Hermano Oil Manufacturing (Hermano), by letter, requested the Toll Regulatory Board that it be given an

easement of right of way to access the NLEX, since it was deprived of its enjoyment of its property when
it was barred from entry and exit to the North Luzon Expressway by the access fence that bounded its
property located near the Sta. Rita exit of NLEX. The TRB however denied the request, averring that it is
a violation of Section 7.0 of the Limited Access Highway Act (Republic Act 2000) and may have
detrimental effects on the scheduled rehabilitation and improvement of the NLEX. Hermano thus filed a
complaint for specific performance with prayer for TRO against TRB, Engr. Jaime Dumlao, the TRB
Executive Director, the Philippine National Construction Corporation, and the Department of Public Works
and Highways, alleging that it was totally deprived of its enjoyment of its property by preventing ingress
and egress to it, and the only access being the road network in front of its property; that it was denied
equal protection of the law because other properties adjacent to it had access to the NLEX; and it was
deprived of its property without due process and just compensation. The Office of the Solicitor General,
appearing for the TRB, filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that it is a suit against the State, and the proper
remedy was to file a petition for certiorari of the denial by the TRB not a complaint for specific
performance.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case, holding that the suit is in the nature of a
suit against the State although the defendants were being sued in their personal capacities, since it would
entail appropriation from the State if and when they were held liable for damages. The RTC also had no
jurisdiction over the case in view of PD 1818 and RA 8975 which prohibits courts from issuing injections
and TROs in infrastructure projects of the government.
On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the dismissal of the case by the RTC, ruling that the relief sought
by Hermano in its complaint is in violation of the law (RA 2000); when it bought the land, the NLEX was
already in existence, as such, an easement of right of way cannot be granted if the isolation was brought
about by the owner; as to non-suability, while the PNCC was sued along with other governments
agencies, it is performing a governmental function, which is the maintenance of highways; while it put
forward cases arguing that government agencies may be sued for performing non-government functions,
still it did not indicate reasons why the NLEX should not be considered a governmental function.
Hermano appealed to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Hermano was deprived of due process and equal protection of the laws when it
was denied access to the NLEX.
The putting up of the access fence on the petitioners property was in the valid exercise of
police power, assailable only upon proof that such putting up unduly violated constitutional limitations like
due process and equal protection of the law.10 In Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways,
the Court has further noted that:
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain
destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety
require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special
kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.11
Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the petitioners property
given the location thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX. Although some adjacent
properties were accorded unrestricted access to the expressway, there was a valid and reasonable
classification for doing so because their owners provided ancillary services to motorists using the NLEX,
like gasoline service stations and food stores12. A classification based on practical convenience and
common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific
uniformity13.
Lastly, the limited access imposed on the petitioners property did not partake of a compensable
taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is no question that the property was
not taken and devoted for public use. Instead, the property was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the
access fence, in order to secure the general safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There
being a clear and valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any just
compensation.14