G.R. No.

206004

February 24, 2015

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
Facts:
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On
January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena from ordering him to appear for a
clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy. Timbol, together
with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia; and during the
clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. In the
Memorandum dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended that
Timbols Certificate of Candidacy be given due course but despite Election Officer
Valencias favorable recommendation, Timbols name was not removed from the list
of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELECs website. With the printing of
ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed a
Petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates for the
May 13, 2013 elections. In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the
COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering that the printing of ballots
had already begun. Meanwhile In the Resolution dated August 6, 2013, this court
ordered Timbol to file a reply. When Timbol failed to file his reply despite receipt of
the order, we required Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras (Atty. Aspiras), counsel for Timbol,
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for failing to file a reply
on behalf of his client in the Resolution dated September 2, 2014. We likewise
reiterated our order for Atty. Aspiras to file a reply for Timbol. Still, Atty. Aspiras
failed to comply with our show cause resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not Counsel for petitioner must be fined for failure to comply with the
Show Cause Resolution dated September 2, 2014.
Held:
Yes. Atty. Aspiras, counsel for petitioner, failed to obtain the injunctive reliefs prayed
for in time for the May 13, 2013 elections. However, this was no reason for him to
defy the orders to file a reply on behalf of his client. For such contumacious acts, he

should be ordered to show cause why he should not be proceeded with

administratively. Moreover, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras is ORDERED to show cause
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution why
he should not be the subject of administrative actions for his contumacious attitude
towards repeated orders of this court, specifically, for his failure to comply with the
Resolutions dated August 6, 2013 and September 2, 2014. The action against Atty.
Jose Ventura Aspiras will be docketed as a new and separate administrative case.

G.R. No. 211666

February 25, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,Petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE R. SORIANO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:

Facts:
On October 20, 2010, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint for
expropriation against respondent Arlene R. Soriano, the registered owner of a parcel
of land consisting of an area of 200 square meters. In its Complaint, petitioner
averred that pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 8974, the property sought to be
expropriated shall be used in implementing the construction of the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX). Petitioner duly deposited to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court
the amount of P420,000.00 representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject
property. Consequently, in an Order dated May 27, 2011, the RTC ordered the
issuance of a Writ of Possession and a Writ of Expropriation for failure of respondent,
or any of her representatives, to appear despite notice during the hearing called for
the purpose. Petitioner then submitted documents to prove the zonal value of the
subject property. The RTC then ruled in favour of petitioner ruling that petitioner has
the lawful right to acquire possession of the subject property. The court then
ordered the respondent to pay for the transfer taxes over the subject property.

Issue:

Whether or not Respondent is liable to pay for the transfer tax

Held:
Yes. Respondent Land owner is liable for capital gains tax because it has been held
that since capital gains is a tax on passive income, it is the seller, not the buyer,
who generally would shoulder the tax. Also, the BIR, in its BIR Ruling NO. 476-2013,
dated December 18, 2013, constituted the DPWH as a withholding agent to withhold
the six percent (6%) final withholding tax expropriation of real property for
infrastructure projects.

A.C. No. 10567

February 25, 2015

WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z.
DABAO, ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K.
RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of
which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr.,
and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was
impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to
represent complainant. On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft
was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation
(FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta,
however, was represented by the law firm, the same law office which handled
complainants labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case
against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21
of the CPR. respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but

explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject
to certain "arrangements." According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed
amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for
cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered
by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own
professional fees exclusively. As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with
the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled
collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm
since its inception. They averred that complainants labor cases were solely and
exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover,
respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled
by Atty. Pealosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainants labor
cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination thereof. IBP
Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest
and recommended that they be reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty.
Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010. The IBP found that complainant was
indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents acting together as a law
firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in
this case, as respondents, through Atty. Pealosa, having been retained by FEVE
Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified theft
case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification
for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.

Held:
Yes. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties.1wphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will
be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform
an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests

oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in
the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste; the termination of attorney-client relation
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should
not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.

G.R. No. 206942

February 25, 2015

VICENTE C. TATEL, Petitioner,

vs.
JLFP INVESTIGATION SECURITY AGENCY, INC., JOSE LUIS F. PAMINTUAN,
and/or PAOLO C. TURNO,Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
On March 14, 1998, respondent JLFP Investigation Security Agency, Inc. (JLFP), a
business engaged as a security agency, hired Tatel as one of its security guards.
Tatel alleged that he was last posted at BaggerWerken Decloedt En Zoon
(BaggerWerken) located in Manila. He was required to work twelve (12) hours
everyday from Mondays through Sundays and received only Pl2,400.00 as monthly
salary; he then filed a complaint against JLFP for underpayment of salaries and
wages, non-payment of other benefits and 13th month pay. On October 24, 2009,
Tatel was placed on "floating status"; thus, on May 4, 2010, or after the lapse of six
(6) months therefrom, without having been given any assignments, he filed another
complaint for illegal dismissal; JLFP denied that Tatel was dismissed and averred
that they removed the latter from his post at BaggerWerken on August 24, 2009
because of several infractions he committed while on duty. LA dismissed Tatel's
illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit.The LA did not give credence to Tatel' s
allegation of dismissal in light of the inconsistent statements he made under oath in
the two (2) labor complaints he had filed against the respondents. NLRC reversed
and set aside the LA's Decision and found Tatel to have been illegally dismissed.
Consequently, it directed respondents to reinstate him to his last position without
loss of seniority or diminution of salary and other benefits. CA, however, reversed
and set aside the NLRC's February 9, 2011 Decision and reinstated the LA's
September 20, 2010 Decision dismissing the illegal dismissal complaint filed by
Tatel. Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in rendering its
assailed Decision, the CA instead concurred with the stance of the LA that Tatel' s

inconsistent statements cannot be given weight vis-a-vis the evidence presented by

the respondents. In this regard, the CA declared that if Tatel could not be truthful
about the most basic information or explain such inconsistencies, the same may
hold true for his claim for illegal dismissal.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
finding Tatel to have been illegally dismissed.

Held:
Yes. Tatel was constructively, not actually, dismissed after having been placed on
"floating status" for more than six ( 6) months, reckoned from October 24, 2009, the
day following his removal from his last assignment with IPVG on October 23, 2009,
and not on August 24, 2009 as erroneously held by the NLRC. Placing an employee
on temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal provided that such
temporary inactivity should continue only for a period of six (6) months. In security
agency parlance, being placed "off-detail" or on "floating status" means "waiting to
be posted." Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain, on the part of the employer has become so unbearable as
to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment, or when
there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution
in pay. In this case, respondents themselves claimed that after having removed
Tatel from his post at BaggerWerken on August 24, 2009 due to several infractions
committed thereat, they subsequently reassigned him to SKI from September 16,
2009 to October 12, 2009 and then to IPVG from October 21 to 23, 2009.
Thereafter, and until Tatel filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal six (6)
months later, or on May 4, 2010, he was not given any other postings or
assignments. While it may be true that respondents summoned him back to work
through the November 26, 2009 Memorandum, which Tatel acknowledged to have
received on December 11, 2009, records are bereft of evidence to show that he was
given another detail or assignment. As the "off-detail" period had already lasted for
more than six ( 6) months, Tatel is therefore deemed to have been constructively
dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ROSALINDA

CASABUENA, Respondent.

BRION, J.:
Facts:
On February 4, 2004, one of the police informants, Armando, went to the
Laoag City Police Station and informed him that the appellant was selling shabu; the
chief of police then formed an entrapment team. When the team arrived there, they
positioned themselves 15 meters from the appellants compound. Armando followed
them after receiving a call from SPO1 Balolong. Armando entered the appellants
house when he arrived; he went out after two (2) minutes and made the prearranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team. Immediately after,
SPO1 Balolong, PO1 Mangapit, and PO1 Celso Pang-ag went inside the appellants
house. The police then brought the appellant and the seized items to the Laoag City
Police Station. Whenthey arrived there, SPO1 Balolong submitted the seized items
to SPO2 Loreto Ancheta, the evidence custodian who, in turn, marked these items.
RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA held that the prosecution was
able to prove that the appellant sold shabu to the poseur buyer. It found Armando to
be a credible witness, in the absence of any showing that there was ill motive on his
part to falsely testify against the appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
No. In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9165, the prosecution mustprove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.
Toremove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seizeddrug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen
seized from the appellant. A vital link in the chain of custody is SPO1 Balolongs
possession of the plastic sachet at Barangay 5, Laoag City and his delivery of this

sachet at the police station. We point out that SPO1 Balolong did not mark the
plastic sachet; it was SPO2 Ancheta who allegedly placed markings when the plastic
sachet was handed to him at the police station. It bears noting that SPO2 Ancheta
was already the third person (after Armando and SPO1 Balolong) to get hold of the
seized shabu from the time it was allegedly sold by the appellant tothe poseurbuyer. While marking at the police station is permissible following our ruing in
People v. Resurreccion, we express doubts whether the seized sachet had really
been marked, and if so, whether the marked shabu was the same shabu taken from
the appellant and eventually presented in court. Furthermore P/Sr. Insp. Cayabyabs
testimony is inconsistent the claim of SPO2 Ancheta that he marked the seized
sachet with, among others, "RC" which stands for the appellants initials. We are
puzzled why the specimen presented to SPO2 Ancheta bore the initial "RC" while the
item presented to P/Sr. Insp. did not have the appellants initials; also there is a
discrepancy between the quantity of shabu stated in the Request For Laboratory
Examination(0.1 gram) and in the Chemistry Report No. D-011-2004 (0.0139 gram).
It is dangerous to assume that the police merely rounded off the weight of the
shabu when it made the Request. At any rate, common sense and fair play dictates
the police to state the exact quantity of the drug or drugs being requested to be
examined since shabu, by its very nature, is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
substitution, and exchange. Therefore the Appellant is acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt with moral certainty.1wphi1Corollarily, the
prosecution's failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with
the chain of custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item
seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime
charged.