EVIDENCE

RULE 128
Section 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the
means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a
judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact. (1)
Section 2. Scope. The rules of evidence shall be
the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings,
except as otherwise provided by law or these rules.
(2a)

testimony of a person who was a party to the

same or has personal knowledge thereof. In
the absence or unavailability of such
witnesses, other competent evidence may be
admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or
ephemeral electronic communication shall be
covered by the immediately preceding
section.

Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is

admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law of these rules. (3a)

If the foregoing communications are recorded

or embodied in an electronic document, then
the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.

Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence

must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to
establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue.

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE

RECOGNITION AND USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS AND DOCUMENTS,
PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL USE
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Rule 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 2. Admissibility. An electronic
document is admissible in evidence if it
complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related
laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules.
Rule 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND
EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
Section
1. Audio,
video and similar
evidence. Audio, photographic and video
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall
be admissible provided it shall be shown,
presented or displayed to the court and shall
be identified, explained or authenticated by
the person who made the recording or by
some other person competent to testify on the
accuracy thereof.
Section
2. Ephemeral
electronic
communications.
Ephemeral
electronic
communications shall be proven by the

Section 12. Admissibility and Evidential

Weight of Electronic Data Message or
Electronic
Document. In
any
legal
proceedings, nothing in the application of the
rules on evidence shall deny the admissibility
of an electronic data message or electronic
document in evidence (a) On the sole ground that it is in
electronic form; or
(b) On the ground that it is not in the
standard written form, and the
electronic data message or electronic
document meeting, and complying
with the requirements under Sections
6 or 7 hereof shall be the best
evidence of the agreement and
transaction contained therein.
In assessing the evidential weight of an
electronic data message or electronic
document, the reliability of the manner in
which it was generated, stored or
communicated, the reliability of the manner in
which its originator was identified, and other
relevant factors shall be given due regard.

PEOPLE VS
QUIDATOOO
PEOPLE
v.
QUIDATO,
JR.
ROMERO (October 1, 1998) The
settled rule is that an uncounseled
extrajudicial confession without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel that
is, in writing and in the presence of
counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
FACTS:
1. Bernardo Quidato, Sr., father
of
accused-appellant
Bernardo
Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato, a
widower, lived alone in his house at
Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian,
Davao. He owned sixteen hectares of
coconut land in the area.
2.
September
16,
1988,
Bernardo, accompanied by his son,
and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita
and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City
to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling
the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita
brothers for their labor, who thereafter
left.

hacked Bernardo on the nape and

neck. Accused appellant and Eddie
ransacked
Bernardo's
aparador
looking for money but they found none
so the three of them left. Bernardo Sr.
was found dead the following day.
5. On September 27, 1988, Leo
Quidato
confronted
his
brother
regarding the incident and learned
that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were
the ones responsible for Bernardo's
death. The two including accusedappellant were arrested by the police
and brought to the police station.
6. September 29, 1988, in the
absence
of
counsel,
Patrolman
Lucrecio Mara interrogated and took
down the confession of the Malita
brothers but refrained from requiring
then to sign their affidavits. Mara then
escorted them to Davao City and
presented them, along with their
unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now
PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom.

3. At around 6:00 p.m. of

September
17,
1988,
accusedappellant asked Reynaldo and Eddie to
come to the former's house and
proposed that they rob and kill his
father.

7. Atty. Jocom conferred with

Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising
the two of their constitutional rights.
The CLAO lawyer explained the
contents of the affidavits, in Visayan,
to the Malita brothers, who affirmed
the veracity and voluntary execution
of the same. Only then did Reynaldo
and Eddie affix their signatures on the
affidavits.

4. They went to Bernardo's

house only at 10:00 p.m. Upon
reaching the house, accused-appellant
knocked on the door, asking his father
to let them in. When Bernardo opened
the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked
the old man down. Reynaldo then

8.
In
indicting
accusedappellant, the prosecution relied
heavily on the affidavits executed by
Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers
were, however, not presented on the
witness stand to testify on their extrajudicial confessions.

9. The testimony of Gina

Quidato, wife of accused, against the
latter was also not admitted as
evidence
under
the
marital
disqualification rule.
10. RTC found accused guilty of
Parricide (Art. 246 RPC)

ISSUE:
1. WON there was a valid waiver
of right to counsel by the Malita
brothers when they made uncounseled
extrtajudicial confession? NO
2.
WON
the
extrajudicial
confessions of the Malita brothers are
admissible as evidence against the
accused-appellant? NO
RATIO:
1. The failure to present the
Malita brothers on trial gives these
affidavits the character of hearsay. It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the
affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their
affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding,
being
inadmissible
hearsay.
The
voluntary admissions of an accused
made
extrajudicially
are
not
admissible in evidence against his coaccused when the latter had not been
given an opportunity to hear him
testify and crossexamine him. The
Solicitor General, in advocating the
admissibility of the sworn statements
of the Malita brothers, cites Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "[t]he act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to
the
conspiracy
and
during
its
existence, may be given in evidence
against the coconspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration." The
inapplicability of this provision is
clearly apparent. The confessions were
made after the conspiracy had ended
and after the consummation of the
crime. Hence, it cannot be said that

the execution of the affidavits were

acts or declarations made during the
conspiracy's existence.
2. The settled rule is that an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession
without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel is inadmissible
in evidence. In People v. Compil ,
[T]he belated arrival of a CLAO (now
PAO) lawyer the following day even if
prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure
the defect (of lack of counsel) for the
investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from
accused-appellant . . . in People vs. De
Jesus (213 SCRA 345 [1992]) we said
that admissions obtained during
custodial interrogations without the
benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed
under the Constitution.
REYES v. CA
G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992
Doctrine: As an exception to the scope of the
Rules of Evidence, Section 16 of P.D. No. 946
provides that the rules of court shall not be
applicable even in a suppletory character in
Agrarian cases.
FACTS: Juan Mendoza, father of defendant
Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of two farm lots
in Pampanga.
The lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian
dela Cruz, late husband of plaintiff Eufrocina
dela Cruz. Eufrocina filed a complaint alleging
that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded
him as bona fide tenant of the farm lots;; and
that Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the
other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta
and her workers through force, intimidation,
strategy and stealth, from entering and working
on the subject premises;; and that until the
filing of the instant case, defendants had refused
to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating

her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for

judgment for the recovery of possession and
damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the meantime. Petitioners in this
case were duly elected and/or appointed
barangay
officials
in
Pampanga,
denied
interference in the tenancy relationship existing
between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza,
particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm
lots. They asked for the case to be dismissed
claiming that they have always exercised
fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the
discharge of their official functions. For his part,
defendant
Mendoza
raised
abandonment,
sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without
his consent and approval, and non-payment of
rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the
government, as his defenses. The agrarian court
ordered the defendants to restore possession of
the farm lots to Eufrocina. This decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, the
petitioners
questioned
the
favourable
consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina
and Efren Tecson, since the affiants were not
presented and subjected to cross-examination.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the lower court erred in giving
favorable consideration to the affidavits o
Eufrocina and Efren
Tecson even if the affiant was not subjected to
cross-examination? NO.
RATIO: The trial court did not err when it
favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina
and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not
presented and subjected to cross-examination.
Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the
"Rules of Court shall not be applicable in
agrarian cases even in a suppletory character."
The same provision states that "In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question
or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits
may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".
Sec. 2, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides
that the rules of evidence shall be the same in
all courts and in all trials and hearings, except
as otherwise provided by the law or these rules.
Section 16 of P.D.
ANALYSIS:

There will be no change in the decision of this

case as there is no proposed change in Sec. 2,
Rule 128 of the current Rules of Court.

PEOPLE v. TURCO
G.R. No. 137757 August 14, 2000
Doctrine: Since admissibility of evidence is
determined by its relevance and competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and
law. On the other hand, the weight to be given
to such evidence, once admitted, depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided in Rule 133 and jurisprudence laid
down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may
be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no
weight at all.