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TUAZON V.

HEIRS OF BARTOLOME RAMOS


463 SCRA 408
FACTS:
Respondents alleged that on a relevant date, spouses Tuazon purchased from their predecessor-in-interest cavans of rice. That on the total number of
cavans, only a certain portion has been paid for. In payment thereof, checks have been issued but on presentment, the checks were
dishonored. Respondents alleged that since spouses anticipated the forthcoming suit against them, they made fictitious sales over their properties. As
defense, the spouses averred that it was the wife of Bartolome who effected the sale and that Maria was merely her agent in selling the rice. The true buyer of the
cavans was Santos. The spouses further averred that when Ramos got the check from Santos, she took it in good faith and didn't knew that the same were
unfunded.

HELD:
First, there is no contract of agency.
If it was truly the intention of the parties to have a contract of agency, then when the spouses sued Santos on a separate civil action, they should have
instituted the same on behalf and for the respondents. They didn't do so. The filing in their own names negate their claim that they acted as
mere agents in selling the rice.
Second, the spouses are liable on the check.
As indorser, Tuazon warranted that upon due presentment, according to their tenor, and that in case they were dishonored, she would pay the
corresponding amount. After the instrument is dishonored by non-payment, indorsers cease to be merely secondarily liable. They became
principal debtors whose liability becomes identical to that of the original obligor. The holder of a negotiable instrument need not even proceed
against the maker before suing the indorser.
Santos is not an indispensable party to the suit against the spouses.

ARTICLE 1868 Case No. 10


Topic: Relation of third party with principal and agent
G.R. No. 120465. September 9, 1999
WILLIAM UY and RODEL ROXAS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERT
BALAO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
William Uy and Rodel Roxas (petitioners) are agents authorized to sell 8 parcels of land in
Benguet.
Uy and Roxas offered to sell the parcels of land to NHA for a housing project. 1989, NHA
passed a resolution approving the acquisition of said lands, and they executed Deeds of
Absolute Sale.
HOWEVER, only 5 out of 8 lands were paid for by NHA because of a report from DENR that
the remaining area is located at an active landslide area and are therefore not conducive for
housing.
1991, NHA issued a resolution canceling the sale of the remaining lands and offered P1.225
million to the landowners as daos perjuicios.
1992, Uy and Roxas filed a complaint for damages against NHA.
RTC: cancellation was justified, but awarded the amount offered by NHA as damages.
CA: affirmed the decision, but deleted the award.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Uy and Roxas are real parties in interest;
Whether or not, as agents, Uy and Roxas can maintain an action against a third party.
HELD: No, they are not parties in interest because theyre merely agents of their principal.
RATIO: An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the substantive law, has
the right sought to be enforced. Uy and Roxas are not parties to the contract of sale
between their principals and NHA. They are mere agents of the owners of the land subject of
the sale. As agents, they only render some service or do something in representation or on
behalf of their principals. The rendering of such service did not make them parties to the
contracts of sale executed in behalf of the latter. Since a contract may be violated only by the
parties thereto as against each other, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant,
in an action upon that contract must, generally, either be parties to said contract.
Uy and Roxas, likewise, have not shown that they are assignees of their principals to the
subject contracts.
NOTE: It is only when an agent is constituted as an assignee that he, in his own behalf, may sue on a
contract made for his principal

HE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI, * MELENCIA** S. MAXIMO, ALBERTO


A. SARILI, IMELDA S. HIDALGO, all herein represented by CELSO A. SARILI,Petitioners, v. PEDRO
F. LAGROSA, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact LOURDES LABIOS
MOJICA, Respondent.
Facts:

On February 17, 2000, respondent, represented by his attorney-in-fact Lourdes Labios Mojica (Lourdes) via
a special power of attorney dated November 25, 19997 (November 25, 1999 SPA), filed a complaint8 against
Sps. Sarili and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City (RD) before the RTC, alleging, among others, that he
is the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in Caloocan City covered by TCT No. 55979 (subject
property) and has been religiously paying the real estate taxes therefor since its acquisition on November
29, 1974. Respondent claimed that he is a resident of California, USA, and that during his vacation in the
Philippines, he discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject property was issued by the RD in the
name of Victorino married to Isabel Amparo (Isabel), i.e., TCT No. 262218, by virtue of a falsified Deed of
Absolute Sale9 dated February 16, 1978 (February 16, 1978 deed of sale) purportedly executed by him and
his wife, Amelia U. Lagrosa (Amelia). He averred that the falsification of the said deed of sale was a result of
the fraudulent, illegal, and malicious acts committed by Sps. Sarili and the RD in order to acquire the
subject property and, as such, prayed for the annulment of TCT No. 262218, and that Sps. Sarili deliver to
him the possession of the subject property, or, in the alternative, that Sps. Sarili and the RD jointly and
severally pay him the amount ofP1,000,000.00, including moral damages as well as attorneys fees.10
In their answer,11 Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having purchased the
subject property from Ramon B. Rodriguez (Ramon), who possessed and presented a Special Power of
Attorney12 (subject SPA) to sell/dispose of the same, and, in such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale13 dated November 20, 1992 (November 20, 1992 deed of sale) conveying the said property in their
favor. In this relation, they denied any participation in the preparation of the February 16, 1978 deed of
sale, which may have been merely devised by the "fixer" they hired to facilitate the issuance of the title in
their names.14 Further, they interposed a counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, for the filing of the baseless suit.15
During the pendency of the proceedings, Victorino passed away16 and was substituted by his heirs, herein
petitioners.17

The RTC Ruling


On May 27, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision18 finding respondents signature on the subject SPA
as "the same and exact replica"19 of his signature in the November 25, 1999 SPA in favor of
Lourdes.20 Thus, with Ramons authority having been established, it declared the November 20, 1992
deed of sale21 executed by the latter as "valid, genuine, lawful and binding"22 and, as such, had validly
conveyed the subject property in favor of Sps. Sarili. It further found that respondent "acted with
evident bad faith and malice" and was, therefore, held liable for moral and exemplary
damages.23 Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated May 20, 2010, the CA granted respondents appeal and held that the RTC
erred in its ruling since the November 20, 1992 deed of sale, which the RTC found "as valid and
genuine," was not the source document for the transfer of the subject property and the issuance of
TCT No. 262218 in the name of Sps. Sarili25but rather the February 16, 1978 deed of sale, the fact of
which may be gleaned from the Affidavit of Late Registration26 executed by Isabel (affidavit of Isabel).
Further, it found that respondent w as "not only able to preponderate his claim over the subject
property, but [has] likewise proved that his and his wifes signatures in the [February 16, 1978 deed
of sale] x x x were forged."27 "[A] comparison by the naked eye of the genuine signature of
[respondent] found in his [November 25, 1999 SPA] in favor of [Lourdes], and those of his falsified
signatures in [the February 16, 1978 deed of sale] and [the subject SPA] shows that they are not
similar."28 It also observed that "[t]he testimony of [respondent] denying the authenticity of his
purported signature with respect to the [February 16, 1978 deed of sale] was not rebutted x x x."29 In
fine, the CA declared the deeds of sale dated February 16, 1978 and November 20, 1992, as well as
the subject SPA as void, and consequently ordered the RD to cancel TCT No. 262218 in the name
of Victorino married to Isabel, and consequently reinstate TCT No. 55979 in respondents name.
Respondents claims for moral damages and attorneys fees/litigation expenses were also granted
by the CA.30

The due execution and authenticity of the subject SPA are of great significance in determining the
validity of the sale entered into by Victorino and Ramon since the latter only claims to be the agent of
the purported seller (i.e., respondent). Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hen a sale of a
piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing;
otherwise, the sale shall be void." In other words, if the subject SPA was not proven to be duly
executed and authentic, then it cannot be said that the foregoing requirement had been complied
with; hence, the sale would be void.

Nicanora Bucton v. Rural Bank of El Salvador, Inc. v.


Erlinda Concepcion (third-party defendant)
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that she owns the parcel of land. The title of the same was
borrowed by Concepcion on the pretext that she was going to show it to an
interested buyer. Subsequently, Concepcion obtained a loan from respondent
bank, and as security for the said loan, Concepcion mortgaged Petitioners house
and lot using a special power of attorney (SPA) allegedly executed by petitioner
in her favor. But Concepcion failed to settle the loan, hence, the bank foreclosed
the house and lot and in the end, had it in an auction sale.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against
Concepcion and respondent bank on the ground that the mortgage foreclosure
should be annuled since the SPA was forged by Concepcion.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. The respondent bank elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA) wherein the appellate court reversed the RTCs

decision stating that since the SPA was notarized, it enjoys the presumption of
regularity. Hence, this present case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be held liable for the loan entered into
by Concepcion in her own name?
RULING: The court held No.
That under settled jurisprudence, the court held that in order to bind the
principal by a deed executed by an agent, the deed must upon on its face purport
to be made, signed and sealed in the name of the principal. Hence, the fact that
the agent was authorized to mortgage the property is not sufficient to bind the
principal, unless the deed was executed and signed by the agent for and in behalf
of the principal.
However in this present case, Concepcion, as the agent, failed to indicate in the
mortgage that she was acting for and in behalf of her principal. The contract
explicitly shows that it was enetered into by Concepcion in her own name and in
her own personal capacity. Thus, consistent with the law of agency and
jurisprudence, petitioner cannot be bound by the acts of Concepcion.
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