STRATEGICDESIGNATDYNACORP

Weretooslow,toounresponsivetothemarket,andtooundisciplinedabout
costs.Andthemainreasonishowwereorganizeditjustisntworkingany
more.Weveoutgrowntheolddesigninsomanyways,butwerestilltryingto
managewiththesamestructurewehadwhenwestartedthecompany.
Dynacorpproductmanager

Theresalotoftalknowaboutchangingourorganizationdesign.Butwe
shouldbecarefulthatwerenotthrowingthebabyoutwiththebathwater.
Werefixatingonwhatswrongwiththeorganizationinsteadofthinkingabout
howtomakeitworkbetter.
Dynacorpengineeringmanager

TheDynaCorporation,knownintheindustryasDynacorp,isamajor
globalinformationsystemsandcommunicationscompany.Originatinginan
officeequipmentcompanythatmovedintohightechnologyapplicationsinthe
1960sand1970s,Dynacorphad,bythe1980s,establishedapositionasan
industryleader,knownforitstechnologicalinnovation.Dynacorpwasfirstto
themarketwithinnovativeandhighqualityproductsthatweresignificant
advancesonanythingitscompetitorswereoffering.Customerswouldgladly
waitmonths,andevenayearorso,totakedeliveryofproductsbearingthe
Dynacorplogo.Thecustomersweretypicallysophisticateduserswhowere
willingtodosomeoftheirownapplicationsworkandtofigureouthowto
integrateDynacorpsnewproductswiththerestoftheiroperations.Duringthis
period,thecompanygrewataveryfastrate,andexpandeditsmarkettoEurope,
Asia,andLatinAmerica.

The1990swereamuchmoredifficultperiodforthecompany.It
continuedtogrow,butataslowerrate,andexperiencedperiodsofsignificantly
reducedearnings.Criticsbothinsideandoutsidethecompanyattributed
Dynacorpsdifficultiestoalossofleadershipingettingnewproductstomarket,
coststhatweretoohigh,andchangesinthemarketplacethatDynacorpwasslow
torecognize.Competitorswereclosingthetechnologygap,andwereoften
fastergettingproductstomarket.Inagrowingnumberofproductareas,
Dynacorphadbeensurprisedbycompetitorsthat,althoughtheyhadstarted
workingonanewproductmuchlaterthanDynacorp,werefasteratgettingthe
producttothecustomerataveryattractiveprice.Inaddition,agrowing
numberofITCconsultingfirmswerecapturingtherelationshipwiththelarge

customerbyofferingvalueaddedservicesandsolutions.Theconsultingfirms
actedasintermediaries,supervisingthepurchaseofITChardwareandsoftware,
providingintegrationservices,andcapturingmuchofthehighmarginbusiness.

AgrowingnumberofexecutivesinDynacorpwerecomingtobelievethat
theproblemscouldnotbeaddressedeffectivelywithDynacorpscurrent
organizationalstructure.Likemostcompanies,Dynacorphadbeenestablished
withafunctionalorganization.Butthecompanyhadexpandeditsactivities
acrossfivecontinentsandgreatlyincreaseditsproductrange,andtop
managementbegantoaskifDynacorpneededamajorredesign.

Asafirststep,theCEOappointedasmallinternaltaskforcetomake
preliminaryrecommendationsonorganizationdesigntothetopmanagement
team.TheCEOpersonallylaunchedthetaskforcewithacompanywide
communicationlistingthechallengesDynacorpwasfacing:highcosts,beingtoo
slowtogetnewproductstothemarket,andaneedtoincreasethevaluecreated
forcustomers.TheCEOemphasizedthatthecurrenttaskforcesmandatewas
drivenbyDynacorpscommitmenttomaintainingitsleadershippositioninits
industry,andaskedallDynacorpemployeestocooperatefullyandfranklywith
thetaskforcesinquiries.

Anumberofthetaskforcememberstraveledaroundthecompany
conductinginterviewswithmanagersatmultiplelevelsacrossthethreemajor
divisionsofthecompany,whileothersembarkedonanexternal
benchmarkingexercisetolookathowothercompaniesintheindustrywere
organized.Astheyconsolidatedtheirfindings,theyfoundthemselvesin
agreementthatDynacorpscurrentorganizationhadseriousshortcomings,but
theydisagreedvehementlyonwhatthebestdesignsolutionmightbe.TheCEO
hadmadeitclear,however,thathedidnotwantasimplelistingofalternatives;
hewantedthetaskforce,attheveryleast,toprovidearankingofthealternative
choices.

DYNACORPSDESIGN:THEFUNCTIONALORGANIZATION

Sinceitsearliestdaysofoperation,Dynacorphadbeenorganized
functionally.Thethreelinedivisions,eachledbyanExecutiveVicePresident,
wereEngineering,Manufacturing,andMarketing.Theseweresupportedbya
numberofcorporatestaffdivisions,includingFinance,HumanResource
Management,andCorporateAffairs.


TheEngineeringdivisionwasorganizedbytechnicalareaintotengroups.
TheAdvancedTechnologyGroupworkedondevelopingthenextgenerationof
technology,ofteninclosecollaborationswithuniversitylabsandindependent
researchinstitutes.Inaddition,therewereeightgroupsbasedontechnical
specialty(Devices,StorageSystems,Software,etc.).Finally,therewasaProcess
Technologygroupthathadbeensetuprelativelyrecentlytoworkonthe
developmentofadvancedcomputeraidedmanufacturingsystems.

Originally,thepersonneloftheEngineeringdivisionclusteredinone
location.Overtime,however,bothconstraintsonspaceandtherecognitionof
theneedtohaveapresenceinkeytechnologyhotspotsmeantthatthe
EngineeringdivisioneventuallyspreadacrosssitesinthreeregionsoftheUnited
States,includingthetwocoasts.Recentlytherewerediscussionsaboutsetting
upEngineeringcentersinEuropeandAsia,wheresalesweregrowingrapidly,
butnodecisionhadbeenmade,althoughtheMarketingorganizationsinthose
regionsstronglyadvocatedtheinternationalizationofEngineering.

DynacorpwasoneofthefewAmericancompaniesthathadsuccessfully
implementedadualcareerladderinitsEngineeringdivision,whereby
outstandingengineersandscientistscouldcontinuetoadvanceinsalaryand
statuswithoutleavingthebenchorthelab.Insteadofmovinginto
engineeringmanagementpositions,theycouldriseonaladderofpositionsthat
paralleledthemanagementcareersteps.Manycompaniestriedtoimplement
suchasystem,butasarulethetechnicalladderdoesnotbegintomatchthe
prestigeandpayofthemanagementladder.InDynacorp,however,asignificant
numberofoutstandingtechnicalpeoplerosetotoppositionsonthetechnical
ladder.Mostengineers,however,advancedintomanagementpositionsinthe
Engineeringdivision.Overtimethenumberofrungsonboththetechnicaland
themanagementladdershadincreased,allowingforadvancementopportunities
withinthedivision.

TheManufacturingdivisionwasorganizedbylocation;thebasicunitwas
thefactory,whichwasacostcenter,measuredonoverallcosts,productivity
(whichwasstronglyshapedbycapacityutilization),andquality.Someofthe
factorieshadbegunbymanufacturingoneparticularproductline,butovertime,
assomeproductswerephasedoutandnewproductlinesintroduced,most
factorieshadcometoproducearangeofproducts.Thismadeitsomewhat
difficultforfactorymanagerstocalculateclearproductioncostsforanyone
productline,becauseofthesharedfactoryoverheads.


Dynacorphadahigherpercentageofitsproductsmanufacturedinits
ownfactoriesthanmostofitsU.S.competitors.Thecompanyhadbeenanearly
AmericanadopterofTotalQualityControl,andwasaleaduserofnewprocess
technology.Thecareerladderinmanufacturinghadoriginallybeenquiteshort
(Dynacorphadprideditselfonitsflatorganization),butasthesizeoftheplants
grew,thenumberofmanagementgradesincreasedovertime.Themostcoveted
positioninthefunctionwasthatofgeneralmanagerofamanufacturingplant.

LikeEngineering,Manufacturinghadbeguninonelocation,butithad
expandedearlierintodifferentlocationswithintheUnitedStates,insearchof
lowercostsandproximitytogrowingmarkets,untilthecompanyhadplantsin
12statesintheUSandtwocountriesinEurope.Thecompanyhadnotsetup
productionintheAsiaPacificregion,butitwasincreasinglydrawingon
supplierslocatedinthatregion,andsomemanagersadvocatedsettingup
manufacturingoperationsthereinordertotakeadvantageofitslocal
manufacturingexpertiseandlowercosts.SomeoftheMarketingpeoplewho
hadbeenpushinghardforthisblamedthecompanysslownesstomoveonthe
reluctanceofManufacturingtolosedomesticproduction.Theyalsocriticized
Manufacturingforbeingunwillingtooutsourcemoreofitsproduction,because
thiswouldaffectthepromotionpossibilitieswithinthefunction.Manufacturing
executivesdeniedthisvehemently,andassertedthattheiroverridingconcern
wastoensurethecontinuationofDynacorpsreputationforproductionquality.

TheMarketingdivisionwasalsoorganizedbygeography,butthe
geographicdivisionsdifferedfromthoseoftheManufacturingdivision.There
weresixregionsintheUnitedStates,whichwereinturndividedintosales
territories(branches).MarketingandsalesoutsidetheUnitedStateswere
handledbyanInternationalgroupthatwasorganizedbycountry.Marketing
peoplecultivatedclosetieswiththeircustomers,soclosethatjuniorrecruits
oftencomplainedthattheirmanagersownedcustomersandwerereluctantto
involvethemdeeplyinservingexistingclients.TheMarketingDivisionprided
itselfonthecontinuityofitscustomerrelationshipsandonthedepthofits
peoplesknowledgeofandfierceloyaltytoDynacorpproducts.

TheMarketingdivisionstaskshadchangedconsiderablyovertime.Inits
earlyyearsandwellintothecompanyshighgrowthera,Dynacorphadtargeted
thesaleofitsproductstotechnicalspecialistsincustomercompanies.These
customersrecognizedthetechnicalsuperiorityofDynacorpsproductsandwere
happytoworkwithitstechnicalsupportpeopletoworkoutanyproblems.
However,moreandmorecompaniesweretakingsystempurchasingoutofthe

handsoftheirtechnicalenthusiasts,andDynacorpsmarketingpeople
increasinglyfoundthemselvessellingtobusinessunitpurchasinggroupsoften
backedupby,orevenrepresentedby,consultingfirmswithspecialpracticesin
ITC.Thismeantahighdemandfortechnicalsupport,lowercustomertolerance
ofearlystageproblemswithnewproductlines,theneedtointegrateDynacorp
productswithothersystemstoprovidesolutions,andmorepolished
marketingpitches.Italsomeantthatitbecamemoredifficulttocultivatethe
closepersonalrelationshipswithbuyersthathadbeenalongstandingelementof
Dynacorpsmarketingstrategy.

Dynacorpstopmanagementwasjustifiablyproudofwhattheir
functionalorganizationhadaccomplished.ItsEngineeringdivisionhadan
excellenttechnicalreputationandwasabletoattracttoptechnicaltalentandto
developthecloseworkingrelationshipswithleadingscientistsandengineersat
majorresearchuniversitiesthatenabledittostayonthecuttingedgeofnew
technology.ItsManufacturingdivisionhadbuiltstrongcapabilitiesinquality
manufacturingatatimewhenU.S.industryoverallwaswidelycriticizedfor
fallingbehindinproductionsystems.Anditcouldboastofadedicatedand
knowledgeablemarketingfunctionwhosepeoplehadbuiltcloseworking
relationshipswithcustomerswhowerefiercelyloyaltoDynacorpproducts.

Buttopmanagementrecognizedthatthecompetitiveenvironmentwas
changing,andthatDynacorpshighcosts,slowpaceofgettingnewproductsto
market,andtheneedtogeneratevalueaddedservicesforcustomersmadethe
companyvulnerable.Dynacorpwasnotfacinganimmediatecrisisitwasstill
profitable,growing,andhighlyrespectedinitsindustry.Buttheindustrywas
changing,andDynacorpstopmanagementbelievedthattheyhadawindowof
ayearortwotoaddresstheproblemsbeforethecurrenttrendsledtoreally
seriousproblems.

INTERNALINVESTIGATION:DIAGNOSINGTHEORGANIZATIONAL
PROBLEMS

Thetaskforcefoundwidespreadagreementontheimportanceofthe
problemsthatDynacorpwasfacing,butconsiderablevariationofopinionon
whatwascausingthemoronhowtofixthem.TheEngineeringdivisions
managerswereconvincedthattheprimaryresponsibilityforhighcostsand
delaysingettingproductstomarketlaywithManufacturing.Onesenior
Engineeringmanagersaidthateventhoughhispeopletriedtohandthe
manufacturingsiteadetailedandcompletesetofspecifications,the
manufacturingmanagerkeptcomingbackwithquestionsorobjectionshe

wantedtosubstitutestandardpartsthatwouldmeanreconfiguringthedesignor
loweringtheproductfunctionality,ortochangeelementsofthedesigntomake
iteasiertoproduce,ortoclarifythingssimplybecausehispeopledidnt
understandsomethingaboutthedesign.Eachiterationtooktime,becausethe
engineersontheprojecthadbythattimegoneontootheractivitiesandhadto
behauledbackkickingandscreamingtoworkonsomethingtheythought
theydfinished.

Manufacturingmanagersrecognizedtheproblem,buttheybelievedit
wasduetothefactthatEngineeringcaredmoreaboutthedesignthanthe
product.TheycomplainedthatEngineeringlikedtodesignfromtheground
up,insteadofusingstandardcomponentsthatcouldconsiderablylowerthe
productcost.Onecomplainedthatifafewengineersgetreallygoodat
designingwidgets,thentheywanttodesignabetter,coolerwidgetforevery
producttheyworkon,insteadofacceptingthatsomeotherengineerswidget
woulddothejobjustfine.Butonemanufacturingmanagerputtheproblemin
thecontextofDynacorpsgrowth:

WhenIfirstjoinedthecompany,wewereallstillbasicallyinthesametown,
andwegottoknoweachother.SoifIhadaproblemwiththedesign,Idjust
walkovertoEngineeringandgraboneoftheguystogivemeahand.Of
coursehedgrumbleaboutusmanufacturingguysbeingabunchofidiots,
buthedeithersitdownwithusorfindoneoftheEngineeringteamwho
wouldhelpoutandhalfthetimetheydrealizethatwehadapoint,and
wedworkthingsout.NowIminaplantthatsinadifferentstateandI
dontreallyknowanyofthebenchengineersthesameway.Theyhandusa
spec[specifications]filethatshundredsofpageslong,andtheythinktheir
jobsfinished.Bythetimeweveidentifiedaproblem,theyrealloffonnew
projects,andfindingtheonesresponsibleforthatpartofthedesign,getting
theirattention,convincingthemthatwearentnumbskullsandthatthere
reallyisaproblemwell,thatalltakesalotoftime.Andchangingthespecs
isabigdeal,becauseeveryonehassignedoffonthem,soevenaminor
changebecomesamajortimesink.

TheonlythingonwhichEngineeringandManufacturingpeople
unanimouslyagreedwasthatonereasonforfallingprofitswasMarketings
eagernesstocutpricestomakeasale.Theviewthatthose[Marketing]guysare
measuredonsalesvolume,andtomaketheirtargetstheyllletthecustomer
squeezethemarginswaswidespread.Severalengineersalsoexpressedthe
viewthatMarketingalsoboresomeoftheresponsibilityforproductscoming

latetomarket,becausetheykepttryingtoaddfeaturesorfunctionsduringthe
developmentprocess,eveninthelatestages,whenchangeswereincreasingly
difficultandcostly.Accordingtooneengineer,theycomeinwhenwerenearly
atthelastgatetosay,Hey,wevetalkedaboutthisproducttooneofourbest
customersandtheythinkitwouldbecoolifwehadamodelthatwouldyodel
theStarSpangledBannerontheFourthofJulyorsomeothercrazyidea.We
canusuallytalkthemoutofit,butitcansureslowthingsdownwhilewesort
themout.TheproblemisthatthoseMarketingguyshavenoideaofhowmuch
engineeringisneededtochangethefunctionalityevenbyasmallincrement.

Tomeetthechallengeoflinkingthefunctionsinproductdevelopment,
Dynacorpreliedheavilyontwolinkingmechanisms:crossfunctionalproduct
developmentteams,withrepresentativesfromManufacturingandMarketingas
wellasEngineering,andthepositionofproductmanager,whohadtheformal
responsibilityofoverseeingtheentireprocessfrominitialconceptiontoproduct
launch.

Intheirinterviewsinsidethecompany,thedesigntaskforcemembers
heardwidespreadcomplaintsaboutthecrossfunctionalteams,especiallyfrom
ManufacturingandMarketing.Onemanufacturingmanagerputhismisgivings
thisway:

Wedontreallyhavecrossfunctionalproductdevelopmentteams;wehave
crossfunctionalproductdevelopmentmeetings.Buteveryoneissitting
therewearingtheirfunctionalhats,andnoonereallylistenstoanyoneelse.
Theycloseranksagainsttheotherfunctions.Evenifthedesignengineers
disagreeamongthemselves,theydneverbringtheissuetotheteamto
discussandresolve;theydworkitoutamongthemselvesandthenpresenta
unitedfrontinsupportoftheEngineeringsolutionatthenextmeeting.

Anothermanagerpointedoutthatthecompanydidnothaveaneasytime
identifyinganddevelopinggoodproductmanagers:

Ideally,aproductmanagerwouldhavesomeexperienceineachfunction.
ButhereatDynacorpweallmoveupwithinafunction,andveryfewpeople
moveacrossthefunctionalboundariesintheircareers.Sotheproduct
managerscometothejobwithafairlynarrowexperiencebase.Theyveall
beenoncrossfunctionalteams,butinafunctionalrole.Theyhavetolearn
onthejobfast.Thefewreallygoodproductmanagersthatwehavearein
highdemand,andaretoobusymanagingproductteamstotrainanybody

else.Weburnoutalotofgoodfunctionalpeoplewhogetpromotedtobe
productmanagersandthenfindtheyarentuptothejob.

Butasoneproductmanager(whowaswidelyregardedasverysuccessful)
pointedout,thejobitselfwasaverydifficultone.

Idonthavemuchinthewayofcarrotsandstickstoinfluencethebehavior
oftheteammembers.Ihaveaninputintotheirevaluations,butthe
evaluationsthemselvesaredonebytheirfunctionalmanagers,anditsthe
qualityoftheirfunctionalexpertisethatdetermineshowtheyarevalued,not
theirabilitytosubordinatefunctionalcriteriatoproductsuccess.Andsince
eachengineerworksonanywherefromsixtotwentyprojectsinayear,my
inputisonlyasmallpieceoftheoverallevaluationoftheEngineering
projectmembers.Itgetsevenmorecomplicated:ifIgivesomeonewhois
seenasareallygoodengineerapoorevaluationbecausehesabadteam
player,wordgetsaround,andthenImgoingtohavetroublegettinggood
peopleontomyteams.Furthermore,thebudgetallocationsfortheproject
arecontrolledbytheseniorfunctionalmanagers,notbymeorbytheproject
leadersfromeachfunction.Iftheprojectneedsmoreresources,Ihaveto
coaxthemoutofthefunctions.SoIhavealotofresponsibilitywithoutthe
formalauthoritytobackitup.

Theinternalinvestigationalsocollectedanumberofmoregeneral
criticismsofDynacorpsorganizationdesign.Youngermembersofthe
organizationcomplainedthattheorganizationhadtoomanylayersofmanagers,
andevensomeoftheoldermanagerswhohadbenefitedbytheproliferationof
stepsinthecareerladderlookedbacknostalgicallyontheflat,speedy
organizationoftheirearlyyearsinthecompany.Informationseemedtotakea
longtimetotravelupanddownthecompany.Andseveralmanagers
complainedofagrowingtendencytopushproblemsupthehierarchyfor
resolution,insteadoftacklingproblemswhenandwheretheyarose.One
relativelyjuniormarketingmanagersaidthathehadgrowndiscouragedbythe
amountoftimeittooktogetaresponsetohissuggestionsforwaysofimproving
thecustomerdatabase:

Iwenttomymanagerwithaproposal,andshesentitontohermanager,
andIdontknowwhereitwentfromthere.Ideasandsuggestionsgoup,
andnothingeverseemstocomedown,orifanythingcomesdownitsa
requestforfurtherstudy.Ivegivenuptryingtochangeanythingaround
here.

Ontheotherhand,manyoftheemployeesexpressedsomeapprehension
aboutthemandateofthetaskforce,fearingthatamajorredesignofDynacorp
woulddamageratherthanimprovethecompany.Asoneengineersaid,

Weallcomplainabouttheorganization.ButIhavefriendswhoworkin
otherhightechcompanies,andtheirproblemsareevenworsethanours.
Onefriendscompanyhasaproductdivisionstructure,andtheycantseem
totransferengineersormanufacturingcapacityacrossproductlineswithout
hugefightsaboutwhosgoingtopayforitandhowmuch.Ifwererunning
lateononeproductdevelopmentproject,forexample,seniorEngineering
managementcanshuntingoodengineersfromotherlessimportantprojects
atamomentsnotice.Orifoneproductisinunexpectedlyhighdemand,a
plantmanagercanswitchlinesquicklytogettheproductvolumesoutthe
door.Iwouldntwanttoseeuslosethat.

Amarketingexecutivewhohadbeenhiredfromtheoutsidemadeasimilar
point:

Myoldcompanywasorganizedbyproductdivisions,andwewere
steppingallovereachothersellingdifferentproductlinestothesame
customers.Sometimeswewereourownfiercestcompetitor:thesmall
systemscustomerreps[representatives]werepushingonesolution,thelarge
systemspeopleadifferentone.ThatwasonereasonIleft,andIdontwant
toseeDynacorpgetintothesamedilemma.

EXTERNALINVESTIGATION:IDENTIFYINGALTERNATIVEDESIGNS

Somemembersofthetaskforcefocusedonthesearchforalternative
organizationdesigns.Theysurveyedtheleadingcompaniesininformation
technologyandcommunications(ITC)industry,talkedwithexecutivesinsome
ofthosecompanies,andinterviewedasetofconsultantswhospecializedin
organizationdesign(andwhowereeagertosellDynacorptheirservices).They
alsotalkedwithsomeofDynacorpsownmanagerswhohadbeenhiredoutof
othercompaniesintheindustry,togettheirviewsonthestrengthsand
weaknessesoftheorganizationdesignattheirpreviousemployercomparedto
Dynacorps.Fromtheseinvestigationstheyidentifiedfivemodelsthattheyfelt
wereviablealternativesforthecompany.
Productdivisionstructure:ThisdesignwoulddivideDynacorps
functionaldivisionsintoproductbasedmultifunctionalproductdivisions

basedontheproducttechnology,withaGeneralManagerinchargeofthe
entirevaluechain(fromtechnologydevelopmentthroughaftersales
service)foreachmajorproductline.Relatedproductdivisionswouldbe
groupedintoBusinessDivisions(e.g.LargeSystems)headedbyan
executiveVicePresident.Sharedcorporateserviceswouldincludenot
onlythecurrentsetofactivitiesbutalsoAdvancedTechnology
Development,whichwouldbeineffectacorporateR&Dcenterproviding
cuttingedgetechnologyforfutureproductlines.
Customerdivisionstructure:Dynacorpsfunctionaldivisionswouldbe
dividedintomultifunctionaldivisions,butthecriteriaforcreatingthe
divisionswouldbeprimarilythecustomersegmenttheyserved(e.g.
SmallBusinessDivision),ratherthanthetechnologyoftheproduct.
Functional/ProductMatrix:Thisstructurewouldmatrixtheexisting
functionalstructurewithaproductdivisionstructure,sothatindividuals
wouldreportbothtoafunctionalmanagerandaproductmanager.Only
onecompanyintheindustrywasusingthisstructuresuccessfully,and
severalcompaniesthathadadoptedthisstructurehadabandoneditafter
afewyears.However,ratherthanregardingitasafailure,twoorthree
hademployeditasatransitionalstructuretodevelopthepeopleandthe
systemstomovemoreeasilyfromafunctionaltoaproductbased
organizationdesign.
Front/Back:Thiswastheneweststructure,adoptedbyaverysmall
numberofcompaniesbutstronglyadvocatedbyseveraloftheconsultants
asthecuttingedgeoforganizationdesignintheITCfield.The
structurewouldkeeptheMarketingdivisionasaseparatefrontend
structure,responsibleforsellingtheentirerangeofDynacorpproducts
andsystems.However,itwouldenhanceitstechnicalsupportcapabilities
toenableittodeliversystemsandsolutionsmoreeffectivelyto
customers.EngineeringandManufacturingwouldbedividedinto
productbasedBusinessUnitsthatwouldberesponsiblefordesignand
production.
Functionalstructurewithstrongerlinkingmechanisms:Thiswasthemost
conservativealternative:itwouldkeepDynacorpsfunctionalstructure,
butwouldsetupamuchstrongerarrayofcrossfunctionallinking
mechanismsandalignmentsystemstosupportcrossfunctionallinkage.

Noneofthedesignsseemedtohavebeensuccessfulineverycompanythattried
it;eachhadsuccessandfailurecaseswithintheindustry.Thefront/back
structurewassonewthattherewerenotyetanyobviousfailurecases,but

evensomeofitsstrongestadvocatesintheindustryadmittedthatithadproved
morechallengingtoimplementthantheyhadinitiallyexpected.

Afterthetaskforcehaddigestedboththeinformationontheproblemsof
Dynacorpscurrentstructureandthemappingofthefivedesignalternatives,the
taskforcebeganthediscussionwithaquickshowofhandsoneachmembers
firstandsecondchoiceforanewdesign.Theresultshowedawidedistribution
acrossthefivealternatives,anditwasclearthattherewasnotgoingtobeaquick
consensusonthebestwayforwardforthecompany.

DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS:
(1)IfyouwereontheDynacorptaskforce,whatwouldbeyourfirstchoicefor
analternativedesign?Whatwouldbeyoursecondrankedchoice?
(2)Whichoftheproblemsofthecurrentdesignwouldyourchosendesign
address?Whatproblems(ifany)woulditnotaddress?Arethereanynew
problemstowhichitmightlead?
(3)Whatlinkingandalignmentmechanismswouldyouproposetomakethe
groupingofyourfavoreddesignmoreeffective?