U.S.

Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals
Office of the Clerk
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church. Virginia 22041

OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - SAJ

7 Tabonuco St., Suite 300 (Rm 313)
Guaynabo, PR 00968

Name: DE LEON-MENDEZ, YGNACIO

A 077-048-349

Date of this notice: 1/7/2016

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,

DonrtL C

t1AA)

Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:

Pauley, Roger

Usertea m : Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

www.irac.net/unpublished/index/
Cite as: Ygnacio De Leon-Mendez, A077 048 349 (BIA Jan. 7, 2016)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

GONZALEZ-RUCCI, ROSAURA
ROSAURA GONZALEZ-RUCCI
P. 0. BOX 6363
LOIZA STREET STATION
SAN JUAN, PR 00914

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: A077 048 349 - Guaynabo, PR

Date:

JAN - 7 2015

In re: YGNACIO DE LEON-MENDEZ a.k.a. Jose Altagracia a.k.a. Victor Pelagio Castillo

MOTION
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Rosaura Gonzalez-Rucci, Esquire
ON BEHALF OF DHS:

Jorge Ramos
Senior Attorney

APPLICATION: Reconsideration
The respondent has filed a timely motion to reconsider the Board's August 4, 2015, decision
dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge's February 20, 2014, decision finding him
inadmissible as charged and ordering him removed from the United States. The motion will be
granted, the proceedings will be reopened, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration
Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and for entry of a new decision.
In the Board's August 4, 2015, decision, we declined to address the respondent's sole
appellate contention that the Immigration Judge erred in finding him inadmissible under section
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), based solely on the evidence regarding
his 2012 conviction for the offense of fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), without providing him the opportunity to establish that he
''timely recanted" his false claim to United States citizenship (I.J. at 6-7). Specifically, we
declined to address the respondent's contention because the respondent did not dispute the other
charges of inadmissibility rendering him removable from the United States.
Through his motion to reconsider, the respondent asserts that the Board erred in not
addressing his arguments pertaining to section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act because, inter alia, a
finding on this charge has ongoing future collateral consequences in terms of his eligibility for
future relief. The respondent points out in his motion that he has United States citizen children, a
lawful permanent resident mother and brother, and an approved 1-130 visa petition and that the
Board's decision to not address the fraud charge, for which there is no waiver, could prevent him
permanently from obtaining future relief. We agree and find that the respondent's motion should
be granted and his proceedings reopened for a final decision on the fraud charge under section
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(c) (2015).
On appeal, the respondent argued that the Immigration Judge erred in concluding that he is
removable and ineligible for relief without having taken evidence as to whether he "timely and
voluntarily" recanted his claim of United States citizenship based on an admittedly photo-altered
driver's license, social security card, and birth certificate in another person's name. We find that
a remand is necessary for fact-finding and consideration of whether the respondent has met his
burden in establishing a "timely recantation." See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii) (de novo review).
Cite as: Ygnacio De Leon-Mendez, A077 048 349 (BIA Jan. 7, 2016)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

A077 048 349

In this case, the evidence in the record indicates that the respondent told the truth about his
identity after he was referred to a secondary inspection and was given his Miranda warnings
(Exh. 2). 2 The evidence is not more specific as to the details of the events that transpired
(Exh. 2). Further, the Immigration Judge did not engage in any fact-finding on this issue and did
not give the respondent the opportunity to present evidence of his claim that he ''timely recanted"
such that he may not be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act and may be
eligible for relief from removal. Given the circumstances in this case, we find it necessary to
remand the record for the Immigration Judge to determine whether the respondent's eventual
admissions were made "prior to any exposure of the attempted fraud." See Matter ofM-, supra.
Accordingly, the motion will be granted, the proceedings will be reopened, and the record
will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
and for entry of a new decision.
ORDER: The motion is granted, the proceedings are reopened, and the record is remanded
to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and for entry of a
new decision.

Like the alien in Matter of R-R-, the alien in Matter of M-, 9 l&N Dec. 118 (BIA 1960), also
recanted his misrepresentation prior to the completion of his primary statement to an
immigration inspector. See id.
2

This is based on the facts and evidence incorporated into the respondent's plea agreement
(Exh. 2).
2
Cite as: Ygnacio De Leon-Mendez, A077 048 349 (BIA Jan. 7, 2016)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

The doctrine of "timely recantation" is of long standing. We have long recognized the virtue
of applying that principle when an alien "voluntarily and prior to any exposure of the attempted
fraud corrected his testimony that he was" entitled to admission to the United States. See Matter
of R-R-, 3 I&N Dec. 823 (BIA 1949). For example, in Matter of R-R-, cited by the respondent,
the alien, when applying for admission to the United States, claimed to be a citizen of the United
States and exhibited a birth certificate of a younger brother, the dates on the certificate having
been altered. See id. at 826. The alien then executed a certificate before the primary inspector
alleging he was his brother and a citizen by birth in the United States. See id. Right after
executing this affidavit the alien admitted to the primary inspector that he had lied. See id.
(emphasis added). Thus, in that case, the recantation was made to the primary inspector and not
after referral to secondary inspection (I.J. at 6). 1