terminant nos dossiers.
22Alors les dossiers, dans notre système
23informatique, ont été créés en mars et c'est là
24qu'on a débuté vraiment les démarches d'enquête
25comme telles, à partir de cette époque-là. Il y
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1avait pas eu, à l'exception d’un dossier, il y
2avait jamais eu de numéro d'événement de créé pour
3ces allégations-là.
4 Ce qu'on fait habituellement, on
5reçoit une plainte, on crée un numéro d'événement.
6Dans ce cas-là, je peux pas expliquer pourquoi,
7j’étais pas là quand ils ont reçu des plaintes.
8Plusieurs mois après, j'ai reçu les plaintes, on a
9monté notre dossier puis on a créé les événements
10plusieurs, plusieurs mois après. Mais en mars,
11c'est là qu'on a vraiment débuté les démarches
12actives d'enquête.
13 Q. Les différentes plaintes dont
14on parle arrivaient pendant quelle période de temps
15à peu près? C'est l'été de 2007?
16 R. J'ai pas cette
17information-là. L'été 2007, ça me semble correct.
18 Q. OK. On ne va pas regarder les
19enquêtes qu'on a vues ce matin avec M. Chamberland.
20On va regarder les autres avec vous. Vous avez eu
21une implication en tant que gérant de dossiers. On
22va revenir à ça.
23 Si on peut tourner, d'abord, à
24l'onglet 13 du même livre, c'est le numéro
25d'événements qui termine avec 6912. Si on regarde à
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1la première page, paragraphe 3(a), je vais vous
2laisser expliquer un peu le contenu, mais il s'agit
3de quelque chose qui s'est passée pendant ce qu'on
4appelle la rotation 1, roto 1, entre février et
5août 2006, c'est exact?
6 R. Oui. Paragraphe 3(a)?
7 Q. Oui. Et je vois juste en haut
8-- pas en haut de la page, mais que c'est le
9sergent Cournoyer qui s'est occupé de cette enquête
10au début?
11 R. Oui. Le projet Centipede a
12été monté selon les principes des enquêtes majeures
13avec le triangle de commandement des enquêtes
14majeures. J'étais le gérant du dossier. Le sergent
15Cournoyer était l'enquêteur principal, en anglais
16on dit le lead investigator ou dépendamment de
17quelle force de police vous opérez, il y a des
18termes différents. Le sergent Cournoyer était
19l'enquêter principal de tous les dossiers.
20 Q. Je vais vous laisser
21expliquer un peu de quoi il s'agissait dans
22l'enquête et aussi nous laisser savoir les
23conclusions du Service national d'enquête,
24là-dessus. Donc le contenu, d'abord, si vous
25pouviez -- Excusez, pour que le panel puisse nous
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1suivre en même temps, on va tourner à l'onglet 15,
2page 43 de 48, ça va vous aider aussi.
3 R. Quarante-trois vous dites?
4 Q. Quarante-trois de 48.
5 R. Oui.
6 Q. Mais je vous laisse d'abord
7le lire un peu.
8 R. Cette plainte-là, c'est un
9policier militaire, durant sa rotation en
10Afghanistan, a effectué une tâche sur un point de
11contrôle. Il y avait un détenu. Le détenu, selon
12l'information qu'on avait, n'avait jamais été
13capturé par les Forces canadiennes, n'avait jamais
14été dans les mains des Forces canadiennes. Il avait
15effectué une tâche pour les Forces afghanes puis
16par la suite, je crois pas que c'est lui qui a
17découvert, mais il y a eu un corps qui a été
18découvert dans le fossé, puis cette personne-là
19croyait que le corps qui était dans le fossé était
20la même personne qu'il avait vue auparavant
21lorsqu'il avait fait la tâche avec les Forces
22afghanes.
23 Les rumeurs se sont répandues sur
24le camp que c'était la même personne, et cetera, et
25cetera. À son retour au Canada, il a fait part de
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1cette information-là à son commandant.
2 Q. Et par la suite, c'est arrivé
3à vous? Et est-ce que vous vous souvenez de comment
4--
5 R. Par la suite, c'était
6l'allégation qu'on avait. On avait possiblement un
7soldat canadien, policier militaire, qui aurait
8accompli une tâche officielle et là, on aurait
9possiblement l'information que la personne qui
10était là serait maintenant décédée puis dans le
11fossé. C'était l'allégation qu'on travaillait.
12 Je l'ai pas mentionné, mais dans
13le cadre de l'Opération Centipede, on avait
14priorisé nos enquêtes. Les sept allégations qu'on
15avait, on avait mis comme objectif, la première
16filière importante qu'on va débuter à enquêter,
17c'est les filières où il y a une implication
18possible d'un policier militaire, à savoir --
19 Q. C'était le cas ici?
20 R. Celui-ci c'était le cas d'un
21policier militaire qui nous rapportait
22l'information. Pourquoi un policier militaire?
23Étant donné sa fonction de policier militaire, avec
24les détenus, ces choses comme ça, on voulait
25enquêter ou vérifier si le policier militaire avait
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1pas manqué à son devoir de policier militaire,
2avait pas commis des infractions quelconques.
3C'était notre première priorité dans l'Opération
4Centipede. C'est pour ça que ce dossier-là était
5enquêté en premier.
6 Notre deuxième objectif, c'étaient
7les dossiers qu'on avait l'information que
8c'étaient des militaires canadiens qui auraient pu,
9encore une fois, commettre des infractions
10concernant les détenus ou des choses comme ça,
11manquer à leur devoir ou pas faire des choses qu'on
12s'attendait d'eux. C'était notre deuxième objectif.
13Et par la suite, les autres dossiers suivaient,
14ainsi de suite.
15 Ce dossier-là, selon les principes
16des objectifs qu'on avait établis, c'était le
17premier dossier qu'on a enquêté. On a rencontré
18l'individu qui apportait l'information --
19 Q. Justement, ça se trouve à la
20page 2 de 48. On a l'indication des entrevues, 1 et
212 de 48 pour plus tard, pour nous. Justement, vous
22avez rencontré le major Greenaway?
23 Q. Pas moi, mais les enquêteurs,
24il y a eu une tâche d'enquête selon le principe des
25enquêtes majeures, en disant: * Il faut rencontrer
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1le major Greenaway +, qui était le commandant de cet
2individu-là à l'époque, pour savoir ce que
3l'individu avait raconté. L'information qu'il avait
4formulée. Oui, on a rencontré le major Greenaway
5dans le cadre de cette enquête.
6 Q. Je vois que vous avez aussi
7rencontré certaines autres personnes, mais pour --
8Est-ce que vous avez interviewé le monsieur
9lui-même, le membre de la police militaire?
10 R. Est-ce que votre question
11c'est de me demander si moi je l'ai fait?
12 Q. Non, le Service national
13d'enquête?
14 R. Oui.
15 Q. Et vous êtes arrivé à quelle
16conclusion pour l'enquête?
17 R. La conclusion de quoi? De
18l'entrevue avec le policier?
19 Q. Non, juste --
20 R. La conclusion finale de
21l'enquête, vous voulez dire?
22 Q. C'est ça, oui. Je peux vous
23assister un peu. Si vous regardez aux pages 6 et 7
24de 48, on va trouver vos conclusions.
25 R. Nos conclusions ont été qu’on
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1n'a pas déterminé que l'individu qui avait pas été
2identifié aux mains des Forces afghanes, avait été
3capturé par les Forces canadiennes ou avait été
4sous le contrôle des Forces canadiennes. On n'a pas
5identifié que la personne qui était -- le corps
6qu'ils ont trouvé dans le fossé était la même
7personne que la personne qui avait été identifiée.
8L'information qu'on avait, c'était qu'il y avait
9aucune indication qu'on pouvait faire un lien entre
10les deux, l'événement rapporté par le policier
11militaire et le corps qui avait été trouvé. Il y
12avait aucune information, aucun témoin qui pouvait
13faire le lien entre la personne qui était dans le
14fossé et ce que le caporal croyait était le --
15 Q. Donc il n'y avait pas de
16détails?
17 R. Il y avait pas de détails sur
18l'identité de la personne qui était aux mains des
19Forces afghanes. Il y avait pas de détails sur une
20description, il y avait pas de témoin qui avait vu
21les Forces afghanes commettre de la torture ou quoi
22que ce soit envers cette personne-là. La seule
23chose qu'on avait, c'est un policier militaire qui
24était en présence d'un détenu qui était sous le
25contrôle des Forces afghanes et un corps dans le
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1fossé.
2 Q. Que vous avez même pas vu?
3 R. Qu'on n'a pas vu, que
4personne avait vu, que personne avait identifié,
5que personne avait des photos quelconques, rien
6pour dire que les deux personnes étaient en fait la
7même personne.
8 Q. OK. Donc un détail que vous
9avez noté ici à la page 6 de 48, premier
10paragraphe, c'était que le détenu n'avait jamais
11été sous la charge des Forces canadiennes. Est-ce
12que vous êtes d'accord que c'est un détail
13important et est-ce que cela a créé différents
14enjeux pour vous en tant qu'enquêteur?
15 R. Oui, c'est une des premières
16informations qu'on va vérifier. Si cette
17personne-là avait été capturée par les Forces
18canadiennes, avait été remise par les Forces
19canadiennes puis -- C'est ça qui nous donne la
20juridiction pour enquêter si les membres des Forces
21canadiennes ont commis un crime ou ont manqué à
22leur devoir. Le fait que les Forces canadiennes
23l'ont capturé, c'est une des informations clés pour
24justifier qu'on pousse plus loin l'enquête.
25 Q. On va revenir là-dessus
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1tantôt. Juste pour fermer ce dossier-là, si on
2tourne à la page 12, excusez-moi, à l'onglet 12,
3c'est juste une page, je vous laisse tourner la
4page. Ça, c'est votre signature pour dire que
5l'enquête est close, est terminée. Qu'est-ce que ça
6veut dire quand quelqu'un dans votre position signe
7pour terminer une enquête?
8 R. Ça veut dire qu'on est
9satisfait et que toutes les étapes d'enquête ont
10été menées à bien, que l'enquête est terminée et
11qu’il y a plus d'autres actions d'enquête à
12effectuer dans ce dossier-là. Alors on informe ceux
13qu'on croit qui ont un besoin de savoir la
14conclusion de cette enquête.
15 Q. Je vois qu’en haut de la
16page, en haut de la lettre, c'est écrit * Neglect of
17duty alleged +. Est-ce que c'est exact de dire que
18c'était le crime potentiel sur lequel vous avez
19enquêté?
20 R. Oui. Dans un des documents
21qu'on voyait tantôt, il y a un plan d'enquête qui
22disait que voici le genre de crime qu'on pense qui
23a été commis, avec qu'est-ce qu'on doit prouver
24pour être capable d'accuser une personne d'avoir
25commis ce crime.
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1 Q. OK. Quel a été le devoir qui
2aurait pu manquer dans ce cas-là, qui aurait failli
3d'accomplir? Juste une idée. On regarde la
4situation, il a aidé avec un détenu puis le détenu
5s'est, supposément, s'est trouvé mort dans un fossé
6deux semaines plus tard. J'essaie d'avoir une idée
7de ce qui aurait pu être la négligence.
8 R. Dans le cadre de l'Opération
9Centipede, une des questions qu'on se pose
10toujours, c'est sûr c'est notre juridiction, aussi,
11c'est dans ce genre d'information qu'on avait, on
12s'est posé la question à savoir: est-ce que les
13soldats canadiens, est-ce que les policiers
14militaires, les soldats canadiens, ont un devoir
15d'intervenir ou de rapporter des choses qu'ils
16voient? Puis s'ils avaient un devoir de le faire,
17est-ce qu'en le faisant pas, est-ce qu'ils
18commettent une infraction? C'était une des
19questions qu'on se posait pour tous les dossiers
20qu'on a travaillés dans l'Opération Centipede.
21 Q. On va revenir là-dessus aussi
22avec chaque dossier. Je vois aussi que cette lettre
23qui termine l'enquête a été envoyée au grand prévôt
24de CEFCOM et aussi au bureau de CEFCOM en général.
25Pourquoi est-ce que vous avez fait ça? Le principe
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1en arrière de ça d'envoyer les résultats d'une
2enquête à ces gens-là?
3 R. Parce que les allégations
4étaient en Afghanistan, une opération que -- Le
5commandant de CEFCOM, c'est lui qui gère les
6opérations en Afghanistan. C'est sa responsabilité.
7Alors c'était le commandant qu'on jugait bon
8d'informer. * Voici l'allégation qu'on a enquêtée,
9voici nos résultats +, afin qu'il puisse être
10informé de ce qu'on a enquêté et afin qu'il puisse
11prendre des actions si jamais il juge qu'il y a des
12actions à prendre ou informer ses commandants en
13théâtre ou quoi que ce soit. C'est la seule
14personne qu'on a jugé bon avoir un besoin d'avoir
15cette information-là.
16 Q. Juste pour clarifier pour le
17panel, les membres, CEFCOM, c'est le bureau des
18forces extérieures canadiennes?
19 R. Non, c'est -- en anglais,
20c'est le --
21 Q. Canadian Expeditionary
22Forces?
23 R. Oui.
24 Q. Ils s'occupent de nos forces,
25vous l'avez mentionné, à l'étranger?
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1 R. Expéditionnaires, les forces
2qui sont déployées dans une opération, que ce soit
3en Afghanistan, que ce soit n'importe où ailleurs
4dans le monde. C'est eux qui gèrent tout ça et le
5commandant de CEFCOM, c'est lui qui est responsable
6de toutes ces opérations-là qui sont effectuées à
7travers le monde entier, que ce soit par les forces
8terrestres, les forces maritimes ou les forces
9aériennes, quoi que ce soit. C'est lui qui est
10l'autorité pour ces dossiers-là.
11 Q. Et pour un dossier comme
12celui-ci, et toutes les enquêtes que vous faites,
13comment est-ce que quelqu'un comme vous est
14impliqué dans le jour le jour du dossier? Est-ce
15que vous avez des réunions chaque semaine, disons,
16pour cette enquête 6912, ou n'importe quelle autre?
17Est-ce que vous vous rencontrez une fois par
18semaine?
19 R. Dans ce dossier-là, j'ai été
20impliqué du début à la fin, dans le sens qu'en
21étant le gérant du dossier, je me suis occupé et
22j'ai participé à l'élaboration du plan de
23l'opération, j'ai révisé le plan d'enquête, j'ai
24révisé l'enquête. L'enquêteur principal. Lorsque
25les enquêteurs revenaient d'avoir effectué une
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1tâche, une entrevue quelconque, je recevais un
2compte rendu: * Voici ce qu'on a trouvé, voici où on
3en est, voici où on croit qu'on doit enquêter,
4voici les personnes qu'on croit qu'on doit
5rencontrer pour avoir plus d'informations. + Alors
6je me souviens plus si c'était des meetings fixes,
7à toutes les semaines, le mardi on se rencontre, ou
8c'était plus au besoin, à la fois, qu'il y avait de
9la nouvelle information. Mais j'avais des contacts
10extrêmement étroits avec l'enquêteur principal. On
11discutait des dossiers, comme un dossier majeur
12doit être géré. L'enquêteur principal, c'est lui
13qui révise le dossier, qui s'assure que les tâches
14sont faites selon qu'on avait discuté, que les
15tâches sont bien remplies, toutes les questions du
16plan d'entrevue ont été posées, toutes les choses
17de l'enquête se déroulent de la façon qu'on avait
18planifiée. S'il y a des problèmes quelconques, il
19vient en discuter avec moi et il y a une décision
20qui est prise et l'enquête se poursuit.
21 Q. Merci. Pour terminer
22là-dessus, je vois que votre lettre a été écrite le
234 juin 2008, donc quelques mois après le début de
24l'Opération Centipede, mais en réalité, presque
25deux ans après l'événement en question, après les
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1faits en question?
2 R. Oui, ça revient à
3l'explication que j'ai donnée.
4 Q. L'explication que vous avez
5donnée tout à l'heure.
6 R. Oui.
7 Q. Je comprends. On va passer à
8une autre enquête, 6913, encore sous le
9regroupement d’Opération Centipede, ça se trouve au
10Volume 1, onglet 2. Je vais commencer à vous poser
11des questions à partir de la page 18 de 45, pour
12s'orienter.
13 R. Pardon, 18 de 45?
14 Q. Oui, 18 de 45. Je pense qu'il
15y a un bon résumé de comment la plainte est arrivée
16sur le bureau du Service national d'enquête.
17 R. Oui.
18 Q. Jetez un coup d'œil, s'il
19vous plaît, et expliquez-nous de quoi il s'agissait
20dans cette enquête, et les conclusions?
21 R. Autre que qu'est-ce qui est
22écrit là, je peux pas vous expliquer plus que ça
23parce que j'étais pas encore au Service national
24d'enquête à cette époque-là. En mars 2007, j'étais
25toujours à Toronto.
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1 Q. On va le lire, ça dit en
2anglais -- C'est justement pour le panel, comme
3vous avez remarqué, le numéro d'événement est un
4ancien --
5 R. Je peux vous expliquer
6pourquoi parce que j'ai pris la décision de le
7faire. Si on revient à mon explication de tantôt
8qui disait que lorsque je suis arrivé en juillet
92007, puis la proposition que j'ai faite au colonel
10Garrick, à l'automne 2007, à propos de regrouper
11tous ces dossiers-là, c'était un dossier qui avait
12été débuté par l'équipe qui travaillait sur le
13projet Camel Spider. Ils se sont vite aperçus
14qu'ils étaient pas capables de faire enquête pour
15les deux dossiers, ça prenait trop de ressources
16puis ils avaient pas les ressources nécessaires
17pour le faire. Ce dossier-là a été débuté en mars
182007, mais avait pas été terminé, avait pas été en
19mesure d'être terminé. Il avait tout simplement été
20mis de côté pour poursuivre avec le projet Camel
21Spider.
22 Q. Nous faisons notre travail
23des notes ici sous l'ancien numéro d'événement,
24mais --
25 R. Pour expliquer, c'est que ce
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1dossier-là était là, ça faisait partie des sept
2enquêtes qui devaient être enquêtées. On a pris la
3décision de redonner un numéro de dossier qui est
4seulement un numéro séquentiel pour une année pour
5illustrer que le dossier 2007, l'Opération
6Centipede existait pas. En 2008, c'est lorsqu'on a
7pris charge de ce dossier-là, alors c'est ce qu'on
8a fait pour ce dossier-là.
9 Q. Merci. Justement, je vais le
10lire. Ça dit que:
11 [As read]
12 "5th of March, 2007, Major
13 Bell received an email
14 complaint from Corporal
15 Toussaint, who reported that
16 while he was serving in
17 Afghanistan he had taken
18 photographs ..."
19 Something is blanked out.
20 "... he had taken photographs
21 of a Taliban prisoner who was
22 in the custody of the
23 Afghanistan National Army and
24 struck with the tube of an
25 RPG-7V grenade launcher by an
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1 ANA soldier. He reported
2 that and NIS assumed an
3 investigation of it."
4 I've read it correctly? Je l'ai
5bien lu?
6 R. Oui.
7 Q. Si on retourne aux pages 20
8et 21, on a justement les courriels, le courriel
9initial du caporal Toussaint. Êtes-vous en mesure
10de nous expliquer un peu ce qui est arrivé dans
11cette enquête?
12 R. Pas pour le dossier de 5564,
13pas vraiment. J'étais pas impliqué dans ce
14dossier-là. Il faut juste que je vérifie à quel
15dossier de l'Opération Centipede ce dossier-là fait
16référence. C'est un dossier 6913 peut-être ou 6917,
17je me souviens plus, il faut vérifier, mais ce
18dossier-là, tout ce que vous avez dans ce
19dossier-là, c'est ce qu'on a pris, l'Opération
20Centipede, les opérations d'enquête qui avaient été
21débutées avant la création de l'Opération
22Centipede. On a continué l'enquête, on a travaillé
23avec le matériel qui existait déjà, avec ce qui
24avait débuté, mais le dossier 5564, j'ai pas
25vraiment été impliqué dans les décisions d'enquête.
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1On l'a pris à partir de l'Opération Centipede puis
2on lui a créé un nouveau numéro de dossier.
3 Q. D'accord. Vous êtes pas à
4l'aise, même de commenter là-dessus?
5 R. Si on peut trouver l'onglet
6qui réfère à l'Opération Centipede, je vais être
7capable de discuter de ce dossier-là. Mais
8celui-là, ces courriels-là, j'étais pas à l'unité.
9 Q. OK.
10 R. Si on va au dossier 6906, on
11va avoir le numéro qui correspond.
12 Q. Ça c'est à l'onglet 11. Tout
13ce qui est arrivé, c'est qu'on a préparé notre
14interrogatoire de ces matériaux-là. C'est la même
15chose que l'autre, ça a été transféré. Si je vous
16réfère à la conclusion, vous pourrez nous dire si
17vous vous souvenez, sinon on va revenir.
18 Encore à l'onglet 2, à la page 39
19de 45, si on regarde en bas de la page, le dernier
20paragraphe, il y a une entrevue du caporal
21Toussaint. Il a dit qu'il n'était pas certain si le
22détenu avait jamais été sous la charge des Forces
23canadiennes. Est-ce que c'est exact? Est-ce que
24c'est ça que vous vous souvenez de l'enquête?
25 R. Oui, si on peut trouver le
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1dossier de l'Opération Centipede, je vais être en
2mesure de vous donner ma conclusion.
3 Q. On va passer à la prochaine
4enquête et on va revenir pour terminer celle-là à
5la fin. Juste pour que je puisse m'orienter, on va
6revenir après la pause. On va passer à la prochaine
7enquête.
8 OK, l'onglet 20 du même livre, à
9la page 9 et 10 de 43.
10 R. Oui.
11 Q. Vous voyez là, il y a un
12paragraphe qui commence:
13 [As read]
14 "Allegations from an RCR
15 corporal that when he was
16 involved in the turnover of
17 detainees during Roto 2, the
18 Afghan authorities took them
19 behind a building and they
20 heard gunshots. Suspects
21 they were killed. This came
22 out of a PTSD, post-traumatic
23 stress disorder, debrief
24 session, and Major Rodrigues
25 advises CFNIS on July 16th,
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1 2007."
2 C'est justement ça le début, ce
3qui a déclenché l'enquête?
4 R. Oui.
5 Q. Si on regarde à la prochaine
6page, on regarde les numéros romains I, II, III,
7IV, juste en haut de la page, ça dit: * This
8occurred on more than one occasion. +
9 R. Pardon?
10 Q. C'est le quatrième paragraphe
11à partir d'en haut.
12 R. À la page 10?
13 Q. Oui, à la page 10 de 43.
14 R. OK, oui.
15 Q. Vous pouvez m'arrêter
16n'importe quand, quand vous vous souvenez des
17détails. Je préfère vous laisser résumer l'enquête
18si vous êtes en mesure, sinon on va passer étape
19par étape.
20 Donc c'est ça, c'est un autre
21détail. Puis il dit:
22 "Himself, his colleagues and
23 his chain of command were
24 aware that the detainees
25 would be shot upon their
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1 transfer."
2 Ça, c'est encore ce que le major
3Rodriguez raconte dans son entrevue. Il raconte ce
4que l'autre caporal lui aurait raconté. Est-ce que
5c'est exact?
6 R. C'est quoi votre question?
7 Q. J'essaie d'avoir les détails
8des allégations et je résume un peu ce qui est dans
9l'entrevue du major Rodriguez. Je vous demande,
10est-ce qu'il raconte donc ce qui a été raconté à
11lui par ce soldat en question? Son nom est pas là.
12C'est juste? C'est exact?
13 R. Oui, mais ça, c'est le major
14Rodriguez qui dit: * Voici ce que le soldat en
15question m'a raconté. +
16 Q. Oui, c'est ça. C'est du
17ouï-dire, doublement. Juste une petite question
18là-dessus, est-ce que la source, ce qui a déclenché
19l'enquête avait aussi été un article du Globe and
20Mail? Parce que si on regarde à la page 1 de 43, de
21ce même onglet, on regarde ici, ça dit:
22 [As read]
23 "An article in The Globe and
24 Mail ..."
25 En plein milieu de la page --
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1 "... 9th of March, 2007
2 indicated that the ANA
3 allegedly planned to murder a
4 detainee after he was handed
5 over."
6 R. Je me rappelle plus de
7l'article, mais l'enquête a certainement débuté
8avec l'allégation qui nous est arrivée du major
9Rodriguez qui dit que lors de son suivi d'un soldat
10pour des soins qu'il avait besoin d'être suivi,
11cette personne-là, ce soldat, a divulgué
12l'information qui devait nous passer au Service
13national d'enquête pour enquête.
14 L'enquête avait vraiment débuté
15non par l'enquête -- pas l'enquête, pardon, par
16l'article de journal, mais par ce que le major
17Rodriguez nous faisait part. Nous, les allégations
18semblaient être sérieuses dans le sens qu'il y
19avait des soldats canadiens qui auraient
20possiblement été témoins de crimes commis contre
21des détenus. On savait pas si les détenus avaient
22été capturés par les Forces canadiennes ou non,
23mais on avait cette information-là puis on avait un
24point de départ, on avait un nom avec une personne
25qu'on pouvait aller rencontrer pour voir
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1l'information qu'il avait. Puis en plus, ce que
2vous dites pas, c'est plus loin, le major Rodriguez
3dit qu'il suit d'autres personnes, qu'il n'y a
4jamais d'autres personnes qui ont raconté les mêmes
5histoires. Il suit des gens pour la même rotation
6qui ont pas les mêmes histoires.
7 C'est un point important parce que
8lorsqu'on a essayé de rencontrer la personne qui
9donnait ces renseignements-là, cette personne-là a
10pas voulu nous rencontrer. Elle a communiqué avec
11son avocat, elle a dit: * Mon avocat m'a conseillé
12de ne pas vous rencontrer. + Donc on n'a pas pu
13avoir l'information de la bouche de cette
14personne-là. Il a pas voulu nous parler. Nous
15sommes allés voir sa chaîne de commandement pour
16confirmer des détails, quand est-ce qu'il a été
17déployé, quel genre de tâche qu'il était affecté,
18pour essayer de valider l'information qu'on avait.
19 L'information qu'on a reçue de la
20chaîne de commandement nous dit que cette
21personne-là en question s'est pas déployée en même
22temps, elle était sur un peloton de réserve situé à
23Petawawa. Ce peloton de réserve-là a pour but que
24lorsqu'on doit remplacer des gens en Afghanistan,
25ces gens-là sont entraînés, sont prêts à partir au
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1besoin. Sa chaîne de commandement nous dit --
2 Q. Je veux juste vous
3interrompre. Ça, c'est à la page 14 de 60, je
4pense que vous avez l'entrevue?
5 R. Oui.
6 Q. Paragraphe (e):
7 "The only time his platoon
8 had any direct contact with
9 detainees was early in the
10 tour before ..."
11 R. Avant que le caporal en
12question soit en Afghanistan. Sa chaîne de
13commandement nous dit: * Oui, il s'est déployé en
14Afghanistan, mais il a jamais eu des contacts
15directs avec les détenus. +
16 Q. OK.
17 R. En plus de ça, il n'y a pas
18personne d'autre qui avance le même genre
19d'information.
20 Q. OK. Je remarque que si on
21retourne à la page 12 de 60, en arrière d'une page,
22la plainte est arrivée au le Service national
23d'enquête en juillet 2007 puis vous avez commencé
24vos entrevues en juin 2008, c'est exact?
25 R. Oui.
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1 Q. Évidemment, je pose la
2question. Est-ce que cela aurait été mieux de
3commencer l'enquête plus tôt que plus tard pour
4avoir la mémoire un peu plus claire?
5 R. Idéalement, ça aurait été
6mieux, mais j'ai expliqué la situation au Service
7national d'enquête au moment que ces plaintes-là
8sont arrivées. C'est certain qu'il faut prioriser,
9faire la priorité des dossiers, lequel on va
10travailler en premier, lequel qui, selon nous, doit
11être enquêté en premier. On est arrivé un an plus
12tard à rencontrer cette personne.
13 Q. OK. On va passer à une autre
14chose qui se passe dans cette enquête ou ce numéro
15d'événement, mais je crois que c'est pour toute
16l'Opération Centipede. Il s'agit d'une entrevue
17avec le lieutenant-colonel Irwin, à CEFCOM.
18 Si vous tournez, s'il vous plaît,
19aux pages 38 et 39 de 43, même onglet. Donc avant
20de lire un peu des détails de l'opinion que le
21lieutenant-colonel a donnée, quelle était l'idée en
22arrière de cette entrevue avec le
23lieutenant-colonel Irwin?
24 R. Comme je l'ai expliqué
25tantôt, lorsqu'on a créé l'Opération Centipede, on
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1se posait la question: C'est quoi les infractions
2qu'on enquête? C'est quoi les infractions
3auxquelles on a juridiction? Puis quel genre
4d'information, quels sont les éléments de la preuve
5qu'on doit approuver pour démontrer qu'il y a eu
6une infraction? Et une des questions qu'on se
7posait, c'est est-ce qu'il existe des directives?
8Quels sont les directives que le soldat doit suivre
9en théâtre d'opération concernant cette
10opération-là, qui sont écrites et qui pourraient
11démontrer que les militaires, les Forces
12canadiennes ou les soldats avaient un devoir, soit
13d'intervenir ou soit de rapporter l'information
14qu'ils voyaient à leur chaîne de commandement?
15 Le but de l'entretien avec le
16lieutenant-colonel Irwin, c'était pour lui
17demander, parce qu'il occupait une fonction de chef
18d'état-major pour cette rotation-là, quels étaient
19les directives en vigueur? Parce que les directives
20changent d'une rotation à l'autre, dépendamment des
21événements ou dépendamment de la situation. On
22voulait vraiment avoir ce qui était en vigueur à
23cette époque-là pour nous aider à comprendre le
24genre d'infraction possible qui aurait pu être
25commise par les membres des Forces canadiennes
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1 Q. Si je comprends bien, vous ne
2pouvez pas déposer une accusation, disons, de
3négligence, selon la Loi sur la défense nationale,
4sans savoir les règles en place, sans savoir les
5expectations pour le soldat sur le champ?
6 R. Si on regarde dans les plans
7d'enquête qu'on a de ces dossiers-là, on démontre
8les infractions qu'on doit -- les éléments qu'on
9doit démontrer pour croire qu'il y a une
10négligence. Une de celles-là c'est les règles, ce
11qu'on s'attend, l'entraînement que l'individu a
12démontré. Pour accuser une personne de négligence,
13il faut démontrer qu'il y a bel et bien eu
14négligence.
15 Q. OK. Le lieutenant-colonel,
16ce n'était pas un avocat?
17 R. Non.
18 Q. Et ce n'était pas un membre
19de la police militaire non plus?
20 R. Non.
21 Q. Si on regarde le paragraphe
22(a) de la page 41 de 60, il dit, je vais le lire
23pour vous:
24 [As read]
25 "In reference to a detainee
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1 that is not in Canadian
2 custody informing one of our
3 members that he or she will
4 be beaten or tortured, is our
5 soldier obligated to act or
6 report? I could not say
7 without looking at the notes
8 or records. However, the TSO
9 was always evolving in
10 regards to our Canadian
11 soldiers dealing with
12 detainee handling, transfer
13 and processing."
14 Donc alors là, on a une opinion de
15lui, je suis pas certain de qu'est-ce qui serait
16l'obligation. C'est exact?
17 R. Oui, c'est le compte rendu de
18son entrevue.
19 Q. Puis le prochain paragraphe,
20il dit:
21 [As read]
22 "It would be my expectation
23 that a soldier would act if
24 he observed something, but to
25 say it is written down
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1 somewhere that they are
2 obliged to act, I cannot
3 say."
4 The next paragraph: [As read]
5 "Within the TSO, there would
6 be elements speaking to the
7 duty of care, where we would
8 be expected to intervene, but
9 to say where it is written
10 and that we have a legal
11 obligation to intervene, I
12 can't say. I know we would
13 have been trained and
14 prepared with the mindset
15 that if there is a
16 requirement to intervene, for
17 example, if someone's life is
18 at stake, in that situation,
19 there would be a duty to
20 intervene."
21 Encore, ça soulève des doutes.
22Juste avant, si on passe au paragraphe (e), il
23parle spécifiquement de la Convention de Genève.
24Paragraphe (e), il dit:
25 [As read]
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1 "The soldiers know that the
2 Geneva Convention applies to
3 them and that they are to
4 treat detainees to a higher
5 standard. We knew and
6 understood the agreement that
7 we had with the Afghans, and
8 that's where the grey area
9 lies. The Afghans are the
10 legitimate authority. It
11 would be one thing handing
12 someone over to them
13 believing they would get hurt
14 versus observing it happen
15 and then how would our
16 members intervene."
17 Quand moi je lis ça, je suis pas
18confus, mais ça m'aiderait pas si j’avais pas
19d'idée au préalable. Est-ce que vous en avez tiré
20la même conclusion avec l'opinion du colonel en
21termes des attentes sur les soldats en théâtre?
22 R. Je suis pas sûr que je
23comprends votre question.
24 Q. Est-ce que vous étiez
25satisfait avec l'opinion de M. Irwin? Du colonel?
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1 R. Non, la seule chose que cette
2entrevue-là nous dit, c'est que c'est pas clair
3quels sont les devoir d'intervenir, de rapporter
4des soldats. Dans nos recherches qu'on a
5effectuées, on en est venu à la conclusion que pour
6cette rotation-là, les directives, les ordres, il y
7avait pas nécessairement un devoir d'intervenir et
8de rapporter. Ce que le colonel nous dit, c'est
9que:
10 "You would expect that the
11 soldier did, but his
12 expectation doesn't mean the
13 standard for me to lay
14 charges."
15 Le problème et la difficulté de
16toute cette entrevue-là, il n'est pas sûr, il pense
17que le TSO -- Mais lorsqu'on obtient les directives
18en place, il y a pas rien qui démontre que le
19soldat pouvait comprendre ses obligations puis son
20devoir d'intervenir. Ou du moins, rien qui démontre
21qu'on soit capable de porter une accusation de
22négligence ou de pas avoir respecté, désobéi à un
23ordre, et cetera.
24 Q. Et est-ce que cette opinion
25vous aurait aidé en termes des obligations d'un
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1soldat selon la Convention de Genève?
2 R. Non, cette entrevue-là, comme
3je l'ai mentionné, cette entrevue était dans le but
4d'essayer de nous diriger, quels étaient les ordres
5en vigueur à cette époque-là. Il faut comprendre
6qu’il faut aller chercher l'information qui est en
7vigueur à cette époque-là, pour laquelle le soldat
8a reçu l'entraînement. On peut pas prendre
9l'information qui était en vigueur puis qui est
10plus en vigueur ou l'information qui est en train
11d'être rédigée puis qui va être en vigueur pour la
12prochaine rotation et dire le soldat, c'est ça ses
13attentes. C'est ce qui était au moment de la
14mission à laquelle le soldat a participé.
15 Q. Je comprends ça, mais la
16Convention de Genève, par exemple?
17 R. La Convention de Genève, oui,
18mais là on parle de devoir de rapporter, de devoir
19d'intervenir dans les directives canadiennes.
20 Q. Est-ce qu'il y aurait aussi
21--
22 R. Puis dans le contexte que le
23colonel, pardon, je m'excuse, dans le contexte que
24le colonel parlait, c'est le devoir des soldats
25canadiens, lorsque qu'ils ont un détenu en leur
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1possession, qu'est-ce qu'ils font pour respecter la
2Convention de Genève, comment on traite les détenus
3lorsque les détenus sont dans les mains des
4Canadiens. C'est dans ce contexte-là.
5 Q. Mais initialement, cette
6enquête, ce que le soldat, on connaît pas son nom,
7a dit, c'était qu'on transférait l'allégation. On
8transfère les détenus, ils se font tuer par après,
9ça arrive plus qu'une fois. Est-ce que vous
10aimeriez aussi vous informer sur est-ce qu'il y a
11une obligation de ne pas les transférer dans ces
12cas-là?
13 R. Si on se réfère aussi, le
14soldat disait que la chaîne de commandement était
15au courant que de transférer les détenus -- C'est
16ce qui arrivait aux détenus, ils étaient transferés
17aux Forces afghanes puis ils tournaient le coin,
18ils allaient en arrière du building puis ils les
19exécutaient là.
20 Notre enquête a jamais démontré
21que la chaîne de commandement était au courant.
22Notre enquête a démontré que ce que le caporal
23disait, il y a pas personne d'autre qui le
24confirme, et qu'en plus de ça, il a jamais
25travaillé, il a jamais effectué des tâches avec les
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1détenus. C'est ce que notre enquête confirme. Ça
2confirme pas ce que la chaîne de commandement sait
3ou sait pas. Ça confirme que ce que le caporal nous
4dit, on n'est pas capable de le confirmer par
5d'autres sources. C'est la seule personne qui le
6dit, il veut pas nous parler puis en plus de ça, il
7a pas eu de travail avec les détenus.
8 Q. Je comprends. Donc pour ces
9faits-là, il n'y avait pas de base?
10 R. Oui.
11 Q. Je comprends ça. Il me
12semble, quand je lis ça, et je vous pose la
13question, qu'il y a un manque de clarté, un peu,
14par rapport aux obligations des soldats par rapport
15aux détenus. Est-ce que vous en avez sorti la même
16conclusion? Et je pose la question pour cette
17enquête et aussi pour toutes les autres, parce que
18celle-ci, cette opinion était reliée à toutes les
19enquêtes sous l'égide d’Opération Centipede.
20 R. Je suis pas sûr que je
21comprends votre question.
22 Q. Est-ce qu'il y a un manque de
23clarté sur la loi applicable?
24 R. Pour ce dossier-là, ce que
25notre enquête démontre, c'est ce que le soldat a
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1dit, on n'est pas capable de le vérifier.
2 Q. Je comprends. Pour ce soldat
3c'est fait, mais quand je lis ça, je sors un peu
4confus si je lis seulement quelles sont les règles
5qui s'appliquent au traitement de détenus. Est-ce
6que vous êtes d'accord ou pas ou vous préférez pas
7commenter là-dessus?
8 R. Les règles s'appliquent pour
9les soldats canadiens. Je crois qu'elles sont très
10claires. Comment le soldat canadien doit se
11comporter en présence d'un détenu lorsqu'il est
12responsable d'un détenu, elles sont très claires.
13 Q. Mais une fois transféré ou
14une fois sous la charge des Forces afghanes, quand
15je lis ça, je suis confus. Vous ne voyez pas mon
16point?
17 R. Non.
18 Q. OK. On va passer à autre
19chose. C'est sur une tentative que vous avez tenté
20d'avoir une opinion juridique du JAG, des services
21juridiques et des Forces canadiennes. Si on tourne
22à la page --
23 R. Je m'excuse, est-ce que
24c'était une question?
25 Q. Préliminaire. Tournez à la
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1page 54 de 62. Vous allez me dire qu'est-ce qui
2s'est passé.
3 R. À quel onglet?
4 Q. Onglet 11.
5 R. Cinquante-quatre, vous avez
6dit?
7 Q. Volume 1, onglet 11, 64.
8C'est 64.
9 R. Soixante-quatre de 66?
10 Q. Oui. Un instant. Non, c'est
1154, 55. On va commencer là.
12 R. Cinquante-quatre?
13 Q. Cinquante-quatre, 55 de 62.
14 R. Cinquante-quatre de 66? Je
15m'excuse.
16 Q. Cinquante-quatre de 62,
17onglet 11.
18 R. Parfait.
19 Q. Ce n'est pas évident,
20excusez-moi. OK, si vous regardez ici, est-ce que
21c'est exact de dire que vous avez tenté d'avoir une
22opinion juridique? J'aimerais que vous m'expliquiez
23ce qui se passe là de JAG.
24 R. C'est pas une opinion
25juridique qu'on a tenté d'avoir.
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1 Q. Qu'est-ce que vous avez tenté
2d'avoir?
3 R. On a tenté d'avoir de
4l'avocat en théâtre, à cette époque-là, quelles
5étaient encore une fois les directives en vigueur
6qui s'appliquaient aux soldats. On n'était pas
7intéressé à avoir l'opinion juridique qu'il avait
8émise parce qu'on sait très bien qu'on n'aurait pas
9accès à cette opinion-là. On veut pas savoir ce
10qu'il a recommandé à son commandant. On veut savoir
11quelles sont les directives en vigueur et on a jugé
12que l'avocat en théâtre, à ce moment-là, était la
13meilleure personne pour nous aider à trouver ces
14directives-là.
15 Q. Et il a dit non. Il a dit
16qu'il ne pouvait pas?
17 R. Oui.
18 Q. Pour des motifs de privilège
19d'avocat?
20 R. Oui.
21 Q. Alors vous cherchez comme les
22règles d'engagement, et cetera?
23 R. Pas vraiment les règles
24d'engagement. Les règles d'engagement, c'est
25l'utilisation de la force et ça avait pas aucun
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1rapport avec les dossiers qu'on enquêtait
2présentement.
3 Q. Les ordres permanents de
4théâtre, des choses comme ça?
5 R. Les ordres des détenus, le
6TSO, 321, si j'ai le bon numéro, mais les ordres de
7détenus qui étaient en vigueur, les directives
8permanentes pour les soldats, tout ça, en vigueur
9pour les soldats à cette époque-là. C'est ce qu'on
10cherchait.
11 Q. Est-ce que c'est exact de
12dire que, je veux pas aller dans les détails, mais
13à part de cette tentative-là qui était même pas
14pour une opinion juridique, et à part ce qui s'est
15passé avec le colonel Irwin, est-ce que vous avez
16eu des conseils juridiques à part de vos
17connaissances sur les questions?
18 R. Oui.
19 Q. Je pense qu'on l'a vu dans
20les matériaux ici, mais ça, ça irait pas dans les
21rapports d'occurences?
22 Me PRÉFONTAINE: De toute façon,
23si ça y était, comme c'est protégé par le secret
24professionnel, vous n'y auriez pas accès.
25 Me MARSHMAN: Même le fait qu'ils
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1l'ont cherché?
2 Me PRÉFONTAINE: Il vous a déjà
3répondu. Il a répondu que oui, mais c'est là où
4s'arrête votre pouvoir de --
5 Me MARSHMAN: C'est bon.
6 Q. Vous avez cherché ça, mais on
7ne va pas plus loin. On va passer aux dernières
8deux enquêtes. On va les traiter ensemble et après
9la pause, on va retourner à l'enquête qu'on a
10manquée un peu. Les dernières deux enquêtes sont
11les numéros 6920 et 6921.
12 R. À quel onglet?
13 Q. Il y en a plusieurs, mais
14commençons par le Volume 2, onglet 5. Si on tourne
15la page, page 3 de 3, on a la conclusion de
16l'enquête pour 6920, et à l'onglet 7 du même livre,
17c'est juste une page et on a la conclusion pour
18l'enquête 6921.
19 R. Oui.
20 Q. Est-ce que vous pourriez me
21décrire le contenu de ces enquêtes? Sur quoi vous
22avez enquêté pour ces deux --
23 R. Oui, il faut revenir à
24l'Opération Centipede dans son entier. L'Opération
25Centipede avait sept allégations, sept choses qu'on
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1devait enquêter ou vérifier ou approfondir un peu
2plus à savoir si on allait poursuivre l'enquête ou
3pas, une enquête plus détaillée. Puis une dernière
4qui s'est rajoutée à la fin, on a reçu d'autres
5informations puis on l'a attachée, qui est le
6dossier 23, il n'a pas le même numéro séquentiel
7que les autres parce qu'il a été ouvert à la fin.
8 Mais dans l'ensemble, si on
9revient aux objectifs que j'ai discutés au début,
10on regardait les allégations où il y avait un
11policier militaire d'impliqué, ensuite de ça, on
12allait aux allégations où il y avait des membres
13des Forces canadiennes d'impliquées, c'étaient nos
14ordres de priorité puis on avait ces deux articles
15de journaux avec de l'information. Un article de
16journal.
17 Q. Donc c'est écrit au début, on
18est à l'onglet 5, par exemple, le paragraphe, je
19peux le lire:
20 [As read]
21 "This report was initially
22 created to investigate the
23 allegations that Afghans who
24 had been captured by CF
25 personnel, were being abused.
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1 These allegations stemmed
2 from two reports in The Globe
3 and Mail dated March 9th,
4 2007, and April 23rd, 2007."
5 Est-ce que c'est exact de dire que
6l'article pour le 23 avril, c'était l'article écrit
7par M. Graeme Smith? Est-ce que vous vous souvenez
8de ça?
9 R. Je me souviens plus, mais je
10crois que c'est l'article, il faudrait vérifier. Il
11y avait deux articles dans celui-là puis c'était un
12de ceux-là, le 23, 24 mai. À la fin, pour revenir à
13ce que je disais, on avait enquêté les allégations,
14on avait ces articles-là, mais on n'avait rien
15d'autres de ces articles-là qui pouvait nous donner
16un doute ou une place à débuter une enquête. On
17avait un article puis c'est tout. À la fin de
18l'Opération Centipede, on s'est assis, on a regardé
19ce qu'on pouvait faire avec cette information-là.
20 Q. Avec ces deux articles-là?
21 R. Avec ces deux articles-là, on
22n'avait pas de nom, à part le journaliste qui l'a
23écrit, on n'avait rien d'autre de concret avec
24lesquels on pouvait travailler pour débuter quelque
25chose, à part le fait d'aller voir le journaliste,
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1deux ans après, dire: * Monsieur, est-ce que vous
2voulez nous parler de votre article? + On n'avait
3pas d'autres portes pour travailler. Alors on a
4pris la décision de pas aller voir le journaliste
5et de fermer le dossier parce qu'on n’avait pas
6d'autres indications qui nous permettaient de
7croire qu'on devait aller plus loin avec cette
8enquête-là.
9 Q. Vous êtes pas allé parler au
10journaliste?
11 R. Non.
12 Q. Je vais passer à l'article
13juste pour confirmer qu'on parle du bon article.
14C'est dans les livres blancs qui sont devant vous,
15Volume 3, onglet 5, et la date là, c'est le 23
16avril 2007?
17 R. Oui.
18 Q. C'est l'article écrit par M.
19Graeme Smith. Maintenant que vous le voyez, est-ce
20que vous êtes d'accord que l'enquête, il s'agissait
21de cet article-là?
22 R. Oui.
23 Q. Quelles allégations
24spécifiques dans l'article est-ce que vous enquêtez
25dessus ou est-ce que c'était le tout? Est-ce que
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1c'est quelque chose de spécifique?
2 R. C'est l'article dans son
3ensemble, à savoir c'est quoi ma juridiction
4d'enquêter cet article-là. Puis on revient -- La
5juridiction de la police militaire est limitée,
6c'est précis, c'est défini. Les Forces afghanes qui
7commettent des crimes contre un Afghan, j'ai pas
8beaucoup de juridiction à enquêter ça.
9 Q. Si on regarde à la fin de cet
10article-là, et je sais que vous êtes pas obligé de
11chercher les opinions juridiques d'un journaliste,
12mais à la fin, il cite l'article 12 des Conventions
13de Genève. Je pense qu'il le fait pour faire croire
14dans son article qu'il y a un risque de bris de
15cette convention, mais on ne peut pas parler de ses
16intentions, mais il cite l'article 12 de la
17Convention de Genève, la partie qui dit:
18 [As read]
19 "Prisoners of war may only be
20 transferred by the detaining
21 power to a party which is a
22 party to the convention and
23 after the detaining power has
24 satisfied itself of the
25 willingness and ability of
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1 the transferee power to apply
2 the convention."
3 Est-ce que dans ce sens limité,
4est-ce que vous êtes d'accord que vous auriez une
5juridiction sur les soldats canadiens s'ils
6savaient qu'ils transféraient quelqu'un aux
7autorités afghanes en sachant qu'il se ferait
8torturer ou maltraiter par après? Est-ce que vous
9voyez mon point?
10 R. Bien, on suppose que
11l'article, on suppose qu'avec l'article, les
12membres des Forces canadiennes avaient de
13l'information qu'ils auraient pas dû transférer les
14détenus.
15 Q. Absolument.
16 R. C'est ce que vous supposez.
17Moi, j'ai pas cette information-là.
18 Q. Je suppose pas ça, mais je
19parle juste qu'il y a des accusations-là. Il y a de
20l'information. Vous avez dit que vous pensiez
21manquer la juridiction d'enquêter là-dessus. C'est
22ça que j'ai compris. Et je vous demande: est-ce que
23s'il y a une porte qui s'ouvre pour que vous
24puissiez appliquer votre juridiction?
25 R. Cet article-là suppose que
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1les Forces canadiennes, connaissaient qu'en
2transférant les détenus, qu'ils allaient être
3torturés.
4 Q. C'est ça?
5 R. Oui, c'est l'article qui dit
6ça.
7 Q. Donc il faut prouver -- Il
8faudrait avoir de l'information comme quoi ils
9savent --
10 R. Il faudrait que j'aie
11d'autres informations, autres que l'article pour
12former un doute. Je l'ai pas cette information-là.
13Tout ce que l'Opération Centipede me dit, c'est
14qu'il y a des soldats qui ont donné l'information.
15L'information, quand on va voir le soldat, elle
16s'avère pas tout à fait la même ou le soldat veut
17pas nous parler. Dans l'Opération Centipede, j'ai
18pas l'information qui me tend à croire que les
19commandants savaient qu'en transférant les détenus,
20qu'ils allaient être torturés.
21 Q. OK. On va revenir à votre
22conclusion parce que je pense que vous vous
23expliquez. C'est l'onglet 5 du Volume 2.
24 R. Pardon, on est encore dans le
25Volume --
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1 Q. Excusez-moi, NIS, dans le
2livre du Service national d'enquête. Vous allez
3m'interrompre, Monsieur, si on approche l'heure de
4la pause. On va peut-être finir. Peut-être que je
5peux finir la question puis --
6 M. BERLINQUETTE: Finissez votre
7question.
8 Me MARSHMAN:
9 Q. On va revenir là-dessus
10après, mais est-ce qu'au paragraphe 2, c'est bien
11la conclusion que vous en avez tiré après avoir lu
12les articles de journaux? Et je vais vous le lire,
13ça dit:
14 [As read]
15 "Although these newspaper
16 journalists are reporting
17 that they have interviewed
18 former Afghan captains, or at
19 least received information
20 concerning their treatment at
21 the hands of the Afghans,
22 considering the general rules
23 of evidence, the
24 inadmissibility of statements
25 as they pertain to hearsay
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1 information, and the lack of
2 any other credible evidence,
3 there is no satisfactory
4 justification to continue
5 this investigation.
6 Likewise, even if these
7 reports were somehow deemed
8 to be credible, the
9 allegations of ill-treatment
10 are directed against the
11 Afghan authorities. This
12 alone excludes our
13 jurisdictional interests and
14 the mandate of the CFNIS."
15 À ce moment-là, novembre 2008,
16c'est la conclusion que vous en avez tiré?
17 R. Oui.
18 Q. Et ça c'est la même pour les
19deux articles?
20 R. Oui.
21 Q. Et le prochain paragraphe, ça
22dit, en plein milieu de la phrase --
23 [As read]
24 "To that end, any pending
25 media reports, articles
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1 concerning the treatment of
2 Afghan prisoners by Afghan
3 authorities which are void of
4 any direct accusations of
5 criminal wrongdoing of CF
6 members will not be
7 investigated by this office."
8 Je vais prendre ça et vous allez
9me corriger. Vous dites là: * On va pas enquêter
10plus loin sur ces articles-là et s'il y a des
11articles dans l'avenir du même genre, on ne va pas
12enquêter ça. On a besoin de quelque chose d'autre. +
13Est-ce que c'est exact?
14 R. Oui.
15 Q. On va terminer là et je vais
16essayer de raccourcir les choses après la pause.
17 M. BERLINQUETTE: On va prendre 15
18minutes. Merci beaucoup.
19--- Upon recessing at 2:43 p.m.
20--- Upon resuming at 2:59 p.m.
21 MR. MARSHMAN: They say I'm hard
22to hear.
23 THE CHAIR: Before you start, can
24everybody hear at the back a little better? You
25can hear okay?
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1 Me MARSHMAN: Si jamais, Monsieur
2Berlinquette, on ne termine pas aujourd'hui, on
3espère de le faire, mais sinon, on avait déjà parlé
4de terminer l'interrogatoire lundi matin, avec le
5prochain témoin, mais on verra. Je crois qu'on a
6l'intention d'arrêter à 4 h 30. C'était ça?
7 M. BERLINQUETTE: Oui.
8 PAR Me MARSHMAN:
9 Q. Je veux juste rester avec
10l'article de M. Smith un peu plus longtemps.
11 R. Je m'excuse, à quel onglet
12vous êtes?
13 Q. C'était Volume 3, onglet 5
14des livres blancs. Vous avez dit que vous n'avez
15pas contacté le journaliste en question qui est
16allé lui-même sur le champ en Afghanistan. C'est
17quoi la raison en arrière de ça de ne pas le
18contacter? Est-ce que vous y avez pensé?
19 R. Oui, on y a pensé.
20 Q. Et pourquoi finalement vous
21avez décidé de ne pas le faire?
22 R. Lorsqu’on était rendu à ce
23dossier-là, le 6920 et le 6921, à part l'article de
24journal, on n'avait rien d'autre qui nous aidait à
25essayer de débuter une enquête, à part l'article de
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1journal avec ce qui était écrit dans l'article de
2journal. C'est pas une façon habituelle. Des fois
3on peut le faire, dépendamment des circonstances,
4mais dans cet article-là -- On débute pas une
5enquête seulement avec un article de journal. On
6débute une enquête avec d'autre chose qui va nous
7aider à former un doute que possiblement il y a une
8infraction qui a été commise, pour débuter une
9enquête. L'article seulement donnait pas cette
10raison-là d'aller plus loin.
11 Je peux pas vous expliquer
12pourquoi l'article était dans la liste, mais
13l'article a été dans la liste lorsqu'on a débuté
14l'Opération Centipede, l'article était là. Alors
15nos conclusions, c'est ce qu'on est en venu à
16formuler suite à avoir enquêté les autres dossiers
17qu'on avait.
18 Q. Ça doit arriver de temps en
19temps, il me semble, théoriquement, on pourrait
20lire quelque chose dans un journal, disons, comme
21des histoires de fraude au gouvernement ou je sais
22pas quoi, puis il pourrait y avoir des noms puis --
23ça pourrait vous pousser à aller poser des
24questions au moins à ces gens-là?
25 R. Oui, mais habituellement,
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1l'article de journal va avoir été suivi de
2quelqu'un qui va dire: * Oui, on a été fraudé. +
3L'article qui est paru, c'est effectivement vrai,
4voici les documents qui confirment ou un rapport
5quelconque de la chaîne de commandement qui va
6référer à l'article et dire que l'incident auquel
7l'article se réfère, c'est effectivement, voici ce
8qu'on a et on va débuter une enquête.
9 L'article de journal en tant que
10tel, c'était notre opinion que c'était pas assez
11pour débuter plus grand que ce qu'on a fait là. Si
12l'enquête où on a dit que le caporal l'avait
13divulgué à son médecin que l'information qu'il
14dévoilait avait été crédible puis qu'il nous avait
15dit oui, que possiblement la chaîne de commandement
16avait été au courant, on aurait peut-être pu avoir
17plus d'informations pour débuter l'enquête, mais
18tout ce qu'on a fait auparavant, avant d'arriver à
19l'article nous amenait rien d'éléments nouveaux
20pour débuter une enquête. Et c'est la décision
21qu'on a prise.
22 Q. Vous dites un peu que c'est
23votre hésitation à procéder à enquêter sur les
24articles et le contenu de l'article qui était lié
25aux conclusions que vous avez tirées avec les
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1autres enquêtes --
2 R. L'ensemble du dossier
3Opération Centipede nous donnait pas d'autres
4éléments qui pourraient nous permettre d'aller plus
5loin que ce qu'on a écrit. C'est pour ça.
6 Q. Si on regarde l'article, par
7exemple, à la page 2, ici c'est facile. Il y a
8juste des numéros à une place seulement. Page 2 de
95 de l'article, il y a des noms dans l'article, par
10exemple, il y a Mahmad Gul, an impoverished farmer,
11et ça, c'est le monsieur, c'est dit dans l'article
12que les soldats canadiens l'ont visité et puis
13qu'ils ont sûrement entendu ses cris. Donc on a un
14nom là. On a le nom, si on tourne à la page 4, Gul
15Mohammed, à la page 4, 25 ans, Sherin, 25, Abdul
16Wali, 23 ans, et supposément qu'on aurait aussi des
17records des détenus qu'on a eus, que les Forces
18canadiennes ont eu dans leurs mains. Est-ce que
19c'est venu à l'esprit que peut-être qu'on pourrait
20passer ça au Service national d'enquête en
21Afghanistan pour aller peut-être chercher ces
22gens-là ou regarder dans les dossiers pour nos
23détenus ou quelque chose de même? Est-ce que cette
24idée est venue? Est-ce que vous l'avez eue?
25 R. Non. Cette idée-là
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1sous-entend qu'on aurait eu des doutes que les
2commandants avaient l'information et qu'ils
3auraient -- et qu'on aurait eu une enquête pour
4dire que oui, le commandant a transféré des détenus
5en sachant que ces informations-là -- On n'a pas
6cette information-là. On a un article avec des
7noms, on a des informations qu'on a enquêtées avec
8des gens qui ont été témoins, des rumeurs que les
9détenus étaient battus, mais il y a pas personne
10qui a été témoin de ça, il y a pas personne qui
11vient nous dire: * Oui j'ai été témoin. Ce détenu-là
12a été capturé par les Forces canadiennes, il a été
13transféré à telle date, puis voici, il a été battu,
14on a l'information. + On n'a pas cette
15information-là à part ce qui est écrit dans
16l'article de journal, dans les articles de
17journaux.
18 Q. Si vous aviez posé ces
19questions, peut-être que vous auriez eu plus de
20renseignements comme est-ce que ça a été des
21détenus du Canada, et cetera. Vous y avez pas
22pensé, c'est ça que vous avez dit.
23 R. Rendu à cette étape-là, on a
24jugé qu'on n’avait rien pour aller plus loin avec
25cette enquête-là.
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1 Q. Je vais passer à la question
2de cette idée que ce qui est dans un article de
3journal ou juste le principe du ouï-dire en général
4qui est mentionné dans les conclusions.
5Pourriez-vous ouvrir le Volume 1 des livres blancs
6que vous avez là? Onglet 3. En fait, pardonnez-moi,
7on va aussi aller au Volume 4. On va mettre ça de
8côté d'abord, parce que ça, c'est la directive
9technique, ça s'applique en Afghanistan. Pour vous,
10c'est le Volume 4, parce que vous étiez au Canada.
11Onglet 5. Est-ce que vous connaissez ce
12document-là?
13 R. Oui.
14 Q. C'est quoi?
15 R. Ce sont nos directives
16techniques de la police militaire.
17 Q. J'aimerais qu'on aille au
18chapitre 6, paragraphe 8, ça va prendre un peu de
19temps pour y arriver.
20 R. Chapitre 6, paragraphe 8?
21 Q. Oui. Est-ce que vous y êtes?
22Ça dit en bas de la page 6 --
23 THE CHAIR: I haven't located the
24page yet.
25 MR. MARSHMAN: 6-3/13.
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1 PAR LE TÉMOIN: Vous remarquez
2qu'il y a une erreur dans la numérotation
3anglais-français?
4 Q. Oui, mais on va aller en haut
5de la page, le paragraphe 8, ça décrit, je suppose,
6ce sont les procédures, les politiques de la police
7militaire, les directives.
8 [tel que lu]
9 * Ouverture d'une enquête.
10 Une police militaire doit
11 ouvrir une enquête quand...
12 -- et ça mentionne plusieurs
13choses et une des choses --
14 ... un informateur,
15 c'est-à-dire la police
16 locale, un témoin, un
17 informateur confidentiel, une
18 personne anonyme, etc.,
19 signale un incident à la
20 police. +
21 Je le note seulement parce que ça
22me dit et je veux savoir si vous êtes d'accord, que
23c'est parfaitement légitime de commencer une
24enquête sur une base du ouï-dire ou de
25l'information qui n'est pas --
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1 R. C'est différent. Là, vous
2dites qu'un article de journal, vous le considérez
3comme un informateur. Je suis pas d'accord avec
4vous. Un informateur, un ouï-dire, une personne,
5c'est quelqu'un qui va prendre un numéro de la
6police militaire, qui va appeler, qui ne se nommera
7pas puis qui va dire: * Voici ce que j'ai. + Là, ce
8que vous essayez de comparer, c'est un article de
9journal avec ce genre de personne-là. Je suis pas
10d'accord avec vous.
11 Q. La comparaison que je fais,
12c'est que aussi ce serait du ouï-dire, ce serait
13pas admissible en cour tout de suite, mais ça
14pourrait déclencher une enquête et vous forcer à
15poser d'autres questions. Est-ce que vous êtes
16d'accord avec ça?
17 R. L'argument inverse se pose.
18Quand je me préparais à réviser les dossiers, le
191er avril, il y a un article de journal qui est
20paru suite à une personne qui disait que la
21relation avec le NDS était nuisible au Canada, par
22contre, ils ont pas découvert de signe d'abus.
23C'est un article de journal. C'est la même veine.
24 Q. C'était écrit par qui? Est-ce
25que vous avez --
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1 R. Je me rappelle pas, ça a paru
2dans le Edmonton Sun. C'est un article de journal.
3 Q. Vous devriez l'envoyer à
4l'enquête par le --
5 R. Ça a paru le 1er avril. C'est
6un article de journal. C'est les directives de la
7police militaire qui me disent que lorsque je dois
8ouvrir une enquête, on peut s'argumenter que
9l'enquête a été ouverte, qu'il y a un numéro de
10dossier, il y a un article de journal -- J'ai
11l'article de journal dans les dossiers de la
12militaire et on a un dossier avec une conclusion
13puis une décision qui a été prise qu'on poursuivait
14pas l'enquête.
15 Alors on peut s'argumenter que
16l'enquête a été débutée. On l'a fermée pour les
17raisons qu'on a élaborées. Est-ce que j'ai respecté
18mes politiques, les directives de la police
19militaire? Je crois que oui. J'ai un numéro
20d'événement général pour un article de journal avec
21un compte rendu des décisions qui ont été prises
22pourquoi qu'on n'allait pas plus loin dans cette
23enquête-là. J'ai respecté ce que la directive de la
24police militaire me demandait de faire.
25 Q. Là j'ai presque terminé, mais
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1j'ai quelques questions sur plusieurs sujets à la
2fois. Je veux savoir si vous êtes au courant de la
3nouvelle entente qu'on a eue avec les Forces
4afghanes au mois de mai 2007. Est-ce que vous étiez
5au courant qu'il y a eu un changement, une nouvelle
6entente pour le transfert de nos détenus?
7 R. Oui.
8 Q. Au mois de mai 2007, donc
9c'était après cet article-là?
10 R. Oui.
11 Q. Est-ce que pendant
12l'Opération Centipede, vous avez étudié cette
13entente ou vous étiez au courant ou c'était pas
14nécessaire?
15 R. On était au courant. Ça
16faisait partie des recherches qu'on a faites pour
17la documentation pour l'ensemble de l'Opération
18Centipede avec plusieurs autres documents. On était
19au courant.
20 Q. Est-ce que vous saviez
21qu’avec cette entente, il allait y avoir des
22suivis?
23 R. Oui.
24 Q. Auprès des détenus, après les
25faits?
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1 R. Oui.
2 Q. Vous étiez au courant?
3 R. Oui.
4 Q. Est-ce que vous avez vu ces
5rapports de visite?
6 R. Non.
7 Q. Est-ce que vous avez tenté de
8les avoir à un moment donné? Est-ce que ça vous est
9venu à l'esprit de les demander?
10 R. Non, mais encore là, ces
11rapport-là sont pas venus à nous. Les rapports de
12visite ont été faits. Pour l'Opération Centipede,
13je reviens aux sept allégations qu'on avait,
14c'était ça le but de l'Opération Centipede,
15c'étaient ces enquêtes-là, ces allégations-là qui
16n'avaient pas encore été enquêtées et c'est ce
17qu'on a fait dans le cadre de l'Opération
18Centipede. Dans le cadre de mon travail, au Service
19national d'enquête, l'Opération Centipede n'a pas
20arrêté les enquêtes des détenus. On a d'autres
21enquêtes de détenus, on a d'autres plaintes de
22détenus qui ont été enquêtées et toutes ces
23enquêtes-là, on n'a pas l'information qui tend à
24dire que le commandant savait qu'en transférant les
25détenus, qu'ils allaient être transférés.
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1 Q. C'était justement ma
2prochaine question. Est-ce que vous avez enquêté
3sur la légalité de ces ordres de transférer? Et
4d'une manière, est-ce que vous dites que vous y
5avez pensé au moins?
6 R. Si on avait de l'information
7qu'un commandant, sciemment, avait transféré des
8détenus, sachant qu'ils allaient être torturés,
9oui, on aurait enquêté la décision du commandant,
10mais on l'a pas cette information-là. On n'a pas
11l'information qui dit que le commandant, de façon
12-- sans considérer tout ce qu'il y a à considérer,
13a transféré des détenus sachant qu'il va transférer
14des détenus et qu'ils vont être torturés.
15 En mai 2009, c'est le courriel
16qu'on discutait hier, on a reçu un courriel où le
17commandant a pris la décision d'arrêter de
18transférer les détenus parce qu'il avait eu de
19l'information. Cette information-là est venue au
20Service national d'enquête, on l'a regardée, on a
21regardé la décision du commandant puis on était
22satisfait que le commandant, lorsqu'il avait une
23information qui tend à croire que les détenus
24pourraient être torturés ou quoi que ce soit, il
25prenait pas la décision de les transférer. Alors
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1tout ça mis ensemble dans son contexte, on l'a pas
2l'information que les détenus allaient être
3transférés ou que le commandant savait qu'en
4transférant les détenus, qu'ils allaient être
5transférés.
6 Q. Justement, est-ce que c'était
7une enquête que vous avez commencée?
8 R. On n'a pas débuté l'enquête.
9On a eu de l'information que le commandant avait
10arrêté les transferts suite à de l'information
11qu'il avait reçue. Puis là, il y a eu des décisions
12qui ont été prises puis on était confortable avec
13la décision du commandant, en sachant qu'il a eu
14cette information-là, il a arrêté les transferts
15jusqu'à temps que la situation soit clarifiée.
16 Q. Donc la même lettre disait: *
17On a eu de l'information, on a cessé les transferts
18+ ou est-ce que vous êtes allé poser des questions
19par après?
20 R. La lettre, c'était un
21courriel qui disait, suite à de l'information que
22le commandant a obtenue, il a perdu confiance aux
23autorités pour effectuer le transfert puis il a
24pris la décision d'arrêter le transfert jusqu'à
25temps que la situation soit clarifiée.
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1 Q. Est-ce que c'était la
2première fois, à votre connaissance, que quelque
3chose comme ça arrive sur votre bureau?
4 R. C'était la première fois à ma
5connaissance. De ce que j'ai vu de l'information
6que le commandant avait, les actions du commandant,
7il y en a pas d'infraction. Le commandant a pris la
8bonne décision. Il a pris la décision qu'il se
9devait de prendre. Alors s'il l'avait pas prise en
10ayant cette lettre-là, bien là on aurait
11possiblement débuté une enquête. Mais là on parle
12de façon hypothétique. Le commandant a pris la
13bonne décision et il y a pas d'enquête.
14 Q. OK. J'ai quelques autres
15questions. Est-ce que vous étiez au courant du
16procès devant le juge McTavish à la cour fédérale
17qui avait été mené par Amnistie Internationale?
18Vous savez, il y a eu plusieurs procès, par
19exemple, l'affidavit du colonel Noonan sortait de
20ce processus-là. Est-ce que vous étiez au courant
21de tout ce qui se passait là? Est-ce que vous avez
22lu les jugements, et cetera?
23 R. Oui, bien pas les jugements,
24mais l'affidavit du colonel Noonan fait partie d'un
25dossier d'enquête de l'Opération Centipede.
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1 Q. Est-ce que vous êtes allé
2plus loin pour voir quoi d'autre ressortait de ce
3processus?
4 R. Non. Cette enquête-là, ce
5qu'on avait comme information, c'était que oui, les
6soldats ont été témoins de quelque chose. Les
7soldats sur le terrain ont pris action pour
8reprendre le contrôle des détenus. Alors le soldat,
9il a pris la bonne décision au moment qu'il a vu
10les choses être commises.
11 Q. Est-ce que vous avez lu cette
12plainte de Amnistie Internationale, ce qui nous
13amène ici? La plainte du 12 juin 2008? Est-ce que
14vous l'avez lue?
15 R. Oui, je l'ai lue.
16 Q. Je vous demande d'abord si
17vous l'avez vue, vous avez dit que oui. Ça,
18c'était, je pense, en plein milieu de l'Opération
19Centipede. Est-ce que la plainte a affecté votre
20façon de procéder ou est-ce que ça vous a donné des
21idées?
22 R. Ce que je comprends de la
23plainte, c'est que les commandants ont transféré
24des détenus sachant qu'ils allaient être torturés.
25C'est ma compréhension de cette plainte-là. Moi, ce
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1que je vous dis, c'est que je l'ai pas cette
2information-là. J'ai pas l'information comme quoi
3le commandant a transféré des détenus sachant qu'en
4les transférant, qu'ils allaient être torturés.
5 Q. Il y a mention dans cette
6plainte, si vous vous souvenez pas, on peut y
7aller, des rapports de visite qui indiquaient qu'il
8y a eu torture dans les prisons afghanes ou il y
9avait des plaintes, pardonnez-moi, de mauvais
10traitements des détenus qui ont été transférés par
11le Canada. Est-ce que vous avez vu cette partie de
12--
13 R. Je m'en rappelle pas. Je l'ai
14lu, ça fait longtemps, mais je m'en rappelle pas,
15non.
16 Q. Vous avez dit déjà que vous
17vous rappelez même pas de cet aspect de la plainte?
18 R. Ma compréhension, encore,
19c'est cette information-là, que le commandant
20savait que cette information-là, qu'en transférant
21les détenus, ils allaient être torturés. C'est la
22compréhension qu'on avait et encore une fois, on
23revient avec l'Opération Centipede. C'est les sept
24allégations, ou huit avec les autres allégations
25qui étaient l'information qu'on avait, qu'on
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1enquêtait.
2 Q. OK. Ce sont toutes mes
3questions. On va juste terminer rapidement avec
4l'enquête sur la plainte du caporal Toussaint. J'ai
5trouvé le document --
6 R. Oui, moi aussi, c'est --
7 Q. C'est le livre de NIS,
8encore, Volume 1, à l'onglet 17 et 18. Par exemple,
9à 18, on se rappelle que le caporal Toussaint croit
10avoir vu un soldat afghan frapper un détenu avec
11une arme. C'est ça le contexte un peu?
12 R. Oui.
13 Q. Il y avait cette question,
14est-ce qu'il aurait dû rapporter ça, et cetera.
15Est-ce qu'on est dans la bonne enquête maintenant?
16Vous vous retrouvez?
17 R. Oui.
18 Q. À la page 3 de 21 --
19 R. Quel onglet?
20 Q. Onglet 18?
21 R. Trois de 21, oui.
22 Q. En bas de la page, on a le
23début d'une entrevue avec le caporal Burke. Est-ce
24que vous vous rappelez de ce que le caporal Burke
25avait -- l'essentiel de ce qu'il a dit? C'est à la
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1page 5 aussi. Il y a plus de détails. À la page 5
2de 21. Je vois par exemple, si vous êtes avec moi,
3paragraphe 1(e), à la page 21, il dit:
4 "He did not observe any signs
5 of blood. However, he noted
6 that he appeared
7 malnourished."
8 On parle du détenu. Pourriez-vous
9juste m'expliquer, maintenant que je vous ai
10orienté comment l'enquête a conclu, est-ce que ce
11que le caporal avait dit avait une base dans les
12faits?
13 R. Notre conclusion de cette
14enquête-là, c'est que cette personne-là avait pas
15été capturée par les Forces canadiennes et elle
16avait pas été sous contrôle des Forces canadiennes,
17elle avait pas été transférée aux Forces afghanes
18sous contrôle canadien. Ce que le caporal Toussaint
19-- Il faudrait que je retourne à la conlusion de
20l'enquête.
21 Q. C'est l'onglet 17, je pense.
22 R. Dix-sept?
23 Q. Oui. Concluding remarks?
24 R. Oui, le paragraphe 1 résume
25nos conclusions que le détenu avait pas été dans
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1les mains des Forces canadiennes. Oui, il le
2décrivait comme étant possiblement pas bien nourri,
3mais il avait pas nécessairement vu de signes de
4violence à ce détenu-là. Ça revient encore aux
5mêmes choses des autres. On a un membre des Forces
6canadiennes qui rapporte certains faits qu'on n'est
7pas capable de corroborer avec personne d'autre.
8 Q. Est-ce qu'une accusation a
9été déposée comme quoi que le caporal Toussaint
10avait failli de se rapporter?
11 R. Non.
12 Q. Et une des raisons, si je me
13rappelle, c'était que ces directives étaient pas
14claires, même si --
15 R. À l'époque de la rotation du
16caporal Toussaint, on n'a pas été capable de
17démontrer qu'il y avait un devoir de rapporter.
18 Q. OK. Ce sont toutes mes
19questions. Je vous remercie beaucoup.
20 M. BERLINQUETTE: Est-ce que vous
21êtes prêt, Monsieur Champ?
22 Me CHAMP: Oui, je suis prêt,
23merci.
24CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAMP:
25 Q. Major Bolduc, my name is Paul
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1Champ. I'm counsel for Amnesty International and
2the B.C. Civil Liberties Association. I want to
3thank you for coming today. I just have a few
4questions for you following from your testimony
5this afternoon.
6 I'd like to start, Major Bolduc,
7by asking you a little bit about your training. I
8understand that as a military police officer, you
9would have received specialized training in the
10Geneva Conventions. Is that so?
11 M. BOLDUC: Je m'excuse, je
12comprends pas le sens. Si j'ai reçu de
13l'information spécifique pour la Convention de
14Genève?
15 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Could you
16repeat the question, Mr. Champ, please?
17 MR. CHAMP: Yes, I will.
18 Q. Major Bolduc, all soldiers in
19the Canadian Forces --
20 THE CHAIR: Just to make sure that
21the witness -- are you listening to it in French?
22Have you got the right channel or are you on it in
23English?
24 Mme CLÉROUX: Est-ce que vous
25entendez en français?
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1 M. BOLDUC: Oui, je l'entends en
2français.
3 BY MR. CHAMP:
4 Q. Major Bolduc, all Canadian
5Forces soldiers receive training at some point in
6the Geneva Conventions; correct?
7 R. Oui, lorsqu'on se déploie en
8mission internationale, on va recevoir
9l'entraînement.
10 Q. Right. And military police
11officers receive even enhanced or specialized
12training in the Geneva Conventions, I understand.
13 R. J'ai pas mentionné ça. Je
14sais pas où vous comprenez qu'on reçoit une
15formation plus poussée. Je comprends pas votre
16question, désolé.
17 Q. Well, because, sir, you're a
18military police officer, so one of your
19obligations, one of your primary duties, is to
20enforce the law, which would include the law of
21armed conflict; correct?
22 R. Oui, mais je comprends
23toujours pas votre question. Votre question, vous
24me demandez si j'ai reçu une formation plus
25poussée, plus spécifique sur la Convention de
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1Genève? Si c'est ça votre question, ma réponse est
2non.
3 Q. So -- well, first I'll start
4-- it's one of your primary duties to enforce the
5law in the Canadian Forces; correct? That's what a
6police officer does; they enforce the law in their
7community, and your community is the Canadian
8Forces. Would you agree?
9 R. Oui.
10 Q. Okay. So, in Ottawa, for
11example, I think a police officer, an Ottawa police
12officer, would know a little bit more about the law
13than, say, a bus driver. So that's what I'm
14suggesting to you, that a police officer, a
15military police officer, would know a little bit
16more about the law of armed conflict than an
17average soldier. Is that a fair assumption?
18 R. Oui, par la nature de notre
19travail, oui, on va avoir à faire des enquêtes où
20on va peut-être avoir à consulter ces lois-là, mais
21encore une fois, est-ce que votre question est:
22est-ce que j'ai reçu un entraînement spécifique sur
23la Convention de Genève plus poussée que les autres
24soldats? Ma réponse est non.
25 Q. So you receive the same
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1training as soldiers? You don't -- how about other
2aspects of international law?
3 R. Je comprends toujours pas le
4sens de votre question, je m'excuse. Oui, en tant
5que policier militaire, mon devoir est de respecter
6les lois. Alors les lois, quelle que soit la loi,
7la Loi de la Convention de Genève ou la Loi
8internationale sur les conflits armés ou toute
9autre loi, la Loi des assises, si j'ai une
10infraction concernant une loi quelconque, oui, on
11va la prendre, on va la consulter. Est-ce que c'est
12ça votre question?
13 Q. Yes, I am. Thank you. I'm
14glad we agree on that.
15 If you look in the volumes there
16to your right, I'm looking for Volume 3 of 5. I'd
17like to take you to tab 20. At tab 20, you will
18find a Military Police Technical Directive for
19Rotation 4. I'd just ask you to take a look at the
20document, if it's familiar to you, if you've seen
21similar kinds of documents of military police
22directives.
23 R. Oui.
24 Q. Okay. I'll turn you to page
256. The page number is in the top left corner. On
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1this page, there's a paragraph 11 that reads: [As
2read]
3 "Specific guidance while
4 deployed on multinational
5 operations. The appropriate
6 component of Canadian MP (MP
7 or CFNIS) shall investigate
8 allegations or instances of
9 the following occurrences
10 attributed to Canadian Forces
11 personnel in addition to the
12 normal investigations
13 required in accordance with
14 reference B.
15 Then I direct your attention to
16(c):
17 "Allegations of violation of
18 the laws of armed conflict or
19 international law."
20 So my question, Major Bolduc, is:
21You understood that this is the role of a military
22police officer?
23 R. Oui.
24 Q. Okay. And when you read laws
25of armed conflict, what do you understand that to
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1mean, just generally?
2 R. Cette directive, ce que je
3comprends de cette directive? En tant que policier
4militaire, je dois enquêter les infractions qui ont
5été commises par les membres des Forces
6canadiennes, que ce soient les infractions, les
7allégations commises par les membres des Forces
8canadiennes contre les lois, la population civile,
9contre les lois ou un membre des Forces canadiennes
10comme un crime de guerre. C'est ce que cette
11directive-là me dit. Si un membre des Forces
12canadiennes commet ce genre d'infraction-là, je me
13dois de l'enquêter. C'est ce que cette directive
14dit à la police militaire.
15 Q. Okay. And laws of armed
16conflict, would you agree with me that includes the
17Geneva Conventions?
18 R. Oui, pour les membres des
19Forces canadiennes, on se réfère encore à cette
20directive-là comme étant ma directive qui me dit
21quand est-ce que je dois enquêter, puis cette
22directive-là concerne les membres des Forces
23canadiennes commettant un crime.
24 Q. Right. And then it says "or
25international law." I appreciate if you didn't
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1have any training in that, but I just would like to
2ask --
3 R. Non, non. Ça me dit,
4j'enquête les crimes qui sont commis par les
5membres des Forces canadiennes.
6 Q. Yeah, I understand. I'm just
7-- I'll ask you questions about that. Just answer
8the questions I put to you now and I'll ask you
9other questions about that.
10 What I'm asking just right now is
11-- first was about the laws of armed conflict and
12Geneva Conventions. My next question is just about
13international law and what understanding you have
14of international law. And I appreciate if you did
15not receive any training in it, but I'm just
16wondering what your understanding of it is as a
17military police officer.
18 R. La loi internationale, je
19veux dire, c'est vague comme question, je m'excuse.
20La loi -- Je comprends pas votre question. Je peux
21pas répondre à votre question, je la comprends pas,
22je sais pas où vous voulez aller avec cette
23question-là.
24 Q. What would an example of a
25violation of international law be that you might be
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1called upon to investigate?
2 R. Par rapport à cette
3directive-là? Qu'est-ce que cette directive-là me
4donne comme obligation en tant que policier
5militaire?
6 Q. Yes. What would you be
7called --
8 R. Par exemple, un soldat
9canadien qui a un détenu et qui le torturerait, ce
10serait une obligation que j'ai en vertu -- Le
11soldat canadien a commis un crime de guerre.
12 Q. Right. That could be a
13violation of the Criminal Code of Canada or it
14could be a violation of Crimes Against Humanity
15Act. It could be a violation of the National
16Defence Act, Code of Conduct. It could be a
17variety of things.
18 I heard some of your testimony
19with respect to the investigation into The Globe
20and Mail article of April 2007. As I understood
21it, you were saying that if a commander, a Canadian
22commander, ordered a transfer, knowing that a
23detainee would be tortured, that would be unlawful;
24that would be a violation that should be
25investigated.
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1 R. Oui.
2 Q. And if a commander knew or
3ought to have known that a detainee might be
4tortured or might be at risk of being tortured,
5would that be something that should be
6investigated?
7 R. Votre question est aurait dû
8savoir, on suppose, aurait dû -- Ma réponse est si
9on a des indications que le commandant a transféré
10des détenus puis il savait qu'en transférant ce
11détenu-là, le détenu était sujet à être torturé,
12oui, ought to have known, aurait dû savoir, c'est
13difficile. Comment on peut prouver qu'un commandant
14aurait dû savoir qu'en faisant cette décision-là,
15que le détenu était -- Je veux dire --
16 Q. I'll take you to some
17information on that in a little while.
18 I just want to understand your
19position, then, in the police chain of command.
20Who was your commanding officer again?
21 R. Le commandant du Service
22national d'enquête. J'en ai eu deux, le
23lieutenant-colonel Garrick, jusqu'en juin 2008, je
24crois, si ma mémoire est bonne, lorsqu'il s'est
25retiré, et le lieutenant-colonel Sansterre, d'août
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1à 2008 -- Il y a eu une période où le DCO, le
2commandant adjoint de l'unité a été le commandant
3par intérim, le major Frej.
4 Q. And did you discuss those
5kinds of topics or those kinds of difficult issues
6with either Lieutenant Colonel Garrick or
7Sansterre.
8 R. Je me rappelle pas avec le
9colonel Garrick. Avec le colonel Sansterre, oui, on
10l'a fait lorsque j'ai donné l'exemple qu'on avait
11reçu le courriel en disant que le commandant en
12théâtre, en mai 2009, avait reçu l'information et
13qu'il avait pris la décision d'arrêter les
14transferts. Oui, on a certainement décidé -- pas
15décidé pardon, discuté de ça justement parce que si
16le commandant, en ayant l'information qu'il avait,
17aurait continué à transférer les détenus, on aurait
18été dans l'obligation d'enquêter. C'était la
19discussion qu'on a eue par rapport à ce
20courriel-là. Alor oui, ce genre de discussion a
21lieu lorsqu'on a de l'information qu'on peut aller
22vérifier, qu'on peut vérifier que le commandant
23avait l'information à sa disposition, que s'il
24effectuait un transfert, que le détenu avait des
25chances d'être torturé.
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1 Q. And who did you receive that
2email from? Do you recall how you learned about
3the suspension?
4 R. Du grand prévôt de CEFCOM qui
5est le major Losier. Si je me rappelle bien, c'est
6le major Losier.
7 Q. And do you recall
8approximately when that was? Approximately.
9 R. Oui, mai, 26, 25 mai. Fin
10mai, entre le 25 et le 27 mai, dans ces
11environs-là. Je me souviens plus de la date exacte
12du courriel, mais j'ai des notes qui disent que
13j'en ai discuté aux alentours du 26 mai.
14 Q. And what year was that?
15 R. 2009.
16 Q. So there was a suspension in
17May of 2009 that you learned about?
18 R. Il y a un moment donné, oui.
19 Q. And you've indicated in your
20testimony that you came into information or you
21learned information about what the commander knew
22when he made that transfer. Did I get that right?
23 R. Il a pas fait le transfert.
24Il a reçu --
25 Q. Or the suspension. Pardon
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1me. Sorry.
2 Did you have information about
3what led the commander to suspend transfers at that
4time?
5 R. Oui.
6 Q. It was an allegation of
7abuse?
8 R. Non.
9 Q. Do you know how long that
10suspension lasted?
11 R. Non.
12 Q. Okay. You were asked some
13questions about one of the operation -- well, you
14were asked questions about all the Operation
15Centipede investigations, and I just have one or
16two questions for you concerning investigation with
17GO number 08-6912. This was the allegation of the
18human remains found in a ditch.
19 You testified this morning that
20one of the reasons why this investigation was not
21taken very far was because there was no information
22that the detainee had ever been in Canadian
23custody. Do you recall?
24 R. Oui, et il y avait aussi
25aucune information qui disait que le corps qui
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1avait été trouvé dans le fossé était la même
2personne que le caporal avait vue dans les mains
3des Forces afghanes.
4 Q. Right. That's fair enough.
5 One of the questions that
6Commission Counsel put to you was that the stakes
7would have been a little bit different if this had
8been a Canadian Forces captured detainee, and you
9indicated yes, it would have changed your approach
10a little bit.
11 R. Oui, ça aurait changé les
12enjeux, mais aussi on aurait eu encore à devoir
13identifier le corps qui était dans le fossé en
14étant la même personne que les Canadiens ont
15transférée et notre enquête a pas été capable de le
16démontrer. Il y avait aucune information dans ce
17dossier-là qui tendait à croire que ce que le
18soldat canadien disait et la relation avec le corps
19qui était dans le fossé, il y avait aucune
20information qui disait que c'était la même personne
21ou qu'on pouvait corroborer que c'était la même
22personne. S'il y avait eu de l'information qui
23pourrait tendre à croire que c'était la même
24personne, oui, mais c'était pas le cas.
25 On a un seul gars qui dit qu'il a
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1fait quelque chose pour les Forces afghanes puis
2quelques jours après, il y a un corps qui a été
3trouvé puis il y avait une personne qui était
4détenue par les Forces afghanes puis il a fait le
5lien entre la personne qui était détenue par les
6Forces afghanes et le corps, que c'était la même
7personne. Mais il s'est pas basé sur rien, il y a
8pas de fait qui pouvait décrire.
9 Lorsqu'on travaillait sur ce
10dossier-là, je faisais souvent l'allégation que,
11pas l'allégation, mais l'image, que si le soldat
12avait dit: * J'ai vu une personne dans les mains des
13Forces afghanes portant un chandail de l'équipe des
14Canadiens de Montréal +, puis si le corps qui a été
15trouvé dans le fossé était une personne avec un
16chandail des Canadiens de Montréal, peut-être qu'on
17aurait pu dire: * Il y a pas beaucoup de personnes
18en Afghanistan qui se promènent avec un chandail
19des Canadiens de Montréal et on peut peut-être
20penser que c'est la même personne. + Mais c'était
21pas le cas. On n'avait pas de description physique
22de la personne qui était en captivité par les
23Forces afghanes puis on avait pas de description
24physique de la personne, du corps. C'est juste une
25rumeur qui s'est formée sur le camp que les gens
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1croyaient que c'était la même personne. Il y avait
2pas beaucoup d'informations qui pouvaient dire,
3qu'effectivement, c'était la même personne.
4 Q. Okay. If I understand you
5correctly, then, had you been able to establish
6that this person, this victim, was in fact the same
7person that the corporal had seen before, that you
8could positively identify that it definitely was
9the same person that was seen before, and secondly,
10that this had been a person who had been handed
11over by the Canadian Forces, that might have
12changed your interest in the investigation, you
13probably would have investigated further, but that
14was not the case?
15 R. Si on avait eu cette
16information-là, oui. Là, on peut seulement spéculer
17que notre intérêt, mais oui, mais on l'avait pas
18cette information-là. Avec l'information qu'on
19avait à travailler, on avait deux informations qui
20avaient rien qui tendait à croire que c'était la
21même personne. C'est pour ça qu'on a fermé le
22dossier de la façon qu'on l'a fermé.
23 Q. You were aware, Major Bolduc,
24that there was a suspension of transfers in
25November of 2007?
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1 R. Oui.
2 Q. And what did you know about
3why transfers were suspended at that time?
4 R. J'ai pas -- je sais pas
5pourquoi qu'ils ont été transférés. Je sais pas
6pourquoi on a arrêté de transférer les dossiers en
72007. J'étais pas dans le NIS à cette époque-là.
8J'occupais une fonction différente au sein de la
9police militaire qui avait rien à voir avec les
10enquêtes du NIS.
11 Q. But you were investigating in
12Operation Centipede allegations that arose from
132007, correct, many that arose from 2007?
14 R. On a enquêté des allégations
15qui écoulaient de 2007, mais on n'a pas enquêté des
16allégations qui écoulaient de la cessation des
17transferts des détenus. On enquêtait des
18allégations spécifiques dans le dossier de
19l'allégation Centipede, ce que les soldats
20canadiens avaient vu, ce genre d'allégation-là.
21 Je suis pas d'accord avec vous en
22disant que les allégations de l'Opération
23Centipede, ce sont des allégations qui ont mené à
24la cessation du transfert en 2007. C’est pas ça.
25 Q. I'm not saying that. I
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1wasn't saying that. I was just wondering that in
2the context of the Centipede investigations,
3whether you would have in any way viewed that
4information as irrelevant, that is, the information
5that led to the suspension of transfers in November
62007.
7 R. Est-ce que vous pouvez
8répéter? Je suis pas sûr de saisir.
9 Q. It's okay. I'll move on.
10 Did anyone ask you to investigate
11the suspension of transfers in November '07, or why
12transfers were not suspended any earlier than
13November '07?
14 R. Non, personne a demandé
15d'enquêter ça.
16 Q. Neither Lieutenant Colonel
17Garrick nor Sansterre gave you that instruction to
18investigate those issues?
19 R. Non.
20 Q. And are you aware of any
21other members of the CFNIS investigating that
22issue?
23 R. Non.
24 Q. I had a question for you
25concerning one of the Operation Centipede
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1investigations, 6917. This was the individual who
2suffered from PTSD and alleged to his treating
3physicians that he had heard or seen individuals
4being executed after being handed over.
5 I don't want to ask you about the
6details of that. I think your testimony before was
7clear. But I had one question about one part of
8your investigation. You indicated that you at one
9point sought and obtained a legal opinion about, I
10gather, what the duties or responsibilities of
11Canadian Forces soldiers in theatre would have
12been.
13 Me PRÉFONTAINE: C'est pas mon
14souvenir du témoignage du témoin.
15 Me MARSHMAN: Je pense qu'il a dit
16qu'il a parlé à un avocat pour avoir pas une
17opinion juridique, mais des documents, des
18directives, et cetera, qui s'appliquaient au roto
19du soldat.
20 Me PRÉFONTAINE: Dans ce cas-là,
21il s'agissait de tentative par les enquêteurs de
22contacter le lieutenant-colonel Smith, qui a
23décliné sur la base du secret professionnel.
24 BY MR. CHAMP:
25 Q. Yeah. Actually, I think, as
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1I understood the testimony, there was two. There
2was the attempt to contact Lieutenant Colonel Smith
3to find out what was going on in theatre, but there
4was another lawyer -- and Lieutenant Colonel Smith
5refused to provide them with any information. But
6it was my understanding you said you approached
7another lawyer within the military for a legal
8opinion. Do I have that correct?
9 R. Oui.
10 Q. And that lawyer, was that
11Commander Sheila Archer?
12 R. Archer? Non.
13 Q. If I take you to the NIS
14witness documents -- these are the blue ones -- in
15Volume 1 of 2, and I'd like to take you to tab 11
16and go to page 64 of 66. Have you found the page?
17 R. Oui, pardon.
18 Q. And you'll see in the bottom
19there, there's assignment of an interview with
20Commander Archer.
21 R. Oui.
22 Q. Having reviewed that, were
23you mistaken? Was that in fact Commander Archer
24that you consulted?
25 R. On a consulté le commandant
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1Archer pour recevoir un avis juridique, oui, mais
2c'est pas elle qui a signé l'avis juridique. C'est
3quelqu'un d'autre, c'est le directeur de la
4poursuite militaire, si je me rappelle bien.
5 Q. The director of -- sorry?
6 R. La poursuite militaire. J'y
7vais de mémoire. Je peux me tromper, mais il me
8semble bien que c'est le directeur de la poursuite
9militaire.
10 MR. PREFONTAINE: Just by way of
11instruction, Mr. Chairman, I understand my friend
12is not particularly well versed in how the JAG
13branch is divided, but if you look at the National
14Defence Act, you will see that under the JAG itself
15are different branches of the JAG office, one of
16which is called the Director of Military
17Prosecutions, which is akin to Crown prosecutors.
18They're in charge of prosecuting offences under the
19National Defence Act.
20 It's my understanding that when
21investigators or members of the military police
22seek legal advice, they seek it from the Director
23of Military Prosecutions. There are other branches
24who offer legal advice to other portions of the
25Canadian Forces, but that's not where they seek
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1their legal advice.
2 THE CHAIR: Yes, that makes sense.
3Would Archer be also a member of that branch?
4 MR. PREFONTAINE: No, she's not.
5As you can see from page 60 to 64, she's with
6CEFCOM. She would have been the legal adviser to
7the commander of CEFCOM at the relevant time, so
8she would not have been the proper person from
9which to obtain a legal opinion.
10 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Thank you for
11the clarification.
12 BY MR. CHAMP:
13 Q. I was aware Commander Archer
14was the adviser of CEFCOM. So I'm just wondering:
15Did you obtain any information from Commander
16Archer?
17 R. Si je me rappelle bien, le
18commandant Archer, c'est de cette personne-là qu'on
19a eu le nom du lieutenant-colonel Smith et le
20conseiller juridique de CEFCOM. Donc elle sait
21quels avocats ont été déployés pour quelle
22rotation. Alors, si je me rappelle bien, le but de
23consulter le commandant Archer, c'était pour
24déterminer à qui on devait s'adresser pour recevoir
25l'information étant donné qu'elle était à CEFCOM.
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1 Dans le cadre de l'entrevue avec
2le lieutenant-colonel Smith pour avoir quel
3règlement était en vigueur pendant cette
4rotation-là. C'était le commandant Archer, la
5personne qu'on allait voir pour vérifier qui était
6l'aviseur juridique pour la rotation. Le commandant
7Archer nous a pas donné d'information dans le
8dossier Centipede. C'était pas dans ses fonctions,
9elle travaillait à CEFCOM.
10 Q. But it says here: [As read]
11 "Information base is
12 background. It was
13 determined through discussion
14 between members of the
15 Operation Centipede command
16 triangle that a legal opinion
17 pertaining to CF personnel
18 responsibilities was required
19 for all OP investigations.
20 As Commander Archer is a
21 member of the legal branch
22 with expertise in deployed
23 OPs, her insight will be used
24 to ensure that CF members
25 interviewed for OP Centipede
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1 files were acting within the
2 scope of their
3 responsibilities."
4 So, major Bolduc, at least
5according to this, you did seek an opinion from
6Commander Archer, at least initially.
7 R. Oui, mais ça revient encore à
8-- Il faut se rappeler que l'entrevue avec le
9lieutenant-colonel Smith, c'était dans le but
10d'obtenir les renseignements, les directives qui
11étaient en cours. Alors le commandant Archer -- Le
12colonel Smith travaillait à un moment donné pour le
13commandant Archer. On a eu de la difficulté. On
14comprenait pas pourquoi le lieutenant-colonel Smith
15voulait pas nous donner l'information, on demandait
16pas les avis juridiques qu'il avait fournis, on
17demandait les directives en vigueur à cette
18époque-là.
19 Alors oui, elle a été consultée
20pour essayer de dire: * Écoutez, on veut pas avoir
21les opinions juridiques, on veut avoir telle
22affaire. + Oui, on a parlé au commandant Archer,
23mais non, on n'a pas eu d'opinion juridique du
24commandant Archer.
25 Q. Did Commander Archer give you
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1any indication that she had some information or
2knowledge about this issue?
3 R. Quelle question?
4 Q. Well, the issue of what
5responsibilities Canadian soldiers might have in
6theatre with respect to the transfer or handling of
7detainees.
8 R. Je rappelle pas qu'elle nous
9a fourni cet information-là. Mais encore une fois,
10les discussions qu'on a eues avec elle, c'était
11pour nous aider à retracer la bonne personne qui
12pouvait nous aider au moment de la rotation, qui
13était là en théâtre pour voir -- Puis CEFCOM,
14c'était la bonne porte à aller frapper pour avoir
15cette information-là. Mais elle nous a pas donné
16son avis à ce qui était en vigueur à cette
17époque-là.
18 Q. I was just curious, because I
19encountered Commander Archer a few times in court
20on this matter. As we'll see in other documents,
21she had a bit of a role in some of the -- in the
22suspension.
23 I'd like to take you now, Major
24Bolduc, to one of the main -- sorry. I'll just
25make sure I've got the right one before I take you
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1to it.
2 I'll take you to Volume 2 of 5 of
3these white volumes. I'd like to take you then to
4tab 49. And there's a number of documents in here,
5but what I'd ask you to do, Major Bolduc, is if you
6go to the very back and then count in about five
7pages, and you'll see that the document I want to
8take you to has got a little number on the bottom,
9in the middle, 285. All of these documents in this
10tab have numbers on them on the bottom. This one,
11on the cut line on the bottom, has 285.
12 R. Oui, merci.
13 Q. Thank you. So the first page
14of this document, page 1 of 3, you'll see it says:
15 "Subject: Kandahar, or KNDH,
16 0123 detainees. Periodic
17 follow-up visit to NDS."
18 Have you ever seen this document
19before?
20 R. Non, mais où vous dites
21qu'ils font des revues périodiques au SNE?
22 Q. This was one of the
23Department of Foreign Affairs prison visits, one of
24their monitoring visits.
25 R. Oui.
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1 Q. The date is blacked out here,
2but it's November 5th, 2007. It was carried out by
3two Department of Foreign Affairs officials, a Mr.
4John Davison and a Mr. Nicholas Gosselin, you'll
5see in the first paragraph. It was copied -- in
6the CC line, it was copied to a few places,
7including NDHQ CEFCOM.
8 THE CHAIR: Did I hear the answer:
9Have you seen the document?
10 MR. CHAMP: He said he had not
11seen the document.
12 R. Non, je l'ai pas vu.
13 BY MR. CHAMP:
14 Q. So if you -- I was just
15trying to situate it a little bit for you before I
16ask you a question on it.
17 MR. PREFONTAINE: Maybe before we
18situate, we should explore the question of whether
19the witness had the means of knowing about this
20document.
21 BY MR. CHAMP:
22 Q. If you had required a
23document relevant to one of your investigations and
24it was in the possession of someone in CEFCOM,
25would they have given it to you, Major Bolduc?
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1 R. Oui, si on n'a pas voulu me
2les donner, j'ai des moyens légaux de les obtenir
3aussi, par voie de mandat de perquisition, des
4choses comme ça. Il faut aussi savoir que -- il
5faut que je sache l'existence d'un document aussi.
6Ce document-là, c'est la première fois que je le
7vois dans les documents qui m'ont été fournis pour
8la préparation de mon témoignage.
9 Q. If you'll go to page 3 of
10this document, you'll see there at the second
11paragraph, at the top, it starts: "When asked ..."
12 R. Oui.
13 Q. So one of the Canadian
14diplomats recorded the following in their interview
15of one of the detainees: [As read]
16 "When asked about his
17 interrogation, the detainee
18 came forward with an
19 allegation of abuse. He
20 indicated that he has been
21 interrogated on [blank]
22 occasions by a group of
23 [blank] individuals. He
24 could not positively identify
25 the individuals, [blank]. He
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1 indicated that he could not
2 recall the [blank]
3 interrogation in any detail
4 as he was allegedly knocked
5 unconscious early on. He
6 alleged that during the
7 [blank] interrogation,
8 [blank] individuals held him
9 to the ground, [blank], while
10 the other [blank], beating
11 him with electrical wires and
12 rubber hose. He indicated a
13 spot on the ground and the
14 room we were interviewing in
15 as the place where he was
16 held down. He then pointed
17 to a chair and stated the
18 implements he had been struck
19 with were underneath it.
20 Under the chair we found a
21 large piece of braided
22 electrical wire as well as a
23 rubber hose. He then showed
24 us a bruise approximately
25 four inches long on his back
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1 that could possibly be the
2 result of a blow."
3 Had you heard about this
4allegation before in any other context, Major
5Bolduc?
6 R. Non.
7 Q. Given that this was a former
8Canadian detainee, and as military police officer,
9does that give you some concern, cause you some
10concern?
11 R. Oui, mais où vous dites que
12c'est un détenu qui avait été transféré par les
13Canadiens? Est-ce que c'est dans le document?
14 Q. Yes, it is. If you go to
15administrative details, just on the left-hand page,
16they were just there to visit Canadian transferred
17detainees. Name of institution visited, national
18director of security, number of security-related
19detainees. D) number of Canadian transferred
20detainees seen by officials on visit. Nature of
21interaction with the Canadian transferred detainee.
22Private interview with [blank]. Outline any
23constraints in accessing the Canadian transferred
24detainees, et cetera.
25 This was -- it's fairly well
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1established this was a Canadian Forces transferred
2detainee. Had you known about it as a police
3officer, would it have caused you to follow up?
4 R. Oui, mais il faut aussi se
5poser la question à savoir, pour en revenir aux
6allégations que le commandant savait qu'en
7transférant les détenus qu'ils seraient torturés.
8Ce document-là en tant que tel ne démontre pas que
9le commandant avait la connaissance qu'en
10transférant le détenu qu'il allait être torturé.
11Alors oui, c'est la fin du processus, mais j'ai pas
12-- j’ai rien dans ce document-là qui me démontre
13que le commandant avait une connaissance qu'en
14transférant ce détenu-là particulier, qu'il allait
15être torturé.
16 Q. I agree with you that this
17document, on its own, shows the end. It shows an
18individual who has been transferred already and has
19been tortured. But the question is: What did the
20commander know? Would that have been something
21worthwhile following up?
22 R. Oui, mais je retourne encore
23à ma réponse qu'il y a rien dans ce document-là qui
24me démontre que le commandant avait l'information
25que le détenu concerné par cette information-là, en
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1le transférant, qu'il allait être torturé. Alors en
2sachant ça maintenant, est-ce que je peux démontrer
3que le commandant savait qu'en transférant le
4détenu, qu'il allait être torturé? Ma réponse est
5non. Je sais pas. Je sais pas l'information que le
6commandant possédait lorsqu'il a transféré cette
7personne-là. L'information que le commandant
8possédait, s'il l'a transféré, nous laisse croire
9qu'il avait pas l'information pour croire que le
10détenu allait être torturé. Alors c'est une
11situation qui est hypothétique. On a la fin de ça.
12 Vous me demandez d'enquêter le
13commandant, à savoir ce qu'il a. Cette
14information-là est pas passée, j'ai pas les détails
15du transfert de ce détenu-là. Oui, ce document en
16lui-même peut nous faire poser des questions, mais
17ça m'indique pas que le commandant savait que le
18détenu, en transférant le détenu, qu'il allait être
19torturé.
20 Q. Okay. I'd like to take you
21to a document just to the left. It's the document
22going to the front of the tab. This one has "279"
23at the bottom. I know it's very small letters, but
24it's the document just before it. It's a
25three-page document. It's got "279" at the bottom.
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1If you go to the one that I was at before, it's the
2one right before it.
3 R. Oui.
4 Q. It says "279" at the bottom.
5In the subject line it says:
6 "KANDH 0082. Detainees
7 periodic follow-up visit to
8 Sarapoza."
9 Major Bolduc, this was another of
10the detainee monitoring visits by the Canadian
11Forces -- pardon me -- by the Canadian Department
12of Foreign Affairs to detainees who had been
13transferred by the Canadian Forces.
14 If you turn to page 3 of this
15document, page 3 of 3, and you go to five
16paragraphs down, it starts with a blank: "[Blank]
17came to NDS ..." I think it's the largest
18paragraph on the page. It reads: [As read]
19 "[Blank] came to NDS but did
20 not see him personally.
21 [Blank] saw him when at NDS.
22 He said he was interrogated
23 once in KAF. While at NDS he
24 was interrogated [blank]
25 times. He now states that he
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1 did not tell the truth in
2 previous interviews and that
3 during NDS interrogation had
4 been kept awake for [blank]
5 days and made to keep his
6 hands raised above his head.
7 He also used the words 'beat'
8 and 'torture'. When asked to
9 expand, he said he was beaten
10 badly but doesn't know with
11 what, as his eyes were
12 covered. When asked what was
13 used, he said a power cable
14 or wire and pointed to his
15 side and his buttocks. By
16 'torture,' he meant having
17 been locked in the NDS
18 [blank] and kept awake. When
19 asked why he didn't come
20 forward with this information
21 previously, he said he didn't
22 trust us because we turned
23 him over to NDS."
24 So, Major Bolduc, as a police
25officer, if -- and this is if -- if the commander
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1had had this information in his possession before
2he transferred the other detainee that we just
3looked at, would that have caused you some concern
4to investigate further?
5 R. Oui, mais ma réponse, encore
6une fois, c'est la fin d'une visite qui dit: * Voici
7ce qui est arrivé à un détenu. + Il y a rien encore
8dans ce rapport-là qui démontre que le commandant
9savait qu'en transférant ce détenu-là particulier,
10qu'il allait être transféré. Si vous me démontrez
11un document qui dit que telle personne a avisé le
12commandant que s'il transférait le détenu, qu'il
13allait être transféré, puis vous me montrez cette
14visite-là -- Bien là, oui, j'ai un petit peu plus
15de matériel pour travailler pour dire que oui, le
16commandant -- Il faut démontrer que le commandant
17avait une connaissance qu'en prenant cette
18décision-là, qu'il allait, en transférant le
19détenu, qu'il allait être torturé.
20 Encore une fois, ce document-là ne
21démontre pas -- Je suis pas là pour dire que la
22torture a pas eu lieu. C'est pas ça que j'essaie de
23dire. L'enquête, pourquoi on est ici, c'est de dire
24que la police militaire a pas enquêté le commandant
25sachant qu'il savait qu'en transférant un détenu,
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1qu'il allait être torturé. C'est ça la chose. Moi,
2je vous dit que cette information-là, on l'a pas.
3Ce rapport-là me donne pas cette information-là. Ce
4rapport me donne juste un détenu qui a été
5transféré qui a été torturé, mais ça me démontre
6pas comment que le commandant savait qu'en prenant
7cette décision-là, qu'il allait être torturé.
8 Q. But I suppose that's because
9no one has asked him the question? You didn't ask
10him the question?
11 R. Non.
12 Q. And if you go to the first
13page of this document again, in the CC line of this
14email --
15 R. À la page 297?
16 Q. It's document 279, page 1 of
173.
18 R. Oui.
19 Q. "Gibbons, Christopher" is at
20the top. You'll see in the CC line, in the second
21line, there's "NDHQ CEFCOM."
22 MR. PREFONTAINE: J9.
23 MR. CHAMP: J9.
24 Q. So we see this document was
25in the hands of CEFCOM, but we don't know from here
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1if they handed it over to the commander.
2 As a military police officer, do
3you think that was something that should be
4followed up on?
5 R. Ce document-là? Encore une
6fois, en tant que policier militaire, ma
7juridiction dans ces incidents-là, c'est les
8militaires, c'est les gens avec qui j'ai la
9juridiction.
10 Encore une fois, ma réponse c'est
11ce document-là, en lui-même, me donne pas les
12doutes ou des raisons de croire que le commandant
13le savait qu'en prenant une décision de transférer
14les détenus, qu'ils allaient être torturés. Encore
15une fois, oui, c'est un rapport de visite, mais ça
16me donne pas l'information que le commandant avait
17au moment que le transfert a été effectué.
18 Q. True. If you take any one of
19these reports -- and before I'm done, I'll take you
20through a few others that all occurred prior.
21Taking any one of them, a person could say: We
22don't know what he knew when he transferred.
23 But when you get to the end of
24this chain, for example, the detainee where the
25rubber hose and the electrical wire was found in
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1the interrogation cell and he had bruises on his
2back, and you then wonder, if the commander had
3other reports similar to this one that I just took
4you to in his possession, wouldn't you wonder maybe
5he should not have transferred that last detainee;
6maybe he should have had some pause?
7 R. Encore là, je reviens à ma
8réponse. Toutes ces documents-là, ce sont les
9visites. Ce que je vous dis, c'est que
10l'information qu'on avait, l'information qu'on a,
11puis l'information en mai 2009, ça me dit que
12lorsque le commandant a de l'information qu'il
13croit qu'il perd confiance en les personnes à qui
14il va transférer les détenus, les transferts sont
15arrêtés. J'ai un exemple concret avec des courriels
16que le commandant a pris cette information-là.
17 Encore une fois, j'en ai pas
18d'information qui dit que le commandant savait
19qu'en transférant les détenus, qu'ils allaient être
20torturés. On peut en passer plusieurs rapports,
21mais il y a aucune place dans ces rapports-là qui
22me démontre que le commandant avait la connaissance
23qu'en prenant la décision de les transférer, qu'ils
24allaient être torturés.
25 Q. But you weren't asked to
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1investigate that?
2 R. C'est correct.
3 Q. If I could take you to the
4NIS witness documents. These are the blue ones,
5Volume 2 of 2. I'd like to take you to tab 5.
6Commission Counsel had brought you to this page
7before, and this is your reasoning on why you
8didn't ask your investigators to follow up any more
9on the newspaper report in The Globe and Mail. Do
10you recall?
11 R. Oui.
12 Q. Okay. And in paragraph 2
13here, the second sentence in the middle, where it
14says: [As read]
15 "Likewise, even if these
16 reports were somehow deemed
17 to be credible, the
18 allegations of ill-treatment
19 are directed against the
20 Afghan authorities. This
21 alone excludes our
22 jurisdictional interests and
23 the mandate of the CFNIS."
24 Just on that point, did you obtain
25a legal opinion on that? Is that part of the legal
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1opinion that you obtained?
2 MR. PREFONTAINE: I don't think
3the witness needs to disclose solicitor-client
4privileged information.
5 BY MR. CHAMP
6 Q. You indicated before -- the
7person that you did obtain a legal opinion from,
8what was that person's name again?
9 MR. PREFONTAINE: The witness
10didn't say. As best he could recall, it was from
11the Director of Military Prosecutions.
12 MR. CHAMP: Right. Thank you.
13 Q. And just to make sure I get
14things accurate, because it's tough to juggle all
15this information at once: Did you indicate that
16Commander Archer had recommended you go to that
17person for a legal opinion?
18 R. Non.
19 Q. So in the first part of this
20paragraph, you speak about inadmissibility of
21statements as they pertain to hearsay information
22and lack of other credible evidence.
23 Commission Counsel took you
24through The Globe and Mail article, saying, "Look,
25there were names," and you gave your justifications
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1why you didn't follow up. If you had had
2information that had confirmed with certainty that
3at least some of those individuals interviewed by
4The Globe and Mail were Canadian Forces detainees,
5would that have caused you to continue the
6investigation?
7 R. Il faut se mettre dans le
8contexte de l'article. L'article décrit des
9allégations où des Forces afghanes ou des autorités
10afghanes commettent des crimes. Dans ce
11contexte-là, c'est ce qu'on essaie de dire. Le
12crime commis par les autorités afghanes, j'ai pas
13juridiction. On n'a pas juridiction sur ce
14contexte-là. C'est ce qu'on essaie de dire,
15simplement, dans ce document-là. Ce qui est
16allégué. L'article de journal ne nous dit pas que
17le commandant possédait de l'information qu'il a
18transféré les détenus et que les détenus ont été
19torturés. L'article de journal me donne pas cette
20information-là. Ce qu'on essaie de dire dans ce
21paragraphe-là, c'est l'allégation des crimes commis
22par des autorités afghanes. On n'a pas la
23juridiction d'enquêter ces crimes-là, la police
24militaire. C'est ce qu'on essaie de dire dans ce
25document-là.
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1 L'article de journal, encore une
2fois, me démontre pas que le commandant avait la
3connaissance qu'en transférant des détenus, qu'ils
4allaient être torturés.
5 Q. But there's a potential
6victim of crime identified in the articles, and
7certainly the direct perpetrator alleged in the
8article would be the Afghan authorities. But given
9that you have a victim of crime and you do have
10jurisdiction over Canadian authorities, did you not
11see there any role for you to look into whether
12Canadian officers had any role in that handover to
13torture?
14 R. Encore là, je reviens à ma
15réponse. Il y a rien dans cet article de journal-là
16qui me démontre que le commandant avait la
17connaissance. Quand on dit que j'ai la juridiction
18sur les autorités canadiennes, c'est les
19militaires, les membres qui sont assujettis au code
20de discipline militaire. Encore une fois, la
21réponse c'est: j'ai rien dans cet article de
22journal-là qui m'indique que le commandant avait
23une connaissance qu'en prenant une décision de
24transférer les détenus, que les détenus allaient
25être torturés. Si l'article avait eu de
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1l'information en disant -- dans le sens que le
2commandant avait une connaissance quelconque, on
3aurait eu une conclusion différente, mais dans cet
4article-là, comme tel, c'est un article qui décrit
5des Afghans faisant des choses à d'autres Afghans.
6Donc on n'a pas la juridiction. C'est ce qu'on
7essaie de décrire dans cette enquête-là.
8 M. BERLINQUETTE: Monsieur Champ,
9est-ce que vous pensez être beaucoup plus long?
10Peut-être qu'on peut remettre ça à lundi matin?
11 Do you believe you'll be a lot
12longer?
13 MR. CHAMP: I'm not sure if other
14people -- I've got maybe two more questions. I can
15tell you, I'd like to leave at 4:30 as well. If
16it's okay with everyone, could I just ask to go
17until 4:30? And I believe I'll be done at that
18time.
19 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Okay. Go ahead
20with your two questions, please.
21 BY MR. CHAMP:
22 Q. It has to do, actually,
23though, with Exhibit P1, which is the first
24complaint of February 21, '07. If you go to page 3
25of the document, and you'll see this letter is
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1dated February 2007. It's a few months prior to
2The Globe and Mail article. This complaint quotes
3a number of widely available human rights reports
4by different bodies. You'll see here what's quoted
5on this page is the Afghan Independent Human Rights
6Commission, which, in its annual human rights
7report at that time, said: [As read]
8 "Torture continues to take
9 place as a routine part of
10 ANP procedures and appears to
11 be closely linked to illegal
12 detention centres and illegal
13 detention, particularly at
14 the investigation stage, in
15 order to extort confessions
16 from detainees. Torture is
17 found to be especially
18 prevalent in Patkia and
19 Kandahar provinces."
20 That was one piece of information
21that might have been available to the commander,
22but you wouldn't know if the commander would have
23known about that, I gather, Major Bolduc?
24 R. Oui.
25 Q. The next page has a quote
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1from the United Nations Office of the High
2Commissioner for Human Rights, and the report of
3the UN High Commissioner noted serious concerns
4over reports of torture in Afghanistan. She says:
5 "The NSD, ..."
6 Same as the NDS.
7 "... responsible for both
8 civil and military
9 intelligence, operates in
10 relative secrecy without
11 adequate judicial oversight
12 and there have been reports
13 of prolonged detention
14 without trial, extortion,
15 torture, and systematic due
16 process violations.
17 Complaints of serious human
18 rights violations committed
19 by representatives of these
20 institutions, including
21 arbitrary arrest, illegal
22 detention and torture, are
23 common."
24 You don't know if the commander
25would have had that information in his possession
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1at the time he was making those transfer decisions?
2The individuals mentioned in The Globe and Mail
3report, they were -- that report was in April '07
4and these reports preceded that. You wouldn't know
5if the commander had this information; is that
6right?
7 R. Oui.
8 Q. You'll see farther down the
9page there's a quote from the United States State
10Department: [As read]
11 "... which in a March 2006
12 report concurred in
13 observations that Afghan
14 local authorities 'routinely'
15 torture detainees and cite
16 the following methods.
17 Afghanistan's human rights
18 record remained poor. There
19 continued to be instances in
20 which ..."
21You found that? It's in the same page.
22 "There continued to be
23 instances ..."
24 It's on the same page, page 4 of
25the letter. There's a paragraph that starts: [As
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1read]
2 "We cannot be certain which
3 techniques of torture ..."
4 R. OK, oui.
5 MR. CHAMP: "... the
6 ANP and the NDS use.
7 However, the U.S. State
8 Department, which in a March
9 2006 report concurred in
10 observations that Afghan
11 local authorites 'routinely'
12 torture detainees citing
13 these methods.
14 Afghanistan's human rights record
15remain poor. There continued to be instances in
16which security and factional forces committed
17extrajudicial killings and torture. Torture and
18abuse consisted of pulling out fingernails and
19toenails, burning with oil, sexual humiliation and
20sodomy."
21 So, Major Bolduc, as a police
22officer, would you be concerned if the commander
23had had those reports in his possession, yet still
24made the decision to transfer detainees into the
25custody of those authorities?
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1 R. On me demande d'assumer que
2le commandant avait ces rapports. J'ai aucune
3indication si le commandant avait cette
4information-là, l'information date de 2006, les
5incidents, la date, c'est 2007. La situation pour
6laquelle le commandant en théâtre prend la décision
7selon l'information qu'il a, il y a un processus en
8place qui décrit les obligations du commandant.
9 Encore une fois, ma réponse c'est
10que j'ai aucune indication que le commandant avait
11de l'information qu'en transférant les détenus, que
12ces détenus-là allaient être transférés. Je peux
13pas vous en dire plus. Je reviens à ma même
14réponse. J’ai pas été demandé d'enquêter pour ces
15allégations-là. J’avais pas l'information que le
16commandant savait qu'en transférant les détenus,
17que les détenus allaient être torturés. Je veux
18dire --
19 Q. I appreciate you weren't
20asked to investigate those allegations.
21 Thank you, Major Bolduc. Those
22are all the questions I have.
23 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Thank you, Mr.
24Champ.
25 Mr. Wallace [sic], do you have any
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1questions?
2 MR. CARROLL: Nothing, sir. Thank
3you.
4 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Thank you very
5much. Me Préfontaine?
6 Me PRÉFONTAINE: Pas de question,
7merci.
8 M. BERLINQUETTE: Je vais
9remercier le témoin pour votre franchise et votre
10précision des faits --
11 Me MARSHMAN: J'ai juste deux
12petites questions de suivi. Je pensais pas terminer
13comme ça aujourd'hui. J'avais quasiment tout rangé
14mes affaires.
15 Q. Une chose que je ne comprends
16pas. Vous avez dit que vous n'étiez pas avec le
17Service national d'enquête lors de la cessation des
18transferts? Est-ce que j'ai bien compris?
19 R. Je suis arrivé au Service
20national des enquêtes en juillet 2007. Si je me
21rappelle bien la date qu'on me mentionnait c'était
22mars 2007. Alors en mars 2007, j'étais pas avec le
23Service national des enquêtes. C'était le contexte
24de ma réponse.
25 Q. Ça répond à ma question parce
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1que je pensais que mon collègue parlait de la
2cessation des transferts au mois de novembre 2007.
3Est-ce que c'est exact?
4 R. Est-ce que j'ai malentendu?
5J'ai eu la date mars 2007.
6 Q. Vous avez aussi dit que vous
7n'avez pas été demandé d'enquêter certaines choses
8dans -- C'était votre réponse, mais vous êtes
9d'accord que vous avez la possibilité, en tant que
10policier militaire, d'initier des enquêtes
11vous-même?
12 R. Oui, si j'ai des raisons de
13croire, un doute qui me tend à croire que le
14commandant a commis une infraction. Mais je l'ai
15pas ce doute-là. Avec tout le dossier Centipede,
16avec le ce que j'ai comme information, avec le
17courriel, en mai 2009, qui me dit que le
18commandant, lorsqu'il a eu l'information, il a
19arrêté les transferts. Je l'ai pas cette
20information-là.
21 Q. Je parle juste de façon
22technique. Quand vous parlez à vos policiers qui
23travaillent en dessous de vous, par exemple, est-ce
24que vous leur donnez des critères pour initier une
25enquête de leur propre gré? Qu'est-ce que ça prend?
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1C'est une question qui se pose dans cette enquête.
2Qu'est-ce que ça prend pour initier de soi-même une
3enquête? Et j'aimerais votre opinion là-dessus.
4 R. Pour qu'on initie une
5enquête, il faudrait qu'on ait des doutes, des
6soupçons que le commandant aurait commis une
7infraction. Si on avait ces soupçons-là, on
8débuterait une enquête.
9 Q. Soupçon, à peu près, pour
10vous, vous utilisez ce mot par exemple?
11 R. Il faut que j'aie un doute,
12un soupçon que le commandant ait pu commettre une
13infraction avant de débuter une enquête. Si j’en ai
14pas de soupçon pour débuter une enquête qu'une,
15infraction a possiblement été commise, je débuterai
16pas une enquête, j'ai pas de raison de le faire.
17 Q. C'est bien. On va poser cette
18question-là plusieurs fois pendant l'enquête et
19j'apprécie votre réponse. Ce sont toutes mes
20questions
21 M. BERLINQUETTE: Nous avons des
22questions ici, s'il vous plaît.
23EXAMINATION BY THE CHAIR:
24 THE CHAIR: Yes, I just have one
25question. I'm just a little surprised on the
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1answer relative to The Globe and Mail article, that
2not yourself, because you didn't do the
3investigating, but one of the investigators at NIS
4would not have at least made the attempt to speak
5to the author of the article. I know you spoke
6that that's not an informant, but how do you know
7that that person wouldn't have additional
8information or other information that may lead to
9other sources for investigation purposes?
10 R. La décision est de moi, la
11décision de ne pas aller parler avec le
12journaliste, c'était la seule option lorsqu'on est
13arrivé à enquêter ce dossier-là. Au moment qu'on a
14pris la décision, on n'a pas cru -- on n'a pas cru
15bon d'aller parler au journaliste.
16 THE CHAIR: Why?
17 R. Encore une fois, l'Opération
18Centipede dans son ensemble, les allégations qu'on
19avait, les allégations que les soldats emmenaient,
20les allégations que les soldats avaient été témoins
21de certaines choses puis quand on enquêtait,
22c'était moins de ce qu'ils disaient, ce qu'ils
23racontaient. Le caporal qui raconteait des choses à
24son médecin puis après qu'il a pas voulu nous
25parler, tout cet ensemble-là du travail qu'on a
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1effectué dans les dossiers nous a emmené à dire
2qu'aller parler au journaliste, on obtiendra
3possiblement rien de plus qui va confirmer.
4 Encore là, notre juridiction, face
5à ce qui était rapporté dans l'article, c'étaient
6des crimes qui auraient été commis par les
7autorités afghanes, contre des Afghans. Il y avait
8pas d'indication dans l'article qu'il y avait des
9militaires qui auraient commis une infraction. Tout
10ça mis ensemble a fait que j'en suis venu à la
11conclusion que d'aller parler au journaliste nous
12apporterait rien de plus qu'à l'enquête.
13 THE CHAIR: Are you not making an
14assumption that they just wouldn't have any more
15information? Is that not part of an investigative
16process, to ask questions or to make inquiries so
17you can see what you can get further? Even if that
18journalist had said, "I don't want to give any more
19information, due to" -- you know, for some reason
20or they didn't want to divulge sources, but maybe
21that individual could lead you somewhere else. I
22think you've answered it, but I just have some
23difficulties understanding why those steps may not
24have been taken.
25 I guess the next one is: Would
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1there be other circumstances in the seven
2investigations where that kind of conclusion would
3be made that questions may not have been asked
4because you didn't feel some of the information was
5necessarily credible or it kind of stood on its own
6there?
7 R. Non, dans le sens que le
8soldat qui voulait pas nous parler, on a quand même
9poursuivi avec la chaîne de commandant. Aller voir,
10le soldat a peut-être des raisons qui veut pas nous
11parler. Aller voir la chaîne de commandement pour
12voir s'il était là en Afghanistan, s'il a parlé
13avec les détenus. Les réponses qu'on a obtenues de
14la chaîne de commandement nous disaient que cette
15personne a pas travaillé avec les détenus. On a
16vérifié, on n'a pas juste arrêté sur le fait que la
17personne veut pas nous parler, on ferme le dossier.
18On a fait d'autres démarches. Le docteur nous a dit
19aussi, lors de son entrevue, qu'il suit d'autres
20personnes qui ont été dans cette rotation-là, mais
21personne d'autre allègue avoir vu les mêmes choses.
22 Alors tout l'ensemble des
23renseignements qu'on a obtenus a fait qu'on en est
24venu à cette conclusion-là, de ne pas aller parler
25au journaliste. L'histoire du soldat qui fait avec
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1le corps dans le fossé, qu'on n'a pas d'autres
2allégations ou d'autres informations qui confirment
3quoique ce soit. C'est tout l'ensemble des
4renseignements qu'on a obtenus dans le cadre des
5autres enquêtes qui en est venu à cette
6décision-là.
7 THE CHAIR: But you don't know if
8there's information to corroborate it if you don't
9ask the questions; correct?
10 R. Oui.
11 M. BERLINQUETTE: Major Bolduc,
12vous avez dit ce matin, au début, qu'il y avait un
13manque de ressources. Vous avez plusieurs dossiers
14en cours puis vous avez planifié -- vous avez fait
15un plan pour adresser le problème. Est-ce qu'il y
16avait une pression pour fermer ces dossiers-là le
17plus vite possible.
18 R. Non.
19 Q. Parce que si je suis mon
20confrère, on peut possiblement sauter à la
21conclusion qu'il y a eu une, comment on dirait ça,
22qu'on a pris le chemin le plus court pour fermer
23ces dossiers-là.
24 R. Il y avait pas de pression de
25fermer. Il y avait une pression de débuter les
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1dossiers par mon commandant en disant j'ai ces
2dossiers-là qui ont pas été débutés puis il faut
3les débuter. Il était pas content qu'on ait pris le
4temps qu'on a pris pour le faire. Il y avait
5d'autres circonstances à ça. Il y avait une
6pression qu'il fallait qu'on les débute le plus
7rapidement possible, mais il y a jamais une
8pression qui a été mise envers moi pour fermer ce
9dossier-là. Non, il n’y a pas eu de pression.
10 M. BERLINQUETTE: Merci. Est-ce
11qu'il y a d'autres questions? D'accord.
12 Alors on vous remercie d'être venu
13aujourd'hui, de votre franchise et de votre
14précision. Et vous êtes excusé. Merci beaucoup.
15 On débute à neuf heures, lundi
16matin.
17 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Mr. Champ, we
18will start at 9:00 Monday. I just want to
19emphasize 9:00.
20 MR. CHAMP: Yes, thank you.
21 MR. BERLINQUETTE: Thank you very
22much.
23--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4:39 p.m.
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8(613) 564-2727 (416) 861-8720
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1 Je déclare sous mon serment d’office que les pages

2 qui précèdent contiennent la transcription exacte
3 et fidèle de la prise de ce jour, le tout
4 conformément à la loi.
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9 ___________________________________
10 Anne De Serres, s.o.
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12 and
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14 I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT the foregoing is a true
15 and accurate transcription of my stenographic
16 notes made herein, to the best of my skill
17 and ability.
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23 Nancy Grindley, RPR, CRR
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9(613) 564-2727 (416) 861-8720

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2 Military Police Complaints Commission

1 Je déclare sous mon serment d’office que les pages

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