1.

ALARCON , NOEL
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
FACTS:
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as
amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within the
NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew
the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21of its Charter. Thus, MIAA
paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real
Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City
Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and
buildings. At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No.
061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show
proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that
MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been
filed out of time. Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from
real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle that
the government cannot tax itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and
buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Paraaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which
expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC. It asserts that an international airport is
not among the exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Paraaque posted
and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In
the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance
of a TRO to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale,
however, the same was received only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax?
HELD:
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by
the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec.133 (o) of the
LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not
extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities.
These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule

is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This
rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national
government instrumentalities. MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the
government. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned
solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the
airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the
airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State.
Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they
remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not subject
to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real estate tax. However,
portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt
from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a
consideration to a taxable person.
MMDA vs Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising
GR 179554 December 16, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising entered intoa contract for advertising with the
Metro Rail Transit Corp. andthereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and
otheradvertising media in different parts of the MRT 3 premises.Sometime in 2001 MMDA
requested Trackworks to dismantle saidbillboards and signages pursuant to MMDA Regulation
No. 96-009wherein the MMDA prohibits the posting, installation, and display of any kind or
form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any partof the road, sidewalk, center-island,
posts, trees, parks and openspaces. Trackworks refused the said request and then
MMDAproceeded to dismantle the billboards and similar forms of advertisement. Trackworsk
filed a civil case before the Pasig RTC, atemporary restraining order was issued against MMDA.
The MMDAfiled a petition with the Court of Appeals but denied said petitionand affirmed the
order of the RTC. Petition was then filed with theSC which denied the same and eventually this
resolution after apetition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MMDA has the power under its mandate to cause the dismantling of
respondents advertisement materials.
HELD:
No, the Court ruled that MMDA had no power on its own to dismantle, remove or destroy the
billboards and other advertising materials installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks.
TheMMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration. Nothing in
Republic Act 7924 granted MMDA police power let alone legislative power. Trackworks derived
its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT 3 from
MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the
MRT3structure or to obtain advertising income is no longer debatable. Under the BLT

agreement, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would
transfer ownership of theMRT3 to the Government. Considering that MRTC remained to be the
owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTCs entering
into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership.
MMDA also may not invoke that it is implementing the Building Code rules and regulations
because the power to enforce this lies with the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), not in MMDA, as contemplated in the letters of Sec. 201, thus:
Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement.
The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of
penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the Secretary.
There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the
Building Code.
2. BAUTISTA, LUDIELYN C.
G.R. No. 169836
July 31, 2007
PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
and the CITY OF ILOILO,respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
The Ministry of Public Works and Highways reclaimed from the sea a 21-hectare parcel of land
in Barangay Tanza, Iloilo City, and constructed thereon the IFPC, consisting of breakwater, a
landing quay, a refrigeration building, a market hall, a municipal shed, an administration
building, a water and fuel oil supply system and other port related facilities and machineries.
Upon its completion, the Ministry of Public Works and Highways turned over IFPC to the
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (Authority), pursuant to Section 11 of PD 977,
which places fishing port complexes and related facilities under the governance and operation of
the Authority.
Notwithstanding said turn over, title to the land and buildings of the IFPC remained with the
Republic.
The Authority thereafter leased portions of IFPC to private firms and individuals engaged in
fishing related businesses.
In May 1988, the City of Iloilo assessed the entire IFPC for real property taxes. The assessment
remained unpaid until the alleged total tax delinquency of the Authority for the fiscal years 1988

and 1989amounted to P5,057,349.67, inclusive of penalties and interests. To satisfy the tax
delinquency, the City of Iloilo scheduled on August 30, 1990, the sale at public auction of the
IFPC. The Authority filed an injunction case with the Regional Trial Court.
At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to avail of administrative proceedings, i.e., for the Authority to
file a claim for tax exemption with the Iloilo City Assessors Office. The latter, however, denied
the claim for exemption, hence, the Authority elevated the case to the Department of Finance
(DOF). The DOF ruled that the Authority is liable to pay real property taxes to the City of Iloilo
because it enjoys the beneficial use of the IFPC. The DOF added, however, that in satisfying the
amount of the unpaid real property taxes, the property that is owned by the Authority shall
be auctioned, and not the IFPC, which is a property of the Republic. The Authority filed a
petition before the Office of the President but it was dismissed. It also
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the Authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the president.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Authority is liable to pay real property tax to the City of Iloilo
Whether or not the IFPC may be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency
HELD:
Yes. But only for those portions which were leased out to private persons. The Authority is
not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government which is generally exempt
from payment of real property tax. However, said exemption does not apply to the portions
of the IFPC which the Authority leased to private entities. With respect to these properties,
the
Authority
is
liable
to
pay
real
property
tax.
Nonetheless,
the IFPC, being a property of public dominion cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax
delinquency. For an entity to be considered as a GOCC, it must either be organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation. Two requisites must concur before one may be classified as a stock
corporation, namely: (1) that it has capital stock divided into shares, and (2) that it is authorized
to distribute dividends and allotments of surplus and profits to its stockholders.
If only one requisite is present, it cannot be properly classified as a stock corporation. As
for non-stock corporations, they must have members and must not distribute any part of their
income to said members.
The Authority should be classified as an instrumentality of the national government. As such, it
is generally exempt from payment of real property tax, except those portions which have
been leased to private entities.
In
Manila
International
Airport Authority
(MIAA)
v. Court
of Appeals,
the
Authority was cited as among the instrumentalities of the national government. The Authority
has a capital stock but it is not divided into shares of stocks. Also, it has no stockholders or
voting shares. Hence, it is not a stock corporation. Neither it is a non-stock corporation because it
has no members.
The Authority is actually a national government instrumentality which is defined as an
agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate

powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but
also corporate powers. The MIAA case also held that unlike GOCCs, instrumentalities of the
national government, like MIAA, are exempt from local taxes pursuant to Section 133(o) of
the Local Government Code. This exemption, however, admits of an exception with respect
to real property taxes.
Under
Section
234(a)
of
the
Local
Government
Code,
when
an
instrumentality of the national government
grants to a taxable person the beneficial use of a real property owned by the Republic,
said instrumentality becomes liable to pay real property tax.
Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption of all juridical
persons "unless otherwise provided in this Code." Now, Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code expressly provides otherwise, specifically prohibiting local governments
from imposing any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities. Section133 states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: Taxes, fees or
charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and
local government units.
The Authority should be classified as an instrumentality of the national government which is
liable to pay taxes only with respect to the portions of the property, the beneficial use of which
were vested in private entities. The real property tax assessments issued by the City of Iloilo
should be upheld only with respect to the portions leased to private persons.
In case the Authority fails to pay the real property taxes due thereon, said portions cannot be
sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority it
was held that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain and cannot, without
Congressional fiat, be subject of a sale, public or private. The Iloilo fishing port which was
constructed by the State for public use and/or public service falls within the term "port" in the
aforecited provision.
Being a property of public dominion the same cannot be subject to execution or foreclosure
sale. In like manner, the reclaimed land on which the IFPC is built cannot be the object of a
private or public sale without Congressional authorization. Whether there are improvements in
the fishing port complex. That should not be construed to be embraced within the term "port,"
involves evidentiary matters that cannot be addressed in the present case.

LUMAYNA V COA
GR NO 185001 9/25/2009
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
The Department of Budget and Management granted a maximum of five percent salary
adjustment to personnel in the Local Government Units pursuant to Republic Act No. 9137 and
issued a circular to provide guidelines on personal services limitation pursuant to the Local
Government Code. In pursuance thereof, a 2003 Annual Municipal Budget resolution was
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayanof Mayoyao, Ifugao adopting a first class salary scheme for
the municipality and implementing a five percent salary increase for its personnel re-aligning the
amount originally appropriated in their 2002 Annual Municipal Budget for the salaries and
benefits of seventeen new positions. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disallowed the increase and
the re-alignment of funds on the ground that the re-alignment is not sufficient in form to
implement a salary increase but finding good faith on the part of the officials of the municipality,
it reconsidered.
The Commission on Audit subsequently issued a Notice of Disallowance for the salary increases
of municipal personnel and ordered herein petitioners to refund the amount contending that the
increase was not in accordance with the Local Government Code; that the limitation on personal
services had been exceeded; and that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution was not the appropriate
manner of granting the increase.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Audit gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the notice of
disallowance which directed the herein petitioners to refund the amount disallowed therein.
HELD:
The Court partially granted the instant petition on the basis of the petitioners good faith but
found that the Commission on Audit correctly affirmed the disallowance of the amount. Findings
of fact by administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great
weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made
from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and should not be
disturbed in the interest of stability of the governmental structure.
In the instant case, although the 5% salary increase exceeded the limitation for appropriations for
personal services in the Municipality of Mayoyao, this alone is insufficient to overthrow the
presumption of good faith in favor of petitioners as municipal officials. It must be mentioned that
the disbursement of the 5% salary increase of municipal personnel was done under the color and
by virtue of resolutions enacted pursuant to LBC No. 74, and was made only after the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan declared operative the 2002 municipal budget. In fact, the Notice of
Disallowance was issued only on 16 May 2003, after the municipality had already implemented
the salary increase. Moreover, in its Resolution No. 2004-1185,38 the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
reconsidered its prior disallowance of the adoption of a first class salary schedule and 5% salary
increase of the Municipality of Mayoyao based on its finding that the municipal officials
concerned acted in good faith.

The decisions of the commission clearly presented the factual findings and adequately explained
the legal basis for disallowing the said amount. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Commission on Audit.
3. BRIGUERA, JOHN GILES
VFP vs. Reyes
GR NO. 1555027 2/28/2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines is a corporate body organized under Republic
Act No. 2640. In 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of
National Defense to conduct Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated that VFP is
under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense. Petitioner complained
about the scope of power given to DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65
assailing that it is a private non-government corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not VFP is a public office.
HELD:
Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In the instant case, the functions of VFP the protection
of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism certainly
fall within the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary
appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers in the
DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and
supervision of DND is proper.
YENKO V GUNGON
GR NO. 165450 & 165452 8/13/2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Raul Nestor C. Gungon in this consolidated case assails his transfer/ reassignment
which according to him was violative of his constitutional right to stability of tenure and
furthermore was illegally dismissed.
On February 28, 1987, Raul Nestor C. Gungon, who holds a professional career service
eligibility, was extended a permanent appointment as Local Assessment Operations Officer III in
the Assessors Office of the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On January 7, 1998, San Juan Municipal Administrator Francisco F. Yenko issued a
Memorandum[2] temporarily reassigning Gungon to the Public Order and Safety Office (POSO)
of the said municipality effective January 8, 1998 in the exigency of the service. Gungon was
directed to report to Mr. Felesmeno Oliquino for further instruction. When Gungon received the
Memorandum, Mr. Oliquino was confined at the San Juan Medical Center and he passed away
on January 9, 1998.

On January 8, 1998, Gungon, in compliance with the reassignment Memorandum, reported to the
POSO. The officer-in-charge (OIC) of the POSO, Arnulfo Aguilar, issued a Memorandum[3]
dated January 8, 1998 requiring Gungon to report as Duty Agent, whose responsibility was "to
conduct inspections within the municipal compound, apprehend any suspicious characters
roaming within the vicinity of the municipal hall and compound," and setting his tour of duty at
12:01 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. from Monday to Friday.
In a letter[4] dated January 9, 1998 to the OIC of the POSO, Gungon protested his reassignment
for being violative of the Administrative Code of 1987, which prohibits reassignment that results
in reduction in rank, status or salary of an employee. Gungon went on sick leave from January 8
to 21, 1998 after filing the proper application with supporting medical certificate.[5]
He was then Dismissed for not having to comply with his supposedly new duty as Duty Agent.
ISSUE:
Was Gungon Illegally Dismissed?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Gungon is hereby reinstated, without qualification, to his former position as Local
Assessment Operations Officer III in the Assessors Office of the Municipal Government of San
Juan, Metro Manila, without loss of seniority rights. Gungon is entitled to payment of back
salaries equivalent to five (5) years from the date he was dropped from the rolls, which is March
1, 1998. No costs.
4. BRILLANTES, JESSA VHIE
BARA LIDASAN V COMELEC
21 SCRA 496
FACTS:
21 SCRA 496 Political Law Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed.
Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton,
Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in
favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be
nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title
that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE:
Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill?

HELD:
No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult
to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it
did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted
for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
AMORA, JR. V COMELEC
GR NO 192280 1/25/2011
FACTS:
Amora filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Bohol on December 1, 2009 his opponent
Olandria filed a petition for disqualification alleging that Amoras community tax certificate was
not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code and the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that Amora merely presented his Community
Tax Certificate to Atty. Oriculo Granada instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.
Amora argued that he is personally known by Atty Granada and is a far relative of his, and that
Olandrias contention is a question of process and not validity and that his allegation is not a
sufficient ground for disqualification. For this, Amora filed a petition for reconsideration. After
winning the election, Amoras petition was denied. The court contended that his CTC is not a
qualified proof of identification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the improper filling of a community tax certificate is a sufficient cause of
disqualification
HELD:
While it is accorded to the law that Amora, given the fact that he lacks a proper proof of identity
is not considered a candidate ab initio, the court founded its decision pursuant to this sec:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a)
Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b)
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c)
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d)
Those with dual citizenship;
(e)
Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f)
Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g)
The insane or feeble-minded.
Apparently none of the said disqualifications apply to Amora and that according to Sec.
2. Affirmation or Oath. The term Affirmation or Oath refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
(a) Appears in person before the notary public;
(b)
is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c)
Avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.
In this case, however, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the
requirement of a sworn COC. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria
since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance. On the whole, the
COMELEC should not have brushed aside the affidavit of Atty. Granada and remained inflexible
in the face of Amoras victory and proclamation as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
5. CALISO, NOEL
NATIONAL ELECTRIC ADMNISTRATION V VILLANUEVA
GR NO 168203 3/9/2010
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED
6. CRISPULO, JEFFREY, JR.
LIMBONA V MANGELIN
170 SCRA 786
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and
informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However,
on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where
he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared
null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been

resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the
petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions.
What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
HELD:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared
to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted,
under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves
the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold
that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the
Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "sessions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction
of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we
still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it
was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be
called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is

that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.
MITRA V COMELEC
GR NO 191938 7/2/2010
FACTS:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the
Representative of the Second district of Palawan. This district then included, among other
territories, the Municipalities of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected
Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and he represented the district for 3
terms before the elections of 2010.
Before the end of Mitras second term Puerto Princesa was reclassified as highly urbanized city
and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence
of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City from voting candidates for elective
provincial officials.
On March 20 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for
the transfer of his voters registration record from precinct no. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica Puerto
Princesa City to Sitio Maligaya Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando Balbon Jr. filed a petition to deny
due course and cancel Mitras COC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
HELD:
Yes. Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. The Court ruled that Mitra did not
misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.
Mitra effectively transfer his residency in Aborlan. Likewise the COMELEC could not present
any legally accepted basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence
was a misrepresentation.

7. DACLIS, MARLON

GUANZON V CA
200 SCRA 271, 1991
DE JESUS, JR. V SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO 192539-71 8/23/2010
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED
8. DE GUZMAN, KENNETH
MMDA V BEL AIR VILLAGE
GR NO 135962 3/27/2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to
open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the
same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a
TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of
the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed
with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of
the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows
the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit of
government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO 153952-71 8/23/2010
FACTS:

Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28,1986
and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman
Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as
OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the
issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent
title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He
misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are
disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for
free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A
motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others
that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was
committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed
in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.
HELD:
Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime
is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of
the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the
prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive
application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To
apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to
his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished
under the law existing when it was committed.

9. ESGUERRA, ELAMAE
NAVARRO V ERMITA
GR NO 180050 4/12/2011
FACTS:
"G.R. No. 180050 (Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
Respondents; Cong. Francisco T. Matugas, et al., Intervenors.) - On June 18, 2010, movants
Congressman Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr., Hon.
Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and Hon.
Cesar M. Bagundol filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.
Movants claim that they have legal interest in this case as they are the duly-elected officials[1] of
Surigao del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, and their positions will be affected by the
nullification of the election results in the event that the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 in this
case is not reversed and set aside. On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered a Decision in the
instant case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation
of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL
and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration in behalf of public
respondents, and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman, representing the Province of
Dinagat Islands, also filed a separate motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated February
10, 2010.
On May 12, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
Meantime, on March 9, 2010, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8790,[2] the
pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the
Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in
line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands
will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
xxxx

If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands
will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in item "b" above.
A special election for Governor, Vice-Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First
District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
Since movants' elective positions will be adversely affected if the Resolution dated May 12, 2010
is not reversed, they pray that they be allowed to intervene in this case and to file their
Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, and that their
motion for reconsideration be admitted by the Court.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not intervention may be allowed after the Court has denied the motions
for reconsideration of its Decision in this case.
HELD:
The Court rules in the negative.
Fundamentally, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.[3] Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, a motion to intervene
may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Since this case
originated from an original action filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motionin-intervention is before and not after resolution of this case.[4]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is DENIED.
In view of the resolution of June 29, 2010, noting without action the second motions for
reconsideration filed by counsel for respondent the New Province of Dinagat Islands and by the
Office of the Solicitor General for the public respondents, the Court further Resolves to NOTE
WITHOUT ACTION the
(a) Opposition to Respondents' Second Motions for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2010 filed by
counsel for petitioner;
(b) Motion to Admit Reply (Re: Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration dated
June 15, 2010), dated July 6, 2010, filed by counsel for respondent the New Province of Dinagat
Islands; and
(c) Aforesaid Reply dated June 15, 2010."

ESTAMPA, JR. V CITY GOVT OF DAVAO

GR NO 190681 6/21/2010
This case is about the failure of a citys medical health officer and disaster coordinator to respond to a
catastrophic bombing incident upon the excuse that he needed to attend first to the needs of his family.
FACTS:
On February 1, 2001 the City Government of Davao appointed petitioner Dr. Edilberto Estampa, Jr. as
Medical Officer VI at its City Health Office. The position made him head of a Task Force Unit assigned
to deal with any untoward event taking place in the city and Disaster Coordinator for the Davao City
Health Office under the Davao City Disaster Coordinating Council.
On March 4, 2003, at around 6 p.m., a powerful bomb exploded at the passengers terminal of the Davao
International Airport, killing 22 persons and injuring 113 others. Dr. Estampa had just arrived home at that
time and was taking care of his one-year-old daughter. He learned of the bombing incident between 7 to 8
p.m. His wife arrived at 9 p.m. from her work at the Davao Medical Center where most of the bombing
victims were brought for treatment. She prevailed on Dr. Estampa to stay home and he did.
On March 6, 2003 Dr. Roberto V. Alcantara, Officer-in-Charge of the Davao City Health Office, required
Dr. Estampa to explain in writing why he failed to respond to the bombing incident. Dr. Estampa
submitted his explanation. Apparently satisfied with the explanation and believing that Dr. Estampas
presence in the aftermath of the bombing was not indispensable considering the presence of other medical
practitioners, Dr. Alcantara considered the case closed. The latter did not, however, bother to endorse the
case to a superior officer or to the City Legal Office with his recommendation.
About 10 months later or on January 26, 2004 Dr. Josephine J. Villafuerte, the Davao City Health Officer,
queried the head of the Citys Human Resource Management Office (HRMO) regarding the status of the
case against Dr. Estampa for failing to respond to the bombing incident. Reacting to this, the HRMO
endorsed the matter to the City Legal Office for verification and investigation. Subsequently, the Assistant
City Legal Officer required Dr. Estampa to answer the charge against him. But he did not do so.
On March 19, 2004 the Assistant City Legal Officer submitted an Investigation Report, finding a prima
facie case against Dr. Estampa for neglect of duty[1] and recommending the filing of a formal charge
against him. The city mayor approved the report and signed the formal charge. On receiving the same, Dr.
Estampa filed his answer and supporting documents.
At the pre-trial, Dr. Estampa waived his right to counsel. The parties agreed to dispense with a formal
hearing and to just submit their position papers or memoranda. On November 12, 2004 the City Legal
Officer found Dr. Estampa guilty of grave neglect of duty and recommended his dismissal. On February
8, 2005 the city mayor approved the recommendation and dismissed Dr. Estampa. The latter moved for
reconsideration but this was denied, prompting him to appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
On June 2, 2006 the CSC denied Dr. Estampas appeal, corrected the denomination of his offense to gross
neglect of duty, and affirmed his dismissal. The CSC also denied Dr. Estampas motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Dr. Estampa appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review under Rule 43. The CA denied
his application for issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and eventually rendered a

decision on March 30, 2009, denying his petition and affirming the resolutions of the CSC. The CA also
found no merit in his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the rulings of the City
Legal Officer and the CSC that found Dr. Estampa guilty of gross neglect of duty for failing to respond to
the March 4, 2003 Davao City bombing.
HELD:
Dr. Estampa points out that his dismissal was void because: (1) neither a proper complaint nor a formal
charge initiated the case against him; (2) the CA considered and appreciated evidence not presented at the
hearing before the City Legal Officer; (3) the delay in the preliminary investigation of Dr. Estampas case
violated his rights to due process and speedy disposition of his case; (4) he could not be held liable for
gross neglect of duty since the charge against him was only for simple neglect of duty; and (5) the
evidence presented did not support the findings against him.
1. But, as the Davao City government pointed out, Executive Order (E.O.) 292 (the 1987 Administrative
Code)[2] and the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases vest in heads of cities the power to
investigate and decide disciplinary actions against their officers and employees.[3] E.O. 292 also allows
the heads of local units, like the mayor, the authority to initiate administrative actions against subordinate
officials or employees[4] even without the complaints being subscribed and sworn to.[5] In these
proceedings, a person is considered formally charged a) upon charges initiated by the disciplining
authority or b) upon the finding by such disciplining authority of a prima facie case against him based on
a private persons complaint.[6]
The Davao City Health Officers inquiry into the status of Dr. Estampas case did not partake of a
complaint under E.O. 292 as he suggests. That inquiry was a mere follow up of the fact-finding
investigation that Dr. Alcantara began. Nor did the City Legal Officers order during the preliminary
investigation, which required Dr. Estampa to file his answer and supporting documents, constitute the
complaint under the law. That order was merely an incident of the preliminary investigation.[7]
The real formal charge against Dr. Estampa was that which the city mayor signed, charging the doctor, in
his capacity as Disaster Coordinator of the City Health Office, with neglect of duty for failing to respond
to the March 4, 2003 bombing in Davao. That formal charge directed him to submit his answer,
accompanied by the sworn statements of his witnesses, and to indicate if he preferred a formal trial or
would rather waive it. He was thus properly charged.
2. Dr. Estampa claims that the CA considered and appreciated evidence that was not presented before the
City Legal Officer, in particular referring to the letters of Dr. Villafuerte (to the HRMO inquiring about
the status of the case against him), Mr. Escalada, HRMO head (endorsing the case to the City Legal
Office), and the affidavit of Dr. Samuel G. Cruz, Assistant City Health Officer (that Dr. Estampa failed to
answer phone calls to him after the bombing and that he ignored the driver who was sent to fetch him).
Dr. Estampa was not furnished with copies of these documents which were mentioned for the first time
only on appeal to the CSC in the City Governments Comment.

The letters of Dr. Villafuerte and Mr. Escalada are official communications and form part of the records of
the case. They are public documents. As to the affidavit of Dr. Cruz, the City Government admits that it
was not presented in evidence although it still formed part of the case records since it was officially
endorsed to the City Legal Office by Dr. Cruz.
The decisions of the CSC and the CA are not based only on these documents. Dr. Estampas guilt is
evidenced by his own evidence and inaction, as will be shown later on. The letters of Dr. Villafuerte and
Mr. Escalada merely show the process of investigation of the case. Dr. Cruzs affidavit is also merely
corroborating at best and may even be dispensed with.
3. Dr. Estampa cannot complain that he was not heard on his defense. The record shows that, initially, his
immediate superior asked him to explain why he did not respond to the bombing incident and he
submitted his explanation. In the next instance, he was asked during the preliminary investigation to file
his answer and submit evidence in his defense although he chose not to do so. After being formally
charged, he was again asked to file his answer to the charge. And he filed one, accompanied by supporting
documents. He also took part at the pre-trial and elected to have the case decided based on the parties
position paper or memorandum. Surely, Dr. Estampa has no reason to complain of denial of his right to
due process.
Dr. Estampa laments that almost a year passed from the time his immediate superior asked him to submit
a written explanation of the incident to the time when preliminary investigation of his case began. The
delay, according to him, violated his right to the speedy disposition of his case.
But, Dr. Alcantaras action cannot be regarded as part of the administrative proceeding against Dr.
Estampa. It was but a fact-finding investigation done by an immediate superior to determine whether
disciplinary action was warranted in his case. And, although Dr. Alcantara was later heard to say that he
regarded the matter closed after reading Dr. Estampas explanation, Dr. Alcantara took no step to formalize
his finding by reporting the matter to his superior, the Davao City Health Officer, with his
recommendation.
Besides, to reiterate what the CA said, the right to speedy disposition of cases may be deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In this case, the
Assistant City Legal Officer finished the preliminary investigation of Dr. Estampas case in only a little
over three weeks from the time it began.
4. The claim of Dr. Estampa that he could not be found guilty of gross neglect of duty when he was
charged only with simple neglect of duty is unmeritorious. The charge against the respondent in an
administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of the information in a criminal action. It is
enough that he is informed of the substance of the charge against him. And what controls is the allegation
of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense in the formal charge.[8] Here, the formal
charge accused him of failing to respond, as was his duty as Disaster Coordinator of the City Health
Office, to the March 4, 2003 bombing incident that saw many people killed and maimed. It was a serious
charge although the formal charge failed to characterize it correctly as gross neglect of duty.

Gross neglect of duty denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a
duty.[9] It has been held that gross negligence exists when a public officials breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.[10]
5. Dr. Estampa claims that the city failed to show that he had an obligation to respond to the Davao City
bombing and that no one advised him of his duties and responsibilities as city health offices Coordinator
to the Disaster Coordinating Council. But Dr. Estampa cannot claim ignorance of his duties. The local
government code, the provision of which he may be assumed to know, provides that a government health
officer has the duty, among others, to be in the frontline of the delivery of health services, particularly
during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities.[11] Furthermore, as
Medical Officer VI, one of his specified duties was to act as head of a task force unit for any untoward
events in his area of responsibility. It was precisely because of his position as Medical Officer VI that he
had been designated Disaster Coordinator for his office.
When Dr. Estampa accepted his post and swore to perform his duties, he entered into a covenant with the
city to act with dedication, speed, and courage in the face of disasters like the bombing of populated
places in the city. As the CA pointed out, the bombing incident on March 4, 2003 caused so many deaths
and injuries that the victims had to be farmed out among several hospitals in the city. Plainly, the City
needed public health officers to come to the rescue of the victims in whatever way their sufferings or
those of their families could be assuaged. As disaster coordinator, the city needed Dr. Estampa to organize
and coordinate all efforts to meet the emergency. Yet, although he knew of the bombing, he chose to stay
at home.
In his letter-explanation, Dr. Estampa justified his absence from the emergency rooms of the hospitals to
attend to the bombing victims with the claim that he needed to attend to his family first. Initially, he could
not leave his one-year-old daughter because they had no house help. When his wife arrived from work
shortly, he also could not leave because she was six months pregnant. Further, a bomb was found some
meters from their apartment a few weeks earlier. Dr. Estampa said in his letter that he was unable from the
beginning to give full commitment to his job since he gave priority to his family. He simply was not the
right person for the job of disaster coordinator.
Dr. Estampas defense is not acceptable. A persons duty to his family is not incompatible with his jobrelated commitment to come to the rescue of victims of disasters. Disasters do not strike every day.
Besides, knowing that his job as senior medical health officer entailed the commitment to make a measure
of personal sacrifice, he had the choice to resign from it when he realized that he did not have the will and
the heart to respond.
Assuming that he had a one-year-old daughter in the house, he could have taken her to relatives
temporarily while his wife was still on her way from work. But he did not. And when his wife arrived
shortly at 9 p.m., he still did not leave under the pretext that his wife was six months pregnant. Yet, he had
in fact permitted her to work away from home up to the evening. What marked his gross irresponsibility
was that he did not even care to call up his superior or associates to inform them of his inability to
respond to the emergency. As a result, the city health office failed to provide the needed coordination of
all efforts intended to cope with the disaster. Who knows? Better coordination and dispatch of victims to
the right emergency rooms could have saved more lives.

The Court finds no excuse for reinstating Dr. Estampa to the position he abandoned when it needed him.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision dated March 30, 2009 and
resolution dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 02191-MIN.

10. IDJIRANI, DATU SYED OMAR

Aldaba v. Comelec
GR No. 188078 March 15, 2010
CARPIO, J:
FACTS:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which
creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the
May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts.
Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and
Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo
(then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos
will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to
merit representative in Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9591, An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000
actual or projected.
HELD:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have
at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a
Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect
because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on
the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V.
Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by
the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have
been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized. The
population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification
issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1,
2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
Salumbides v. Ombudsman
GR. No. 180917 April 23, 2010
Carpio Morales, J.:
FACTS:
Salumbides and Glenda who were both appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal
Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively of Tagkawayan, Quezon, and
Mayor Vicente Salumbides III were administratively charged with with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. This is
with regards to the construction of a two-classroom building with fence for the Tagkawayan
Municipal High School (TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion area would no longer
admit high school freshmen starting school year 2002-2003. This was done without any
approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding. The Office of the Ombudsman dropped
the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004
elections having mooted the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Condonation shall expand to cover coterminous appointive
officials who were administratively charged along with the re-elected official/appointing
authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term.
HELD:
No. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the re-election
to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under
the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed,
supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a noncareer position. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.

11. LAURIO, CRISTINA

SEN AQUINO III V COMELEC
GR NO 190582 3/7/2010
FACTS:
This case comes before the court by way of Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify as unconstitutional the Republic Act 9716, An Act
Reapportioning the composition of the (1st) and (2nd) legislative districts in the province of
Camarines Sur and thereby creating a new legislative district from such reapportionment.
Petitioner contends that the 250,000 population requirement was not meet and declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province?
HELD:
Rep. Act 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of
Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law because under Sec.
5, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution succinctly provides Each City with a population of atleast
250,000, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
It just only means that a 250,000 population requirement is just for the city and not to the
province. Wherefore, the petition dismissed, and R.A. 9716 declared as a valid law.
GALEOS V PEOPLE
GR NO 174730-37 & 174845-52 2/9/2011
FACTS:
This was a consolidated petitions seek to reverse and set aside the decision of SandiganBayan
convicting Paulino Ong, Galeos, and Rivera who was a relative with each other as to
consanguinity and affinity on the crime of Falsification of Documents.
Ong was a Mayor in 1998, who appoint Rivera and Galeos in the position of Construction and
Maintenance man and Plumber I when he was an OFFICER-In-Charge-Mayor.
Ong signed their SALNS many times and he contends that he does not aware with their
relationship when he appoints them. Galeos and Rivera leave the question in SALNS that
correspond to their relatives in the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused acts violates the Local Government Code of 1991?
HELD:

By withholding information on his relatives in the government service as required in the SALN,
Rivera and Galeos was guilty of falsification as clearly stated that No person shall be appointed
in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.
As to Ong, gave rise to abuse of authority, knowing the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong
kinship and extended family ties. Wherefore, petitioners denied and affirmed the decisions of
Sandiganbayan.
12. ORANG, MONER
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ V BAZ, JR.
265 SCRA 182, 1996
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of RTC Branch 14, affirming the legal existence of
Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation of its boundary for
the purpose of determining whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.
Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order 258 of President Elpidio Quirino
pursuant to 68 of Revised Administrative Code of 1916, which consists of southern portion of
Municipality of Jimenez and through Municipal Resolution 171 & Provincial Board Resolution
No. 77 fixed the boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. But Municipality of Jimenez asserted that
together with Municipality of Sinacaban an Agreement on boundary approved also by Provincial
Board but it has no power to alter the boundaries fixed by Executive Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the boundary provided in Executive Ordet 258 or Resolution No. 77 of Provincial
Board should be used as basis for adjudicating Sinacaban territorial claim.
HELD:
The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially a Legislative Matter and therefore President
has no power to create a Municipality, however, it was held that the Municipality created by
Executive Order is later IMPLIEDLY RECOGNIZE and its acts are accorded with legal validity,
its creation can no longer questioned.
Local Government Code 1991 states that:
" Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of Code shall continue to exist. Existing
Municipal district organized pursuant to Presidential issuances or Executive Orders and which
have their respective set of elective Municipal Officials holding office at the time of effectivity
of the Code shall be considered as Regular Municipalities."
The Petition was DENIED and the decision of RTC Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.

FERRER, JR. V ROCO, JR.

GR NO 174730-37 &174845-52
FACTS:
This petition challenges the April 21, 2006 decision of Court of Appeals (CA) affirming IN
TOTO the Order of Regional Trial Court of Naga and its Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner herein filed petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Preliminary Injunction with prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order questioning the Resolution No. 2000-263, 2000-354 and
Ordinance 2000-056 issued by Mayor Roco approving the application of Mr. Obieda of ARE
Square Realty Development Corp. for Preliminary Approval for Locational Clearance (PALC)
for First Class Memorial Park in Naga.
RTC found that petitioner prayer was premature as the questioned resolutions and ordinance
were merely promulgated to pave the way for the endorsement of Application of respondent. It
recognized that Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the entity which decidr
whether application will be granted or not.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Trial Court erred in holding that HLURB has jurisdiction over the case and in
granting appellants prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and on Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
HELD:
Court ruled that filing of petition with RTC has no basis because we recognized the DOCTRINE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES which requires that the resort be first made to
administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their
functions and discharge their liabilities within the specialized areas of their competence.
In addtion, in this case issues raised are clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination.
Decision of Court of Appeald and Resolution were AFFIRMED.
13. ORGASAN, LEDEBEE LEE
PROV. OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL V COMMISSIONERS OF COA
GR NO 182574
MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI V BETITO
GR NO 171873 7/9/2010
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED
14. RIVERA, DENISON
BASCO V PAGCOR
197 SCRA 52, 1991
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED

15. SALVADOR, JERLIE

US V ESPIRITU SANTO
23 PHIL 610 12/11/2012
FACTS:
The provincial fiscal of Rizal filed an information charging Isidoro Espiritusanto with a violation
of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1910 enacted by the municipal council of Malabon,
Rizal which strictly prohibits the game of jueteng within the limits of the pueblo and prescribes
the penalties to be imposed for its violation. Isidoro was found to be engaged, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, in collecting wagers for the gambling game known as jueteng wherein
the tickets necessary for conducting the same have been seized in his possession. He was
sentenced to the payment of a fine of 50 and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment and the costs.
Defendants attorney questioned the constitutionality of the said ordinance. He argued that the
ordinance is invalid and contrary to the municipal code because the council exceeded the powers
conferred upon it by the code which, in subsection (u) of Section 39, only authorizes it to
provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly houses of whatsoever
sort.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1910 of Malabon, Rizal was constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The municipal council concerned acted within the powers conferred upon it by the
Municipal Code and in accordance with the provision of Section 6 of Act No. 1757. Since the
game of jueteng is not susceptible of regulation, but must be prosecuted and completely
suppressed in order to avoid repetitions of the great and far-reaching social and moral evils it has
been producing in the towns of these Islands.
The ordinance is not in conflict with the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of Congress. It must
be considered that an ordinance has not the character of and is not a general law. It is merely a
regulation of a local nature, and one perfectly valid and effective, provided it is in harmony with
the general laws in force in the Islands.
The constitutional provision has no application to municipal ordinances, as these do not partake
of the nature of laws, but are mere rules provided for the fulfillment of the laws.
Thus, the Supreme Court affirm the judgment of the CFI.

16. SAMORANOS, CHARISSE

TATEL V MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
207 SCRA 57
G.R. NO. 40243 11 Mar 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.
Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse.
A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation
on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to
the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood.
Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a
public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code and directing the
petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two months
from receipt of the said resolution.
The municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed
in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of hous
es either in thepoblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters
from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.
HELD:
Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for
the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the
police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.
Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which
reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law
These principles require that a municipal ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire
which is one of the primordial obligations of government. The lower court did not err in its
decision.
ASILO, JR V PEOPLE
GR NO 159017-18 &159059 3/9/2011
FACTS
Private respondemt visitacions late mother Marciana Vda Coronado (Vda. De Coronado)
and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a lease contract whereby the
Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store in
favor of the respondents mother for a period of twenty (20) years, extendible for another 20
years. The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado in case of modification of
the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights. Visitacion took over
the store when her mother died Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits.
A fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions request for inspection, District
Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe of Ministry of Public Works and Highways found that the
store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was
contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan. The store of Visitacion continued to operate after
the fire.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarian, Laguna issued Resolution No. 156 authorizing Mayor
Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. With the
strength
of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183
and
156 Mayor Comendador authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles
supervising the work.
Visitacion filed with a case for damages before the RTC. Spouses bombasi, thereafter, filed a
criminal complaint against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec.3(e)
of the Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the office on the Ombudsman. Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, finding the
accused Demetrio T. Comemdador and Paulino S. Asilo Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The
counsel
for
the
late
Mayor
also
filed
its
Motion
for
Reconsideration alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his
criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the extinction of the
criminal liability is concerned and
denied
the
extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action.
Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of violating RA 30192.

HELD:
The Supreme Court sustain the Sandiganbayanin its finding of criminal and civil liabilities
against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador.
The elements of the offense are as follows:
(1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
(2) That said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions;
(3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;
(4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the
other party; and
(5) that the public officers have actedwith manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried
out without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was
able to obtain.
The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by
evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in
the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiffs
store. The accused public officials were devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer
look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file
an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building
using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not
among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the
general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily
opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said
street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against
Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the
area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the
Jupiter street for public use.
HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
RATIO:
Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence along
Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to
maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated,
it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed
non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of
general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to
warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

17. TELLO, LAWRENCE

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V V.M. REALTY
292 SCRA 678 7/20/1998
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED
18. VILLANUEVA, KRISTIAN RORY
SANGALAG V IAC
176 SCRA 719 8/25/2009
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED
19. LISACA, KENAN ISRAEL
MODAY V CA
268 SCRA 586 2/20/1997
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED
20. SIOSON, MARTIN
MERCADO V BES
GR NO 109713 4/6/1995
NO CASE DIGEST SUBMITTED