Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts.
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on
the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity
of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the
Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and illegal.
In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Fred Castro,
because allegedly, he is the brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son was
appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here Atty. Santiago implied that the
justices were not fair and that their decision was influenced).
In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and was
only included due to inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language he used
was necessary to defend his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first
duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their
clients success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiagos defense is not tenable.
A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief in
the judicial system. A lawyers duties to the Court have become common place. Really,
there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such
duty: To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance.
Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.
the penalty of four months and one day of arrests mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. That period of confinement he had duly served by November 10, 1975,
considering that he had been under detention since July 18, 1975. 2 This notwithstanding,
the petition alleged that he was not set free, the reason being that on November 19, 1975,
the last day of the prison term imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Judge, in the very same case where your
petitioner was convicted and for which he served sentence, Criminal Case No. 15289, a
'Motion to Order the Warden to Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia alleging as a ground
that the 'father of the victim, Gilberts Valenzuela, informed the movant that the victim in the
above-entitled case died and for this reason the undersigned will file an amended
information. Then came this paragraph in the petition: "That on the following day, November
20, 1975, the respondent Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he had no
jurisdiction to act on said motion because the case had long been terminated and his
decision therein had already been executed, and, further, even assuming that the
respondent Judge could still act in the case, he could not and should not act on the Fiscal's
motion because the same was not set for hearing and no copy thereof was furnished to
your petitioner whose very liberty was being sought to be deprived, still he persisted in
acting upon the Fiscal's motion and granted the same 'in the interest of justice,' not at all
minding that your petitioner, while maybe a convict in the eyes of the respondent Judge, is
still entitled to due process of law and to some justice.
On the morning December 17, 1975, respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P.
Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared. Neither petitioner nor his counsel,
Salvador N. Beltran, was present. There was this manifestation though: '[Petitioner thru
counsel, respectfully manifests that he has already been released from confinement, for
which reason the present petition has been rendered moot and academic. It would appear,
therefore, that with the release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and
academic. That disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There was a lapse in
judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of
appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse
explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice
before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his
future actuations as a member of the bar.
ISSUE: Whether the amending of the information by Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr is the proper
remedy to address the order of release of the petitioner.
HELD: After being able to study the applicable rule and jurisprudence, the undersigned
concluded that the proper remedy is not amendment of the information because judgment had
already been rendered on the first information, but the filing of a new information for homicide
upon the authority of this Honorable Court's ruling in People v. Manolong, and It is similar
cases. 8
HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies
that what the Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the
resolution of the case or investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty
(not punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may
recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not
proper. It cannot be filed in this special civil action which is confined to questions of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts
of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of
members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. However, the
lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded not be carried away in espousing their clients cause.
The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in
the profession.
On the sixth paragraph of the letter-complaint, the only testimony of Primitivo Santos on
which his suspicion that Judge Cruz was interfering with a criminal case filed by Teresita
Cruz was he saw Judge Cruz enter the room where an investigation was being conducted \
The letter-complaint asks that Judge Cruz voluntarily inhibit himself from trying and allow
another judge to hear it, and Judge Cruz suspended the proceedings.
A careful review of the records of this case shows that the investigating Judge correctly
found that the complainant was not able to prove the charges of partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge.
However, the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that during the formal investigation
conducted on February 9, 1973 6 the respondent judge, while cross-examining the witness,
Alberto T. Cano, lost his temper and said: "You can go to hell I don't care or where do you
want to go Mr. Cano". This language of the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal judge and
deserves administrative penalty.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Cruz committed a conduct of unbecoming a municipal judge.
HELD: The respondent Judge is hereby EXONERATED of the charge of partiality but is
found guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge by uttering intemperate language during the
trial of the case. The respondent judge is hereby imposed a penalty of a fine equivalent to
one (1) month salary and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely