Civil Cases Compilation

Batch 2014 2015 Compilation of Jurisprudence on Civil Law
Contents
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
10
Prejudicial question
10
Principle of Abuse of Rights
11
Pure civil actions under the Civil Code

Article 26 and the declaration of nullity of marriage in a foreign judgment
Foreign Divorce
Declaration of presumptive death
Declaration of Presumptive Death, what constitutes well-founded belief
Who are Juridical Persons
Distinctions between void and voidable marriage
Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages; real party in interest
Lack of Marriage License
Judicial decalration of nullity as requirement for remarriage
12
14
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Definition and scope of Psychological Incapacity

23
Sexual promiscuity as psychological incapacity
23
Factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
23
Collusion
24
Relevance of expert opinion
24
Other evidence for psychological incapacity must be presented
25
Interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code
26
Judgment must be based on evidence to establish the medical condition or disease
26
Other cases regarding Psychological Incapacity
27
Collateral attack on validity of marriage
31
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
32
Article 49 of the Family Code granting visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children
33
Abandonment as grounds for legal separation
35
Effects of the decree of legal separation
35
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code
36
Conjugal Property
37
Joint Administration of Spouses of Conjugal Property
38
Case citation: Manuel O. Fuentes, et al. vs. Conrado G. Roca, et al., G.R. No. 178902, Apr 21, 2010
39
Charges to the conjugal partnership
39
Dissolution of Conjugal Property
40
Article 160 of the Civil Code on conjugal partnership
40
Sale of conjugal property without the spouses consent
41
Decree of absolute nullity of marriage, its effects
42
Judicial separation of property under Article 135
43
Separation of property
45
Where the ground for nullity of marriage is Psychological Incapacity, properties acquired during the union of
the parties
45
Co-ownership in cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other]
47
Post Marriage Modification
49
Case citation: Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
49
Inapplicability of the rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other.
49
2
Ad maiorem Dei gloriam

Who are beneficiaries
Exemption from Execution; Exceptions
DNA in paternity and filiation
Proof in filiation
Paternity and filiation of an accused in a criminal case
Article 164 of the Family Code
Proof of filiation
Establishing Illegitimate Filiation
Permitting an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father
Joint adoption by Spouses
Mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption
When obligation to support starts
Support by grandparents
Parental authority over recognized natural child
Art 213 of the FC in custody of minor child
Tender Age Presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code
Special Parental Authority
Habeas corpus vs judicial adjudication of custody
Rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code
Entry in the civil register
PROPERTY
Foreshore lands
Proof of ownership
Requisites for Recovery of Ownership of Real Property
Prescription period if based on Implied Trust
Laches
Innocent purchaser for value
Exception to the doctrine that accessory follows the principal
Law on Accretion and P.D. 1529
Effect of improvements on property
Builder in good faith
Builder in good faith is entitled to reimbursement of his necessary expenses
Reimbursement of improvements
Accumulation of sediments along the river banks
Old bed left to dry by the change of course
Name/Class: ARENAJO, CHRISTIAN Executive class
Rights of a Co-owner
Legal redemption
Interest of a co-owner
Oral patition
Right of Possession
Protection over right of possession
Remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name
Notice of Lis Pendens
Kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property
Accion Publiciana
Name/Class: SAGARINO, ARIEL Executive class
Occupation by tolerance is not possession in good faith
Builder in Good Faith under Art 448 in relation to Art 546
Art. 450. Owners option to sell his encroached property pegged at the current fair market value.
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53
54
54
55
55
56
57
58
60
60
61
62
63
63
64
64
65
66
67
69
69
70
70
72
73
73
76
77
78
78
79
79
80
81
86
86
87
87
88
90
92
93
93
94
95
96
96
97
98
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Easement of Lateral and Subjacent Support
99
Legal Easement of Right of Way
100
Kinds of nuisance
101
Ownership by a purchaser
102
Donation
103
Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership
106
Indefeasibility of title
108
A void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value
110
Torrens Title as conclusive evidence
110
Free Patent over a private land
111
Prescriptive period for annulment of title
111
Prescription for cancellation of title and reversion
112
The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are two apparently valid titles over a
single property
112
Lands of Public Domain
113
Application for Registration of Title
116
Application for registration of public lands
116
Who may file for registration under Sec 14(1) of PD 1529
118
Registration of land under Sec 14(1) and Sec 48(b) of PD 1529
119
Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title
125
Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title under R.A. No. 26
125
Corrections or Insertions of Mistakes in Certificate of Title
126
Better right between previous and latest sale
128
Tenancy relations
128
Section 113 of PD 1529
129
Application of Original Registration
129
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
130
Unregistered Sale of Land
131
PRESCRIPTION
136
I)
136
Definition
Land Registration Court's Jurisdiction and Principle of Estoppel
Estoppel in Pais
136
136
II)
No prescription applicable
137
III)
Prescription or limitation of actions
137
Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title
137
SUCCESSION
139
I)
139
General Provisions
Successional Rights Transmitted at the Moment of Death
Right of an heir accrues from the moment of the death of the decent
What constitutes inheritance
Hereditary succession as method in acquiring private lands by foreigners
Venue for the Settlement of Estate
Interested persons in a settlement of estate
Judicial declaration of presumptive death
139
139
139
140
141
142
142
4

Case citation: Antonia Armas y Calisterio vs. Marietta Calistero, G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000.
II)
Testamentary Succession
Testator's intention must be respected

Donation Mortis Causa
Donation mortis causa purporting to be inter vivos
Testamentary Capacity
Feeble-minded person's capacity to make a will
Formalities of a will
Attestation clause
Attestation and acknowledgment
Lack of authority of the Notary Public invalidates the will executed before him
Holographic Will and number of witnesses required if will is contested
Holographic Will and Preterition
Blind under Article 808 of the Civil Code
Doctrine of liberal interpretation / substantial compliance
Strict Compliance vis-a-vis Substantial Compliance in relation to non-entry of the number of pages in the
Attestation Clause.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
Petition of allowance of the will by the testator himself
Probate of a will executed by a foreigner abroad
Partition before probate of will
Last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void
Absence of probate proceedings, its effect
Prohibition of alienation under Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code
Prohibition of alienation in a will
Compulsory Heirs
Decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents estate are exclusively the person
enumerated in Article 887
Reserva Troncal
Legitime
Division of a decedents Estate
Rights of an illegitimate child
Rule of Proximity
Determination of Relationship under Art. 962, NCC
Preterition /Article 1104 of the Civil Code
Extrajudicial Settlement resulting to preterition
Institution Sub Modo
Who may accept or repudiate an inheritance, legacy or devise
Repudiation of Co-ownership
Collation
Collation between compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs
Collation and Advancement of Legitime
Inoffious donation and rights of heirs to contest donation
Period of reimbursement under Article 1008
III)
Legal or Intestate Succession
Intestate succession
Share of surviving spouse and collateral relative (sister) in intestate succession
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143
144
145
146
146
147
148
149
150
150
151
151
152
154
154
155
155
156
156
157
157
157
158
159
160
160
161
162
163
163
164
164
165
166
166
167
168
168
169
170
170
171
171
172

IV)
Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession
172
Contracts entered into by predecessors-in-interest

Remedies of Creditors against Estate
Necessity of partition to be contained in a public instrument
Requisites for Partition by act inter vivos
Appointment of administrator
Authority of an Encargado
Removal of an Administrator may be done at the discretion of Probate Court
Oral partition
Partition inter vivos
Indispensable parties to be impleaded in partition
Unregistered Deed of Partition
Allowance of widowed spouse
Rescission and Nullity of Partition
172
173
173
173
174
175
175
175
176
176
177
178
178
OBLIGATIONS
180
I)
180
Elements of an Obligation
Fraud
Simulated Contracts
Contract as law between the parties
II)
Different Kinds of Prestations
Force Majeure
III)
Classification of Obligations
Solidary Obligation
Option Contracts
Action for Reconveyance vis-a-vis fraud
IV)
Sources of Obligations
Principle of Unjust Enrichment
V)
Nature and Effect of Obligations
Presumption of payment (installments)
VI)
180
180
181
181
182
183
183
183
184
184
184
185
185
Kinds of Civil Obligations
186
Rescission under Article 1191

Rescission on Reciprocal Obligations
Default
186
186
187
VII)
Joint and Solidary Obligation
Guaranty and Solidary Obligations
VIII)
187
188
Extinguishment of Obligations
188
Recoupment
Novation
Consignation
Acceptance of payment by creditor from a third person
188
189
190
190
CONTRACTS
193
I)
193
Essential Requisites
Mutuality of Contracts
Right of first refusal
Deed of Sale entered into upon future inheritance
3)
Kinds of Contracts
Exception to the Doctrine of In Pari Delicto
Ratification of a voidable contract
4)
Defective Contracts
Void and inexistent contracts
193
194
194
195
195
196
196
196
SALES
198
I)
198
Definition and Essential Requisites of a Contract of Sale

Absence of the owners consent
Contract to sell
198
198
II)
Parties to a Contract of Sale
200
III)
Formation of Contract of Sale
200
Nature of contract of sale

Double Sale
Dragnet Clause
200
200
201
IV)
Remedies of an Unpaid Seller
201
V)
Warranties
201
VI)
The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree (P.D. 957)
202
Twin requirements under the Maceda Law

Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act
202
202
TRUST
204
I)
204
Definition and Nature

Implied resulting trust
Instance where implied trust can exist
204
204
PARTNERSHIP
205
I)
205
Contract of Partnership
II)
Dissolution
Purchase of a Partners Interest
205
205
AGENCY
Buyer in Good faith negated by failure to verify extent and nature of seller's authority
206
206
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
207
I)
207
Guaranty and Suretyship

Continuing Suretyship
Continuing guaranty
II)
Real Mortgage
Principal to be held liable when indicated in Real Estate Mortgage

Application of Writ of Possession
Mortgagee in good faith
Accessory follows the principal
Notice in Contracts
III)
Antichresis
207
207
208
208
209
209
210
211
212
LEASE
213
I)
213
Lease of Work or Services

Recovery of Additional Costs in Contracts
II)
Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee
Renewal of Lease
III)
Special Rules for Lease of Rural/Urban Lands
Privity of contracts and sublease
213
213
213
214
214
TORTS AND DAMAGES
216
I)
216
Principles
Elements of Quasi-Delict
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
216
216
II)
The Tortfeasor
217
III)
Proximate Cause
217
IV)
Negligence
218
Presumption of Negligence of a person who was violating any traffic regulation at the time of the mishap
V)
Special Liability in Particular Activities
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

Medical Negligence
DAMAGES
218
218
218
219
220
8

I)
Nominal Damages
220
II)
Temperate or Moderate Damages
221
III)
Liquidated Damages
221
Loss of Earning Capacity

Subrogation of rights; Common carriers; Liability of Quasi-Delict
IV)
Miscellaneous Rules
Quantum Meruit
Vicarious Liability
Negligence
Attorney's fees
Damages in breach of contract of carriage
Case citation: AIR FRANCE vs. GILLEGO G.R. No. 165266, December 15, 2010
Civil liability in case of acquittal
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223
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225
225
226
226

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Prejudicial question
PROBLEM: Petitioner AA who is engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased beer
products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC). Petitioner paid through a check signed by AA and drawn against Argovans Asia
Trust Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment , the check was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands, petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC
to file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners.
Petitioners maintained that their checking account was funded under an automatic transfer arrangement, whereby funds from
their joint savings account with AsiaTrust Bank were automatically transferred to their checking account with said bank
whenever a check they issued was presented for payment.
Petitioner claimed that on 7 April 2000, the date when they issued the check to SMC, their joint savings account had a balance
of P330,353.17. As of 13 April 2000, petitioners balance even amounted to P412,513.17.3
On 13 April 2000, Gregorio Guevarra (Guevarra), the Bank Manager of AsiaTrust Bank, advised AA that the Allied Bank Check
No. 82813 for P378,000.00, which was issued for other transactions of AA was not cleared due to some alterations. AsiaTrust
Bank then garnished the P378,000.00 from the joint savings account of petitioners without any court order. Consequently, the
check issued by petitioners to SMC was dishonored having been drawn against insufficient funds
Petitioner filed an action for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank and SMC. Petitioners alleged that
AsiaTrust Bank unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished by
payment.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa. Should the criminal case be suspended on the grounds of prejudicial question?
Decide.
ANSWER: NO. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements necessary for a civil case to be considered
a prejudicial question, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then
a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided that the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only
that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution
of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case
does not involve a prejudicial question.
The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the
civil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the P378,000.00 from petitioners savings account.
The subject of the civil case is the garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioners savings account.
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being conducted by the prosecutor.
The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged
materially altered check leading to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners savings account. The source of the
funds of petitioners savings account is no longer SMCs concern. The matter is between petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the
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other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer
products. Therefore, a suspension of the criminal case on the grounds of prejudicial question is not proper.
Case citation: SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO, vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION. G.R. No. 188767 July 24, 2013
Name/Class: CLEMENCIO, REUVILLE Regular Class
PERSONS
I)
Persons and Personality (Civil Code)
Principle of Abuse of Rights

PROBLEM: Ardy owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to Pastor, however, the connection of
water supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of Ardy which was never questioned, until such time that Pastor
became delinquent in paying the water bill. Ardy, without notification to Pastor, then requested the MCWD to cut off the water
supply, which the latter did on the basis that the water supply was under his name. Is Ardy liable to Pastor?
ANSWER: Yes. Ardys acts which violated Article 19 of the Civil Code is his unjustifiable act of having the Pastors water supply
disconnected, coupled with his failure to warn or at least notify Pastor of such intention. The principle of abuse of Rights in the
enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Case citation: JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, VS. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER
DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR., G.R. NO. 161921 JULY 17, 2013)
Name/Class: ESCOBER, PAULO Regular Class
Article 19, also known as the principle of abuse of right, prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly
or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be
no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith
but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement,
petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.
On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners
actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an
excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to
respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him. (Ernesto Ramas Uypitching vs. Ernesto Quiamco - G.R. No. 146322.
December 6, 2006)
The elements of abuse of rights are the following:

a)
b)
c)
the existence of a legal right or duty;

which is exercised in bad faith; and
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks
to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with illmotive. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
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doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this right,
petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third elements for abuse of rights are not
attendant in the present case. The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the existence of bad faith or malice
on its part in closing the respondents account on April 4, 1988 because on the said date the same was already
overdrawn. The respondent issued four checks, all due on April 4, 1988, amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of
his current account deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the
dishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further, petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current account of the
respondent was overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the said
account was overdrawn 117 times for the same reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also several instances
when the respondent issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file with
petitioner bank. All these circumstances taken together justified the petitioner banks closure of the respondents
account on April 4, 1988 for improper handling. (Far East Bank and Trust Company Vs. Themistocles Pacilan, Jr. -
G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005)
Pure civil actions under the Civil Code
Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be instituted, like in the case at bar, as a purely civil
action, the cause of action for which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The above elements of libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for damages. As held by this Court in GMA
Network, Inc. v. Bustos:
An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to
defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious
imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present the following elements:
(a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication
of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
Of these four elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the publication of the alleged imputation. Libel
is published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice
of another person other than its author and the offended party. The circulation of an allegedly libelous matter in a
newspaper is certainly sufficient publication.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, it was found
that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the
libelous articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.
Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner. Such damages may be
awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioners anguish. Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.s argument,
although petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still such violations directly
resulted in the publication of the libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground for the
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recovery of moral damages under (7) of Article 2219. (Alfonso T. Yuchengco Vs. The Manila Chronicle Publishing
Corporation, et al. - G.R. No. 184315. November 28, 2011)
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of
the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for
tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently
from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal
offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal
action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended
party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. (Lily Lim Vs. Kou Co Ping a.k.a. Charlie Co/Kou Co Ping a.k.a. Charlie Co -
G.R. Nos. 175256. Agust 23, 2012)
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil liability if the same
arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of
obligation, the law on human relations. The pertinent articles follow: Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. (Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. Vs. People of the Philippines, et al. - G.R. No.
159017-18. March 9, 2011)
13

Article 26 and the declaration of nullity of marriage in a foreign judgment
PROBLEM: Anna married Kristoff, a citizen of Japan. Because of an issue with Kristoffs parents not approving of Anna, Kristoff
could not bring Anna back with him to Japan. They soon lost all contact with each other. Thereafter, Anna met Hans, also from
Japan. They eventually got married, without Annas first marriage to Kristoff being dissolved. Hans was able to bring Anna to
Japan. There, she fell victim to physical abuse at the hands of Hans and so she left him and contacted Kristoff. Kristoff and Anna
rekindled their relationship. Kristoff helped Anna obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan, declaring the marriage
between Anna and Hans void on the ground of bigamy. Subsequently, Kristoff filed a petition in the RTC for the Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage.Does the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages apply to foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, necessitating a relitigation of the matters already decided in the aforesaid judgment?
ANSWER: No, it does not. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To rule otherwise would be to defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues. Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The principle in Article 26 applies to a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the
Filipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
Case citation: Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, et al. - G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Name/Class: CORBITA, JOHN KEVIN Executive class
Foreign Divorce
PROBLEM: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano married Lady. Their marriage was blessed with a son and daughter Kristopher and
Kimberly. In1986, Lady left for the US bringing along their son Kristopher. A few years later, Lady became a naturalized as an
American citizen. In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married an American.
Thereafter, Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code. Rule on the petition.
ANSWER: The petition shall be granted. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under the Philippine law.
The said provision of law seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. It however also applies to the instant case where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry.
Thus, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but the citizenship
of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
14

Case citation: Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido GR. 154380 October 05, 2005
Name/Class: CRISTAL, MARIA GRETEL Executive class
Facts: First wife divorced with husband, subsequently filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against husband and
second wife alleging that marriage was bigamous because second wife has prior existing marriage.
Held: Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are
1)
2)
absolute divorce ora vinculo matrimonii; and

limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.
The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the
personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if
the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute. Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause
of action. hus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity
of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. (F. Amor-Catalan Vs. CA, et
al. - G.R. No. 167109. February 6, 2007)
The spouses frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute
psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Narciso S. Navarro, Jr. Vs. Cynthia Cecilio-Navarro.
- G.R. No. 162049. April 13, 2007)
Facts: Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
2000. On January 2005, Gerbert married Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerberts petition for divorce onDecember 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree
on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
In its decision, the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able
to remarry under Philippine law.
Ruling: As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
15

substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of
no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17
of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that
the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law. Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
On the other hand, while Act No 3753 requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. (Gerbert Corpuz Vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas and the Solicitor General - G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010)
Declaration of presumptive death
PROBLEM: In January 5, 1971, Angel Andemons married Luis Wiskawayan. She gave birth to a baby girl named Jenelyn. Their
marriage turned sour, and they argued constantly because Luis was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March
1972, the latter left their house. Angel and her child waited for him, until May 1972 when they decided to go back to her
parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from Luis until in October 1975 when he showed up, and they agreed to
separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of from each
other ever since. Believing that Luis was already dead, petitioner married Phil Ty in June 1985. Phils application for
naturalization in US was denied because Angels marriage with Luis was still subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, Angel filed a
petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Luis. Is marriage of Angel to Phil valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Luis?
ANSWER: YES, Angel was capacitated to marry Phil at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said
marriage is legal and valid.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of
the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however,
the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage,
that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The law that will apply in this case is the Civil Code. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83, which provides that,
Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless (2nd par.) The first spouse had been absent
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court. Article 390 of the Civil Code states that after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to
arise.
16
Case citation: ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009
Name/Class: MACASA, JOSEPH PAUL Regular Class
Declaration of Presumptive Death, what constitutes well-founded belief
PROBLEM: Sometime in January 1998, Husband and Wife had a violent quarrel brought about by Husbands inability to reach
"sexual climax" whenever they would have intimate moments. After their quarrel, Husband left their conjugal dwelling and this
was the last time Wife ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from him or about his
whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, Wife filed a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that she had a wellfounded belief that he was already dead and alleged "earnest efforts" to locate him by (1) making inquiries about his
whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends, but to no avail; and (2) whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it
that she looked through the patients directory, hoping to find Husband.
If you were the Judge, will you grant the petition of Wife based on her well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her
husbands presumptive death?
ANSWER: The petition should not be granted. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that
the prior spouse was already dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of "well-founded belief". To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts
and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one).
The case at bar however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence. In sum, Wife
merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She
failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband
was already dead.
Hence, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still
alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
Case Citation: Rep. of the Phils. vs. Ma. Fe Espinosa Cantor, G.R. No. 184621. December 10, 2013
Name/Class: ALOCILLO, CARMEL BENITA Regular Class
PROBLEM: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada got married in 1993. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that
from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives
of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The RTC rendered a
Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued
that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
Questions:
1) Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
2) Did the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death based on evidence
that respondent had presented?
17

ANSWER:
1)
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. A petition for declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is
a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the
Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment
of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
2)
Yes, RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The belief of
the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a
diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Case citation: Philippines vs. Yolanda Cadacio Granada - G.R. No. 187512. June 13, 2012.
Who are Juridical Persons
PROBLEM: Sunrise Corporation, bought lighting materials from Z Company, a sole proprietorship owned by EZ. Despite
repeated demands, Sunshine Corporation defaulted in its payment. EZ filed a suit in the RTC to collect the outstanding balance
of P90,000. Sunrise Corporation filed a motion to implead Z Company, alleging that Z company is the real party in interest of
the case filed by EZ.
Is Z Company a real party in interest to be impleaded as a party-plaintiff?
ANSWER: No. Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil case. Article 44 of the New Civil Code enumerates who are juridical persons:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins
as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Z Company is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by which he conducted his business. As such, it
does not exist as a separate entity apart from its owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued.
As the sole proprietor of Z Company, there is no question that the respondent is the real party in interest who stood to be
directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the complaint. There is then no necessity for Z Company to be impleaded as a
party-plaintiff, since the complaint was already filed in the name of its proprietor, EZ. To heed the petitioners sophistic
reasoning is to permit a dubious technicality to frustrate the ends of substantial justice.
Case Citation: S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation vs. Engr. Leonardo A. Parada of Genlite Industries,
G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013
Name/Class: ENRIQUEZ, GREMARIE Regular Class
18

II)
Marriage (Family Code)
Distinctions between void and voidable marriage

PROBLEM: Penelope and Ralph were sweethearts. On April 13, 1988 they got married in Sugar Rush, Palawan. On November
17, 1992, Ralph filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress
forced him into marrying Penelope. He further alleged that a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army,
whom he claimed that was hired by Penelope, accompanied him during their marriage to harass him. He also denied that he
impregnated Penelope. In her answer, Penelope prayed the dismissal of the case arguing that Ralph freely and voluntarily
married her and that they stayed together in Sugar Rush after their marriage as husband and wife. She also alleged that Ralph
knew that she was pregnant of their son at the time of their marriage.
Questions:
a)
b)
Give at least 3 distinctions between a void and voidable marriage.

If you were the judge how will you decide the case?
ANSWER:
a)
Void and voidable marriages may be distinguished from each other in the following ways:
As to the nature: A void marriage is inexistent from the time of its performance, whereas a voidable marriage is valid
and binding until it is annulled by a competent court.
As to the convalidation: A void marriage is not susceptible of convalidation, whereas a voidable marriage may be
convalidated either be prescription or by cohabitation.
As to the effect upon the property: In a void marriage, the property relations between the parties are governed by the
rules on co-ownership, whereas in a voidable marriage, the property relations are, as general rule, governed by the
rule on absolute community of property unless other system is agreed upon in marriage settlement.
b)
If I were the judge I will uphold the validity of the marriage between Ralph and Penelope. The law provides that a
marriage may be annulled on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force and intimidation or
undue influence which exists at the time of the marriage unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. In the case at bar, while there may be indicators that
the consent of Ralph was obtained through fraud, violence or duress at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
but because of his continued cohabitation with Penelope for almost 4 years and 8 months from the time of their
marriage, the same was already ratified. Therefore, the marriage of Penelope and Ralph shall be uphold.
Case Citation: Villanueva vs. Hon. CA and Villanueva, G.R. No. 132955, 27 October 2006
Name/Class: PAYOPANIN, ANGELINE CHISKA Regular Class
Grounds to declare marriage void is exclusive
QUESTION: L, a Filipina, married F, an American. She then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage alleging
that they got married for her to obtain American citizenship, that in consideration thereof, she would pay F. L contends that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never had the intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of the essential marital obligations. The judge declared that the marriage
between the parties was akin to a marriage in jest and that such is void ab initio for lack of consent. Is the judge correct?
ANSWER: No, the judge is not correct. Under the New Civil Code, a marriage may only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
In the case at bar consent was not lacking, in fact there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Such consent freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. Said marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest for the parties had an
19

undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow L to acquire American citizenship. Only a
genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
Therefore, the judge is not correct.
Case Citation: Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Name/Class: TESALONA, JAYME MARIE - Regular Class
Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages; real party in interest
PROBLEM: X and Y were married in the Philippines on June 4, 1950. They later migrated to the United States of America and
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, X and Y divorced in April 1988, while they were still American
citizens. Two months after the divorce, X married A in the Philippines. Y now files a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against X and A on the ground that A has a prior subsisting marriage with another man.
Will the petition prosper?
ANSWER: No. It is true that under the New Civil Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate " proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be
based on a cause of action.
Further, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
now specifically provides, that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.
Case citation: FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE
E. BRAGANZA, Respondents. G.R. No. 167109. February 6, 2007

Name/Class: COMENDADOR, JONA MAE Regular Class
While it is true that in the case of Nial, the Court in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its
ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved
therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs
to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. Hence, in
resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (LOLITA D. ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI
AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO - GR. No. 173614. September
28, 2007)
20

Lack of Marriage License
PROBLEM: X, a foreigner, was invited to the house of Y, mother of Z. X was asked to participate in a ceremony to welcome
him in the Philippines. X did not know that the ceremony was his marriage with Z. Later Z filed a Bigamy Case against X for he
was allegedly married to W. To avoid the Bigamy case, X filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage to Z. To prove the
validity of their marriage, Z presented the marriage contract signed by X as well as the solemnizing officer which contained the
alleged marriage license issued to X. X presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar that the marriage license,
based on its number indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to X but to someone else. Is the marriage between X
and Z valid or void ab initio?
ANSWER: The marriage is void ab initio for their marriage lacked one essential requisited of marriage which is the issuance of
a valid marriage license. The fact that X did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid
marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued. Art. 4 of the Family Code is clear
when it says, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Art. 35(3) further
states that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void from the beginning.
Case Citation: Syed Abbas Vs. Gloria Abbas, January 30, 2013
Name/Class: TORREFIEL, ERIC JOHN Regular Class
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig
City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." (Sally Go-Bangayan Vs. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. - G.R. No. 201061. July 3,
2013)
A marriage solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the same Code. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.
In a line of cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein.
The certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails
until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in
case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
(RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS - G.R. No. 167746. August 28,
2007)
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is
clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
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cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio. (REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008)
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of
official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. The presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar
where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications. Moreover, the
absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as
we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or
falsity of entries therein. (Jaime O. Sevilla vs. Carmelita N. Cardenas - G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006)
Judicial decalration of nullity as requirement for remarriage

PROBLEM: On November 23, 2002, Hakuri Shinagawa, a Japanese national married Juliet Alonzo in Pasay City, Philippines.
Thereafter, the couple resided in Japan. Sometime in August 2008, Hakuri noticed the depression of his wife Juliet. Suspecting
that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife. To his shock, Juliet confessed to him that the
latter received news of her previous husbands demise.
Upon further inquiry, Hakuri discovered that indeed, Juliet was married to one Dennis Alcantara on July 20, 1994. This
prompted Hakuri to file a petition for declaration of his marriage to Juliet as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one, based on Article 35 (4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
If you were the Judge, will you grant the petition of Hakuri? Decide with reasons.
ANSWER: Yes, I will grant the petition of Hakuri.
It has been consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.
The documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of Hakuri to Juliet on the ground that
their marriage is bigamous. The following facts directly prove that the marriage is bigamous: (1) that Juliet married Dennis on
July 20, 1994; (2) that Juliet contracted a second marriage this time with Hakuri on November 23, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that
there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of Juliet with Dennis at the time she married Hakuri; (3) that Dennis
died sometime on August 2008 and that it was only on said date that Juliets marriage with Dennis was deemed to have been
dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of Juliet to Hakuri is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was
still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
Case citation: Yasuo Iwasawa Vs. Felisa Custodio Gangan (a.k.a. "Felisa Gangan Arambulo" and "Felisa Gangan Iwasawa"), et
al. - G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
Name/Class: LOR, REMFEL Regular Class
At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been
legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of
the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. (Merlinda Cipriano
Montaez Vs. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano - G.R. No. 181089. October 22, 2012)
22

Definition and scope of Psychological Incapacity
PROBLEM: Arabelle and Dominic had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in
college. After a month of courtship, they became intimate which led to their marriage in civil rites. Dominic remained jobless
and dependent upon his father for support until he finished college. Being the one with the fixed income, Arabelle shouldered all
of the familys expenses.
Dominic spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as Arabelle shouldered all the
household expenses and their childs schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon. She later on
discovered her husbands illicit relationship with a co-employee. Furthermore, Dominic was subsequently fired from his
employment after he ran away an amount belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of BP 22 and
estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated.
Feeling frustrated, Arabelle approached a psychiatrist and intimated the behavior of Dominic and the status of their marital
relationship. Dr. Samson concluded that Dominic was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his role as husband and father. In
view of the development, Arabelle decided to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC.
If you are the judge, will you grant the petition? Explain.
ANSWER: As the judge, I will deny the petition. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Although expert opinions are afforded great weight, it cannot bind the court from basing its
judgment on the totality of the evidence presented.
In the case at bar, although Dominics inability to take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his
earnings with his family, are indicative of an immature mind, it is not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that
cannot be cured. The affliction must also be shown to exist at the time of marriage.
Case Citation: Arabelle J. Mendoza vs. Republic of the Philippines, GR No. 157649. November 12, 2012.
Name/Class: YEE, JEDD ALDRICH Regular Class
Sexual promiscuity as psychological incapacity
PROBLEM: R, husband and N, wife were married sometime in 1969. However, in 1998, R filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage alleging that N was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. R furthered
that he was just forced to marry her in light of her accidental pregnancy; that she left the conjugal abode to live with another
man, and married a third man. Dr. Z found both R and N to be psychologically incapacitated suffering from emotional
immaturity. As the judge, would you grant the petition?
ANSWER: SA: No. Psychological incapacity must be proven within the parameters set by jurisprudence. Mere allegation of
sexual promiscuity and emotional immaturity won't suffice. In the case given, the facts are insufficient to conclude that N's
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility or even sexual promiscuity cant be equated with psychological incapacity. Dr. Z's finding
does not explain in reasonable detail how N's condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within the
parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
Case citation: Republic vs De Gracia, GR 171557, Feb. 12, 2014
Name/Class: LITUAAS, MARY ROSE Executive class
Factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
PROBLEM: X filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Y on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition based solely on the Psychiatric Report of Dr.
Villegas which she derived from a 7-hour interview with the Xs employee, and Y. Is the RTC decision proper?
ANSWER: No, it is not proper. Three (3) factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. In the instant case, the expert opinion of a
psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests,
cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. Dr.
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Villegas sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations
Case citation: Edward N. Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim - G.R. No. 176464, February 2, 2010
Name/Class: CAMINERO, MEESHEL Executive class
Collusion
PROBLEM: Sometime in 1977, H and W were married in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. The couple was not
blessed with a child due to Ws hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.
On April 6, 1998, H filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Ws psychological incapacity to comply
with her essential marital obligations. W did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the
conjugal house and lot located in Pangasinan.
H testified that W always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she
constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas
worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with P, her paramour.
H presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she
administered on W, Dr. Reyes opined that W exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr.
Reyes found that Ws disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to
meet her marital obligations.
If you are the judge, will you grant the petition? Explain.
Was there collusion between H and W, because W did not interpose any objection to the petition?
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I will deny the petition. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and
duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.
To start with, Ws supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Hs consent, refusal
to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. H presented
no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-serving and would have no
serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.
No, there was no collusion between H and W. Verily, the payment to W could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her
and H. To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but
she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that H
willingly gave her an amount as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to
such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of
not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence determining the issue of
collusion between the spouses.
Case citation: Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Eduardo De Quintos Jr. G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
Name/Class: YU, RALPH MARTIN Regular Class
Relevance of expert opinion
PROBLEM: In January 1996, Edward Kenneth Ngo-Te and Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te met. In March 1996, they eloped to
cebu, but as soon as their survival money was depleted they returned to Manila. In April 23, 1996, Rowena's uncle brought both
parties to a court to be married. Edward was 25 years old and Rowena 20. Sometime in June, Edward returned to his home to
24

live with his parents, his wife did not want to live at his parents home and suggested that they live apart. After almost four
years, Kenneth filed for an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation,
submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to try the merits of the case. The
opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert psychologist. The OSG appealed and the CA ruled in
favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the Molina case to be followed as guidelines.
Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark
case of Molina?
ANSWER: Yes.The Supreme Court may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining Psychological
Incapacity. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there
is not much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals. The Supreme Court however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the Supreme Court
merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar.
The principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The Supreme Court then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both parties psychological
disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others. He is too
dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.
Case Citation: Edward Kenneth Go Te vs. Rowena Ong Guttierez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
Name/Class: DACAL, GOLDY LUCK Regular Class
Other evidence for psychological incapacity must be presented
PROBLEM: On March 27, 1965, Mariz and Marvin Cho-Ya (Marvin) were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan City.
Their union begot three children, namely, Felix, Paulo and Lambino.
On August 19, 1996, Mariz filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Marvins psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by personal service
on Marvin on October 21, 1996 by the sheriff. Marvin failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary
period.
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Mariz counsel, the RTC allowed the presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court.
Mariz testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Marvin has been a habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he (a) sometimes
sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he goes to her office, utters unwholesome remarks against her and drags her home,
(c) he usually lays a hand on her, (d) he often scolds their children without justifiable reason; his liquor drinking habit has
brought shame and embarrassment on their family; when she would refuse to give him money for his compulsive drinking habit,
he would beat her up and threaten her; he has not been employed since he was dismissed from work and he refuses to look for
a job; she has been the one supporting the family, providing for the education and the basic needs of their children out of her
salary as a government employee; on December 27, 1985, because of unbearable jealousy to her male officemates, Marvin
went to her office, dragged her home and then beat her up; her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and then told Marvin to
get out of the house;
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC, based only on the evidence adduced by Mariz, which washer testimony of
Marvins acts, rendered its decision nullifying the marriage of Mariz and Marvin.
Was the act of the court in granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage valid?
25
ANSWER: No. In order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication, evidence
other than Mariz lone testimony should have been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is
not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened Mariz claim of
Marvins alleged psychological incapacity. Mariz omission to present one is fatal to her position.
There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
The Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented
during the trial Which in this case was lacking, because the only evidenced that was used by the trial court was the testimony
of Norma who is the Petitioner also in this case.
Case citation: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006
Name/Class: SILVOSA, LEX JOSHUA ANDREW Regular Class
Interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code
PROBLEM: On May 2002, Corazon filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against her husband, Danilo on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She alleged that they were both psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying
with their respective essential marital obligations.
On November 8, 2002, Danilo filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground of the failure of the petition to state a cause
of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
On January 14, 2002 the trial Court denied the motion and ruled that the petition complied with the requirements of the Molina
doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during
trial.
Question: Is the denial of the Motion to Dismiss proper?
ANSWER: Yes, the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is proper. In the case of Aurelio vs Aurelio, June 6, 2011, the Supreme
Court held that each case involving Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of expert and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
Case citation: AURELIO VS AURELIO, G.R. 175367, JUNE 6, 2011
Name/Class: CHATTO, RUBY JEAN Executive class
Judgment must be based on evidence to establish the medical condition or disease
PROBLEM: Maria filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation against her
husband Rab on the ground of psychological incapacity. She avers that her husband was jobless and dependent to her. When
he was able to be a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her own
efforts and the help of her parents in order to live. Maria also complained that whenever Rab gets back to their home, they
usually have a constant quarrel. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and smoke marijuana and even forced her
to use it. The worst situation was when he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was
able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She then resorted to
the help of a psychologist who made psychological conclusion that the respondent is suffering from psychological hang ups.
Maria claimed that Rab was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and
such incapacity became manifest only after marriage. If you were the judge, will you grant the petition based on the
circumstances being presented?
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ANSWER: If I were the judge I will grant the petition for legal separation but not on the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity.
The law provides that it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party'spsychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Based on the
evidence presented, the same cannot prove that the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations thus the petition for nullity of marriage cannot be granted.
Case citation: Najera v Najera G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
Name/Class: MENIANO, MA. CYNDI THERESE Regular Class
Other cases regarding Psychological Incapacity
The totality of the evidence adduced by both parties (as regards their claim of grave psychological maladies), we
perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. (Juanita Carating Siayngco Vs. Manuel Siayngco. - G.R. No. 158896. October 27, 2004)
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy
to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the
group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner discovered per certification by the
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the number one moneymaker in the commercial
industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent
the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in
or connected with Blackgold
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that
she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired
it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money
from other people on false pretexts. She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he
separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Herrera, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who
stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner was
abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They
further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there
27

was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. (Leonilo
Antonio Vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes. - G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006)
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally " inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to
be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage
void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. (Ma. Armida Perez-
Ferraris vs. Brix Ferraris - G.R. No. 162368. July 17, 2006)
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification
of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in
the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of
the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. There is no evidence that Justos defects were present at the inception of the marriage. His
defects surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the
election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely,
these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage. Equally
important is that records fail to indicate that Justos defects are incurable or grave. (ROSA YAP PARAS vs. JUSTO J.
PARAS - G.R. No. 147824. August 2, 2007)
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her
report, Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a
borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very
weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions,
an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable
and aggresive, irresponsible and vain. She further defined nymphomia as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in
motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband. The report failed to specify,
however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out
by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her
husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but
also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain
Susan. Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how they
came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient
factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in Nilda's character that
effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her
psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment. (NILDA
V. NAVALES vs. REYNALDO NAVALES, G.R. No. 167523. June 27, 2008)
Narcissistic personality disorder. Rowenas evidence merely showed that Edward: (a) reneged on his promise to
cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her
greeting cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the
28

death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in
1997. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires, and
should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages. To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character
flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a
psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations.
Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by
only one side Rowenas whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does
not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a
more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed
the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent
and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctors probes. (Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua Vs. Eduardo
Rumbaua - G.R. No. 166738. August 14, 2009)
In granting Jeanices petition, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Gates to support its conclusion that
Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Gates declared that Jordan
was suffering from "Borderline Personality Disorder" as manifested by his being a "mamas boy" and that such was
"grave and incurable," "rooted in his family background, [and] antedates the marriage." However, contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, Jordans alleged psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as
to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanices
allegations showed that Jordan was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Jeanice
do not show that Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies that paralyzed Jordan from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity. (Jordan Chan
Paz Vs. Jeanice Pavon-Paz - G.R. No. 166579. February 18, 2010)
As shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is
the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality
disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. It is not enough that the respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the
respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on
the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and
refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that
these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. (Jocelyn M.
Suazo Vs. Angelito Suazo and Republic of the Philippines - G.R. No. 164493. March 10, 2010)
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.
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In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates
when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued
financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing
Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support
Cesars allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological
incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric
illness. Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as a
consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into
a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot
simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart
from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one
another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another.
To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores further belief
that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support. (Republic of the
Philippines Vs. Cesar Encelan - G.R. No. 170022. January 9, 2013)
Facts: Marieta filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. According to
her, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the
essential responsibilities and duties of a husband. She complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead
always asked his mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a room
near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental. She also testified that she constantly
encouraged her husband to find employment, but to no avail and continued to be dependent to his mother.
Apart from the foregoing, Marieta complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards
her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When
they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did
not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when she requested that they move to
another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to
leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.
Ruling: There was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.
First, Marieta successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband. It should be noted that,
apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which the psychiatric report was
based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of testimony. Significantly, her narration of facts was corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close
relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the
manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition,
sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. From the beginning of their marriage,
Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find
employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that
the couples inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to
his relationship to his mother. These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to
medical or clinical causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of psychology in general
and psychological incapacity, in particular.
Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
of marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first few years of
marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility, overdependence on
his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfos dependent
30

personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by product of his
upbringing and family life.
Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother cannot be attributed to his
immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or
the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior. Of course, this is
not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical cases of
patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and in the degree
of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type
of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions
and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe
mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who
cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who
cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was supported
by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness. At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar
predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time
and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts
must take into account not only developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including
the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial
and material support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an autonomous
social institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In
the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love,
respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage. (Marietta C. Azcueta Vs. Republic of
the Philippines and the CA - G.R. No. 180668. May 26, 2009)
Collateral attack on validity of marriage
PROBLEM: B, married to C, died in 1992. After his death, D, his common-law wife and E her daughter filed a Letters Of
Administration with respect to the late fathers estate. C together with her children opposed such contending that the alleged
daughter has no legal interest.
D argued that the marriage between B the deceased and C was void ab initio for having contracted while the latter was married
to another man. A Certificate of marriage was shown. On the other hand, C provided a certification from the National Archive
that no information existed.
Questions:
1)
2)
Does an illegitimate daughter have legal interest in the intestate proceeding?

Can E question collaterally the validity of marriage between B and C in a intestate proceeding?
ANSWER:
1)
Yes, an illegitimate daughter who is also a compulsory heir has a legal interest with respect to settlement proceeding
of her late father. Under the law, one has legal interest when he or she would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor
2)
E can collaterally attack the validity of marriage because a void marriage cannot be source of rights. Any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. The death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
31

The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage, and the fact that there is a certification from the National
Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries.
Case Citation: Quiazon et al vs Belen, G.R. No. 189121. July 31, 2013.
Name/Class: FLORES, LAWRENCE JOHN Regular Class
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
PROBLEM: Sometime in June 1986 during an occasion, Jose was introduced to Felisa by their common friend. The two were
madly attracted to each other that immediately thereafter, Jose came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his
landlady. Afraid of losing one another, the two did not waste time that on the November 24 1986, Jose and Felisa exchanged
vows. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, attesting that both of them had attained the age
of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Not long enough, their relationship turns sour. On 1993 Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he
and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through
fraud. Jose maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false. Felisa, on her side,
maintained that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with. She continued that even assuming that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment already prescribed.
Questions:
1) Does the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation be considered only as a mere irregularity which do not
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
2) Does Joses action prescribed?
ANSWER:
1)
No, the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. The
governing law during their marriage was Article 76 of the Civil Code which provides that,
No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law
not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. The falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.
2)
No, an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage
license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Case citation: Republic of the Phil vs. Jose A. Dayot / Felisa Tecson-Dayot vs. Jose A. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008
Name/Class: OCBA, DEJEH Executive class
Questioning the validity of marriages
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which
32

they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of
action is for the correction of Patricks birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively,
hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that,
doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death
benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the
husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two
marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are
not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all betweenthe
petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as
the petitioners mother and the substitution thereof with Tiu Chuan who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral
attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth
records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is Filipino, not Chinese, because their parents
were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely
innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts
grant of the petition.
The above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case. (Ma. Cristina Torres Braza, et
al. Vs. The City Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza, represented by
Leon Titular, et al. - G.R. No. 181174. December 4, 2009)
Art. 45(5) lack of power to copulate
QUESTION: On October 11, 2000, Rey married Veronica. After the wedding, they lived together for five days in Mindoro where
they consummated their marriage. However, after they went back to Manila, Rey left for Riyadh to work for a year and a half.
And upon his return, he did not go home to Veronica nor did he contact her. Thus, Veronica filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage due to Reys physical incapability to consummate his marriage under Art. 45 of the Family Code. Was Reys physical
incapability to consummate their marriage a ground for annulment?
ANSWER: No. Art 45 (5) of the FC refers to the lack of power to copulate. Incapability to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouse to perform act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be caused by a
physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block
or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.
In the present case, the spouses lived together for five days after the celebration of their marriage in Mindoro where they
consummated their marriage. Hence, there was no ground for annulment.
Case citation: Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar vs. Rey C. Alcazar - G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
Name/Class: TANTUAN, EDHONA Regular Class
Article 49 of the Family Code granting visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children
PROBLEM: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a year after their marriage, Ma. Theresa
gave birth to Jose Gerardo. However on December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario
Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola
Heights, Quezon City. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the
marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.
33
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the
child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the
'bastardization' of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called 'visitation rights'' between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of
any Sunday." She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child." Gerardo opposed the motion.
The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for
the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so
that she could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for
reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by
Mario during her first marriage. Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied. Hence,
this appeal. Resolve.
ANSWER: The petition filed by Gerardo is hereby denied. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other's company. There being no such parent-child relationship
between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Article 167 of the Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. The status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of
his parents is legitimate. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose
Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt
that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola
Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove
personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband,
Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who
asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue
of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall
have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames. A person's surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent
to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any
way.
34

Case Citation: Gerardo B. Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 123450
Name/Class: DE LUNA, AMIE ROXYLEN Regular Class
III)
Legal Separation (Family Code)
Abandonment as grounds for legal separation

PROBLEM: Agatha and Dee were married on 1975 and the said union was blessed with three (3) chidren. On 1995, Agatha
asked Dee to bring Kelly, their daughter, back from Agusan Del Sur (wherein Dee brought her away from Agatha), which turned
into a violent quarrel between them, wherein Dee hit Agatha on the head, left cheek, eye, stomack and arms. Ultimately, Dee
pointed a gun to Agatha's head asking her to leave their house.
On 1996, Agatha filed a complaint for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code on grounds of physical violence,
threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of Dee. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the prayer for legal separation.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the lower court's decision.
The case was submitted for review to the Supreme Court. Dee contends that a decree of legal separation should not be granted
when both spouses have given a ground for legal separation under Article 56 (4) of the Family Code. As one of the Justices,
decide the case.
ANSWER: Dee's contention is untenable and his petition should be denied.
It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have given ground for legal separation (Art
56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.
In the case at bar, it was established that Agatha left because of the abusive conduct of Dee which is considered as a justifiable
cause to abandon the conjugal home. Said abandonment cannot be considered as one of the grounds contemplated under the
law.
Case Citation: Ong Eng Kiam AKA William Ong vs. Lucita G. Ong., GR No. 153206, October 23, 2006
Name/Class: BISCAYDA, KRISTEL JOY Regular Class
Effects of the decree of legal separation
PROBLEM: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot
in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.
Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest
money and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in
the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property.
Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of
Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the
wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional
Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty.
Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to InterDimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land.
Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and
Winifred to Inter-Dimensional.
35

However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the
consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of
legal separation by the Cavite RTC.
Questions: Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? Did the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share
in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal separation?
ANSWER: The sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which
require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of
the husband, Alfredo.
CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the
Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides
that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said, Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the
conjugal partnership property. Thus, as regards this point, the CA erred.
Case Citation: Mario Siochi Vs. Alfredo Gozon, et al./Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. Vs. Mario Siochi, et al. - G.R. No.
169900/G.R. No. 169977
Name/Class: LADONGA, LEOMAR Regular Class
IV)
Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Family Code)
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating.
Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from
home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as
beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but
their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact,
they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal
intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to
any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is,
they appear to lack a conscience.
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4)
failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa. (Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes Vs. Ramon Reyes - G.R. No. 185286. August 18,
2010)
V)
Property Relations of the Spouses (Family Code)
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code

PROBLEM: P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to return partnership funds representing profits from the
sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover from P retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance
of the cash advance that he obtained.
36

R prevailed in the case he filed. On the execution of judgment the sherriff levied two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and
1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818. P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had
levied on properties belonging to his children and wife Joena (whom P married on 1998 after the dissolution of his first
marriage). Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal
properties sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP. Is the contention of Joena correct?
ANSWER: NO. The contention of Joena is not correct. In the case presented Joena asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles
purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community
regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
Case Citation: SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B. ABRENICA, vs. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and
TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N. TUNGOL G.R. No. 180572 June 18, 2012.
Name/Class: SUPATAN, LORENA Regular Class
Conjugal Property
PROBEM: Sps. A and B acquired a parcel of land, Lot 5, from Bs mother during the subsistence of their marriage. This land,
however, was never registered during the same period. In 1942 B died. A subsequently contracted a new marriage with C in
1967. During this union, A and C had two children together, namely Y and Z. A then applied for a free patent over Lot 5 and
was issued an OCT in his name with a personal circumstance that he is married to C. Later, A sold the land to Y, his daughter
with C. W and X, As children with his late spouse B, contested the sale arguing that the sale was void because A failed to obtain
their consent, being co-owners thereof. As compulsory heirs upon the death of B, W and X claim that they acquired successional
rights over the land.
In her Answer, Y argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the second marriage of A with C. Y stressed that the OCT
was issued in the name of A, married to C. Thus, the property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the Sps. A and C.
Questions:
1) Does Lot 5 belong to the conjugal partnership of Sps. A and C?
2) Is the sale of Lot 5 to Y valid?
ANSWER: No, Lot 5 does not belong to the conjugal partnership of Sps. A and C. The law provides that every certificate of title
shall set forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land, including their civil
status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence and postal address. If the
property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both spouses.
In the case at bar, the phrase "A, married to C" merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered
owner A. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is conjugal.
The sale of Lot 5 to Y is valid. The law provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent.
In the case at bar, at the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the
heirs of A. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable
consideration, W and X have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived
them of their respective shares.
A applied for and was issued a free patent while already married to C. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner
and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject
property ipso jure became private property and formed part of As exclusive property. It was therefore excluded from the
conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. As the sole and exclusive owner, A had the right to convey his property in
favor of Y.
Case Citation: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia GR No 184148, June 9 2014
Name/Class: SANTIAGO, JANRY NIO Regular Class
37
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the
ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From
April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus
interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering
the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot
is considerably more than theP60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject
property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the
written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. (Francisco Muoz, Jr. Vs. Erlinda Ramirez, et al. - G.R.
No. 156125. August 25, 2010)
Joint Administration of Spouses of Conjugal Property

PROBLEM: Spouses OA (husband) and RA (wife) are separated de facto. They left Lot 2 where their house was situated to
OAs brother, VA. Subsequently, OA (husband), without the consent of his wife RA sold the lot to his brother VA. The Deed of
Sale was executed with RAs signature in blank. Is the sale valid, voidable or void?
ANSWER: No, the sale is void ab initio.
Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. They do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
In the case at bar, OAs sale of their conjugal property made by him alone is void in its entirety. VA was well aware that the said
property is the conjugal property of Spouses OA and RA. OA sold the lot to his brother without procuring the consent of his
wife. VA is in bad faith because when he received the sale documents, he was aware of the infirmity not bearing RAs signature.
Case citation: Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas vs. Spouses Victor and Elena Alinas, G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008.
Name/Class: BELDEROL, DAPHNE DIONE Regular Class
PROBLEM: H and W are husband and wife. In October 1995, W obtained a loan amounting to 400k from C. To secure the loan,
W executed a deed of real estate mortgage on a property which is however part of the conjugal. Only W signed the deed. But in
November 1995, H executed a special power of attorney authorizing W to mortgage the property. W was not able to pay the
loan despite repeated demands from C. C then filed an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court ruled that the action for
foreclosure cannot prosper because it appears that there was no valid mortgage between W and C. W mortgaged the property
without the consent of her husband and the special power of attorney executed by H a month after the execution of the deed
did not cure the defect. Is the trial court correct?
ANSWER: The trial courts contention is incorrect.
Under the law, while it is true that mortgaging a conjugal property, being an act of strict dominion, by one spouse without the
consent of the other spouse is void. However, under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction shall be considered as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offeror.
In the case at bar, although the mortgage between W and C was void at the beginning, the subsequent execution of the special
power of attorney by H authorizing W to mortgage the property resulted to the perfection of the mortgage as the subsequent
authorization given by H to W is equivalent to an acceptance by H on the continuing offer on the part of the W and C.
Therefore, there was a valid real estate mortgage and that the action for foreclosure by C should prosper.
Case Citation: ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO, G.R. No. 183984 April 13,
38

2011
Name/Class: SANTOS, LOUIE ERNEST Regular Class
PROBLEM: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in
1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the
documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php
60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the
consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and
claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale
was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and
control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997,the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey
the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature
was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of
fraud is 4 years from discovery. Does Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed?
ANSWER: No. Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses did not prescribe. Although Tarciano and
Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family
Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property
done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact
that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the action has already prescribed, based on the discovery
of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract
due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other
spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
Case citation: Manuel O. Fuentes, et al. vs. Conrado G. Roca, et al., G.R. No. 178902, Apr 21, 2010
Name/Class: ACOSTA, ROLAND GABBY Executive class
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without
the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court. The
particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was
not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute
community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale
is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement,
such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing
the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and
execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not
include the lot, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns
consent. (Patrocinia Ravina and Wilfredo Ravina vs. Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille - G.R. No. 160708. October 16, 2009)
Charges to the conjugal partnership

PROBLEM: Sps. Mekiniko and Mekinika filed a complaint for damages against Debart Candoda Said action originated from Mr.
Candodas civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against him by the Spouses. On 6 April 2014, the trial
court rendered a decision ordering Debart to pay the former the amount of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as moral
damages, fifteen thousand (P15,000.00) pesos as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, another fifteen thousand (P15,000.00)
pesos as exemplary damages and the cost of suit. Finding Debarts personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property in execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga. A notice
of sheriffs sale was then issued.
Mrs. Candoda the wife of Debart Candoda, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary
injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff, Alleging that the contested property is conjugal in nature hence the
personal obligation of Mr. Candoda is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Is Mrs. Candodas Contention correct?
ANSWER: Yes, Mrs. Candodas contention is correct
39

Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Since the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Mr. Debart did not in any way redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, the conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation.
Case citation: Spouses Roberto Buado and Venus Buado vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 14522, April 24,
2009
Name/Class: GEROMO, FELIX LOUIS Executive class

Dissolution of Conjugal Property
Question: Explain the process of computing net profits in an absolute community of property regime and that of a conjugal
partnership of gains.
ANSWER: In absolute community, the market value of the properties at the time of dissolution is determined and from this
value the debts and obligations are deducted. From the value, the properties at the time of the marriage are also deducted. The
remainder is the net profit.
In a conjugal partnership of gains, conjugal and exclusive property is separated. Debts of the partnership are paid from the
partnership assets while personal debts of the spouses are paid from their exclusive properties. Any parnership debt advanced
by a spouse is an asset of the partnership while any benefit a spouse has derived from the partnership must be returned. Any
amount left in the partnership is the net profit.
Case citation: Quiao vs. Quiao - G.R. 176556 July 4, 2012
Name/Class: VELOSO, MARVIN JOSHUA Regular class
PROBLEM: Lorna de Ubalde and Juan de Asis got married on March 1, 1951 in Bacolod City. After six years, or on April 1,
1957, they separated. They entered into an agreement, which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains
shall be deemed dissolved as of April 15, 1957. They submitted such agreement to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental where the custody case was pending, which approved the same on June 6, 1961.
On December 12, 1984, Lorna filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against Juan before the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental and asked for her conjugal share in Juans inheritance as per the settlement of the
estate of Juans parents, who died on November 17, 1975. If you were the judge, decide on Lornas petition.
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I will dismiss Lornas petition.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains.
The finality of the June 6, 1961 Order approving the parties separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Civil Code.
A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive upon the parties.
Case citation: Lorea de Ugalde vs. Jon de Ysasi, Gr. No. 130623, February 29, 2008.
Name/Class: PITALCORIN, FEONA IVANA Regular Class
Article 160 of the Civil Code on conjugal partnership
PROBLEM: W and H are married and their property relation was governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. Upon the
death of H, such property relation was terminated. Few months after the death of H, a transfer of certificate of title was issued
solely in the name of "W, of legal age, widow, Filipino covering certain properties. Since she is now the registered owner of the
property she sold it to B. Her children question the sale, alleging that the property is part of the conjugal partnership of their
parents and hence, what W sold is only up to her share, no evidence was presented by Ws children since they invoke the
application of the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code. Is Ws Children correct?
ANSWER: No. Article 160 of the Civil Code states that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
40
For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed
acquired during the marriage as a condition sine qua non for its operation in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. In other words, the presumption
in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In this case, the children of W, did not present any evidence to prove their claim and they only relied to the presumption.
Hence, Article 160 of Civil Code cannot be made to apply.
Case citation: Bobby Tan Vs. Grace Andrade, et al./Grace Andrade, et al. Vs. Bobby Tan G.R. No. 171904/G.R. No. 172017.
August 7, 2013
Name/Class: COLIS, ROSELETTE ANN Executive class
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows: "Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on
the face of the title that the properties were acquired by the spouse when she was already a widow. When the
property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by
said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved. (Francisco Lim Vs. Equitable PCI Bank, now known as Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. - G.R.
No. 183918. January 15, 2014)
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. As the
parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peas did not even come
close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond
Antonias bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married, the
record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When
queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the
property was owned by his parents was Antonias unilateral pronouncement to the effect. Considering that the
presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired, we find that the CA cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonias exclusive property.
(Antonia R. Dela Pea, et al. Vs. Gemma Remilyn C. Avila and Far East Bank & Trust Co. - G.R. No. 187490. February
8, 2012)
Sale of conjugal property without the spouses consent
PROBLEM: Leonardo de Caprio married to Kate Winslet died on November 26, 1986. Elsa Frozen, the legitimate and eldest
daughter of Leonardo was appointed as one of the administratix. Elsa discovered sometime in 1990 that her stepmother Kate
Winslet sold Lot 39, Block 12 located in Cebu City to one Justin Beiber without the consent of Leonardo de Caprio. The
respondent filed a case for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale alleging that it was voidable. Will the case prosper?
ANSWER: Yes, the case will prosper. The applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172 of
the Old Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands
consent. The disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the husbands consent is voidable is supported by Article
173 of the Old Civil Code which states that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such
consent is required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned.
Elsa, as one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos estate, had the right therefore to seek for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale as it deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their hereditary rights. Consequently,
the sale is invalid and must be cancelled.
Case citation: SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN., GR No. 177235 July 7, 2014
Name/Class: GERMONES, ARJUN Regular Class
41
According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the same
Code. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not make
the husbands alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable. Hence,
the Deed is valid until and unless annulled.
In this case, the records show no evidence that any action to annul the transfer made by Honorio was ever brought by
Ana within ten years from the transaction questioned. Her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract has thus
prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable. (Vicente G. Villaranda Vs. Sps. Honorio G.
Villaranda, etc., et al. - G.R. No. 153447. February 23, 2004)
Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the conjugal partnership after the effectivity of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Civil Code). The Civil Code came into force on 30 August 1950. Although there is no dispute
that the Properties were conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do not show, and the parties did not
stipulate, when the Properties were acquired. Under Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil Code, the husband could
alienate conjugal partnership property for valuable consideration without the wifes consent. Even under the present
Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is not void. It is well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal real property
without the wifes consent are merely voidable under the Civil Code that is, binding on the parties unless annulled by
a competent court and not void ab initio.
Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real property without her
consent. The wife must file the action for annulment during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned
transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the remedies available if the wife fails to exercise this right within the specified
period. In such case, the wife or her heirs can only demand the value of the property provided they prove that the
husband fraudulently alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.
Respondents action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article 166 must fail for having been filed out of time. The
marriage of Mauricio and Simona was dissolved when Mauricio died in 1973. More than ten years have passed since
the execution of the Deed of Sale. Further, respondents, who are Simonas heirs, are not the parties who can invoke
Article 166. Article 173 reserves that remedy to the wife alone. Only Simona had the right to have the sale of the
Properties annulled on the ground that Mauricio sold the Properties without her consent. (Lily Elizabeth Bravo-
Guerrero, et al. Vs. Edward P. Bravo. - G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005)
Decree of absolute nullity of marriage, its effects
Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated
to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the very beginning. It does not apply
to a cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife.
Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, the law can be
applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The petitioner failed to prove that she had any
vested right over the property in question. (Josefina C. Francisco Vs. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, et
al - G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005)
PROBLEM: Parcos and Elixia were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to
separate in 1994. In 1996, Parcos and Elixia decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married.
On May 30, 2011, Parcos filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Elixia, citing Psychological Incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The court rendered the following judgment:
1. Declaring the marriage between Parcos and Elexia, and all its effects, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
42

3. Declaring that the decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Parcos filed for a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the Dissolution of the Absolute Community Property and the
ruling that a decree of annulment shall only be issued upon partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147
of the Family Code.
The Trial Court partially granted the motion and modified its decision stating that a DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued after the liquidation, partition and distribution of properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
Will you agree with the Trial Court in its ruling on the motion?
ANSWER: No, I will not agree.
In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as Parcos
and Elixia in the case before the Court.
Article 147 provides that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
Therefore, the rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouse should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the New Civil Code, partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding of
nullity of marriage.
Case Citation: Alain M. Dio Vs. Ma. Caridad L. Dio - G.R. No. 178044
Name/Class: CANILLO, BHOUWLS Regular
Judicial separation of property under Article 135
PROBLEM: Yoshi Reyes (Yoshi) and Meg Reyes (Meg) were married in QC, Philippines. They resided in California, USA where
they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Ron Reyes and Martha Reyes.
During their marriage, they acquired properties in the Philippines and the USA. Due to business reverses, Yoshi left the USA and
returned to the Philippines in 2001. According to Meg, sometime in September 2003, Yoshi abandoned his family and lived with
Gladys Postrano in Aurora Province. Upon learning of the extra-marital affair, Meg filed a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California. The California court granted the petition on June 24, 2005. The California court granted to Meg the custody
of their two children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA.
On August 8, 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora anchoring
her petition on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code.
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations
to the family as provided for in Article 101;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In Yoshis Answer, he stated that there was already a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage by the Superior Court in
California. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated.
The RTC rendered judgment, recognizing the divorce decree; hence, awarding to Yoshi only the net assets of the absolute
43

community of property of the parties in the Philippines and in the sole ownership of Meg the properties in the USA. On appeal,
the CA modified the trial courts decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.
Questions:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Is the trial court correct in recognizing the divorce decree? If so, is the trial court correct in proceeding the liquidation?
Is there abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of property?
Assuming that it is established that Meg and Yoshi had actually separated for at one year and the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property is granted, what is the procedure for liquidation?
The trial court rendered the decision that the titles presently covering the US properties of the spouses shall be
cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded. It also ruled that
of the properties in the US awarded to Meg should be given to her two minor children with Yoshi, as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles /documents covering the said properties. Are these rulings
proper?
ANSWER:
1)
No, the trial court is not correct in recognizing the divorce decree.
Under the law, Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. As a rule, no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the foreigner must comply with our rules of evidence.
In the instant case, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Hence, the trial court erred in
recognizing the divorce decree alone which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the RTC did with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of the divorce decree is entirely different matter because, to begin with, divorced is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that
the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
2)
No, there is no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of properties.

Under Article 101 of the Family Code, abandonment must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when he or she left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not
returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, Meg knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown. Actual abandonment
has not been proven. Therefore, judicial separation of properties on such ground alone should not be warranted.
3)
Under Article 102 of the New Civil Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the
following procedure should apply:
a.
b.
c.
d.
An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
property of each spouse.
The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of
said assets, the spouse shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in
accordance with the provision in the second paragraph of Article 94.
Whatever remain the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered each of them.
The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in the Civil Code.
For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63
44
e.
f.
4)
No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
The said rulings of the trial court are not proper.

Article 16 of the New Civil Code clearly states that the real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.
In the instant case, Philippine courts have no and will not acquire jurisdiction over the Califonia properties of Yoshi and
Meg. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
Case citation: David A. Noveras vs. Leticia T. Noveras - G.R. No. 188289. August20, 2014
Name/Class: CARTAJENAS, CLEO MARJO Executive class
Separation of property
PROBLEM: Virgil Maquilan filed a criminal case against his spouse Dita Maquilan and her paramour on the ground of adultery.
The two accused were convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. After the adultery case has been decided, Virgil filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages with
the RTC on the ground of Ditas psychological incapacity. However, during the pre-trial of the case, the spouses voluntarily
entered into a compromise agreement partially dividing their properties among themselves and their only son. The compromise
agreement was given Judicial Imprimatur by the RTC but Virgil filed an omnibus motion to repudiate the Compromise
Agreement and reconsider the judgment rendered on the ground that his former lawyer failed to intelligently and judiciously
apprise him of the agreements consequential effects. Is the voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage valid?
ANSWER: Yes. Article 143 of the Family Code provides that the separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause subject to judicial approval.
T h e qu e st i o n ed C o m pr o m i se A gr e em en t w h i c h w a s j u di c i a l l y
a p p r o v e d i s e x a c t l y s u c h a s e p a r a t i o n o f pr o p e r t y a l l o w e d u n d er t h e l a w . Such is applicable even if the
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of marriage is still pending. However, pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code,
voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons
with pecuniary interest.
Case Citation: Maquilan vs Maquilan; G.R. No. 155409; June 8, 2007
Name/Class: LONGOS, JOSE MANUEL Regular Class
Where the ground for nullity of marriage is Psychological Incapacity, properties acquired during the union of the
parties
PROBLEM: Juan was married to Eden on September 1986 and had a daughter named Joan. Five months into their weeding
Juan left them both. After a few years Eden filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Art. 36 of the Family Code. The petition stated that the spouses did not have any conjugal properties. The RTC granted
the petition and further provided the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains if any. Subsequently, Eden filed a
Manifestation and Motion stating that she discovered three parcels of land under the name of Juan. This prompted Juan to file
an opposition arguing that Eden had waived her rights to the 3parcels of land and likewise enumerated other properties
allegedly waived in her favor.
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules, even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court can
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially
adjudicated upon. Further, The RTC found that the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned
and distributed between Juan and Eden and that Juan failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties.
Question: How will the discovered properties be distributed between the spouses?
45

ANSWER: The discovered properties will be divided according to the law on co-ownership as provided for in Art. 147 of the
Family Code. In Dio v. Dio, the court held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case.
Article147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the
couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Juan did not rebut this presumption.
Case Citation: Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. v. Eden Villena Aguila GR No. 202370, September 23, 2013.
Name/Class: LIM, BRIAN Regular Class
The records reveal that Nonato and Barridos marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is
46

clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision
pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have
existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However,
their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. (Marietta N. Barrido Vs.
Leonardo V. Nonato - G.R. No. 176492. October 20, 2014)
Co-ownership in cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other]
PROBLEM: Trowa Barton and Dorothy Catalonia were married on June 1980. Although they did not have common children,
both have children from prior marriages (Trowas daughter is Cagalli, while Dorothys son is Yzak), noting however, that at the
time of the marriage, Dorothys prior marriage was still subsisting, while Trowas marriage was dissolved by virtue of his wifes
death in 1960.
According to Yzak, Trowa purchased a portion of Vitas property sometime in 1968, the remaining portion of which was
purchased by Cagalli on her fathers behalf in 1970. The property was covered by TCT 141782 issued to Trowa Barton, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Dorothy Catalonia dated December 1980. He also claimed that starting 1978, the father and daughter
operated small business establishments referred to as Delpan property.
On Sept 6, 1997, Trowa sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Cagalli and her husband Athrun Zala. Trowa and Dorothy
respectively passed away on Sept 11, 1997 and July 1999 respectively.
Sometime in 2000, Yzaks mother, Leonora, discovered the sale. Thus, he, represented by Leonora, filed for Petition for
Annulment of Deeds of Sale alleging that the sale of properties was fraudulent because Trowas signatures on the deeds of sale
were forged. Spouses Zala on the other hand, argued that because of Dorothys prior marriage to Quatre, her subsequent
marriage to Trowa was null and void. Thus, neither Dorothy nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties
purchased by Trowa and spouses Zala.
During trial, Yzak argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by
Trowa and Dorothy because the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued several months after the parties were married, and the
title to the land was issued to "Trowa Barton, of legal age, married to Dorothy Catalonia.
Question: Is Yzaks contention tenable?
ANSWER: No, Yzaks contention is not tenable. Article 148 of the Family Code, provides:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. xxx
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were
acquired during the cohabitation of Trowa and Dorothy; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the
parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
In the present case, the title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Trowa alone. The phrase "married to Dorothy
Catalonia" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Dorothy co-owned the property. The facts also
established that Trowa acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Dorothy, even if the certificate of
title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not
vest title. Thus, co-ownership between Trowa and Dorothy cannot be presumed.
47

Case citation: Edilberto Ventura vs Sps Paulino & Evangeline Abuda - GR No. 202932. October 23, 2013.
Name/Class: TIMBAL, MA. CECELIA Executive class
Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal
union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by
law owned in common by the husband and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of
the Code, which we quote:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse."
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the
wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties
must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage.
The law places the burden of proof on the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to establish their claim by a preponderance of
evidence -- evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing than that which is offered to oppose it.
On the other hand, Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a woman who are living
together but are not legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though, that for Article 144 to apply, the couple
must not be incapacitated to contract marriage. It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-law
relations amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in this case. The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a coownership in cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife.
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied. The latter Article provides:
"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party which acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith."
Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. (Milagros Joaquino Vs. Lourdes Reyes, et al - G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004)
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza
was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime,
therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required. As it is, the regime of limited
co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
48

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or
the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. (Lupo Atienza vs.
Yolanda de Castro - G.R. No. 169698. November 29, 2006)

Post Marriage Modification
PROBLEM: Petitioner Jobert Baldado (Jobert), his wife Bubbles, and others were accused of murder. Jobert was acquitted but
Bubbles and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Jobert and Bubbles. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were
issued.
Jobert and his wife Bubbles filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Bubbles.
Question: Can the conjugal properties of spouses Jobert and Bubbles be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Bubbles civil liability in the murder case?
ANSWER: Yes, Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Jobert does not dispute the RTCs finding that Bubbles has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil
indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Case citation: Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
Name/Class: SALISE, HECTOR CHRISTOPHER JR. Executive class
Inapplicability of the rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other.
PROBLEM: Walter, a German citizen who was assigned to work in a company here in the Philippines, met Myrna, a Filipina who
was a separated mother with two boys, in a hotel where the latter works. Walter befriended Myrna and asked her to tutor him
in English. In dire need of additional income to support her children, she agreed. The two fell in love and decided to live
together, so Walter then bought a house and lot in Cebu City. In the contract, the two of them were referred as buyers but the
title was issued in Myrna's name alone.
After a few years, their relationship ended and Walter then decided to sell the house and lot to Carlo. When the latter tried to
register the deed of absolute sale, he found out that the property was registered in the name of Myrna and the same has
already been mortgaged. Subsequently, Carlo filed an action for reconveyance. In her answer, Myrna stated that she owns the
property since it was registered in her name, the same was acquired during their cohabitation, and Walter, being an alien, was
prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.
Would Carlo's action prosper?
ANSWER: Yes. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case,
Myrna was still legally married to another when she and Walter lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no coownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
49

acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution
do not apply.
Walter solely and exclusively used his own funds to buy the property. The mere registration of the title under the name of the
Myrna does not confer upon her absolute ownership against convincing evidence that the property was financed exclusively by
the Walter. Thus, the sale of the property to Carlo is valid. Consequently, the action for reconveyance would prosper.
Case citation: Borromeo vs. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009)
Name/Class: ALI, BAI MARA ODESSA Regular Class
Compromise in a suit between family members
Article 151 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. Hence, a sister-inlaw or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.
As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
Thus, a partys failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a family member
would render such complaint premature.
In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151 of the Family code
and that they failed to do so is erroneous. Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in
the MTC. She is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. (April
Martinez, et al. Vs. Rodolfo G. Martinez - G.R. No. 162084. June 28, 2005)
VI)
The Family Home
PROBLEM: Mr. X bought Lot No. 7777 located in Zamboanga del Sur from its registered owner. Mr Z, on the other hand, was
an awardee in a cadastral proceeding of a nearby lot (Lot No. 7778) but had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse
possession of Lot 7777. A complaint was instituted by Mr. X against Mr. Z. The court decided in favor of Mr. X and the decision
became final and executory. Mr. X, thereafter, filed a motion to execute the judgment but Mr. Z argued that the property was
duly constituted as a family home which is not subject of execution. Is Mr. Zs contention tenable? Decide.
ANSWER: No, Mr. Zs contention not tenable. The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute
community or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It
cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on community
property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with consent of the latter. If constituted by
an unmarried head of a family, where there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only on his or
her own property. In the instant case, the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by respondents and the
question of ownership had been long laid to rest. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance
of respondents.
50
Case citation: Simeon Cabang, et al. Vs. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay - G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009
Name/Class: ALI, YASIR Executive class
Who are beneficiaries
PROBLEM: Marcelino died intestate on July 10, 2002. He was survived by his wife, Carmelita, and children, Danny, Roberto and
Rick. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building in Labangon, Cebu
City.
On August 20, 2013 his wife children decided to extrajudicially settle his estate. Subsequently, Carmelita, Danny and Roberto
advised Rick of their intention to partition the property. Rick opposed the partition claiming that the subject property which is
the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Carmelita cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still
living therein namely, his 12-year-old daughter, who is the granddaughter of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor
is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Rick insists that even after the
expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 10, 2002, the subject property continues to be considered as
the family home considering that his minor daughter, Samantha, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the
premises.
Is the partition of the family home proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a
minor beneficiary still resides in the said home?
ANSWER: No. The minor granddaughter is not dependent on the grandmother.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must
be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house
specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for
legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of
the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses
or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns
the property or constituted the family home.
In the case at bar, Samantha satisfies the first two requisites of who must be the beneficiaries of the family home, however, the
third requisite was not fulfilled. Samantha cannot demand support from her paternal grandmother if she has parents who are
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on her parents, especially her father, Rick, who is the
head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially
the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Thus, despite residing in the family home and her being a descendant of Marcelino, Samantha cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because she did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on her grandmother
for legal support. It is her father whom she is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Case citation: PERLA G. PATRICIO vs MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division
[G.R. No. 170829; November 20, 2006]
Name/Class: VERANA, ILEEN MAE Regular Class
51

Exemption from Execution
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it
was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such
privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must
have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and
233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the
courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the
execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with
either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there
is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family
home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts
depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as
1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the laws protective mantle
cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute
the judgment but failed because Ramos bank accountswere already closed while other properties in his or the
companys name had already been transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan property. (Juanita
Trinidad Ramos, et al. Vs. Danilo Pangilinan et al. - G.R. No. 185920. July 20, 2010)
In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., we stressed that: Under the Family Code, there is no need
to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized
as follows: First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must
be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in
order to be exempt from execution; Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein; Third, family residences which were
not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded
to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that
the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, We
agree with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. The settled rule is that
the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted
to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
52

before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely
alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff. x x x. Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before
the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them
from later claiming the said exemption. (Sps. Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa Vs. Sps. Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
and Ma. Rufina D. Acero, et al. - G.R. No. 185064. January 16, 2012)
Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially. The settled rule is
that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the
property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the
party from later claiming the exception. In the case under consideration, petitioners allegedly filed with the trial court
an Urgent Motion to Suspend Auction Sale on the Property of Defendants which was dated 12 September 2000. The
said motion was filed before 19 September 2000, the scheduled date for the sale of the subject property at public
auction. The records of the case, however, do not disclose that petitioners in the said motion set up and proved that
the property to be sold was their family home. (Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola vs. Hon. Court of Appeals - G.R. No.
164740. July 31, 2006)
Exemption from Execution; Exceptions

PROBLEM: Spouses Alpha and Beta contracted a loan with Omega Bank. As security for the said amount, a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) was executed over a condominium unit owned by the spouses. Alpha signed the REM both as principal debtor
and as President of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, Sigma Trading, Inc.
The spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation. The spouses offered to settle their indebtedness
through dacion en pago with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot of corresponding value but the bank rejected the
offer. Omega Bank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage by filing an ex parte petition to foreclose
the mortgage.
The spouse then applied for an Injunction, alleging that the subject property is being used and occupied by the spouses and
their children as a family home. They further claimed that the extrajudicial foreclosure will cause grave injustice and irreparable
injury to them and their four (4) young children because their family home, in which they were residing since 1997, at least
insofar as the unencumbered area in excess of 180.750 sq. m., is exempt from forced sale or execution under Article 155 of the
Family Code. Omega Bank, on the other hand, will not suffer any loss if the foreclosure will not proceed. Is the spouses
contention meritorious?
ANSWER: No, the spouses contention is unmeritorious.
Arts. 153 and 155 of the Family Code generally provides that a family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment, but an exception to this rule is when the debt is secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution.
In the case at bar, the spouses constituted the property as security for its loan. The condominium was subject to a Real Estate
Mortgage. Besides the registered owner of the condominium is Sigma Trading and not the spouses. Even if the condominium
unit constitutes their family home, the same is not exempt from foreclosure as the law allows the execution or forced sale for
debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution.
Case citation: EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. vs. OJ-MARK TRADING, INC. and SPOUSES OSCAR AND EVANGELINE MARTINEZ,
G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010
Name/Class: BAUTISTA, RAMON ISAGANI III Regular Class
Spouses Fortalezas argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it is a family home
deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza
voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even
53

notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public
auction. (Sps. Charlie Fortaleza and Ofelia Fortaleza Vs. Sps. Raul Lapitan and Rona Lapitan - G.R. No. 178288. August
15, 2012)
VII)
Paternity and Filiation (Family Code)
We have recognized that "filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases,
the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child."
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a
"baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." (Charles Gotardo Vs. Divina Buling - G.R. No. 165166. August 15, 2012)
DNA in paternity and filiation

Question: Is DNA Test a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation?
ANSWER: Yes, DNA Test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
It is a settled jurisprudence in 2002, that there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible
object evidence in Philippine courts (ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo, 2002).
Moreover, in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the following are the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test
results in a paternity suit (known as the Vallejo Guidelines):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
How the samples were collected;

How they were handled;
The possibility of contamination of the samples;
The procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
Whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and
The qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
Note: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the
evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
Case citation: Herrera vs Alba - GR No. 148220. June 15, 2005
Name/Class: TAYAO, IRISH Executive class
Proof in filiation
PROBLEM: M and her minor son R filed a claim for support against Mr. A, alleged illegitimate father of R as appeared in the
certificate of live birth. However, Mr. A denied such fact considering that such certificate did not contain any proof or his
signature showing that he signify to be Rs putative father.
Question: Is certificate of live birth a sufficient proof of filiation as basis for the granting of support?
54

ANSWER: Certificate of live birth is not a sufficient proof of filiation. The law provides that the filiation of legitimate and
illegitimate children is established by any of the following:
1)
2)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

An admission of legitimate or illegitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
a)
b)
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child; or
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
However, paternity or proof of filiation must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proving affirmative
allegation of filiation rest with the applicant.
In the case of Antonio Perla vs. Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla, the court ruled that Certificate of Live Birth has no probative
value to establish filiation if it is not signed by the putative father. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate.
Therefore, Mr. A is not liable to support R because his illegitimate filiation has not been proven.
Case citation: Antonio Perla vs. Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla, G.R. No. 172471, Nov. 12, 2012
Name/Class: VILLAROJO, SUNNY RAY Executive class
Paternity and filiation of an accused in a criminal case
PROBLEM: AAA gave birth to a baby girl on April 24, 2002. She alleged to have been raped by her uncle Abat on September
22, 2001. Abat argues that if it were true that he raped AAA in September 2001, then the baby girl AAA gave birth to in April
2002 would have been born prematurely. Since the baby appeared to be healthy when she was born, she could not have
possibly been the result of the alleged rape in September 2001. Is the baby girl a child of Abat?
ANSWER: Yes. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can overcome the presumption that AAAs child was
begotten as a result of her having been raped in September 1991 only if he can show either that it was physically impossible for
him to have sexual intercourse because of impotence or serious illness which absolutely prevents him from having sexual
intercourse or that AAA had sexual intercourse with another man. However, accused-appellant has not shown either of these.
Case citation: People of the Philippines Vs. Joel Abat y Cometa, G.R. No. 202704. April 2, 2014
Name/Class: BARON, ALI Executive class
Article 164 of the Family Code
PROBLEM: Pablo, a SSS pensioner, died. His surviving spouse Rosanna filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits and
indicated that Pablo was survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Leticia, the deceased sister contested the claim, saying that
Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6 years earlier and that she was living with another man, that Pablo did not have
any children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo. SSS conducted an investigation and
confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and that Pablo was incapable of having children because he was
infertile. . Janet also claiming to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the petition
included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janets certificates of live birth.
The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, she was not
Pablos legitimate child, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo. Janet was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with
no legal papers. If you are the judge, resolve the case.
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I will rule that Jeylnn is the primary beneficiary of the deceased for his SSS pension and
therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits.
Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. The
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
55

husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the signature of Pablo as her father. Based on the
records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents, she is considered legitimate.
Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be dependent from support upon the husband . Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet,
there were no legal papers to prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary.
Case Citation: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, v. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented
by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, G.R. NO. 165546. February 27, 2006
Name/Class: BAS, MARC ARTHUR Regular Class
Proof of filiation
PROBLEM: Katniss met Peeta in a birthday party of her friend held at Makabuntis Hotel. The two get along with each other in
fact they exchanged cellphone numbers. They kept on seeing with each other twice every week which developed into a sexual
relationship. Eventually, Katniss got pregnant. It was only then she discovered that Peeta is married to Primerose and has
children. Despite such fact, Peeta took good care of her and rented an apartment where she stayed with a housemaid. He also
provided for all their expenses until she gave birth on December 23, 2010. However, Peeta refused to give support to the child
when Katniss declined the offer of Peetas family to adopt the child in exchange of money. Hence, she filed a complaint for
support against Peeta. In his defense, Peeta denied paternity over the child and interposed an affirmative defense that he was
motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child in
fact he never signed the Certificate of Live Birth of the child.
Questions:
a.) Under the Family Code, how may illegitimate filiation be proved?
b.) If you were the judge, how will you decide the case?
ANSWER:
a)
Under Article 172 in relation to Article 173 and Article 175 of the Family Code, the filiation of an illegitimate child may
be established in the same way and by the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 provides that the filiation legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. the record of birth appearing in the civil register or final judgment;
2. an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1)
2)
b)
open and continues possession of the status of a legitimate chid ; or

any other menas allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Law.
If I were the judge, I will decide in favor of Peeta.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition
and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must
be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as recognition in a public instrument nor does it have probative value to establish filiation to the
alleged father.
In the case at bar, it is clear that Peeta did not sign in the Certificate of Live Birth of the child. Being such, Katniss failed to
prove the illegitimate filiation of the child againt Peeta.
56
Hence, I will rule in favor of Peeta.

Case Citation: NARCISO SALAS vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013.
Name/Class: VILLAMOR, CLEMENTINE Regular Class
Establishing Illegitimate Filiation
PROBLEM: Lourdes Montemayor filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie Baguio before
the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Baguio, she prayed that Baguio be obliged
to give support to Laurence Montemayor, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.
Is Laurence Montemayor legally entitled to support from the respondent Ronnie Baguio?
ANSWER: Yes. Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation
in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the case at bar, Laurences record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and
filiation. The respondent Baguio signed as father in Laurences certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data
entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation.
Case Citation: Dolores Montefalcon & Laurence Montefalcon vs. Ronnie Vasquez G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
Name/Class: Paragamac, Christopher Regular Class
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, following the
rules for establishing filiation found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code, said certificate has no probative value
to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate." We also cannot lend credence to Mirasols claim
that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in having any participation in the
preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to
confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of
Antonios non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which
she confirmed on the witness stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy
called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt
Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be considered as
indications of Randys open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph
of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity.1wphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously." Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be
considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, "the fathers conduct towards his
son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist." Here, except for that singular occasion in which
they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. Neither can Antonios paternity be deduced
from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelitas actuations could have been done due to charity or some
other reasons.
Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonios paternity
of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a
baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. And "while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are
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per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same." (Antonio Perla Vs. Mirasol Baring and Randy B. Perla - G.R. No. 172471. November 12, 2012)
Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to prove that he was the illegitimate and
acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. Among them were his certificate of birth indicating that his mother was
Dominga Goyma; statement of assets, income and liabilities for 1958 (Exhibit C) of Dominga Goyma indicating him
as her son and; income tax returns for calendar years 1953 up to 1955 of Dominga Goyma where she invariably
claimed personal exemption as head of the family and stated therein that she was separated from her husband and
claimed an exemption for her son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. These pieces of documentary evidence, whose authenticity
were not refuted by petitioners, were properly considered by the court a quo and the appellate court to establish that
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was acknowledged by Dominga Goyma to be her illegitimate son. (Reynaldo Rodriguez and
Nancy A. Rodriguez vs. Concordia Ong Lim et. al. - G.R. No. 135817. November 30, 2006)
Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated
birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his
daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa, thus:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1)
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it
is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. (Rosalina P.
Eceta Vs. Ma. Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta. - G.R. No. 157037. May 20, 2004)
Permitting an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father
Question: Can an unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of a minor be considered as a recognition of
paternity In a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA
9255?
ANSWER: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in
conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature.
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly
implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the case of Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz vs.City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009 , however, special
circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of
the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second,the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third,
Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of
his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of
the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that
JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER.
In view of the many pronouncements made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
3)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
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4)
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that
the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
Putting all the reasons together, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed Civil Registrar of Antipolo City to
immediately enter the surname AQUINO as the surname of Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the
same in the Register of Births.
Case Citation: Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz vs.City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009)
Name/Class: MAYOL, ALFREDO III Regular Class
Problem: Timmie and Tonie for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Tonie was at that time already
married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard
Patrick (on October 13, 1999).The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of
the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Timmie left for the United
States with her two children in May 2007 . This prompted Tonie to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer
to take Parental Authority.
Question: Can a father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their
filiation?
Answer: No, Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondents prayer has no
legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is,
in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate
child may use the surname of the father.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition
of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.
Case citation: GRACE M. GRANDE vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO,G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
Name/Class: Name/Class: SENIDO, FATIMA NENA Regular Class
Under Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, which took effect on March 19, 2004,
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case
they may bear the fathers surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar, it was held that an illegitimate child whose
filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mothers surname. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his
fathers surname, reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
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In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an illegitimate child because she was
never married to private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner
minor, the latter is therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his mother.
(Rosendo Alba Vs. Court of Appeals, et al. - G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005)
VIII)
Adoption
Under the law, husband and wife must jointly adopt , except in the following cases:
1)
2)
When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, EO 91 and PD 603 Article 185 Family
Code)
Joint adoption by Spouses

PROBLEM: Jona, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Cedrick but were childless. Two minor children named
Kim and Aimie, were entrusted to them by Clementine, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD.
The spouses registered the children making it appear as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Cedrick died. She
then married an American Citizen, Paulo in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Kim
and Aimie before the trial court. Aimie was then 25 years old and already married and Kim was 18 years and seven months
old. Aimie and her husband including Kim and Paulo gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. Can the
petitioner singly adopt Aimie and Kim?
ANSWER: No. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except
in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental
authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child; it is but
natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Paulo will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of R.A. 8552.
The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec
7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
Case Citation: In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Name/Class: VALLARTA, MARVIN Regular Class
Mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption
PROBLEM: Baba Lu cohabited with Martha without the benefit of marriage because the former was married to Taylor who died
on April 20, 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties in different parts of Cebu. Other than
that, they had a son named Dolfi.
On the other hand, Baba has three sisters namely, Aida, Lorna and Fe while Bong, Rudy and Philip are brothers of Martha.
Martha died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will.
On August 8, 1980, Baba and Dolfi executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of
Marthas estate comprising a number of properties. In that document, Baba Lu, for the amount of P50,000, conveyed his
interests in the estate to Dolfi.
The brothers of Martha filed a case for partition of Marthas estate and annulment of titles with damages. They also argue that
Dolfi cannot inherit because he was neither the adopted nor the illegitimate son of Martha and presented a copy if his birth
certificate that was marked, adopted by both Baba Lu and Martha.
60

Dolfi, in attempting to prove that he was the sole heir of the late Martha, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal
certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the SSS of the decedent naming him as her son, and
her school records. He also testified that he had been reared and continuously treated as Marthas son.
If you were the trial court judge, how will you rule on the status of Dolfi whether he be considered an adopted child of Baba Lu
and Marha?
ANSWER: If I were the trial court judge, I will rule that Dolfi is not considered as the adopted or even an illegitimate child of
Baba Lu and Martha.
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does
not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of
the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Dolfi should have adduced
evidence on his adoption, in view of the contents of his birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
Case citation: Elino Rivera et. Al. vs. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, G.R. No. 141501
Name/Class: LAPITAN, ELMER Regular Class
IX)
Support (Family Code)
When obligation to support starts

PROBLEM: A and B got married in 1974. Their marriage bore 2 daughters, C and D. Soon after the kids were born, A left B and
the kids. B did not badger A for support relying on his commitment memorialized in a note to give support. However, the latter
reneged on his promise and just gave meager amounts for the familys expenses. For eighteen years, B and her kids shuttled
from one place to another not their own. Due to such neglect, B borrowed money from E, her brother from time to time. When
C was about to graduate in college, B in behalf of her 2 daughters filed a complaint for support. The trial court found for the
petitioner and directed A to pay support and arrears for 18 years amounting to P2 million pesos. A admits his obligation to
provide support to his daughters; however he argued that his obligation to pay support starts from the filing of the civil case
since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him.
Questions:
1) Rule on As contention.
2) Can F be reimbursed for the amounts he provided the family?
ANSWER:
1)
A is obliged to provide support in arrears.

Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.
However, a father could not evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters simply because their mother did
not make a formal demand therefore from him. A husbands insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is
truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in
his own handwriting. Said note stating that he will sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa also stated as
requested by their mother thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by respondents
mother.
2)
Yes. Article 207 provides that when the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support
when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of
reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their
uncle for their sustenance and education when their father failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their
pre-schooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been established, it can be said that E, who, owing to
consideration of kinship, had reason to help and lent money to B and her children. Thus, E can be reimbursed.
61
Case citation: Edward V. Lacson vs Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson, G.R. No. 150644. August 28, 2006
Name/Class: LAPUT, RENA MAE Executive class
Right to Support on Articles 194 to 196
QUESTION: Kat, represented by her mother Jiesa filed for recognition and support against Elmer. Elmer denies that Kat is his
illegitimate daughter. Jiesa bases her claim on the assertion that she had an extramarital affair with Elmer, and that out of
which she bore Kat. Elmer also refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth but he executed a handwritten note
where he would give Kat financial support each month. Will the note be sufficient to prove filiation of an illegitimate child in
order to demand for support?
ANSWER: No. The note is insufficient. Kats demand for support is dependent on the determination of her filiation (Art. 195
par. 4). The note not containing any statement on Kats filiation to Elmer does not fall under Art. 172 (2) vis--vis Art. 175 of
the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child, since it must be notarized
and must be accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Both requisites
in this case are missing. Even the Certificate of Birth has no probative value to establish filiation to Elmer, not having signed the
same.
Therefore, Kat cannot legally demand for support because the note is insufficient to prove filiation in order to establish her right
to support.
Case citation: BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO v. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ (G.R. No.
181258, 18 March 2010)
Name/Class: CAJETA, KURT Regular Class

Support by grandparents
PROBLEM: H and W are married couple living with Hs parents. H and W has 3 children, A, B, and C. W caught H in a sexual
act which prompted W to leave the house of H with her children. While W is filing a case of concubinage against H, she sued for
support for her and her minor children against H and Hs Parents.
W asks for the support of 40,000 per month (6,000 from H and 34,000 from Hs parents). Will Ws petition prosper?
ANSWER:
A)
YES, Ws petition will prosper because when a husband cannot provide for his family, the nearest ascendants are
required to support W, as daughter in law and A, B, C, their grandchildren.
B) YES, Ws petition will prosper but modified because the law only says ascendants will support their
grandchildren and not the daughter in law. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants
to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil.
C) No, Ws petition will not prosper because H and W are still married and their parental authority over their children has
not ceased.
D) No, Ws petition will not prosper because grandparents liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the childrens minority.
LESSON: Yes, grandparents are asked to support their descendants however, the support does not reach to the daughter-inlaw because there is no blood relationship.
Case citation: (Spouses Prudencio and Filomena Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, for herself and on behalf of her minor children Lester
Edward S. Lim, Candice Grace S. Lim, and Mariano S. Lim, III, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009)
Name/Class: CAUMERAN, KRISTIAN ERVING Executive class
62

X)
Parental Authority (Family Code)
Parental authority over recognized natural child

PROBLEM: Joey has an illegitimate son named Michael who is a minor with Loreta. He was born in Japan on September 17,
1996 as evidenced by his birth certificate. Loreta is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
Joey caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. Joey
enrolled him at a nursery school and finished his nursery course.
On May 2, 2001, Maricel and Francisca came to the house of Joey in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the
minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM department store. They promised
to bring him back in the afternoon but they did not bring him back as promised by them.
Joey went several times to Maricel but he was informed that the child is with the latters mother. Joey said that as the natural
father, he should not be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Question: Is the contention of Joey correct?
ANSWER: No, Joeys contention is not correct.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of Joey and Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of
whether the father admits paternity. Furthermore, in the case of David v. CA, the recognition of an illegitimate child by the
father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to
the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody
and authority over the minor.
There is thus no question that Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have
custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even
renounce or transfer it cases authorized by law.
Case citation: JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL et al. G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Name/Class: VILLARUBIA, GRETHEL Executive class
Art 213 of the FC in custody of minor child
PROBLEM: Romeo filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juliet,
with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Robert, whom Juliet allegedly took away
with her from the conjugal home and his school.
On his petition for the nullity of marriage Romeo alleged that Juliet was living an immoral life having a relationship with a
lesbian. This allegation was corroborated by the testimony of Roldan, President of United Security Logistic who was
commissioned by Romeo to conduct surveillance on Juliet and came up with the conclusion that she is having lesbian relations
with one Loreen.
Question: If you were the Judge, would you grant the ancillary prayer of Romeo for custody pendent lite?
ANSWER: No. I will not grant the prayer. Article 213 of the Family Code provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise."
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
63

"Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure."(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the
basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care. In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code
Commission stressed thus:
"The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.
No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by
the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers
heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative)
divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
Case citation: JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005
Tender Age Presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code
PROBLEM: On December 23, 2000 A and B got married and decided to establish their conjugal dwelling in Boracay. Two years
after, a child was born to them and was named C. in 2005, the couple started to have marital problems as B wanted to stay in
Makati City while A insisted that they stay in Boracay. On March 23, 2006, B came to their conjugal home and asked permission
to bring C with her. A agreed but soon thereafter discovered that neither B nor C would be coming back. He then filed a Petition
for Habeas Corpus before the trial court. After a series of hearings and presentation of evidence, the trial court granted A joint
custody with B of their minor child. B then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision which was denied. She argued that
A was unable to adduce evidence proving that she is unfit to have the sole custody of the child. Dissatisfied with the judgment
of joint custody, B filed an appeal. Is the ruling of the trial court correct?
ANSWER: No. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, the so-called tender age presumption may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more
of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, and drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
In the case at bar, B was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. Thus, there is no
compelling reason to wrench the child from the mothers custody.
Case Citation: Gamboa-Hirsch vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007.
Name/Class: HAMLIG, NONELUZ Regular Class
Special Parental Authority
PROBLEM: Inside St. Joseph Colleges premises, the class to which Jayson Miranda belonged was conducting a science
experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject
teacher and employee of SJC.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or
occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the
result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group
mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and
several particles of which hit his eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, his
eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.
Are SJC and Tabugo liable for the accident?
ANSWER: Yes. The proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent failure of SJC and Tabugo to prevent the
foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. They were negligent by failing to exercise the
higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
64
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the following
persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Case citation: St. Josephs College, et. al vs. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010.
Name/Class: VALLINAS, LORRAINE JEAN Regular Class
Habeas corpus vs judicial adjudication of custody
PROBLEM: Cecilio and Kristel joy are the parents of baby girl peralta. Due to the incessant nagging of Kristel Joys mother,
Cecilio decided that his family should move out of the house, which belongs to Kristel Joys mother. But Kristel Joy refuses to
leave. So it was Cecilio who only moved out of the house. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his daughter by Kristels
mother.
Later, Cecilio in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus in the RTC so that
he can see his son.
In her defense, Kristel Joy contend that it is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain
that Cecilio had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Cecilio counters that Kristel Joys argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his
petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his
son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father
and vice versa.
As the judge how will you decide the case?
ANSWER: As the judge I will grant the petition in favor of Cecilio.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article
211of the Family Code, both have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the
couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of
custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
However in judicial adjudication of custody, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Kristel joy can raise it as a counter argument for Cecilios
petition for custody but is a petition for habeas corpus and not a petition for custody. However judicial adjudication of custody
is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or
visiting his child under seven years of age.
Case citation: Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, et. al. vs. Loran S.D. Abanilla, et. al. - G.R. No. 162734
Name/Class: LABASAN, KIM LAURIS Regular Class
65
XI)
Summary Judicial Proceedings in Family Law Cases
Rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code
PROBLEM: A and B were married in civil rites. A and B had only spent a night together and had been intimate once when B
told A that she and her family will soon be leaving for the USA. B assured A that the former will file a petition so that the latter
can live with her in the USA and in the event that the petition is denied, B promised to return to the Philippines to live with A.
Thereafter, B and her family flew to Seattle, USA. A and B kept in touch for a year before B stopped responding to As letters. A
had inquired from Bs uncle of Bs whereabouts but it turned out that even the latters relatives had no idea. A solicited the
assistance of a friend in Texas, but to no avail. Finally, A sought the aid of his parents in Los Angeles and his aunt in Seattle,
but again, to no avail. This prompted A to file a petition before the RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of B under
Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC issued an Order declaring B presumptively dead. On appeal by the Republic of the
Philippines, the CA affirmed the RTCs order.
Was the appeal by the state proper?
ANSWER: By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases,
such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
Case citation: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v . FERVENTINO, G.R. No. 161062, 31 July 2009
Name/Class: PARRUCHO, BRYAN Regular Class
XII)
Use of Surnames
PROBLEM: In 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision granting the adoption. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known
as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.Petitioner filed a motion praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
Questions:
1. How will you resolve the petition?
2. Rule on the parental authority of the mother after the adoption?
3. Will your answer be the same in no. 2 if Honorato B. Catindig, being a widower, married Gemma Astorga Garcia,
mother of Stephanie Nathy before the adoption?
ANSWER:
1) There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. The law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."
Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter. In the
case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters. " Again, it is silent
whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the
adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is an internationally accepted
principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor
the adopted child.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law
66

to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law
on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
2)
Section 16 of Ra 8552 provides:
Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
In this case, the parental authority of Gemma over Stephanie is thus considered terminated upon the effectivity of
Stephanies legal adoption.
3)
No. The answer will not be the same invoking Section 16 of RA 8552 which states that except where the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter, his/her parental authority over the adoptee is not severed.
Case citation: (In the matter of the adoption of STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, G.R. NO. 148311. MARCH 31, 2005).
Name/Class: GABISAN, MIGUELA Executive class
XIII)
Civil Register
Entry in the civil register

PROBLEM: Hubert and Arlene were born in 1974 and 1975, respectively. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that
their parents CO BOON PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO BOON PENG filed an application for
his naturalization as citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no.
270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of
naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15,1977. On August 27, 1998, they filed with the
RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff.
grounds:
a)
b)
c)
d)
Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial
effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant;**Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the
children
LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;
Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270;
Application of pari material rule of construction is misplaced.
Question: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng.
ANSWER: No. It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father to entitle
them to Philippine citizenship.
They are likewise mandated to prove the ff. material allegations in their petition:
1)
2)
3)
That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;

They were born in the Philippines;
That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The
entries envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
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Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but also nationality. The acts, events or factual errors
envisaged in Article 407 of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the petitioner. However, in such
cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the petition
shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar.
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from. To change means to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not
qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or
change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors
Case citation: Hubert Tan Co, et al. vs. The Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004
Name/Class: MENCHAVEZ, RAY LAMBERT Executive class
68

PROPERTY
I)
Classification
Foreshore lands
PROBLEM: Siblings A, B, C, and D inherited a parcel of land from their parents. Since the land is being occupied by several
informal settlers, the siblings filed an action for recovery of possession and damages of the said property with the MTC.
Thereafter, the court with the concurrence of the parties, designated engineer X to conduct the verification and relocation
survey of said lot upon which, X came up with the following report:
"That a big portion of the lot is submerged under the sea and only a small portion remain as dry land".
The siblings claim however that the portion of the land remains dry even during high tide. In it's judgment, the MTC dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of the lot has become foreshore land and should be returned to the
public domain. Is the ruling of the MTC correct? Decide.
ANSWER: The ruling of the MTC is not correct. The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be
shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
The land's proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.
In this case, the disputed land remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, the disputed portion of land is not foreshore land
but remains private land owned by the siblings.
Case citation: MANUEL ALMAGRO vs. KWAN (G.R. Nos. 175806 and 175810; October 20, 2010)
Private Possession of Forest Lands of Forest Reserves
PROBLEM: A parcel of land under Lot 1234 originally declared under the name of Manny Pokyaw through Tax Declaration (TD)
08860 issued by City of Smiles. The same property passes to his heirs whom were in actual possession after the former
deceased. Upon failure to pay the real property taxes for several years, the City of Smiles has sold the property in public auction
in favor of Chris Alhere and eventually a certificate of sale was duly issued upon failure to redeem within the prescribed period
and a new Tax Declaration was issued under his name. Thereafter,
Chris Alhere went to court for Judicial
Confirmation/Application for Registration over the said land through RTC of City of Smiles. The action was opposed by the hiers
of Manny Pokyaw citing the legality of the auction sale and redemption rights in their favor. While, there being no other
evidences presented by the Petitioner except for the validity of the auction sale, a copy of tax declaration under his name , and
certification from CENRO that the said land has never been subject of any application. At the onset the RTC ruled in favor of
Chris Alhere confirming his ownership and granting his application for registration over the said land.
Question: Is the RTCs decision of confirming ownership/granting the application for registration correct?
ANSWER: No. While RTC may pass upon the issue of ownership to determine whether the applicant is entitled to the
application for original registration, it is deem necessary to rule on all matters necessary for the determination of issue of
ownership, including the validity of auction sale and other related contentious issues involved. However, the court must always
consider the more crucial aspect of the proceeding in all land registration cases pertaining to identity and registrability of the
land applied for. There are stringent evidentiary requirements to establish the character of land. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof.To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the
following: a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable. PENRO OR CENRO is not enough to certify that the land is alienable or
disposable. DENR Secretary s classification or approval is dispensable as proof to establish if the subject land is alienable and
be released for public as disposable. In the case at bar, absence of these requirements renders the decision improper and
should be set aside.
Case Citation: Jose Teofilo Mercado vs. CA et.al. /Heirs of Juan Olimpiada, et al. vs CA GR 141019 , November 23, 2011
Name/Class: PARAGAMAC, CHRISTOPHER Regular Class
69
II)
Ownership
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are
also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of
the national patrimony. Helmut Muller was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because
of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be
sustained. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in
view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition. (In Re: Petition for Separation of Property Elena Buenaventura Muller vs. Helmut Muller.
August 29, 2006)

Proof of ownership
PROBLEM: A, B, C, D, E, and F are siblings. Their parents, Dad and Mom, were the owners of a parcel of land situated along
Quezon Ave., Cebu City covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717.
By 1999, both Dad and Mom had already passed away, leaving to their six children ownership over the subject property.
Subsequently, sometime in 2002, A,B and C brought an action for partition against D, E and F. The trial court dismissed the
case for failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to appear despite due notice.
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, D,E and F siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication
on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the six siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the six heirs of the Dad
and Mom.
Subsequently, D,E and F siblings sold their 1/2 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses
Rex and Rose Rivera. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses Rivera and an
Agreement of Subdivision purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 390484 was partially canceled and TCT No.
434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering the 1/2 portion.
On June 1, 2009, A,B and C filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against D,E and F wherein they alleged that
during their parents lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of their six children. Upon
distribution, A,B and C alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They
likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four
(4) decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.
Decide whether A, B and C were able to prove ownership over the property. 5%
ANSWER: The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish
his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, A,B and C, in this case failed to discharge the said burden imposed
upon them in proving legal or equitable title over the parcel of land in issue. As such, all 6 siblings inherited the subject property
from Dad and Mom, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Rivera, A,B and C together with
spouses Rivera became co-owners of the same.
Case Citation: QUINTOS vs NICOLAS GR No. 210252, June 16, 2014
Requisites for Recovery of Ownership of Real Property
PROBLEM: PEC acquired parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title by virtue of a sales patent issued by the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands on February 18, 1915 issued by Register of Deeds in accordance with Section 122 of Act 496
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. It built a building in the said parcel of land. Sometime in 1989, Ambrosio entered
70

and cultivated said property. PEC filed a complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria and Accion Publiciana against Ambrosio and
alleged as the owner of parcels of land. Ambrocio claimed ownership of the parcel of land and contended that he received the
property as inheritance. May PEC recover the parcel of land?
ANSWER: Yes. An accion reinvindicatoria is an action to recover ownership over real property. Article 434 of the New Civil Code
provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right
to it must prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area, and boundaries thereof; and
second, his title thereto. The Court finds that PEC-EDNP was able to successfully prove both requisites by preponderance of
evidence, both documentary and testimonial.
Even defendant Ambrosio admitted on cross-examination that there was a building owned by the plaintiff in the disputed. It is
apt to observe that actual possession of an owner did not need to be the actual and physical possession and occupation of
every inch or portion of the property. That is an impossibility. Constructive possession is sufficient, for, according to Ramos v.
Director of Lands: "The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
(See Arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Case citation: SPS. AMBROSIO DECALENG, vs. THE PHILIPPINE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, G.R. No. 171209. June 27, 2012
PROBLEM: A was the owner of a piece of land. B illegally entered it and applied for a free patent over said land. B eventually
was granted the free patent.
A sued B for ejectment.
B applied and was granted a mortgage over the land by BankOne. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed as B was unable
to pay the loan.
C was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale over the land. Subsequently, the title was transferred in his name.
Meanwhile, A was successful in his ejectment suit against B.
Now that title of the land is held by C, how may A recover ownership of the land?
ANSWER: Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and
second, his title thereto.
In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property
must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. Anent the second
requisite, i.e., the claimant's title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only over the
parcel of land that was the object of the deed.
Case Citation: Del Fierro vs Sequiran, GR No. 152141
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that in an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover possession, a
person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.
In this case, respondent Barangan was able to prove the identity of the property and his title. To prove his title to the property, he
presented in evidence the following documents: (1) Land Purchase Agreement; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale; (3) and a Torrens title
registered under his name, TCT No. N-10772. To prove the identity of the property, he offered the testimonies of Engr. Jonco, who
conducted the relocation survey, and Estardo, the caretaker of the subdivision, who showed respondent Barangan the exact
location of the subject property. He likewise submitted as evidence the Verification Survey Plan of Lot 11, Block 5, (LRC) Psd60846, which was plotted based on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans title. (Rogelio J. Jakolsalem,
et al. Vs. Roberto S. Barangan - G.R. No. 175025. February 15, 2012)
71
We hold that respondent has established by preponderance of evidence the identity and his ownership of the subject
land. The governing law is Article 434 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.
The first requisite: the identity of the land. In an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better
right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries
thereof. Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimants title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a
right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed.
To prove the identity of the land he bought from Patrocenia, respondent submitted in evidence deeds of conveyances
from the original sale made by Bernardo in 1929 in favor of Emiliano Gamboa, up to the acquisition thereof by
Patrocenia. As can be gleaned from the proceedings before the MTC, ownership by respondent was not disputed but
only the exact area because the deeds presented by him showed only the area and location with respect to adjoining
owners, but did not describe the boundaries of the land sold in metes and bounds.
It is settled that what really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries
therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. The identity of the land sought to be recovered may
be established through the survey plan of the property. In this case, a survey could have settled the issue of
overlapping boundaries especially since the properties involved are all unregistered and, apparently unsurveyed.
We have held, however, that in controversial cases where there appears to be an overlapping of boundaries, the actual
size of the property gains importance. (Leonardo Notarte, et al. Vs. Godofredo Notarte - G.R. No. 180614. August 29,
2012)
Article 434 of the Civil Code states that "in an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim." The plaintiff, therefore, is dutybound to clearly identify the land sought to be recovered, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of
ownership. It bears stressing that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the identity of the property claimed is fatal to
his case.
In this case, petitioners failed to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to describe the location, the
area, as well as the boundaries thereof. In fact, as aptly pointed out by the CA, no survey plan was presented by
petitioners to prove that respondent spouses actually encroached upon the 70-square meter portion of petitioners'
property. Failing to prove their allegation, petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in their Complaint. (Heirs
of Telesforo Julao, et al. Vs. Spouses Alejandro and Morenita Jesus - G.R. No. 176020. September 29, 2014)
Prescription period if based on Implied Trust
QUESTION: When is an action to recover based on implied trust prescribes?
ANSWER: An action for reconveyance of real property based on implied or constructive trust is not barred by the 10-year
period of prescription only if the plaintiff is in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved. Generally an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10-years from the date of issuance of the decree
of registration. However, this rule does not apply when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the land.
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. (Art. 1456, NCC). Thus, the law thereby creates the
obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. The prescriptive period for the
reconveyance for fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title.
Case citation: IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE, vs. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO TAEZA, G.R. No. 179597, February 03, 2014
72

Laches
PROBLEM: Sometime in the year 1986, X purchased a parcel of land covered under TCT No. 12345. The said property is
swampy and naturally abundant for breeding crabs and prawns. However, the said property was not occupied nor used by X. Y
was in possession of the property as early as 1981 and used the same as a fishpond. X merely tolerated Y to use such property
as a fishpond.
In 2014, X ordered Y to vacate such property. However, Y did not vacate the property, alleging that Xs right of ownership was
already barred by laches. Is the contention of Y tenable?
ANSWER: The contention of Y is not tenable.
Laches is the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.is an
unreasonable delay pursuing a right or claim.
In the case of Arroyo vs. Bocago Inland Devt (BIDECO), the court ruled that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse
of time. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. As a registered
owner of a property, the right to eject any person illegally occupying his property is imprescriptible and can never be barred by
laches.
In the case at bar, Y possessed such property by mere tolerance of X. Furthermore, the said property was titled and registered
under the name of X. Therefore, the contention of Y is not tenable because Xs right of ownership is imprescriptible and can
never be barred by laches.
Case citation: Jack Arroyo vs. Bocago Inland Devt. Corp. (BIDECO) et. Al., G.R. No. 167880, Nov. 14, 2012
Innocent purchaser for value
PROBLEM: Jose Rodriguez filed a complaint against Sps. Christian Grey and Anastasia Steele-Grey alleging that he is the owner
of a certain parcel of land situated in Caloocan City covered by TCT No. 55979 and has been religiously paying the real estate
taxes therefore since November 29, 1974. He and his wife had immigrated to the USA since 1968 and is now a resident of
California, USA and he only discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject property was issued by the register of deeds
in the name of Elliot, married to Kate Kavanagh, during his vacation in the Philippines. He further alleged that it was due to a
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by him and his wife, dated February 16, 1978, which was a result of the
fraudulent, illegal and malicious acts committed by Sps. Grey and the Register of Deeds in order to acquire the subject property.
Sps. Grey, on the other hand, maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having purchased the subject property
from one Jason Taylor, who possessed and presented a Special Power of Attorney, but without Jose Rodriguezs CTC number,
to sell/dispose of the same, and, in such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute sale dated November 20, 1992 conveying the
said property in their favor.
Questions:
(1) As regards to the proof of capacity of the seller, what is the difference when there is a special power of attorney
and when there is none?
(2) What is an innocent purchaser for value? In this case, are the Sps. Grey innocent purchasers for value?
(3) Sps. Grey argue that they were presented a certificate of title and as a rule persons dealing with a registered land
has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title; hence, they are not obliged to go beyond the
certificate and determine the condition of the title. Is their argument tenable?
ANSWER:
(1) The strength of the buyers inquiry on the sellers capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof of capacity of
the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of
such public document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is
one but there appears to be flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do; the
buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances of its execution.
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(2) Under the law, an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.
In this case, In the present case, it is undisputed that Sps. Grey purchased the subject property from Jason Taylor on
the strength of the latters ostensible authority to sell under the subject SPA. The said document, however, readily
indicates flaws in its notarial acknowledgment since the respondents community tax certificate (CTC) number was not
indicated thereon; which is required under the governing rule on notarial acknowledgements at that time. Despite this
irregularity, however, Sps. Grey failed to show that they conducted an investigation beyond the subject SPA and into
the circumstances of its execution as required by prevailing jurisprudence. Hence, Sps. Grey cannot be considered as
innocent purchasers for value.
(3) No, their contention is untenable.
The general rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of
the property. Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
However, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner,
although the land object of the transaction is registered. In such a case, the buyer is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor. The buyer also has the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is dealing with and the
latters legal authority to convey the property.
In the instance case, Sps. Grey failed to do what the law requires them to do.
Case citation: THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI vs PEDRO F. LAGROSA, G.R. No. 193517 January 15, 2014
We stated at the start that in determining whether or not a buyer of property is a purchaser in good faith, he must
show that he has bought the property without notice that some other person had a right to, or interest in, such
property, and he should pay a full and fair price for the same at the time of his purchase, or before he had notice of
the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He must believe that the person from whom he receives
the property was the owner and could convey title to the property, for he cannot close his eyes to facts that should put
a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.
In Bautista v. Silva, the Court enunciates the requisites for the buyer to be considered a purchaser in good faith, viz:
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the
property with the well- founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to the
property and capacity to convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the title
to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the
four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following
conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession
thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other
person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title
to the property. Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on notice
and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and
examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the sellers title and capacity to transfer any interest
in the property. Under such circumstance, it was no longer sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he
had relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he had exercised reasonable precaution by
inquiring beyond the title. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.
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An examination of the deed of sale executed between Isabel Ronda, et al. and the petitioner respecting the portions
covered by TCT No. 31120 and TCT No. 31121 indicates that the TCTs were issued only on August 17, 1998 but the
deed of sale was executed on July 31, 1998. While it is true, as the petitioner argues, that succession occurs from the
moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code, his argument did not extend to whether or
not he was a buyer in good faith, but only to whether or not, if at all, Isabel Ronda, et al., as the heirs of Mariano
Ronda, held the right to transfer ownership over their predecessors property. The argument did not also address
whether or not the transfer to the petitioner was valid.
Evidently, the petitioner entered into the deed of sale without having been able to inspect TCT No. 31120 and TCT No.
31121 by virtue of such TCTs being not yet in existence at that time. If at all, it was OCT No. 9852 and OCT No. 9853
that were available at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, and such OCTs were presumably inspected by
petitioner before he signed the deed of sale. It is notable that said OCTs categorically stated that they were entered
pursuant to an emancipation patent of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program of the government. Furthermore, said OCTs plainly recited the following prohibition: "it shall not be
transferred except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 27, Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines and other existing laws and regulations."
The foregoing circumstances negated the third element of good faith. As we have ruled in Bautista v. Silva, the
absence of the third condition put the petitioner on notice and obliged him to exercise a higher degree of diligence by
scrutinizing the certificates of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the sellers title and
capacity to transfer any interest in the lots. Consequently, it is not sufficient for him to insist that he relied on the face
of the certificates of title, for he must further show that he exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the
certificates of title. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution rendered him a buyer in bad faith. "It is a well-settled
rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor." (Hector L. Uy Vs.
Virginia G. Fule, et al. - G.R. No. 164961. June 30, 2014)
An innocent purchaser for value is the one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another persons claim. As such, a defective title --- or one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud
and misrepresentation --- may be the source of a completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an
innocent third person who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser
for value.
Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule that every person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond
the certificate to determine the condition of the property. The recognized exceptions to this rule are stated as follows:
A person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with
the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of the
defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into
the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses
suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title
of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can
neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and,
hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
Thus, in Domingo Realty, Inc. v. CA, we emphasized the need for prospective parties to a contract involving titled
lands to exercise the diligence of a reasonably prudent person in ensuring the legality of the title, and the accuracy of
the metes and bounds of the lot embraced therein, by undertaking precautionary measures, such as:
1.
2.
Verifying the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with the Office of the Register of Deeds and
the Land Registration Authority;
Engaging the services of a competent and reliable geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes, and
bounds of the lot subject of said title based on the technical description in the said title and the approved
survey plan in the Land Management Bureau;
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3.
4.
5.
6.
Conducting an actual ocular inspection of the lot;

Inquiring from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal ownership of the
lot in question;
Putting up of signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered; and
Undertaking such other measures to make the general public aware that said lot will be subject to alienation,
lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
In the case at bar, Bolos certificate of title was concededly free from liens and encumbrances on its face. However, the
failure of Carlos and the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level of caution in light of the factual milieu
surrounding the sequence of transfers from Bolos to respondents bars the application of the mirror doctrine and
inspires the Courts concurrence with petitioners proposition. (Enriqueta M. Locsin Vs. Bernardo Hizon, Carlos Hizon,
Sps. Jose Manuel & Lourdes Guevarra - G.R. No. 204369. September 17, 2014)
Facts: The complaint alleged that Lolita Cabigas and her late husband, Nicolas Cabigas, purchased two lots (Lot No.
742and Lot No. 953) from Salvador Cobarde, who in turn had purchased these lots from Ines Ouano.
Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and Cobarde, and because the two lots remained registered in her name,
Ouano was able to sell these same lots to the National Airports Corporation on November 25, 1952 for its
airport expansion project. The National Airports Corporation promptly had the titles of these properties registered in its
name.
When the airport expansion project fell through, respondents Melba Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and Linda Logarta, the
legal heirs of Ouano, succeeded in reclaiming title to the two lots through an action for reconveyance filed with the
lower court; the titles over these lots were thereafter registered in their names. They then subdivided the two lots and
sold them to several buyers. All the buyers registered the titles over their respective lots in their names.
Held: A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before
he has notice of the claim of another person. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to
facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.His mere refusal to believe that such defect
exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendors title, will not make
him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he
had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which
may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
We are dealing with registered land, a fact known to the Cabigas spouses since they received the duplicate owners
certificate of title from Cobarde when they purchased the land. At the time of the sale to the Cabigas spouses,
however, the land was registered not in Cobardes name, but in Ouanos name. By itself, this fact should have
put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted them to check with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent
certificates of title to discover if there were any liens, encumbrances, or other attachments covering the lots in
question.
Instead, the Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobardes representation that he owned the properties in question,
and did not even bother to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by checking the properties titles with the
Registry of Deeds. Had the Cabigas spouses only done so, they would easily have learned that Cobarde
had no legal right to the properties they were acquiring since the lots had already been registered in the
name of the National Airports Corporation in 1952.Their failure to exercise the plain common sense expected of
real estate buyers bound them to the consequences of their own inaction. (The Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas, namely,
Lolita Zabate Cabigas, et al. Vs. Melba L. Limbaco, et al. - G.R. No. 175291. July 27, 2011)
Exception to the doctrine that accessory follows the principal
PROBLEM: The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment ordering FGCI CORP to return the excess payment made by Magdalena
on their contract for a construction of a condominium building.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building which was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI CORP.
who is in actual possession of the said building. All the court processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and Magdalena
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were served, thru the formers representative Mr. Segundo, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject
property is located. Nonetheless, the lots in which such building was erected were registered in the names of Spouses Segundo.
Spouses Segundo filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was
erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. They contended that since they have the title over the land the law presumes them to be
owners of the improvements built thereon under the doctrine that the accessory follows the principal.
Question: Is the contention of Spouses Segundo meritorious?
ANSWER: No, the contention of Spouses Segundo is without merit.
The Supreme Court held in the case of Villasi vs. Garcia that in cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove
that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption that the accessory
follows the principal shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. It further provides that actual possession of
the building and as the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly
supports a claim of ownership.
In the case at bar, although Spouses Segundo were the registered owners of the lot where the subject property is located, they
failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. They were unable to adduce credible evidence to
prove such ownership. Furthermore, FGCI CORP. was in actual possession of the property and at the same time paid the tax
due it.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the contention of Spouses Segundo is not meritorious.
Case citation: VILLASI VS GARCIA, G.R. No. 190106. January 14, 2014.
III)
Accession
Law on Accretion and P.D. 1529

PROBLEM: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, Joel applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the RTC of Cebu City. The property, which had an area of 1,045square meters, more
or less, was located in Brgy. Basak Pardo, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to Brian, in the Southeast
by the Mananga River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Jedd.
The City of Cebu (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the
property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the
reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. The RTC granted the
application of Joel and Brian. The CA has affirmed.
Questions:
1. Define Accretion. Requisites of Accretion.
2. Is Joel and Brian have a right to claim the dried up river as accretion according to Art. 457 of the Civil Code?
ANSWER:
1. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c)
taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
2.
No, Joel and Brian cannot claim the dried up river as accretion.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c)
taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
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The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents property pursuant
to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land
involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level
did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the
provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is,
indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application. The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
Case citation: Republic of the Philippines vs. Arcadio Ivan Santos III, G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012
Effect of improvements on property
PROBLEM: Spouses Nangginansya Binay and Etomas Binay are owners of a residential house which they mortgaged with the
GSIS to secure a loan (200k). It is alleged that Gloria Macapal granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the
debt to GSIS. The balance of the loan (400k) will be delivered by Macapal upon surrender of the title over the property and an
affidavit of waiver of rights to be executed by the husband. While the spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit was
signed by the husband. Consequently, Macapal refused to give the 400k balance of the loan and since the spouses could no
longer return the 200k Macapal kept the title over the property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own
name.
The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in favor of Macapal. The RTC ruled that
the property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (since she inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid
even without the husbands consent.The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive paraphernal
property of the wife, it became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan that was paid through
conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void.
Questions:
A. Is the property (house) is conjugal?
B. Is the contract between petitioner and the spouses is an equitable mortgage?
ANSWER:
A.
All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. But in this case,
since the residential lot was inherited, it was the exclusive property of the spouse. To find out whether the house is
conjugal or paraphernal, we have to look at the improvements made on the separate property of the spouses.
When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the
time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal. Otherwise, it is paraphernal.
In this case, the improvements were less than the value of the property, hence paraphernal. The written consent of
Eliseo is not necessary hence, whatever contract entered into is valid.
B.
It is an equitable mortgage because the vendor remained in possession as the lessee, the purchaser retained for
himself a part of the purchase price, the vendor bound himself to pay for the taxes, and because the real intention was
to secure the payment of a debt. These instances, according to the civil code gives rise to the presumption that it is an
equitable mortgage.
Case citation: Ramirez vs Munoz - G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
Builder in good faith
PROBLEM: T Corporation was the registered owner of a property. A law was passed later invalidating the titles of the
corporation. In 1992, Mr. F was allowed possession of the property. In the meantime, in 1995, the law was later struck down
and was declared unconstitutional. In 2002, unaware of the promulgation of the court, he built properties thereon. On the other
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hand, T Corporation by virtue of the judgment, filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer after demands were made against Mr. F.
Mr. F, on his part, claimed to be a builder in good faith. Is his contention correct?
ANSWER: No, Mr. Fs contention is not valid. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. In
this case, since he built the property only after the promulgation of the decision, he could not have been a builder in good faith.
All judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, it existence should be on one hand a matter of judicial notice; on the
other, ignorantia legis non excusat. Hence, Mr. Fs contention holds no water.
Case citation: Mirallosa vs. Carmel Development Inc - GR 194538, October 9, 2013
Builder in good faith is entitled to reimbursement of his necessary expenses
PROBLEM: A owns a lot situated in Cebu City having an area of 277 square meters under TCT No. 1435. In 1980 he sold a
part of it to her nephew B through a deed of absolute sale but B failed to register the same with the register of deeds. B
immediately took possession of the portion sold to him and built thereon a house made of concrete materials and fenced it. In
1994, A sold again the said parcel of land to C but this time it was the whole 277 square meters that was sold through a deed
of absolute sale and registered the same with the register of deeds of Cebu City. As a result TCT 1435 in the name of A was
canceled and TCT No. 1988 was issued in the name of C. In 1995, C demanded that B should vacate the portion he occupied
because the former had bought it from his aunt and had registered the same in his name. B refused to vacate contending that
he is the owner of said lot as he also bought it from his aunt as evidenced by an unregistered deed of sale. C instituted a suit
with the RTC to recover said lot. The RTC ruled that B is a builder in good faith but declared that C has a better right to the land
being the first to register the sale. Both parties appealed but the RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. If you are the Justice of the Supreme Court handling this case how are you
going to resolve this case?
ANSWER: The only question to be settled in the instant case is whether B as a builder in good is entitled to reimbursement of
his necessary expenses over the lot. To answer the above issue, article 448 of the Civil Code is very explicit as it provides
that the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
In the case at bar, B being a builder in good faith is entitled indemnity and reimbursement of his necessary expenses if the
owner choses to appropriate the improvements as his own. However the owner may compel the owner of the improvements to
pay the price of the land if the value of the improvement exceeds the value of the land.
Case Citation: BENEDICTO vs. VILLAFLORES G.R. No. 185020
Name/Class: Vallarta, Marvin Regular Class
October 6, 2010
Reimbursement of improvements
PROBLEM: Spouses Adam and Mia claimed to be the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Banawa, Cebu City. The
same is covered with TCT number 123345 under the name of the spouses. In 1989, Liam and his family were able to persuade
the spouses to allow him and his family to use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate
the premises should spouses need to use the same. Liam and his family were allowed to construct their residential house. Since
then, the Spouses never made an attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing that Liam and and his eight children have no
other place to live in. However, Liams present circumstances have completely improved. This prompted the spouses to send a
letter demanding that Liam to vacate the premises. But Liam refused to vacate not until he is reimbursed of the improvements
he has introduced to the property.
Decide on the case.
ANSWER: It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
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builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith.
In this case since Liams occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, he has no right to retain its possession
under Article 448 of the Civil Code. He is aware that his tolerated possession may be terminated any time and he cannot be
considered as builder in good faith.
Case Citation: Esmaquel vs. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010
Name/Class: VILLAMOR CLEMENTINE Regular Class
Accumulation of sediments along the river banks
PROBLEM: The Regetta family claims to be the absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Paraaque City covered by Tax
in the name of Regene Regetta. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.
The Regettas assert that the original occupant and possessor of the land was their great grandfather, Tieria Erde, which was
given to his son, Lyle Erde, in 1930. From then on, Lyle continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed said lot. In 1966,
after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, Lyle was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property
in his name. Since then, the family has been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property.
Meanwhile, in 1961, Regene Regettas son married Lyles daughter, Mileina. In 1964 and 1971, Regene Regetta secured building
permits from the Paraaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On 1987, Lyle transferred his
rights over the land in favor of Regene.
On 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from
the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The
proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of the Erdes Compound traversing the lot occupied by the Regettas.
The Regettas immediately opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, the Regetta family was surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning
office proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted thereon and subsequently the City Administrator sent a letter to the them
ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty days, or be physically evicted from the said property. The Regettas sent
a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue, but the request remained
unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, they went to the RTC of Paraaque City and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
local government claiming they owned said parcel of land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Meanwhile the local government
argued that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have
formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain.
Question: Can the local government construct on said parcel of land?
ANSWER: No, the local government cannot construct on said land. Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
While it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain. The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system, otherwise, the alluvial property may
be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In the case at bar, the Regettas assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Lyle Erde, had occupied and possessed the subject lot
as early as 1930. In 1964, Regene Regetta secured a permit from the local government of Paraaque for the construction of
their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Lyle executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the
property in his name for taxation purposes. Undoubtedly, the Regetta family deemed to have acquired ownership over the
subject property through prescription. They can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over
the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration
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of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring
ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. Thus, the local government cannot
construct on the said land.
Case citation: Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio,
Eduardo, et al. - G.R. No. 178411. June 23, 2010.

Old bed left to dry by the change of course
PROBLEM: In their Complaint, the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision project known as
Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2) an adjoining property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No.
185252, with an area of 1,201 sq.m.; that the properties were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in
1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were
able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), through its Provincial Office (PENRO); that, specifically, the property was denominated as Lot 5735, Cad 29
Ext., Case-1, with an area of 1,573 sq.m. covered by OCT No. P-928; that they discovered the existence of the certificate of title
sometime in March 1997 when their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed them that the subject property had been
fraudulently titled in the names of the Galangs; that in 1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of the
property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to continue
the application because of financial constraints on his part; that they continued the application, but later learned that the
application papers were lost in the Assessors Office; and that as the owners of the land where the new course of water passed,
they are entitled to the ownership of the property to compensate them for the loss of the land being occupied by the new creek.
The Galangs in their Answer denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered that OCT No. P928 was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR, through the PENRO; that they
and their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some
time; that the property described under TCT No. 185252 belonged to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT
No. 3991; that the property was transferred in the names of the Reyeses through falsified document; that assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for
themselves the portion of the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property; that Enteroso was able to occupy a
portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations, and stealth in 1981; that such unlawful entry was then the
subject of an Accion Publiciana before the RTC of Antipolo and that at the time of the filing of the Complaint, the matter was still
subject of an appeal before the CA, under CA-G.R. CV No. 5350.
Question: Did the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in interpreting Article 420 in relation to Article 461 of the Civil Code
by substituting its own opinion based on assumption of facts?
ANSWER: YES. The law in this regard is covered by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to
the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the
lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
Pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by the
claimant. But before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that
is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in
this case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the
creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by
natural occurrence.
In the case at bar, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment and the
new course. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued, the
evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the Court to order
the reconveyance of the property to them. This failure did not escape the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General.
Thus, it commented:
In the case at bar, it is not clear whether or not the Marigman Creek dried-up naturally back in 1980. Neither
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did private respondents submit any findings or report from the Bureau of Lands or the DENR Regional Executive
Director, who has the jurisdiction over the subject lot, regarding the nature of change in the course of the creeks
waters. Worse, what is even uncertain in the present case is the exact location of the subject matter of dispute.
This is evident from the decision of the Regional Trial Court which failed to specify which portion of the land is actually
being disputed by the contending parties.
Case citation: Spouses Crispin Galang and Caridad Galang vs. Spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe De Kastro Reyes (As
substituted by their legal heir: Hermenigildo K. Reyes) - G.R. No. 184746. August 8, 2012.
IV)
Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over Title to or

Interest in Real Property
The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real
property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective,
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In the
action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the plaintiff and the other claimants, not
only to put things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to the immovable, respect and not
disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt
over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and
even abuse the property.
The other proper remedy the CA suggested was an action for reconveyance of property. According to Vda. de Recinto
v. Inciong, the remedy belongs to the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another persons name, and such landowner demands the reconveyance of the property in the proper court of justice.
If the property has meanwhile passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the landowner may seek
damages. In either situation, the landowner respects the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review
provided the one-year period from the land coming under the operation of the Torrens System of land registration
already passed. (Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng
and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. - G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012)
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked
to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper
place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit
of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he
deems best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."
Contrary to petitioners stand, the issue relating to the grant of rights, title or award by the NHA determines whether
the case for quieting of title may be maintained. If the petitioners are legitimate successors to or beneficiaries of
Iluminardo upon his death under the certificate of title, award, or grant, or under the special law or specific terms of
the NHA program/project then they possess the requisite interest to maintain suit; if not, then Civil Case No. 2741MN must necessarily be dismissed.
From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have failed to show their qualifications or right to
succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant,
document or certification from the NHA or proper government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla
have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified
successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardos rights after his death.
They did not call to the witness stand competent witnesses from the NHA who can attest to their rights as successors
to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to present proof, at the very least, of the specific law, provisions, or
terms that govern the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project which would indicate a modicum of
interest on their part. For this reason, their rights or interest in the property could not be established. (Dionisio
Manaquil, et al. Vs. Roberto Moico - G.R. No. 180076. November 21, 2012)
The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the
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plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must
show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or
proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy."
This case does not involve complex issues that require extensive disquisition. Quite the contrary, it could have been
resolved on a simple motion to dismiss. The trial court apparently was satisfied that the first requisite, possession by
petitioners of a legal or equitable title to the land, was complied with; it concluded that petitioners held equitable title,
being descendants of Rafael, albeit by his first marriage to Eleuteria. The trial court assumed that although the land
was titled in the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda", Rafael had a share therein on
account of his marriage to Andrea. From this assumption, the trial court then concluded that petitioners must at least
have a right to Rafaels share in the land, which right grants them the equitable title required to maintain a suit for
quieting of title. This assumption, nevertheless, is decidedly erroneous.
It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafaels second wife. The
land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he is not even named in OCT No. 22447. With greater reason may it
be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are Rafaels children by his first wife Eleuteria. Unless
Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood such fact is not borne out by the record they could not be heirs to each
other. And if indeed Eleuteria and Andrea were blood relatives, then petitioners would have so revealed at the very first
opportunity. Moreover, the fact that Rafael died ahead of Andrea, and that he is not even named in the title, give the
impression that the land belonged solely to the heirs of Andrea, to the exclusion of Rafael. If this were not true, then
the title should have as registered owners the "Heirs of Rafael and Andrea Mondragon", in which case the petitioners
certainly would possess equitable title, they being descendants-heirs of Rafael. Yet OCT No. 22447 is not so written.
Add to this is the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. A different view would have been taken if they
were. Indeed, not even the fact that their sister Teofila Macedas name appears in OCT No. 22447 could warrant a
different conclusion. Her name appears therein only a representative of Andreas heirs. As mere representative, she
could have no better right. (Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., et al. Vs. Jack Daniel Mondragon, et al. - G.R. No. 179754.
November 21, 2012)
PROBLEM: Jose Pilar filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1 to 4 of Plan Psu-204785 situated at Mag-asawang
Mangga, Las Pias, Rizal, before Court of First Instance of Rizal. On the other hand, Manuel Vasquez filed an application for
registration of title o v e r s i x l o t s b e f o r e t h e s a m e c o u r t .
T h e C F I r e n d e r e d a d e c i s i o n declaring Jose to be the absolute owner of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 described in
Plan Psu-204785. The LRA called the attention of the Director of Lands regarding the overlapping of several lots awarded to
Manuel, with lots adjudicated to Jose, and requested that portions of these lots that are not in conflict be
segregated. Manuel petitioned the CFI to set aside the award earlier made in favor of Manuel. The CFI issued an Order
declaring that the application of Velasquez be given due course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 of Ap-11135 which are identical to Lots 1
to 4, Plan Psu-204785 in favor of Gregorio respecting the same lots as null and void.
Jose appealed and he entered into an agreement with Trinidad and Fajardo and by virtue of which, Fajardo would finance the
cost of the litigation and in return he would be entitled to one-half of the subject property if the appeal is successful. The court
rendered judgment in their favour.
Meanwhile, Everest Management Programs Corporation filed a case for Quieting of Title With Damages. It alleged that the
issuance of TCT No. T-27380 in the name of Fajardo who obtained the same from the court in a case without the knowledge of
petitioner who was not a party therein despite the existence of TCT No. T-8129 in its name constitutes a cloud upon the title. It
further claimed that it acquired the same property in good faith and for value from the original owners thereof.
Is the action for quieting of title proper in this case?
ANSWER: No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to
real property. In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over
the subject real property, but that they have a valid title to it. The court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no
rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the
right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he
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may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit. If two certificates of title purport to include the same
land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were
derived.
Everest Management Programs Corporation being a mere transferee at the time the decision had become final and executory, it
is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs of Jose to convey the lots in favor of Trinidad. As such buyer of one of
the lots to be conveyed to Trinidad pursuant to the courts decree with notice that said properties are in litigation, petitioner
merely stepped into the shoes of its vendors who lost in the case. Such vested right acquired by Trinidad under the final
judgment in his favor may not be defeated by the subsequent issuance of another certificate of title to the heirs of Jose
respecting the same parcel of land. For it is well-settled that being an involuntary transaction, entry of the notice of lis pendens
in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons
of such claim.
Case Citation: Top Management Programs Corp. v. Luis Fajardo and the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City, GR 150462. June
15, 2011
Name/Class: CANILLO, BHOUWLS Regular Class
Undoubtedly, our land registration statute extends its protection to an innocent purchaser for value, defined as one who buys the
property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the
same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. An
innocent purchaser for value includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value . Here, we agree with the
disposition of the RTC and the CA that PNB is not an innocent purchaser for value. As we have already declared:
A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment
of the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations.
PNBs contention that Ciriaco failed to allege in his complaint that PNB failed to take the necessary precautions before accepting
the mortgage is of no moment. It is undisputed that the 2.5002-hectare portion of the mortgaged property has been adjudged in
favor of Ciriacos predecessor-in-interest in Civil Case No. 2514. Hence, PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in good faith
from the time the land was offered as collateral. However, PNB miserably failed to overcome this burden. There was no showing
at all that it conducted an investigation; that it observed due diligence and prudence by checking for flaws in the title; that it
verified the identity of the true owner and possessor of the land; and, that it visited subject premises to determine its actual
condition before accepting the same as collateral.
Also, the incontrovertibility of a title does not preclude a rightful claimant to a property from seeking other remedies because it was
never the intention of the Torrens system to perpetuate fraud. As explained in Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong:
The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the possessor
a true owner of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the
owner of the land illegally included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in
question and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from
the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible
and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages.
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. An action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in
10 years as it is an obligation created by law, to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property. This
rule, however, applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property.
In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, we said that there is no prescription when in an action for reconveyance, the claimant is in
actual possession of the property because this in effect is an action for quieting of title:
Since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are
in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
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thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
In Ciriacos case, as it has been judicially established that he is in actual possession of the property he claims as his and that he has
a better right to the disputed portion, his suit for reconveyance is in effect an action for quieting of title. Hence,
petitioners defense of prescription against Ciriaco does not lie. (Philippine National Bank Vs. Ciriao Jumamoy, et al. - G.R. No.
169901. August 3, 2011)
V)
Co-ownership
PROBLEM: LUNA and his elder brother PING are locked in a petition for partition over the property in question. LUNA claiming
co-ownership over the lot. He alleged that their father left the brothers money as a small capital to start a business, they
registered as partners in a partnership agreement as claimed by a witness. The Money was then used to buy the property in
issue. Such allegation however was not proven in the lower courts by the petitioner. LUNA also allegedly lent money to PING
and prevented attachment over the property by paying PING's creditors.
PING alleges that he bought the property from a certain ROCCO as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale and the property was
titled under his name. He also alleges that in an unlawful detainer case he filed against LUNA, the Supreme court decided the
case in his favor.
LUNA denies such allegation saying, the property was titled under his name as a Chinese custom of registering lands under the
name of the Elder brother.
Decide on the petition for partition.
ANSWER: The petition should be denied. The property is the exclusive property of PING. A division of property cannot be
ordered by the court unless the existence of co-ownership is first established. In Ocampo v. Ocampo, we held that an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the property. Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation
in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. x
xx
The Co-ownership was not proven by evidence and besides the Title together with all the tax declarations indicate PING as the
owner. The allegation of Custom as well as the fact that money was indeed left for the brothers mutually wasnt proven by the
petitioner. Therefore ownership was not controverted by LUNA successfully.
Payment of PING's debts as well as lending money are kind acts but they do not prove Co-ownership.
The testimony of the witness only proves partnership between the brothers but doesn't prove the capital contribution, and
besides, such testimony doesn't bind PING, well-settled is the rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.
The petition for partition should therefore be denied, there being no Co-ownership between LUNA and PING.
Case Citation: Co Giok Lun, as substituted by his legal heirs namely: Magdalena Go, et al. vs Jose Co, as substituted by his legal
heirs namely: Rosalina Co, et al., G.R. No. 184454. August 3, 2011
PROBLEM: A and B acquired in co-ownership Lot 2189a one thousand fifteen (1,015) square meter In 1970, following a
cadastral proceeding, A and B were recognized as co-owners of Lot Consequently, (OCT) undivided shares, of A and B Not
long after, A and B decided to partition Lot 2189. For this purpose, B hired C to prepare a subdivision plan for the lot. (First
Plan)into two (2) lots, lot 1 with an area of 507 square meters, and lot 2 with an area of 508 square meters. The Regional
Director of the Bureau of Lands approved the First Plan. A and B formalized their decision to subdivide Lot 2189 by executing an
Agreement of Partition. A died. He was survived X, who are his wife and children S and T, however, B entered into a Contract to
Sell M. In it, B undertook to sell, among others, her ideal share in Lot 2189 to Aurora upon full payment of the purchase
price. C prepared a second subdivision plan (Second Plan) for Lot 2189. The Second Plan, was executed between the
respondents in their capacity as heirs of A on one hand, and B on the other. Presumably with the Second Plan as a new basis,
the agreement named B as the owner of Lot 2 while the respondents were allocated Lot 1. B sold Lot 2, with an area of nine
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hundred sixty-four (964) square meters, to M. Meanwhile, it would seem that the Register of Deeds had refused registration of
the Second Partition Agreement in view of the fact that several of the respondents, namely S and T were still minors. X opposed
the sale of the land and was asking for the rightful share of her late husband.
Question: Are A and B co-owners?
ANSWER: Yes, A and B are Co-owners. Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that
There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. In default
of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title.
In the present case, it is clear that A and B entered into an agreement and State where an undivided thing or right belongs to
two or more persons. Right of common dominion which 2 or more persons have over a spiritual, ideal part of a thing which is
not physically divided.
Case citation: Aurora L. Tecson, et al. vs. Minverva, Maria, et al. all surnamed Fausto and Isabel Vda. De Fausto - G.R. No.
180683

Rights of a Co-owner
PROBLEM: Ruping Villarin and her husband Pablo Villarin filed a Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in
Trinidad, Bohol. The said application was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines and Spouses Eugenia and Teofilo Barbajo.
Spouses Villarin obtained a favorable judgment both in the CFI and the appellate court.
The decision became final, but the Order to vacate the property was not implemented. Hence, Ruping Villarin and her daughter
Yolanda Villarin, as successor-in-interest of the late Pablo Villarin, filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment. An Answer was
filed by spouses Barbajo. Meanwhile, Ruping went to Canada, and as a consequence, a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was
executed by Ruping in favor of Yolanda Villarin, to attend the Pre-Trial Conference on her behalf. After the pre-trial conference,
it was, however discovered that the SPA presented has not been authenticated by a Philippine Consulate official, it is not
sufficient authorization and hence, Ruping cannot be considered to have attended the pre-trial conference. The case must,
therefore, be dismissed insofar as she is concerned.
In relation to the defective SPA, can the case proceed or can it be dismissed on the basis that Ruping Villarin, as the
complainant, was not present during the pre-trial conference? Decide with reasons.
ANSWER: Yes, the case can proceed. Any perceived defect in the SPA would not serve to bar the case from proceeding.
Anent the SPA, given the particular circumstances in the case at bar, an SPA is not even necessary such that its efficacy or the
lack of it would not in any way preclude the case from proceeding. This is because upon Pablo Villarins death, Yolanda Villarin
in succession of her father, became a co-owner of the subject property together with her mother, Ruping. As a co-owner, she
may, by herself alone, bring an action for the recovery of the co-owned property pursuant to the well-settled principle that "in a
co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners."
The action to recover the property is therefore one which Yolanda Villarin as co-owner, can bring and prosecute alone, on her
own behalf and on behalf of her co-owner, Ruping. Hence, a dismissal of the case with respect to Ruping pursuant to Sec. 5,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court will be futile as the case could nevertheless be continued by Yolanda Villarin in behalf of the two
of them.
Case Citation: Eugenio Basbas, et al. vs. Beata Sayson and Roberto Sayson, Jr., G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011
Name/Class LOR, REMFEL Regular Class
PROBLEM: Brothers Armando and Agapito purchased a residential house. Agapito died leaving behind his wife, Lydia, and four legitimate
children, who adjudicated to themselves the property where the title to the said property was reconstituted as TCT No. 18990 and registered
solely in the names of Lydia and her four children. This prompted Armando to execute an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on
TCT No. 18990. Meanwhile, Lydia filed with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City an Affidavit of Cancellation of Adverse Claim which caused
the cancellation of the adverse claim. Thereafter, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by her children in her favor, TCT No.
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18990 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 90388, was issued solely in her name. Lydia obtained from Maunlad Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. a loan of P2.3 million, secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 90388.
Armando filed a Complaint against Lydia, Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. and the Register of Deeds before the RTC. He sought
the cancellation of TCT No. 90388, the issuance of a new title in his name for his one-half share of the subject property, and the nullification of
real estate mortgage insofar as his one-half share is concerned.
Questions:
a.
b.
Was there a valid Real Estate Mortgage with respect to Armandos co-owners share in the subject property? Explain.
Was Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. an innocent mortgagee in good faith? Explain.
ANSWER:
a.
No. There was no valid Real Estate Mortgage with respect to Armandos co-owners share in the subject property. The real estate
mortgage executed is valid only insofar as the share of the mortgagor Lydia in the subject property. Under Article 493 of the Civil
Code, a co-owner can alienate only his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property, and not the share of his co-owners.
b.
No, Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. is not an innocent mortgagee in good faith.
The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater
care and due diligence is required of them. Imbued with public interest, they are expected to be more cautious than ordinary
individuals. Thus, before approving a loan, the standard practice for banks and other financial institutions is to conduct an ocular
inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners
thereof. Failure to do so makes them mortgagees in bad faith.
Case Citation: Armando V. Alano vs. Planter's Development Bank, as successor-in-interest of Maunlad Savings and Loan
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171628 June 13, 2011

Legal redemption
PROBLEM: A, B, C & D are co-owners of a co-owners of Lot No. 1028 of Subdivision Plan Psd-21702 covered by TCT 1234 .
Sometime on 2003 D sold his share of the parcel of land to E. On 2004 A, B & C filed a case against E for legal redemption. On
2005 A, B & C entered into a compromise agreement with E, whereby for and in consideration of the amount of Php
650,000.00, E conveyed to A, B & C all his shares, interests, and participation over the properties. F, an alleged subdivision lot
owner of the aforementioned lot, filed a suit seeking the Declaration of Nullity of the compromise agreement entered into by A,
B. C & E claiming that his lots are affected by the redemption case therefore extrinsic fraud was present when the he was not
impleaded in the redemption case and when A, B & C entered into a compromise agreement with E. Is the contention of F
tenable?
A: No, the contention of F is untenable. The redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an action for
legal redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner. Thus, the mere fact that respondent was not impleaded in the
redemption case is not in itself indicative of extrinsic fraud. If a seller/co-owner is not treated as an indispensable party, how
much more is a third person who merely alleged that his lots are affected thereby? Truly, the exclusion of respondent (or other
alleged subdivision lot owners who are equally affected) from the legal redemption case does not entitle him to the right to ask
for the annulment of the judgment.
Case Citation: Gochan vs. Mancao G.R. No. 182314
Interest of a co-owner
PROBLEM: A, a co-owner, sold the entire property to D without the consent of the other co-owners, B and C. Is the sale of
the entire property valid?
ANSWER: The sale of the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other coowners is valid, not null and
void. However, only the rights of the coownerseller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a coowner of the property.
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Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership (Article 493 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
Therefore, the sale of the entire property by A to D, without the consent of his co-owners, B and C, is not null and void.
However, only the right of the A, coownerseller, is transferred. Thereby making D, the buyer, a coowner (of B and C) of the
property.
Note: A coowner is entitled to sell his undivided share, even if a coowner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale. The sale or other disposition affects
only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned
in common. Consequently, by virtue of the sales which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares and the subsequent
transfers thereby, the buyer became a coowner of the property since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in
the enjoyment thereof.
In addition, to be a coowner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the thing,
of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and
enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.
Case citation: Arambulo vs. Nolasco, G.R. No. 189420 March 26, 2014
In the sense that Teodoro Teodoro has not proven exclusive ownership, the MTC was right. But exclusive ownership of
Lot No. 2476 or a portion thereof is not in this case required of Teodoro Teodoro for him to be entitled to possession.
Co-ownership, the finding of both the MTC at first instance and by the RTC on appeal, is sufficient. The pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.
xArt. 1078. When there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned
in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.
Certainly, and as found by the trial courts, the whole of Lot No. 2476 including the portion now litigated is, owing to
the fact that it has remained registered in the name of Genaro who is the common ancestor of both parties herein, coowned property. All, or both Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession as coowners.
Neither party can exclude the other from possession. Although the property remains unpartitioned, the respondents in
fact possess specific areas. Teodoro Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is that which was possessed by
Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor but
also because of his own right of possession that comes from his co-ownership of the property. (Teodoro S. Teodoro, et
al. Vs. Danilo Espino, et al. - G.R. No. 189248. February 5, 2014)
Oral patition
PROBLEM: A, B and C are the co-owners of a real property having inherited from their parents. They orally partitioned the
same. Is the agreement valid? Explain.
ANSWER: Yes. The agreement is valid.
The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. It is not required that the partition agreement be registered or annotated
in the title to be valid. After exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate, they are
estopped from denying the existence of an oral partition. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is
valid or enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking
of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of their respective portions set off to each other,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the right of the parties thereunder.
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Case citation: Leonardo Notarte et. al vs. Godofredo Notarte GR. 180614 August 29, 2012
Repudiating Co-ownership and other related issues
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules
of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to
effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of Quit claim executed
by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. It is well noted that the
petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the Deed of Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been
rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilariathis contention is, of course, flawed. Mere
issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that
other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated
differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can
no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In this case,
co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as
correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed fact. As such heirs, they became
co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she
likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share, however, passed on to her daughter
Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not
prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property
he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non
habet.
Also, co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership. The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is
subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by
law.
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was
created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondents undivided share. As
trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. In Ringor v. Ringor, the Court
had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not
vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and
records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens
system was not intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of another. Where one does not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens
system of registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands in
Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they seek. For Jose
could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs. The beneficiaries are
entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended trust must be
sustained. (Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. Vs. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla - G.R. No. 151334.
February 13, 2013)
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VI)
Possession
Right of Possession
PROBLEM: Respondent AA obtained a loan from Spouses BB on November 15, 1996, to secure which they executed a real
estate mortgage in petitioners favor covering an unregistered parcel of land; AA failed to settle the loan. Petitioners
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, as the highest bidder at the public auction, bought the property on February
4, 1999. Sometime in 1997 respondent AA, sold the property to respondent Spouses CC who caused the cancellation of the land
in their name on August 15, 1997. Petitioners filed annulment of Deed of Sale. Respondent CC, who were evicted from the
property, prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore them to physical possession of the
property.
If you are the judge, how will you resolve the case? Explain.
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I will rule in favor of Spouses CC.
Article 539 of the Civil Code provides that every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed therein, he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of
Court.
For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable injury and a clear and unmistakable
right to it must be proven by the party seeking it. The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, is to preserve the status
quo. The enforcement of the writ of possession against respondent CC, who did not take part in the foreclosure proceedings,
would amount to taking of real property without the benefit of a proper judicial intervention.
Therefore, I will grant the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Case Citation: Sps. Castro Vs. Sps. Se and Dela Cruz, et al. - G.R. No. 190122
PROBLEM: Jejomar Blackie (Jejomar) being the only son inherited 300 hectares of land in the City of Kampeon ng Araw or
Sunchamp City, Batangas from his parents Don Allan Peters and Donya Miriam who were both from prominent families Trillanes
and Cayetano in the said City. In 1950, while Jejomar was still 5 years old his predecessors allowed a portion of their land to be
used as an access road in going to and from the school by pupils and students of Don Antonio T. Cayetano Elementary School
(DATCES) since it was nearest to the highway and the most convenient (though not the only) pathway. In January 1999, due to
the increasing number of students DATCES constructed a gymnasium on the subject property which will be used for school
activities and as a makeshift classroom. In March 2000, upon discovering that a structure was being constructed on the land, he
demanded that the DepED cease and desist and vacate the property. The respondent, however, refused. Jejomar likewise
demanded payment for reasonable rent, but his demand was also ignored. On October 8, 2002, Jejomar, armed with certificate
of title, supporting documents and other pieces of evidence, filed an action for recovery of possession and removal of structure
with damages against the Department of Education (DepEd) with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Sunchamp City (MTCC).
In its defense, the DepEd denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that it did not state a cause of action.
Even if there was, the same was already barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the subject land was adverse,
peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than fifty (50) years. Further, the DepEd presented the
testimony of Mrs. Graciana Poe a retired teacher and has taught in DATCES for 32 years that the subject land is owned by the
school.
Question: Is the possession or occupation by DATCES of the subject land adverse, peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of
an owner?
ANSWER: No, the possession or occupation by DATCES of the subject land was not adverse, peaceful, continuous, and in the
concept of an owner. In the case of DepEd vs. Tuliao, the Court ruled that mere material possession of the land was not
adverse as against the owner and was insufficient to vest title, unless such possession was accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner. Accordingly, the DepEd 's possession can only be considered as adverse from the time the gymnasium
was being constructed in 1999 on the subject portion of Jejomars property. In March 2000, Jejomar discovered the construction
and demanded that the DepEd cease and desist from continuing the same. When DepEd refused, Jejomar filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of the subject lot in 2002. Thus, only two (2) years had elapsed from the time the DepEd resisted
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Jejomar's claims. Clearly, he did not sleep on his rights. There was no prolonged inaction that barred him from prosecuting his
claims.
Case citation: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL DIRECTOR TERESITA DOMALANTA vs MARIANO
TULIAO G.R. No. 205664, June 9, 2014
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Necessarily, whoever owns the property has the right to possess it.
Here, between the Almerias registered title of ownership and Gaiteros verbal claim to the same, the formers title is
far superior.
As the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA found, the disputed area forms part of the Almerias registered title. Upon
examination, this fact is also confirmed by the subdivision plan which partitioned Tomagans original Lot 9960. The
evidence shows that the Almerias bought Lot 9964, which includes the disputed area, from the Asenjo heirs in whose
names the land was originally registered. Since Gaitero was unable to prove that fraud attended the titling of the
disputed area, the Almerias right over the same became indefeasible and incontrovertible a year from registration.
The Court cannot consider Gaiteros claim of ownership of the disputed area, based on his alleged continuous
possession of the same, without running afoul of the rule that bars collateral attacks of registered titles. Gaiteros
action before the MCTC is one for recovery of possession of the disputed area. An adjudication of his claim of
ownership over the same would be out of place in such kind of action. A registered title cannot be impugned, altered,
changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, reliance on
registered titles would be lost. Gaiteros action is prohibited by law and should be dismissed.
Gaiteros theory of laches cannot vest on him the ownership of the disputed area. To begin with, laches is a
consideration in equity and therefore, anyone who invokes it must come to court with clean hands, for he who has
done inequity shall not have equity. Here, Gaiteros claim of laches against the Almerias can be hurled against
him. When the lot that the Almerias acquired (Lot 9964) was registered in 1979, Gaitero had constructive, if not actual,
notice that the cadastral survey included the disputed area as part of the land that Leon Asenjo claimed. Yet, neither
Gaitero nor his mother complained or objected to such inclusion. Worse, when Gaitero saw the subdivision plan
covering Tomagans original Lot 9960 in 1993, it showed that the disputed area fell outside the boundaries of Lot 9960A which he claimed. Still, Gaitero did nothing to correct the alleged mistake. He is by his inaction clearly estopped
from claiming ownership of the disputed area. He cannot avail himself of the law of equity. (Feliciano Gaitero and Nelia
Gaitero Vs. Generoso Almeria and Teresita Almeria - G.R. No. 181812. June 8, 2011)
Possession is acquired in any of the following ways: (1) by the material occupation of the thing; (2) by the exercise of
a right; (3) by the fact that the property is subject to the action of our will; and (4) by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring the right. In Director of Lands v. IAC, we explained the nature of the possession
required to confirm ones title as follows:
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it
is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
In perusing the evidence submitted by respondent, petitioner claims that the former merely presented (1) a witness
testimony full of motherhood statements, and (2) Tax Declarations and realty payments that do not conclusively prove
ownership. Thus, the Republic claims that the evidence of possession is insufficient.
However, as found by the courts a quo, it is clear from the records that respondent presented several pieces of
documentary evidence to prove that he openly possessed the properties. He submitted notarized Deeds of Sale,
Agreements of Partition and Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate and Sale to show the acquisition of the lands from his
predecessors-in-interest.
Moreover, he presented Tax Declarations and realty payments showing that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been paying real estate taxes since 1948 until the inception of this case in 1997; hence, for more than 30 years. He
also submitted the original tracing cloth plan in which the advance survey plan shows that the subject lots had
previously been under the names of the vendors, the previous transferors, and the original owners of the lots.
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The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes is an announcement of ones claim against the
State and all other interested parties. In fact, these documents already constitute prima facie evidence of possession.
Moreover, if the holders of the land present a deed of conveyance in their favor from its former owner to support their
claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and tax receipts relative to the property may be used to prove their
good faith in occupying and possessing it. Additionally, when considered with actual possession of the property, tax
receipts constitute evidence of great value in support of the claim of title of ownership by prescription. (Republic of the
Philippines Vs. Martin T. Ng - G.R. No. 182449. March 6, 2013)

Protection over right of possession
PROBLEM: Siblings Feliz and Marilou have been occupying for decades a house from a partitioned lot that they inherited from
their ancestors. The siblings were asked by their cousins to vacate said lot and transfer to a different one but they refused
insisting that their inheritance pertained to the lot in which they were staying at.
Carmencita purchased from the cousins the lot that the siblings were occupying. She then sent a demand letter to the siblings
to vacate the house. When the siblings filed for nullity of the partition, Carmencita filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
them alleging that she is entitled to possession since she bought the lot from the cousins who were the real owners and that
the siblings were occupying the same by mere tolerance, therefore she had the right to demand for them to vacate. Is
Carmencita correct?
ANSWER: No, Carmencita is not correct. The law provides that every possessor has a right to be protected in his possession;
and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by means established by the laws and
the Rules of Court. Under the Rules of Court, one requirement of unlawful detainer is that possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, Carmencita failed to prove how and when such tolerance came about. Firstly, the siblings have been
occupying the lot for decades as owners thereof. Carmencita only had bare allegations that the siblings occupation was lawful
by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and that they became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot's
possession after she, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. She failed to
sufficiently aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
Therefore, Carmencita is not correct.
Case Citation: Suarez v. Emboy, G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014
Name/Class: TESALONA, JAYME MARIE Regular Class
The purchasers right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but
not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. In this case, petitioner opposed the issuance of
the writ of possession on the ground that he is in actual possession of the mortgaged property under a claim of
ownership. He explained that his title to the property was cancelled by virtue of a falsified deed of donation executed
in favor of spouses Pearedondo. Because of this falsification, he filed civil and criminal cases against spouses
Pearedondo to nullify the deed of donation and to punish the party responsible for the falsified document. Petitioners
claim that he is in actual possession of the property is not challenged, and he has come to court asserting an
ownership right adverse to that of the mortgagors, the spouses Pearedondo.
The third partys possession of the property is legally presumed to be based on a just title, a presumption which may
be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property. Through such a judicial
proceeding, the nature of the adverse possession by the third party may be determined, after such third party is
accorded due process and the opportunity to be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property only after he
has been given an opportunity to be heard, conformably with the time-honored principle of due process. The Civil Code
protects the actual possessor of a property, as Article 433 thereof provides:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of ownership.
The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its
physical recovery. The judicial process could mean no less than an ejectment suit or a reivindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
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The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by respondent, strictly speaking, is not the kind of
judicial process contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding
for the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in
court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. (Emmanuel C. Villanueva Vs. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation - G.R. No. 177881. October 13, 2010)
Remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name
PROBLEM: In 1950, Gold digger Plantation turned over a 911 square meter parcel of land situated in the District of Toril,
Davao City to the Philippine government and was later administered by the Board of Liquidators (BOL) pursuant to Republic Act
no. 477.
In 1957, Piolo Sakwal occupied the said property and built a house of light materials thereon. On July 28, 1960 however, an
Occupants affidavit was executed by Willie Visaya over the same property, and on December 3, 1970 he executed a Deed of
transfer of rights over the said property in favor of Zanjo Lugs who paid P10,000.00 as consideration for the improvements
thereon. In receipt of Zanjo's application for patent/title over the subject parcel of land, the BOL issued and caused the posting
of the 16 November 1987 Notice directing person/s affected thereby to make known their adverse claim/s, if any. In support of
his application, Zanjo filed the required Occupants Affidavit of Application, buttressed by a Joint-Affidavit executed by his
witnesses as well as a Certification issued by Barangay Chairman of Toril, attesting to his actual possession of the subject
parcel.
On November 29,1988, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-123456 was issued in favor of Zanjo who, forthwith, declared the land
in his name for taxation purposes and started paying the real estate taxes due thereon.
On 2 March 1994, Piolo commenced the instant suit with the filing of his complaint for reconveyance of title and damages
against Zanjo. Claiming that he had been in possession of the subject parcel since 1957, Piolo alleged, among other matters,
that he discovered the titling of the same in the name of Zanjo only in 1993; and, that the latter had fraudulently misled the
BOL into believing that he was the one in possession of the land.
Question: Is the suit filed by Piolo for the reconveyance of title against Zanjo meritorious?
ANSWER: No, Piolo failed to prove that he was a bona fide occupant of the land in litigation. Piolo did not also file any
application for the land and/or declare the same for taxation purposes. Taxes paid, tax receipts and tax declaration may become
a basis of a claim of ownership when coupled with proof of actual possession
Even if Piolo were, moreover, to be considered the bona fide occupant of the land in dispute, it cannot be gainsaid that he
effectively forfeited the priority accorded him under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 477, as amended, when he failed to register
his claim in writing after the notice relative to Zanjos application was posted.
Where there is a wrongful or erroneous registration in another persons name, the rightful owner or one with a better right can
seek reconveyance of the property and cancellation of title after one year from the date of the decree of registration and so
long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
Case Citation: Loreto Luga, et al. vs. Sps. Elena and Rogelio Arciaga, G.R. No. 175343
Notice of Lis Pendens
PROBLEM: A client comes into your office with a Torrens Title. At the back of the title is an annotation. He inquires regarding
the implication and purpose of such annotation. And how to remove such annotation. As a counsel, what is the advise you will
give to your client, and how will you explain the principle of notice of Lis Pendens?
ANSWER: Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit. Notice of lis pendens is filed for the purpose of
warning all persons that the title to certain property is in litigation and that if they purchase the same, they are in danger of
being bound by an adverse judgment.
The notice is, therefore, intended to be a warning to the whole world that one who buys the property does so at his own risk.
This is necessary in order to save innocent third persons from any involvement in any future litigation concerning the property.
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The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the
court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind
a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently.
Ordinarily a notice which has been filed in a proper case cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined,
except in cases expressly provided for by statute.
It may be cancelled upon order by the court or upon action by the Register of Deeds at the instance of the party who caused
the registration of the notice.
While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is exercised under express provisions of
law:
1)
2)
If the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party;
When the annotation isnt necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded
As stated in Sec. 77 of PD 1529. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be canceled by the Register of Deeds
upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
Case citation: Col. Francisco Dela Merced, substituted by his heirs, namely Blanquita E. Dela Merced, et al. Vs. Government
Service Insurance System, et al., G.R. No. 167140, November 23, 2011
Kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property

PROBLEM: A is the son of Z, filed an unlawful detainer against B, C, and D. A had Torrens title, while respondents as actual
occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deed of Sale. The latter believe that they
cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this
date. A, on the other hand, rebuts this claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his
name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system and asserts that, having registered the properties in his name,
he is the recognized owner and consequently has the better right to possession. As an owner, what kind of action for the
recovery of possession of real property will you apply?
ANSWER: As an owner, I will file action for the recovery of possession of real property specifically accion interdictal, or an
ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a
summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and
should be brought in the proper inferior court.
Case Citation: Ruben C. Corpuz, represented by Atty.-in-fact Wenifreda C. Aguillana vs. Sps. Hilarion Agustin and Justa Agustin,
Gr. No. 183822

Ejectment
PROBLEM: Eliseo, Jose, and Gloria are siblings and owns a undivided lot from their father Bibiano. Before the partition, Eliseo
sold his pro indiviso share to Atty Amante without the knowledge of Jose and Gloria. Later, when Bibiano died, the siblings went
into extrajudicial partition of real estate. However, the portion sold by Eliseo was granted to Gloria (the portion now occupied by
Atty Amante). Gloria asked Atty Amante to vacate the property by filing an ejectment case.
On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, affirming the decision of the RTC, and dismissing the case for ejectment, but
on the ground that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the right of possession over the disputed
property.
Is Gloria correct?
ANSWER:
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A)
Yes, Gloria is correct, Atty Amante is neither an owner or an assignee for buying the property in bad faith knowing that
the one sold is an undivided lot.
B) Yes, Gloria is correct, Atty Amante should vacate because an ejectment case is one seeking for the release of the lot in
favor to the legal owner.
C) No, Gloria is incorrect, The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred only
the sellers pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until
it is partitioned.
D) No, Gloria is incorrect, considering that the allegation of the Glorias tolerance of Atty Amantes
possession of the disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be deemed
illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail. Even so, the Court
would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry because the complaint
contained no allegation that his entry in the property had been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy
or stealth.
LESSON: A case of Ejectment will fail if force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth are not alleged.
Case citation: Fe U. Quijano Vs. Atty. Darill Almante G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014
Accion Publiciana
PROBLEM: A, filed her complaint for Recovery of Possession and /or Ownership with Damages against B, C, D and E
(petitioners) before the MTCC.
A, alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of approximately 2,000
square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of title. Sometime in 2006, she discovered that B,C,D, and E
unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed
their houses thereon. She went to the properties and verbally demanded that B,C,D,and E vacate the premises and remove
their structures thereon. They begged and promised to buy the said properties for P3,500.00 per square meter. She gave them
time to produce the said amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy them. They refused to vacate the subject properties
despite several demands.
On the other hand, B, C, D and E countered that the titles of A were products of Civil Registration Case No. 1, Record 211,
which were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos (G.R. No. L-29675, September 30, 1969 , 29 SCRA 517),
and reiterated in Republic v. Marcos (152 Phil. 204, 1973); that the said case was later enacted into law, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1271, entitled An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of
Lands that are Alienable and Disposable Under Certain Conditions and For Other Purposes which took effect on December 22,
1977; that A failed to comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles, hence,
the titles were void; that petitioners B,C,D and E had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous
possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that A was never in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject
land.
Both contending parties claim that they have a superior possessory right over the disputed lands.
Questions:
a) Who between petitioners and respondent A have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land?
b) What action is proper in this case?
ANSWER:
a)
A has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land.
As certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of land
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name
the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is also
settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Thus,
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in Arambulo v. Gungab this Court declared that the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof.
b)
The proper action is Accion Publiciana

Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding todetermine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. When parties,
however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of
the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in
short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
Case citation: GABRIEL ETAL VS. CRISOLOGO, G.R. NO. 204626. June 9, 2014
Occupation by tolerance is not possession in good faith
PROBLEM: Cipriano owned an untitled parcel of land in Minglanilla, Cebu. The land was purchased from the government in
1940. In 1949, Dionisio bought an adjacent parcel of land from Pilar Diaz. It was later found that he had encroached on a small
portion of lot owned by Cipriano. Dionisio offered to buy the encroached portion, but Cipriano refused the offer. In 1956, the
latter gave the former permission to temporarily build a house on said portion. No action for ejectment was filed against
Dionisio during the lifetime of Cipriano, who eventually died on 1982.
Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano. In 1997, they went to the Office of the Municipal Assessor to secure a copy of tax declaration
of the subject lot, as they intended to sell it to an interested buyer. To their surprise, they were informed that the said tax
declaration had been cancelled and another was issued in the name of Dionisio. Petitioners filed a Complaint against
respondents for the recovery of possession and ownership. If you were the judge, how would rule the case?
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I would rule in favor of the petitioners. The law provides that persons who occupy land by virtue
of tolerance of the owners are not possessors in good faith.
In the instant case, Dionisio was then well aware that this temporary arrangement may be terminated at any time. Respondents
cannot now refuse to vacate the property or eventually demand reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses under Articles
448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, because the provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land
with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Further, the house was erected only after Cipriano permitted it. Thus, I would rule
in favor of the petitioners.
Case Citation: HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA VS. HEIRS OF DIONISO CAADA G.R. NO. 175874 DECEMBER 11, 2013
Under Articles 444 and 1942 of the old Civil Code, possession of real property is not affected by acts of a possessory
character which are merely tolerated by the possessor, or which are due to his license. Granted that long, continued
occupation, accompanied by acts of a possessory character, affords some evidence that possession has been exerted in
the character of owner and under claim of right, this inference is unavailing to petitioners since Simplecios continued
possession of the property after his defeat in the ejectment suit was clearly upon the tolerance of respondents
predecessors-in-interest.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, petitioners reliance on Sections 40 and 41 of Act No. 190 or the
Code of Civil Procedure is, at the very least, misplaced. Inasmuch as possession must be adverse, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted in order to consolidate prescription, it stands to reason that acts of a possessory character done by
virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient. It has been ruled that this
principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but, to the prescription of
right in rem. Considering that Article 1119 of the present Civil Code also provides that "acts of possessory character
executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession,"
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the error petitioners impute against the CA for applying the new Civil Code provisions on prescription is more apparent
than real. Then as now, possession must be en concepto de dueo or adverse in order to constitute the foundation of
a prescriptive right. If not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription. (Vevencia Echin Pabalan, et al. Vs. The Heirs of Simeon A.B. Maamo, Sr. - G.R. No. 174844. March 20,
2013)
Builder in Good Faith under Art 448 in relation to Art 546

PROBLEM: Yolanda entered into a Contract of Lease with Ruby involving a parcel of land which property is covered by TCT No.
35788 in the name of Ruby. As a consequence of the lease agreement, Yolanda constructed a building worth at least
P200,000,000.00 on the said property.
Thereafter, Quenne filed a case for the recovery of possession of property that is being occupied by Yolanda by virtue of a
contract of lease with Ruby. Quenne proved its ownership and the identity of the subject property, thus, the trial court granted
her petition. Since Yolanda constructed a building on the subject parcel of land, she now claims reimbursement from Quenne
the cost of its improvement on the land invoking Article 448 of the Civil Code as builder in good faith.
Question: Can Yolandas claim against Quenne be sustained considering that she unaware that the property leased by he was
owned by another person other than Ruby
ANSWER: Article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land
or, at least, have a claim of title thereto, but not when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.
Articles 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one
who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee
under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
Hence, Uniwide cannot recover the cost of its improvement on the land from VSD under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Case citation: VSD Realty & Development Corporation Vs. Uniwide Sale, Inc. and Dolores Baello Tejada G.R. No. 170677.
October 24, 2012
Article 448 contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another. The law
presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found
and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith. We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can
easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in
his title.
With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in
good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as
of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory,
preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or
obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no
inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of
the Civil Code. (Pedro Angeles, represented by Adelina T. Angeles, attorney-in-fact Vs. Estelita B. Pascual, et al - G.R.
No. 157150. September 21, 2011)
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. Said article provides,
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
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The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the
land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to
him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to
remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land,
and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the
owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. (Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones Vs. Jose
Macabagdal, Fe D. Macabagdal and Vergon Realty Investments Corporation - G.R. No. 150666. August 3, 2010)
Art. 450. Owners option to sell his encroached property pegged at the current fair market value.
PROBLEM: In 2004, Henry, owner of a sizeable parcel of land, who just came back from a decade-long employment abroad,
was surprised to know that Our Ladys Foundation, Inc. (OLFI) intruded and trimmed his property for the development of a
subdivision road. The total area intruded upon sums up to 92 square meters. Henry recalled that in 1994, before he left, the
property was completely fenced.
Resultantly, Henry filed a case against OLFI for reimbursement of the intruded portion reckoned at the time that he elected to
be reimbursed, which was on 2004. On the other hand, OLFI contended that the amount should be pegged at the time when
they intruded, which was in 1995.
If you are the judge, how will you rule on the matter?
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I would rule in favor of Henry. Under Article 450 referring to encroachments in bad faith, the
owner of the land encroached upon has the option to require respondent builder to pay the price of the land. Jurisprudence
defined reimbursement to mean that in the event that the seller elects to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing
market value at the time of payment.
In the present case, Henry elected to be reimbursed from the intruded property in 2004. Hence, OLFI should reimburse Henry
the 92 square meters pegged at the current fair market value of the intruded lot.
Case Citation: Mercy Vda. de Roxas vs. Our Ladys Foundation, Inc., March 6, 2013, GR No. 182378
VII)
Easements
PROBLEM: X bought a property from Y, the former being fully aware of the water facility made available in the Subdivision
where residents have been relying on for 30 years for water supply. X sold the block with the water facility to A. A died. B, heir
of A, now sought for the removal of the overhead water tank from the subject parcel of land. Will Bs action prosper?
ANSWER: NO. The easement for water facility existed in the subject property sold to A.
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act
of man.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on the subject lot sold to A for the benefit of the community. It is continuous
and apparent, because it is used incessantly without human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view by the
overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
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For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously used by the residents as their sole source of water. The Civil Code
provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years. It is
therefore clear that an easement of water facility has already been acquired through prescription.
Case citation: EMETERIA LIWAG, vs HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., G. R. No. 189755. July 4, 2012
Easement of Lateral and Subjacent Support
PROBLEM: Ana is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered under TCT 1234 located on Manuela Homes. Noelle, on the
other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot Ana located on Moonwalk Village. There is a concrete fence dividing
Manuela Homes and Moonwalk Village.
Noelle caused the annotation of an adverse claim, without any claim of ownership, against the property (TCT 1234) of Ana to
assert the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of her estate to prevent the property from
collapsing since her property is located at an elevetaed plateau above Ana's property. Ana averred that when she bought the
property (TCT 1234) from Manuela Homes, there was no annotation or existence of any easement over the property. Noelle
neither asked permission nor talked to her with regard to the use of the her property as easement.
The Court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT 1234 stating that the adverse claim of
Noelle was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse tp the registered
owner and neither did he contest the title of Ana. Further, the adverse claim failed to comply with the requisites provided under
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision stating that although it did not comply with PD 1529, it can still be
annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support.
Does easement of lateral and subjacent support exists?
Can it be annotated at the back of TCT 1234?
ANSWER: Easement of lateral and subjacent support exists. However, the annotation is not necessary. An easement or
servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
There are two kinds of easements according to source. An easement is established either by law or by will of the owners.The
courts cannot impose or constitute any servitude where none existed. They can only declare its existence if in reality it exists by
law or by the will of the owners. There are therefore no judicial easements.
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent
land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his
land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported
by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbors
land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so
excavating is liable.
In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent. It was established that the
properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin each other. The residential house and lot of respondent is located on an elevated
plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioners property. The embankment and the riprapped stones have been in
existence even before petitioner became the owner of the property. It was proven that petitioner has been making excavations
and diggings on the subject embankment and, unless restrained, the continued excavation of the embankment could cause the
foundation of the rear portion of the house of respondent to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family
dwelling.
However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is
annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner
of the same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to court or have the
easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and respected.
Case Citation: Margarita F. Castro v. Napoleon A. Monsod, G.R. No. 183719. February 2, 2011
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Legal Easement of Right of Way
PROBLEM: Spouses Marinas alleged that they are the owners of Lot A, while Lucia Cabasag is the owner of Lot B. As the
spouses had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot B in accessing the
road since 1970. Lucia, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though the spouses have been granted another
passageway by the spouses Gilbero, the owners of another adjacent lot, Lot C, spouses Marinas instituted a complaint before
the RTC. Lucia denied that she allowed anybody to use Lot B as passageway. She said that the spouses claim of right of way is
only due to expediency and not necessity. She also maintained that there is an existing easement of right of way available to
the spouses Marinas granted by the spouses Gilbero. Can Lucia refuse to grant a right of way on the desired passageway?
ANSWER: Yes. Lucia can refuse to grant a right of way. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for
the grant of compulsory right of way. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is adequacy. In a number of cases, the
Supreme Court ruled that when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even
when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.
In the case at bar, the claim of right of way was only due to expediency. An existing easement of right of way is available to the
spouses Marinas. Therefore, because the claim of right of way is not for necessity but mere expediency, Lucia can refuse to
grant right of way through her property.
Case Citation: CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO v. PATROCINIO L.
MARCOS. G.R. No. 180282, 11 April 2011

Easement on Public Lands
Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly building their shanties,
without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly
registered in its name under TCT No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an open
space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents. The trial court
opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement
purposes and that only the local government of Las Pias City could institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership.
Held: An easement or servitude is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his or her property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively belongs,
indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. The Code defines
easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner
or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. There are two
kinds of easement according to source: by law or by will of the owners the former are called legal and the latter voluntary
easement. A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by necessity constituted by law has for its object either
public use or the interest of private persons.
While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the
portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the
easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all matters concerning easements established for public or communal
use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this
Title Title VII on Easements or Servitudes."
In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999, which superseded DENR A.O. No. 97-05dated
March 6, 1997 and prescribed the revised guidelines in the implementation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
1273 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the governments
program of biodiversity preservation, Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along
the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the
open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977. Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use and
are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and that "the areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be
non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable." (Pilar Development Corporation Vs. Ramon Dumadag, Ronaldo Bacabac, et al. G.R. No. 194336. March 11, 2013)
100

VIII)
Nuisance
Kinds of nuisance
PROBLEM: Crisostomo is the CEO of Boracay West Cove. On January 2010, company applied for a zoning compliance with the
municipal government of Malay. While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought the
issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located
in Sitio Diniwid, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes issued by the DENR in favor of Boracay
West Cove. The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied the application on the ground that the proposed construction site was
within the no build zone demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance. Pertinent provisions of which states:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Ordinance, the following words, terms and phrases shall mean as
follows:
xxxx
xxx
(b) No Build Zone the space twenty-five (25) meters from the edge of the mean high water mark measured inland;
xxx
SECTION 3. No building or structure of any kind whether temporary or permanent shall be allowed to be set up,
erected or constructed on the beaches around the Island of Boracay and in its offshore waters. During the conduct of
special activities or special events, the Sangguniang Bayan may, through a Resolution, authorize the Office of the
Mayor to issue Special Permits for construction of temporary structures on the beach for the duration of the special
activity as embodied in the Resolution.
In due time, Crisostomo appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor. On May 2010, Crisostomo followed up his appeal
through a letter but no action was ever taken by the mayor. On April 2011, a Notice of Assessment was sent to him asking for
the settlement of Boracay West Coves unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a recommendation for closure in view of
its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance, building permit, and business and mayors
permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the companys obligations, but the municipal treasurer refused to
accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile, Crisostomo continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort
hotel.
Subsequently, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on
June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor, issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves
hotel. EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein the local
government demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most recent of which was made in February
2014.
During trial, Crisostomo asserted that their right to due process was violated when the mayor ordered the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel without first conducting judicial proceedings and that the hotel cannot summarily be
abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
Questions:
1) Was the construction of the hotel considered nuisance?
2) Was Crisostomos contention tenable?
ANSWER:
1)
Yes, the construction of the hotel is considered nuisance. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs
or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property.
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination that constructions
therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public
safety. No build zones are intended for the protection of the public because the stability of the grounds foundation is
adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges also justifies the
ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the areas exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be
ignored and ample protection to the residents of Malay should be afforded.
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2)
No, Crisostomos contention is not tenable. Property valuation, is not the litmus test for such a determination. More
controlling is the propertys nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to see if it qualifies as a nuisance as
defined under the law. As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per
accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace
to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The
second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance.
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is generally
defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotels particular incidentits location
and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay
West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. However, the LGU may nevertheless, properly
order the hotels demolition, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause which allows the
government to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare.
Case citation: Crisostomo B. Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, represented by Hon. Mayor John P. Yap, et al. - G.R. No.
211356. September 29, 2014

PROBLEM: Retired Justice Gancayco owned a parcel of land in Quezon City where a two-storey building was being
constructed. Sometime in 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for
commercial buildings in business zones.
The property of Justice Gancayco being covered by the Ordinance, he subsequently sought exemption from the application of
the Ordinance to which the City Council acted favorably on his request.
In 2003, the MMDA summarily demolished the party wall or the wing wall of the ground floor structure of Justice Gancaycos
building on the ground that the structure was a public nuisance per se impeding the safe passage of pedestrians.
Is the wing wall a nuisance per se?
ANSWER: No. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or
property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A
nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the
undefined law of necessity.
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not
consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property.
Case Citation: Emilio Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City and MMDA, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011
IX)
Modes of Acquiring Ownership
Ownership by a purchaser
PROBLEM: Spouses X failed to pay their loan, resulting in the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of their mortgaged
properties. In the auction sale, Y emerged as the highest bidder, so a Certificate of Sale was issued in its name. This certificate
was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds.
Consequently, Y demanded that Spouses X vacate the properties covered by the mortgage. However, this went unheeded,
forcing Y to file with the trial court a petition seeking a Writ of Possession over the foreclosed properties.
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Considering that the 12-month redemption period has already lapsed and the need for a bond already dispensed with, is
consolidation of title necessary before possession may be automatically given to Y bank?
ANSWER: Yes. Y can only demand possession after the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a
new transfer certificate of title.
The purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the
property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at
any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title
in the purchasers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of
title becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.
Hence, for Y to be issued a writ of possession, it must first clearly show that it has consolidated ownership of the subject
properties in its name. It is only at this point that issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function of the courts.
Case citation: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. SPOUSES EDGARDO M. CRISTOBAL and MA. TERESITA S.
CRISTOBAL G.R. No. 175768. December 11, 2013

Donation
PROBLEM: David is a natural-born American citizen, and is the son of the spouses Simeon, a naturalized American citizen, and
Helen, an American citizen. In 2000, Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several
parcels of land located in Cebu City.
In 2010, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all
of the property, and registered it to the Register of Deeds a year after. In 2012, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning,
transferring and conveying her one-half (1/2) share of the properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed
another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in the
Philippines.
In 2014, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG and furnished it with documents showing that Davids ownership of one-half (1/2 of
the estate was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country.
The only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a naturalborn citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really
donations inter vivos. David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of accretion and not by way of
donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helens intention to renounce her share in the property and not an
intention to donate.
Question: Was there a proper donation inter vivos?
ANSWER: No. Not all the elements of a donation are present.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the
patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an
immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that there should be an
acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the acceptance is
made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in
both instruments.
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The transfer of the property by
virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent
increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helens intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not
sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm
it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a
waiver of her rights, title, and interest over the lands in favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was
not possible.
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Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writing the notice of the acceptance must be noted
not only in the document containing the acceptance but also in the deed of donation. These requisites, definitely prescribed by
law, have not been complied with, and no proof of compliance appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the
conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds. Further,
the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice thereof to the donor in an authentic manner.
It is well-settled that if the notification and notation are not complied with, the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the
law not having been complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos
Case citation: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA,
and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, G.R. No. 132964. February 18, 2000
PROBLEM: A, sued X to recover a parcel of land. A claimed ownership over the property through purchase in July 1971 from B,
who in turn, bought the property from Rodrigo in August 1970. A, declared the property in his name for tax purposes soon after
acquiring it.
X similarly claimed ownership over the property through purchase in July 1983 from Y, who in turn acquired the property from
Rodrigo in May 1965 in a deed of donation which was signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses. Rodrigo stipulated
that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of
Y. X entered the property and paid taxes afterwards. Is As title over the property superior to that of X?
ANSWER: No. The title of A is not superior to that of X because Rodrigo passed naked title to Y under a perfected donation
inter vivos. The stipulation in the Deed of Donation shows the irrevocability of the passage of title to Ys estate, waiving
Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Ys acceptance to the
disposition which is being reflected in the Deed of Donation. The acceptance of Y to the transfer underscores its essence as a
gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.
Accordingly, having expressly and irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Y in 1965 by way of donation inter
vivos, Rodrigo cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another. Thus, Rodrigos postdonation sale of the Property vested no title to B in which A acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, X bought the
Property from Y, thus acquiring the latters title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants.
Case Citation: Gonzalo Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
Rules of contract govern the onerous portion of donation; rules of donation only apply to the excess, if any. We now
come to the appreciation of the legal incidents of the donation vis--vis the alleged ungrateful acts.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Silim, we classified donations according to purpose. A pure/simple donation is the truest
form of donation as it is based on pure gratuity. The remuneratory/compensatory type has for its purpose the
rewarding of the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional/modal
donation, on the other hand, is a consideration for future services; it also occurs where the donor imposes certain
conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, whose value is inferior to the donation given. Lastly, an onerous
donation imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation; this is made for a valuable consideration whose cost is equal
to or more than the thing donated.
In De Luna v. Judge Abrigo, we recognized the distinct, albeit old, characterization of onerous donations when we
declared: Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the
law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20
Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495." In the same case, we emphasized the
retention of the treatment of onerous types of donation, thus: "The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as
provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed."
We agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the property
forP15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the nature of
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an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application
with respect to the onerous portion of the donation.
Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation exists, and the legal
provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on donation to the gratuitous
portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation. She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly
established by the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee; it was her husband who
committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against the donor; it was the petitioner's sister who
received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the case out of the purview of Article 765 of the
New Civil Code. (Cerila J. Calanasan, represented by Teodora J. Calanasan as Attorney-in-fact Vs. Spouses Virgilio
Dolorito and Evelyn C. Dolorito - G.R. No. 171937. November 25, 2013)
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor
to the done and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And
once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.The donation of the first
parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten
(10) years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated
in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally
speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The
donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code. The
donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels
including a portion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in
article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses did not
intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's sister) had several children to support is not one of the
grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.
(Heirs of Cesario Velasquez, et al. Vs. Court of Appeals, et al. - G.R. No. 126996. February 15, 2000)
Debt claimed as Donation
Facts: Spouses Cueto (respondents) alleged that Esperanza and her husband acquired from one Roberto Ventura the rights
over a parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-129128 under the name of GSIS measuring 180 sq.m. Esperanza and Jose
were to assume the payment of the applicable monthly amortizations for the subject land to the GSIS. Several amortizations
remained unpaid by the spouses resulting in an impending cancellation in 2005 of GSIS conditional sale of the subject property
to Roberto. It was then that Esperanza, then already a widow, sought financial assistance from her brother, Gavino. Spouses
Cueto then paid from their conjugal savings Esperanzas total obligation of P785,680.37 under the subject deed of assignment.
Spouses Cueto alleged that Esperanza and Jazer (her son) undertook to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
respondents once the title over the subject property was transferred to their names, subject to the condition that they would be
given the first option to buy it back within three years by reimbursing the expenses incurred by the respondents on the
property. Besides satisfaction of the unpaid amortizations to GSIS, the respondents paid for the transfer of the subject property
from Roberto to Esperanza, and the renovation of the residential house erected on the subject land, resulting in additional
expenses of P515,000.00. TCT No. T-636804 already under the name of Esperanza was surrendered to the respondents.
Sometime in 2006, the respondents demanded from Esperanza and Jazer the fulfillment of their commitment to transfer the
subject property to the respondents names through the execution of a deed of sale. Esperanza and Jazer disputed these claims.
They argued that there was neither a written or verbal agreement for the transfer of the disputed property to the respondents
names, nor a promise for the repayment of the amounts that were paid by the respondents. Esperanza believed that Gavino
paid her outstanding balance with the GSIS out of sheer generosity and pity upon her. She denied having borrowed the
respondents money because given her financial standing, she knew that she could not afford to pay it back. Furthermore, to
require her to execute a deed of sale for the propertys full conveyance would totally disregard the payments that she personally
made for the purchase.
Held: Between Esperanza and the respondents, there was a clear intention for a return of the amounts which the respondents
spent for the acquisition, transfer and renovation of the subject property. The respondents then reasonably expected to get
their money back from Esperanza. Esperanzas claim that the expenses and payments in her behalf were purely gratuitous
remained
unsupported
by
records.
As
observed:
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Indeed, the absence of intention to be reimbursed is negated by the facts of this case. The respondents conduct never
at any time intimated any intention to donate in favor of Esperanza and Jazer. A donation is a simple act of liberality
where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it ( Article 725, New Civil Code, as
amended). But when a large amount of money is involved, as in this case, this court is constrained to take Esperanza
and Jazers claim of generosity by [the respondents] with more than a grain of salt.
Esperanzas refusal to pay back would likewise result in unjust enrichment, to the clear disadvantage of the respondents. The
main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
without just cause or consideration. While Esperanza claims that her brothers generosity was the consideration for the
respondents payment of her obligations, this was not sufficiently established, that even the respondents vehemently denied the
allegation.
In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents was actually a donation, Esperanza
should have also submitted in court a copy of their written contract evincing such agreement. Article 748 of the New Civil Code
(NCC), which applies to donations of money, is explicit on this point as it reads:
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be
made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
As the Court ruled in Moreo-Lentfer v. Wolff, a donation must comply with the mandatory formal requirements set forth by law
for its validity. When the subject of donation is purchase money, Article 748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation
of money as well as its acceptance should be in writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal
requisites prescribed by law.
The respondents statement that they paid for Esperanzas obligations because they wanted to help her did not contradict an
understanding for the return of the claimed amounts. Clearly, the aid then needed by Esperanza was for the immediate
production of the money that could pay for her obligations to the GSIS and effect transfer of title, in order that her payments
and interest over the property would not be forfeited. The help accorded by the respondents corresponded to such need. It did
not follow that the respondents could no longer be allowed to later demand the repayment. In disputing the claim against her,
Esperanza imputed deceit upon the respondents and claimed that they misled her into their real intention behind the payment
of her obligations and possession of TCT No. T-636804. Deceit, however, is a serious charge which must be proven by more
than just bare allegations. (Esperanza C. Carinan Vs. Sps. Gavino Cueto, et al. - G.R. No. 198636. October 8, 2014)
Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership
PROBLEM: Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, with an area of
Zone 5, Bulan, Sorsogon. After he died, his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel,
equally among themselves. Later, Dionisia died without issue ahead of her four
Dionisias share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1, 1948,
her share to him in May 1945.
570 sq. m., located at Magsaysay Avenue,

Macario, and Dionisia divided Lot No. 552
siblings, and Macario took possession of
Macario claimed that Dionisia had donated
Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty Gullaba and Saida Gabelo sold 225 sq. m. to his son Roger
Espinocilla, husband of respondent Belen Espinocilla and father of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla. On March 8, 1985, Roger
Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. Per actual survey of Lot No. 552, respondent Belen Espinocilla occupies 109 sq.
m., Caridad Atienza occupies 120 sq. m., Caroline Yu occupies 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacion's son, occupies 132 sq. m.
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.5 sq. m. which he bought from Aspren and another 28.5
sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was occupied by Macarios house. His claim has since been modified to an alleged
encroachment of only 39 sq. m. that he claims must be returned to him. He avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171
sq. m. of Lot No. 552, having inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren.
According to him, his mothers inheritance is 142.5 sq. m., that is, 114 sq. m. from Doroteo plus 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia.
Since the area he occupies is only 132 sq. m., he claims that respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq. m.
Respondents agree that Doroteos five children each inherited 114 sq. m. of Lot No. 552. However, Macarios share increased
when he received Dionisias share. Macarios increased share was then sold to his son Roger, respondents husband and
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father. Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of acquisitive prescription and that there
is no basis for petitioners claim of encroachment.
Whether or not petitioners action to recover the subject portion is barred by prescription.
ANSWER: YES. Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, is concerned
with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. In
extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted
adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.
Here, petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents possession with his assertion that Macarios fraudulent
acquisition of Dionisias share created a constructive trust. In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary
relation to speak of and the so-called trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the
beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a
constructive trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse. Prescription may supervene even if the trustee
does not repudiate the relationship.
Then, too, respondents uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was established. Macario
occupied Dionisias share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit.
We also agree with the CA that Macarios possession of Dionisias share was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his
three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in
favor of his son Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macarios possession because said sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of
ownership over Macarios original share and Dionisias share. In 1985, Roger also exercised an act of ownership when he sold
114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer petitioners complaint, that
respondents peaceful possession of the remaining portion (109 sq. m.) was interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary
acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macarios 1948 affidavit void is of no
moment. Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with Macarios title or good faith. Accordingly, the RTC erred in ruling that
Macario cannot acquire by prescription the shares of Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel, in Dionisias 114-sq. m. share from Lot No.
552.
Moreover, the CA correctly dismissed petitioners complaint as an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. This is the other kind of prescription under the Civil Code,
called extinctive prescription, where rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. Petitioners action for recovery of
possession having been filed 55 years after Macario occupied Dionisias share, it is also barred by extinctive prescription. The
CA while condemning Macarios fraudulent act of depriving his three sisters of their shares in Dionisias share, equally
emphasized the fact that Macarios sisters wasted their opportunity to question his acts.
Case Citation: Celerino E. Mercado Vs. Belen Espinocilla and Ferdinand Espinocilla G.R. No. 184109 / February 1, 2012
Name/Class: DE LOS SANTOS, NAIZA MAE Regular Class
107

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
I)
Torrens System
Indefeasibility of title
PROBLEM: Kristelio and Cecilio Tumbal where siblings who inherited an agricultural land. It was Kristelio who applied for land
registration. After the petition was granted, OCT 14369 was issued solely on Kristelios name. 20yrs after, Kristelio sold the
property to Chieken Joy, OCT 14369 was cancelled and TCT 666 was issued in the name of Chieken joy. As basis for recovering
the possession of the property, Cecilio has assailed the title of Kristeli.
Is Cecilios action tenable?
ANSWER: NO, the title of Kristelio over the property has become indefeasible.
Registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title. The Torrens
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein. In that sense, the
issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the
certificate may be co-owners of the real property therein described with the person named therein, or that the registered owner
may be holding the property in trust for another person.
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under the Torrens system becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible.
The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 14369 in the name of Kristelio, and its
derivative certificates) before Chieken Joy became the registered owner. In all that time, Cecilio did not oppose the transactions
causing the transfers. It is unthinkable, therefore, that Cecilio, fully aware of the exclusive registration in his brother Kristelios
name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first time.
Case citation: Casimiro Development Corporation vs. Renato Mateo deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse Virginia B.
Mateo and his daughter Lady Bird Josephine M. Marquez GR No. 175485
Petitioner claims that the action is barred by extraordinary acquisitive prescription and laches. Petitioner contends that
she took possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, exclusive, notorious and continuous since 1952
through her predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio, and by herself up to the present; that the late Fernando and private
respondents had never taken possession of the land at any single moment; and that, granting without admitting that
the transfer of rights between Fernando and Eugenio was null and void for any reason whatsoever, petitioner's
possession of the land had already ripened into ownership after the lapse of 30 years from August 1952 by virtue of
the extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
We are not persuaded.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the
registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. In this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a
titled property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles. (Ceferina De Ungria
(deceased) substituted by her heirs, Lolita Ungria San Juan-Javier and Rhodora R. Pelomida Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals,
et al. - G.R. No. 165777. July 25, 2011)
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, states that no title
to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because
possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
However, in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the Court had recognized the
jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is true that a Torrens title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered
property by reason of laches.
108
Thus, in Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, the Court had held that while a person may not acquire title to the
registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner,
the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto,
by reason of laches.
In the more recent case of Bartola M. Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion, we similarly held that while jurisprudence is
settled on the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally an abundance of cases where we
unequivocally ruled that registered owners may lose their right to recover possession of property through the equitable
principle of laches.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert his right either has abandoned
or declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in equity. The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in
asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge of defendants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue;
(c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.
In view of respondents decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by virtue of a court
judgment and the erstwhile registered owners inaction and neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right to recover the same, it is clear that
respondents possession may no longer be disturbed. The right of the registered owners as well as their successors-ininterest to recover possession of the property is already a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.
In the same vein, we uphold the finding of the Court of Appeals that the title of petitioners ascendants wrongfully
included lots belonging to third persons. Indeed, petitioners ascendants appeared to have acknowledged this fact as
they were even the ones that prayed for the cadastral court to subdivide Lot 1303 as evident in the November 29,
1929 Decision. We concur with the Court of Appeals that petitioners ascendants held the property erroneously titled
in their names under an implied trust for the benefit of the true owners. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1456.
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
As aptly observed by the appellate court, the party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their title over the
property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. As we held
in Medizabel v. Apao, the essence of an action for reconveyance is that the certificate of title is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. It is settled in
jurisprudence that mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may
only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
(Jose Fernando, Jr. et al. Vs. Leon Acua, et al. - G.R. No. 161030. September 14, 2011)
Collateral attack on a Torrens certificate of title
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked. What cannot be collaterally
attacked though is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by
the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often
than not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both
are interchangeably used.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can
no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of
ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In
fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
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property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate
of title. Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
(Betty B. lacbayan Vs. Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. - G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011)
Anent the issuance of OCT No. M-10991 in favor of petitioners husband Alfredo Herrerra in 2002, respondents alleged
that there was fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith in the issuance thereof. Thus, respondents are now questioning
the legality of OCT No. M-10991, an issue which this Court cannot pass upon in this present petition. It is a rule that
the validity of a Torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally, Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law.
The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during the proceedings before this Court as said title was issued
in the name of petitioner's husband only during the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The issue on the validity of
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose
and the present appeal before us (Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as to whether the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems has jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership between the
parties), is simply not the direct proceeding contemplated by law. (Celia S. Vda. De Herrera Vs. Emelita Bernardo, et
al. - G.R. No. 170251. June 1, 2011)
A void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value
PROBLEM: House and Lot #9, situated in Scout St., Diliman, Quezon City, is owned by Yee Ching married to Emily Ching. For a
consideration of valuable services rendered by Emerald, Emilys sister, Yee transferred ownership of the house and lot #9 to
Emerald. The latter acquired TCT #2014 covering the subject property. However, Emily did not approve of the transfer so she
forged a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale purports that Emerald sold the house and lot #9 to her.
Consequently, TCT#2014 was cancelled and a new TCT#12345 was issued in favor of Emily. Subsequently, Emily sold the
house and lot#9 to Spouses Go. Spouses Go obtained a loan of Php500,000 from BBI Family Savings Bank and constituted a
mortgage on the subject property. BBI Family Savings Bank foreclosed the mortgage when Spouses Go defaulted on the
payment of their loan, and TCT#2114 was issued in favor of BBI Family Savings Bank. Then, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed by the BBI Family Savings Bank in favor of Spouses Chan and TCT#6789 was issued to the latter. Presently, the
Spouses Chan occupy the house and lot. Emerald filed a complaint for Forcibly Entry against the Spouses Chan averring that
she never sold the property and that her signature was forged. She contended that the sale between her and Emily was void
due to forgery and so there was no valid transfer of ownership. Decide.
ANSWER: I will dismiss the complaint. It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of
a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value. Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title, every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the
vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the
vendors acquisition of the property. The rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title
and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of
such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.
Even on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be
valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here for we are confronted with the
functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of
sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true
owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.
Case Citation: Emerita Muoz vs. Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. and Samuel Go Chan, Gr No. 142676, June 6, 2011
Torrens Title as conclusive evidence
PROBLEM: R filed an action to quiet title with the RTC against P alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of
residential lot covered by OCT-888. P denied Rs claim and asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who
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had been in open, public, continuous, and exclusive possession of the property. P alleges that the lot in question is only a
portion of the land that he inherited from his father. Since then, he had been in adverse possession and ownership of the
subject lot through his caretaker. He mortgaged the land with the DBP. He declared the land for taxation purposes and paid real
estate taxes. P contended that OCT-888 was secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation,
considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued is a free patent. The RTC declared OCT-888
null and void; and declared that R should be the absolute or true owner and possessor of the land in dispute. On appeal, the CA
reversed the order of the RTC and held that there is no controversy as R is a holder of a Torrens title; hence, he is the owner of
the subject property. Is the contention of the CA correct in reversing the decision of the RTC?
ANSWER: Yes, the contention of the Court of Appeals must be upheld.
According to the Supreme Court, the Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. In addition, the power to classify
lands rests on the President upon the recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. Furthermore,
the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants
claim and mu properly indentify the property. Lastly, it has been stated that at present, not only agricultural lands, but also
residential lands, have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born
Filipino citizen.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court correctly pointed out that Rs OCT888 had already obtained indefeasibility and that it should prevail over the tax declarations and tax receipts as presented by P.
Furthermore, P failed to prove fraud in the issuance of OCT-888 as he did not present any proof that the President classified the
land into a residential land as opposed to what was stated in OCT-888 that it was an agricultural land. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals contention that there was no fraud in the issuance of OCT-888 as free patent should be sustained.
Case Citation: Datu Kiram Sampaco, substituted by Hadji Soraya S. Macabando Vs. Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud - G.R. No.
163551

Free Patent over a private land
QUESTION: In a land dispute, can a Free Patent issued by a Director of Lands over a private land be declared null and void?
ANSWER: The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects
whatsoever. Private ownership of land - as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory
information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants - is
not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land, law applies only to lands of the
public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character
and have passed to private ownership. Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of
the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it is really a part of the disposable land of
the public domain
Case Citation: Heirs of Margarito Pabaus, etc. vs Heirs of Amanda Yutiamco, etc. G.R. No. 164356 July 27, 2011
Name/Class: SENIDO, FATIMA Regular Class
Prescriptive period for annulment of title
PROBLEM: Dyosa Mendiola is the registered owner over a parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-177292. Said land was
acquired by her father who applied for a free patent over the subject properties, resulting in the issuance of Free Patent No. V3005844 under OCT No. P-17792 in her name on August 24, 1979.
On December 19, 1990, Laura Pweragaba, filed an action for annulment of title of OCT P-17729 with prayer for receivership and
damages claiming that she is the lawful heir of the said lot which belonged to her grandfather. She alleged that Mendiola
obtained said land through fraud and deceit. Mendiolas father was merely an administrator of her late grandfathers estate who
applied for a free patent under his name. To prove her claim of ownership, she presented a Titulo Possessorio and Recognition
of Ownership and Possession.
Question: Will the action for annulment of title prosper?
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ANSWER: No. For annulment of Torrens Title to prosper, such action must be filed within the prescriptive period. Sec. 32 of
the Property Registration Decree provides that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be shall be one year from the
date of its entry and that after the lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate of title becomes incontrovertible and
indefeasible. In the instant case, the Torrens Title has been issued on August 24, 1979; however, the action was commenced
only in 1990.
Case citation: LAURA F. PARAGUYA v. SPS. ALMA ESCUREL-CRUCILLO AND EMETERIO CRUCILLO AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF SORSOGON, G.R. No. 200265. December 2, 2013

Prescription for cancellation of title and reversion

QUESTION: Under the Public Land Act, who may initiate an action for cancellation of title and reversion? Does the action for
reversion prescribes?
ANSWER: Under Section 101 of Public Land Act provides for a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently
awarded to the applicant may be recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the government. The Office of Solicitor
General shall represent the government in all land registration and related proceedings and institute actions for the reversion to
the government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution. A
private party cannot bring an ac tion for reversion. If there has been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an
action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy.
Statute of limitations doesnt run against the State, Hence an action for reversion is not barred by prescription.
Case citation: Republic of the Philippines-Bureau of Forest Development Vs. Vincente Roxas, et al./Provident Tree Farms, Inc.
Vs. Vicente Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 157988, December 11, 2013
The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are two apparently valid
titles over a single property
PROBLEM: Ramitex bought a parcel of land known as Lot 1131 from co-owners Tomas Soriano and Concepcion Lozada in
1957. On the basis of such sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled the vendors Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
29334 and issued TCT No. T-18460 in favor of Ramitex. Troubles began for Ramitex when Oliveros filed a petition in the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-17186, his alleged title over Lot 1131. He claimed that he
obtained title in 1956 but the original copy was destroyed in the fire that gutted the office of the Bulacan Register of Deeds.
However, the trial court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Oliveros TCT No. T-17186 does not exist. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Oliveros appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in
holding that it was their burden to prove the invalidity of Ramitexs title and that they failed to discharge such burden. He
maintain that the mere existence of a prior title in his name suffices to create the presumption that Ramitexs title, being the
later title, is void and with that presumption, it was incumbent upon Ramitex to prove the validity of its alleged title. Is Oliveros
correct in holding that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one?
ANSWER: No, Oliveros is not correct. The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are
two apparently valid titles over a single property. The existence of the earlier valid title renders the subsequent title void
because a single property cannot be registered twice. As stated in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of
Appeals a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an
earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Clearly, a mere allegation of an earlier title will not suffice. Since petitioners
allege that they have a title which was issued earlier than SMCs title, it was their burden to prove the alleged existence and
priority of their title. The trial and appellate courts shared conclusion that petitioners TCT No. T-17186 does not exist in the
official records is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. Petitioners have not offered a reason or pointed to evidence
that would justify overturning this finding. Neither did they assert that this factual finding is unsubstantiated by the records.
Without a title, petitioners cannot assert priority or presumptive conclusiveness.
Case citation: Heirs of Leoncio C. Oliveros, represented by Aurora B. Oliveros, et al. vs San Miguel Corporation, et al., G.R. No.
173531, February 01, 2012
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II)
Regalian Doctrine
Lands of Public Domain

PROBLEM: Bob Ong filed an application with the Regional Trial Court for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land
situated in Taguig, Metro Manila. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order for initial hearing and publication, as required by
law, after finding that the application is sufficient in form and substance. Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared
as oppositor. LLDA asserted that the two parcels of land subject to the case are not part of the alienable and disposable lands if
the public domain pursuant to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 4850 which provides that lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay,
located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake.
On the other hand, the Republic filed its opposition on the ground that the applicant failed to prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lands since June 12,
1945 or earlier. On the other hand, the applicant presented witnesses who testify that the he and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945.
Thereupon, the Regional Trial Court rendered decision in favor of Bob Ong. Is the decision correct?
ANSWER: No, the decision of the court is incorrect.
All public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. Futhermore, under PD 1529 which refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, the applicant must sufficiently establish that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In this case, the assertions made by the respondents are unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions f the possession and
occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest. They do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation.
Therefore, the decision is invalid.
Case Citation: Republic of the Philippines vs. Remman Enterprises Inc., G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable
public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
On this requirement of proof to establish that a land has become alienable and disposable, the respondent argues that
the Advance Survey Plans that were prepared by Engr. Dumaguing and approved by the DENR-Land Management
Bureau, providing notations that the lots indicated therein are within the alienable and disposable properties of the
State, should suffice. We disagree.
As the rule now stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and
disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. In a line of cases, we have ruled that mere
notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties alienable and disposable character.
Our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation is particularly instructive:
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the
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application is alienable or disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable.
However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan
bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers
only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.
Clearly, even the testimony of Engr. Belleza fails to satisfy the required proof. Before us, Medida attempts to remedy
the deficiency in his application by submitting the Certifications of the CENRO of Argao, Cebu, attached to his
Comment to further substantiate his claim that the subject properties were already declared alienable and disposable.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the said CENRO Certifications remain inadequate to support his intended purpose.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., this Court explained that a Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) or CENRO certification, by itself, fails to prove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of land. We
ruled:
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
We further explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy x x x.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public
lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public
documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect
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"entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the
Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook. The certifications are not
the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a
government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x.
The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration be accompanied by: (1)
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. Medida failed in this respect. The records only
include CENRO Certifications on the subject properties alienability and disposability, but not a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by its legal custodian. (Republic of the
Philippines Vs. Marlon Medida - G.R. No. 195097. August 13, 2012)
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine visvis the right of the claimants to lands they claim to have possessed
since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act
of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable
and disposable. Absent such wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject land was
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land
was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are
inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, wherein we held:
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are
public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence
of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition. x x x.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and
the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated
upon by the members of this Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic. In Malabanan, the members of this Court
were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that
effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural
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or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessorsin
interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. (Republic of the Philippines Vs. Heirs of Maxima
Lachica Sin - G.R. No. 157485. March 26, 2014)
III)
Citizenship Requirement
Application for Registration of Title

PROBLEM: Barack filed an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1916. Barack
alleged that he inherited the subject land from his mother. The government then filed an opposition to his application for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not
subject to private appropriation.
During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, Barack presented several exhibits in compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove his ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the
registration. Significant was the testimony of Mr. Putin, a Special Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He attested to having
conducted an inspection of the subject land and identified the corresponding Report dated 17 January 1997, which he had
submitted to the Regional Executive Director. The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely within the
alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by any
other person. The government argued that Barack failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the
testimony of Mr. Putin did not contain the date when the land was declared as such.
1)
2)
What are the instances when a person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land?
If you were the judge, how would you rule Baracks application for registration based on the evidence he presented?
ANSWER: Under PD 1529, persons who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 may file an application for registration of title to land.
If I were the judge, I would deny Baracks application for registration of land.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. (G.R. No. 154953, 26 June 2008), the Supreme Court ruled that a CENRO certification is
not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable; the applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, Baracks evidence, particularly Mr. Putins testimony, is not sufficient enough to prove that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain.
*In the case of Republic vs. Carlos Vega (G. R. No. 177790, 17 January 2011) the Supreme Court granted the application for
registration based on the testimony of the CENRO Special Investigator, but without the necessary approval by the DENR
Secretary. The Court held that when Republic vs TAN Properties, Inc. was pronounced the former case was still pending in the
lower courts, and, thus, Republic vs. Carlos Vega shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
The general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1)
a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
Case Citation: Republic of the Philippines vs. Carlos Vega GR 177790, January 17, 2011
Name/Class: SANTIAGO, JANRY NINO Regular Class
Application for registration of public lands
PROBLEM: Spouses Antonio and Erlinda filed an application for registration of a 2,597- square meter land which was originally
owned by Pastora, upon whose death succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria. Through an affidavit of adjudication
116

dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo
on May 23, 1975 who later sold the same lot to the spouses Antonio and Erlinda through a deed of absolute sale on May 4,
1984.
Antonio and Erlinda claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful,
adverse and uninterrupted possession of the lot for more than 50 years and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan,
technical description and certificate of assessment.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed but did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private
opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the world,
except the Republic.
The RTC granted the application for registration in favor of Antonio and Erlinda. The Republic appealed the RTC decision with
the CA arguing that the spouses Antonio and Erlinda did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot
has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortunas evidence Tax
Declaration No. 8366 showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945
cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 of the Property Registration Decree.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and
disposable nature of the land, they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e.
since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republics argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses
Fortunas predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land only since 1948
Questions:
A. Should the application for registration be granted?
B. B. Assuming that the land has been already classified as alienable and disposable prior to their application, can they
acquire such property through acquisitive prescription?
ANSWER:
A.
No, the application for registration cannot be granted.

The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State. Public land that has not been
classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any
applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and
disposable nature of the land. Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title
acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the applicants only presented as evidence the lots survey plan, technical description and certificate of
assessment, thus, they failed to present incontrovertible evidence that the lot has been reclassified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Therefore, the application should be denied.
B.
No, they cannot acquire the land through acquisitive prescription.

PD No. 1073 provides that Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least 30 years or at least since May 8, 1947 may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
In the case at bar, the applicant failed to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
Case citation: Sps. Fortuna vs Republic GR 173423 March 5, 2014

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Who may file for registration under Sec 14(1) of PD 1529
PROBLEM: On February 28, 2003, A filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land. In
support of his application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for various years from
1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property is classified as alienable and disposable;
(3) technical description of the property, with a certification issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5)
extrajudicial settlement of estate dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to A; and (6) escritura de particion
extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to As mother.
A further claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March 21,
1998, after his parents died he and his siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their
deceased parents and one of the properties allocated to him was the subject property; that the subject parcel of land is not part
of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Question: Did A comply with all the requirements for original registration of title?
ANSWER: No. In this case the applicable provision is Section 14 of PD 1529, which pertinently provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. The annotation in the survey plan presented by A is not the kind of evidence
required by law as proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A failed
to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the classification of the subject property. A likewise failed to
present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable.
Having failed to present any incontrovertible evidence, Cortez claim that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain must fail.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the same. Cortez failed to
present any evidence to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. A was only able to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the subject property since 1946, the year in which
his mother supposedly inherited the same.
Further, Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically provides that only private properties may be acquired thru prescription
and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended
for the development of national wealth, are considered private."
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons through prescription.
This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "all things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription," and that property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription."
The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth before it can be acquired by
prescription. The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that the
State officially declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
118

development of national wealth. Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how
public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
Therefore the application of A must be denied because the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as
alienable and disposable; it must also be declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public use, public service or the
development of the national wealth
Case citation: (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ G.R. No. 186639
February 5, 2014).
Registration of land under Sec 14(1) and Sec 48(b) of PD 1529

PROBLEM: In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable
and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant
for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
ANSWER: In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Case citation: Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009
Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. 1073,
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
x x x
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x
119
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently establish: (1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; ( 2) that the applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, before an applicant can adduce evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the property in question, he must first prove that the land belongs to the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. It is doctrinal that, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain pertain to the
State and the latter is the foundation of any asserted right to ownership in land. Accordingly, the State presumably
owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption,
irrefutable evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration has been declassified and
now belongs to the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Notably, the Court finds no evidence in this case that would show that the land in question has been classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The sketch plan, technical description and the tracing clothing plan
that respondent presented do not show the actual legal status of the land. Hence, the conclusion reached by the CA
that it was no longer necessary for the respondent to prove the alienability of the land in question on the assumption
that he had already completed the thirty-year possessory requirement was misplaced. The requirements of alienability
and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier under Section 14(1) are indispensable prerequisites to a
favorable registration of his title to the property. Absent one, the application for registration is materially infirmed.
Since respondent provided no competent and persuasive evidence to show that the land has been classified as
alienable and disposable, then the application for registration should be denied. At any rate, after reviewing the
documents submitted by the respondent, it is clear that there was no substantive evidence to show that he complied
with the requirement of possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The earliest tax declaration that respondent tried to incorporate in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration does
not measure up to the time requirement. In particular, the tax declaration on the first lot, as shown by Tax Declaration
No. 6932 in the name of Adulfo Calo, only began in 1948. On the second lot, Tax Declaration No. 3852 in the name of
Marcos Azote merely appeared in 1952. While on the third lot, Tax Declaration No. 6891 registered in the name of the
Heirs of Felipe Calo came up in 1948. Unmistakably, the respondent cannot avail of registration under Section 14(1) of
P.D. 1529.
Under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529, before acquisitive prescription could commence, the property sought to be
registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must also be expressly declared by the State that
it is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public
dominion. (Republic of the Philippines Vs. Jose T. Ching - G.R. No. 186166. October 20, 2010)
Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, in order that petitioners application for
registration of title may be granted, they must first establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Applicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the public domain and
that they have an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in their names arising from an imperfect title.
In the instant case, petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of their application are
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the subject properties could no
longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are building structures, residential houses and even
120

government buildings existing and standing on the area. This, however, is hardly the proof required under the
law. As clarified by this Court in Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, a forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted with crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places.
The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply. As aptly held by the appellate court:
The fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land are located is being used for
residential and commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels of land into
agricultural land. It is fundamental that before any land may be declassified from the forest group
and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land before the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for
purposes of an imperfect title.
Moreover, during the hearing of petitioners' application, the Republic presented a Report of Rene Gomez, Land
Investigator/Inspector, CENRO No. V-2-3, which disclosed that the lots applied for by the petitioners were classified as
alienable and disposable under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393 and released and certified as such only on October
30, 1986. A Compliance dated January 19, 1999 submitted by OIC-CENR Officer Joaquin Ed A. Guerrero to the trial
court also stated that Lots. 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291 were verified to be within Alienable and Disposable area under
Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393, as certified on October 30, 1986 by the then Bureau of Forestry. Evidently,
therefore, the subject lots were declared alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986. Prior to that period, the
same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioners possession of the subject forest land prior
to the date when it was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. To reiterate, it is well settled that possession of forest land, prior to its
classification as alienable and disposable land, is ineffective since such possession may not be considered as
possession in the concept of owner. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation
of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared and alienable. (Vicente Yu Chang
and Soledad Yu Chang Vs. Republic of the Philippines - G.R. No. 171726. February 23, 2011)
Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1073, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
x x x
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
121

immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently establish: ( 1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These the respondents
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
In the case at bench, the respondents failed to establish that the subject lots were disposable and alienable lands.
Although respondents attached a photocopy of a certification dated August 16, 1988 from the District Land Officer,
LMS, DENR, attesting that the subject lots were not covered by any public land applications or patents, and another
certification dated August 23, 1988 from the Office of the District Forester, Forest Management Bureau, DENR,
attesting that the subject lots have been verified, certified and declared to be within the alienable or disposable land of
Tagaytay City on April 5, 1978, they were not able to present the originals of the attached certifications as evidence
during the trial. Neither were they able to present the officers who issued the certifications to authenticate them.
A careful scrutiny of the respondents Offer of Evidence would show that only the following were offered as evidence:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
blue print plans of AP-04-006225 and AP-04-006227

technical descriptions of Lot 3857 and 3858
surveyors certificates for Lot 3857 and 3858
photo-copy of the deed of sale dated September 17, 1971
jurisdictional requirements of posting and publication
tax declarations
tax receipts
Hence, there is no proof that the subject lots are disposable and alienable lands. (Republic of the Philippines Vs.
Juanito Manimtim, et al. - G.R. No. 169599. March 16, 2011)
Registration of land title under Section 14 Paragraphs (1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529
Facts: On September 11, 1998, Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration of Land Title of a parcel of land located in
Talamban, Cebu City, and identified as Lot 11193 of the Cebu Cadastre 12 Extension, before the RTC.
After establishing the jurisdiction of the RTC to act on the application for registration of land title, hearing thereon ensued.
In support of his application, Aboitiz attached the original Tracing Cloth Plan with a blueprint copy, the technical description of
the land, the certificate of the geodetic engineer surveying the land, and the documents evidencing possession and ownership
of the land.
To prove his claim, Aboitiz presented his witness, Sarah, his secretary, who testified that he entrusted to her the subject
property and appointed her as its caretaker; that he purchased the subject property from Irenea on September 5, 1994; that he
had been in actual, open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner; that as per
record of the DENR VII, the subject property had been classified as alienable and disposable since 1957; that per certification of
the CENRO Cebu City, the subject property was not covered by any subsisting public land application; and that the subject
property had been covered by tax declarations from 1963 to 1994 in Ireneas name, and from 1994 to present, in his name.
Another witness for Aboitiz, Luz, daughter of Irenea, the original owner of the subject property, testified that she was one of the
instrumental witnesses in the deed of sale of the subject property and that saw her mother affix her signature on the said
document. She added that her mother was in open, continuous, peaceful, and exclusive possession of the said property.
Subsequently, the Republic manifested that it would not adduce any evidence to oppose the application for registration of
Aboitiz.
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Issue: WON Aboitiz is entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, or, in the alternative,
pursuant to Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Held: No. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4
of P.D. No. 1073, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The foregoing requisites are indispensable for an application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
to validly prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, to authoritatively establish the subject lands alienable and disposable character, it is incumbent upon
the applicant to present a CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Certification; and a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.
Strangely, the Court cannot find any evidence to show the subject lands alienable and disposable character, except for a CENRO
certification submitted by Aboitiz. Clearly, his attempt to comply with the first requisite of Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 fell
short due to his own omission. In Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, the Court declared that the CENRO is not
the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of
public lands. Thus, the CENRO Certification should be accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable. For this reason, the application for registration of Aboitiz should be denied.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a parcel of land by the applicant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. A mere showing of possession and
occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not sufficient.
Unfortunately, Aboitiz likewise failed to satisfy this third requisite. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal,
the earliest that he and his predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of the subject land was
only in the year 1963. Evidently, his possession of the subject property commenced roughly eighteen (18) years
beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Here, he neglected
to present any convincing and persuasive evidence to manifest compliance with the requisite period of possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Accordingly, his application for registration of land title was legally infirm.
Notwithstanding his failure to comply with the requirements for registration of land title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
Aboitiz advances that he has, nonetheless, satisfied the requirements of possession for thirty (30) years to acquire title to the
subject property via prescription under Section 14(2) of P. D. No. 1529.
123
Regrettably, the Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to applicants proposition. Significantly, Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
In the case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court clarified the import of Section 14(1) as distinguished from Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to
the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.1wphi1 The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.
On September 3, 2013, the Court En Banc came out with its Resolution, in the same case of Malabanan, denying the motion for
reconsideration questioning the decision. In the said resolution, the Court authoritatively stated that x x x the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth."
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the State, the
classification of ' land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in
addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued, by the
President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be
a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. (Republic of the Philippines Vs.
Luis Miguel O. Aboitiz - G.R. No. 174626. October 23, 2013)
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Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title
PROBLEM: Frank filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title issued in favor of the undivided equal shares.
He averred that the owners duplicate was in his possession while he was securing clearances for the transfer of title in their
names but he either left or misplaced the same and despite efforts he exerted to locate the owners duplicate he was unable to
find it.
The trial court ordered respondent to submit the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property. Frank complied
with the judge's order.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the Registry of Deeds to reconstitute the original certificate of title.
Is the decision of the trial court correct?
ANSWER: No, the decision of the trial court is not correct. Under the law, the requirement of actual notice to the occupants
and the owners of the adjoining property under Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. 26 is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the
court in a petition for reconstitution of title and essential in order to allow said court to take the case on its merits.
Notice must be actually sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution. The order of reconstitution,
therefore, having been issued without compliance with the said requirement was null and void.
The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The proceedings therein were therefore a nullity and the Decision was
void.
Case citation: Republic vs. Millado, G.R. No. 194066, June 4, 2014
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed
instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after
observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred.
The lost or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in the custody of the Register of Deeds. When
reconstitution is ordered, this document is replaced with a new onethe reconstituted titlethat basically reproduces
the original. After the reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted title. This is specifically
provided under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 26, An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of
Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed, which states:
Sec. 16. After the reconstitution of a certificate of title under the provisions of this Act, the register of
deeds shall issue the corresponding owner's duplicate and the additional copies of said certificates of
title, if any had been previously issued, where such owner's duplicate and/or additional copies have
been destroyed or lost. This fact shall be noted on the reconstituted certificate of title.
Petitioner went to great lengths to convince the CA that the order for the issuance of a duplicate title to respondents
was included in its appeal. We find such exercise unnecessary. The CA should not have been quick in declaring that
such order had already become final and executory. (Republic of the Philippines Vs. Candido vergel de Dios, et al. -
G.R. No. 170459. February 9, 2011)
Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title under R.A. No. 26

PROBLEM: A certain Enrico died leaving three children: Andut, Baby and Silvosa. A fire broke out in their place which led to the
destruction of their house together with other pertinent documents. Silvosa sought the help of a lawyer regarding the petition
for reconstitution and issuance of second owners copy of transfer certificate of title. He presented in the course of the
proceeding the following: affidavit of Loss, plan and technical description, extra-Judicial Partition among other heirs, and
photocopy of TCT No. T-12345.
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In the course of proceeding there was publication and posting of notice of hearing. The lower court after finding there is
substantial compliance set forth granted the petition. However, the Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Solicitor
General, opposed contending that there was no compliance with the rules and the fact that the Affidavit of Loss was hearsay
because such was not affirmed in court.
If you were the judge, how would you grant the petition?
ANSWER: As a judge, I would rule in the negative for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Under the law, the Petition for Reconstitution of title must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts: the notice of hearing must
be published in the Official Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to all interested persons.
In this case, although there is publication of notice of hearing, the same is not complied with respect to notice to all interested
persons. It is clear that Silvosa has other siblings, yet he did not allege in the petition that notices were given to them. Noncompliance with the requirements would nullify the proceeding because liberal construction does not apply to land registration
cases. When jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, such requirements must be strictly complied with.
Case Citation: Bienbenido Castillo vs. Republic of the Philippines - G.R. No. 182980 June 22, 2011
Name/Class: FLORES, LAWRENCE Regular Class
Corrections or Insertions of Mistakes in Certificate of Title
QUESTION: Can a party, at any time, ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any
memorandum appearing therein concerning corrections or insertions of mistakes?
ANSWER: While Section 108 of PD No. 1529, among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any
erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any memorandum appearing therein, the prevailing rule is that
proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but
certainly not controversial issues. Relief under the said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the
parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.
Case Citation: G.R. No. 163530 March 9, 2011 PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs.RAMON VALENZUELA
Name/Class: PARRUCHO, BRYAN CARLO Regular Class
Amendments and alteration of certificates
Facts: TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation heirs and successors-in-interest to the first
generation testamentary heirs of the late philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco who donated on May 19, 1934 a 14,073-square
meter parcel of land in the following manner:
a) the property shall be used as a site for an institution to be known as the Abierrtas House of Friendship the purpose
of which shall be to provide a Home for needy and unfortunate women and girls, including children of both sexes and
promote, foster all efforts, work and activities looking toward their protection from the ravages of all forms of
immoralities;
b) Should the property herein be used for any other purpose or purposes not herein specified, the present gift shall
become ipso facto null and void and property given shall automatically revert to the donor, his heirs and assigns, but
any improvement or improvements placed, constructed and/or maintained on said premises by the Donee, shall remain
the property of said Donee to be by it removed there[f]rom (sic) at its expense after reasonable notice from the donor,
his heirs and assigns.
The property was registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT No. 20970 at the back of which the above-quoted
conditions of the donation were annotated. PWCTUI is a non-stock, non-profit corporation originally registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1929 under SEC Registration No. PW-959.
PWCTUIs corporate term expired in September 1979. Five years thereafter, using the same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained
SEC Registration No. 122088 and forthwith applied for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the
subject property thru LRC Case No. 22702. The application was granted and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-22702
which, however, bore only the first condition imposed on the donation.
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Recounting the foregoing episodes, TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUIs corporate term in 1979 effectively
rescinded the donation pursuant to the "unwritten resolutory condition" deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code
prescribing that the Corporation Code, specifically Section 122 thereof, be read into the donation. Interestingly the latter
provision mandates dissolved corporation to wind up their affairs and dispose of their assets within three years from the
expiration of their term. Being comprised of the heirs of the donor, TRY Foundation claimed that it is entitled to petition for the
issuance of a new title in their name pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. TRY Foundation prayed for
the issuance of a new title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-22702.
Held: Whether the donation merits revocation and consequently effect reversion of the donated property to the donor and/or
his heirs cannot be settled by filing a mere petition for cancellation of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 which reads:
Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same
by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person
having interest in the registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interest of
any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and
ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or an
error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate: or that the same
or any person in the certificate has been changed or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married,
that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not yet convened the same within three years
after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after
notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of
a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security and
bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the
court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the
court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his
heirs and assigns without his or their written consent. Where the owners duplicate certificate is not presented, a
similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any other provision of this decree after original registration
shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered.
A parallel issue was encountered by the Court in Paz v. Republic of the Philippines, which involved a petition for the cancellation
of title brought under the auspices of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. The petition sought the cancellation of Original Certificate of
Title No. 684 issued thru LRC Case No. 00-059 in favor of the Republic, Filinvest Development Corporation and Filinvest Alabang,
Inc., and the issuance of a new title in the name of the petitioner therein. The petition was dismissed by the RTC.
The dismissal was affirmed by the CA and eventually by this Court on the following reasons:
We agree with both the CA and the RTC that the petitioner was in reality seeking the reconveyance of the property
covered by OCT No. 684, not the cancellation of a certificate of title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
Thus, his petition did not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 108, and was for that reason rightly
dismissed.
Moreover, the filing of the petition would have the effect of reopening the decree of registration, and could thereby
impair the rights of innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. To reopen the decree of registration was no longer
permissible, considering that the one-year period to do so had long ago lapsed, and the properties covered by OCT No.
684 had already been subdivided into smaller lots whose ownership had passed to third persons. x x x.
xxxx
Nor is it subject to dispute that the petition was not a mere continuation of a previous registration proceeding. Shorn of
the thin disguise the petitioner gave to it, the petition was exposed as a distinct and independent action to seek the
reconveyance of realty and to recover damages. Accordingly, he should perform jurisdictional acts, like paying the
correct amount of docket fees for the filing of an initiatory pleading, causing the service of summons on the adverse
parties in order to vest personal jurisdiction over them in the trial court, and attaching a certification against forum
shopping (as required for all initiatory pleadings). He ought to know that his taking such required acts for granted was
immediately fatal to his petition, warranting the granting of the respondents motion to dismiss.
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By analogy, the above pronouncements may be applied to the controversy at bar considering that TRY Foundations exposed
action for revocation of the donation necessarily includes a claim for the recovery of the subject property.
The circumstances upon which the ruling in Paz was premised are attendant in the present case. The petition of TRY Foundation
had the effect of reopening the decree of registration in the earlier LRC Case No. 20970 which granted PWCTUIs application for
the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970. As such, it breached the caveat in Section 108 that "this
section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration." The petition of TRY
Foundation also violated that portion in Section 108 stating that "all petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any
other provision of this decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered." The petition of TRY Foundation in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) was clearly not a mere continuation of
LRC Case No. 20970.
Further, the petition filed by TRY Foundation is not within the province of Section 108 because the relief thereunder can only be
granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest. Records show that in its opposition to the petition, PWCTUI maintained that it "remains and continues to be the true
and sole owner in fee simple of the property" and that TRY Foundation "has no iota of right" thereto. (Philippine Woman's
Christian Temperance Union, Inc. Vs. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. - G.R. No. 199595. April
2, 2014)
Better right between previous and latest sale
PROBLEM: On September 2, 1981, Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Juanito over a 7,500square meter parcel of unregistered land. Juanitos father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. and brother Domingo Jr. took actual
possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real property taxes on the lot for the
years 1980 up to 1998.
On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana, Jr., through a notarized deed of
absolute sale.
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the Public Land Act or
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana opposed by saying that they have a better right because they acquired the
property in good faith and for value; and that the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches.
Now, who has a better right to the property?
ANSWER: The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale
to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the
first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the
seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.
What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,32 as amended, which provides for the system of recording of transactions over
unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right.
Case citation: SABITSANA vs. MUERTEGUI, August 5, 2013
Tenancy relations
PROBLEM: A, the real owner of a parcel of land sold the same to B. A day after the alleged sale, A supposedly executed a
document entitled Pagpapatunay claiming that he was the original owner of the land and acknowledging C as his tenant, even
though not registered with the Department of Agrarian Reform. In the same document, A attested that C did not sign the deed
of sale since he did not want to give up his tenancy rights. Thereafter, B registered the land in his name and executed an
Agricultural Leasehold Contract with C, his brother. A year after, B mortgaged the said parcel of land and executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of Cebu Union Bank as a security for the loan obtained by B. Due to non-payment, Cebu Union Bank
foreclosed the property. Meanwhile, D, an heir of A filed a complaint for annulment of title against B alleging among others that
B falsified documents and forged the signature of A to transfer the subject land under his name; thus he could not validly enter
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into any voluntary dealings with anybody even with C. A judgment which became final and executory was rendered by the Court
declaring that indeed B was guilty of falsification and forgery of the signature of A. However, C, claimed that he is a de jure
tenant or lessee who is entitled to redemption, pre-emption, peaceful possession, occupation and cultivation of the subject land.
Is his contention correct?
ANSWER: No. Cs contention is not correct. In determining tenancy relations between the parties, it is a question of whether or
not a party is a de jure tenant. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant, cultivator, or a planter, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes
his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing tenancy laws.
In this case, no such relationship was ever created between C and D nor between C and B because B was not the true and
lawful owner of the agricultural land. Since Cs claim on his supposed tenancy rights was based on the leasehold contract, as
well as the certifications from A and the MARO, which were found to be inadequate to prove that an agricultural tenancy
relationship exists, then Cs assertions must fail.
Case citation: MINORU FUJIKI V. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, ET AL., G.R. NO. 196049, JUNE 26, 2013.
Name/Class: HAMLIG, NONIE LUZ Regular Class
PROBLEM: On September 17, 1997 Mrs. Merinda executed a deed of real estate mortgage covering a portion of Lot 410 in
Pardo Cebu City in favor of AAA Money lending Corporation as security for 2 promissory notes. On March 31, 1999 AAA Money
lending Corp assigned the promissory notes and deeds of real estate mortgage to BBB Credit Resources Corporation. Mrs.
Merinda was unable to pay the loan in view of such non-payment the subject lot was extra-judicially foreclosed. BBB-CRC then
acquired the mortgaged property as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued in favor of private
respondent. Petitioner failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period and a final deed of sale was issued by the
Sheriff on March 19, 2001 in favor of BBB Corp. Supposing that the land was unregistered and was covered by a tax declaration
in the name of Mrs. Merinda when the same was mortgaged by her in 1997 in favor of private respondents predecessor-ininterest, AAA Lending Corporation, is the mortgage valid as between Mrs. Merlinda and BBB Credit Resources Corporation?
ANSWER: No, The Mortgage as between Mrs. Merlinda and BBB Credit Resources Corporation is not valid.
Section 113 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides that no deed, conveyance, mortgage,
lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between
the parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
Case citation: Viola Cahilig and Antonio G. Sinel, Jr. vs. Hon. Eustaquio G. Terencio, et al, G.R. No. 164470, November 28, 2011
IV)
Original Registration
Application of Original Registration

PROBLEM: On September 17, 2002, Mr. X filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land. In support of this
application, he presented evidence to establish the disposable and alienable character of the subject land through a survey plan,
where on its lower portion, a note stated, among others, as follows: This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as
per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military
reservation. The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando,
Pampanga on December 3, 1998. Decide on the application.
ANSWER: The application is denied. The law provides that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1)
a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
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In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
Case citation: RP vs SESE, G.R. No. 185092
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
PROBLEM: X filed an application for registration of a parcel of land which he bought from his mother on 1962, evidenced by a
Deed of Transfer. The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Opposition alleging that neither X nor his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945
and that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and not subject to
private acquisition.
X alleged that he is is currently in possession of the land and that he has been paying real property taxes beginning 1952 up to
the filing of the application, thus he has the right to register the parcel of land under his name.
May X apply for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title?
ANSWER: No. Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove
compliance with Sec. 14 of P.D. No. 1529 of the Property Registration Decrees.
Sec. 14 provides that the following persons may file an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under existing laws.
Therefore, X did not comply the third requirement under sec. 14 paragraph 1. He has only managed to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mother's ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of a Deed
of Absolute Sale on December 31, 1958. Respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or
earlier. The law requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.
Case Citation: Republic of the Philippines vs. Teodoro Rizalvo, Jr. G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011
Preference to a duly registered levy on attachment
Since the subject property is covered by a Torrens Title, the law applicable is Section 51 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529. Said provision provides:
SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws.
He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are
sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land,
but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
Registry of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made
in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.
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The preference given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a prior unregistered sale is well settled
in our jurisdiction. This is because registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons
are concerned. It is upon registration that there is notice to the whole world.
Petitioners cannot escape the fact that when they registered the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 5, 1995, a writ of
attachment was already inscribed on TCT No. 127330 as early as November 18, 1994. Accordingly, when TCT No.
127330 was cancelled and TCT No. 134590 was issued in petitioners name, the notice of levy on attachment was
carried over in the new title. It bears stressing that at the time of the inscription of the writ of attachment, Townhouse
Unit 320 was still in the name of Benito.
In Valdevieso v. Damalerio, this Court explained that an attachment is a proceeding in rem and that the right of
ownership of an individual over a sale registered after such attachment is limited and subject to the prior registered
lien. It is doctrinal that a levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference over a prior unregistered sale and, even if
the prior unregistered sale is subsequently registered before the sale on execution but after the levy is made, the
validity of the execution sale should be upheld because it retroacts to the date of levy. The priority enjoyed by the levy
on attachment extends, with full force and effect, to the buyer at the auction sale conducted by virtue of such levy.
The sale between petitioners and Benito was undoubtedly a valid transaction between them. However, in view of the
prior levy on attachment on the same property, petitioners took the property subject to the attachment. Petitioners, in
buying registered land, stood exactly in the shoes of their vendor, Benito, and their title ipso facto became subject to
the incidents or results of the pending litigation between Benito and respondent.
Petitioners may have been in good faith when they bought the property from Benito. So also, petitioners may not have
known about the case filed by respondent against Benito and the resulting grant of a writ of attachment over
Townhouse Unit 320. Be that as it may, this Court is concerned not with actual or personal knowledge, but constructive
notice through registration in the Register of Deeds. Otherwise stated, what this Court should follow is the annotation
(or lack thereof) on the original title on file with the Register of Deeds, not on the duplicate title in the hands of private
parties. Furthermore, when a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive notice of its contents
and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule on notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument on record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrefutable and cannot be overcome by
any claim of innocence or good faith.
There is, however, a known exception to the above-mentioned rules, that is, when a party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent
toregistration. Thus, if it can be proven that respondent, at the time of the institution of the proceedings before the
RTC, had knowledge of the sale between petitioners and Benito, the same would be considered equivalent to
registration as to him. As far as petitioners are concerned, however, other than their bare allegation that respondent
was aware of the sale of the subject property to them by Benito, the records of the case show no evidentiary proof
that respondent had knowledge of such transaction prior to the institution of the proceedings before the RTC. (Spouses
Jose Chua and Margarita Chua Vs. The Hon. Pedro Gutierrez, etc. et al. - G.R. No. 172316. December 8, 2010)
V)
Subsequent Registration
Unregistered Sale of Land

PROBLEM: Fortunato owned two parcels of land located in Bulacan registered under his name. These lands were mortgaged
by Regina the daughter of Fortunato to Spouses Bulaong to secure a loan amounting to 4,000,000 and the titles were given to
them respectively. When the Spouses went to the Register of Deeds to annotate their mortgage, they learned that the copies of
the title were included in the fire that occurred sometime in 1987 and were advised to have the titles reconstituted assuring that
their mortgage will be protected. During the extrajudicial settlement of Fortunatos estate, new titles were issued in favor of
Reggie, and to the Spouses Bulalongs astonishment they found out that a Levy of Execution was annotated subsequent to their
mortgage.
It was found out that a certain Veronica was awarded damages against Regina and was levied upon the two parcels of land.
The titles to the land were transferred to the name of Regina by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed between Fortunato prior to
his death but the former never registered such sale. After the lapse of the one year redemption period the title to the lands
were consolidated to Veronica who petitioned in court to surrender the titles to her or if Regina fails to comply a new title be
issued in her favor. At the same time, the spouses extrajudicially foreclosed on their mortgaged and were the highest bidder.
131
They filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC Bulacan against the Register of Deeds and Veronica, enjoining the former from
issuing new titles to Veronica and for her to pay damages and attorneys fees. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Bulaongs
stating that allowing veronica to levy on the property would amount to unjust enrichment for the value of the property is higher
than the amount of damages she is asking for. However on appeal it was reversed in the CA stating that when the spouses
received the titles there was already a Levy on the lands and for their failure to redeem had consolidated ownership over the
lands to Veronica.
Question: Who has a better right over the land upon which the titles should be issued?
ANSWER: Even assuming that the Deed of Absolute Sale in Reginas favor was valid, we still cannot uphold the validity of the
levy and execution sale in Veronicas favor.
The general rule in dealing with registered land is set forth in Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease,
charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases
or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a
will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
land lies.
From the standpoint of third parties, a property registered under the Torrens system remains, for all legal purposes, the
property of the person in whose name it is registered, notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance, unless the
corresponding deed is registered. Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it
does not affect innocent third persons.
Undoubtedly, Veronicas claim on the properties is rooted in the unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale between Regina and her
parents. The Bulaongs do not appear to have had any knowledge that this sale ever took place. To recall, Regina gave the
Bulaongs the owners duplicate certificates of the properties, which showed that the properties were registered in the names of
her parents, Fortunato and Bertha Limpo. It thus appears that the Bulaongs first learned about the sale between Regina and her
parents when they received the newly issued titles in Reginas name which contained the annotation of the levy in Veronicas
favor.
One of the principal features of the Torrens system of registration is that all encumbrances on the land shall be shown, or at
least intimated upon the certificate of title and a person dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind
the certificate and inquire into transactions, the existence of which is not there intimated.46 Since the Bulaongs had no
knowledge of the unregistered sale between Regina and her parents, the Bulaongs can neither be bound by it, nor can they be
prejudiced by its consequences. This is but the logical corollary to the rule set forth in Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529, in keeping
with the basic legal maxim that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
Execution sale in Veronicas favor was highly irregular
Case citation: Spouses Anselmo and Priscilla Bulaong v. Veronica Gonzales- GR No. 156318
VI)
Non-registrable Properties
Facts: In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot 56, and that the Modestos,
through stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to occupy a portion of this property, designated as Lot 356, PLS 272.
Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the sale of this lot. However, before the parties could finalize the sale, the
Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began claiming ownership over the lot. Urbina made several demands on the
Modestos to vacate the property, the last of which was through a demand letter sent on July 22, 1983. When the Modestos still
refused to vacate, Urbina filed the present action against them.
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In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful owner of the property because it was still government
property, being a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation.
Urbinas claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his Miscellaneous Sales Application which he filed on July 21,
1966. While Urbinas accion publiciana complaint was pending before the RTC, the Modestos filed a letter-protest against
Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Land Management Bureau (LMB) on January 29, 1993, claiming that: (a) they
are the owners of Lot 356, PLS 272; (b) they have been occupying this lot for almost 33 years; and (c) their house is
constructed on this lot. The Modestos also alleged that they filed an unnumbered sales application for Lot 356 with the LMB,
based on their actual occupancy of the property, pursuant to Proclamations 2476 and 172, on February 10, 1993.
Held: Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and disposable that
private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it.
Accordingly, even if we recognize that Urbina had been in possession of the property as early as July 21, 1966, when he filed
his Miscellaneous Sales Application, his occupation was unlawful and could not be the basis of possessory rights, in keeping with
Section 88 of the Public Land Act, that states:
Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be nonalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President.
The same holds true for Urbinas tax declarations. Absent any proof that the property in question had already been declared
alienable at the time that Urbina declared it for tax purposes, his tax declarations over the subject property cannot be used to
support his claim of possession.
Similarly, while the Modestos claim to have been in possession of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, this occupation could not give
rise to possessory rights while the property being occupied remain government land that had not yet been declared alienable
and disposable.
Possession after October 16, 1987

The different land investigators sent by the LMB to survey the subject property have consistently held that the Modestos are the
actual occupants of the lot in question. This actual occupation is not denied by Urbina. As a matter of fact, we know from
Urbinas final demand letter that the Modestos have been in open and continuous possession of the property since July 22,
1983. We also consider established that the Modestos built a house on the subject property, a fact that Urbina affirmed in his
testimony before the RTC. From these circumstances, we consider as settled the fact that the Modestos were the actual
possessors of the property when it was declared alienable and disposable on October 16, 1987, and continued to
possess the property until the present time.
Furthermore, the Modestos have a valid Insular Government Patent Sales Application over the property pending with the LMB,
which they filed on January 27, 2009. In contrast, Urbina has a Miscellaneous Sales Application filed in 1966, which the LMB
considered invalid since it was filed when the property still formed part of a military reservation.
As for the Certification from the City Treasurer of Taguig that the respondents presented, which certified that Carlos Urbina had
paid real estate taxes on real property describe[d] in the name of Carlos Urbina, with property located at Lower Bicutan,
Taguig City from 2009 and prior years, we note that the certification contains no description of the property subject of the tax
declaration, leaving us to wonder on the identity of the property covered by the declaration.
In any case, even if we consider this certification as sufficient proof that Urbina declared the subject property for tax declaration
purposes, it must be stressed that the mere declaration of land for taxation purposes does not constitute
possession thereof nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of the claimants actual possession. And in light of
our categorical finding that the Modestos actually occupied the property in question from the time that it was declared alienable
and disposable until the present time, the tax declaration fails to convince us that Urbina has a right to legally possess it. (Pio
Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto Vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al. - G.R.
No. 189859. October 18, 2010)
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VII)
Dealings with Unregistered Lands
Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Both the trial court and the CA are,
however, wrong in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Both courts seem to have forgotten that the provision does
not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyers good or bad faith is
relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the
registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.
Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands. What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended, which
provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that
any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The question to be resolved
therefore is: who between petitioners and respondent has a better right to the disputed lot?
Respondent has a better right to the lot. The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an
unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991,
or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to
petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat
quod non habet. (Spouses Sabitsana Vs. Juanito F. Muertegui, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Domingo A.
Muertegui, Jr - G.R. No. 181359. August 5, 2013)
134
135

PRESCRIPTION
I)
Definition
Land Registration Court's Jurisdiction and Principle of Estoppel

PROBLEM: President Marcos issued a Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserving for the use of the Philippine Army three (3)
parcels of the public domain located in Barangay Sabang Nueva Ecija. The parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."
Alleging ownership in fee simple, Antonio Romero filed an application for registration over the same parcel of land and stated
among others that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.
Based on the evidence presented by Romero, the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision holding that the applicants
had conclusively established ownership in fee simple over the subject land and that their possession, including that of their
predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty (40)
years
No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory,
resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title over the subject property.
The Republic filed a complaint for annulment of title against Romero before the RTC, one (1) year and ten (10) months from
the issuance of OCT 038. The Republic claimed that Romero the registration over the said parcel of land was null and void as he
fraudulently omitted to the name of the military camp as the actual occupant in his application for registration.
Furthermore, the land had long been reserved for military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it was no longer
disposable and subject to registration. The RTC ruled in favour of Romero. Does the Land Registration Court have jurisdiction
over the abovementioned case? Was the action of the Republic barred by prescription or estoppel?
ANSWER: The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which
are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Prescription or
estoppel cannot lie against the government. Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine
of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and
cannot be the subjects of land registration proceedings.
Case Citation: Republic of the Philippines Vs. Antonio Bacas, et al., G.R. No. 182913. November 20, 2013
Estoppel in Pais
QUESTION: What is Estoppel In Pais and give its requisites?
ANSWER: The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the
existence of such facts.
It said that the essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in relation to the party to be estopped, and to the party
invoking the estoppel in his favor. For the party to be estopped, such party (1) commits conduct amounting to false
representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are inconsistent
with those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) has the intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall at
least influence the other party; and (3) has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. On the party claiming the
estoppel, such party (1) has lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth on the facts in question; ((2) has
relied, in good faith, on the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) has acted or refrained from acting based on
such conduct or statements as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or
prejudice.
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Case Citation: ERNESTO DY, vs. HON. GINA M. BIBAT- PALAMOS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Makati City, and ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 196200 September 11, 2013
II)
No prescription applicable
Under Section 101 of Public Land Act provides for a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently
awarded to the applicant may be recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the government. The Office of
Solicitor General shall represent the government in all land registration and related proceedings and institute
actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as
lands held in violation of the Constitution. A private party cannot bring an ac tion for reversion. If there has been
any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General
would be the proper remedy.
Statute of limitations doesnt run against the State, Hence an action for reversion is not barred by prescription.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESBUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT v. VICENTE ROXAS AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,. [G.R. No. 160640] December 11, 2013)
III)
Prescription or limitation of actions
PROBLEM: Petitioner Manuel& Sons is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Teresa, Rizal. On November 29, 1973,
two Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed by petitioner, as vendor, in favor of respondent VI INC. as vendee. VI INC. was
able to pay petitioner the amount of P275,055.558 as partial payment for the two properties corresponding to the initial
payments and the first installments of the said properties.
However, respondent suspended further payment as it was not satisfied with the manner petitioner complied with its obligations
under the conditional deeds of sale. Consequently, on March 17, 1978, petitioner sent respondent a letter 11 informing
respondent of its intention to rescind the conditional deeds of sale and attaching therewith the original copy of the respective
notarial rescission.
November 28, 1994, VI INC. filed a Complaint12 for specific performance and damages against petitioner with the RTC of
Antipolo City. However, on January 15, 1996, the case was dismissed. Five years later, or on March 16, 2001,VI INC. again filed
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 1 (trial court) a Complaint14 for specific performance and damages, seeking to compel
Manuel&Sons to accept the balance of the purchase price for the two conditional deeds of sale and to execute the
corresponding deeds of absolute sale.
May VI INC. Still compel Manuel&Sons to accept balance to complete the contract of sale?
ANSWER: The Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed on November 29, 1973, and payments were due on both Conditional
Deeds of Sale on November 15, 1974. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions based upon a written contract must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
The vendee, VI INC.herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001, which is clearly beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence,
the action has prescribed.
Case Citation: Manuel Uy & Sons Incorporated vs. Valbueco Inc., GR 179594 September 11, 2013
Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title
PROBLEM: In 1990, Don Cruz mortgaged his property to the Spouses Teves. When Don died, his children Juan and Jenny
alleged that the Spouses Teves obtained the property via forged Deed of Sale and had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim entered
in the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back of the TCT of the property.
When Spouses Teves died, the property was partitioned by their heirs and sold to Maria Solano, the current possessor of the
property. Maria filed a Petition to Cancel the Memorandum of Encumbrance. On January 1, 2000 the court granted the Petition
and the prayer to allow the Register of Deeds to have the title of the property transferred to her name.
In August 15, 2012, Juan and Jenny filed a Complaint to cancel the TCT, Reconveyance, With Accounting, Receivership and
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Preliminary Injunction with Damages. Maria filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that their action had prescribed. Juan and Jenny
argue that their action is actually in the nature of Quieting of Title, which does not prescribe. Decide.
ANSWER: Jose Olviga vs CA held that; whether or not an action for Quieting of Title has prescribed depends if the Plaintiff is in
possession of the property or not.
If the plaintiff is in possesion of the property, the action does not prescribe; the continued possession being in the nature of a
continuing right. However, if the plaintiff is not in possession, the action may prescribe.
In this case, since Juan and Jenny are not in possession of the property, their argument that it is an action of Quieting of Title
fails. The action is that of Enforcement of an Implied Trust which prescribes in ten years. The action has prescribed.
Case citation: Heirs of Domingo Valientes vs. Hon. Reinerio Ramas - G.R. 157852. Dec 15, 2010
138

SUCCESSION
I)
General Provisions
Successional Rights Transmitted at the Moment of Death

PROBLEM: Spanky died intestate on May 31, 1995 leaving several personal and real properties in Bohol, Siquijor and Romblon.
He is survived by his wife Darla and their three children, namely: Alfalfa, Buckwheat and Porkie. Apart from his family, the
demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour, Amy and their children Butch and Woym. On November 8, 1995, Porkie
discovered that Amy and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Deceased Person and Quitclaim involving the
property of Spanky in Bohol. In fact, a new Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Amy and her children. This prompted
Darla and her children to file a compliant for the Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person and the
Cancellation of the Certificate of Title against Amy and her children. On their answer, they interposed a defense that Darla and
her children are not the real-party-in-interest but instead it is the estate if Spanky in view of the pendency of the administration
proceeding.
QUESTION: Is the defense of Amy and her children tenable?
ANSWER: No, the defense of Amy and her children is not tenable. The law provides that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Furthermore, in several line of cases the Supreme Court recognized
the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the
appointment of an administrator. In this case, there is no dispute that Darla and her three children are the legal heirs and that
their rights to the estate of Spanky has been transmitted at the time of his death. Evidently, the necessity of the heirs to seek
judicial relief to seek recovery of the property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator.
Therefore, the defense of Amy and her children is not tenable.
Case Citation: Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004
Name/Class: VILLAMOR, CLEMENTINE Regular Class
Right of an heir accrues from the moment of the death of the decent
PROBLEM: The 18 hectare land was co-owned by siblings Enrique and Fe after their fathers death. After the death of Enrique
Factor, it was his eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao who took over the administration of the subject property. Gloria was married
to Ruben. When Gloria died, Ruben remarried and this time, the tenant of the property named Preci. Ruben died while Preci
holds the real property. Now, Fe wanted to eject Preci from the real property. Preci argued that Fe was never in possession of
the subject property since the latter never occupied the same. Does Fe have a right to eject Preci?
ANSWER:
A)
YES, Fes right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their
fathers death and as a consequence of co-ownership, soon after the death of Gloria, Fe, as one of the
surviving co-owners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the
right to the administration and management of the subject property.
B) YES, the case is one of reserva troncal and second wives cannot get the property of the first wife after the common
husband died.
C) NO, as a conjugal property of Gloria and Ruben, when Gloria died, Ruben subrogates Gloria in a co-ownership of a real
property. A husband co-owns whatever his spouse co-owns.
D) NO, Fe has not been in possession of the land prior to the claim. Therefore an ejectment case can only prosper if Preci
took the real property by stealth, fraud, intimidation, threats.
Case citation: PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI vs FE S. FACTOR, G.R. No. 172547, June 30, 2009
What constitutes inheritance
PROBLEM: Amiel, Joseph and John Paul are children of spouses Mel and Jay. Their parents owned a property in Barili with an
area of 69,000 square meters.
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Due to the lifestyle of Jay, he mortgaged the property,which he owns, as security of the loan, to Sikyo Bank for P690,000 on
January 3, 1979.
Jay failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole
bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale was executed by the sheriff in
favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or
on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the
name of the Bank. Mel died on September 6, 1978 while Jay died on July 6, 1984.
On October 10, 1989, Amiel, Joseph and John Paul executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them
equal shares.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, Joseph and John Paul bought the subject property from the
Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of the two. Subsequently,
a TCT was issued in the name of the two. Meanwhile, Amiel continued possession of the subject lot.
Joseph and John Paul now want Amiel to vacate the property. Amiel countered that he is entitled to a portion of the property
because he is a co-owner and they inherited the subject property from their father.
Question: Is Amiel Correct?
ANSWER: No, Amiel is not correct because he is not a co-owner and the subject property is not part of the inheritance from
their father.
The disputed property did not pass into the hands of Amiel, Joseph and John Paul as compulsory heirs of Jay at any given point
in time.
Under the Article 777 of the Civil Code, The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death. In addition, Article 781 provides that, the inheritance of a person includes not only the property
and the transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Jay lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, Amiel,
Joseph and John Paul never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Case Citation: Celestino Balus vs. Saturnino Balus,G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
Hereditary succession as method in acquiring private lands by foreigners
PROBLEM: Benjamin A. Taylor, a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor, a Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot situated at Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. The sale was allegedly
financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually
converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had
a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. In 1992, Joselyn as lessor and Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into
an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void
since it was entered into by Joselyn without his consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn.
QUESTION: Can the court validly annul the Agreement of Lease on the ground that it was entered into by Joselyn without the
consent of her husband?
ANSWER: No, the court cannot annul the Agreement of Lease. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that save
in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. Thus, Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease. Considering that
Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This
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is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no
declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.
Case citation: PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner, versus BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents. G.R. No.
164584, June 22, 2009

Venue for the Settlement of Estate
PROBLEM: A, was born, studied, worked and resided in Tagbilaran City. When his health was deteriorating his son, B, who is
operating a build-and-sale business in Cebu City, brought him and let him stay in Bs residence in Gorordo Ave. Cebu City so
that A could have easy access to the hospital for regular check up and medical treatment when it arises.
A eventually died intestate on May 12, 2011, in Chong Hua Hospital. On April 17, 2013, B instituted a petition for issuance of
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, over the estate of A.
C, Bs only brother moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He argued that the deceased did
not reside in Cebu City during his lifetime.. The decedents actual residence was in Tagbilaran City, Bohol, where their late
father used to work as citys administrator. As the health of their father deteriorated due to old age, he stayed in As residence
at Gorodo Ave, Cebu City solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization.
Question: Where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Tagbilaran, Bohol, where the decedents had his permanent
residence, or in Cebu City, where he actually stayed before he died?
ANSWER: The estate of the deceased be settled in the RTC of Cebu City.
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
Case citation: RODOLFO V. JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002
PROBLEM: Brian Jedd Yu (Brian Jedd) was the former Governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Brian Jedd
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Cyndi De Los Santos. Cyndi predeceased Brian Jedd.
Five years later, Brian married Mara Odessa Meniano. However, Mara Odessa, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce. Brian Jedd thereafter, married Naiza Mae
Canillo. He had no children with Naiza Mae but lived with her in Makati for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
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death. Naiza Mae filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Naiza Mae alleged
that she is the widow of Brian Jedd; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street,
Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati, Metro Manila.
Joel Raffy Yu (Joel Raffy), one of the children of Brian Jedd by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Joel Raffy claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Brian Jedds place of residence prior to his death.
Further, Joel Raffy contends that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, residence is synonymous with domicile which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends
to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Brian never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Question: Was the contention of Joel Raffy correct that venue was improperly laid? Decide the Case.
ANSWER: No, the contention of Joel Raffy is not correct. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of Joel Raffy should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the
time of his death.
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation,
or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
From the foregoing, we find that Brian Jedd was a resident of Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate.
Case citation: E. San Luis vs. F. San Luis / R. San Luis vs. F. Sagalongos, G.R. No. 133743/ G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
PROBLEM AND QUESTION: What are the rights entitled to an interested persons in a settlement of estate?
ANSWER: The Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all interested parties. The instances when notice has
to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and
allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor
or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90
regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.
Case Citation: Hilado vs. CA G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
Judicial declaration of presumptive death
PROBLEM: On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946
at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven
years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
Questions:
1) Is the marriage of Teodorico and Marietta valid even if it was entered into without securing a prior judicial declaration
of absence of the absentee spouse?
2) How much would be Mariettas share in the estate of the deceased Teodorico?
ANSWER:
1)
YES, the marriage was valid. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the
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explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that
the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41 , in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been
absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code,
should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James
Bounds.
2)
The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the
inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces,
however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand,
nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces
except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed.
Case citation: Antonia Armas y Calisterio vs. Marietta Calistero, G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000.
II)
Testamentary Succession
Testator's intention must be respected

PROBLEM: Torcuato J. Reyes died and left a last will and testament declaring therein in part, to wit: xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties to wit:
a.
b.
All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins, antiques, statues,
tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in common with my
brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real
estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines,
Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.
Subsequently, a petition for probate was filed by Vivares, the executor therein. The said petition was opposed by Reyes natural
children on the ground that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the
formalities of law and that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his
wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never
annulled. Thus Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.
The trial court ruled that the last will and testament was made in accordance of the law. However, it further ruled that
Assuncion Reyes was never married to the decedent. The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and
(b) of the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals.
QUESTION: Did the trial court err in ruling the case?
ANSWER: Yes, the trial court erred in ruling the case in favour of the oppositor. The law provides that a will is the testator
speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood
before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose
of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament.
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As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated.] Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by
law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficacy of the wills provisions.
In the case at bar there was a declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes is his wife. And absence of any
competent evidence that their marriage was inexistent or void, such declaration must be respected. The trial court gravely erred
in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being contrary to law and
morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very
declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife. Hence the provisions must be respected and be accepted for
probate.
Case citation: Manuel G. Reyes et al Vs. Court of Appeals, et al - G.R. No.124099
Donation Mortis Causa
PROBLEM: Matilde is the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. She executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos in favor of Maria, her adopted child covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that:
This will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the
Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided however, that anytime during the lifetime of
the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they could dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the
land.
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido, her adopted son and subsequently, Matilde executed a will devising four (4) of the lots
to Maria and the remaining one to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matildes death. Thereafter, Marias heirs filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots one of which was donated and the other sold to Zenaido,
alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via
the Deed of Donation.
QUESTION: Is the donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa? What are the requisites?
ANSWER: The donation to Maria Aluad one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
A)
B)
C)
It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad nutum, but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; and
That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during the
formers lifetime. Further the statement, anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they
could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated, means that Matilde retained
ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The phrase, anyone of them who should survive is out of sync. For
the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have
referred to the donor.
Case Citation: Aluad vs Aluad; G.R. No. 176943; October 17, 2008
PROBLEM: In 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed deeds of donation bestowing portions of land in favor of Estela C.
Maglasang, Nicolas Cabatingan, and Merly S. Cabatingan.
These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:
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"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby,
by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with
the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.
In 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
QUESTION: Are the donations mortis cause or inter vivos?
ANSWER: The donations are one of mortis causa.
In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It
conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the
transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any
clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective
upon the death of the DONOR" admits an interpretation that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
Case citation: Maglasang, et. al vs. The Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, (G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002)
Donation mortis causa purporting to be inter vivos
PROBLEM: A deed of donation was executed by Aurora Montinola. It named as donees her grandchildren. Montinola expressed
her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the
sale of the poperty for such period. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their
acceptance of the donation. Subsequently, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: however, the donees shall not sell
or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the donor.
Aurora drew up a deed of revocation and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on the title. She filed a petition in court
for the cancellation of the transfer on the ground that the transfer was mortis causa - thus, void because it did not comply with
the formalities of a will. The donees opposed the petition. The trial court judgment holding that the donation was one inter
vivos. She elevated the case to the CA. Meanwhile, Aurora died. Shortly after A's demise, a manifestation and motion was filed
by Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Sicad alleged taht they had become the owners of the prop by virtue of a deed of definite sale. The
CA affirmed the RTC's decision.
Question: What is the character of the deed of donation.
ANSWER: The donation is mortis causa. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds form the donee that
right to dispose of the donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis
causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.
In the present case, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and
that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the
deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of
the donor." The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the
intercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed into the space
between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding it. Not only did Aurora Montinola order the
insertion in the deed of that restrictive proviso, but also, after the recording of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating
the property as her own. She continued, as explicity authorized in the deed itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and
otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the property taxes as they fell due all these she did until she transferred the
Property to the Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990. As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its
language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.
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Case citation: Ernesto Sicad vs. Court of Appeals - G.R. No. 125888. August 13, 1998.
Testamentary Capacity
PROBLEM: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament. Childless and without any brothers
or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to Lorenzo and his wife Corazon and their children Luna and Katherine.
Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as
his own mother.
During the probate of Paciencia's will, Antonio filed an opposition to Lorenzo's petition, contending that Paciencia no longer
possessed sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity when she made her will. Antonio presented
Rosie, the housemaid who testified that Paciencia was forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen
then start looking for it moments later.
QUESTION: Will the contention of Antonio prosper?
ANSWER: No. The burden to prove that the testator was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the one questioning it.
Article 799 of the New Civil Code states: Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical
or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. More importantly, a
testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will (Article 800, NCC) and the burden to prove
otherwise lies on the oppositor. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Case citation: ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A.
PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, vs LORENZO LAXA [G.R. No. 174489; April 11, 2012
Feeble-minded person's capacity to make a will

PROBLEM: Like so many others before him, Don Tubal toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally
reached retirement. In 1980, Tubal finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at
#6969, Maria Luisa Vill., Cebu City which he owned in common with his sister Mara Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT
123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Maria Juana (Maria) who was then 28
years old. . But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Tubal died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR
PULMONALE.
Tubal executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983
but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. In his will he bequeathed, stating each and every property to his wife Maria all of his
property including those in which he co-owns with his deceased sister. During the probate of the will, there was an opposition
by Exstacia, one of the nieces and grandniece of the Tubal. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at
the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. During that
time, the testators physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility.
QUESTION: Rule on the allowance of the probate of the will.
ANSWER: The will should be allowed for probate.
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According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as
follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of
the testamentary act.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the
extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its
formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
A weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. (Alsua-Betts v. CA)
Case citation: LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA vs. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, G.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005
The law provides that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written
(Art. 805). While substantial compliance is recognized (Art. 809), the rule only applies if the number of pages is
reflected somewhere else in the will with no extrinsic evidence required. Richard B. Lopez vs. Dianna Jeane Lopez,
GR No. 189984 Nov. 12, 2012

Formalities of a will
PROBLEM: A will was executed by Milliardo Gremory bequeathing his entire estate to his wife Noin Gremory, save for a parcel
of land which he devised to his children Millicas Gremory and Naina Gremory. The will was executed and acknowledged before
Atty. Rias Raberba on June 30, 1985 and the acknowledgment of the will shows the residence certificate of Milliardo dated
January 5, 1982 with Gilbert Durandal and Nicol Amalfi as witnesses without notation of their residence certificates.
Vali Gremory filed a complaint against Atty. Rias, averring that his father Milliardo, never executed the contested will.
Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of witnesses Gilbert Durandal and Nicol Amalfi.
Atty. Rias on the other hand, alleged that Vali was not a legitimate son of Milliardo Gremory and that, the last will and
testament was validly executed and actually notarized by Atty. Rias per affidavit of Gloria Argento, common-law wife of Milliardo
and corroborated by the joint affidavit of Milliardo Gremorys children, Naina and Millicas.
Rule on the validity of the will.
ANSWER: The will is not valid. Article 783 of the Civil Code provides that a will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with
the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. A will
may either be notarial or holographic. A notarial will, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses.
In the present case, the will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Gilbert and Nicol. This circumstance alone, renders
the will void.
Moreover, the acknowledgment of the will was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Gilbert and Nicol in the
acknowledgment. The law then enforced required the exhibition the residence certificate upon notarization of the document or
instrument. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of
the law. These omissions by Atty. Rias invalidated the will. As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, Atty. Rias was
required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization.
Case citation: Lee vs. Tambago - A.C. No. 5281. February 12, 2008
PROBLEM: The validity of the Aaliyah's (Testator) will is questioned by the opponents of the will on the following matters: (a)
It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the will. (b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the
will. (c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will. (d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness
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(e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge on the part of the testator
that they were signing his will. (f) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of the testator. (g) This
clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of the will and was attached to the will after the death of the
testator. (h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of the will are not authentic.
QUESTION: Decide as to whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the requirements of law.
ANSWER: The evidence sufficiently shows that when the Notary Public read the will to the testator, the latter's mind was
perfectly sane and he understood it: that he signed all the pages of the will proper, although he did not sign the page
containing the attestation clause; that while he did not personally call the witnesses, yet the latter were invited by the Notary
Public to act as such in his presence. The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to request the witnesses
to attest his will.
It was also sufficiently established in the record that the testator signed the will in the presence of the three witnesses and that
the latter, in turn, signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause
before the death of the testator; that this clause, with the names of the witnesses in blank, was prepared before the testator
signed the will, and that the sheet containing said clause, just as those of the will proper, and that all the four sheets of which
the will was actually composed were kept together and are the very ones presented in this case; and finally, that the signatures
of the testator on page 3 of said will are authentic.
As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not appeal on the upper part of the
sheet, but it does appear in its text. It is provided in the clause that the will is of three sheet actually used, correlatively
enumerated, besides this sheet . . . . It is clear that such a sheet of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the will,
including said sheet, has four sheets. This description contained in the clause constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirements prescribed by the law regarding the paging. The law does not require that the sheet containing the attestation
clause only, wholly or in part, be numbered or paged. Consequently this lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take
anything from the validity of the will.
Case citation: G.R. No. L-21151 February 25, 1924 In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased. RAMON J. FERNANDEZ,
HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, vs. FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, ET AL.
Attestation clause
PROBLEM: T, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at
his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses, namely, A, B, and C. T was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Y,
and a notary public, Atty. Z, in the preparation of that last will. It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator
was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to D1, D2, L1, and L2, all of whom do not appear to
be related to T.
Four months later, T himself filed a petition seeking the probate of his last will and testament. But before his petition could
finally be heard by the probate court, T passed away. Subsequently, L1, ono of the legatees named in the will, sough his
appointment as special administrator of Ts estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he was so appointed by
the probate court.
In the course of the hearing of the first petition, petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the T's will
on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the T was already in the poor state of health such that he could not
have possibly executed the same. They also asserted that the will is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is
fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the
will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The said attestation provides:
"we do certify that the testament was read by him and the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the
foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters
of the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof,
on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in the
presence of each and all of us.
Question: Is the attestation clause of the will valid?
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ANSWER: No, the attestation clause of the will is not valid. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby
the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the
same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the
witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed.
Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will.
Attestation clause should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or
expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the
attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
In the present case, while it recites that T indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance
that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his
Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each
and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as
referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words " he has
signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then
clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. As such the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or
imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will sought to be admitted to probate.
Moreover, while it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each
page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred that the said witness affixed their respective
signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that
it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on
various days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.
Case citation: Caneda vs CA GR No. 103554. May 28, 1993.
Attestation and acknowledgment
PROBLEM: A was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City. Sometime in 1990, A donated these lots to B through a Deed
of Donation Mortis Causa and B accepted the donation. In 1998, A executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of X
Corporation and in 2000, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the previous Contract
to Sell. In 2002 A died and so B then filed a petition to approve As donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the
contracts of sale A executed in favor of X Corporation.
The court held that since the donation in favor of B was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity
of wills should have been observed. The court found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was
therefore void. In appeal, B argues that the court ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of donation, which contains
the "import and purpose" of the attestation clause required in the execution of wills. The Acknowledgment reads:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1990 at Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared A with Res.
Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1989 at Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the same person who
executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis Causa before the Notary Public and in the
presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument before and in the presence of each
other and of the Notary Public and all of them acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and
deed.
Moreover, B claims that the court should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will to As
donation mortis causa. He insists that the strict construction of a will was not warranted in the absence of any indication of bad
faith, fraud, or substitution in the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
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Question: Is Bs contention correct? Explain.
ANSWER: No, the attestation clause and an acknowledgment cannot be merged in one statement.
The requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805
and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is
made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other
hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the
instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary
public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedents will. An
attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the
witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa.
Case citation: MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ vs. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010

Lack of authority of the Notary Public invalidates the will executed before him
PROBLEM: D, the decedent left property in favor of A and B expressed in a will. A assigned as executrix in the will filed for a
petition for probate on D's property but was opposed by B alleging that the execution and attestation of the will was not done in
accordance with the law. B alleges that D together with his witnesses attested the document in front of Atty. z in Quezon City,
however Atty. Z's commission is for and in Caloocan City.
QUESTION: Does the flaw in the attestation affect the validity of the will?
ANSWER: The will is void. The law provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
"Section 240. Territorial Jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the
province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall
possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction."
A notary publics commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. It is issued "within and for" a
particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary publics authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, outside of his territorial
jurisdiction, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside of his
jurisdiction has no force and effect.
Since Atty. Z was not a notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take acknowledgement of the testatrix
and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, The testatrix and his witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will
before him.
Furthermore, the civil code provides:
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
The provisions of the notarial law are mandatory and prohibitory. Therefore, the will not having been acknowledged in
accordance with the law is considered void.
Case Citation: Bella Guerrerro vs Resurreccion Bihis GR 174144
Holographic Will and number of witnesses required if will is contested
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PROBLEM: X died leaving a holographic will, designating A, B and C as legatees. A, B and C filed a petition for probate of the
holographic will with the Regional Trial Court. Y and Z filed an opposition to the probate, alleging that the will was a forgery
and that the same is illegible. They further allege that someone else executed the holographic will.
A, B and C presented six witnesses to prove that the holographic will was executed by the hand of X, who testified in this
manner:
N presented documents bearing the signature of the deceased for purposes of comparison
S identified the voters affidavit of decedent without presenting the voters affidavit
H accompanied decedent in issuing receipts to tenants, carried personal letters of deceased to creditors
W former lawyer of decedent who said signature in the will was similar to that of the deceased, but could not be sure
V employee of DENR who processed application of deceased for a pasture permit and claimed familiarity of the
latters signature because the latter signed application form in her presence
A (one of the legatees) lived with the deceased since birth and alleges familiarity with deceaseds signature
The Regional Trial Court denied the petition for probate of the purported holographic Will due to insufficiency of evidence but
was reversed by the Court of Appeals, ratiocinating that no witnesses need to be presented in the probate of a holographic Will.
The Court of Appeals further reasoned that the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive.
It then allowed the Will to probate.
QUESTION: Is the ruling of the Court of Appeals correct?
ANSWER: No. Article 811 of the Civil Code provides, In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least
one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. We
cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic
will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Case citation: EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and
UEFEMIA PATIGAS, G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999

Holographic Will and Preterition
PROBLEM: SS died, survived by his 4 children, left a document entirely written, signed and dated in his own hand. However, it
only provided for the disinheritance of his eldest son, AS. The other three children presented for probate the document as SS'
holographic will which was however contested by AS on the ground of its invalidity due to preterition and that the same did not
provide a disposition of SS' estate. The probate court ruled that to tolerate the probate of the purported will when it appears to
be intrinsically void would've been an exercise in futility. Can the document effected by SS be considered a holographic will
despite the fact that it contains only AS' disinheritance?
ANSWER: Yes. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not
be witnessed. SS' document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of SS himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of
the latters property, the disinheritance of AS, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator SS in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of AS.
Case citation: Dy. Yieng. Seangio et al v. Seangio et al, GR Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
Blind under Article 808 of the Civil Code
PROBLEM: On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting
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probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the
execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the
eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary
public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same
month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre
5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye
operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the
case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the
notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on
27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was
blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since
the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and
codicil should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado
was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art.
808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then
concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making
known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.
Question: Is the testator considered blind within the context of Article 808? And are the requirements on the execution of the
will validly executed?
ANSWER: YES. Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of
reading their wills. Since the deceased was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions
of their execution due to his poor, defective, or blurred vision, there can be no other course but to conclude that he
comes within the scope of the term blind as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way
of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instruction. Hence, to
consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential to ascertain whether or not Art. 808 had been
complied with. There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently
made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the Huling Habilin, the day of the execution
was not the first time that the testator had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. Moreover, with
four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the type written documents. This is
especially true considering the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator. Thus, the will was
validly executed.
Case citation: Alvarado vs Gaviola GR No. L-74695, September 14, 1993.
Doctrine of liberal interpretation / substantial compliance
PROBLEM: Celada is the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayora while Lucia is the decedents companion since 1929.
Margarita died single on April 27, 1987 without any ascending or descending heirs and she was survived by her first cousins. On
February 2, 1987, prior to her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament wherein she bequeathed to Lucia and other
devisees her real properties, left all her personal properties to Lucia whom she likewise designated as the sole executor of her
will. Caleda filed a petition for letters of administration while Lucia filed for a petition for probate of the will, and the 2 cases
were then consolidated. The RTC probated the last will and testament which was affirmed by the CA.
Celada posits that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three
(3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial
will, the same is not accurate.
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Question: Did the Court of Appeals err in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law.
ANSWER: No, the CA did not err. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining
the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation
clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with
pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have
been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal
interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects
and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article
805.
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial
will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of
the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.
Case citation: Paz Samaniego-Celada vs. Lucia D. Abena, G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008.
PROBLEM: A petition for probate of a will was filed in the Regional Trial Court. After a close inspection of the will, it was found
out that the three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not
at the bottom of the attestation clause. The attestation also stated that:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa
ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa
ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
Also, in lieu of the Acknowledgment it merely stated that the notary public signed and notarized the will. The Regional Trial
Court ruled that the will be admitted on the ground that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law in
mere signing of the three witnesses in the left hand margin and the fact that the first page contains the entire text of the
testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such
being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will.
QUESTION: By applying Art. 809 of the Civil Code on substantial compliance, is the decision of the Regional Trial Court correct?
ANSWER: No the Regional Trial Court is wrong. The total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in
the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.
In the case of Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca . the Court ruled that: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in
the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely
change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal
might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the
other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the
inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with
much greater difficulty."
With regard to the Acknowledgment it is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the
notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed. It coerces
the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal
prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the
testator.
153
It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to
those persons he/she had designated in the will. The New Civil Code provides under Article 806 that a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public.
Case Citation: Felix Azuela v. Court of Appeals GR NO. 122880, April 12, 2006.
Strict Compliance vis-a-vis Substantial Compliance in relation to non-entry of the number of pages in the
Attestation Clause.
PROBLEM: Enrique and Wendy, had four (4) children: Richard, Diana, Marybeth and Victoria. Before Enriques death, he
executed a will which appointed Richard to be the executor and was acknowledged to comprise a total of seven (7) pages.
Richard filed a petition for the probate before the RTC Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary.
Marybeth and Victoria opposed the petition contending that the purported will was not executed as required by law because it
did not state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause and was actually comprised of eight (8) pages as stated in
the acknowledgment. Richard raised substantial compliance while Marybeth and Victoria prayed to disallow the will for noncompliance with the law.
QUESTION: If you are the judge, how will you rule on the petition?
ANSWER: As the judge, I would disallow the probate of the will. The law provides that the attestation clause must state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written (Art. 805). While substantial compliance is recognized (Art. 809), the rule
only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no extrinsic evidence required.
In the present case, while the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consist a total of seven (7) pages; the fact that it has
actually eight (8) pages, including the acknowledgment portion, is fatal. As such, I would disallow the probate of the will for not
having been executed and attested in accordance with law.
Case Citation: Richard B. Lopez vs. Dianna Jeane Lopez, Nov. 12, 2012, GR No. 189984
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
PROBLEM: Sometime in June 1994, Edward Uy died intestate. His surviving spouse Lou Uy and duly represented by her
nephew Gary Lim, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition for the administration of Edwards estate in the Regional Trial Court.
Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company
are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the
Torrens system filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
decedent because its properties were included in the inventory of the estate. Lou Uy averred that the deceased was not only a
mere stockholder but the owner of said corporations.
QUESTION: On the jurisdiction of the probate court, can the court extend its probing arms in the determination of the question
of title in the probate proceeding?
ANSWER: NO. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties. In a litany of cases, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court has limited
jurisdiction. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but
if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Edward Uy are in the possession of and are
registered in the name of the corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said
titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
154
Case citation: RUFINA LUY LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE
DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. G.R. No. 124715, 24 January 2000
Petition of allowance of the will by the testator himself

PROBLEM: Hagupit executed a Last Will and Testament. He filed a petition for probate of his will in the RTC Branch 1 docketed
as SP No. 419. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs and he has named KEED Foundation as the sole legatee and
devisee. He named Ruby as his executrix. The petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament was approved and
allowed by RTC Branch 1. Shortly thereafter, Hagupit died.
Ruby filed a petition for the issuance of Letters Testamentary docketed as SP No. 722. Meanwhile, Queenie file a Motion for
Intervention before Branch 1 alleging that she is the full-bloodied niece and the nearest of kin of Hagupit, and prayed the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of Letters of Administration under her name.
QUESTION: Is the court correct in allowing the probate of the will of Hagupit? Is the contention of Queenie tenable?
ANSWER: Yes, the court is correct in allowing the probate of the will of Hagupit.
Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides: Civil
Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern. Subject to the right of
appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Even if Queenie is the nearest next of kin of Ruby, she cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule
of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art.
842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Ruby, as niece of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testators will.
Case Citation: Octavio S. Malolles II vs. Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, etc., et al. G.R. No. 129505 & G.R. No. 133359, January
31, 2000

Probate of a will executed by a foreigner abroad
PROBLEM: In 2001 Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the
last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
155
In 2003, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for appointment as special administrator of her estate was filed before
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. However, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not
be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it, arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American
citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
QUESTIONS:
1.
2.
Is the contention of the nephews correct?

Can a will executed by a foreigner abroad be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously
probated and allowed in the country where it was executed?
ANSWERS:
1.
2.
No, the contention of the nephews is incorrect. In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and
allowed by the court of California, is a procedure applicable for the reprobate of will before admitting it in our
country. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different
from that of probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. In reprobate, the
local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the
matter can be established. Hence, the rules governing on reprobate of wills cannot be made applicable in the
present case.
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as
yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country. Thus, our courts can take cognizance of the petition for
probate of Rupertas will.
Case Citation: In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Ruperta Palagnas, G.R. No. 169144 Jan. 26, 2011
Partition before probate of will
QUESTION: Under Philippine Law, is there a valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated?
ANSWER: No. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The
law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will
decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
Case citation: UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, G.R. No.
149926. February 23, 2005

Last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void
PROBLEM: Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Her husband Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977,
after Alejandros death, a certain Lourdes who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding
for the probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court admitted Alejandros will to probate. No appeal was
made by the children of Alejandro. Later in 1983, Alejandros children filed a Motion to Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The
trial court granted the motion and issued an order which states that Lourdes is not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the
provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente, Jose
and Nilda as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro and Aniceta, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.
Question: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final
and executor still be given effect?
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ANSWER: Yes, it can still be given effect.
It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. It has been
consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by
mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can
no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. Such final order makes the will conclusive
against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions
regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession, the unlawful provisions/ dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
In the case at bar, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were
void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply.
Case citation: LOURDES L. DOROTHEO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of
VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
Absence of probate proceedings, its effect
PROBLEM: Krismar Ty filed an action for unlawful detainer against the heirs of Boy Abundant. According to Krismar, she has a
better right of possession based on the deed of conveyance executed by the real owner, which was her father, and that the
heirs of Boy allegedly possessed the property by mere tolerance. The latter in their defense alleged that they have a better right
because they inherited it from their father, showing a Last Will and Testament which has not yet been probated.
QUESTION: Who among the parties has a better right of possession over the property?
ANSWER: Krismar Ty has a better right of possession based on the deed of conveyance.
The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession without having been probated. The said
last will and testament could not be the source of any right according to Art. 838 of the New Civil Code which provides that, No
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Further, in
Caiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997), it was ruled that: a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy. (Guevara v.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Baluyot v. Pao, 163 Phil. 81 (1976); Roberts v. Leonilas, 214 Phil. 30 (1984).
Case citation: Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, etc. v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006.
QUESTION: What are the rights entitled to an interested persons in a settlement of estate?
ANSWER: The Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all interested parties. The instances when notice has
to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and
allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor
or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90
regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.
Case Citation: Hilado vs. CA G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
Prohibition of alienation under Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code
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PROBLEM: On July 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita, died in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The will was
admitted to probate. At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was
completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of Doa Margaritas
testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the properties and the income from her properties for
distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint the desire of the decedent:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;

Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties, after the necessary deductions for expenses,
including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund with a bank;
Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa habang
panahon);
Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to the
different beneficiaries; and
Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the
fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, petitioners Hilarion and Enrico, heirs of Henrietto, who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents
will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedents estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years,
in violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may be perpetual citing the case of Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province
where the trust holding the two estate of one Luis Palad was allowed to exist even after the lapse of twenty years.
Rule on the perpetuation of the trust.
ANSWER: The trust cannot be perpetuated. The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the twenty-year allowable
period, the estate may be disposed of under Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition of the
testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of the law by the trust constituted by Luis Palad because the will of the testator
does not interdict the alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income of said two parcels be utilized for
the establishment, maintenance and operation of the high school. Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the
socialization of the ownership of property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles.
The trust involved in the Palad case covers only two lots, which have not been shown to be a large landholding. And the income
derived therefrom is being devoted to a public and social purpose the education of the youth of the land. The use of said
parcels therefore is in a sense socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different situation as the testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of
her properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties, unlike in the Palad case. The herein testatrixs large
landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her
even in the afterlife.
Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and the income
accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trusts designated
beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Therefore, the probate court must admit the case to determine the properties to be
subject to intestate succession as well as the nearest relative of the deceased that may inherit the said properties under the
perpetual trust.
Case citation: Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, represented by Fe Orendain vs. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita
Rodriquez, G.R. No. 168660. June 30, 2009.

Prohibition of alienation in a will
PROBLEM: Samuel Bilibid contracted three marriages in his lifetimethe first to Maximina, the second to Amor, and the third
to Dabiana. Samuel and his first wife bore two off springs Nina and Debbie, and with his second wife had six off springs namely
Samuel Jr, Inigo, Nestor, Torio, Ulysses and Ronaldo all surnamed Bilibid. After having lived a long and fruitful life of 45, Samuel
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succumbed to Tuberculosis and died testate. Thereafter his will was probated. An important provision in his will reads as
follows:
" Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Nina at Debbie
hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking
mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
Question: Is the provision in the will valid?

ANSWER: Yes, it is valid but for 20 years only. It is clear from Samuels will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be
transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in common.
Art. 871. The institution of an heir may be made conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause.
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are
void.
Case citation: IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO, MA. PILAR SANTIAGO
and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, December 04, 2013, G.R. No. 179859

Legitime
PROBLEM: Marcelo died and left several conjugal properties to his wife Teofista and six (6) children. After the death of Marcelo
his wife and his children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate partitioning his estate. The Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate provides that the title to the properties shall be in common and the share of each heir being pro indiviso. Despite the
partition, the title to the properties remained in the couples name and Teofista continued to administer and manage these
properties.
Subsequently, the subject properties were levied and sold in an execution to satisfy the judgment rendered against Rizal Realty
Corporation and Teofista, the later owning ninety (90%) of the formers shares of stock. Before expiration of the redemption
period, the children filed a reivindicatory action for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied
properties. Rule on the propriety of the action.
ANSWER: The action for annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership in favor of the children of Marcelo shall be
granted.
Article 886 of the Civil Code provides:
Legitime is that part of the testators property which cannot be dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who
are, therefore called compulsory heirs.
In the instant case, even without delving into the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the right of the children as compulsory
heir to the succession vested from the moment of their fathers death. Herein, their ownership of the subject properties is no
longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelos death, although their respective shares therein remained pro indiviso.
Hence, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to answer for their mothers judgment obligation, the
inclusion of their share was null and void.
Case citation: Valente Raymundo vs. Teofista Isagon Vda. De Suarez et. al GR No. 149017 November 28, 2008
Compulsory Heirs
PROBLEM: X, who was the appointed Administratrix, signed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Partition, allotting the
estate to the heirs, however no share was assigned to the wife of the deceased.
QUESTION: Is the settlement of the estate proper?
159
ANSWER: No. Elementary it is in succession law that compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall have a share in the estate
by way of legitimes and no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right except if she gives it up for lawful
consideration, but never when the spouse is not a party to the said settlement. And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must
give every man his due.
Decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents estate are exclusively the
person enumerated in Article 887
PROBLEM: The land, situated in Sitio Guso, Barangay Talaytay, Argao, Cebu planted with rice, corn and coconuts was
originally owned by the late Juana Conte, who had two marriages. The first marriage was to Ramon Bautista, by whom she bore
Aileen Bautista, whose husband was Joseph Alday (JOSEPH). The second marriage was to Bryan Bernad, by whom she bore
Honey Bolongon (HONEY), who married Bogs Go. Juana died without a will and was survived by HONEY and Lauris Alday, the
son of Aileen Bautista (who had predeceased Juana) and JOSEPH.
The Spouses Jaime Tor and Kurt Biscaylor (SPOUSES) asserted their right in the subject property by virtue of their purchase of
it from Reuville Tubal, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase from JOSEPH who claimed to have acquired the said
property by inheritance from Juana. Kurt Biscaylor contended that Joseph Alday had become automatically the heir of Juana
after the death of his wife, the wife being the only daughter and he the only son-in-law. This led to the commencement of the
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real property damages against HONEY.
Question: If you were the judge, how would you decide the case?
ANSWER: If I am the judge, I will dismiss the case on the ground that the spouses claim of ownership could not be legally
sustained.
Under the New Civil Code, a decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents estate are
exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887; to wit, (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
In the instant case, only two compulsory heirs survived Juana upon her death, namely: Honey, her daughter, and Lauris Alday,
her grandson. The latter succeeded Juana by right of representation because his mother, Aileen Baustista, had predeceased
Juana. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living or if she could have
inherited. Herein, the representative (Lauris Alday) was called to the succession by law and not by the person represented
(Aileen); he thus succeeded Juana, not Aileen. Hence, from the foregoing facts, the contention of Kurt Biscaylor that Joseph
Alday had become automatically the heir of Juana is plainly irrelevant.
Wherefore, the suit filed by the spouses shall be dismissed.
Case citation: Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon, et. al. vs. Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S. Magtanum, G.R. No. 153736, August 4,
2010

Reserva Troncal
PROBLEM: Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza and Dominga Mendoza. Placido and Dominga had four children:
Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and
Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentins
children. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter,
Gregoria.
After Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after
Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of
Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and
must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserve troncal.
QUESTION: Does Reserva Troncal applies in this case?
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ANSWER: No. Reserva Troncal is not applicable in this case.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous
title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco)
from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by
gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return. At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by
Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral
relative.
Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from
whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this
case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
Case citation: Mendoza v. Delos Santos Gr. 176422. March 20, 2013
Legitime
PROBLEM: Roman during his lifetime married twice. His first wife was Flavia while Ceferina became his second wife. Flavia
died sometime in the year 1944 or 1945. Roman Sr. and Flavia begot seven children, namely: Josefina, Flavey, Woodrow, Pablo,
Manuel, Roman, Jr. and Cresencia. On 18 October 1954, Roman Zuiga, Sr. married Ceferina Bendaa. Roman, Sr. and Ceferina
had four children, and they were the plaintiffs Roscef, Claro, Perfecto and Cefernita. Roman died on 9 August 1976 leaving Lot
No. 1-P then embraced by Tax Declaration No. 2975 as his only property. It appears that his second wife Ceferina Bendaa died
ahead of him.
Flavia A. Zuiga sold the subject lot to her sister Cresencia Zuiga-Echague on 20 June 2001. On the same day Cresencia
Zuiga-Echague sold the same lot in favor of the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos. On October 30, 2001, Roscef Zuiga
Bernarte, Claro Zuiga, Perfecto Zuiga, and Ceferina Zuiga-Garcia (Roscef, et al.) filed a complaint for declaration of partial
nullity of deeds of transfer and sale against petitioner-spouses, Flavey Zuiga (Flavey), and Cresencia.
Questions:
1) If you were the judge to whom will the lot be transmitted?
2) If you were the judge what will be the ideal share of each heir?
3) Was the sale of lot between Cresencia and the petitioner spouses valid?
4) Can the petitioner spouses raise the defense of purchasers in good faith?
5) Was the lot in question a paraphernal property of Flavia (first spouse) or a capital property of Roman?
ANSWER:
1) If I am the judge, I will decide that the lot be transmitted to Romans eleven legitimate children, as co owners being
co-heirs. Article 979 provides that, legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. Hence, Lot
No. 1-P rightfully belongs to the 11 children of Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage with Flavia and four (4) from
his second marriage with Ceferina.
2)
If I am the judge, the ideal share of the heirs is 1/11. Article 980 states that, the children of the deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Therefore, each will have 1/11 as their
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ideal share of the lot.
3)
Yes, the sale was valid but only limited to Cresencias ideal share and the other ideal share she acquired from Flavey A.
Zuiga. Under Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Hence, the
spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos acquired the ideal shares of the
sisters Flavey A. Zuiga and Cresencia ZuigaEchague which is 2/11 of Lot No. 1-P.
4)
No, the petitioner spouses defense of purchasers in good faith is incorrect. As held in the case of Spouses Ong
v.
Spouses Olasiman, the issue of the buyers good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the
sale
is
registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to
the land is clean.
Lot No. 1-P appears as an unregistered lot, and thus the spouses merely step into the shoes of the seller. They
cannot acquire a property interest greater than Cresencia Zuiga- Echagues, whose share is only 2/11 of the lot in
question.
5)
Lot No. 1-P was Romans capital property. The lot was declared for tax purposes for the first time on 14 December
1948. The reckoning date for the acquisition of Lot No. 1-P should be the date when it was declared for tax purposes
which is 14 December 1948- when Roman was still a widower. Clearly such lot was his capital property.
Case citation: Spouses Mariano & Emma Bolaos vs. Roscef Zuiga Bernarte, G.R. No. 180997. November 17, 2010
Division of a decedents Estate
PROBLEM: Eli Sandejas and Remedy Sandejas are husband and wife, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains property
regime. On April 17, 1955, Remedy Sandejas died. Eli became the administrator of the estate of the late Remedy Sandejas in
the settlement of the latters estate case. While being the administrator, he sold in their entirety all the parcels of land which
formed part of the estate of the late Remedy Sandejas to Alexis Luna without notice and approval from the children as heirs.
The Manila City Hall was consumed by fire on November 19, 1981 and among the records burned were the records of the
settlement of the estate of Remedy Sandejas. Eli filed a motion for Reconstitution of the records. Alexis Luna filed a motion to
intervene alleging that the entire parcels of land were already sold to him.
QUESTION: Considering that the sale was valid, to what extent of the inheritance may Eli validly transfer to Alexis through
sale?
ANSWER: He may validly sell one half of the lots as the conjugal partner, plus his pro-indiviso share in his capacity as one of
the legal heirs.
Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
decedents entire estate under the concept of conjugal partnership of gains must be divided equally, with one half going to
the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased. After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the
remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devises.
Case citation: Heirs of Sps. Remedios Sandejas vs. Alex A. Lina, GR. No. 141634 February 5, 2001
Petitioner Leonor, a teacher, and her husband Laureano Salvador (Laureano) were the registered owners of two parcels of land,
Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738 of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Pangasinan, located in the Barrio of Basista, San Carlos,
Pangasinan.
Laureano died intestate on December 9, 1941. He was survived by his wife-petitioner Leonor; his brothers Agapito and
petitioners Jose and Fortunato, all surnamed Salvador; and the heirs of his deceased brother Luis Salvador (Luis), namely,
petitioners Virginia, Gloria, Florendo, Delfin, Rodrigo, Eleuterio, Narciso, Onofre, Zenaida, and Aurelia, all surnamed Salvador.
On February 9, 1983, Leonor, together with her brothers-in-law Agapito, Jose, Fortunato, and Luis heirs, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan a Complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Adjudication with Sale of the
entire Lot No. 19554 and of Lot No. 18738, a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of portion of each two lots together
with Leonors conjugal share of of each two lots, and a Deed of Absolute Sale of the other half of Lot. No. 18738 against
Frias, on the grounds that the said documents did not reflect the true intention of the parties x x x moreover, the shares of the
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plaintiffs, other than Leonor, were included without their knowledge, participation and consent, and that they are absolutely
fictitious and simulated. Furthermore, petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with respect to
the shares of Leonors co-heirs-co-petitioners as they were conveyed without their knowledge and participation.
Question: Were the sales illegal, considering the other petitioners, being owners of the other half, have preferential right to
purchase that half portion instead of buyer Frias?
ANSWER: NO. One-half of the properties in question belong to Frias, by virtue of the valid sale by Leonor. The other half
should be divided among the brothers, nephews and nieces of the late Laureano Salvador by right of intestate succession: to
brothers per capita and to the nephews and nieces per stirpes.
Article 948. If there are brothers and sisters and nephews, who are children of brothers and
sisters of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Article 953. In case there are brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters, the widow or
widower shall have a right to receive, in concurrence with the former, the portion of the inheritance
in usufruct granted him or her in Article 837.
Article 837. When the testator leaves no legitimate descendants or ascendants, the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance also in usufruct.
Case citation: LEONOR CAMCAM, JOSE SALVADOR et al vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ARCADIO FRIAS G.R. No.
14297

Rights of an illegitimate child
PROBLEM: A, an illegitimate child, died intestate, leaving B,C,D, and E, his siblings from the same mother, but all illegitimate
children.
QUESTION: Do they have a right to inherit from As estate?
ANSWER: Yes. Succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The
reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case
under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives.
There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different
persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation.
Case Citation: IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
vs HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, GR No. 155773

Rule of Proximity
PROBLEM: X died intestate leaving sizable amount of properties. He died without leaving any direct descendant nor an
ascendant. Meanwhile, Y is the maternal aunt, a third-degree relative of the decedent while Z is the daughter of a first cousin of
the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. Subsequently, Y instituted a Special Proceedings case entitled, "In the
Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of X. While the case is pending, Z, the petitioner moved to intervene in the
said proceeding claiming her entitlement to a share of the estate of X as the latters fifth-degree relative. In support of her
contention, Z cited Article 1009 of the Civil Code which states that should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines
or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
QUESTION: Is the contention of Z valid?
ANSWER: No. Article 962 of the Civil Code provides that in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
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In the problem given, Y, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late X excludes Z, a relative of the fifth degree,
from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent. In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and
a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a thirddegree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have
priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. Thus, Zs contention was not valid.
Case citation: Ofelia Hernando Bagunu vs. Pastora Piedad, G.R. No. 140975, December 8, 2000.
Name/Class: HAMLIG, NONELUZ - Regular class
Determination of Relationship under Art. 962, NCC
PROBLEM: Justine acquired the 0.5 hec by inheritance from her parents, Juan Tamad and Petra Ursula, and 2.2 hec by
purchase. Estor, Justines nephew, claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justine on the ground that she died without any
issue. Estors mother is the half-sister of Justine. Estor further claimed that Hagardo Versisi who apparently worked the land as
Justines tenant refused to give him his share of the harvest. Estor claimed that Hagardo has no right to the entire land but
could only claim of the 0.5 hec. land which Justine had inherited from her parents Juan and Petra. Hagardo died and was
survived by his heirs.
Allegedly, heirs of Hagardo claimed that they were not mere tenants but Justines heirs and entitled to her entire land. They
claimed that the entire land, was originally owned by Ambrocio their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Pedro
and Juan, Ambrocios nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. Pedro was to receive two-thirds of the land
and Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justine never
asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that Estor did not
have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio, the original owner of the property.
QUESTION: Who is entitled to Justines estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
ANSWER: Estor is entitled to Justines estate as the nearest relatives within the meaning of article 962 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Estor is Justas nephew, his mother, being Justas half sister. He is thus Justas nearest relative and thus, the only one entitled
to her estate. Estor is a 3rd degree relative of Justine. On the other hand, the children of Justines cousin are the 5th degree
relatives of Justine. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then Estor is the lawful heir of Justine. The
fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if
no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survives the decedent. That Estrada is only a half-blood is immaterial. This alone does
not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of full or half blood is important
only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
Case Citation: HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE vs. CA GR No. 116775, January 22, 1998
Preterition /Article 1104 of the Civil Code
PROBLEM: Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a
passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. He begot fourteen (14) children. His eldest was Policronio.
The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos children and their descendants ( Heirs of
Alfonso).
In order to reduce the inheritance taxes, Alfonso made it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. He executed
four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife,
Valeriana Dela Cruz. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso
continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
Later, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4)
deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronios eldest son, representing the
Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
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On the other hand, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. They obtained a
copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Not long after, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned
about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonsos estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the
Aklan Reporter.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the
Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition,
and Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso before the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the Complaint.
Aggrieved, the Heirs of Policronio appealed before the Court of Appeals. The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the
absence of the Heirs of Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority of their representative results, at the very least, in
their preterition and not in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition. Assuming there was actual preterition, it did not render
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable.
Citing Article 1104 of the Civil Code, they aver that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, but the heirs shall be proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted.
QUESTION: Is preterition applicable in this case?
ANSWER: No. Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs
should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance. It consists in the silence of the
testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving
him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
case. Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there is no will involved.
Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
Case Citation: Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al. vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa
F. Ureta, et al./Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al. vs. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado
B. Ureta, et al. G.R. No. 165748 September 14, 2011
Extrajudicial Settlement resulting to preterition
PROBLEM: During their lifetime, the spouses Julian and Virginia owned several pieces of property, among them a house and
lot located at Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 42682. Virginia died on 1982. Julian died three years
later on 1985. Surviving them were their children Nilo, Leah, and herein petitioners Rebecca, and Delia. Nilo and Leah both
died on 22 April 1987. Nilo left behind as his own sole heirs his wife Alicia and their two children Cherri and Fe.
Rebecca and her family, Delia and Alicia and her two children Cherri and Fe shared, a common residence at the Isarog property.
Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between Rebecca and Alicia after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children. Alicia and her two children Cherri
and Fe, claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that Rebecca vacate the portion occupied by the
latter. Alicia and her two children Cherri and Fe predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two
documents a deed of donation executed by the late Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor
of Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian, Leah and Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights
and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia.
Rebecca filed an action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments contending that the exclusion of her
retardate sister, Delia, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.
QUESTION: Should the extrajudicial settlement of the subject property be annulled?
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ANSWER: No. The subject extrajudicial settlement should not be annulled. The exclusion of Delia, alleged to be a retardate,
from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of
Alicia and her two children. The relief, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is
not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the
share pertaining to her.
Case Citation: G.R. No. 137287
February 15, 2000 REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO
vs. THE

Institution Sub Modo
QUESTIONS:
A)
B)
What is institucion sub modo and when does it occur?

How does a conditional institution differ from institucion sub modo?
ANSWERS
A)
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an
institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution,
(2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the
heir.
A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession.
B)
On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the
heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but
does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
Case Citation: Rabadilla v CA, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
Who may accept or repudiate an inheritance, legacy or devise
PROBLEM: Ping died intestate survived by his wife, Lucy and five children namely: Po, Tigress, Viper, Monkie and Mantis. He
left an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. A petition for letters of administration was
filed by Shifu and Ogway, both minors and represented by their mother, Lou, praying the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly distribution of Pings estate. They claimed that they were the acknowledged illegitimate children of
Ping. The heirs of Ping filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the decedent left no debts and that his estate can be settled
without securing letters of administration. On its supplemental joint motion to dismiss, they further argued that the claims had
been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason that their mother has signed a Release and Waiver of
Claims in exchange for the financial and educational assistance given to the latter.
QUESTIONS:
a. Who may accept or repudiate an inheritance, legacy or devise.
b. Is there a valid waiver or hereditary rights in this case?
ANSWERS:
a. As a rule, if the heir, legatee or devisee has the free disposal of his property, he himself may accept or repudiate his
inheritance, legacy or devise. There are however, certain special limitations imposed by the law in the following cases:
a.i.
if the beneficiary cannot freely dispose of his property because he is incapacitated to do so, such as when he
is a minor or a deaf-mute who cannot read and write or an insolvent judicially declared or is under civil
interdiction, his guardian or legal representative shall be the one who may accept or repudiate. In case of
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a.ii.
a.iii.
repudiation, judicial authorization is necessary (Arts. 1044-1048, NCC);

if the beneficiary is the poor, the right to accept shall belong to the person designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property. In default of such person, it shall belong to the
executor. As far as the right to repudiate is concerned, it may be exercised only by the beneficiaries
themselves once they are finally determinded (Art 1044, NCC);
if the beneficiary is a corporation, association, institution or entity, the right to accept or repudiate belongs to
the legal representative, but in the case of repudiation, judicial authorization is necessary (Art. 1045, NCC).
b. No, there is no valid waiver of hereditary rights in this case. The law provides that any person having free disposal of his
property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Moreover, any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be
accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization considering that repudiation amounts to alienation of property which must pass to the courts scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. In this case, it is clear that Shifu and Ogway were represented by their mother who signed the
Release and Waiver of Claims without having been judicially authorized to do so. Being such, the Release and Waiver of Claim in
the instant case is void and will not bar Shifu and Ogway from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. Therefore, there is
no valid waiver of hereditary rights in this case.
Case Citation: Guy vs. Hon. Court or Appeals et. al, G.R. No.163707, 15 September 2006
Repudiation of Co-ownership
PROBLEM: Troy was the owner of a parcel of land in Roma, Aklan covered by an Original Certificate of Title. Troy died in 1962
and was survived by his siblings Remus and Romulus. Both are now deceased. None of the co-owners at that time made a valid
repudiation or partition of the existing co-ownership.
Remus is survived by his son Asterix and grandson Julius. Romulus is survived by his children, Jupiter, Diana, and Neptune.
Neptune had a daughter, Romana who is married to Marc Antony. The surviving heirs are only Julius and Romana with Marc
Antony.
Julius now wants to partition the property, believing that he has a share therein. Marc Antony refused saying he has become
the sole owner of the property. He alleges that prescription has set in and he has been in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property with a just title.
Marc Antony alleges that he challenged Julius co-ownership of the property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former
executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name. These apparent acts of
repudiation were followed later on by Marc Antonys act of withholding Julius share in the fruits of the property, beginning in
1988. Marc Antony has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property, and that Julius had only
30 years from Troys death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to file the partition case. Since Julius instituted the partition
suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription.
Is Marc Antony correct? Rule on the matter.
ANSWER: No. Marc Antony is incorrect.
The law provides that for prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. A co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
While it may be argued that Marc Antony performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the
fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Romulus; he is merely Neptunes son-in-law, being
married to Neptunes daughter Romana. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.
In point of law, Marc Antony is not a co-owner of the property; Romana is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation
of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Julius, and his right
to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
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Troys ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law. Since none of the
co-owners made a valid repudiation or the existing co-ownership, Julius could seek partition of the property at any time.
Case citation: Antipolo Ining, et al. Vs. Leonardo R. Vega, et al, G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013
QUESTION: L died without issue in 1970. His heirs were T, R and G who inherited in equal shares. In 1995, R's son A,
challenged the co-ownership of the property and executed an Affidavit of Ownership of the Land and a Tax Declaration in his
name. In 2001, T and G filed a case in court to partition the property but the trial court ruled that it had already been thirty
years since the death of L and A had already aquired the property through prescription. The case was elevated to you, the
judge, on appeal. Decide the case.
BEST ANSWER: A cannot perform acts of repudiation. He is not an heir of L but only the son-in-law. Under Article 150 of the
Family Code, excludes succession by affinity and includes those; (1) Between husband and wife;(2) Between parents and
children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Since A is not an heir, he is not a co-owner and thus cannot perform acts of repudiation. He cannot acquire shares in coownership via prescription.
Alternate Answer. The trial court is incorrect. The prescriptive period begins to run at the time of the act of repudiation and not
the time of death. Therefore, it should be counted from 1995 when A executed the act of repudiation.
Case Citation: Pedro Ining Jr. vs. Vega
G.R. 174727
Name/Class: VELOSO, MARVIN JOSHUA Regular Class
August 12, 2013
Collation
PROBLEM: Don Ernie died intestate in 2010 leaving no heirs other than his two siblings, named: Macdo and Jobee. Before he
died, he donated certain property evidence by a Deed of Donation to Macdo.
In the course of judicial settlement of intestate proceeding, Jobee opposed the partition on the ground that the donated
property to Macdo should be considered as part of his advance legitime which is subject to collation, and that all other
properties be distributed to Jobee alone.
QUESTIONS:
1) Is the donated property to Macdo subject to collation?
2) How should the residue of estate be distributed?
ANSWERS:
1. The donated property to Macdo, the decedents sibling, is not subject collation because there are no compulsory heirs.
Collation takes place only when there are compulsory heirs as the purpose of which is to determine the legitime and
free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be protected.
In this case, the presence of other siblings who belonged to the collateral relatives does not in any way warrant them
to have part in the share reserved by law.
2.
The residue of the estate should be distributed equally among the siblings-collateral relatives because the decedent left
no compulsory heirs.
Under the law, when only the siblings survive, they would inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Case Citation: Arellano vs Pascual GR No 189776. December 15, 2010

Collation between compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs
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PROBLEM: Donna who is married to MichaelAngelo, purchased from her father, Rafael, a parcel of land located at Valenzuela.
Using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property, she bought a new parcel of land in Paraaque. The following
year, Donna died.
The year after that, her father died, survived by his wife and their other children. Donnas brother, Leonardo, filed for the
probate of his fathers estate and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to
his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Leonardo stated that MichaelAngelo, is one of Rafael's children "by right of
representation as the widower of his deceased daughter Donna."
Leonardo also alleged that the transfer of the Valenzuela property in favor of Donna by her father was gratuitous and the
subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the sale is subject to collation.
QUESTION: Can the Paraaque property be validly subject for collation?
ANSWER: NO. The Paraaque property cannot be validly subject for collation.
Article 1061 of the NCC provides that collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in
the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that
the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding
with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the
decedent.
MichaelAngelo, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, MichaelAngelo, who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a
third person or a stranger. As such, MichaleAngelo may not be dragged into the estate proceedings. Neither may he be
permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding.
Case citation: Lauro G. Vizconde vs CA G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998
Collation and Advancement of Legitime
PROBLEM: Mario (decedent) died intestate on June 3, 1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value
of P200,000.00. He was survived by his wife Dolor and their five children, namely Caloy, Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and
Corazon. Dolor was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario.
During the probate, Dolor submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedents estate. Jose filed his Comment
on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 125429. The said Lot 829-B-4-B registered under the name of Sps. Mario and Dolor.
Dolor excludes such property in the inventory considering that they previously donated such property to their son Vicente during
the lifetime of Mario. Vicente presented a copy of the Deed of Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolor and
Mario.
Questions:
1.) Is the omission to exclude such property proper?
2.) Can the probate court decide the questions of title and ownership?
ANSWER:
1.) The omission is not proper.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.
Moreover, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
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Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or

alleged to have been made, by the deceasedto any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
In the case at bar, the property was still under the name of the decedent & Dolor. Moreover, assuming that the
donation was valid, still it is required to be included in the inventory of property of the deceased in determining the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs. Property received by an heir during the lifetime of the deceased by donation or
gratuitous title are considered as advances to his/her legitime.
2.) Yes, the probate court can make a provisional determination of title and ownership but only for the purpose of
inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of properties of a decedent, without prejudice to a final determination through a
separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to make a provisional determination
of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress that the question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent
to an heir over which the question of title and ownership can be passed upon by a probate court.
Case citation: Corazon M. Gregorio, as administratrix of the estate of Casimiro Madarang et. Al. vs. Atty. Jose Madarang and
Vicente Madarang, G.R. No. 185226, Feb. 11, 2010

Inoffious donation and rights of heirs to contest donation
PROBLEM: Zuko purchased a parcel of land from his father, Ozai. This transaction was denominated as a sale but both parties
admitted that it was a donation. Thereafter, Ozai filed an action for the annulment of the supposed deed of sale. However, both
parties entered into a compromise agreement. When Ozai died, his adopted daughter, Azula, substituted him in the compromise
agreement. When Azula also died, her heirs filed an action for annulment of the donation on theground that the conveyance in
favor of Zuko impaired the legitime of Thea. Was the donation made by Ozai in favor of Zuko inofficious and should it,
therefore, be reduced?
ANSWER: No. A claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. What is brought to collation is not the donated property
itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation that
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of
the heir of the donee.
Case citation: Eloy Imperial Vs. CA & Cesar Villalon, etc., et al - G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999
Period of reimbursement under Article 1008
PROBLEM: A parcel of residential land was left behind by Z. Notarized Extra Judicial Settlement among heirs A, B, C, D, E, F,
G, H, and I partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square
meters. The heirs A, B, C, and D, however, did not sign the document. Only E, F, G, H, and I signed it. An Extra Judicial
Settlement among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the
same sharing. Once more, only E, F, G, H, and I signed the document and their respective shares were sold to X. B came to
know of the Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs with Sale only when the original house built on the lot was being
demolished. B also claimed that she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs involving the same
property had been published. After knowing of the sale to petitioner X, B tried to redeem the property but the offer was
refused. A filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot against X.
QUESTION: Can B deemed constructively notified pursuant to Art.1088 of the Civil Code and bound, regardless of their failure
to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has
been duly published?
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ANSWER: No. Art.1088 provides, Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all
of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do
so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the
vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or
contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up
his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of
redemption, the method of notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law. This proceeds from the
very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the
presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in
the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This will remove all uncertainty
as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. As a
result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation.
Considering, therefore, that respondents co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to
allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the formers obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
Case Citation: Joseph Cua vs. Gloria Vargas et al., G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006
III)
Legal or Intestate Succession
Intestate succession
PROBLEM: Piolo was married with no children during the duration of their marriage. Due to old age, Piolo died in 1952. Angel
immediately instituted an instestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate, in which she was appointed as an administrator.
Angel soon died, so her neice (Angela) instituted a petition for the administration of the intestate estate in 1955, got appointed
as administratrix and took possession of the properties; then later registered the same in her name. In 1985, Pablo, the nephew
of Piolo filed for Letters of Administration on Piolos intestate estate. In 1987, after learning of the settlement of the intestate
proceeding instituted by Angela, a complaint against the latter for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property were instituted by Pablo. He alleged that Angel, as administratrix of the estate of Piolo, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the
real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Piolo. Angela contends among others that they dont have any cause of
action because the titles to the lots in question were legally transferred to the name of the late Angel since 1952 when the
surviving heirs of Piolo sold their rights over the said properties to Angel.
Question: Is the contention meritorious?
ANSWER: No, the contention is not meritorious. Articles 995 and 1001 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
In the present case, Piolo left no will at the time of his death, his estate was to be settled in accordance with the rules on legal
or intestate succession. Pablo being a nephew of Piolo, is among of those listed under Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil
Code. Thus, as Piolos heir, Pablo has a right to inherit together with Angel, from Piolos estate.
Case citation: Erlinda Pilapil, et al. vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, et al. - G.R. No. 150175. March 10, 2006
171

Legal Heirs
PROBLEM: Spouses D and M owned several parcels of land. Upon their death, their 11 children inherited the properties. One of
the lands inherited was a free patent. Pursuant to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the property was inherited by DA
and was registered in his name. DA and his wife CD borrowed money from XYZ bank and mortgaged the subject lot. Upon
failure to pay the loan, it was extrajudicially foreclosed with the bank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and
was registered. DA died and was succeeded by his surviving spouse and children. The latter filed a complaint for repurchase
against the bank under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141.
QUESTION: Are CD and their children considered as DAs legal heirs?
ANSWER: Yes, CD and their children are DAs legal heirs.
The term legal heirs is used in Section 119 of CA 141 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who
is called to succession either by a provision of the will or by operation of law. They include both testate and intestate heirs. They
are not necessarily compulsory heirs.
In the case at bar, DAs wife and children are his legal heirs. Under the rules on intestacy, they are entitled to succeed
to the estate of DA. They inherited the property from DA, husband of CD and father of their children. DA in turn inherited it
from his father. CD as a daughter-in-law of the patentees can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the
land.
Case citation: Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Ella Gagarani Isagani, Adrian, Nathaniel, Nieva, Jonathan, Dionisio,
Florence, and Jeremias, all surnamed Asok, G.R. 172248 September 17, 2008
Share of surviving spouse and collateral relative (sister) in intestate succession

PROBLEM: Joy Biscayda died intestate, she was survived by Kristelio Biscayda, her husband, and her sister Cecilia Tubal.
Suppose Joy Biscayda left a 400 sq meter lot in Kamagayan, Cebu City, How much shall the heirs receive?
QUESTION: Suppose Kristelio, for the past 30 yrs has been utilizing the whole property while Cecilia didnt utilize her share,
may Kristelio acquire the whole property through acquisitive prescription?
ANSWER: Kristelio and Cecilio Tubal will each receive half of the property. Art. 1001 provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Kristelio cannot acquire the whole property through acquisitive prescription. To reiterate, the herein parties are co-owners of the
property subject of the controversy. Surely, in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly
shown that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive
ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run.
In order that his possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following requisites
must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3)
that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Case citation: PEDRO GENEROSA, - versus -PACITA PRANGAN-VALERA, G.R. No. 166521 August 31, 2006
IV)
Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession
Contracts entered into by predecessors-in-interest

PROBLEM: In 1976, Roy executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over his lot in favor of Bella. However, the latter failed to register
the deed because she did not have enough money to pay for the registration fees. After 7 years, Roy suffered from an illness
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which caused his death. Unknown to Bella, the heirs of Roy subsequently executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and
adjudicated the lot among themselves.
Bella instituted an action for reconveyance claiming that she is the absolute owner of the lot due to the Deed of Sale executed
by Roy during his lifetime.
QUESTION: Is Bella's contention tenable?
ANSWER: Yes. Bella's contention is tenable. Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest. As
heirs of Roy, they are bound by the contract of sale that Roy executed in favor of Bella. Having been sold already to Bella, the
property no longer formed part of Roy's estate which the heirs could have inherited. The deed of extrajudicial settlement that
the heirs executed over the lot is, therefore, void, since the property subject thereof did not become part of Roy's estate.
Case citation: Naranja, et. al. vs. CA (G.R. No. 160132; April 17, 2009
Remedies of Creditors against Estate
PROBLEM: Sps. X and Y obtained a loan from ABC Banking Corporation in the amount of P350, 000.00 with interest, and
secured by a real estate mortgage over several properties. The debt was due and demandable within a period of one year. Two
years later X died. During the probate proceedings over his estate, ABC Banking Corp. notified the probate court of the money
claim it has against X. When the probate proceedings were terminated the claim of ABC was not yet satisfied due to its
certification that Xs account was undergoing a restructuring. Thus, the mortgaged properties were extra-judicially foreclosed
thereafter, and a deficiency claim was filed by ABC. Xs heirs contested the deficiency claim by arguing that ABC is barred from
doing so.
QUESTION: Can ABC still recover the deficiency against Xs estate?
ANSWER: No, ABC can no longer recover the deficiency against the estate of X.
The law provides that a secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his
indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely
on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file
a claim for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others.
In the case at bar, ABC sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps. X and Y
and, therefore, availed of the third option. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial
foreclosure ABC is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount.
Case Citation: Heirs Of The Late Spouses Fla Viano Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corporation GR 171206, September 23 2013
Name/Class: SANTIAGO, JANRY NINO Regular Class
Necessity of partition to be contained in a public instrument
QUESTION: Must a partition, to be valid, be contained in a public instrument?
ANSWER: A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument. The execution of a deed of extrajudicial settlement
of an estate reflects the intention to physically divide a property. The fact that a document is not notarized is no hindrance to its
effectivity. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document to be valid between the parties.
Case Citation: MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU
CITY,and LICERIO P. NIQUE. G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998

Requisites for Partition by act inter vivos
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QUESTION: In the rules of Succession whereby the testator partitioned his property by act inter vivos, is there any formalities
required by law?
ANSWER: No. The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the
general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. . . .
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no
formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require
the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a
donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been
made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical
determination of the part to be given to each heir.Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament,
but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and
does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will
of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.
Case citation: J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG and
HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents., G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005.

Appointment of administrator
Question: Can a court appoint a co-administrator in the estate proceeding?

ANSWER: Yes, the court can appoint a co-administrator in the estate proceeding. The practice of appointing co-administrators
in estate proceedings is not prohibited. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators
has been upheld for the following reasons:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
To have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;
Where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estate of the deceased;
Where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;
To have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of
the estate; and
When a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is
not alone in the administration.
Note: In this case, the court held that:
Going over all the arguments of the parties, after hearing has been set relative thereto, this Court has
observed that indeed the judicial administrator had not submitted to the Court any report about the Estate
under his administration except those involving the cases he filed and/or intervened in other branches. This
may be due to his being inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to remove him from the
administration of the Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof. However, considering that the Intervenor is
claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who claims to have enormous knowledge of the businesses
and properties of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of this Court that it will be very beneficial to the
Estate if he be appointed co-administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of
the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to the alleged enormous properties/businesses and to
bring them all to the decedents Estate pending before this Court.
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In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed
private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time
attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his administration.
Case citation: Uy vs Court of Appeals - G.R. No. 167979. March 16, 2006
Authority of an Encargado
PROBLEM: FELIPE BUENAVENTURA who was married twice, died intestate. One of his children , Anacoreta Francisco was
appointed as administratix. She, in turn,appointed her son,Michael Francisco,as her "encargado". Anacoreta left for the United
States.
In a Project of Partition,approved by the RTC, Lot 143 was designated to one of the heirs,Nicasia Buenaventura. However,
Michael Francisco objected to the partition on the ground that it was incomplete and erroneous. His objection was given due
course by the Court.
On a conference for the partition, being a member of the Joint Commissioners, Michael Francisco manifested that the share of
Nicasia Buenaventura in Lot 143 be swapped with Lot 789. A revised Project of Partition was then submitted.
Upon learning of the swapping, Nicasia vehemently denied having known nor authorized Michael to swap her lot.
Question: Can an heir be bound with the recommendation of an "encargado"?
ANSWER: No. Francisco was merely the "encargado" of the Administratix, a member of the Joint Commissioners tasked to
effect a physical partition of the estate. Any recommendation made in such capacity is still subject to the action of the court
after due notice to the heirs; unless and until all the parties are notified of any report/recommendation, thereafter duly heard by
the Court,the heirs cannot thereby be bound.
Case citation: Intestate Estate of the late Felipe Buenaventura vs. Nicasia Buenaventura. - G.R. No. 131614. June 8, 2006.
Removal of an Administrator may be done at the discretion of Probate Court
PROBLEM: A certain Johny Cage died intestate leaving some heirs. In the intestate proceeding, Liu Kang was appointed as the
administrator of the deceased. While the Special Proceeding was pending, the administrator was indicted and convicted to a
charge of estafa through falsification of public document with respect to the subject will.
Thereafter, Raiden, the other co-administrator, sold to subject property to LAW Corporation. Upon learning this, Liu Kang on
behalf of the estate filed a civil case for Nullification of the sale, but the probate court in the special proceeding removed him. In
this aspect, the co-administrator and LAW Corporation filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of legal capacity, thus,
leading to the dismissal of the case.
Liu Kang on the other hand argued such action is premature for the criminal case is still on appeal.
QUESTION: Can the administrators civil case be dismissed even if the special proceeding case is still pending?
ANSWER: Yes, the civil case initiated by the administrator may be dismissed because of the removal by the probate court of
his authority to act on behalf of the estate of the deceased. An administrator derives his power or authority to represent the
estate of deceased from his appointment by the probate court.
A final conviction of the crime involving moral turpitude is not necessary before an administrator can be removed. He must raise
that matter in his appeal in the intestate proceeding.
Case Citation: OBANDO vs. FIGUERAS, G.R. No. 134854. January 18, 2000
Oral partition
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PROBLEM: Spouses X and Y died intestate. They were survived by the following heirs: A,B, C, D, E & F. The estate located in
Cagayan de Oro City was equally divided among the heirs. At the time of the actual partition, F had already died. His share was
given to his only son, G. Twenty two years later, A & B found out that Lot 5872 was not included in the inventory and project of
partition. A & B claimed that an oral partition was entered into by all heirs soon after the death of their parents. To set things
right, A & B prepared a quitclaim to confirm the alleged oral agreement. C, E and G signed a notarized quitclaim in favor of A
& B. Six years after the execution of the quitclaim, C, E, G and H, who is the son of D found out that Lot 5872 was still under X
& Ys name and demanded for the distribution and delivery to the heirs. G & H disputed the voluntariness of their consent or
the consent of their predecessors-in-interest to the quitclaims that they signed. Thus A & B filed an action for Quieting of Title.
As the judge , will you consider Lot 5872 still common property?
ANSWER: No. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased. A & Bs ownership over said lot was
acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses heirs. That oral agreement was confirmed by the
notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs. An oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. Moreover, even
the requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where
no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but
merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. Finally, said notarized quitclaims signed by the
heirs in favor of petitioners are not vitiated by fraud. Hence, they are valid.
Case citation: Josefa Maestrado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. - G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000.
Partition inter vivos
PROBLEM: David Fuentebella died intestate leaving as heirs his four children, Aurora, Clark, Alfonso and Selma. The youngest
child Selma thereafter filed a complaint with the RTC of Cavite against Spouses Aurora and Daniel Cruz, for the delivery of her
inheritance share. She claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late David. She further
alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister
were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American
citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession.
QUESTION: Is the alleged partition of David Fuentebella of his property valid? If you are the Judge, will you grant the delivery
of the inheritance share?
ANSWER: Yes, the partition was valid.
It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080
of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
No, I will not grant the delivery of the inheritance share since all of the heirs concerned were not impleaded.
In the present case, unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance
share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the
institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective
legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
Case citation: Spouses Zaragoza vs. CA - G.R. No. 106401, September 29, 2000
Indispensable parties to be impleaded in partition
PROBLEM: Spouses A and B were the owners of 3 parcels of land; they died intestate. They have a daughter C who died
intestate. They were survived by their daughter D, and their grandchildren. A Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim
covering the lots was executed by their grandchildren all surnamed E. However, the other grandchildren all surnamed F, filed a
complaint to annul the said Deed.
The plaintiffs alleged that the deed was tainted with fraud because it included persons who were not heirs of the spouses A & B.
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They denied the defendants allegation that they were Cs descendants, the latter having died single at the age of 25 and
without issue. The defendants specifically denied that there was fraud or undue pressure in the execution of the questioned
deed. They maintained that they were the direct descendants of the spouses A & B, and successors-in-interest of C from whom
they derived their rights. According to them, long before she died, their grandmother C married G. This matrimonial union
begot their mother.
QUESTION: If you are the judge, how will you decide the case?
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I will grant the petition on the sole ground that the respondents, who were the plaintiffs in the
trial court, failed to implead indispensable parties.
This is fatal to the complaint. All heirs of the deceased are indispensable parties to the respondents action to nullify the deed
and the partition of the subject property among the signatories therein. All the parties to the deed are, likewise, indispensable
parties.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties-in-interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Case citation: G.R. No. 161955. August 31, 2005 CELEDONIO MOLDES, ROSITA MOLDES and CAROLINA CEDIA, vs. TIBURCIO
VILLANUEVA, APOLONIO VILLANUEVA, MANUEL VILLANUEVA, MARIANO DULLAVIN, RONALDO DULLAVIN and TEODORA
DULLAVIN,
Unregistered Deed of Partition
PROBLEM: One Jose Padwa had three (3) children, namely, Mariano, Aniceto, and Roberta. He died intestate. His estate
included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land. During the lifetime of Jose, his half-brother, Feliciano Padwa, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of the said lot. When Feliciano died, his son, Pepe, continued
living in the house together with his eight children. Eventually, the heirs of Jose Padwa entered into an extra-judicial
partition(private document) of his estate without having registered at Registry of Deeds. Both Mariano and Roberta died without
issue and both were represented by their daughters, Maria and Remy, respectively. When Anecito died, his daughter Juanita
succeeded to his right of the said lot. Juanita then sold to Ernie Pajes, the right of his father, Aniceto, as co-owner of the lot.
The same right executed by Maria to sell the co-ownership right of his father, Mariano.
Thereafter, Ernie Pajes demanded that spouses Pepe vacate the northern portion of the said lot so his family can utilize the said
area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but
all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
Hence, a complaint for ejectment filed in the Municipal Trial Court against Spouses Pepe. Few days after the instant filing of the
complaint, Maria has decided to donate the lot in questioned to the Spouses Pepe as if she did not recognized the validity of the
Deed of Partition, of which the same argument has used by the defendants of the instant case filed while invoking of the Deed
of Donation as duly executed in their favor.
Question: Is the contention of the Defendants tenable? If you are the Judge, how will you decide the case?
ANSWER: The contention of the Defendants is not tenable. The extrajudicial partition of the estate among heirs made is valid,
albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in
order to be valid. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules ]The partition of
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein. Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of
title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.The
extrajudicial partition of Jose Padwa estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, and validly transferred their ownership
Case Citation: Verona Kilario & Ricardo Kilario vs. CA and Silverion Pada, G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000
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Allowance of widowed spouse
PROBLEM: A criminal case for falsification of marriage was filed by the children of 1st marriage against the surviving spouse
by 2nd marrriage of the decedent. Allegation that the widow is a common law wife, thus not entitled to widow allowance before
partition of estate.
QUESTION: Is the contention valid?
ANSWER: No, the contention is not valid.
Under Rule 83, Sec. 3. of Rules of Court. The allowance of widow and minor or incapacitated children of deceased person,
during the settlement of estate, shall receive therefrom,under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Article 188 of the Civil Code provides from the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to
the children.
Until the marriage is publicly declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and is entitled to received the widow
allowance to be taken from the estate of her late husband.
Case Citation: Heirs of Jose Sy Bang vs Rolando Sy GR. No. 114217
Name/Class: SENIDO, FATIMA NENA - Regular Class
Rescission and Nullity of Partition
PROBLEM: X applied for petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in Xs favor over a parcel of land. After her death in
1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Xs children, namely Q, R, S, and
T. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war.
Subsequently, all the heirs of Q, R, S, and T executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 4, 1965, conveying the subject parcel of land to AB Realty. The deed was registered with the Register of Deeds under Act
No. 3344 (the law governing registration for unregistered land), and since then, AB Realty had been paying real property taxes
on said property.
After the issuance of a reconstituted title, AB Realty sent notices to the heirs of Q, R, S, and T to vacate the property. The heirs
then filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and
damages, alleging that the extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale is a fraud and is null and void ab
initio because not all the co-owners of subject property affixed their signature on said document and some of the co-owners
who supposedly signed said document had been dead at the time of the execution.
QUESTION: If there was preterition of the compulsory heirs in the foregoing facts but the lower courts found no fraud in its
execution, should the partition with sale be rescinded? Rule on the matter.
ANSWER: No. the partition should not be rescinded.
Under Art. 1104 of the Civil Code, a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless
it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately
obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him.
In the present case, even if there was preterition, the partition with sale should not be rescinded. The lower courts found there
was no fraud in the partition. The remedy would be to pay or recompense the heir whose share was omitted. The partition with
sale may only be rescinded when bad or fraud is present.
The ponencia of this case did not discuss Article 1104 of the Civil Code as there was no rescission to apply said law.
With regard to petitioners argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating that a partition made with
preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say that the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to
the parties who participated in the execution of the same. As discussed above, what was conveyed to petitioner was ownership
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over the shares of the heirs who executed the subject document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code,
imposed the obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying
who, having brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the reconveyance of their share in the land
in dispute.
Article 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that
there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to
the person omitted the share which belongs to him.
Case citation: Aznar Brothers Realty Company Vs. Laurencio Aying, et al., G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005
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OBLIGATIONS
I)
Elements of an Obligation
Fraud
PROBLEM: A proposed to B to enter into As shipping corporation. A tells B he is giving him shares worth P1 Million and he is
going to make B a Director.
A tells B they need a new vessel for the business, and they therefore, need a loan. They could secure a loan from DBP Bank
with the vessel brought to have a first mortgage with DBP. B then signed a promissory note in favor of the DBP, wherein he
bound himself to jointly and severally pay DBP the amount of the mortgage loan.
Although B had been made a stockholder and director of the corporation, he only attended one meeting of the board. Other
than that, he had never been notified of another meeting of the board of directors. He had been excluded deliberately from
participating in the affairs of the corporation and had never been compensated as a director and stockholder.
Later, the vessel was sold in an adequate amount but according to B, it was sold with double the amount the next day. He
wrote a letter to A saying that he was severing all ties and terminating his involvement with shipping business. He alleged that
he did not voluntarily sign the promissory note in favor of DBP because A employed fraud or deceit to secure Bs involvement in
the company. Did A commit any fraud? If yes, will it affect the promissory note made by B in favor of DBP?
ANSWER: Yes, A committed a fraudincidental fraud or dolo incidente. This kind of fraud will not affect the promissory note
made by B in favor of DBP. Such promissory note would remain valid.
Article 1338 of the Civil Code defined fraud as when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties,
the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. There are two types of fraud
contemplated in the performance of contracts: dolo incidente or incidental fraud and dolo causante or fraud serious enough to
render a contract voidable. The effects of dolo causante are the nullity of the contract and the indemnification of damages,
while dolo incidente merely obliges the person employing it to pay damages.
In the present case, there was no dolo causante or fraud used to obtain the Bs consent to enter into the contract. However, in
refusing to allow B to participate in the management of the business, A was liable for the commission of incidental fraud. In
Geraldez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108253, February 23, 1994, 230 SCRA 320) the Court defined incidental fraud as "those
which are not serious in character and without which the other party would still have entered into the contract."
Case citation: Tankeh vs. Development Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 171428 November 11, 2013
Simulated Contracts
QUESTION: May the court determine in a civil case the heirs of the decedent and not in an intestate proceeding?
ANSWER: As stated in the case.
As a general Rule: yes but by way of exception, It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, not in an independent civil action.
However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only
if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring
administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,
and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.
Question: Jacques Trap was among many co-heirs of a property, he was made to sign a document and made to believe that
the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. However, it turned out that what he signed was an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and a deed of absolute sale. are the contracts valid?
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ANSWER: As stated in this case. The contracts are absolutely simulated, since Jacques strap had no intention to dispose of the
property. The true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent, it was meant
to facilitated the facilitating of the title and not to transfer the ownership. No. Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious
contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it.
The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal
effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void,
and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract.
Question: If Jacques Strap sold the co-owned property, without authority from the other co-owners, to Hugh Jass, what are
the legal effects of the sale?
ANSWER: As held in this case. Jacques strap did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot
portion. What he could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. mao ra ni gi reasoning
sa court.
Case Citation: AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A.
OROSCO vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, G.R. No.
204029 June 4, 2014
Contract as law between the parties
PROBLEM: Naiza Meniano (Naimie) filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against respondents Ruby
Sabanal Foods (Phils.), Inc. (RSFPI) and/or Mara Odessa SIlva.
While her appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, she and respondents entered into a compromise agreement, whereby she
was paid P40,000,000 in addition to the P14,252,192.12 earlier paid to her. She later filed a motion to dismiss/withdraw case
but before it could be acted upon, a motion for intervention to protect attorneys rights was filed by Brian Joel Salise Jr. and
Raffy Lim Yee of Longos Salise Yee and Associates (LSYA), through its Of counsel, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Hector del Bando. The motion sought, among others, that both Naimie and RSFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and
severally the intervenors contingent fees.
In opposing the motion, Naimie claimed that their dismissal was based on a justifiable cause because the law firm is merely
involved in preparation and submission of pleadings and other papers incidental to the cases or litigations in court. Does this
contention find merit?
ANSWER: No, the contention is not correct. In the Case of Malvar vs. Kraft Foods the Court ruled that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigations in court but embraced also the preparation of pleadings and other papers incidental
to the cases or litigations as well as the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of the clients. In the absence of
the lawyers fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a
justifiable reason. Here, Naimie not only downplayed the worth of the intervenors legal service to her but also attempted to
camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most
importantly, fell short of being justifiable.
The stipulations of the written agreement between Naimie and the intervenors, not being contrary to law, morals, public policy,
public order or good customs, were valid and binding on her. They expressly gave rise to the right of the intervenor to demand
compensation.
In a word, she could not simply walk away from her contractual obligations toward the Intervenor, for Article 1159 of the Civil
Code provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in
good faith.
Case citation: Czarina T. Malvar vs. Kraft Food Phils., Inc. and/or Kraft Foods International, G.R. No. 183952, Sept. 9, 2013
II)
Different Kinds of Prestations

181
Interest Rates
PROBLEM: X approached and asked Y for a loan that she would use to repurchase her property in Cebu City which was
foreclosed by the Farmers Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Farmers Savings). To secure the loan, X was required to execute a real
estate mortgage, a promissory note and a deed of sale. In the said promissory note, it was agreed that the monthly interest
would be 5% per month. However, X defaulted in her obligation under the promissory note. All the postdated checks which she
had issued to pay for the interests were dishonored. This development prompted Y to send a demand letter with a
corresponding statement of account. Unfortunately, the demand fell on deaf ears which constrained Y to file a complaint for
sum of money with damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment on the ground that indeed, with the suspension
of the Usury Law and the removal of interest ceiling, the parties are free to stipulate the interest rates to be imposed on
monetary obligations. On the other hand, X argued that the stipulated interest was unconscionable as it would amount to 60%
per annum. If you were the judge, how would you rule in this issue?
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I would rule in favor of X. The Law provides that stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are
unconscionable and the Court is allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. In exercising this vested power to determine
what is iniquitous and unconscionable, the Court must consider the circumstances of each case. What may be iniquitous and
unconscionable in one case, may be just in another. With the suspension of the Usury Law and the removal of interest ceiling,
the parties are free to stipulate the interest rates to be imposed on monetary obligations. However, while the Supreme Court
recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts, this rule is not absolute.
In the problem given, the interest rate of 5% per month, which when summed up would reach 60% per annum, was null and
void for being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, contrary to morals, and the law. Thus, the interest rate of
5% per month which was the basis in computing Xs obligation was reduced to 6% per annum.
Case Citation: FLORPINA BENAVIDEZ VS. NESTOR SALVADOR, G.R. NO. 173331, DECEMBER 11, 2013
Name/Class: HAMLIG, NONIE LUZ Regular Class
Force Majeure
PROBLEM: In 1990, Char Baki Cascast (CBC) obtained several loans from Harhar Bank (HB). In order to settle their loan
obligations, CBC offered the sale of its remaining asset-the srap metal. In 2002, Ay Sus Corporation (ASC) expressed interest in
buying the scrap metal. During the negotiations, Atty. So Saw, a member of HBs legal department, acted as the latters agent.
Eventually, with the conformity of HB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was drawn between CBC and ASC, under which the
latter obligated itself to purchase the scrap metal for a total consideration of P34,000,000.00.
Unfortunately, ASC reneged on all its obligations under the MOA. As a result, CBC was not able to pay its obligation to HB. CBC
asseverated that their failure to pay their outstanding loan obligations to HB must be considered as force majeure and since HB
was the party that accepted the terms and conditions of payment proposed by ASC, CBC must therefore be deemed to have
settled their obligations to HB.
Is the contention of CBC correct?
ANSWER: No, the contention of CBC is not correct.
The MOA have no any relevance to the performance of CBCs obligations to HB. The MoA is a sale of assets contract, while
CBCs obligations to HB arose from various loan transactions. More importantly, ASC breach of its obligations to CBC arising
from the MoA cannot be classified as a fortuitous event under jurisprudential formulation. Fortuitous events by definition are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is
not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be
impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor
must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.
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In this case, neither has it been shown that said occurrence rendered it impossible for CBC to pay their loan obligations to HBC
and thus, negates the formers force majeure theory altogether.
Case citation: Metro Concast Steel Corporation, et al vs. Allied Bank Corporation, GR No. 177921, December 4, 2013
III)
Classification of Obligations
Solidary Obligation
PROBLEM: A, B, and C contracted a loan from C in the amount of Php 300,000 with annual interest of 4% per annum. A
certain parcel of land was mortgaged to cover as a security. The contract provides:
All the debtors, for a single loan, bind themselves to cede, transfer, and convey by way of real estate mortgage all their rights,
interest and participation in the subject parcel of land including the improvements thereon in favor of the plaintiff and that
should they fail to perform their obligation the mortgage will be foreclosed
A died in 203. When the loan became due, the debtors defaulted prompting the mortgagee to institute foreclosure proceeding.
In the course of the proceeding, the debtors admitted that a loan was obtained among them. The court ruled that their
obligation is solidary.
Question: Is the obligation solidary?
ANSWER: No, the obligation is not solidary, but joint. Under the law, when there is a concurrence of two or more debtors
under a single obligation, the obligation is presumed to be joint. Further for it to be considered as solidary, it must be made
expressly by law, or by the nature of the obligation itself.
In the instant case, the testimony of debtors admitting that they contracted a loan established only the existence of the loan.
Hence, there being no express term of solidarity, the presumption of joint liability will apply. It is incumbent upon the party
alleging to prove otherwise with a preponderance of evidence that obligation under the loan contract is indeed joint and several,
or solidary.
Case Citation: Spouses Berot vs Siapno, G.R. No. 188944. July 9, 2014.
Option Contracts
PROBLEM: Roberto and Lourdes executed a Contract of Lease over a parcel of land for a period of three years. During the
effectivity of the lease, Lourdes sent a letter to Roberto where she offered to sell to the latter subject parcel of land. She
pegged the price at P37,541,000.00 and gave him two years from January 2, 1995 to decide on the said offer.
More than four months after the expiration of the Contract of Lease, Lourdes sold subject parcel of land to her only child,
Catalina Suarez-De Leon, her son-in-law Wilfredo De Leon, and her two grandsons, Miguel Luis S. De Leon and Rommel S. De
Leon (the De Leons), for a total consideration of onlyP2,750,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the
parties. TCT No. 177986 was then issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the De Leons.
Roberto was then notified to vacate the leased premises, but he refused to vacate. Thus, a complaint of unlawful detainer was
filed against him. Roberto claims that Lourdes violated his right to buy subject property under the principle of "right of first
refusal" by not giving him "notice" and the opportunity to buy the property under the same terms and conditions or specifically
based on the much lower price paid by the De Leons.
On the other hand, respondents posit that this case is not covered by the principle of "right of first refusal" but an unaccepted
unilateral promise to sell or, at best, a contract of option which was not perfected. The letter of Lourdes to Roberto clearly
embodies an option contract as it grants the latter only two years to exercise the option to buy the subject property at a price
certain of P37,541,000.00. As an option contract, the said letter would have been binding upon Lourdes without need of any
consideration, had Roberto accepted the offer. But in this case there was no acceptance made neither was there a distinct
consideration for the option contract. If you were the judge how would you decide on the case?
ANSWER: I would decide in favor of Lourdes. The case involves an option contract and not a contract of a right of first refusal.
183
The law provides that an option contract is an agreement in writing to give a person the option to purchase property within a
given time at a named price is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell. It is simply a contract by which the owner of property
agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. Further, when
the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by
communicating such withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon a consideration, as something paid or promised.
On the other hand, right of first refusal while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would
be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on
terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up.
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no right of first refusal, rather an option contract but the same was not perfected
for want of consideration.
Case Citation: Roberto Tuazon vs. Lourdes Del Rosario Suarez, et al. - G.R. No. 168325
Action for Reconveyance vis-a-vis fraud
PROBLEM: Spouses Esteban and Eufemia died intestate leaving a parcel of land. Jose and Margarita, their children entered into
a compromise agreement dividing the land. Thereafter, On September 28, 1990 TCT No. T-12561 was issued in their names. On
August 18, 1999 Severino and Violeta filed their complaint for reconveyance claiming that that prior to his marriage to Eufemia,
Esteban was married to a certain Francisca; that Esteban and Francisca bore 2 children, Severino and Violeta; they are the heirs
of Esteban and Francisca; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over Jose and Margarita and that they aquired
the said property by fraud.
Jose and Margarita contend that Severino and Violeta are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for
reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly committed by Jose and Margarita,
arguing that under the law an action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which
period is reckoned from the discovery of the fraud. Are Jose and Margarita correct?
ANSWER: No, Jose and Margarita are not correct. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the date of
registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by Jose and Margarita on September 28, 1990, while Severino and Violeta
filed their complaint for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period has not yet
expired.
Case Citation: RAMON B. BRITO, SR., vs. SEVERINO D. DIANALA, VIOLETA DIANALA SALES, JOVITA DIANALA DEQUINTO,
ROSITA DIANALA, CONCHITA DIANALA and JOEL DEQUINTO, G.R. No. 171717 December 15, 2010
IV)
Sources of Obligations
Principle of Unjust Enrichment

PROBLEM: Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation organized under
Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized
under Philippine laws.
Respondent filed a claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which consists of unpaid
portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of P5,275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount
of P442,014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for overpayment in the amount of P2,512,997.96.
On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power
and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation for the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase
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Order Nos. 4501200300-000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a
total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation orders in the Project. In
connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable against respondent.
Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total
amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read 2003], respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to
petitioner demanding for the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back
charges in the amount of P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as material
back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their
dispute.
On February 22, 2006, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision affirming the CIAC ruling that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient proof that the parties had an agreement regarding charges for respondent's use of the manlift where petitioner argues
that the existence of unjust enrichment on the part of the respondent. As to the other charges for materials, the CA held that
the evidence on record amply supports the CIAC findings. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said ruling, but the same was
denied.
Question: Whether or not the Principle of Unjust Enrichment is applicable in this case.
ANSWER: No. Petitioner's reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment is likewise misplaced. The ruling of the Court in
University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc. is highly instructive, thus:
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it
must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly
received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the
person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be
entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a
theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been
enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and
(4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's free use of the manlift was
without legal ground based on the provisions of their contract. Thus, the third requisite, i.e., that the enrichment of respondent
is without just or legal ground, is missing. In addition, petitioner's claim is based on contract, hence, the fourth requisite that
the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict is also absent. Clearly, the principle
of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case.
Case Citation: Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. vs. RRN Incorporated G.R. No. 172525, October 20, 2010
V)
Nature and Effect of Obligations
Presumption of payment (installments)

PROBLEM: In 2004, Ben obtained a loan from RCBC bank and secured it with a mortgage over his townhouse unit. He agreed
to pay a fixed monthly payment for five years. For this purpose, he opened an account with RCBC from which the latter was to
deduct the monthly amortizations. In 2009, Ben received a Notice of Public Auction of the mortgaged townhouse unit. A month
after, a public auction sale was then conducted where RCBC emerged as the highest bidder.
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Ben claims that he has no unpaid payments as evidenced by the recent Amortization schedule issued to him by RCBC that he no
longer had an unpaid balance on his loan and that his account balance is sufficient to cover the installments that became due.
RCBC contended that Ben was in default at that time of the foreclosure of the mortgage. The bank points out that respondent
made payments until 2010, but these payments were not withdrawn by the bank and credited to respondents loan payments
but remained in his account.
Were there installments left unpaid that would warrant the foreclosure and auction sale of Ben's mortgaged property?
ANSWER: Ben has no unpaid installments and was not in default as would warrant the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale
of the property.
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the interest, shall give rise to
the presumption that the said interest has been paid. The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as
to prior installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been paid.
Bens account balance indicate that RCBC continued to receive his payments even after it made demands for him to pay his past
due accounts, and even after the auction sale. RCBC cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the
deposits were "not withdrawn." It is not respondents fault that RCBC did not withdraw the money he deposited. His obligation
under the mortgage agreement was to deposit his payment in the savings account he had opened for that purpose, in order
that RCBC may debit the amount of his monthly liabilities therefrom. He complied with his part of the agreement.
Case citation: RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs. BUENAVENTURA G.R. No. 176479; October 6, 2010)
VI)
Kinds of Civil Obligations
Rescission under Article 1191

PROBLEM: Mr. T agreed to buy a property owned by Mr. P, a relative, for installments. Mr. T begins to pay his obligations. After
several years, Mr. T transferred the subject property in his name despite non-payment of the full price thereof, without Mr. Ps
consent. Can Mr. P rescind the contract?
ANSWER: Yes, Mr. P can rescind the contract. Under Article 1191, the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones,
in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
As a general rule, "rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as
are substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement.
In the case at bar, Mr. Ts act of transferring the title to the subject land in his name, without the knowledge and consent of Mr.
P and despite non-payment of the full price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of the contract to sell.
The main object or purpose of a seller in entering into a contract to sell is to protect himself against a buyer who intends to buy
the property in installments by withholding ownership over the property until the buyer effects full payment therefor. As a result,
the sellers obligation to convey and the buyers right toconveyance of the property arise only upon full payment of the price.
Thus, a buyer who willfully contravenes this fundamental object or purpose of the contract, by covertly transferring the
ownership of the property in his name at a time when the full purchase price has yet to be paid, commits a substantial and
fundamental breach which entitles the seller to rescission of the contract.
Case citation: Sps. Delfin O. Tumibay and Aurora T. Tumibay-deceased; Grace Julie Ann Tumibay Manuel, Legal representative
Vs. Sps. Melvin A. Lopez and Rowena Gay T. Visitacion - G.R. No. 171692. June 3, 2013.
Rescission on Reciprocal Obligations
PROBLEM: On July 16, 1980, The Plaza, Inc. (The Plaza), a corporation engaged in the restaurant business, for the
construction of a restaurant building for the price ofP7,600,000.00. Thereafter, Rhogen commenced construction of the
restaurant building. However, just two months after commencement of the project, construction works were ordered stopped
by the local building official and the building permit subsequently revoked on account of several violations of the National
Building Code and other regulations of the municipal authorities.
186
Rhogen sent Progress Billing No. 1 and demanded payment from The Plaza in the net amount of P473,554.06 for the work it
had accomplished from July 28, 1980 until the date they stop the construction. The Plaza, however, failed to pay the said
amount. On January 9, 1981, Rhogen informed The Plaza that he is terminating their contract accusing Plaza of not cooperating
with Rhogen in solving the problem concerning the revocation of the building permits. Thereafter, The Plaza filed a case against
Rhogen for breach of contract.
Question: Does Rhogen has the power to rescind the contract invoking Art 1191 on reciprocal obligations?
ANSWER: No, Rhogen do not have the power to rescind the contract. The law provides that, reciprocal obligations are those
which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of
one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one
is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. Respondent The Plaza predicated its action on Article 1191 of
the Civil Code, which provides for the remedy of "rescission" or more properly resolution, a principal action based on breach of
faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated in the provision is the obligors
failure to comply with an existing obligation. Thus, the power to rescind is given only to the injured party. The injured party is
the party who has faithfully fulfilled his obligation or is ready and willing to perform his obligation.
Rhogens may not justify termination of the contract upon grounds of non-payment of progress billing and uncooperative
attitude of respondent The Plaza and its employees in rectifying the violations which were the basis for issuance of the stoppage
order. Having breached the contractual obligation it had expressly assumed, that is to comply with all laws, rules and
regulations of the local authorities, Rhogen was already at fault.
Case citation: Heirs of Ramon C. Gaite, et al. vs. The Plaza, Inc. and FGU Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 177685. January 26,
2011

Default
PROBLEM: Spouses Jose Go obtained a loan from PBcom in the amount of P80million evidenced by promissory note
embodying his commitment to pay within a ten year period. To secure the loan Go executed a pledge agreement covering
shares of stock of Ever Gotesco Resources and Holdings, Inc. The shares were valued at P70million. Two years later, the value
of such share plunged to less than P0.04 per share. Thus PBcom notified Go in writing that it was renouncing the pledge
agreements and later filed before the RTC a complaint for the sum of money alleging that Spouses Go defaulted on the
promissory notes. Consequently, the entire balance of the obligations of Go became immediately due and demandable. The
RTC ruled in favor of PBcom. Was the ruling proper?
ANSWER: The ruling was not proper. Article 1196 of the Civil code provides that whenever in an obligation with a period is
designated, it is presumed to have been established for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor. However, Article 1198
further provides that the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period when:
a.
b.
c.
After the obligation has been contracted, he become insolvent, unless he gives a guaranty or security for the debt;
He does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he promised;
By his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their establishment, and when through a fortuitous
event they disappear, unless he immediately gives new ones equally satisfactory.
The debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period.
The debtor attempts to abscond
d.
e.
f.
The law further provides that those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
In the instant case, absent of specific proof of default and the existence of prior demand, Spouses Go could not have lose the
benefit of the period. Thus, PBcom had no right to recover the entire balance of the loan before the end of the stipulated
period.
Case citation: Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Spouses Jose Go GR No. 175514 February 14, 2011
VII)
Joint and Solidary Obligation

187
Guaranty and Solidary Obligations

PROBLEM: J, a domestic corporation applied for a credit facility (Letter of Credit/Trust Receipt) with S Bank Corporation.
Petitioners L and A, Chairman and President of J Corporation, respectively, executed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement (CSA)
in favor of S Bank wherein they guaranteed the due and full payment and performance of Js guaranteed obligations under the
credit facility. The application was then approved S Bank soon discovered material inconsistencies in the financial statements of
J and concluded that the latter committed misrepresentation. While Js petition for rehabilitation was lodged with RTC, SBC
demanded for the full payment. Petitioners failed to comply with S Banks demand, hence, S Bank filed a complaint for sum of
money before another Regional Trial Court against J, L and A. The RTC however issued an order archiving the complaint against
all petitioners herein due to the pendency of the rehabilitation proceeding.
Questions:
1. Distinguish Surety from Guaranty.
2. Can they be proceeded independently from J?
ANSWER:
1) Art. 2047 of the New Civil Code provides:
By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the
principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.
If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of
this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship.
A guarantor is not compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and has
resorted to all legal remedies against the principal debtor while a Surety is solidarily liable with the principal debtor.
The suretys liability is not contingent upon the pursuit of whatever remedies the creditor may have against the
Principal Debtor or the collaterals/liens it may possess. If any of the Guaranteed Obligation is not paid or performed on
due date (at stated maturity or by acceleration), the Surety shall, without need for any notice, demand or any other act
or deed, immediately become liable therefor and the Surety shall pay and perform the same.
2)
ART. 1216 of the New Civil Code provides: The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some
or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against any one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected.
In fine, S Bank can pursue its claim against L and A despite the pendency of Js petition for rehabilitation. For, by the
CSA in favor of S Bank, it is the obligation of the sureties, who are therein stated to be solidary with J, to see to it that
Js debt is fully paid.
Case citation: JAPRL development Corp., Peter Rafael C. Limson and Jose Uy Arollado vs Security Bank Corporation GR 190107
June 6, 2011

VIII)
Extinguishment of Obligations
Recoupment
PROBLEM: Uruha Inc entered into a series of transactions with Hokage Group from January to April 2014 for the purchase of
six units of dump trucks.
On July 7, 2014, Uruha Inc ordered one unit of jackhammer from Hokage Group and a mixer on July 17, 2014. For the two
purchases, Uruha partially paid in cash and the balance through post-dated checks.
When Hokage Group presented the checks for payment, they learned that Uruha Inc had ordered the payment stopped. Uruha
Inc refused to pay the balance represented by the checks because Hokage Group refused to repair one of the dump trucks
previously ordered within the warranty period.
Because of such refusal, Hokage Group instituted an action for collection against Uruha Inc.
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Uruha Inc., by way of counterclaim, now demands the return of the purchase price for the defective dump truck less the
amount of their two checks, and reimbursement for repair expenses (recoupment).
Hokage Group is saying that this is not proper because the purchase of the jackhammer and mixer, covered by the two checks,
was an entirely different transaction from the sale of the dump trucks.
Questions:
A)
B)
If you were the judge, decide on the propriety of the recoupment.

Can Uruha Inc be allowed to offset its unpaid obligation under the two checks with the repair expenses they incurred
due to Hokage Group's refusal to repair the dump truck?
ANSWER: Recoupment is not proper. Paragraph (1) of Article 1599 of the Civil Code which provides for the remedy of
recoupment in diminution or extinction of price in case of breach of warranty by the seller should therefore be interpreted as
referring to the reduction or extinction of the price of the same item or unit sold and not to a different transaction or contract of
sale. This is more logical interpretation of the said article considering that it talks of breach of warranty with respect to a
particular item sold by the seller. Necessarily, therefore, the buyers remedy should relate to the same transaction and not to
another.
To be entitled to recoupment, therefore, the claim must arise from the same transaction, i.e., the purchase of the jackhammer
and the mixer and not to a previous contract involving the purchase of the dump truck.
Yes. Legal compensation takes place when the requirements set forth in Article 1278 and Article 1279 of the Civil Code are
present.
Article 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each
other."
Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consists in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and
also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated
in due time to the debtor.
Hence, the repair expenses should be set off against Uruha Inc.s unpaid obligation and the remaining balance is the amount
still owed to Hokage Group.
Case citation: FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS CORPORATION and BLUE STAR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, vs.
BAYANIHAN AUTOMOTIVE CORPORATION, GR 164985, January 15, 2014

Novation
PROBLEM: A awarded outdoor electrical and lighting works for a park to B with which it entered into a Construction Agreement
for the contract price. On receipt of As notice to proceed, B immediately began construction works. C subsequently took over
the management of the project.
A lost no time in informing B of the consequent termination of its services. Because the C refused to recognize As contract with
B. B filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a complaint, seeking to collect its remaining claims plus
interest from A and B.
In its answer, A denied liability, claiming that it merely processed and recommended payment of all the works done. The money
came from the projects Construction and Development Fund that A did not control. PNB acted as trustee of the funds. Since
these funds had all been turned over to C when the latter came into being, B should not address its claims to A. While B first
189

dealt with the A, it eventually dealt with the C before the construction company can finish the contracted works, evidencing
novation of parties. Is As contention tenable?
ANSWER: In novation, a subsequent obligation extinguishes a previous one through substitution either by changing the object
or principal conditions, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person into the rights of the
creditor. Novation requires (a) the existence of a previous valid obligation; (b) the agreement of all parties to the new
contract; (c) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) the validity of the new one.
There cannot be novation in this case since the proposed substituted parties did not agree to the As supposed assignment of its
obligations under the contract for the electrical and light works. The latter definitely and clearly rejected the As assignment of
its liability under that contract to the C. B tried to follow up its claims with the C, not because of any new contract it entered
into with the latter, but simply because A told it that the C would henceforth assume the As liability under its contract with B.
Case citation: Philippine Reclamation Authority (formerly known as the Public Estates Authority Vs. Romago, Inc./Romago, Inc.
Vs. Philippine Reclamation Authority, G.R.NOS.174665 AND 175221, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013
Consignation
PROBLEM: Winston owned a 1,811- sq. meter parcel of land located at corner of V. Rama Avenue and Velez St. Cebu City.
Sometime on 1999, the said property is leased to Bernard for a period of 10 years. On March 11, 2000 Winston sold the
property to Bianca. Thereafter, Bianca constructed a 5-storey building on the said property. Bernard tendered his rentals to
Winston but the latter refused to accept the same. This prompted Bernard to consign his rentals to the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City. But he failed to notify Winston about the consignation. In motions dated July 1, 2000 and July 13, 2000, Winston and
Bianca withdrew the amount consigned and reserved their right to question the consignation.
Question: What is consignation? What are the requisites of a valid consignation?
ANSWER: Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot
accept or refuses to accept payment and generally requires a prior tender of payment. In order that consignation may be
effective, the debtor must show that:
(1) there was a debt due;
(2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made
refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled
to receive the amount due or because the title to the obligation has been lost;
(3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation;
(4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and
(5) after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof.
Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective.
When the creditors acceptance of the money consigned is conditional and with reservations, he is not deemed to have waived
the claims he reserved against his debtor. In withdrawing the amounts consigned, Winston and Bianca expressly reserved the
right to question the validity of the consignation.
Case Citation: Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 172577, January 19, 2011
Name/Class: VILLAMOR CLEMENTINE Regular Class
Acceptance of payment by creditor from a third person
PROBLEM: A obtained a loan with Piggy Bank covered by 2 promissory notes secured by a real estate mortgage over 2 lots
registered under B. B was a co-maker in one of the promissory notes.
Subsequently, A failed to pay the loan forcing B to pay the whole amount. B now demands that A reimburse him for the amount
that he paid to Piggy Bank. A claims that he is not obliged to pay B as the transactions with Piggy Bank was merely
accommodation loans purely for Bs benefit.
190

Question: Is B entitled to reimbursement from A?
ANSWER: No. Article 1236 of the Civil Code provides that Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he
has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
In this case, it is clear that the transaction was an accommodation loan in favor of A as it was B who allowed the use of his
property as collateral. Hence, because the payment by B was beneficial to A as it extinguished his obligation to Piggy Bank, B is
entitled to reimbursement from A.
Case Citation: Maxwell Heavy Equipment vs Yu, GR 179395
191
192

CONTRACTS
I)
Essential Requisites
QUESTIONS:
1)
2)
What are the elements of a contract?

What are the stages that a contract goes through? Explain each briefly.
ANSWER: Every contract has the elements of (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established. A contract is perfected by mere consent, which is
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.
Generally, contracts undergo three distinct stages: (1) preparation or negotiation; (2) perfection; and (3) consummation.
Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the
moment of agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree upon the
essential elements of the contract. The last stage is the consummation of the contract where the parties fulfill or perform the
terms they agreed on, culminating in its extinguishment.
Case Citation: Intl Freeport Traders, Inc. vs Danzas Intercontinental, GR. No. 181833
Mutuality of Contracts
PROBLEM: Spouses Junjun and Gabriela Prutas obtained a revolving credit line from Banco De Coco for the amount of
P150,000.00 ,to secure such credit the petitioners constituted a real estate mortgage over their 2 lots. Over the course of the
years what started initially as P150,000.00 substantially increased to millions (their loan being in a nature of revolving credit),
along with such increase the spouses provided additional securities to cover the increase of the loan which comes in a form of a
real estate mortgage on another lot. Sometime in July 2013 Petitioner Spouse issued eight Promissory Notes and signed a Credit
Agreement with Banco de Coco, such credit agreement contained a stipulation granting PNB the right to increase or reduce
interest rates within the limits allowed by law or by the Monetary Board. The Real Estate Mortgage agreement provided the
same right to increase or reduce interest rates at any time depending on whatever policy Banco de Coco may adopt in the
future. The spouses religiously paid their loan obligations without questioning nor making any queries with the rate of interest
they are paying with the bank( this went on for many years and with reference to numerous loan payments), subsequently they
defaulted with one of their payment which led Banco de Coco to foreclose on their mortgages.
It is during this period that the Spouses questioned the rate of interest they are paying with the bank, insisting among others
that the interest rate provision in the Credit Agreement and the Amendment to Credit Agreement should be declared null and
void, for they relegated to the bank the sole power to fix interest rates For its part, the bank disputes petitioners claim that
interest rates were unilaterally fixed by it, taking relief in the fact that petitioners are deemed estopped by their failure to
question the imposed rates and their continued payment thereof without opposition.
Questions:
A. Is the contention of the bank correct?
B. Explain the Principle of Mutuality of Contracts
ANSWER:
A)
No, Banco de Cocos contention is not correct. It is basic that there can be no contract in the true sense in the absence
of the element of agreement, or of mutual assent of the parties. If this assent is wanting on the part of the one who
contracts, his act has no more efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a person of unsound mind. Contract
changes must be made with the consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the
proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case of loan contracts,
it cannot be gainsaid that the rate of interest is always a vital component, for it can make or break a capital venture.
Thus, any change must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it is bereft of any binding effect.
B)
MUTUALITY OF CONTRACTS
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Art. 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will
of one of them.
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the parties, there must be mutuality
between the parties based on their essential equality. A contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment
dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties, is void.
Case citation: Spouses Eduardo and Lydia Silos Vs. Philippine National Bank G.R. No. 181045, July 2, 2014
Right of first refusal
PROBLEM: Alterco Inc. won the public bidding for the purchase of the fly ash generated by CNPs power plant, Borbor power
plant . In its contract, CNP granted Alterco Inc. the right of first refusal to purchase the fly ash generated by other coal fired
power plants that may be put up by CNP in the future. Years later, CNPs other plants, Subsub and Batbat coal fired power
plants came into operation. CNP caused the publication of an Invitation to Pre-Qualify and to Bid the purchase of fly ash from
Subsub and Batbat plants. CNP released the tender documents for the bidding which made no reference to Altercos right of
first refusal. Alterco filed a complaint against CNP praying that it be allowed to exercise its right of first refusal by permitting to
match the price and terms offered by the winning bidder. PSALM, a government owned and controlled corporation whose
purpose is to manage the sale, disposition and privatization of CNPs generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets
challenged the validity of Altercos right of first refusal; it being contrary to public policy.
Question: Can Alterco validly claim its right of first refusal?
ANSWER: No. The right of first refusal granted to Alterco Inc. in the contract with Borbor power plant is invalid for being
contrary to public policy as the same violates the requirement of competitive public bidding in the award of government
contracts for the following reasons: 1. The grant of the right of first refusal constitutes an unauthorized provision in the contract
that was entered into pursuant to the bidding. 2. The right to buy fly ash precedes and is the basis of the right of first refusal,
and the consequent right cannot be acquired together with and at the same time as the precedent right. 3. The right of first
refusal is against the public policy that contracts must be awarded through public bidding. The respondents right of first refusal
cannot take precedence over the dictates of public policy.
The right of first refusal of Alterco being invalid, it follows that it
has no binding effect. It does not create an obligation on the part of CNP to acknowledge the same. Neither does it confer a
preferential right upon Alterco to the fly ash of CNPs power plants.
Case citation: POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION VS. POZZOLANIC PHILIPPINES
INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 183789, August 24, 2011

Deed of Sale entered into upon future inheritance

PROBLEM: The property subject of the controversy is a 9,000 square meter lot. It is a portion of a property registered in the
name of the late Faustina Maslum (Faustina) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16776 with a total area of 140,211
square meters.
On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, dated July 27, 1939, assigning and
distributing her property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not probated. One of the heirs was
the father of Domingo Laxamana (Domingo), Benjamin Laxamana, who died in 1960. On March 5, 1975, Domingo executed a
Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 square meter share of the land to Laureano Cabalu.
On August 1, 1994, to give effect to the holographic will, the forced and legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Succession with Partition. The said deed imparted 9,000 square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to
Domingo.
Question: Is the Deed of Sale entered into by Domingo & Laureano valid?
ANSWER: The sale entered into by Domingo & Laureano is invalid.
Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law." Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void.
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The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the
contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is
purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not yet probated; the object of the contract, the 9,000
square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere
inchoate hereditary right therein.
Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him. Therefore, the Deed
of Sale entered into by Domingo & Laureano is null and void.
Case citation: Milagros De Belen Vda. De Cabalu et.al vs. Sps. Renato Tabu and Laxamana,G.R. No. 188417, September 24,
2012

3) Kinds of Contracts
Exception to the Doctrine of In Pari Delicto
PROBLEM: Gonzalo, the sole contractor of the project in question, subcontracted the implementation of the project to Tarnate
in violation of the statutory prohibition that every contractor is prohibited from subcontracting with or assigning to another
person any contract or project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary has approved the subcontracting or
assignment.
Tarnate, having been fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of the deed of assignment from the time of its execution,
provided the equipment, labor and materials for the project in compliance with his obligations under the subcontract and the
deed of assignment.
However, it was Gonzalo as the contractor who received the payment with the DPWH as well as the 10% retention fee that
should have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of assignment. Gonzalo refused despite demands to deliver to Tarnate
the stipulated 10% retention fee that would have compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project.
Can Tarnate recover/claim under a void deed of assignment considering that both parties were in pari delicto?
ANSWER: Yes, the prevention of unjust enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnates favor. The doctrine of in pari
delicto which stipulates that the guilty parties to an illegal contract are not entitled to any relief, cannot prevent a recovery if
doing so violates the public policy against unjust enrichment.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from one another and are
not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. An accepted exception arises when its
application contravenes well-established public policy. The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the
State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him."
In the instant case, Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and materials for the project in compliance with his obligations under
the subcontract and the deed of assignment and it was Gonzalo as the contractor who received the payment for his contract
with the DPWH. Not to afford relief will make a travesty of the justice to which Tarnate was entitled for having suffered from
Gonzalos unjust enrichment.
Hence, Tarnate is entitled to his claims because Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the latter was
to be barred from recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto.
Case Citation: Domingo Gonzalo vs. John Tarnate Jr. G.R. No. 160600 January 15, 2014
195

Ratification of a voidable contract
PROBLEM: Sometime in 1995, ECE Realty started a construction of a condominium project called Central Park Condominium
Building located along Jorge St., Pasay City. However, printed advertisements were made indicating therein that the said
project was to be built in Makati City. IN December 1995, Rachel, agreed to buy a unit from the above project by paying
reservation fee and, thereafter, downpayment and monthly installments. On June 18, 1996, Rachel and the representatives of
ECE Realty executed a Contract to Sell. In the said contract, it was indicated that the condominium project is located in Pasay
City.
More than 2 years after the execution of the Contract to Sell, Rachel, through her counsel, wrote petitioner a letter dated
October 30, 1998 demanding the return of P422,500.00, representing the payments she made, on the ground that she
subsequently discovered that the condominium project ws being built in Pasay City and not in Makati City as indicated in its
printed advertisements. ECE Realty denied her letter, hence, she filed a complaint with the HLURB seeking the annulment of
her contract with ECE Realty, the return of her payments, and damages.
Questions:
1. Was there fraud in the execution of the contract sufficient to nullify it?
2. Assuming that there was fraud sufficient to annul the contract, can the contract be still considered valid?
ANSWER:
1.
No, there was no fraud in the execution of the contract that was sufficient to nullify it.
Article 1338 of the Civil Code provides that there is fraud when through insidious words or machinations of one of the
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
Jurisprudence has shown that in order to constitute fraud that provides basis to annul contracts, it must fulfill two
conditions. First, the fraud must be dolo causante or it must be fraud in obtaining the consent of the party. This is
referred to as causal fraud. The deceit must be serious. The fraud is serious when it is sufficient to impress, or to lead
an ordinarily prudent person into error; that which cannot deceive a prudent person cannot be a ground for nullity.
Second, the fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and not merely by a preponderance thereof.
In the present case, the petitioner is guilty of false representation of a fact as evidence by its printed advertisements
indicating that its subject condominium project is located in Makati City when in fact it is in Pasay City. However, the
misrepresentation made by petitioner in its advertisements does not constitute causal fraud which would have been a
valid basis in annulling the Contract to Sell between them. Rachel failed to prove that the location of the said project
was a causal consideration or the principal inducement which led her into buying her unit in the said condominium
project.
2.
Yes, the contract can still be considered as valid due to an implied ratification by Rachel.
Under Article 1392 of the Civil Code, ratification extinguished the action to annul a voidable contract. In addition,
Article 1396 of the same Code provides that ratification cleanses the contract from all its defects from the moment it
was constituted. Implied ratification may take diverse forms, such as by silence or acquiescence; by acts showing
approval or adoption of the contract; or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.
In the instant case, even assuming that ECE Realtys misrepresentation consists of fraud, which could be a ground for
annulling their Contract to Sell, Rachels act of affixing her signature to the said Contract, after having acquired
knowledge of the propertys actual location, can be construed as an implied ratification thereof.
Case citation: ECE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. RACHEL G. MANDAP G.R. No. 196182, September 1, 2014
4) Defective Contracts
Void and inexistent contracts
PROBLEM: A deed of absolute sale, dated November 25, 1981, states that a parcel of land registered in the name of Tony
Stark has been conveyed to his brother, Thor, through a sale. In a case for annulment of a deed of sale, Tony assailed the said
document as sham and replete with falsehood and fraudulent misrepresentations.
196
Although Tony admitted that he sent the pre-signed deed of sale to Thor in response to the latters offer to buy his property,
he, however, alleged that the said transaction did not push through because Thor did not have the financial means to purchase
the property at that time. He also stated that he sent the said document undated and not notarized. He alleged that he tried to
retrieve the said deed from Thor but the latter failed to return it despite several reminders. A further alleged that he continued
to allow Thor to occupy his property since their ancestral home was built thereon which liberality was later extended to Ms livein partner, Jane Foster, as evidenced by the Bequest of Usufruct which Tony executed. By way of affirmative and special
defenses, Thor alleged lack of cause of action, prescription and laches. RTC dismissed the case on the basis of the pleadings
submitted. CA reversed the decision of the lower court on ground that there is need for trial to determine the facts and ordered
that case be remanded to RTC for trial.
Questions:
(1) Was there a valid contract?
(2) Was the RTC correct in positively finding laches and prescription on the basis of the pleadings alone?
ANSWER:
(1) It depends on whether the contract was absolutely simulated or fictitious or there was merely a non-payment of
purchase price.
Under Article 1409 of the New Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and
void from the beginning. Article 1470 expressly states that if the price is simulated, the sale is void. Moreover, it is
a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has
never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Thus, in the instant case, if M
did not pay the contract price but the deed of sale states otherwise, that would be considered as a badge of
simulation and would render the contract void.
However, it what actually transpired was merely a non-payment of purchase price, such will not invalidate a
contract. Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein the Court held that mere failure to pay the consideration
results only in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation, under Article 1191 of the New
Civil Code, under an existing valid contract. Thus, in this case, if what was actually transpired was a simple nonpayment of purchase price, there is still a valid contract; however, the seller is given the remedy to either demand
fulfillment or rescission of the contract there being a breach of the obligation.
(2) No, the RTC is not correct.
Well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a
fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss.
At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Those issues must be
resolved at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims and defenses.
Case citation: Modesto Sanchez v. Andrew Sanchez, G.R. No. 187661, December 4, 2013
197

SALES
I)
Definition and Essential Requisites of a Contract of Sale
Absence of the owners consent

Question: What is the effect and/or consequence of the absence of consent of the owner in a contract of sale of property?
ANSWER: General Rule: The contract of sale is void. One of the essential requirements of a valid contract of sale is the
consent of the owner of the property. The buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had. He cannot give what
he does not have quod non habet. A stream cannot rise higher than its source.
Exceptions:
a.
b.
When the owner of the goods is, by his conduct, precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell. (Article 1505)
1.
2.
3.
4.
Factors acts, recording laws, or any other provision of law enabling the apparent owner of the goods to dispose
them as if he were the true owner;
Sales made under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;
Sales made pursuant to a special law;
Purchases made in a merchants store or fairs or markets. (Article 1505)
Note: When there was no intention on the part of one party to transfer ownership or sell the property in exchange for the
amounts borrowed, there is no contract of sale. There was no agreement between the parties, the element of consent or
meeting of the minds was wanting. Thus, it is correctly argued that there was no contract of sale. Under Article 1475 of the
Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds on the thing which is the object of
the contract and on the price.
Case citation: Riosa vs Tobaco La Suerte Corporation - G.R. No. 203786. October 23, 2013
Contract to sell
PROBLEM: Dolores Ventura entered into a Contract to Sell with Sps. Endaya for the purchase of two parcels of land. The
purchase price of P347,760.00 shall be paid with down payment of P103,284.00 upon execution of the contract and the balance
of P244,476.00 in instalment basis within a 15-year period plus 12% interest. Dolores was placed in possession of the subject
properties and allowed to erect a building thereon. Before the payment period expired, Dolores passed away. The total
payments made by Dolores and her children amounted to P952,152.00, which is more than the agreed purchase price of
P347,760.00, including the 12%interest p.a. thereon computed on the outstanding balance. Dolores children filed a Complaint
for specific performance, seeking to compel Sps. Endaya to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. Sps. Endaya
refused execution of the corresponding deed of sale. They countered that Dolores did not pay the stipulated down payment and
remitted only a total of 22 installments. Should Sps. Endaya be compelled to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties
in favor of petitioners?
ANSWER: No, respondents are not obliged to execute the deed of sale. A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract
whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the latter upon his fulfillment of the conditions agreed
upon, xxx. Given its contingent nature, the failure of the prospective buyer to make full payment and/or abide by his
commitments stated in the contract to sell prevents the obligation of the prospective seller to execute the corresponding deed
of sale to effect the transfer of ownership to the buyer from arising.
A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the
parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.
In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition will not automatically transfer ownership to the buyer although
the property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer
by entering into a contract of absolute sale. On the other hand, in a conditional contract of sale, the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition renders the sale absolute and the previous delivery of the property has the effect of automatically
transferring the sellers ownership or title to the property to the buyer.
198
The summary of payments as well as the statement of account submitted by petitioners clearly show that only the payments
corresponding to the principal obligation and the 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance were considered in arriving at
the amount of P952,152.00.
Case citation: Frederick Ventura, et al. Vs. Heirs of Sps. Eustacio T. Endaya and Trinidad L. Endaya, namely, Titus L. Endaya, et
al. G.R. NO. 190016. October 2, 2013

PROBLEM: Spouses Jose C. Roque and Beatriz Cruz Roque and the original owners of the then unregistered Lot 18089
namely, Velia R. Rivero executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of Real Property. The parties agreed that Sps. Roque shall make
an initial payment of P15,387.50 upon signing, while the remaining balance of the purchase price shall be payable upon the
registration of Lot 18089, as well as the segregation and the concomitant issuance of a separate title over the subject portion in
their names. After the deeds execution, Sps. Roque took possession and introduced improvements on the subject portion which
they utilized as a balut factory. On August 12, 1991, Fructuoso
Sabug, Jr. former Treasurer of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), applied for a free patent over the
entire Lot. however, Sabug, Jr., through a Deed of Absolute Sale sold Lot 18089 to one Ma. Pamela P. Aguado (Aguado)
for P2,500,000.00, who, in turn, caused the cancellation of OCT No. M-5955 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate.
Thereafter, Aguado obtained an P8,000,000.00 loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) secured by a mortgage
over Lot 18089. When she failed to pay her loan obligation, Land Bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and
eventually tendered the highest bid in the auction sale. Upon Aguados failure to redeem the subject property, Land Bank
consolidated its ownership, and TCT No. M-115895 was issued in its name on July 21, 2003. Sps. Roque filed a complaint for
reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of real estate mortgage, foreclosure, and certificate of sale, and damages before the
RTC. With respect to Sps. Roques complaint, the RTC found that the latter failed to establish their ownership over the subject
portion, considering the following: (a) the supposed owners-vendors, i.e., Rivero, et al., who executed the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale, had no proof of their title over Lot 18089; (b) the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale was not registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds; (c) the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is neither a deed of conveyance nor a transfer document,
as it only gives the holder the right to compel the supposed vendors to execute a deed of absolute sale upon full payment of
the consideration; (d) neither Sps. Roque nor the alleged owners-vendors, i.e., Rivero, et al., have paid real property taxes in
relation to Lot 18089; and (e) Sps. Roques occupation of the subject portion did not ripen into ownership that can be
considered superior to the ownership of Land Bank. Moreover, the RTC ruled that Sps. Roques action for reconveyance had
already prescribed, having been filed ten (10) years after the issuance of OCT No. M-5955.31On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the foregoing RTC findings in a Decision.
Question: Did the CA erred in not ordering the reconveyance of the subject portion in Sps Roques favor?
ANSWER: The CA is correct. The petition lacks merit. The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the
property which was wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name to its rightful owner or to one with a better
right.Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the
registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Sps. Roque claim that the subject portion covered by the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale between them and Rivero, et al. was
wrongfully included in the certificates of title covering Lot 18089, and, hence, must be segregated therefrom and their
ownership thereof be confirmed. Examining its provisions, the Court finds that the stipulation above-highlighted shows that the
1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract to sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps. Roques belief.
[I]n contracts to sell the obligation of the seller to sell becomes demandable only upon the happening of the suspensive
condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price by the buyer. It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale that
the seller becomes obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. Prior to the existence of the contract of
sale, the seller is not obligated to transfer the ownership to the buyer, even if there is a contract to sell between them. Here, it
is undisputed that Sps. Roque have not paid the final installment of the purchase price. As such, the condition which would have
triggered the parties obligation to enter into and thereby perfect a contract of sale in order to effectively transfer the ownership
of the subject portion from the sellers (i.e., Rivero et al.) to the buyers (Sps. Roque) cannot be deemed to have been fulfilled.
Consequently, the latter cannot validly claim ownership over the subject portion even if they had made an initial payment and
even took possession of the same. It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale
specially in cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted with, but to a third
person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying such
property despite the fulfilment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot
be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property.
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Case citation: SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE Vs. MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO G.R. No. 193787
II)
Parties to a Contract of Sale

The law provides that in a contract of sale, the parties obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the
vendor to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale. On the other hand, the
principal obligation of a vendee is to pay the full purchase price at the agreed time. PNB VS. TERESITA TAN DEE,
G.R. No. 182128, February 19, 2014

III)
Formation of Contract of Sale
Nature of contract of sale

PROBLEM: Bank foreclosed xs property upon non-payment of loan. Despite the lapse of the redemption period and
consolidation of title in respondent bank. petitioner expressed his willingness to pay the balance of the repurchase price, and
requested respondent bank to release to him the remaining parcels of land but bank however, turned down his request
prompting the petitioner to cause the annotation on the said titles and a complaint for specific performance.
Question: Was there a perfected contract for the repurchase of the foreclosed properties?
ANSWER: NO. A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. When there is
merely an offer by one party without acceptance of the other, there is no contract. When the contract of sale is not perfected, it
cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation between the parties.
In the case at bar, the acceptance of the offer was not absolute, such acceptance is insufficient to generate consent that would
perfect a contract. Petitioner's claim of utmost accommodation by respondent bank of his own terms for the repurchase of his
foreclosed properties are simply contrary to normal business practice.
Case citation: Heirs of Fausto C. Ignacio vs. Home Bankers Savings and Trust co., et al, G.R. No. 177783, January 23, 2013
Double Sale
PROBLEM: Petitioner A bought land from their mother (B) who acquired such lot from (X) through a deed o f sale dated 1958
such sale was annotated on the back of the title. Petitioners were issued in their names TCT No. 39488, covering the lot.
Defendant (Z) who bought in 1992 the same lot from (Y) who claims he inherited the same from (X). (Y) has previously caused
the reconstitution of the mother title which lead to its cancellation and issuance of a new title TCT No. 5760-R in his favor.
Petitioner further alleges that they have a better right because they acquired the land prior to the sale of the same land to the
defendant and that defendant cannot be considered as buyers in good faith because of the annotations on the title. Defendant
further alleges that petitioners acquired the lot under questionable circumstances due to the absence of a record of a deed of
sale with the Register of Deeds. WHO HAS BETTER RIGHTS TO THE PROPERTY? WAS THERE A DOUBLE SALE?
ANSWER: The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are:
(a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each represent conflicting
interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the
very same seller.
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated not by just one but two vendors.
In the present case, the subject lots were sold to petitioners and respondents by two different vendors B and Y Hence, Article
1544 of the Civil Code is not applicable. Y an heir of X never acquired ownership over the property since it was sold during the
lifetime of X and was never part of Xs estate. Indeed, not being an X, Y never acquired any right whatsoever over the subject
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lots, even if he was able to subsequently obtain a title in his name. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one
does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire
no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. Since Y has no right to the subject lots, Z, who simply stepped into the
shoes of Y, in turn, acquired no rights to the same.
Case citation: SKUNAC CORPORATION and ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ vs. ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG,
G.R. No. 205879 April 23, 2014

Dragnet Clause
PROBLEM: A and B obtained from GED Bank various loans and credit accommodations, the former executed two Real Estate
Mortgages covering their two parcels of land.
A Real Estate Mortgage contain the following provision:
"That for and in consideration of certain loans, overdrafts and other credit accommodations obtained, from the
Mortgagee by the Mortgagors and/or Spouses A and B, and to secure the payment of the same, and the principal of all
of which is hereby fixed at NINETY THOUSAND PESOS (P90,000.00), Philippine Currency as well as those that the
Mortgagee may hereafter extend to the Mortgagor x x x, including interest and expenses or any other obligation owing
to the Mortgagee, whether direct or indirect, principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books and records of
the Mortgage."
However, GED Bank only released P35,000.00 to Spouses A and B instead of the full amount of P90,000.
Question: Is the provision valid? Distinguish Dragnet Clause and Real Estate Mortgage.
ANSWER: Yes, The above stipulation is also known as "dragnet clause" or "blanket mortgage clause" in American
jurisprudence that would subsume all debts of past and future origins. It has been held as a valid and legal undertaking, the
amounts specified as consideration in the contracts do not limit the amount for which the pledge or mortgage stands as
security, if from the four corners of the instrument, the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. A
pledge or mortgage given to secure future advancements is a continuing security and is not discharged by the repayment of the
amount named in the mortgage until the full amount of all advancements shall have been paid.
A "dragnet clause" operates as a convenience and accommodation to the borrowers as it makes available additional funds
without their having to execute additional security documents, thereby saving time, travel, loan closing costs, costs of extra
legal services, recording fees, etc. While a real estate mortgage may exceptionally secure future loans or advancements, these
future debts must be sufficiently described in the mortgage contract. An obligation is not secured by a mortgage unless it comes
fairly within the terms of the mortgage contract.
Case Citation: Traders Royal Bank vs. Norberto Castanares and Milagros Castanares G.R. No. 172020, December 6, 2010
IV)
Remedies of an Unpaid Seller

The law provides that a secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the
satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt
from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the
deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same
before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. It must, however, be
emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the
election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others. Heirs Of The Late Spouses Fla Viano Maglasang vs.
Manila Banking Corporation GR 171206, September 23 2013

V)
Warranties
PROBLEM: ADL mortgaged in favor of UBANK a real property registered in the name of ADL and his wife. The property was
foreclosed and sold at auction to UBANK. R, ADL's wife, sought for the annulment of mortgage and reconveyance claiming that
ADL mortgaged the property without her consent. Meanwhile, BEPI, through its President, MOS, offered to purchase said
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property from UBANK, by virtue of which a deed of sale was executed. One of the provisions of said deed was that UBANK was
to 'defend its title xxx against the claims of any person whomsoever.' However, the civil case was rendered in favor of R and as a
result of which, BEPI was evicted. What is eviction and is eviction present in this case?
ANSWER: Eviction shall take place whenever by final judgment based on a right prior to the sale or an act imputable to the
vendor, the vendee is deprived of the whole or of a part of the thing purchased. Eviction is present in this case. BEPI purchased
the property, through MOS, without the knowledge of the pending civil case. UBANK is therefore liable for its express
undertaking under the deed of sale to 'defend its title xxx against the claims of any person whomsoever.'
Case citation: Bignay Ex-Im Phils Inc. vs Union Bank of the Philippines, GR No. 171590. Feb. 12, 2014
VI)
The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree (P.D. 957)
Twin requirements under the Maceda Law

PROBLEM: Spouses B entered into a Contract to Sell with S whereby the latter agreed to sell the spouse a house worth
P400,000. To pay for the loan, Spouses B decided to borrow money from Capitol Bank. A simulated sale was executed by S with
Spouses B to facilitate the loan and the TCT were transferred to the spouses. However, Capitol Bank collapsed before it could
release the loan. Spouses B took out a loan with S instead and undertook to pay it over a period of four years.
After four years, S sent Spouses a notarized Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of the Contract to Sell for failure to pay. S
filed for Cancellation of Title and Recovery of Possession, Reconveyance and Damages. The spouses however, argued that the
sale was valid. Decide.
ANSWER: Since the case stemmed from a Contract to Sell, the Maceda Law governs the sale of real estate on installment.
Under the Maceda Law, before a contract to sell can be validly and effectively cancelled, the seller has to:
(1)
(2)
to send a notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer and

to refund the cash surrender value.
Until and unless the seller complies with these twin mandatory requirements, the contract to sell between the parties remains
valid and subsisting. Thus, the buyer has the right to continue occupying the property subject of the contract to sell, and may
"still reinstate the contract by updating the account during the grace period and before the actual cancellation" of the contract.
Case citation: Communities Cagayan Inc. vs. Spouses Arsenio, GR 176791. November 14, 2012
Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act
PROBLEM: Spouses Himura entered into a Contract to Sell with Shishio Developers for the purchase of a residential in Kyoto
for a total consideration of P2,000,000.00. Pursuant to the contract, Spouses Himura took possession of the property upon a
downpayment of P1,000,000.00, undertaking to pay the remaining P1,000,000.00 in equal monthly installments starting June
12, 2005.
Spouses Himura failed to pay their monthly installments despite several written and verbal notices, causing Shishio Developers
to issue a Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell on April 10, 2006.
On May 25, 2006, Shishio Developers later sent a final demand letter to vacate and deliver possession of the subject property
within seven (7) days but it remained unheeded.
Shishio Developers filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, contending that Spouses Himuras possession of the said property
was by virtue of a Contract to Sell which had already been cancelled for non-payment of the stipulated monthly installment
payments. As such, their rights of possession over the subject property necessarily terminated or expired and hence, their
continued possession thereof constituted unlawful detainer.
Is the contention of Shishio Developers correct?
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ANSWER: Yes. (2) Yes. Given that the Contract to Sell in this case is one which has for its object real property to be sold on
an installment basis, the said contract is especially governed by and thus, must be examined under the provisions of RA
6552, or the "Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act", which provides for the rights of the buyer in case of his default in the
payment of succeeding installments.
Essentially, the said provision provides for three (3) requisites before the seller may actually cancel the subject contract: first,
the seller shall give the buyer a 60-day grace period to be reckoned from the date the installment became due; second, the
seller must give the buyer a notice of cancellation/demand for rescission by notarial act if the buyer fails to pay the installments
due at the expiration of the said grace period; and third, the seller may actually cancel the contract only after thirty (30) days
from the buyers receipt of the said notice of cancellation/demand for rescission by notarial act.
In the present case, the 60-day grace period automatically operated in favor of the buyers, Spouses Himura, and took effect
from the time that the maturity dates of the installment payments lapsed. With the said grace period having expired bereft of
any installment payment on the part of Spouses Himura, Shishio Developers then issued a notarized Notice of Delinquency and
Cancellation of Contract on April 10, 2006. Finally, in proceeding with the actual cancellation of the contract to sell, Shishio
Developers gave Sps. Himura an additional thirty (30) days within which to settle their arrears and reinstate the contract, or sell
or assign their rights to another.
It was only after the expiration of the thirty day (30) period did Shishio Developers treat the contract to sell as effectively
cancelled making as it did a final demand upon Sps. Himura to vacate the subject property only on May 25, 2006.
Thus, based on the foregoing, there was a valid and effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell in accordance with Section 4 of
RA 6552 and since Sps. Himura had already lost their right to retain possession of the subject property as a consequence of
such cancellation, their refusal to vacate and turn over possession to Shishio Developers makes out a valid case for unlawful
detainer.
Case citation: OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. SPOUSES BENIGNO V. JOVELLANOS and LOURDES R. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No.
189145 December 4, 2013
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TRUST
I)
Definition and Nature
Implied resulting trust

PROBLEM: Spouses Jon and Jen had ten children including Jan. Sometime in 1957, Jon had a meeting with all his children and
informed them of his intention to purchase Lot 998. However, since he was a Chinese citizen and was disqualified from
acquiring the said lot, the title to the property will be registered in the name of his eldest son, Jan, who at that time was already
of age and was the only Filipino citizen among his children. Jon bought Lot 998 and on May 16, 1957, TCT No. 12345 was
issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of Jan. Jon and Jen both died intestate. Subsequently, Jan died and his surviving
heirs are now claiming ownership over Lot 998 by succession, alleging that it was Jan who bought Lot 998 and that there exist
no trust agreement between Jon and Jan. Is the contention of Jans surviving heirs correct?
ANSWER: No. The contention of Jans surviving heirs is not correct. The law (Article 1448, Civil Code) provides that an implied
resulting trust is created when there is (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting
valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration is furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. The principle of a
resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or
interest. In the case at bar, Jan was merely a trustee of Jon. It was Jon who provided the money for the purchase of Lot 998
although the corresponding transfer certificate of title was placed in the name of Jan. Therefore, the contention of Jans
surviving heirs is incorrect.
Case Citation: JOSE JUAN TONG, ET AL. v. GO TIAT KUN, ET AL. (G.R. No. 196023 April 21, 2014)
Instance where implied trust can exist
PROBLEM: The Binay spouses mortgaged to petitioner Mangmang Juan, employee and nephew of James Yap to secure a
loan.Mangmang Juan thereafter sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Although Juan and Yap participated in
the auction sale, the properties were sold to Juan for tendering the highest bid. However, no certificate of sale was issued
because he failed to pay the sales commission.
A year after, James Yap and the Binay spouses executed a MOA in which the spouses acknowledged Jam Yap as their real
mortgage-creditor and Juan as their trustee. Yap agreed that spouses can redeem the foreclosed properties for 1.2 million. Yap
agreed to annul the previous contract in order that the properties be reconveyed. Juan insisted on his rights over the properties
and that he was not a trustee.
Question: Was there an implied trust?
ANSWER: Yes. Although not appearing as one of the provisions on the Chapter on Trusts, the code itself provides that such
listing does not exclude other general concepts of trust
An implied trust arising from mortgage contracts is not among the trust relationships the Civil Code enumerates. The
Code itself provides, however, that such listing "does not exclude others established by the general law on trust x x
x." Under the general principles on trust, equity converts the holder of property right as trustee for the benefit of
another if the circumstances of its acquisition makes the holder ineligible "in x x x good conscience [to] hold and enjoy
[it]."As implied trusts are remedies against unjust enrichment, the "only problem of great importance in the field of
constructive trusts is whether in the numerous and varying factual situations presented x x x there is a wrongful
holding of property and hence, a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant."
This is hinged on the general principle: Equity converts the holder of the property right as trustee for the benefit of another if
the circumstances of its acquisition makes the holder ineligible in good conscience to hold and enjoy it.
Case citation: Richard Juan vs. Gabriel Yap, Sr. - G.R. No. 182177. March 30, 2011
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PARTNERSHIP
I)
Contract of Partnership
CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP
Problem: Aris and Edu are brothers. In 1993, Aris alleged that Edu entered into a contract of partnership with him. Aris
showed as evidence a letter sent to him by Edu that the latter is allowing Aris to manage their family business (if Edu's away)
and in exchange thereof he will be giving Aris P1 million or 10% equity, whichever is higher. A memorandum was subsequently
made for the said partnership agreement. The memorandum this time stated that in exchange of Aris, who just got married,
retaining his share in the family business (movie theatres, shipping and land development) and some other immovable
properties, he will be given P1 Million or 10% equity in all these businesses and those to be subsequently acquired by them
whichever is greater.
In 2002 however, the relationship between the brothers went sour. And so Aris demanded an accounting and the liquidation of
his share in the partnership. Edu did not heed and so Aris sued Edu.
Question: What is the legal effect of the Contract of Partnership entered by the parties.
Answer: No. The partnership is void and legally nonexistent. The documentary evidence presented by Aris, i.e. the letter from
Edu and the Memorandum, did not prove partnership.
The 1993 letter from Edu on its face, contains typewritten entries, personal in tone, but is unsigned and undated. As an
unsigned document, there can be no quibbling that said letter does not meet the public instrumentation requirements exacted
under Article 1771 (how partnership is constituted) of the Civil Code. Moreover, being unsigned and doubtless referring to a
partnership involving more than P3,000.00 in money or property, said letter cannot be presented for notarization, let alone
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as called for under the Article 1772 (capitalization of a
partnership) of the Code. And inasmuch as the inventory requirement under the succeeding Article 1773 goes into the matter of
validity when immovable property is contributed to the partnership, the next logical point of turns on the nature of Aris
contribution, if any, to the supposed partnership.
The Memorandum is also not a proof of the partnership for the same is not a public instrument and again, no inventory was
made of the immovable property and no inventory was attached to the Memorandum. Article 1773 of the Civil Code requires
that if immovable property is contributed to the partnership an inventory shall be had and attached to the contract.
Case Citation: AURELIO K. LITONJUA, JR.,vs. EDUARDO K. LITONJUA, G.R. NOS. 166299-300. December 13, 2005
Name/Class: SENIDO, FATIMA NENA Regular Class
II)
Dissolution
Purchase of a Partners Interest

PROBLEM: Bob Aram entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Freddie Rooks, a American national, for the operation of an
ice manufacturing business. With Bob as the industrial partner and Freddie as the capitalist partner, the parties agreed that
they would each receive 40% of the net profit, with the remaining 20% to be used for the payment of the ice making machine
which was purchased for the business. For and in consideration of the sum ofP1,000,000.00, however, Freddie subsequently
executed a Deed of Assignment, transferring all his rights and interests in the business in favor of Dionisia Gwapa, With
Freddies eventual departure from the country, Dionisia caused her lawyer to send Bob a letter, apprising her of her acquisition
of said Americans share in the business and formally demanding an accounting and inventory thereof as well as the remittance
of their portion of its profits. Dionisia with unjustified failure to heed her demand, she commenced the instant suit against Bob
Aram, his wife, and their alleged dummies, for specific performance, accounting, examination, audit and inventory of assets and
properties, dissolution of the joint venture, appointment of a receiver and damages.
Question: Is the action initiated by Dionisia Gwapa tenable? If you were the judge how would you resolve the case?
ANSWER: No. Pursuant to Article 1813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; Dionisia cannot be considered as partner in the
business while she is entitled to Freddies share in the profits of the business, she cannot, however, interfere with the
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management of the partnership, require information or account of its transactions and inspect its books; the partnership should
first be dissolved before she can seek an accounting of its transactions and demand Freddies share in the business. The rule is
settled that joint ventures are governed by the law on partnerships which are, in turn, based on mutual agency or delectus
personae. Insofar as a partners conveyance of the entirety of his interest in the partnership does not make the assignee of
such interest a partner of the firm, nor entitle the assignee to interfere in the management of the partnership business or to
receive anything except the assignees profits.
And as a judge, a ruling that Dionisia is entitled to Freddies share in profits and granting her prayer for dissolution of joint
venture maybe proper conformably with the right granted to purchaser of a partners interest under Article 1813 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Case Citation: Josefina Realubit vs Sps Jaso GR. No. 178782, September 21, 2011
AGENCY
Buyer in Good faith negated by failure to verify extent and nature of seller's authority
PROBLEM: Lucy Lou owns two parcels of land covered with TCT No. 12345 and TCT No. 54321. In May 1997, she applied for
loan with Moneymaker Bank, as a security thereof, she offered to constitute a real estate mortgage over the said lots. After a
routine credit investigation, Moneymaker Bank discovered that the titles of the subject lots were cancelled and new titles were
issued in the name of Xzyk Mendez. Upon learning of such fact, Lucy filed a complaint for cancellation of titles and damages
claiming that she did not sell the subjects lots and denied having executed the deed of absolute sale. In his answer, Xzyk
claimed that he purchased the said lots from one Enrique Vicks who sold the same at a bargain price and who claimed to be
duly-authorized by the owner. Will the complaint prosper? Is Xzyk a buyer in good faith?
ANSWER: Yes. The complaint will prosper.
As a rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate itself to determine the actual owner or the circumstances of its ownership. It is only
there are circumstances apparent on the face of the title which would excite a prudent man to promptly inquire where the
transfer is being facilitated by a person other than the registered owner. Moreover, Article 1874 of the New Civil Code provides
that, when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing;
otherwise, the sale shall be void. On the other hand, a buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property.
In the case at bar, it is crystal clear that Xzyk purchased the subject lots not directly from the owner but from an agent who is
not equipped with a written authority to sell the same. Hence, the sale is void. Being such, Xzyks claim of good faith is negated
by his failure to verify the extent and nature of Enriques authority.
Therefore, the complaint will prosper.
Case Citation: Spouses Bautista vs. Spouses Jalandoni, G.R. No. 171464, November 27, 2013
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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
I)
Guaranty and Suretyship
Continuing Suretyship
PROBLEM: Linda executed a Continuing Suretyship in favor of ABC Bank to secure "any and all types of credit accommodation
that may be granted by the bank hereinto and hereinafter" in favor of Raul Arroyo for the amount of P5,000,000.00 which is
covered by a Credit Agreement/Promissory Note. In turn, the Continuing Suretyship executed by Linda stipulated that: 3.
Liability of the Surety. - The liability of the Surety is solidary and not contingent upon the pursuit of the Bank of whatever
remedies it may have against the Debtor or the collaterals/liens it may possess. If any of the Guaranteed Obligations is not paid
or performed on due date (at stated maturity or by acceleration), the Surety shall, without need for any notice, demand or any
other act or deed, immediately become liable therefor and the Surety shall pay and perform the same.
The debtor, Raul, defaulted on his loan obligation. Thereafter, Linda received a Notice of Final Demand dated August 28, 2013,
informing her that she was liable to pay the loan obtained by Raul, including the interests and penalty fees amounting to
P10,703,185.54, and demanding payment thereof. Linda failed to comply with said demand and ABC Bank filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money against her and Raul. Since Raul can no longer be located, summons was not served on him, hence,
only Linda actively participated in the case.
May Linda be validly held liable for the principal debtor's loan obtained six months after the execution of the Continuing
Suretyship?
ANSWER: YES. A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by
another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of another party, called the obligee.
Although the contract of a surety is secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty
of another although it possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit therefrom.
Thus, suretyship arises upon the solidary binding of a person deemed the surety with the principal debtor for the purpose of
fulfilling an obligation. A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged
touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable.
In this case, Linda executed a Continuing Suretyship. By executing such an agreement, Raul places himself in a position to enter
into the projected series of transactions with ABC Bank; with such suretyship agreement, there being no need to execute a
separate surety contract or bond for each financing or credit accommodation extended to him. The terms of the Continuing
Suretyship executed by Linda are very clear. It states that she, as surety, shall, without need for any notice, demand or any
other act or deed, immediately become liable and shall pay "all credit accommodations extended by ABC Bank to the Debtor
(Raul), including increases, renewals, roll-overs, extensions, restructurings, amendments or novations thereof. Such stipulations
are valid and legal and constitute the law between the parties.
Thus, Linda is unequivocally bound by the terms of the Continuing Suretyship. There can be no cavil then that she is liable for
the principal of the loan, together with the interest and penalties due thereon, even if said loan was obtained by the principal
debtor even after the date of execution of the Continuing Suretyship.
Case citation: MARIANO LIM vs. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION G.R. No. 188539, March 12, 2014
Continuing guaranty
PROBLEM: Spouse Flores borrowed money from petitioner bank in the amount of Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P900,000.00) on Oct 1993. Respondents executed a Real Estate Mortgage5over the condominium unit as collateral, and the
same was annotated at the back of CCT No. 2130. Two years later again the spouses borrowed One Million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000.00) from petitioner bank, which was also secured by a mortgage over the same property
annotated at the back of CCT No. 2130.On Jan 1996 respondents paid One Million Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Five
Pesos and 54 centavos(P1,011,555.54), as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 1477417issued by petitioner bank. On the face of
the receipt, it was written that the payment was "in full payment of the loan and interest." Respondents then asked petitioner
bank to cancel the mortgage annotations on CCT No. 2130 since the loans secured by the real estate mortgage were
already paid in full. However, the bank refused to cancel the same and demanded payment of Four Million Six Hundred ThirtyThree Thousand Nine Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P4,633,916.67), then petitioner bank applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages over the condominium unit. The public auction sale was scheduled on September 4, 1998.
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Question: Is the real estate mortgage over the subject condominium unit is a continuing guaranty for the future loans of
respondent spouses despite the full payment of the principal loans annotated on the title of the subject property?
ANSWER: Yes, A continuing guaranty is a recognized exception to the rule that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be
limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage contract. Under Article 2053 of the Civil Code, a guaranty may be given to
secure even future debts, the amount of which may not be known at the time the guaranty is executed. This is the basis for
contracts denominated as a continuing guaranty or suretyship. A continuing guaranty is not limited to a single transaction, but
contemplates a future course of dealing, covering a series of transactions, generally for an indefinite time or until revoked. It is
prospective in its operation and is generally intended to provide security with respect to future transactions within certain limits,
and contemplates a succession of liabilities, for which, as they accrue, the guarantor becomes liable. In other words, a
continuing guaranty is one that covers all transactions, including those arising in the future, which are within the description or
contemplation of the contract of guaranty, until the expiration or termination thereof. The language of the real estate mortgage
unambiguously reveals that the security provided in the real estate mortgage is continuing in nature. Thus, it was intended
as security for the payment of the loans annotated at the back of CCT No.2130, and as security for all amounts that
respondents may owe petitioner bank. It is well settled that mortgages given to secure future advance or loans are valid and
legal contracts, and that the amounts named as consideration in said contracts do not limit the amount for which the mortgage
may stand as security if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be
gathered.
Respondents full payment of the loans annotated on the title of the property shall not effect the release of the mortgage
because, by the express terms of the mortgage, it was mean tto secure all future debts of the spouses and such debts had been
obtained and remain unpaid. Unless full payment is made by the spouses of all the amounts that they have incurred from
petitioner bank, the property is burdened by the mortgage
Case citation: Bank of Commerce vs Flores G.R. No. 174006 December 8, 2010
II)
Real Mortgage
Principal to be held liable when indicated in Real Estate Mortgage

PROBLEM: Angel owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-54678 located in Dipolog City. Her neighbor, Sheryl borrowed
the said title on the pretext that the latter is going to show it to Brian, an interested buyer. But instead of showing the
document to Brian, she obtained a loan in the amount of 50,000.00 from X bank where Brian works. As security for the loan
obtained, she mortgaged the land covered by the aforesaid title by executing an SPA and a Real Estate Mortgage. Eventually
Sheryl lost her job and failed to pay the loan from X bank. The subject property was then foreclosed and sold in an auction sale
in favor of X bank.
Angel filed a case for Annulment of Mortgage, Foreclosure, and SPA against Sheryl and X bank. The bank however denied
Angels claim of forgery of the SPA. The court ruled in favor of Sheryl and the bank, stating that it was not convinced that the
SPA was forged. The court declared that although the Real Estate Mortgage did not indicate that Sheryl was signing for and in
behalf of her principal, Angel is estopped from denying the liability since it was her negligence in handling over her title to
Sheryl that caused the loss.
Question: Is the ruling of the court proper? Decide on whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Sheryl binds
Angel, and whether or not the bank is negligent and is liable for damages.
ANSWER: No, the Real Estate Mortgage does not bind Angel since it was entered into by Sheryl in her own personal capacity.
The law provides that in executing real estate mortgage, the name of the principal should be indicated in order for the latter to
be liable. In this case, the authorized agent failed to indicate in the mortgage that she was acting for and on behalf of her
principal. Granting arguendo that the SPA was valid, the Real Estate Mortgage would still not bind Angel as it was signed by
Sheryl in her personal capacity and not as an agent of Angel. Simply put, the Real Estate Mortgage is void and unenforceable
against Angel.
Yes, the bank acted with negligence and is therefore liable for damages. The law provides that the words "as attorney-in-fact
of," "as agent of," or "for and on behalf of," are vital in order for the principal to be bound by the acts of his agent. Without
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these words, any mortgage, although signed by the agent, cannot bind the principal as it is considered to have been signed by
the agent in his personal capacity.
In the present case, X bank has no one to blame but itself. Not only did it act with undue haste when it granted and released
the loan, it also acted negligently in preparing the Real Estate Mortgage as it failed to indicate that Sheryl was signing it for and
on behalf of petitioner. Hence, X bank is negligent and is liable for damages.
Case Citation: NICANORA BUCTON VS. RURAL BANK OF EL SALVADOR. G.R. No. 179625, February 24, 2014
Application of Writ of Possession
PROBLEM: Spouses CL borrowed P12 million from UC bank. To secure the performance of their obligation, they constituted a
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay. Upon failure to settle the obligation, UC bank applied for extrajudic
ial forclosure sale and emerged as the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was then later issued and registered.
The title was consolidated after the spouses failed to redeem the property. RTC granted the bank's petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession. Should the spouses' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be granted? why or why
not?
ANSWER: No, the writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted. Under Act No. 3135, the application for a writ of
possession by the purchaser in a foreclosure sale conducted under Act No. 3135 is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for
the benefit of one party only and without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. It is a non-litigious
proceeding. It is a ministerial act. Its issuance is a matter of right on the part of the purchaser.
Case citation: UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK vs. CHRISTOPHER LUMBO and MILAGROS LUMBO, G.R. No. 162757
December 11, 2013

Mortgagee in good faith
PROBLEM: Myrtle and Peter, owners of a parcel of land consisting 532 square meters with a five-bedroom house, covered by
TCT No. T-402, mortgaged the said property to Andres to secure the loan in the amount of Php 1,655,000.00. However, instead
of a real estate mortgage, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with an Option to Repurchase. On December 2010,
Myrtle and Peter filed an action for Reformation of Contract (Reformation case) and RTC Manila rendered judgment in their
favor. This was appealed by Andres to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed RTC Manila. Pending appeal of the Reformation
case, Andres filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership and was issued a New Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44848 in the
RTC Las Pias (Consolidation case). Myrtle and Peter appealed the Consolidation case. Andres mortgaged the property to
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank (HSLB) using the new title. HSLB caused the annotation of the mortgage. Myrtle and Peter
also caused an annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Andres title. HSLB foreclosed the subject property. However, on
October 27, 2014, CA annulled RTC Las Pias decision on the Consolidation case declaring Myrtle and Peter as the absolute
owners and ordering the cancellation of Andres title. Can HSLB be considered mortgagee in good faith?
ANSWER: No. The rights of the parties to the present case are defined not by the determination of whether or not HSLB is a
mortgagee in good faith, but of whether or not HSLB is a purchaser in good faith. Although it is a recognized principle that a
person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are
circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, it is
expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants.
HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions.
The subject of the lis pendens on the title of HSLBs vendor, Andres, is the Reformation case, which was decided in favor of
herein respondents. In effect, Andres was not the owner of the property but only a mortgagee. Therefore, Andres could not
have constituted a valid mortgage on the property because ownership of the thing mortgaged is an essential requisite. Article
2085 (2) of the Civil Code provides that the pledger or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged is
essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage.
Case Citation: HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs. ASUNCION P. FELONIA and LYDIA C. DE GUZMAN, Gr. No. 18477
February 26, 2014)

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PROBLEM: Felonia and De Guzman were registered owners of a parcel of land. Sometime in June 1990, the two of them
mortgaged the property to Delgado to secure a loan in the amount of P1,655,000.00.
However, instead of a real estate mortgage, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with an Option to Repurchase. On 20
December 1991, Felonia and De Guzman filed an action for Reformation of Contract (Reformation case), before the RTC of
Manila. On the findings that it is very apparent that the transaction had between the parties is one of a mortgage and not a deed of
sale with right to repurchase.
The RTC, render judgment favorable to Felonia and De Guzman. Aggrieved, Delgado elevated the case to the CA, hence the CA
affirmed the trial courts decision. The CAs decision became final and executory. Despite of the pendency of the Reformation
case in which she was the defendant, Delgado filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership of Property Sold with an Option
to Repurchase and Issuance of a New Certificate of Title, the RTC granted it. Hence a new TCT was issued in favour of Delegado.
Aggrieved, Felonia and De Guzman elevated the case, meanwhile, Delgado mortgaged the subject property to Homeowners Savings and
Loan Bank (HSLB) using her newly registered title. Three days later, or on 5 June 1995, HSLB caused the annotation of the
mortgage. Felonia and De Guzman caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Delgados title. HSLB foreclosed the
subject property and later consolidated ownership in its favor, causing the issuance of a new title in its name. CA annulled and
set aside the decision of the RTC, Las Pias City in the Consolidation case. The decision of the CA, declaring Felonia and De Guzman as the
absolute owners of the subject property and ordering the cancellation of Delgados title, became final and executory. Felonia and De
Guzman, represented by Maribel Frias (Frias), claiming to be the absolute owners of the subject property, instituted the instant complaint
against Delgado, HSLB, Register of Deeds of Las Pias City and Rhandolfo B. Amansec before the RTC of Las Pias City for Nullity of Mortgage
and
Foreclosure
Sale,
Annulment
of
Titles
of
Delgado and
HSLB, and finally, Reconveyance of Possession and Ownership of the subject property
in their
favor. As
defendant,
HSLB asserted that Felonia and De Guzman are barred from laches as they had slept on their rights to timely annotate, by way
of Notice of Lis Pendens, the pendency of the Reformation case. HSLB also claimed that it should not be bound by the decisions
of the CA in the Reformation and Consolidation cases because it was not a party therein. Lastly HSLB asserted they were
mortgagee in good faith.
Question: Is HSLB a Mortgagee in good faith.
ANSWER: Mortgagee in good faith; HSLB, as a mortgagee, had a right to rely in good faith on Delgados title, and in the
absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, HSLB had no obligation to undertake further investigation. When the property
was mortgaged to HSLB, the registered owner of the subject property was Delgado who had in her name TCT No. 44848. Thus,
HSLB cannot be faulted in relying on the face of Delgados title. The records indicate that Delgado was at the time of the
mortgage in possession of the subject property and Delgados title did not contain any annotation that would arouse HSLBs
suspicion. HSLB, as a mortgagee, had a right to rely in good faith on Delgados title, and in the absence of any sign that might
arouse suspicion, HSLB had no obligation to undertake further investigation. As held by this Court in Cebu International Finance
Corp. v. CA: The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the
mortgagor of the property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to
undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the
mortgaged property, the mortgagee or transferee in good faith is nonetheless entitled to protection.
Case citation: Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Asuncion P. Felonia and Lydia C. De Guzman, rep. by Maribel Frias, et al.,
G.R. No. 189477. February 26, 2014
Accessory follows the principal
PROBLEM: A mortgaged a building located in Cebu to PNB. Before the expiration of the redemption period B the true owner of
the lot filed an Annulment of the mortgage and reconveyance of the property in the RTC. C a lessee of the property, not
knowing to whom his unpaid rentals belong consigned his payment with the Court where the case was pending. The Court ruled
that the property belonged to B but the mortgage must be respected as it was in good faith. Both parties did not appeal the
case but B filed a motion to withdraw the rentals paid by C being the true owner. PNB argued that the rentals should go to him
as the ownership of the lot was reconveyed to him after the expiration of the redemption period.
Who among B and PNB bank is entitled to Cs rentals?
ANSWER: PNB is not entitled to the rentals paid by C as the mortgage was not made by B who was the true owner.
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Rent as an accessory follows the principal. In Castro Jr. v. CA the Court explained that Article 2127 is predicated on the
presumption that the ownership of accessions and accessories also belongs to the mortgagor as the owner of the principal.
After all, it is an indispensable requisite of a valid real estate mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
encumbered property.
Thus, PNBs title over the property in not in the concept of an owner having mortgage to him by not the true owner.
Case citation: PNB V. SPS BERNARDO AND CRESENCIA MARANON, GR No 189316 July 1, 2013
Notice in Contracts
PROBLEM: Jose T. Ramirez mortgaged two parcels of land located at Bayanbayanan, Marikina City in favor of respondent The
Manila Banking Corporation to secure his P265,000 loan. The real estate mortgage provides that all correspondence relative to
the mortgage including notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to petitioner Ramirez at his given address.
Respondent filed a request for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage before Atty. Hipolito Saez on the ground that
Ramirez failed to pay his loan despite demands. During the auction sale on September 8, 1994, respondent was the only bidder
for the mortgaged properties. Thereafter, a certificate of sale was issued in its favor as the highest bidder.
In 2000, respondent demanded that Ramirez vacate the properties. Ramirez sued respondent for annulment of sale and prayed
that the certificate of sale be annulled on the ground, among others, that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage was violated
for he was not notified of the foreclosure and auction sale.
In its answer, respondent claimed that the foreclosure proceedings were valid. The trial court ruled that the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings were null and void and the certificate of sale is invalid. The CA reversed the trial courts decision and
ruled that absence of personal notice of foreclosure to Ramirez as required by paragraph N of the real estate mortgage is not a
ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. Ramirezs motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed CA Resolution.
Question: What is the legal effect of violating paragraph N of the deed of mortgage which requires personal notice to the
petitioner-mortgagor by the respondent-mortgagee bank?
ANSWER: The petition shall be granted.
In Carlos Lim, et al. v. Development Bank of the Philippines, we held that unless the parties stipulate, personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting
of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case,
the parties stipulated in paragraph N of the real estate mortgage that all correspondence relative to the mortgage including
notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to mortgagor Ramirez at his given address. Respondent had no choice but to
comply with this contractual provision it has entered into with Ramirez. The contract is the law between them. Hence, we
cannot agree with the bank that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage does not impose an additional obligation upon it to
provide personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor Ramirez.
As we explained in Metropolitan Bank v. Wong, the banks violation of paragraph N of the real estate mortgage is sufficient to
invalidate the extrajudicial foreclosure sale:
A contract is the law between the parties and absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the courts. Section 3, Act
No. 3135 reads:
"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three
public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and city."
The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the publication of the
same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless,
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the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. In this case,
petitioner and respondent in entering into a contract of real estate mortgage, agreed inter alia:
"all correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas, or
notifications of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR."
Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to apprise respondent of any action which petitioner might take on the
subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of
foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on November 23,
1981 null and void.
Case Citation: JOSE T. RAMIREZ VS. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 198800, DECEMBER 11, 2013
III)
Antichresis
PROBLEM: X was the owner of 12 hectares of land. He obtained a loan from Y in the amount of P 200,000.00 and as security,
mortgaged the said property to the latter. Y immediately took possession of the land. The transaction was not put into writing.
When X died, his heirs, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated December 24, 1997 covering the subject property and
TCT No. T-65152 was issued to them.
In June 1998, the Heirs of X expressed their intention to redeem the mortgaged property from Y but the latter refused, claiming
that the transaction between him and X was one of sale. On trial, however, X was not able to present authentic record of the
Deed of Conveyance and the Register of Deeds found discrepancies of his title as the TCT No. indicated therein was in existent
in the Register of Deeds record.
The heirs of X claimed that the contract being made was one of antichresis. Is the claim tenable?
ANSWER: No. For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that "the amount of the
principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of antichresis shall be void." In this case, the
Heirs of Adolfo were indisputably unable to produce any document in support of their claim that the contract between X and Y
was an antichresis.
Case citation: Aniceto Bangis, substituted by his heirs, namely Rodolfo B. Bangis, et al. vs. Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo,
namely: Luz A. Banniester, et al. G.R. No. 190875. June 13, 2012
212

LEASE
I)
Lease of Work or Services
Recovery of Additional Costs in Contracts

PROBLEM: A and B, petitioners, contracted with respondent Z Construction to construct, within a 150-day period, the concrete
structural shell of the formers two-storey residential house in Urdaneta Village, Makati City at the contract price of
P3,291,142.00.
Article I, paragraph 6, of the Contract incorporates this provision:
The CONTRACTOR shall make no change or alteration in the plans and specifications as
well as in the works subject hereof without the prior written approval of the OWNER. A
mere act of tolerance shall not constitute approval.
During the construction, the respondent effected 19 change orders without the petitioners prior written approval, amounting to
P 912, 885.91. Respondent also notified the petitioners that the delay in the payment of progress billings delays the
accomplishment of the contract work. Respondent then demanded full payment for progress billings and change orders.
On the other hand, the petitioners denied liability, asserting that the respondent violated the contract provisions by, among
others, failing to finish the contract within the 150-day stipulated period, failing to comply with the provisions on change orders,
and overstating its billings.
This prompted the respondent to file a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for collection of the unpaid balance of the
contract and the unpaid change orders, plus damages and attorneys fees.
Applying Article 1724 of the Civil Code, the RTC found that when the respondent performed the change orders without the
petitioners written agreement, it did so at its own risk and it could not compel the petitioners to pay.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It ruled that Article 1724 of the Civil Code does
not apply because the provision pertains to disputes arising from the higher cost of labor and materials and there was no
demand for increase in the costs of labor and materials. Does Article 1724 of the Civil Code apply?
ANSWER: Yes. The law provides Article 1724 governs the recovery of additional costs in contracts for a stipulated price (such
as fixed lump-sum contracts), and the increase in price for additional work due to change in plans and specifications. Such
added cost can only be allowed upon the: (a) written authority from the developer or project owner ordering or allowing the
written changes in work, and (b) written agreement of parties with regard to the increase in price or cost due to the change in
work or design modification. Compliance with these two requisites is a condition precedent for the recovery. The absence of one
or the other condition bars the recovery of additional costs. Neither the authority for the changes made nor the additional price
to be paid therefore may be proved by any other evidence.
In the present case the Contract provided that the CONTRACTOR shall make no change or alteration in the plans and
specifications as well as in the works subject hereof without the prior written approval of the OWNER. A mere act of tolerance
shall not constitute approval. Significantly, the respondent did not secure the required written approval of the petitioners before
making the changes in the plans, specifications and works. Thus, for undertaking change orders without the stipulated written
approval of the petitioners, the respondent cannot claim the additional costs it incurred, save for the change orders the
petitioners accepted and paid for as discussed below. Thus, Article 1724 of the Civil Code applies.
Case citation: SPOUSES VICTORIANO CHUNG and DEBBIE CHUNG v. CONSTRUCTION, INC. G.R. No. 156038 October 11, 2010
II)
Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee
Renewal of Lease
PROBLEM: George and ABC Corporation entered into a contract of lease whereby the former leased in favor to the latter a
parcel of land known as Lot 5-E. One of the stipulations in the contract of lease states, The LESSEE, if desirous of continuing
213

his lease, should notify the LESSOR sixty (60) days prior to expiration of the period agreed upon for the renewal of the Contract
of Lease.
Within 60 days before the expiration of the lease contract, ABC Corporation notified George of its intention to renew the same.
However, George declined to renew the lease contract, and ordered ABC to vacate the property upon the expiration of the
lease. The president of ABC Corporation, Marcus, without a prior board resolution, sent a letter to George conceding to the
latters wishes. Later, ABC replaced its president with a new one, Theodore, and this time he sent a board-approved letter
notifying George of the companys intention to renew the contract of lease. George still declined. Thus, ABC was compelled to
go to court and prayed for an order to renew the contract of lease. George countered with the following arguments:
5)
6)
He was not bound to renew the contract of lease with the company. The renewal of the contract of lease cannot be
made to depend on the sole will of respondent for the same would then be void for being a potestative condition.; and
That, in any event, Marcus, the former president of ABC, already conceded to the non-renewal of the contract; thus,
the company is already estopped.
Decide.
ANSWER: George is bound to renew the contract of lease.
In Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124290, 16 January 1998) the Supreme Court held that an express
agreement which gives the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is frequent and subject to statutory restrictions, valid and
binding on the parties. This option, which is provided in the same lease agreement, is fundamentally part of the consideration
in the contract and is no different from any other provision of the lease carrying an undertaking on the part of the lessor to act
conditioned on the performance by the lessee. The fact that such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only
by the lessee does not render it void for lack of mutuality. After all, the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the
lessee. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to continue with the lease or not, once he exercises his option to
continue and the lessor accepts, both parties are thereafter bound by the new lease agreement.
The renewal provision between George and ABC Corporation solely granted to latter the option of renewing the lease of the
subject property, the only express requirement was for the company to notify the lessor of its decision to renew the lease within
60 days prior to the expiration of the original lease term. It has not been disputed that said contract of lease was willingly and
knowingly entered into by George and ABC Corporation. Thus, the lessor freely consented to giving the lessee, ABC, the
exclusive right to choose whether or not to renew the lease.
c.
The essential elements of estoppel in pais may be considered in relation to the party sought to be estopped, and in
relation to the party invoking the estoppel in his favor. As related to the party to be estopped, the essential elements
are: (1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts; or at least calculated to convey
the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts
to assert; (2) intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, the other
party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.
As related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge
of the truth as the facts in questions; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped;
(3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to
his injury, detriment or prejudice.
In the case at bar, Marcus letter to George may have already expressed acquiescence to the non-renewal of the lease. But not
long thereafter, Theodore, the new president of ABC, already wrote another letter which revoked Marcus earlier letter for
having been sent without authority of the Board of Directors of the company, insisted on the renewal of the lease. There is no
showing that the lessor, George, relying in good faith on Marcus letters, acted or did not act as to have caused him injury,
detriment, or prejudice. There is an utter lack of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence on the part of the lessor, as the
party claiming estoppel, of the second and third elements for the application of said principle against the lessee.
Case Citation: Manila International Airport Authority vs. Ding Velayo GR No. 161718, December 14, 2011
Name/Class: Santiago, Janry Nino Regular Class
III)
Special Rules for Lease of Rural/Urban Lands
Privity of contracts and sublease

214
PROBLEM: HDSJ leased a parcel of land located in Pasay City to A. The lease contract was effective for a period of one year,
and was renewed for one-year periods several times. Section 6 of the lease contract provides:
This contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing.
A constructed two buildings on the parcel of land which he subleased. He also designated his son B to administer the said
property. Few years later A died but B did not notify HDSJ of As death. After As passing, B collected the rentals from the
sublessees, and paid the rentals to HDSJ, and the taxes on the property. HDSJs property administrator, notified B that HDSJ is
terminating the lease contract stating:
We acknowledge the fact that HDSJ has been accepting the payment of your rentals since the demise of A. Hence, an
implied contract of lease between the two of you exists. However, since there is no stipulation as to the period of the
contract and you are paying a monthly rental to our client, the period for the lease is on a month-to-month basis (Art.
1687). Thus as of this date, your contract should expire on March 31, 2001.
B then sent a letter to HDSJ dated 12 March 2001, suggesting that the lease contract be renegotiated for the welfare of the
sublessees occupying the parcel of land. On 3 April 2001, HDSJ notified Ramon that the lease contract shall not be renewed
because Ramon has "continually subleased the subject premises to about 20 families (in addition to a commercial
establishment) without the knowledge and consent of the lessor, [HDSJ]."
Question: Is HDSJ correct? Is the lease contracted terminated upon As death?
ANSWER: No. Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. The general rule, therefore, is lease
contracts survive the death of the parties and continue to bind the heirs except if the contract states otherwise.
Moreover, Ramon had a right to sublease the premises since the lease contract did not contain any stipulation forbidding
subleasing. Article 1650 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1650. When in the contract of lease of things there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing
leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the lessor.
Therefore, the sublease contracts executed by B were valid.
Case citation: ANALITA P. INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON INOCENCIO (Deceased) vs. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE, G.R. No.
201787. September 25, 2013
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
I)
Principles
Elements of Quasi-Delict
PROBLEM: On August 31, 2014 , at around 10:00 p.m., Joseph Russel Ingko was driving a Blue Maserati Ghibli car along
South Road Properties , Cebu City. His sister, Dra. Vicky Ingko, was seated at the front passenger seat. Joseph stopped the car
across SM City SRP, when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and
sand suddenly rammed the cars rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars rear end collapsed and
its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. Vicky Ingko , although she did not appear to have suffer
from any other visible physical injuries except for minor wounds. Later, through investigation report, the truck driver was
identified as Joel Adriatico, found to be recklessly imprudent in driving the truck owned by Rebecca Byong, doing business
under the name and style of MMDA Trading and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.
In the first week of September 2014, Dra.Vicky Ingko began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of neck and shoulder.
The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe and her health deteriorated to the extend
the she could no longer move her left arm. Thus, she consulted with Dr. Francisca Tolentino, a rehabilitation specialist, and the
latter told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left
arm.
Dr. Vicky Ingko came to your office for legal consultation and hired you as her counsel. She wants to file an action for Damages
against Rebecca Byong.
Question: As the counsel of Dr. Vicky Ingko, what will you do on sought action will prosper in court?
ANSWER: As counsel for the Plaintiff, we need to adduced preponderance of evidence to establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury of my client. Pursuant to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, though there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties a quasi-delict is deemed situated. There are necessary elements that we
must consider, as such: (1) Damages to the Dr. Vicky Ingko(Plaintiff);(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by
some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages. Once all of these will be established first, we can laid down our basis as to the extent of liability of
Rebecca as Joels employer on the presumption that she did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Joel. Thus, the court may proceed then in applying the provision under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code that calls for an action predicated on an employees act or omission maybe instituted against the employer who is held
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.
Case Citation: Dra. Leila A. Dela Llana vs. Rebecca Biong GR. No. 182356, December 04, 2013
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
PROBLEM: A post-dated check in the amount of One Million payable to MMGI was presented for deposit and accepted at Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied). The post-dated check was drawn against the account of Silva with Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI). Upon receipt, Allied sent the check for clearing to BPI through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation. The check was
cleared by BPI and Allied credited the account of MMGI with One Million.
Subsequently, MMGIs account was closed and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered the debit
of One Million from his account. In response to Silvas complaint, BPI credited his account with the said sum.
Thereafter, BPI returned a photocopy of the check to Allied for the reason: "Postdated." Allied, however, refused to accept and
sent back to BPI a photocopy of the check.
Allied filed a complaint against BPI before the PCHC Arbitration Committee which rendered decision against the latter, noting its
failure to return the check within the 24-hour reglementary period or to course through the clearing facilities of PCHC.
Does the antecedent negligence of Allied in the encashment of a post-dated check and the supervening negligence of BPI of
clearing a post-dated check without observing procedural rules call for the application of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance?
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ANSWER: Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes
negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon
that assumption. In situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendants failure to exercise such ordinary care,
having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.
In this case, the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of BP which cleared
a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification procedure. If only BPI
exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on
the face of the check. BPI could have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, Allied would have
not credited the amount thereof to the payees account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of Allied in accepting
the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from BPI the amount credited to the payees account covering the
check.
Case citation: Allied Banking Corporation vs. BPI, (G.R. No. 188363, February 27, 2013)
II)
The Tortfeasor
PROBLEM: PUJ operators Sps. Mamaril would park their 6 passenger jeepneys every night at BSPs compound in Malate,
Manila for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. One day, one of the vehicles was missing and was never recovered.
According to the security guards with whom BSP had contracted for its security and protection, a male person who looked
familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound. The parking ticket itself expressly stated that the "Management
shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein." It also claimed that Sps. Mamaril
erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from not being parties thereto, its provisions cover only the protection
of BSP's properties, its officers, and employees.
Question: May be held liable for the loss of the vehicle caused by the negligence of its security guards?
ANSWER: Yes. Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Similarly, Article 2176 of the Civil Code states that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The proximate cause of the loss of vehicle was the negligent act of security guard in allowing an unidentified person to drive out
the subject vehicle. The records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP.
Moreover, the contract between the parties herein was one of lease as defined under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It has been
held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. The agreement with respect to
the ingress and egress of Sps. Mamaril's vehicles were coordinated only with AIB and its security guards, without the knowledge
and consent of BSP. Accordingly, the mishandling of the parked vehicles that resulted in herein complained loss should be
recovered only from the tort feasors (Pea and Gaddi) and their employer, AIB; and not against the lessor, BSP.
Case citation: Sps. Mamaril vs. Boy Scout of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179382. January 14, 2013
III)
Proximate Cause
PROBLEM: For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio booked at the
Shangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).
Three days before the event, a final food tasting took place. The spouses aver that the salmon served was half the size of what
they were served during the initial food tasting; and when queried about it, the hotel quoted a much higher price (P1,200.00)
for the size that was initially served to them. The parties eventually agreed on a final price P1,150 per person.
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The spouses claim that during the reception, respondents representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales Manager
Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their guests complained of the delay in the service of
the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable; the hotels waiters were rude and unapologetic when
confronted about the delay; and despite Alvarezs promise that there would be no charge for the extension of the reception
beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M.
the next day. They filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
In its Answer, the Hotel claimed that spouses requested a combination of king prawns and salmon, hence, the price was
increased to P1,200.00 per person, but discounted at P1,150.00; that contrary to spouses claim, Marquez and Alvarez were
present during the event, albeit they were not permanently stationed thereat as there were three other hotel functions; that
while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests to 470 from the
guaranteed expected minimum number of guests of 350 to a maximum of 380, as stated in the Banquet Event Order
(BEO). The Hotel argued that the proximate cause of petitioners injury was an unexpected increase in their guests. As the
Judge, how will you rule on the complaint?
ANSWER: Rule in favour of the spouses. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads: Art.
1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Therefore the spouses are entitled to nominal damages.
Case Citation: SPOUSES GUANIO vs MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL, G.R. NO. 190601. February. 7, 2011
IV)
Negligence
Presumption of Negligence of a person who was violating any traffic regulation at the time of the mishap
PROBLEM: Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap on a national highway. Laarni was driving
a jitney while the tractor-trailer was driven by Jabon. Eye witnesses clearly recount that Laarni was the one negligent since her
jitney was moving downward in a zigzag manner while Jabon was slowly ascending a slope. Multiple death and injuries to those
in the jitney resulted.
During the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his drivers license. As a
matter of fact, he even asked the Land Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license which would allow him to drive a
tractor-trailer. Conclusively, he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision.
Laarni hastily filed a petition for damages against Jabon, praying for indemnification of the medical and burial expenses together
with moral damages. If you are the judge, how will you rule on the petition?
ANSWER: If I were the judge, I would deny Laarnis petition. Although, driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic
regulation, under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises only if at the time of the mishap, a
person was violating any traffic regulation. A causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the
traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or
that it substantially contributed thereto.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer drivers restrictions on his license to the
vehicular collision. Laarni was in fact the proximate cause of the accident, hence, her petition should be denied.
Case Citation: Albert Tison and Claudio Jabon vs. Sps. Gregorio Pomasin, et. al., GR No. 173180. August 24, 2011
V)
Special Liability in Particular Activities
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
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Facts: Aerith Sitri was born with an imperforate anus. Two days after her birth, she underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure
to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling her to excrete through a colostomy bag
attached to the side of her body.
On May 1995, then 3yrs old, Aerith was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation, which was conducted
by several surgeons and anaesthesiologists, including Dr. Murrue Ramius. During the operation, Aerith experienced bradycardia,
and went into a coma which lasted for 2weeks and when she regained consciousness, she could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her daughters helpless and unexpected condition, Tifa lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office against the attending physicians.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Murrue Ramius guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries. Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Judge reasoned where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.
Question: Is the Judge correct in applying res ipsa loquitur on this case?
Held: No, the Judge is not correct. In order to allow resort to the doctrine, the following essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit:
1)
2)
3)
the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and
the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
In the present case, the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inappropriate. Although the second and third elements
were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Murrue
Ramius, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence, the first element is lacking. Tifa delivered Aerith to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through
operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Aerith was then of sound body and mind at the time of her submission to the
physicians. Yet, she experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of her senses and rendering her immobile.
Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to
the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of her attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril
to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired
result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation
or treatment was not accomplished.
Case citation: Dr. Fernando Solidum vs People - GR 192123. March 10, 2014
Medical Negligence
PROBLEM: Patient X with cancer of sigmoid was operated on by Doctor A. During the operation, it was discovered that the
cancer had spread to the ovaries. Another doctor, Dr. B was called in to perform the hysterectomy.
The record of operation showed sponge count lacking 2.announced to surgeon. Search done but to no avail. Continue for
closure.
Patient X complained of pain after the operation but was reassured that it was natural consequence of surgery. More than 4
months later, X went back to the country and still experiencing pain. A piece of gauze was later seen protruding from her
genital area. The surgeon who operated on her was able to extract a piece of gauze by hand and reassured a piece of gauze by
hand and reassured her that pain would now go away.
The pain did not go away and upon consultation with another physician, another gauze was found in her vaginal vault as well as
the presence of a recto-vaginal fistula requiring second operation.
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X sued Dr. A and PSI hospital for negligently leaving 2 pieces of gauze inside patients body and for concealing their acts of
negligence.
PSI hospital raised the following contentions:
a.
that they cannot be held liable because there is no employer-employee relationship between PSI hospital and Dr. A;
such that the principle of respondent superior is unavailable;
b.
that had the patient informed the hospital of her discomfort and pain, the hospital would have been obliged to act on
it;
Question: Are the contentions tenable?

ANSWER: No, both contentions are not tenable.
On the first contention, even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient
that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article
1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority.
On the second contention, the hospital took no heed of the record of operation and consequently did not initiate a review of
what transpired during patients operation. Rather, it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to others-to the doctor whom it
expected to inform patient, and to the patient herself to complain before it took any meaningful step. PSI may be held directly
liable to the patient for its own negligence for failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a
corporation. By its inaction, therefore, hospital failed its own standard of hospital care. It committed corporate negligence.
Case citation: Professional Services, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. / Natividad, G.R. No. 126297. February 2, 2000.
DAMAGES
I)
Nominal Damages
PROBLEM: Sometime in March 2014, Jejemar Trillanes made a travel reservation with Cayetano Travel for his familys trip to
Argao, Spain. Jejemar paid for the Makati Airlines round-trip airplane tickets for Manila-HongKong-Argao-HongKong-Manila.
Jejemar reconfirmed his familys return flight with the Makati Airlines office in Argao and the reservation was okay as scheduled.
On departure day Jejemar was informed by a staff from Makati Airlines that they did not have confirmed reservations, and only
his mother-in-law's flight booking was confirmed. Nevertheless, they were allowed to board the flight to Hong Kong. But in
HongKong, they were again informed of the same problem and were not allowed to board because the flight to Manila was fully
booked. Only his mother-in-law was allowed. The next day, they were allowed to board the next flight to Manila.
Jejemar filed a Complaint for damages with attorney's fees against Makati Airlines and Cayetano Travel.
Makati Airlines argued that no valid ticket number was inputted in its system and it had the right to cancel the booking.
Cayetano Travel maintained that it made the necessary reservation with Makati Airlines for respondents trip to Argao.After
getting confirmed bookings with Makati Airlines, Cayetano Travel issued the corresponding tickets to respondents.
Question: Are both of them, Makati Airlines and Cayetano Travel liable for damages?
ANSWER: Yes, Makati Airlines and Cayetano Travel are jointly and solidarily liable for nominal damages.
Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
Makati Airlines and Cayetano Travel acted together in creating the confusion in the bookings which led to the erroneous
cancellation of respondents bookings. Their negligence is the proximate cause of the technical injury sustained by respondents.
220
Therefore, they are liable to pay Jejemar and his family nominal damages.
Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must vindicated against an invasion that has
produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.
Case citation: Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Reyes, et al. G.R. No. 185891, June 26, 2013
PROBLEM: The Municipality of Boljoon entered into a contract with Derama Incorporated, a corporation engaged in the
operation of shopping malls in the country, for the construction of a shopping mall in the Municipality. They agreed that Derama
Inc. shall shoulder the cost of the construction and shall pay a minimal amount only as lease of the lot on which the mall is to
be constructed. Derama Inc. hired Vallarta Construction Specialist Inc. as contractor to carry out such contract. In their
contract, Derama Inc. has the discretion to suspend the construction due to changes in the building plan after notice to the
contractor.
Thirty days after the commencement of the construction of the shopping mall, Derama Inc. ordered the indefinite suspension of
the construction of the mall on account of the modification of its designs and on account of a Graft case filed against the
Municipal Officials of Boljoon arising from the said contract. After the graft case was terminated, Derama Inc. never notified the
contractor and never lifted the suspension order. In order to get rid of the first contractor, the latter ordered for another public
bidding for the new design of the shopping mall.
As a result Vallarta Construction Specialist Inc. filed this instant suit for the payment of its accomplished works and the cost of
the materials amounting to Php 5,000,000.00 and alleged that it is entitled to nominal damages in the amount of Php
100,000.00. Is the contention of Vallarta Construction Specialist Inc. tenable?
ANSWER: Yes, on account of Derama Incorporateds failure to observe the proper procedure in terminating the contract by
declaring that it was merely indefinitely suspended, Vallarta Construction Inc. is entitled to the payment of nominal damages.
Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of
vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is, thus, not
for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. A violation of the plaintiffs right,
even if only technical, is sufficient to support an award of nominal damages.
Case Citation: LICOMCEN INCORPORATED, vs. FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., G.R. No. 167022 April 4, 2011
II)
Temperate or Moderate Damages
QUESTION: When may temperate or moderate damages be awarded?

ANSWER: Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
The claimant must present proof of the actual amount of expenses which will served as the basis for the court to award
temperate or moderate damages.
Case Citation: Wuerth Philippines Inc., vs. Rodante Ynson G.R. No. 175932 February 15, 2012
III)
Liquidated Damages
Loss of Earning Capacity

PROBLEM: P, 43 years old and a policeman was riding a motorcycle and crossing the intersection, when a tricycle, driven by T,
allegedly bumped his motorcycle from behind. As a result, the motorcycle was pushed into the path of a delivery van, driven by
D, which was cruising along the same road. The delivery van ran over P, while his motorcycle was thrown a few meters away
221

which resulted to the latters death. The heirs of P then filed a case against T and D. The Regional Trial Court then ruled in
favor of the heirs of P and declared that T and D be held solidarily liable for damages and loss of earning capacity. How much
does the Regional Trial Court award the heirs of P if the latter is earning P12, 754 monthly?
ANSWER: The Regional Trial Court should award the amount of P1, 887, 847.00 as loss of earning capacity.
According to the Supreme Court, the award of damages for loss of earning capacity is concerned with the determination of
losses or damages sustained by heirs of the deceased. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity is determined by computing the
net earning capacity of the victim using the formula Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses) and life expectancy should be computed in accordance with the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality which is again computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]). Lastly, the
reasonable and necessary living expenses should be pegged at 50% of the gross annual income absent any evidence to the
contrary.
In the case at bar, P, 43 years old, was earning P12, 754 a month as a policeman at the time of his death which should be
multiplied by 12 to get his gross annual income minus the reasonable and necessary expenses equivalent to 50% of the gross
income which would result to the amount of P 76, 524. Next is to compute for Ps life expectancy by deducting his age at death
of 43 to 80 and multiply it by 2 and divide it again by 3 which would result to 24.67 which then should be multiplied to the
amount of P76, 524 to get the Net Earning Capacity of P1, 887, 847.00.
Case Citation: Constancia G. Tamayo, et al. Vs. Rosalia Abad Seora, et al. - G.R. No. 176946
Subrogation of rights; Common carriers; Liability of Quasi-Delict
PROBLEM: AA insured the shipment of its cargo with BB. AA also engaged the services of XX for the withdrawal of its cargoes
from pier to its warehouses. XX engaged the services of YY for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to AAs
warehouses. The goods were loaded to the trucks owned by YY, driven by its employees. One truck did not reach its
destination. It was later on recovered but without the goods. AA filed with BB a claim for insurance indemnity and the latter
paid. BB then filed a complaint for damages against both XX and YY for the loss of the subject cargo.
Questions:
1) Can BB subrogate the rights of AA?
2) Are both XX and YY common Carriers?
3) Can YY be held liable?
ANSWER:
1)
YES. Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so
that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or
securities. Doubtless, BB is subrogated to the rights of the insured (AA) to the extent of the amount it paid the
consignee (AA) under the marine insurance, as provided under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the person who has
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, BB has the right to seek reimbursement from either XX or YY
or both for breach of contract and/or tort.
2)
YES. Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, XX is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods
by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein
the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general
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public. The distinction is significant in the sense that the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private
carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between XX and YY was private in
character. There is no showing that XX solely and exclusively rendered services to YY.
In fact, XX admitted that it is a common carrier.
In the same vein, YY is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum, it
states that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is
engaged in the business of customs brokering. It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court
in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a
common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
3)
YES. It may not have a direct contractual relation with AA, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of YY whose employees (truck driver and helper)
were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, YY should be made answerable for the
damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to
the warehouse.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an
employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. In this regard, YY failed.
Case Citation: Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc, vs. Glodel Brokerage Corporation and R and B Insurance Corporation, GR.
No. 179446

IV)
Miscellaneous Rules
Quantum Meruit
PROBLEM: RR Realty entered into a joint venture agreement with SS Builders Corporation for the construction of a residential
subdivision. According to its terms, SS Builders Corporation was to assume the works in the remaining 69% undeveloped
portion of the project owned by RR Realty, and complete the same within twelve (12) months from signing. RR Realty agreed to
reimburse SS Corporation but the reimbursable amount remained paid. Should SS Builders Corporation be entitled to be
compensated for the development works it had accomplished? Why or why not?
ANSWER: Yes, SS Builders Corporation is entitled to be compensated for the development works it had accomplished on the
project based on the principle of quantum meruit. Under this principle, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value
of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of a written contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment.RR Realty obligated
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itself to unconditionally reimburse SS Builders Corporation the amount after the JVA had already been terminated by them
through mutual assent. RR Realty cannot unilaterally renege on its promise.
Case citation: RIVELISA REALTY, INC., represented by RICARDO P. VENTURINA, vs. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS
CORPORATION, represented by RAMON A. PANGILINAN, as President, G.R. No. 189618 January 15, 2014
Vicarious Liability
QUESTION: A bus owned and registered under the name of Bea Locsin and driven by Phil Manzano hit the car of Angelica
Ramsay due to the negligent driving and for violation of traffic regulations of Phil.
An information was filed against the driver, Phil Manzano, for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
physical injuries, however, he eluded arrest, thus, Angelica filed a separate complaint for damages against Bea. Bea, on the
other hand contended that she is exempted from any liabilities for the acts done by his employee.
Can a separate claim for damages be instituted against Bea?
ANSWER: Yes, a separate claim for damages may be instituted against Bea under the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed
negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to
another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances. In our
jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in
the action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his
employee
Case citation: Mariano C. Mendoza and Elvira Lim v. Spouses Leonora J. Gomez and Gabriel V. Gomez, G.R. no. 160110
MACASA, JOSEPH PAUL Regular Class
Negligence
PROBLEM: Arnelito Binay fell from the overpass and was brought unconscious to West Boulevard Medical Center, a
government hospital. His hospital patients identification sheet erroneously identified him as Angelito Pintay of Kalayaan Avenue,
Quezon City upon arrival at the Emergency Room. Later on Pintay developed generalized seizures and his condition
progressively deteriorated. Admission to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilator support became necessary, but
there was no vacancy at the ICU and available ventilator at WBMC.
Arrangements were made and the unconscious Angelito was transferred to the National Kidney Institute, another government
hospital. At the NKI, the name Angelito was recorded as Angelito Pintay. As Pintay had no relatives around, Jenny Masa, NKIs
Transplant Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media assistance. Dr. Una, Chairman of the
Department of Surgery, observed that the severity of the brain injury of Pintay manifested symptoms of brain death.
Angelito was later pronounced brain dead. It was learned that Pintay was a suitable organ donor and that some NKI patients
awaiting organ donation had blood and tissue types compatible with Pintay. As the extensive search for the relatives of Pintay
yielded no positive result and time being of the essence in the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Una requested Dr. Fili,
Executive Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of Pintay for transplantation purposes to
which Dr.Fili gave his consent. Dr. Una likewise instructed Dr. Rosa Maria to secure permission for the planned organ retrieval
and transplantation from the Medico-Legal Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), on the assumption that the
incident which lead to the brain injury and death of Pintay was a medico legal case.
Later on, a medical team, composed of Dr. Una, as principal surgeon, then transplanted a kidney and the pancreas of Pintay to
In Chi Ek and the other kidney of Pintay to Alexandro.
Minda, aunt of Arnelito, heard the news aired on television about a successful double organ transplantation and that the donor
was an eighteen (18) year old boy whose name sounded like Arnelito Binay and that the body was at La Funeral Oro, Minda
informed Arnelitos family of the news report. Upon receiving the news from Minda, Arnelitos family and children went to La
Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket.
Arnelitos Family now sues the Surgical Team and NKIs Executive Director for negligence and damages in granting authorization
and for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of Arnelito who had been declared brain dead, for the emotional
224

pain they suffered for the death of Arnelito and upon seeing the cheap casket he was in, and finally, for their failure to receive
word or notice of Arnelitos death.
If you were the judge, rule on the case. Explain.
ANSWER: I will rule against the plaintiff. Defendants are not negligent.
The Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code provides that to be liable for damages, one must have contrary to law, morals, good
customs, or public policy, willfully or negligently causes damage, injury, or loss to another.
In the case at bar, defendants are not negligent as all efforts were made to locate and inform the family. The operation was
only done when all the necessary permission were obtained. It was not the Surgical or Medical Teams fault that Arnelito Binay
was erroneously identified nor was it their fault if plaintiff failed to immediately receive notice of Arnelito's death because the
notices did not properly state the name or identity of the deceased.
It was the WBMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who recorded the wrong information
regarding the deceased's identity to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, the
deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.
Hence, the case has no merit.
Case citation: Dr. Filoteo A. Alano vs. Zenaida Magud-Logmao, G.R. No. 175540, April 7, 2014
Attorney's fees
PROBLEM: Spouses Pedro and Petra engaged the legal services of Atty. Mukhangpera in the complaint filed against them for
annulment of contract involving a parcel of land. They agreed that Atty. Mukhanpera would get 25% of the market value of the
subject land if the complaint filed against them would be dismissed. While the case was pending, the spouses died. Thereafter,
they were substituted by their children. When the case was dismissed, Atty. Mukhangpera filed the Motion to Determine
Attorneys Fees before the RTC. The children asserted that Article 2208 of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorneys fees
under a written agreement and the alleged understanding between their deceased parents and Atty. Mukhangpera, however,
was never put in writing. They also aver that they did not have any knowledge or information about the existence of an oral
contract, contrary to Atty. Mukhangperas claims. Subsequently, RTC denied the motion on the ground that the agreement was
not in writing. Is the RTCs decision correct?
ANSWER: NO. There are two concepts of attorneys fees ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by
the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.
In the case at bench, the attorneys fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation for professional services
rendered, and not as indemnity for damages notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was not put in writing. It cannot be
denied that petitioner devoted much time and energy in handling the case for the spouses and the children. Given the
considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the quality of work shown by him in ensuring
the successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorneys fees for services rendered.
Case citation: FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner, vs. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, PHILIP RYAN DE
GUZMAN, and ROSELLA DE GUZMAN BAUTISTA, Respondents. G.R. No. 191247 July 10, 2013
Damages in breach of contract of carriage
PROBLEM: Gillego, a congressman left Manila on board Air Frances aircraft bound for Paris, France. He was to attend as a
keynote speaker in a conference to be held in Budapest, Hungary and Tokyo, Japan. When in Paris, he arranged for an earlier
connecting flight to Budapest. When he arrived in Budapest, he was not able to locate his luggage. Despite assurance that it
would be delivered to him and repeated follow-ups, he did not recover his luggage. It contained his personal effects such as
clothes, toiletries, medicines for his hypertension, and the speeches he had prepared, including the notes and reference
materials he needed for the conference. When he returned to Manila, he followed up about his luggage but was ignored. He
filed a case for breach of contract of carriage and claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages. When he recovered his
225

luggage (2 yrs after) he did not insist on his claim for actual damages so TC granted him moral damages (1m), exemplary
damages (500k), and attorneys fees (50k).
Question: Are amounts awarded to respondent as moral and exemplary damages are excessive, unconscionable and
unreasonable?
ANSWER:
A)
YES, The mere fact that Gillego was a Congressman should not result in an automatic increase in the
moral and exemplary damages recoverable. The social and financial standing of a claimant may be
considered only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offenders knowledge of
his or her social and financial standing.
B)
NO, The mere fact that the luggage was not return for a reasonable time (2 years) speaks of bad faith on the part of
the airlines and awards should be commensurate to the social status of the aggrieved.
LESSON: In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious
or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Not every case of mental anguish, fright or serious anxiety
calls for the award of moral damages. Where in breaching the contract of carriage the airline is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability does not include moral
and exemplary damages.
Case citation: AIR FRANCE vs. GILLEGO G.R. No. 165266, December 15, 2010
Civil liability in case of acquittal
PROBLEM: A purchased construction materials from B. As payment for the goods, A issued three (3) checks for the total
amount ofP830,998.40. However, the checks were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. B thus charged
A with 3 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The Court acquitted A on reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. Blg.
22. However, a civil liability is imposed on him.
Question: Is the imposition of civil liability proper?
ANSWER: YES, petitioners acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt
does not include the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. In case of acquittal, the accused may still be
adjudged civilly liable.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted.
Case Citation: ALFEREZ VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182301
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Principle of Abuse of Rights

Pure civil actions under the Civil Code

Judicial decalration of nullity as requirement for remarriage

Definition and scope of Psychological Incapacity

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Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession

Contracts entered into by predecessors-in-interest

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Rescission under Article 1191

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Guaranty and Solidary Obligations

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Definition and Essential Requisites of a Contract of Sale

Parties to a Contract of Sale

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Remedies of an Unpaid Seller

The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree (P.D. 957)

Twin requirements under the Maceda Law

Definition and Nature

Purchase of a Partners Interest

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Guaranty and Suretyship

Principal to be held liable when indicated in Real Estate Mortgage

Lease of Work or Services

Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee

Special Rules for Lease of Rural/Urban Lands

Privity of contracts and sublease

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Special Liability in Particular Activities

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

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Persons and Personality (Civil Code)

Principle of Abuse of Rights

The elements of abuse of rights are the following:

the existence of a legal right or duty;

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