2004 Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Exercise

Executive Summary
Introduction
Louisiana, like the entire Gulf Coast, is extremely vulnerable to hurricanes. While Louisiana has
been historically spared from a truly catastrophic hurricane, the danger still exists. Due to this
fact, FEMA proposed a catastrophic hurricane exercise for the State of Louisiana—specifically
southeast Louisiana and the City of New Orleans. The purpose of this exercise was to develop a
response and recovery plan for a major hurricane that floods New Orleans and the surrounding
parishes and to identify any issues that cannot be resolved based on current capabilities. IEM,
along with subcontractors Dewberry and URS, were tasked by FEMA to provide support to the
exercise, including consequence estimation, scenario development, exercise facilitation, and
exercise documentation.

The exercise, named “Hurricane Pam” after the scenario on which it was based, was conducted
at the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) and
buildings in the surrounding complex from July 16–23, 2004, with over 350 participants. The
first two days of the exercise were devoted to pre-landfall planning.

The following objectives were achieved during the exercise:

• Validation of existing local, State, regional, and headquarters plans (including checklists
and decision and action “trigger points”); recommendation of changes needed; and
consolidation into a single joint master plan
• Identification of potentially available existing teams and resources and where, when, and
how they will be alerted, activated, and deployed
• Identification of new plans, checklists, and decision and action points that need to be
developed and documented
• Identification of any inconsistencies or conflicts between State, regional, and national
plans and recommendations of changes to resolve discrepancies
• Objectives with specific emphasis on Search and Rescue, Temporary Medical Care,
Sheltering, Temporary Housing, Schools, and Debris
• Objectives with specific emphasis on other action topics selected during the exercise,
including Hazardous Materials; Unwatering of Levee Enclosed Areas; Billeting of
Federal Response Personnel; Donations Management and Volunteer Resources;
Distribution of Ice, Water, and Power; Public Information; Transition from Rescue to
Temporary Housing; and Reentry and Access Control

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Exercise Design
Design of the exercise began in March 2004 with the appointment of an Exercise Steering
Committee by the Unified Command. The National Weather Service (NWS) began work on the
weather scenario in late April 2004. IEM was awarded the contract for exercise support on May
19, 2004, and IEM project leads met with the Steering Committee and members of the Unified
Command in Denton, Texas, on May 20. The Exercise Design Committee met at least once per
week from this point until the exercise began. Emergency management personnel from each of
the 13 Parishes affected in the scenario received an exercise briefing on June 25.

The weather scenario designed by the NWS involved a slow moving (a forward speed of 5 mph)
Category 3 hurricane sustaining 120 mph winds at landfall. Landfall occurred at Grand Isle,
Louisiana, in the early morning of September 28, 2004. The hurricane moved slowly northward,
spawning destructive tornados and generating a storm surge that inundated the City of New
Orleans under 15 to 20 feet of water. This nightmarish, yet realistic, scenario would be the
costliest and deadliest hurricane in U.S. history, displacing more than one million people from
their homes.

IEM, along with Dewberry and URS, performed an extensive series of consequence analyses for
use by participants during the exercise. These analyses involved determining areas of flood
inundation, structural damage, displaced households, human casualties, amount of debris,
amount and location of hazardous materials, and impacts to transportation, along with other
consequences. IEM also performed a broad literature search for material regarding catastrophic
hurricanes. This information was provided to each exercise participant on CD.

Exercise Execution
The exercise was conducted in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from July 16–23, 2004. Over 350
individuals participated in this exercise. These participants were drawn from more than 15
Federal agencies; more than 30 State agencies; representatives from 13 parishes; FEMA
Headquarters; FEMA Regions I, II, IV, V, and VI; LOHSEP; the State of Mississippi; the State
of Arkansas; numerous volunteer agencies; and IEM/Dewberry personnel. A small subset of
these individuals participated in two days of pre-landfall planning.

Response to the exercise was very positive. Participants felt that the exercise was a worthwhile
activity and was beneficial in that many agencies that are normally involved only in operations,
not in planning, were given an opportunity to bring their experience to the table. A summary of
participant comments regarding exercise improvement can be found in the exercise information
summaries.

Exercise Outcomes
The purpose of this exercise was to develop a response and recovery plan for a major hurricane
that floods New Orleans and the surrounding parishes and to identify any issues that cannot be
resolved based on current capabilities. This plan, once completed, will serve as a bridging
document between local, State, and Federal plans. Fifteen functional plans were produced during

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the course of the exercise, along with associated action plans, checklists, and trigger points. This
plan will be a living document, continually improved through additional workshops and
exercises.

In addition to the functional plans, IEM has produced at the request of FEMA this executive
summary and a series of exercise information summaries addressing the following topics:
• Responding to a Catastrophic Hurricane—Number of Responders
• Responding to a Catastrophic Hurricane—Resources
• Issues and Limiting Factors in the Functional Plans
• Improving the Exercise Process—Participant Feedback
• Exercise Participant List

The Path Forward

Planning for such a catastrophic event is never complete. Recognizing this fact, three follow-on
workshops have been tentatively scheduled for further planning in three areas: Temporary
Medical Care, Temporary Housing, and Sheltering. The first workshop is tentatively scheduled
for November 2004, the second workshop for January 2005, and the third for February 2005. The
purpose of these workshops is to further refine the functional plans for these planning areas using
a concentrated group of operational personnel.

Fifteen functional plans were produced during the exercise conducted July 16–23, 2004. Many
additional topics that should be addressed were identified during and after this exercise. In order
to address these topics, a second planning exercise is tentatively scheduled for April 2005.

An exercise guidance document, including a template for recreating a scenario-driven exercise of

this type will also be produced by IEM and delivered to FEMA by December 31, 2004.

Proposed future work includes completion of a Basic Plan framework and content to overlay the
functional plans produced during the exercise, as well as development of emergency support
function (ESF) annexes for the Base Plan. These plans and annexes will be based on the format
and content of the Federal Response Plan.

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Point of Contact
The IEM point of contact for this project is Brad Tiffee. He may be reached at:

IEM, Inc.
8555 United Plaza Blvd., Suite 100
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 952-8229
(225) 952-8122 (fax)
brad.tiffee@ieminc.com

The alternate point of contact is Wayne Thomas. He may be reached at:

IEM, Inc.
2751 Buford Highway, Suite 204 Druid Pointe
Atlanta, GA 30324
(404) 214-0330
(404) 214-0337 (fax)
wayne.thomas@ieminc.com

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Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan
Exercise Information Summaries
Introduction
At the request of FEMA, IEM is providing a series of exercise-related information summaries.
The summaries contained in this document include:
• Responding to a Catastrophic Hurricane—Number of Responders
• Responding to a Catastrophic Hurricane—Resources
• Issues and Limiting Factors in the Functional Plans
• Improving the Exercise Process—Participant Feedback
• Exercise Participant List

Responding to a Catastrophic Hurricane—Number of Responders

Introduction
The number of personnel that would respond to a catastrophic hurricane in Louisiana will vary
depending on the severity and location of the impacted area. The analysis presented here will be
based on the assumption of a Category 3 or stronger hurricane impacting southeast Louisiana
with significant impact to the city of New Orleans.

Responders in this summary will be categorized by local, State, or Federal agencies. The number
of responders could easily multiply quickly after a catastrophic disaster, especially as search and
rescue (SAR) efforts evolve into recovery efforts. However, the ability to support those
responders will require limiting the number of personnel until proper support resources for
shelter and food have been mobilized and established.

Under the assumption that a catastrophic hurricane would displace over one million people in
southeast Louisiana, thousands of emergency personnel, relief workers, and volunteers would
respond to the impacted areas. Obtaining an exact figure of the number of response personnel is
unrealistic; however, based on interviews and published reports, this analysis will provide an
estimated number of local, State and Federal responders.

Local Responders
Many parishes in southeast Louisiana could be severely impacted by a major hurricane making
landfall in that region. Those parishes would likely include Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson,
Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany,
Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and other neighboring parishes. Based on the number of personnel that
would likely respond to a hurricane disaster at the local level in the aforementioned parishes, it is
estimated that approximately 4,000 local responders would be involved in response to a Category
3 or stronger storm.

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State Responders
Most State agencies would likely be involved with response and recovery efforts. The number of
State responders is estimated near 8,000, with at least half of those being Army National Guard
personnel.

Federal Responders
The greatest number of responders to a direct impact in southeast Louisiana would likely be
deployed from the Federal level. More than half of the estimated 21,000 total responders would
come from the Department of Defense (DoD). In addition, over 3,000 FEMA personnel would
likely be deployed to a Disaster Field Office (DFO); at least 3,000 volunteers would be involved
across the region; and other Federal agencies would deploy an estimated 2,000 to 3,000
responders.

Conclusions
A major hurricane impacting southeast Louisiana would involve thousands of responders and
volunteers. Although it would be unrealistic to determine the exact number of personnel, recent
disasters have provided the opportunity to estimate how many responders would be involved in
such a large operation. More than 20,000 responders would be required to provide rescue, relief,
and recovery services under the assumption that such a hurricane would impact over one million
people in Louisiana.

Responding to a Catastrophic Hurricane—Resources

Introduction
A Category 3 or stronger hurricane threatening southeast Louisiana would require a large
number of Federal and State assets. At the Federal level, FEMA would provide resources and
commodities based on the storm’s expected impact in the region. However, the availability of
resources might be diminished based on current or recent disasters in other FEMA regions in the
United States. This summary of resource requirements will be based on the assumption that no
FEMA commodities and materials are committed to other areas at the time of their need.

Summary of Issues
Once a threat has been identified, FEMA Region VI officials will meet with the Louisiana Office
of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) to determine the parishes and
populations at risk.

Camp Beauregard Operations

The amount of resources and commodities required for response to a major hurricane in
Louisiana will continue to grow after landfall. However, the top five immediate response
commodities would include ice, water, generators, cots, blankets, and food. The necessity to
replenish these resources will be based on power restoration in the impacted areas. In addition,
other resources will be required in the days and weeks following landfall, including sanitary kits,
clean-up kits, sanitary facilities, travel kits, mobile homes, and tents. The Mobilization Center for

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FEMA Region VI will be located at the Territorial Logistical Center (TLC) in Fort Worth,
Texas, and the Region VI Staging Area for Louisiana would be located at Camp Beauregard in
Alexandria.

FEMA would pre-stage water, ice, and generators under the surge account in coordination with
the State of Louisiana. The limiting factor for generators initially will be installation crews rather
than number of generators. The per person absolute minimum amount of water required is 1.3
gallons per day and the minimum for ice is five pounds per day. Based on the assumed potential
impact in Louisiana, initial ice and water supplies will be required for approximately 1.1 million
persons or 1,530,000 gallons of water per day and 5.5 million pounds of ice per day. This will
require 306 truck loads of water (at 5,000 gallons each) and 138 truck loads of ice (at 40,000
pounds each). The following assets would also be moved to the staging area at Camp Beauregard
before landfall to provide support for the first five days of response operations:
• 150 generators (three 50-packs, including 11.5 kw, 35 kw, 85 kw, and 125 kw generators)
• 100 larger generators (125 kw, 250 kw, 350 kw, and 450 kw generators)
• 2,000 cots and blankets
• 48 computer terminals and IT support materials for FEMA field operations

NDMS Operations
The regional team leader for the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) would be at the
Region VI Regional Operations Center (ROC) before and during landfall. They would be sent to
the DFO once operational. Their initial mission is to work through the Operations Chief to
determine the need and number of Disaster Mortuary Operational Response
Teams (DMORTs), Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), and Veterinary Medical
Assistance Teams (VMATs). The number of teams and their staging areas would be situational.
For the State of Louisiana, it is expected that FEMA would make an initial request for four
teams. These teams would be deployed from the most logical area or by rotation. FEMA would
most likely pre-stage teams at a facility in Alexandria, Louisiana, or Jackson, Mississippi. These
teams may also pre-stage at Camp Beauregard. As the units were deployed, the back-
up/rotational teams would be brought into Camp Beauregard for preparation.

DMORT Team Operation

There are currently ten DMORT teams and one Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) specialty
team in the United States. The deployment of these teams would be based on their proximity to
the disaster location. FEMA would most likely pre-deploy two teams followed by additional
teams when needed. Each team would initially deploy to the DMAT pre-staging area in Virginia.
Teams deployed early enough could continue a forward deployment to the staging area at Camp
Beauregard or directly to the disaster area. These teams will be responsible for victim
identification and mortuary services, mobile morgue operation, search and recovery, family
assistance and counseling, data collection and matching, and biological-chemical-nuclear
decontamination of remains. DMORT teams can vary in size and typically operate under a 14-
day rotational schedule. These teams will consist of a wide range of personnel: radiologists
(body and dental), pathologists, anthropologists, fingerprint specialists, embalmers, funeral
directors, family counselors, morgue specialists, and biological-chemical-nuclear specialists.
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Conclusions
A major hurricane impact in or near southeast Louisiana could potentially impact and displace
hundreds of thousands of people. A disaster of this magnitude would greatly stress FEMA’s
response capabilities. The most likely “limiting factor” for the staging of commodities and
resources will be the availability of supplies. In addition, recent or ongoing disasters can
drastically reduce the amount of key response commodities, such as generators, ice, water, and
food. If these resources are not available, FEMA will need to rely on other government and
private organizations to supplement shortfalls.

Issues and Limiting Factors in the Functional Plans

During the exercise, functional action plans were developed which establish the framework for
response. While these plans have resolved many concerns regarding how these functional areas
would respond to an event of this nature, some issues remain. The following issues were
identified by each of the planning groups:

Debris
• It is recommended that a disposal task force be formed to work on unresolved issues.
• There may not be enough fuel from the Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development (LDOTD) to support this plan. Under normal debris conditions, LDOTD
stated that each 1,000 gallons of stockpiled fuel lasts them about one week. Each 1,000
gallons stockpiled consists of 500 gallons of gasoline and 500 gallons of diesel fuel.
• It is unclear what will be done with debris in the long term. Suggestions include dumping
out to sea, incorporation into artificial reef systems (coordination with the Minerals
Management Service and other agencies would be required), transportation to landfills in
the Midwest (issues with asbestos or Formosan termites may exist), or sale of vegetative
chips.
• The permitting process for the New Orleans Metropolitan Area to include on-site burial
and RCRA vaults should be explored.
• Restoration of normal traffic on rivers and inland waters should be coordinated with
debris removal efforts. It is not clear who has responsibility for the various types of
debris on rivers and inland water (e.g., sunken vessels).
• Permitting and mitigation issues for dumping in wetlands should be examined and their
impacts to the debris functional plan studied.
• At this time, it appears that debris can not be disposed of in St. Helena Parish. St. Helena
Parish has passed a law disallowing any solid waste disposal site in the parish.
• There is an issue with the handling of abandoned vehicles, mainly from a legal
standpoint. At what point is a vehicle considered abandoned? Are boats and other
watercraft considered vehicles? During Tropical Storm Allison in Houston, vehicles in
parking garages were labeled “abandoned” and removed, but to an impound lot where
they could later be reclaimed.
• Location of debris management sites and the availability of final disposal locations, the
magnitude of the contaminated debris, and availability of resources for the extended
amount of time necessary to complete operations are all potential issues.

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 • The ability for all responding agencies to respond to a catastrophic event may be initially
limited.
• Politics at all levels can slow things down, or pressure responders to move faster than is
feasible or prudent.
• Formosan termites may prevent moving debris. Asbestos and legal injunctions could also
prevent or delay work.

Schools
• Non-public school issues such as records and financial issues for both nonprofit and for
profit schools are not addressed.
• Higher Education was not part of the functional plan, but needs to be considered as an
extension of the plan or as a plan of its own.
• All 68 public school districts, as well as non-public schools, lab schools, and charter
schools, need to develop disaster recovery plans that include record maintenance. A
program to guide local education authorities with the development and maintenance of
these plans needs to be established.
• Funding to local school districts for students from affected parishes that are receiving
educational services outside the State needs to be resolved.
• The plan should consider additional resources potentially provided through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).
• The current FEMA public assistance program may not fit this scenario.
• The Louisiana Department of Agriculture would usually assist in distribution of
commodities, but there will be much competition for food allocation. There is uncertainty
as to whether it can be distributed to schools, or if it will go to competing needs.
• The planning group is unsure of the roles of the U.S. Department of Education, the
Louisiana Public Information Officer Group, and the Louisiana Division of
Administration.
• The Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force could be expanded to include education in
order to maintain momentum.
• All school extra-curricular activities will be impacted and are not currently addressed in
this plan.
• State and Federal laws that affect funding will need to be examined and may require
some type of emergency legislation or temporary suspension. The No Child Left Behind
law, Louisiana’s Accountability law, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
are examples of laws that provide special funds or make judgments against schools.
Another important consideration involves Federal consent decrees associated with
desegregation lawsuits impacting attendance zones and school quotas.
• Providing educational services will follow and is dependent on the housing patterns that
develop after the disaster. Educational services will also be dependent upon how fast
human and other resources can be accumulated and supplied to the Local Education
Agencies (LEAs).
• Given existing capacity and assuming adequate financial resources, educational services
can be delivered as planned, although the time of delivery may be extended. This

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 functional plan is probably 80% executable and is heavily dependent upon the LEAs
adequately developing and implementing their portion of the plan. Although many, if not
all, records could be lost, educational services will not be stopped. Knowledge of housing
patterns of the displaced population is important. The lack of information on the
displaced population will greatly affect the success of this operation.

Search and Rescue

• Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) need to
be established with cooperating private entities that could provide SAR equipment,
supplies, and other support.
• FEMA and States need to review and update the Initial Response Resource list
specifically for a catastrophic event of this magnitude.
• It is not clear what Federal resources will be pre-deployed before landfall that could assist
SAR. It is also unknown what Federal resources are currently located in Louisiana that
could assist SAR.
• The political implications of suspending SAR operations are not addressed in the
functional plan.
• The public affairs implications of suspending SAR operations are unclear. All public
information should originate from the Joint Information Center (JIC). It is recommended
that a Joint Information System be developed.
• It is recommended that a strategy for adopting the Incident Command Structure/National
Incident Management System (ICS/NIMS) by Federal, State, and local governments be
developed.
• It is recommended that mutual aid agreements be established where not already in place.
• Additional coordination with temporary medical care and sheltering needs to take place
to develop a plan that covers survivors from the time they are rescued until they are in
shelter. (NOTE: This topic was passed to an action room.)
• After a State of Emergency Declaration and a Major Disaster Declaration have been
made by the President, the Governor, under emergency powers authorized by State law,
shall suspend any State or local regulation that would otherwise interfere with the
execution of SAR operations.
• There are also potential issues with logistics (supplies cannot meet demand), self-rescue,
and potential disposition of animals.

Sheltering
• The functional plan does not address the unique needs of illegal immigrants.
• The functional plan does not address special needs populations because the following
working document is deemed adequate: Annex X of the Louisiana State Shelter Task
Force Plan (Annex 1C of the State EOP).
• The lead State agency responsible for sheltering is currently ambiguous. This should be
clarified.
• Integration of tribal governments may be necessary in response to a catastrophic
hurricane. This should be addressed in a catastrophic plan not based solely on Louisiana.

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 • There are limitations on the use of schools (minimum number of school days per year),
the amount square feet of space required per person (Red Cross), the number of people
allowed in certain buildings (Fire Marshal), and the requirements for safety at each site
(Fire Marshal).
• The State requirement of a commercial driver’s license (CDL) to operate busses or large
transportation vans is a potential limitation.
• Limited medical care must be available to each shelter, especially those with large
populations. This is normally accomplished by assigning nurses to large shelters, or
nursing supervision to groups of smaller shelters. The State of Louisiana does not
automatically recognize certifications issued by all other states, which could hinder the
ability to provide additional medical staff from national resources.
• There is a need for refinement of multi-state agreements and applicable Federal
regulations to allow funding and support of shelters outside of declared parishes and
states.
• There is limited current shelter capacity (approximate 200,000-person deficit based on
the Hurricane Pam scenario).
• There are limited human resources to open, staff, manage, operate, and support required
shelters, as well as limited (and potentially overtaxed) material resources to include
transportation, sanitation, and cots.
• The emergency support functions (ESFs) will be tasked beyond normal capabilities and
with non-traditional requests.

Temporary Housing
• The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) regulations prevent the use of FEMA
funds for building in floodplains.
• HAZMAT deposition may require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
exclude areas from consideration as building sites.
• Historical preservation regulations may prevent or restrict temporary housing.
• There has been no prior thought to potential locations for large group sites.
• There are factory production capacity limits for mobile homes and travel trailers.
• There is a lack of infrastructure to support a large number of large group sites.
• There may not be enough billeting for the large number of Federal recovery
personnel, including those working on temporary housing.
• There are inadequate staff resources for such a large undertaking.
• State/local building codes and permitting processes may slow down the process.
• Transportation system overload and restriction damage and repair will complicate the
situation.
• Security and maintenance of order at large group sites will represent an additional
drain on law enforcement resources.
• Another disaster event somewhere else in the country could impact ability to provide
temporary housing.

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 • It is recommend that State and Federal regulations that govern the movement of
mobile homes be waived as appropriate, and that the Defense Production Act be
applied to alleviate any shortage of materials
• The dedication of highway lanes and/or transportation corridors for disaster traffic
movement is recommended.
• It is recommended that floodplain management regulations be temporarily waived as
necessary to alleviate temporary housing shortfalls.
• It is recommended that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
floodplain management regulations be temporarily waived locally so that temporary
housing can be placed where it is needed in a timely fashion.

Temporary Medical Care

• Transportation of people rescued by SAR from SAR Base of Operations (BOO) to
Temporary Medical Operations Staging Areas (T-MOSAs) and transport of supplies and
equipment to hospitals in the affected area must be established.
• Hospitals in the affected area should address evacuation plans, restoration of electricity
(possibly putting generators on the roof), and delivery of supplies. Hospitals should
possibly be tasked with reviewing their stockpiles and compiling lists of what supplies
will need to be delivered.
• The creation of a Nursing Home Task Force to review evacuation plans is recommended.
• There is an issue with validating credentials of out-of-state volunteer doctors, emergency
medical technicians (EMTs), nurses, and other medical personnel who will arrive to help
following the disaster.
• Billeting of medical personnel working at T-MOSAs and hospitals must be resolved.
• Reimbursement for hospital expenses incurred for care during a catastrophic hurricane
needs to be addressed.
• Hospital policies regarding credentialing of medical personnel may inhibit the use of out-
of-state providers and volunteers.
• The availability of the following could be problematic: health professionals/staffing,
hospital beds (especially critical care); DoD resources; transportation assets to transport
medical casualties and staff (a marked improvement in response could be possible if
transportation from the T-MOSA is pre-staged and available within three days post-
landfall); basic needs (e.g., water and electricity); and specialized medical equipment and
resources (e.g., dialysis machines and laboratory support).
• Communication of needs (especially among inundated hospitals) is necessary.
• SAR priorities must be established.
• A possible HAZMAT environment is an identified issue. This situation may require
health care providers to wear protective equipment. Also, proper treatment of patients
exposed to the “HAZMAT gumbo” may be difficult if the identity of the chemicals is not
known.
• The capacity of the shelters at the T-MOSAs and elsewhere is unknown. This may
influence the flow of patients leaving the T-MOSA and result in a pooling effect.

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 Consequently, the ability to treat patients may be reduced if hospital beds are occupied by
people for whom there is no room in the shelters.

Unwatering of Enclosed Areas

• There will be issues with shipping and wakes in waterways.
• The potential for hazardous materials to exist in the river and drinking water is an issue.
The possibility of using bottled water for communities getting drinking water from the
river must be examined.
• There is a noted difficulty in estimating needs for rebuilding supplies and the reluctance
of suppliers to keep materials (especially large, heavy, expensive materials) on hand for
such an event.

Billeting of Response Personnel

• There must be preplanning and identification of the number of critical responder agencies
(e.g., EPA, U.S. Forestry Service, USAR, USACE, Coast Guard, DoD, D-MORT, and
Federal Protective Services) in order to determine the number of critical responders
needed for each agency, what their transportation requirements are, and the amount of
equipment each will bring.
• The parking capacity in Port Allen is unknown.
• The availability of warehouses in Port Allen should be established.
• The Lower Mississippi River Forecast Center should be contacted to determine the true
risk and potential flood stage along the river at the Port Allen facilities.
• It should be determined if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) temporary
seasonal workers can be hired by FEMA to perform disaster-related duties.
• FEMA Region VI needs to send notification in writing to the USACE regarding the
potential need to use quarter boats for billeting.
• Some coordination between sheltering and temporary housing will be necessary in
organizing this plan to provide additional billeting if necessary.
• The General Services Administration (GSA) facility near Sherwood Forest in Baton
Rouge should be evaluated as a possible asset.
• It should be established how billeting will be provided for responders once the total
number exceeds 550.

Volunteer and Donations Management

• A comprehensive resource database is needed to track donors and services.
• Training for the call center personnel is needed. This training may include the FEMA
Volunteer Resources Course.
• An MOA for the use of message boards that are in the control of the Louisiana DOTD
needs to be developed that would allow messages to be displayed that aid in volunteer
and donations management.
• The use of EMAC for volunteers and donations needs to be further developed.
• Credentialing of volunteers has not been planned to the appropriate level.

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 • Warehouse locations that could be used for volunteer and donations management need to
be identified. These warehouses should be maintained on a list or in a database and the
information updated on a regular basis.

HAZMAT
• The number of HAZMAT certified personnel is unknown, as is the location of the
HAZMAT mitigation equipment.
• The privately-owned contractors should be identified. A command center for contractors
should also be established.
• The methods of off-loading trucks, ships, and rail cars must be established.
• The capability of the Louisiana State Police to handle various hazards must be
established. Their capabilities lead them to the Department of Health and Hospitals and
the Department of Environmental Quality and possibly the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC).
• New Orleans and Jefferson documentation on site contents is forthcoming from an event
with the Port of New Orleans to the LSU representative. This information is currently not
available.
• Long-term (> 21 days post-landfall) issues include the final disposal method and location
of the hazardous material. It may be possible to move hazardous material to the Gulf of
Mexico and keep it away from Lake Pontchartrain.
• Much of the material may be heavy and contaminated, and thus will sink. This will make
it difficult to control and it may not be discovered until after the bowls are drained.
• The structure of storage tanks and their ability to withstand such an event is unknown.

Access Control & Re-entry

• It is recommended that during a major evacuation, LOHSEP establish a Reentry Action
Team with each ESF, State Liaison, and other key players to execute reentry protocols.
• A system to provide response personnel and other contract workers with identification
badges needs to be developed.
• Parties should meet with the Louisiana Hurricane Task Force to present the idea of
establishing an MOU to be signed by each parish and city emergency management
agency (EMA) Director, Mayor, or other designated official in coastal risk areas of
Louisiana to coordinate a unified reentry plan. For example: I, ______, representing
______ Parish/City, agree to contact the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness to coordinate re-entry notification to the citizens of our
Parish/community and will not publicize or begin citizen re-entry without prior
coordination with the re-entry team at LOHSEP.
• The State of Louisiana should request that future studies and/or funding projects with the
USACE study re-entry behaviors of the public.
• If the Louisiana National Guard is going to be tasked with security responsibilities, they
should be allowed to carry ammunition.

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Power, Water and Ice Distribution
• Parish assessments of generator needs (e.g., locations, wattage, cycle, and location)
should be conducted and negotiation of pre-existing contracts with generator suppliers
should established.

Transport from Water Rescue to Shelter

• The location for decontamination of people coming out of the water should be established
(e.g., SAR base camp or T-MOSA).
• DOTD contracts should be in place for emergency transport.
• An issue exists with medical screening demands and capabilities. Everyone needs to
come to a T-MOSA, which means up to 100,000 per day arriving, but each T-MOSA can
process only 18,000 per day.

Improving the Exercise Process—Participant Feedback

At the conclusion of the exercise, participants were asked to provide feedback regarding how
they thought the exercise process should be improved. This section summarizes these comments.
• Participants should convene in all break-out rooms for a period of time before groups are
sent to action rooms. Moving people to action rooms disrupted the planning process and
removed key personnel from break-out rooms.
• Each room should have the ability to project images and documents for all participants to
view.
• Each room should have a professional transcriptionist provided.
• There should be better communication between all planning groups, including regular
meetings. Knowledge of each group’s timelines would have enhanced planning.
• More parish emergency managers should be involved in the exercise.
• Planning rooms should be larger and contained in a single building.
• Exercise participants should be informed earlier of the topics to be addressed and should
have the ability to review material before the exercise.
• A knowledgeable planner should be provided to each group for more efficient plan
writing.
• A field trip to areas in question would have been useful.
• Portions of the functional plans were presented out of sequence to the Unified Command,
causing confusion.
• The importance of the pre-exercise meetings was not emphasized enough and a promised
follow-up pre-exercise meeting was not conducted.
• All participants should have the ability to witness all Unified Command briefings.
• Meeting schedules for facilitators and recorders should be streamlined.
• Representatives from higher education should have been present. More representatives
from non-public schools, host schools, and school boards should have been present.
• Documentation addressing emergency management policies and historical summaries
should have been provided to participants before the exercise.
• Participants were pleased with the fact they were not restricted by plans already in place.

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• The explanation of the exercise methodology in orientation was not sufficient.
• Pre-landfall participants had a better understanding of the exercise process than those
who did not attend pre-landfall planning. Many other participants would have benefited
from participating in pre-landfall planning.
• SAR operations personnel should have been represented in pre-landfall planning.
• The concept of scenario-driven planning was hard to grasp. The scenario was abandoned
at times in order to accomplish planning.
• The exercise timeline was restrictive. The timeline should have varied by room, as
planning areas have different timelines during an actual event.
• A more detailed planning effort or another layer of planning should be funded and
scheduled before the 2005 hurricane season.
• There should have been a more thorough discussion on day-to-day expectations of
project, goals, and objectives. Changes to these expectations were not made clear.
• Participants need more time each morning to read what other groups completed the
previous day.
• There should be a commitment to exercising and reviewing this plan on an annual basis
from the Unified Command.
• The draft functional plans (specific to each group) should be added to the participant
guide.
• Each room should establish internal (within each room) working groups.
• Better information about each of the action rooms and what they do (in advance) is
needed, so that participants can better identify where they fit.
• An overview of planning for participants is needed, since most participants had more
operational experience than planning experience.
• It would have been more useful to have the maps hung on the walls. It would have helped
out-of-area participants to visualize the area.
• The Unified Command’s desire for specifics rather than generalities should have been
clearly communicated from the beginning of the exercise.
• Written objectives in the participant guide were often in direct conflict with instructions
of the Unified Command.
• It is suggested that rooms should be broken by ESF, not by topic.
• The participant reference CD content should be available (perhaps on a website) before
the exercise.
• A red team for a reality check of the feedback from Unified Command on functional plan
drafts should be established.
• Workgroups should be established to write the plan, and then an exercise conducted to
test it. There should not be an exercise for plan writing. The workgroups could have had
2 to 3 day workshops at a time, with breaks in between to flesh out ideas/sections.
• The sheltering and temporary housing groups should be combined into one room.
• The morning briefing time should have been extended and allowed each room to share
where they were and what they had done with the other groups.
• All major players/subject matter experts should be assigned to the most appropriate
breakout and/or action rooms.
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• Red Cross personnel were all removed from the sheltering room at the same time for
action topics.
• The participating agencies should have the opportunity to review the participant list
before the event so they can better assign their agency’s representatives to the appropriate
rooms.
• The April briefing did not give a good description of what was going to happen at the
exercise. The June Parish Director briefing was not very useful, either.
• There should have been clearer and earlier identification of who should brief the Unified
Command.
• More than one facilitator should have been provided for large groups.
• The scenario should be developed in more detail. Scenario details specific to each break-
out room topic should be briefed each day.
• Training on the contents of the five paragraph functional plan format should be
conducted.
• A hotel with conference space would have been a more appropriate setting for the
exercise. This would allow rooms to be closer, adults to have food and drink, and would
have been more comfortable.
• The exercise should not be conducted during hurricane season.
• Only two of the three task forces from the State attended. All should have attended.
• A landline telephone in each room would have eliminated need for runners.
• The Unified Command was not balanced (Federal, State, and local).
• The Incident Command System was not used—the EOC should have been operational.
This would have helped communication, organization, and reliable information flow.
• The focus of the exercise should be expanded beyond the affected area.
• The lunch period was too long.
• There was a need for current market data.
• There should be more participation from private industry.
• The functional plan format was very awkward.
• The planning rooms contained too many participants.
• The morning briefings were too long and not useful. Briefing memos should have been
provided to each participant.
• Information on past hurricanes would have been useful.
• Two recorders would have been better and more information could have been gathered.
• Other people may need to be included in the exercise and decision making process, such
as EMS, Public Safety Individuals from New Orleans area, a NORTHCOM Joint
Regional Medical Planning Officer (JRMPO), and a Louisiana Chemical Manufacturers
Association representative.
• Provide a microphone in each room. There were problems hearing at the back of the
rooms.
• It would be a good idea to have large name placards at each participant’s seat so everyone
can know who is speaking and what agency they represent.

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 • The medical and public health perspective was under-represented in the Unified
Command.

Exercise Participant List

The list of exercise participants is contained in a database provided by LOHSEP. The database of
exercise participants will be submitted to FEMA in its entirety.

Point of Contact
The IEM point of contact for this project is Brad Tiffee. He may be reached at:

IEM, Inc.
8555 United Plaza Blvd., Suite 100
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 952-8229
(225) 952-8122 (fax)
brad.tiffee@ieminc.com

The alternate point of contact is Wayne Thomas. He may be reached at:

IEM, Inc.
2751 Buford Highway, Suite 204 Druid Pointe
Atlanta, GA 30324
(404) 214-0330
(404) 214-0337 (fax)
wayne.thomas@ieminc.com

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