San Diego Sector (A-1)

Deployment Analysis

Location: San Diego, California – 3.58 Miles of Remote Area

Key Issues/Constraints:
• The area is in a remote setting adjacent to and inclusive of the Otay Mountain
Wilderness Area (OMW).
• The OMW consists of rugged, mountainous terrain with large rock outcroppings
and high growth vegetation that provides cover and concealment.
• Closest patrol road to the area is over a mile away called the Otay Mountain
Truck Trail which is a single lane dirt road that follows the contour of high
mountain ridges that extend over 3,500 ft. elevation.
o The next closest road system is approximately two miles north along Otay
Lakes Road.
• Access to the area is limited to aerial insertions and foot patrol.
• Terrain hazards have resulted in significant officer safety risks to agents.
o 3 agent deaths since 1996
• 2 agents died from falls off steep rock faces while on foot patrol in
the OMW area.
• 1 agent died while attempting to traverse Otay Truck Trail by
vehicle with limited visibility and subsequently veered off the
roadway and rolled 1,200 feet down a steep mountain slope.
o 128 reported agent injuries between FY’05 through FY’07
o 293 reported Border Safety Initiative rescues between FY’00 through
FY’07
o In 2007, 1 National Guard Helicopter crashed atop Otay Mountain while
transporting agents and guardsmen to entry interdiction posts in the
OMW. The crash resulted in several injuries to include a National Guard
Pilot and agent passengers.
• Area is sandwiched between two Mexican metropolitan areas that provide
infrastructure to support smuggling operations such as stash houses, access roads,
cell phone and two-way radio communication.
o To the west lies the City of Tijuana, Baja California is the 6th largest city
in Mexico with a population of 1.5 million
o The City of Tecate, Baja California lies to the east and has a population of
over 50,000
o The Tecate Highway runs east and west between these two cities
providing access within 100 yards of the border immediately south of the
OMW.

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 • The OMW is host to sensitive habitat for the Quino Checkered Spot Butterfly and
its host plant Plantego Erecta which is adversely impacted by alien foot traffic
activity and associated human and solid waste.
• Inaccessibility also negatively affects other public safety efforts to include fire
suppression, rescue and area policing to reduce cross-border crime such as bandit
activity and predatory violence against illegal entrants.

Nature of the Threat:

• The OMW is the highest trafficked corridor in San Diego Sector accounting for
over 30% of total entries and apprehensions.
• Due to the lack of patrol access and challenging terrain features, entry detection
capabilities are limited and create an enforcement vulnerability that is easily
exploited by numerous smuggling organizations that operate in the area and
subjects agents to serious officer safety risks.
• Despite its remote designation, the tolerance to depth of intrusion within the
OMW under current deployment is approximately 1 mile north of the border at
the Otay Mountain Truck Trail. Due to lack of access and terrain challenges, an
expansive enforcement footprint is presently the only means of patrolling this area
thus subjecting agents to the hazards of the wilderness and does nothing to
prevent environmental degradation caused by illegal entrants.
• Due to lack of law enforcement presence in the OMW at the border, predatory
violence by bandits against illegal entrants to include assaults, robberies, and rape
has been reported. Since the beginning of FY08, there have been 20 reported
assaults against agents and 12 reported incidents involving bandit activity within
the OMW.

The lack of access in the OMW and the close proximity of the two heavily populated
Mexican cities create an opportunity for criminal organizations to gain quick unopposed
access thus enabling the use of cover and concealment throughout the wilderness to
points north. The ability to avoid detection and apprehension creates enforcement
vulnerability for agents charged with gaining effective control of the border.

Alternatives Analysis:
(b) (7)(E)

o The current deployment provides an “Initial Control Capabilities Established”

border security status in the project area. This status is accomplished with
staffing augmentation from specialized operations units and an expansive
enforcement footprint that extends throughout the OMW.
• Sensors – Standard ground sensors are currently deployed on trails most
frequented. Due to the vastness of the wilderness, terrain aspects (to include steep
ridges and canyons, rock outcroppings and high growth vegetation) and
innumerable trails that exist in the OMW, an inordinate number of sensors would

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 be required to provide the necessary detection capability to the Otay Mountain
Truck Trail.
(b) (7)(E)

• Cameras – Cameras will provide some visual detection of persons entering the
United States and will provide limited tracking capability for a relative short
distance due to terrain, vegetation and inclement weather to include fog, rain,
snow and frequent marine layer.
(b) (7)(E)

o The Sector Chief anticipates the deployment of cameras combined with

the current deployment baseline will facilitate increased identification and
classification capabilities, will aid in detection but will not enhance
deterrence or response requirements that the pedestrian fence alternative
provides.
• Mobile Surveillance Systems (Radar) – (b) (7)(E)

o The construction of an access road is necessary to support MSS

deployment in the OMW.
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

o The Sector Chief anticipates that the deployment of MSS combined with
the current baseline deployment will facilitate increased detection and
identification but will not meet classification or response requirements that
the pedestrian fence alternative provides.
• Border Patrol Agents – Border Patrol Agents are capable of detecting entries,
identifying and classifying the threat, and responding to intrusions, but can be
overwhelmed by the number of illegal entrants (on foot) they confront. However,

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 these capabilities are hindered by the OMW terrain environment and lack of
access. Current deployment requires the use of air assets and increased foot
patrols which drains manpower as well as budgetary resources and is not
sustainable over a long period of time.
(b) (7)(E)

o The Sector Chief anticipates that the deployment of the additional 504
total agents combined with the current deployment baseline will enhance
detection, identification, classification and response requirements but is
deficient in the areas of executability and sustainability when compared to
the pedestrian fence alternative.
• Pedestrian Fence – 3.58 miles of pedestrian fence will deter illegal entrants who
are not physically capable of climbing the structure and significantly delay those
who may be fit enough to climb it.
o Bollard design (PV-1) built to accommodate anti-climb, vehicle stop
capability and 18’ height requirements.
o Estimated cost to commercially construct fencing, access road and
associated drainage installation - $17.8 million per mile.
o As a stand alone feature, pedestrian fence cannot detect illegal entrants or
alert enforcement personnel for a proper response and resolution to the
situation. As a result, personnel and technology are required to
compliment tactical infrastructure.
o Proposed access roads and fencing will enhance operations by increasing
agent mobility and enabling them to tactically address the high volume of
pedestrian traffic in the area. San Diego Sector has requested a fence
design that meets both pedestrian and vehicle stop capability requirements
for the A-1 segment.
o The operational tolerance to depth of intrusion necessitates a pedestrian
fence to allow agents the opportunity to confront illegal entrants before
they can access the OMW where there is a higher risk to their safety,
safety of agents and environmental degradation.
o The Sector Chief anticipates that the deployment of the pedestrian fencing
and supporting road infrastructure combined with the current baseline
deployment will enhance detection, identification, classification and
response requirements. In addition, the pedestrian fence provides the
necessary persistence of impedance requirement that facilitates long term
sustainability.
• Vehicle Fence –3.58 miles of vehicle fence as a stand alone option is not viable
for the A-1 project area. The tolerance of intrusion depth will essentially be
located near the access road only a short distance from the fence itself. As a

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 result, vehicle fence will not answer the time and distance requirement that
addresses the volume of traffic seen in this area.
o Estimated cost to construct vehicle fence is $2.2 million per mile not
including necessary road and drainage structures.
o Estimated cost to build associated construction road - $30 million
o Total estimated cost to construct vehicle fence - $36.6 million
o The Sector Chief Patrol Agent anticipates that the deployment of the
vehicle fence combined with the current deployment baseline will not
enhance detection, identification, classification and response requirements.
• Technology Mix – An analysis of technology components was conducted to
determine what complement of technology would be most cost effective. Based
on the analysis conducted by Field Commanders and the Sector Chief, (b) (7)(E)

Key Evaluation Factors:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

• The installation of the technology, as a stand alone alternative, would not provide
the required level of deterrence or enhance agent time-distance response.

Recommended Solution:
• Deploy pedestrian fencing to deter and to significantly slow those who are fit
enough to negotiate the fence. Fencing will deflect a large number (women,
children, less-than-fit males, etc) from crossing.
• Build access road to facilitate fence construction and upgrade for patrol activities.
• Deploy a sensor system on or in the area of the fence to alert agents when a
person or person is approaching, attempting to climb, or tampering with, the fence
(fence alignment is built several feet off the border enabling the deployment of
sensors to the south).
• Deploy cameras providing overlapping view sheds of the fence and brush clearing
to provide enhanced surveillance and compliment detection capabilities.

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 • Deploy visual deterrence systems (lights that may be activated by camera
operators) for nighttime deterrence.
• Deploy agents in a mobile capacity, patrolling the fence and responding when the
technology systems detect an illegal entry.

Projected Results:
• Fewer illegal entries will occur resulting in a lesser agent and alien presence in the
OMW. This ultimately will minimize exposure to the dangers associated with
terrain and subsequent environmental impacts.
(b) (7)(E)

• Those who challenge the pedestrian fence will require equipment or assistance
from others, thereby increasing the level of difficultly and frustration of the
criminal element.
• Long term effect will allow significantly fewer agents to maintain control in the
OMW area.
• Field Commanders will be able to redeploy agents to new areas of operation to
address the shift in smuggling patterns.
• Fewer aerial assets will be required to support operations which will reduce risks
to agents and pilots and result in budget savings associated with subsequent
maintenance and fuel costs.
• Create the potential to re-allocate several million dollars in yearly salaries for a
one-time cost of technology and tactical infrastructure deployment.
• Increased level of effective control will be established.
• This enhancement is expected to raise the border security status to a sustainable
level of “Initial Control Capabilities Established” and achievable increase to
“Effective Control” with the proper combination of technology solutions, tactical
infrastructure and appropriate staffing.

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