Who may apply?

Under PD 1529
Cases:
-Republic v Candymaker 492 SCRA 272
-Republic v CA and Naguit 448 SCRA 442
-Republic v CA and Tancino 132 SCRA 514
-Buenaventura v Republic GR 166865
-Domingo v Landicho 531 SCRA 606

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.

(GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)
Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay.Candy
Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of
its alleged title over the lot.
The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and
disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land Registration Authority recommended the
exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public
use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the
LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration
may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a
public land within, its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable
property of the State, and if so, whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove its ownership over the property?
Held:
The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over
the property. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not
operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the
same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from
the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not

constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership, such possession is not exclusive and
notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing, the
petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT
G. R. No.144057January 17, 2005Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her
imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without
any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit
upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the
petition. The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion
for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained bonafide
claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
RULING: Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is
alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.There must be a
positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of the
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as
alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession of the land
no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription. To
follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render

the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public
domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession
by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as
it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable. The land in question was found to
be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The
inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous
possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the
waters of the rivers.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision appealed
from, and ordered the private respondents to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their
original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.
ANGELITA BUENAVENTURA VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(GR. NO. 166865, March 2, 2007)

GR L-61647 12 October 1984

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Tancinco
FACTS:
Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos
filed an application for the registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu131892: Lot 1, 33837 sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq. On 5 April 1974, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.
On 6 March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration
with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court. On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from
the application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu131892. On 26 June 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on
the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds covered by
TCT 89709. On 30 July 1976, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 August
1982, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower cost;
without costs.
ISSUE: Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA.
RULING: The Republic claimed that there was no accretion to speak of because what
actually happened was that the Tancincos simply transferred their dikes further down the
river bed of Meycuayan River, and thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree enumerates the persons who may
apply for registration of land: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. Because of Section 14 (2) of the said
decree, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose
possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or
more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their
possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
Spouses Amado and Irene Buenaventura acquired a parcel of land, located at San
Dionisio Paraaque, from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon even before the World War II.
However, it was only on 30 January 1948 that a Deed of Sale was executed in favor of the
spouses. This land was transferred, subsequently, to their heirs, including petitioners
Angelita and Preciosa Buenaventura (Buenaventuras).
A new tax declaration was issued in their name.
On 05 June 2000, the Buenaventura filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque an
Application for the Registration of Title of the land. When the case was set for hearing no
formal opposition had been filed. The Buenaventuras, then, proceeded to present evidence
and witnesses to prove that they have acquired vested rights over the land thru open,
continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50
years completely unmolested by any adverse claim as required by law and that the land is
alienable and disposable.

Subsequently, the trial court granted the application, ordering the registration of the parcel
of land in favor of the Buenaventuras.
Respondent Republic appealed the trial court's order with the Court of Appeals,
who ruled in favor of the Republic, declaring that the land was public. Moreover, the
appellate court while recognizing that the Buenaventuras and their predecessors'-in-interest
had acquired possession of the land since 1948, it ruled that they failed to show possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required
by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject property is an alienable and disposable land of
public domain, hence susceptible of application for registration under the
Property Registration Decree
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the decision of the trial
court confirming petitioners' title over the subject property for not being
allegedly supported by substantial evidence as required by law
HELD:
The petition is GRANTED.
The subject property is an alienable and disposable land of public domain since 3
January 1968 as certified by the DENR.
Section 14 of the Property Registration enumerates the persons who may apply for
registration of land: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. Under the first classification, three
requisites must be complied with for the filing of an application for registration of title, to wit:
(a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of public domain; (b) that
the applicants themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; (c) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945. The second classification relates
to prescription.
In this case the Court disagreed with the Republic's claim that the land in
questioned is not alienable and disposable, invoking Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution

and the Regalian Doctrine, which states that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and all lands not otherwise appearing within private ownership are presumed to
belong the State. Such presumption, however, is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by the
applicant's presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of
application for registration is alienable and disposable. Petitioners presented a certification
issued by the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources showing that the land is
an alienable and disposable land of public domain since 3 January 1968. Such certification
is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject property. The certification
enjoys the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. Therefore,
the alienable and disposable character of the questioned parcel of land has been clearly
established by the evidence of the Buenaventuras, by 3 January 1968, at the latest.
As to the requisites of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, the Court
agreed with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioners
was not enough to prove that their possession of the subject property started since 12 June
1945 or earlier because the evidence established that the questioned parcel of land was
acquired by spouses Buenaventura only on 30 January 1948, the date of the execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale by its previous owners. Moreover, petitioners' possession of the
subject property could only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when the same
became alienable and disposable. In Republic v. Herbieto (G.R. No. 156117, 26 May
2005, 459 SCR\ 183, 201-202), the Court ruled that "any period of possession prior to the
date when the subject property was classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession;
such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as
alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto."
Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced
only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the said property is still
possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks
of prescription.
The fact that they failed to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier as required by Section 14 (1) will not be an insurmountable bar to the petitioners to
have title to the subject property registered in their names.
The Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448
SCR\ 442, 451-452) declared that the enactment of the Property Registration Decree
and the amendatory P.D. 1073, both providing 12 June 1945 or earlier as the reckoning
period of possession necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of

the public domain, did not preclude the application for registration of alienable lands
of public domain, possession over which commenced only after 12 June 1945,
considering Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the
possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 June 1945,
application for registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.
Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership.
Article 1137 of the Code states that "ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need
of title or of good faith."
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least 30 years. Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14 (2), over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of Section
14 (2) of Presidential Decree 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and
disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and
exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite
the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while
petitioners' possession over the subject property can be reckoned on 3 January 1968, the
date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable,
they can still have the subject property registered in their names by virtue of Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years, 32 years to be exact, reckoned from the year 1968, when
the subject property was finally declared alienable and disposable by the DENR to the time
they filed an application for registration of title over the subject property on 5 June 2000.
Petitioners' possession of the subject property since 1968 has been characterized as open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.
By this, the subject alienable and disposable public land had been effectively converted into
private property over which petitioners have acquired ownership through prescription to
which they are entitled to have title through registration proceedings.

DOMINGO vs LANDICHO Case Digest

CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO v. SEVERINO and RAYMUNDO LANDICHO, et al.
531 SCRA 606, 29 August 2007, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)
To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.
FACTS: Crisologo Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, an
application for registration of certain parcels of land (the lots ), which he supposedly
purchased from one
Genoveva Manlapit in 1948, and has since been in continuous, open, public, adverse and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner.
Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de Sagun and Editha G. Sarmiento
subsequently filed an Answer/Opposition to Domingos application, claiming, among other
things, that they have been the ones in open, continuous, adverse and actual possession
and cultivation of the lots in the concept of owners and have even been paying real estate
taxes thereon.
The RTC approved Domingos application for registration. On appeal by Landicho, et al.,
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and dismissed Domingos
application for registration of land title. Petitioner Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration
with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by said court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domingo is entitled to the registration of the lots in question
pursuant to Section 14, sub pars. (1) and (4) of P.D. 1529
HELD: Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that to be entitled of a land, the applicant must
prove that: (a) the land applied for forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State, and unless it has been shown that they have been reclassified by the
State as alienable or disposable to a private person, they remain part of the inalienable
public domain. To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish
the existence of a positive act of government, such as presidential proclamation or an
executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator or a legislative act or statute.