Civ pro case # 38

G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO,
JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE,
CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43,
Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania
and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of
Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon,
Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various
motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the
respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2)
the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N.
Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss
for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters
that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs
of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that
could be determined only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from
the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the
ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order

of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a
motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July
27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
The CA affirmed the RTC. Thus this petition.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the petitioners filed their notice of appeal within the reglamentary period?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. It even held that the petition is granted and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside. The records of this case was also
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
In its decision, it also held that, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as amended,
provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, the Court
have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal

application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, the Courts
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But the
Court hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied,
there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the
strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
The Court thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be
filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final
order," which the Court already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion
for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration.