AT: Topicality

Surveillance includes the process of overseeing economic

and financial policies
Boughton 9 (Historian for the IMF, International Monetary Fund Surveillance
Princeton University Press, The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy, vol 2,
pgs. 693-697, proquest)
Surveillance, as practiced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is the process of
overseeing the functioning of the international monetary system and certain economic and
financial policies of IMF member states. The legal mandate for this activity is Article IV of the IMF Articles
of Agreement, which was rewritten after the 1973 collapse of the Bretton Woods system, when exchange rates were
no longer anchored by gold, and currency values of most of the major industrial countries floated. Section 1 of the
new Article IV (adopted in 1978) requires "each member ... to collaborate with the Fund and other members to
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates." Section 3 requires the
IMF to "oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation,

and [to]

oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article." To
that end, the fund is required to exercise "firm surveillance" over member countries' exchange rate
policies, and those members are required to consult with the fund on dieir policies.

BIS and Export enforcement conduct surveillance

operations
California AOG 4 (California Office of the Attorney General, New CLETS
Service Application: US Department of Commerce, 2004,
http://ag.ca.gov/meetings/pdf/cn_04_us_doc.pdf
The applicants primary function is to conduct investigations involving
violations of the Export Administration Act. These investigations are matters
of National Security & agents are involved in search & arrest warrants,
surveillance activities, undercover operations and task force operations. The
mission of the Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Enforcement, is to
protect U.S. national security, homeland security, foreign policy, and economic
interests through a law enforcement program focused on: sensitive exports to
hostile entities or those that engage in onward proliferation; prohibited foreign
boycotts; and related public safety laws.

Licensing provisions monitor adherence to regulations and

include prohibitive intent
Henn et al no date [R. Charles Henn Jr., Alicia Grahn Jones, Lauren Sullins Ralls,
and Lauren A. Linder. Attorneys at law at Kilpatrick and Stockton. Trademark
Licensing Basics

In contrast, other quality control provisions go on for pages and may address the
numerous practical

provisions that a licensor can request to ensure adequate quality control and
prevent abandonment,
such as:
(1) Being involved in the design process for the product;
(2) Reviewing early models and prototypes;
(3) Reviewing packaging, advertisements, labels, and other materials to ensure
that the
mark is used properly and appears in a manner consistent with the
licensors trademark
guidelines; and
(4) Requiring access to the licensees facilities, raw material, finished
products, personnel,
and records to monitor the licensees adherence to the licensors quality
standards.

Requires data collection

Mesenbourg and lee 7 [Thomas L. Mesenbourg, Ronald H. Lee Associate Director
for Economic Programs Senior Financial Advisor. The Electronic Reporting
OptionDoes It Make Sense or Cents? Papers presented at the ICES-III, June 1821, 2007. http://www.amstat.org/meetings/ices/2007/proceedings/ICES2007000040.PDF//jweideman]

Trade Statistics Program, a principal economic indicator, collects almost all of its data
electronically through its Automated Export System. AES Direct and AESPcLink now have
Our Foreign

more than 23,475 companies participating. Another 761 companies file directly to the Customs Service. As of January 2007, 97.4
percent of all non-Canadian export transactions were filed using AES. The AES has allowed the Census Bureau to reduce the number
of paper Shippers Export Declarations (SEDs) collected monthly from 500,000 in 1999 to approximately 39,300 in December 2007.
Currently, more than 600,000 shipment transactions are processed monthly through AES Direct.

Contextual evidence proves licensing requirements on export

controls are a form of surveillance
Commerce et al 2001 Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration,
US Census Bureau, AUTOMATED EXPORT SYSTEM (AES) CERTIFICATION REPORT Report to Congress
Presented To: Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations House: Committee on International Relations,
May 2001, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/aes-certification-rpt.pdf//OF

The Census Bureau and Customs, as the primary developers of the AES,
recommend that the full implementation of mandatory filing for all
items (licensed and unlicensed) on the CCL and the USML , as well as
all other shipper's export declaration information , and the integration of the AES
with other Federal Government agency licensing systems, as specified in the Feasibility of Mandatory

Stage
1 - Require mandatory filing through the AES only for exports of items on the
USML and the CCL 90 days after the law becomes effective. The law will become
effective 270 days after AES is certified as a secure, functional system. (FY 2001) Stage 2
- Require mandatory filing through the AES for the remainder of exports
requiring an export license. (FY 2002) Stage 3 - Require mandatory filing through the
AES for all freight forwarders, nonvessel operating carriers, consolidators, and other
intermediaries, that file commodity documentation on behalf of exporters . (FY 2003)
Stage 4 - Require mandatory filing through the AES for all exporters (U.S. principal
parties in interest), including companies, individuals, and other exporting entities
that file commodity documentation. (FY 2005) 150 This proposed schedule
recognizes the urgency of improving the surveillance of exports on the
USML and the CCL, takes into consideration the time required to
integrate the information systems among all the potential Government users of the AES data, and
acknowledges the fact that mandatory filing of SEDs over the AES will represent
a significant change in business practice for many exporters, especially smaller ones.
Automated Export (AES) Filing report issued July 27, 2000, be initiated in four stages as described below:

Export controls are monitoring with prohibitive intent

Kehl and Morgus 14 Danielle Kehl is a policy analyst at New America's Open
Technology Institute, where she researches and writes about broadband policy, Internet
freedom, and other technology policy issues, and Robert Morgus is a researcher at New
Americas Open Technology Institute, The Dictators Little Helper: How to stop Western
companies from exporting surveillance technologies to authoritarian governments, 3/31/14,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/03/export_controls_how_to_stop
_western_companies_from_sending_surveillance.html//OF

export controls are licensing regulations that allow governments

to monitorand in some cases, preventthe flow of domestic products
and services to other countries. In the United States, they are part of a
complicated and tiered system administered by the Departments of
Commerce, State, and Defense. American companies need to check both the U.S.
Munitions List, which controls defense-related items, and the Commerce Control
List, which controls so-called dual-use items (items that have both military and civilian uses),
before selling products to foreign countries. Generally, if the item in question is included in either
list, a company would need to seek a license to sell the technology abroad, giving
the U.S. government the ability to approve or deny the application based on a number of
In essence,

factors, including the destination and end-use.

One list consolidates the monitoring system

Farkas 10 Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas is a former Senior Fellow at the American Security Project. She
was also Executive Director of the congressionally-mandated Commission on the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Terrorism which issued the report World at Risk in 2008,
U.S. Export Controls: Emerging Consensus On Increasing Risk, April 2010,
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/US-Export-Controls-Consensusand-Risk-FINAL.pdf//OF
The single agency option would involve merging the DDTC and BIS functions and personnel, and could potentially

It is unclear where this agency would be

locatedthe State Department is most likely. It is clear, however, that there would only
even include DOD personnel (though this appears unlikely).

be one list of items to be controlleddivided into categories based on

whether or how militarily critical or sensitive they are . The system would provide for
cascading, the ability to move items from the most-controlled category to lessercontrolled categories, and then out of the system entirely, based on technological
advances. At the same time, the administration would have to develop tiers of countries, or end-users, to scale
the level of scrutiny given to an item under consideration for export. This would be similar to a proposal made
several years ago directing the administration to develop a matrix approach to ranking requests based on both
technology and nationality of applicants. A system should be in place for identifying and ranking the sensitivity of
technologies and friendliness of countries. The system should also be able to assess to what countries these
technologies may be ultimately passed.55

both U.S. industry and policy makers

would have one bureaucracy, one form and, ideally, one computer system
to track everything from license or commodity jurisdiction requests, to
shipment, and finally to end-use.
The clear advantage of this option would be that

CAP K Defense: Severe income

inequality is not inevitable
government intervention solves
Mark Thoma 14, a macroeconomist and econometrician and a Professor of
Economics at the Department of Economics of the University of Oregon (3/25, The
Fiscal Times, The Week, http://theweek.com/articles/449564/inequality-americanot-inevitable, lpc)
Some degree of inequality is needed to provide the incentives that make a
capitalist system work, but inequality has risen far past what is needed to
induce the effort that makes the system function. Would those at the very
top of the income distribution where inequality is increasing the most
really work less if they only received $250 million instead of $350 million
per year for their efforts? At some point, one I believe we've passed already, the
benefits of inequality in terms of incentives are surpassed by the costs. As Joseph
Stiglitz argues, "Inequality leads to lower growth and less efficiency. Lack of
opportunity means that its most valuable asset its people is not being
fully used. Many at the bottom, or even in the middle, are not living up to
their potential, because the rich, needing few public services and worried that a
strong government might redistribute income, use their political influence to cut
taxes and curtail government spending. This leads to underinvestment in
infrastructure, education, and technology, impeding the engines of growth."
Capitalism is a wonderful economic system, but it is not perfect.
Government intervention is needed to soften the impact of recessions, to
overcome market failures, and to offset the rising inequality that
threatens capitalism's ability to serve the vast majority of households to
the fullest possible extent.

Money in politics is the problem not

cap
Joseph Stiglitz 14, American economist and a professor at Columbia University. He
is a recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and the John Bates
Clark Medal (6/27, Inequality Is Not Inevitable,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/inequality-is-not-inevitable/?
_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, lpc)
One stream of the extraordinary discussion set in motion by Thomas Pikettys
timely, important book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has settled on
the idea that violent extremes of wealth and income are inherent to
capitalism. In this scheme, we should view the decades after World War II a
period of rapidly falling inequality as an aberration. This is actually a
superficial reading of Mr. Pikettys work, which provides an institutional
context for understanding the deepening of inequality over time.
Unfortunately, that part of his analysis received somewhat less attention
than the more fatalistic-seeming aspects. Over the past year and a half, The
Great Divide, a series in The New York Times for which I have served as moderator,
has also presented a wide range of examples that undermine the notion that there
are any truly fundamental laws of capitalism. The dynamics of the imperial
capitalism of the 19th century neednt apply in the democracies of the 21st. We
dont need to have this much inequality in America. Our current brand of
capitalism is an ersatz capitalism. For proof of this go back to our response to
the Great Recession, where we socialized losses, even as we privatized gains.
Perfect competition should drive profits to zero, at least theoretically, but we have
monopolies and oligopolies making persistently high profits. C.E.O.s enjoy
incomes that are on average 295 times that of the typical worker, a much higher
ratio than in the past, without any evidence of a proportionate increase in
productivity. If it is not the inexorable laws of economics that have led to
Americas great divide, what is it? The straightforward answer: our policies
and our politics. People get tired of hearing about Scandinavian success
stories, but the fact of the matter is that Sweden, Finland and Norway have all
succeeded in having about as much or faster growth in per capita incomes than the
United States and with far greater equality. So why has America chosen these
inequality-enhancing policies? Part of the answer is that as World War II faded
into memory, so too did the solidarity it had engendered. As America triumphed in
the Cold War, there didnt seem to be a viable competitor to our economic
model. Without this international competition, we no longer had to show
that our system could deliver for most of our citizens. Ideology and
interests combined nefariously. Some drew the wrong lesson from the collapse
of the Soviet system. The pendulum swung from much too much government
there to much too little here. Corporate interests argued for getting rid of
regulations, even when those regulations had done so much to protect and
improve our environment, our safety, our health and the economy itself. But this
ideology was hypocritical. The bankers, among the strongest advocates of
laissez-faire economics, were only too willing to accept hundreds of billions

of dollars from the government in the bailouts that have been a recurring
feature of the global economy since the beginning of the Thatcher-Reagan
era of free markets and deregulation. The American political system is
overrun by money. Economic inequality translates into political inequality,
and political inequality yields increasing economic inequality. In fact, as he
recognizes, Mr. Pikettys argument rests on the ability of wealth-holders to keep
their after-tax rate of return high relative to economic growth. How do they do this?
By designing the rules of the game to ensure this outcome; that is, through politics.

You have to look no further than recent history to see the utter failure of
Marxism USSR, Cuba, Cambodia, Soviet bloc states. The very laptops we
are debating on are a product of capitalism . Their definition of Marxism is
completely speculative, they never mentioned a single success , compared
to the countless others cap successes. They claim its never been done.
But a complete utopian Marxist society has been proven impossible by the
countless attempted proven failures.

Export Controls kill Comp

Export controls are directly responsible for other countries
closing the gap behind the US
Farkas 10 (Evelyn-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, U.S. Export Controls: Emerging Consensus On Increasing
Risk, American Security Project, April 2010,
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/US-ExportControls-Consensus-and-Risk-FINAL.pdf)
We have left the era of the military-industrial complex and entered a new reality
of military industrial complexity. Today, many cutting-edge technologies, such
as encryption and software in general, are developed in the private sector and sought
by the government. This means the list of dual-use items is growing, while at the
same time globalization is ensuring that new items and services that were
once only available in the U.S. market are now readily available from foreign
sources. In addition, the United States is no longer unchallenged in the global
marketplace either in terms of market share or quality, even in militarily critical
technologies.3 Today, for example, the Netherlands and Japan are the leaders in the
manufacture of lithography equipment, which is critical to making semiconductors.4 In terms
of market share in the defense arena, as one journalist has observed, The United States position as the worlds
dominant military exporter since the Cold War-era is swiftly being eroded by the growth in Russian and European
supply.5 The U.S. share of the global arms market has declined from about 40% in 2000 to approximately 27% in
2008.6 Whereas American-made semiconductors used to be 10 years ahead of their Chinese competitors, the GAO
reported that by 2002 the U.S. lead had been reduced to two years. Over the ensuing six years, the gap narrowed

the 21st century reality is that the

United States is no longer head and shoulders above the rest of the world in terms
of its scientific, technical, and military capabilities. In fact , we risk losing that edge to
countries such as China and India. Clearly, export controls are not responsible for this development, but
they do cut both ways. They are intended to limit the spread of technology , but in some
cases they also appear to damage the defense industrys ability to make
business decisions that support the innovation on which future military
advances depend.
further to about one generationor one to two years.7 In short,

Controls Deck Exports

Export Controls deter exports to China perceptions of
uncertainty uniquely impact business
AmCham China 9 American Chamber of Commerce in China, The Effect of U.S. Export Controls: Case
Studies from China on Impact of Export Controls on Manufacturers Decisions to Use or Not Use U.S.-Origin Goods in
Commercial Products, February 19, 2009 , https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=39&ved=0CFgQFjAIOB4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amchamchina.org
%2Fdownload%3Fpath%3D%2Fcmsfile
%2F2009%2F03%2F18%2F39ae86701a04416a26643d110852136c.pdf&ei=yBCaVbDeL8PvsAXpto0w&usg=AFQjCN
Gl9ko2rllSEIqZaGgTsEzPU2blnw&sig2=K_VqDnmSQi2J16QWvdzOzg&cad=rja//OF

The examples presented in this report from the semiconductor, manufacturing,

materials processing, and aerospace industries represent a pervasive problem in
which U.S. exporters of parts, components, systems, and equipment are suffering
the loss of sales and jobs due to current U.S. export control policies. Many of these
examples never reach the statistics because the sales are lost even before
an export license application is submitted, and these examples represent
only a small portion of impacted trade. As manufacturers in China encounter
delays and prohibitions related to the purchase and import of U.S. commercial
goods, these negative experiences are spread throughout industry, warning other
manufacturers of the potential problems that may arise during or following the
purchase of controlled items from the United States . This stigma that has become associated
with U.S. products, particularly in certain high technology sectors, also impacts U.S. sales of non-licensable goods,

Concerns about U.S. export controls have led to

misconceptions about what is prohibited, what requires an export license,
and the length of license processing times. Other concerns include overlyrestrictive conditions placed on U.S. export licenses and fear of regulatory
changes that may prohibit future sales, parts and/or services, thereby
suspending manufacturing activities. While some other countries, such as Japan, may include
technologies and services.

conditions on export licenses that restrict the transfer or re-export of a controlled item, they allow for approvals of
such activities through a direct importer to exporter consultation. By allowing the companies to seek approvals
directly from their suppliers, these Japanese export licenses permit more flexibility to the companies to resolve

Companies already face many challenges

from Chinese and other foreign non-U.S. competitors in areas such as competition
for talent recruitment, R&D funding, and speed of bringing products to market. U.S.
export control limitations add hurdles to manufacturers business
strategies that build additional time, resources and uncertainties into
their technology and product development roadmaps. This has led to Chinese
manufacturers concluding that the benefits of purchasing U.S. products are far
outweighed by these drawbacks. Over the course of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, the
United States has issued new regulations that have severely impacted
trade between the countries. Some of these changes were prompted by uncontrollable international
transfer and re-export issues quickly and efficiently.

events that elicited strong political reactions of the U.S. Government. Other export control regulatory changes,

These past regulatory changes have

raised the level of uncertainty among foreign manufacturers about the
ability of U.S. suppliers to consistently and reliably supply future
products, replacement parts and service.
however, have come at seemingly unprompted times.

Controls kill coop

New regulatory changes shut out China from the international
satellite market this undermines US-China space cooperation
and US satellite competitiveness
Jingjie 13 Yang Jingjie (citing Chinese ministry officials) is a reporter for Global Times, US
excludes China from satellite deal, 1/7/13, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/754153.shtml//OF

The Chinese government and aerospace industry have called on the US to stop
politicizing Sino-US space cooperation and allow China access to commercial launch
services, after new revisions to US satellite export control rules once again barred the
emerging space power from obtaining US satellites. US President Barack Obama Thursday
signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which included a section on the removal of
satellites and related items from the US Munitions List with the aim of stimulating the commercial space sector.

the relaxation of export controls shut China out by stipulating that

no satellites or related items may be exported, re-exported or transferred
to China, North Korea or any country that is a state sponsor of terrorism. It prohibits satellites or
related items from being launched in those countries, and prohibits those countries
from using these items in their launch vehicles. Only the president could waive
the prohibition on a case-by-case basis. In response, China expressed grave concern. Shen
Danyang, spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce, said Saturday that despite US promises that the
reform of the export control system would benefit Beijing and boost US exports of
high-tech equipment to China, the US in fact took measures to continue containing
Sino-US cooperation in civilian-use satellites. "China is very disappointed and
dissatisfied," said Shen, adding that China hopes the US will stop discriminating
against it. Sino-US cooperation in commercial satellite launches ceased after June
1999, when the US tightened its export controls following the Cox Report, which accused China of "illegally
However,

obtaining" US space technology. Fu Zhiheng, a vice president of the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC),
told the Global Times that Sino-US commercial space cooperation was active throughout the 1990s, during which
CGWIC successfully launched 26 US satellites into space. " With

six launches of Iridium

communications satellites by our Long March launch vehicles, we played an
important role in the building of the US network ," said Fu, listing a number of other US partners
such as Hughes and EchoStar. Despite a ban on satellite exports to China in the early 1990s, former US presidents
Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton all authorized launches in China during their tenures citing
national interests. "The

Obama administration has made repeated promises to relax hightech export controls. But it turns out that it has been the strictest ," Zhou Shijian, a senior
researcher with the Center for US-China Relations at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times. The new
rules proposed by some right-wing legislators have in fact labeled China
as "an enemy" of the US, Zhou said, noting that even during the Cold War era, the US
didn't stop space cooperation with the former Soviet Union . Over the past 14 years,
export controls haven't stopped China's space advancements. In 2011 and 2012,
China's Long March carriers made 19 launches each year, well ahead of the launches by the US. According to Fu,
since 2005, the CGWIC has carried out 16 international commercial launches, winning international contracts
courtesy of low costs and high reliability. In the most recent commercial launch in December 2012, a Long March
launcher sent Turkish earth observation satellite GK-2 into orbit. Egemen Imre, chief engineer of Satellite Systems

that the
Chinese company presented the best offer in terms of technical merit and costs to
win the tender, and regarded the launch as "very successful." A report by the Aerospace
Industries Association showed the global share of US satellite exports dropped from 73
percent in 1995 to 25 percent in 2005, which Zhou said was partly due to the
Design Group under the Turkey-based space institute TUBITAK UZAY, told the Global Times Sunday

prohibition of launches in China. While appealing for US market access, Fu further noted that
Chinese companies wouldn't pose any threat or bring any competition to
US commercial launch companies.

Satellite exports ban destroys trust and curbs US-China space

coop
Richburg 11 [Keith, Washington post staffwriter and correspondent in asia. Masters
from the London school of economics. 1/22/11, Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space
cooperation http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html//jweideman]

BEIJING - China's grand ambitions extend literally to the moon, with the country now embarked on a multi-pronged program to
establish its own global navigational system, launch a space laboratory and put a Chinese astronaut on the moon within the next

decade. The Obama administration views space as ripe territory for

cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has called it one of four
potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear
weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen

But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic

talk of cooperation has so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant
dialogue and exchanges" in the field.

interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At

Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's

wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some hightechnology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in
the same time,

space appears to mirror the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion
on both sides. "What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said
Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space
program. ad_icon NASA's human spaceflight program has been in flux in recent years, fueling particular concern among some U.S.
observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary, careful, mutual watching,"

Song Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV, said that
substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust . Achieving
that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a
partner to cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is
Cheng said.

experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty." But while China may still be an adolescent in terms of space
exploration - launching its first astronaut in 2003 - it has made some notable strides in recent months and years, and plans seem on
track for some major breakthroughs. On the day Hu left for his U.S. trip, Chinese news media reported the inauguration of a new
program to train astronauts - called taikonauts here - for eventual deployment to the first Chinese space station, planned for 2015.
As part of the project, two launches are planned for this year, that of an unmanned space module, called Tiangong-1, or "Heavenly
Palace," by summer, and later an unmanned Shenzhou spacecraft that will attempt to dock with it. On a separate track, China is also
working through a three-stage process for carrying out its first manned moon landing. The first stage was completed in October with
the successful launch of a Chang'e-2 lunar orbiter. In 2012 or 2013, an unmanned landing craft is scheduled to take a rover to the
moon to collect rock and soil samples. By 2020, according to the plan, a taikonaut could land on the moon.

Dual-use exports dont increase Chinese military capability or

cause prolif
Lewis 2 [ James Lewis Senior Fellow and Director, Technology Policy Center for
Strategic & International Studies. Export Controls/Dual Use Technology and
Technology Transfer Issues January 17, 2002.
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/congress/ts020117lewis.pdf//jweideman]
on technology transfer, export
controls and China. This is an important topic and I applaud the Commission for looking at it. It is an
Chairmen, Commissioners, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify

important topic, but one that has been much clouded by rhetoric and
imprecision, and the Commission has an opportunity to dispel some of this. That transfers of U.S.
technology to China can damage national security has become a staple of
the larger debate over China policy. Critics charge that China improves its military
capabilities with U.S. commercial technology. While these charges are widely
accepted, they are wrong. Despite the noisy China cases that attracted public attention in the past few years, a
close examination suggests that U.S. technology is irrelevant to China's military
modernization and that efforts to restrict high tech trade are more likely to
damage than to improve U.S national security. Contrary to claims that China
acquires U.S. commercial technology and turns it to military purposes, the Chinese
follow the more sensible course of acquiring modern military technology from
non-U.S. sources. U.S. commercial technology is important to China's continued economic growth, but these
commercial technologies are all available from other Western industrial nations that
do not share U.S. concerns with China and which do not support an embargo on
advanced technology exports. Other countries with advanced military and industrial
technologies are willing to sell to China (although the ability of the PLA and China's defense industry to absorb
these technologies remain mixed, despite China's general economic progress). There is not the slightest interest
among America's major trade partners or allies in Europe or Japan support a coldwar style embargo (or indeed any embargo on technology) for China. Finally, the U.S. technology
sold to China has been overwhelmingly civil and not military, and of little use in
weapons production. Given the limitations of its domestic arms industry, China can only improve its military through
purchases of foreign military equipment. China cannot manufacture major weapons systems equal in quality to the best Russian,
U.S. or European equipment. While foreign purchases are crucial to any effort to modernize China's military, the U.S. does not sell

None of the items that have starred in the U.S.

debates over China - computers, satellites, telecommunications, elderly machine
tools, semiconductor-manufacturing equipment - are regarded by the three
major nonproliferation regimes (the Missile Technology Control Regime, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group for Chemical and Biological
Weapons) as contributing to proliferation. This point is usually lost in the larger dispute about China,
military or proliferationrelated items to China.

where charges that U.S exports help China develop weapons of mass destruction are frequent. An ironic aspect of the China tech
transfer debate is that it focuses on general purpose industrial goods, not weapons or military technology. The debate has blurred
differences between military and civil technologies in a way that is unhelpful for analysis. Additionally, efforts to restrict access to
these industrial goods make little sense in light of growing global economic integration. Multilateral cooperation in controlling these
technologies is at a low ebb. While there was a consensus in the 1980s to control technology transfers among the U.S. and its allies
vis--vis the Soviet Union, this consensus did not extend much beyond the Warsaw pact. The U.S. itself relaxed technology transfer
controls for China in the late 1980s, when China became a useful card to play against the Soviets.

To reformism
Broad support for reform
Kerr and Fergusson 14 [Paul, non-prolif analyst. Ian F. Fergusson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance. 1/13/14, The U.S. Export Control
System and the
Presidents Reform Initiative
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf//jweideman]
Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by
exporters, nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as
being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete,
inefficient, or any combination of these descriptions. In August 2009, the
Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control
system. In April 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline
of a new system based on four singularities:
a single export control licensing agency for dual-use, munitions exports, and
Treasury-administered embargoes.
a unified control list,
a single primary enforcement coordination agency, and
a single integrated information technology (IT) system