Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
functioned independently along 3 sections of the front under the very loose direction/lack of direction
of General Gough's Headquarters from 23 March 1918 until it is brought in to provide some
communication, transport and firepower for Carey's Force during the final stand in front of VillersBrettoneux. During this period the 1CMMGB suffered 50 percent casualties with some batteries
such as Borden Battery suffering 93% casualties on 24 March 1918 as part of a hold at all
costs action on the west side of Clery-sur-Somme when this 56-man battery blocked the
advance of a German division.
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In Michael Holden's masters thesis [University of New Brunswick ] and a presented paper [Source:
http://www.cda-cdai....2003/holden.htm] he outlined the following:
"On 14 May, the Motors received instructions, which stated that the brigades were to be engaged the
following day in Tactical Training carried out under Corps Orders. The live fire drills were designed
to teach the men of 1 and 2CMMGB to think and operate in an open warfare setting. The first day
witnessed a relatively simple mobile flanking and pincer movement. The first group created a
diversionary head-on attack from the north while other motor machine gun batteries paired with half
squads of cavalry from the Canadian Light Horse (CLH) and the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion
(CCCB) moved in on the position from the east and west. The movements were carried out efficiently
and the objective taken very quickly. The following day, the Motors were engaged in another tactical
training scheme that required the men to move into a position as if to fill a gap until a replacement
infantry brigade could be moved into the line.
On the 21st of May the tactical scheme changed slightly. Some of the Canadians, including the
Motors, now represented enemy forces on the attack against a railway line. The change was effected
in order to give the men the semblance of opposition and to help the units along the learning curve,
with respect to the observation of offensive operations. There were small communication and initial
cooperation problems but overall the general exercise was deemed successful.
It is important to understand how the CMMGBs trained during summer 1918 because it had a direct
influence on their success during the Hundred Days. In May 1CMMGB and 2CMMGB had been
involved in two open warfare tactical schemes. The first, the pincer movement was relatively easy.
While the assault on the railway proved a little more difficult, it must be remembered that as of 1 May,
the Motors doubled in size. Naturally, the brigades felt some growing pains'. Nonetheless, the
exercise proved to be very useful. On the 17th of June the CMMGBs fought in a large tactical
scheme, this time on the Allied side.
In this latest exercise the Canadian Corps with an attached mobile force, part of which was
comprised by the 1stCMMGB, was sent to reinforce the Allied (British) line and keep the enemy from
gaining high ground. The mobile force left its transports, and proceeded to dig in. The Motors used
direct and overhead fire to prevent the enemy from establishing a footing in the northern side of a
densely wooded area. They were also successful in moving their guns by foot to foil the enemys
advance on the southern edge of the woods. The defence of the woods finished by mid-day, and the
scheme indicated next that a gap had been created to the North and the brigade might be used to
great advantage in that location. Consequently, the men quickly returned to their vehicles and
prepared for action. The fictitious gap was never deemed to have required CMMGB assistance. The
orders were designed to provide an opportunity for the brigade to practice preparation for redeployment.
During July the units took time to learn tactical collaboration with the recently attached sections of 6inch trench mortars, and practiced using autocars to draw fire and allow the accompanying troops to
identify the location of machine guns and points of resistance
A number of lessons were derived from the July exercises. It was found that the use of motor cyclists
for scouting and liaison was deficient. During the intra-brigade exercise, defenders did not make
proper use of outposts or attached troops to screen and protect the machine gun nests; snipers and
enemy patrols had encroached too easily. It was decided that future instruction would revolve around
these points. However, this training never occurred. The men were ordered into GHQ reserve and
were told that they might be called on to support either the French First Army or the British Fourth
Army on the Amiens Front."
"During allied advances beginning on 8 August 1918 wireless became the primary communications
for the Canadian Corps. The deep penetrating Canadian Independent Force (based on the Machine
Gun Brigade) found that wireless was all that it required. During the 11 days of action Canadians
passed 1,400 wireless messages."
[SOURCE: http://www.forces.gc...ory/chap3_e.htm]
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The Canadian Expeditionary Force established several "Independent Forces" during the latter part of
the Great War. Here are some edited excerpts from a 1926 summary of operations of units
associated with the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.
In this case, these "Independent Forces" were intended to exploit any breaks in the German line
during the Last One Hundred Days. The forces were totally mobile and were in direct communication
with both Headquarters and overhead aircraft via spark wireless communication. One might say the
forefunner of a "Blitzkreig" formation.
The formation of a mobile force for use in offensive operations had been under consideration and it
was decided to organize a "Canadian Independent Force". This force came into effect on 2nd
August, 1918, and was composed of the following units:H.Q., Canadian Machine Gun Corps.
1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.
2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.
Canadian Cyclist Battalion.
5th Canadian Trench Mortar Section.
1 Corps Wireless Section.
Canadian Motor Machine Gun Mechanical Transport Co.
The force itself was sub-divided as under:H.Q., the Commander; two staff officers, etc.; wireless section; 10 motor cyclists.
Armoured Car Detachment: 4 armoured auto-cars (two from each M.M.G. Bde - 16 guns); 1 platoon
cyclists; 10 motor cyclists.
Trench Mortar Section; 2 lorries each containing 1-6" Newton trench mortar.
No. 1 Group (1st Cdn. M.M.G.Bde.): 5 motor machine gun batteries (40 guns); 2 platoons cyclists; 20
motor cyclists.
No. 2 Group (2nd Cdn. M.M.G.Bde.): 5 motor machine gun batteries (40 guns); 2 platoons cyclists;
20 motor cyclists.
No. 3 Group (Cyclist Bn.): 2 armoured auto-cars (one each from the M.M.G. Bdes.); 4 platoons
cyclists; 10 motor cyclists.
Supply Section: ration lorry; ammunition lorry; water lorry; fuel and oil lorry; first aid lorries (2); 5
motor cyclists.
For the Battle of the Drocourt-Quant Line: 2nd - 3rd September, 1918, Brutinel's Brigade (consisting
of 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion)
was withdrawn into Corps Reserve on the 30th August for reorganization. Next day the following
units were added to the brigade which was to be re-grouped into the Canadian Independent Force
(under control of Brig. Genl. R. Brutinel, C.M.G., D.S.O.) for future operations:10th Royal Hussars.
Canadian Light Infantry Horse (less 1 1/2 squadrons).
Six heavy armoured cars (17th Tank Battalion).
30th Battery (8th Army Brigade, C.F.A.)
Two sections, medium trench mortars, (5th C.D.A.).
One wireless detachment.
One supply column.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SOURCE: NARRATIVES COVERING OPERATIONS OF The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun
Brigade, the Canadian Independent Force, the Composite Brigade and Brutinel's Brigade During
1918:- Historical Section, General Staff. OTTAWA, Canada September, 1926. [p. 10 and p. 30]
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SAMPLE OF BORDEN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY
- NAMED IN HONOUR OF CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER BORDEN
Thu., Dec 10, 1914, MONTREAL, CANADA
This unit was given orders to mobilize in Montreal, Que. on Dec. 10, 1914 and to be known as
Bordens Armoured Battery. The establishment to be six officers, one warrant officer, one Sergeant
Major, eight Sergeants, nine Corporals and forty five privates making a strength of sixty officers and
men. This included twenty-two artificers.
The following officers were appointed
Major E.J. Holland V.C. in command Nov. 1 - 14
Capt P.A.G. McCarthy 2nd ,, ,, Dec. 16 - 14
Lt. W.F. Battersby ,, 16 - 14
,, J.H. Rattray ,, ,, ,,
,, J. R. Ryan Jan. 9 15
,, C.B. Grier ,, 22 15
Later by orders from Headquarters, Ottawa the Warrant-officer was struck off the establishment and
one more allowed under Lieutenant.
---signed E.J. Holland, Major, O.C. Borden's Armoured Battery.
Mon., Sep 6 to
Sat., Sep 11, 1915 SHORNCLIFFE, ENGLAND
The unit was drilled with the MOTOR VEHICLES making road runs and repairing and tuning up the
old SCOTT CARS.
---signed by E.J. Holland, Major, O.C., Borden's Motor Machine Gun Battery.
Capt. Nicholson called up Lieut. Inch who had been back from the line with the men and the
armoured cars. Inch was to try and get a message back to headquarters asking for immediate
reinforcements. The message ran.
A heavy smoke Barrage was blowing from the East, but not evident hostile activity. Two guns were
placed in CLERY Village under command of Lieut. R.H.A. West, shortly after the Enemy broke
through on our left flank, and overran the Village. One [of] our guns was blown up and the crew of
the other completely killed or wounded, one officer, one N.C.O. and one man remained, they
managed to save a Tripod.
The remaining Guns were placed on the MARICOURT-CLERY Road, in an old shallow Trench with
no wire in front. This trench was on the forward slope of the Ridge, observation was good, and as
good targets were constantly presenting themselves our Guns created great havoc.
We held this Trench until 1 p.m. during which time our Casualties were exceptionally severe. Lieut.
F.G. Waldron and Lieut. R.H.A. West were killed by enemy snipers, they being very active, causing
many casualties.
Our Guns kept up harassing fire until our Supply of Ammunition became exceedingly low. There
being a Trench 50 yds. to the rear, behind a strong line, the Guns were withdrawn to this stronger
line. Casualties were continually being received during the whole Afternoon until at 5 p.m. we had
only 3 guns (1 out of action) Capt. W. C. Nicholson, one N.C.O. and two men.
We had been reinforced about 11.30 oclock by the 15th Ches[h]ires, 35th Division, and we arranged
with them that we should hold the line until 8 p.m., but the Enemy attacked in force on our left flank,
and at the same time on our front in mass. We were compelled to withdraw, but not before we had
poured a terrible fire into the close Enemy Ranks.
While proceeding down the Road near Hemp Dump Capt. W. C. Nicholson was hit in the arm by a
ricochet, and forced to leave the Line.
The remainder of the Battery, Sergt. A. Peek and two other Ranks [Pte. Mercer and Pte. Findlayson]
were instructed to report to D.M.G.C. 35th Div., and were then given instructions to return to Brigade
H.Qs VILLERS-BRETONNEUX arriving about 3 a.m. 25th inst.
During the later part of the afternoon 8 O.R.s, who had been assisting out wounded, attached
themselves to B Battery, and were joined later by 13 O.R.s under Sergt. C.D. Salkeld, who had
arrived as Reinforcements. The Party rested at BRAY overnight.
--- signed Lieut. F. P. OReilly, MC, O.C.
Details attached to B Battery in the line, went into Action during the day patrolling the Roads in
Armoured Cars.
At about 5.30 p.m. Orders were received to move Head Qrtns to HBECOURT, leaving at 6 p.m.
and arriving at HBECOURT about 8.30 p.m.
--- signed Lieut. F. P. OReilly, MC, O.C.