: ,

.o.
.';.
C~Q 162.-Pc

~ Breidenich.Clare@epamail.epa.gov

~==~C:'::3::'. 10/23/2001 12:54:59 PM

Record Type; Record

To: Phil Cooney/CEQ/EOP, Kameran L. Bailey/CEQ/EOP

cc: Harvey.Reid@epamail.epa.gov

Subject: Draft Chapter 6 for Review

Hi·Phil,

Attached'is a draft chapter of the national communication on

vulnerability and impacts of climate change. Since most of this chapter

draws upon the national assessment, it would good if you or Kameran good

take a look at it to make sure you're comfortable with the tone. I will

be leaving for Marrakech tomorrow, so please send any comments directly

to Mike MacCracken and cc Reid Harvey. I don't believe you've met Reid

.yet - he's a colleague here at EPA who has been coordinating the

development of the national communication (I've just been pulled in to

assist him). He can be reaches at 564 - 9429.

Have a good couple of weeks. "II be in touch when I return.

- Clare
.) ~lJi,
"'- Forwarded by Clare Breidenich/OC/USEPNUS on 10/23/01 12:55 PM (~n ...Lt"-'ro\Jtl
...,. ~/ ~~
Mike cr-
MacCracken To: Ken Adler/DC/USEPAlUS@EPA, Beverly Mcintyre
<mmaccrac@usg <mcintyrebd@state,gov>, Bob Tuccillo <rtuccilJ@omb.eop.gov>, Clare
crp.gov> Breidenich/DC/USEPNUS@EPA, "Bruce. Harding@osd. mil"
<Bruce.Harding@osd.mil>, Katherine Buckley/DC/USEPAlUS@EPA, ·Col.
10/22/01 George Ledbetter" <Iedbellg@osdgc.osd.mil>, "CommcolJ@Aol. Com"
12:44 PM <commcoll@aol.com>. "Cstokes@Usaid. Gov" <cstokes@usaJd.gov>,
Donald
Trilling <donald.trilling@ost.dot.gov>, Edmund Coe/OC/USEPAlUS@EPA,
Michael Gillenwater/OC/USEPAlUS@EPA, Howard Diamond
<howard.diamond@noaa.gov>, "lgoklany@los. Doi. Gov"
<igoklany@ios.doLgov>, "Jeff. Oowd@Hq. Doe. Gov"
<jeff.dowd@hq.doe.~0·1>.Jim Hrubovcak <jhrubovcak@oce.usda.gov>,
"John. Conti@Hq. Doe. Gov" <John.conti@hq.doe.gov>, Kathleen
HoganIDC/USEPAlUS@EPA, Skip Laitner/DC/USEPAlUS@EPA, "Lisa.
Hanle@Hq.
Doe. Gov" <lisa.hanle@hq.doe.gov>, Margot Anderson
<margot.anderson@hq.doe.gov>, "MaryBeth. Zimmerman@ee, doe. gOY"
<MaryBeth.Zlmmerman@ee.doe.gov>, Mike MacCracken
<mmaccrac@usgcrp.gov>, Robert Worrest <rworrest@usgcrp.gov>, Mitchell
Baer <mitchell.baer@hq.doe.gov>, "Patel-Weynandto@State. Gov"

0021.01
,.
- ,.,",
CEQ O(}'7~66
 <patel-weynandto@state.gov>. "Peter. Karpoff@hq. doe. gOY"
<Peter.Karpoff@hq.doe.gov>. "Phillip. Tseng@ee. doe. gOY"
<Phillip.Tseng@ee.doe.gov>, "Raymond. Prince@Hq. Doe. Gov"
<raymond.prince@hq.doe.gov>, Reid Harvey/DC/USEPAlUS@EPA, "Richard.
Ohlemacher@Noaa. Gov" <richard.ohlemacher@noaa.gov>, Sharon
Saile/DC/USEPAlUS@EPA, Jason Samenow/DC/USEPAlUS@EPA. JamesT
Sullivan/OC/USEPAlUS@EPA, Jennifer Thatcher/DC/USEPAlUS@EPA, Todd
Ramsden <todd.ramsden@ost.dot.gov>, Trigg Talley <talleyt@state.gov>.
William Hohenstein <whohenst@oce.usda.gov>, "William. Breed@Hq. Doe.
Gov" <william.breed@hq.doe.gov>. "Wpizer@Cea. Eop. Gov"
<wpizer@cea.eop.gov>
cc:

Subject: Draft Chapter 6 for Review

Reviewers of the US Third National Contribution:

Attached for review Is the draft of Chapter 6 of the National

Communication, on VUlnerability Assessment, Climate Change Impacts and

Adaptation Measures. The gUidelines for this chapter from the FCCC

indicate

that the communication "shall include information on the expected

impacts'

of climate change and an outline of the action taken to implement

Article

4.1 (b) and (e) with regard to adaptation." As a result of studies to

date,

we know more about impacts than about adaptation, and it would be very

helpful if agency representatives could help to add specific examples of

adaptation strategies, etc. There are several notes in the draft chapter

indicating where this would be partiCUlarly helpful; in addition, there

is

a section 'at the back of the chapter where additional specific examples

could be added (although the chapter is already likely somewhat too

long).

It would also be helpful to have further suggestions on how to link this

. chapter to other chapters.

Tables are included at the end of the text document as are Figure

captions.

A file of draft figures is also attached, in Powerpoint format (and one

figure is s.titl being tracked down).

Although it was originally intended that two weeks would be available

for

review, to get back on schedule, it would be very helpfUl if comments

could

be returned to me by noon, Monday, October 29. It would be most

appreciated if comments could be provided giving page and line number

(which are indicated on the draft); if that is not possible, providing

redline/strikeout corrections can be used.

CEQ 061667

 Thank you for help with this review, and please pass the draft report or

sections of it along to others In your agencies who might be able to

pr9vjee. comp:lefl~

/ '/
, Mike.M~cCracken .

(See attached file: Chapter6-Rev_Draft-10=22=01.doc)(See attached file:

Chapter6-Revi ures.Jpg.p ichael C. MacCracken, Ph.D.

Office of t . S. Global Change R arch Program

Sti!te . '

40 irginia Avenue

. shington DC 20024
/ .

el (direct line): (202) 314·2233

el (USGCRP Office): (202) 488-8630

ax: (202) 488-8681 or (202) 488-8678

; ~mail: mmaccrac@usgcrp.gov
GCRP Home Page: http://www.u crp.govl

10­ Chapler6-Rev_Draft-1 0=22=01.doo

10­ C.hapler6-RevlewFlgure, .jpg.ppl

CEQ 007668

 Draft for Review-October 22, 200t-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
1 Chapter 6. Impacts and Adaptation

2
? ,IJ?

3 I. Overview L;~ ,'- ~ • J ~e c-~e •

4 ,. '5 jprt-Lt t.­

5 FroIT' the cold of an Alaskan winter to the he t of a Texas summer, and from year~round
6 consrancy in Hawaii to strong variation in orth Dakota, the United States experiences a very
7 wide range of climatic conditions and seas nal variations. Across all of these conditions, natural
8 ecosystems are able to thrive and Americ ingenuity and resources have enabled communities
9 and businesses to develop. Death rates fr weather extremes and climatically dependent
10 infectious diseases are also at~ levels ill the context of total deaths occurring in the
11 US. Impacts of variations in weather and climate on the American economy as a whole have also
12 b~en reduced to quite modest levels, although particular economic sectors in particular regions
13 can experience widely reported losses and disruptions from extreme conditions of various types.
14 All of this has been accomplished because both the public and private sectors have undertaken a
15 wide range of steps to enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability to climatic variations and
16 extremes. These steps range frorri designs of buildings and communities to federal and private
17 insurance and assistance for those most affected when climatic extremes do strike.
18
19 Changes and variatfons that have occurred during the 20 th century provide some context for
20 evaluating the potential vulnerability ofthe US to projected changes..For example, while most
21 areas of the US experienced wanning of more than about 0.6 C (about 1°F), which is consistent
22 with the observed warming of the world as a whole, the warming was greater than the average in
23 the Northeast, the Southwest, the upper Midwest, and the northern Great Plains, and the wanning
24 actually reached as much as 1.6 C (about 3 F) in interior Alaska. These climatic changes have
25 been associated with changes ranging from the melting ofpermafrost to changes in the
26 distributions ofbutterflies and the migrations of birds, but, overall, the US economy has readily
27 adapted to these changes and measures to improve the US environment are having many positive
28 effects. In addition, although the amount of property damage from storms is increasing, mainly
29 due to increasing development and population in vulnerable coastal areas, the annual number of
30 fatalities due to these .events is declining.
31 f'#J7
32 For the 2JSl century, we recognize that the challenge will be somewhat more challenging.
33 Although new projections by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (!pCC) project
34 that global average temperatures could increase from 1.4 to 5.8°C (2.5 to 10.4Of) and that the
35 warming is expected to be larger than average changes for land areas in the mid~ and high
36 latitude regions, probabilistic studies indicate that the changes are more likely to be in the lower
37 hal f than'the upper half of this range, even before actions are taken to reduce total emissions over
38 the 21'1 century. To the extent that future changes in mean and extreme conditions will be like
39 past variations, and that the occurrence of new extremes will only slowly become manifest, it is
40 likely that continued development will be able to further reduce overall costs and impacts of
41 climate change within the US. To the extent that future changes will be new and their onset will
42 come as a surprise, disruption is likely to increase to some extent, but be moderated by the many
43· ongoing efforts to increase resilience to the variations that society experiences. Although changes
44 in the environment will surely occur, evaluations indicate that. presuming we take actions to

CEQ 007859

 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
I prepare for future change, our nation's economy should continue to provide the wherewithal for
2 successful adaptation to the projected changes.
3
4 In considering overall US vulnerability, we recognize that the US will be affected by the
5 consequences, both positive and detrimental, affecting the rest of the world. Because we are
6 connecte.d to the world through the global economy, our common environment, shared resources,
7 migrating species, our historic roots, moral concern, travel, and more, we recognize that what
8 happens around the world will be of importance for the US, both directly and indirectly. To
9 better understand and more thoroughly evaluate the potential consequences ofclimate change
10 and the potential for adaptation worldwide, we are conducting and participating in research

11 assessments both within the US and internationally (see Chapter 8). To help alleviate

12 vulnerability
. to adverse consequences, we are undertaking . a wide range of activities that will

13 help nationally and internationally, from developing medicines for dealing with infectious
14 disease to promoting worldwide development through trade and assistance. In addition, as
15 described in Chapter 7, we are offering many types of assistance to the world, believing that
16 information about and preparation for climate change can help to reduce adverse impacts.
17
18 Within this broader context, this chapter provides an overview of potential impacts and possible
19 response options within the US. Because the US is so hirge and diverse, many of the adaptive
20 steps will be most appropriately taken at state and local levels and by the private sector, with the
21 federal government providing information about potential consequences and research that
22 expands the available set of options onsideration. For this reason, this chapter focuses
23 mainly 011 the types of change i elyt esult from climate change and national level activities
24
25 change.
1
to encourage steps to reduce VUln rability. an.d increase adaptation to climate variations and
~~~
26
27 II. Weather and Climate Context
28
29 The United States experiences a wide variety of climatic conditions. East to west, the climates
30 range from the semi-arid and arid climates of the west and southwest to the continental climates
31 of the Great Plains and the moister conditions of the eastern US. North to south, the climates
32 range from the Arctic climate of northern Alaska to the tropical climates in Hawaii, the Pacific
33 Islands and Caribbean. Although US society and industry have adapted to the typical climatic
34 conditions of their region, a variety of extreme events each year cause significant impacts across
35 the nation. Weather events causing death, injury and damage include hurricanes (also known as
36 tropical cyclones) and associated stonn surges, lightning, tornadoes and other windstonns,
37 hailstorms, severe winter storms, snow avalanches, and extreme summer temperatures. Heat
38 waves, floods, landslides, droughts, fires, land subsidence, coastal inundation and erosion, and
39 even dam failures can result when extreme::; persist over time. Much of the upward trend in
40 economi~ damages is a result of increased populations and structures in particularly vulnerable
41 locations; for example, 53% of the US population currently resides in the coastal areas of the US
42 and the fraction is increasing. Determining the factors that lead to extreme events and
43. encouraging steps to reduce the potential for death and damage from such events have become
44 research priorities.
45

CEQ 007670
 raft for Review-october 22, 200t-Comments to M. Macera jAJ-J .. ,(,tri\­
Do Not Cite or Quote w~cA- V"~ -, _.J sc~'·J J
,eJ~
/ 51
I II Model-based projections for the 21 century indicate that, compared to th upw .
2 the 20mcentury, warming across the US is likely to be significantly larg ,sea level rise is likely
3 to be greater, and heavy rainfall events are likely to be more frequent Cl intense. Although
4 models are unable to accurately project the regional patterns of these anges, the model results
5 do give indications of the range of magnitude of potential changes. sed on results assembled
6 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC;2001a), ual-average warming
7 over the US could be as much as several degrees Celsius (e.g., roughly 3 to 9Of), both
8 precipitation and evaporation are projected to increase, occurrences of what are now unusual and
9 extreme conditions are expected to increase, and sea level is expected to rise. Should such
10 warming occur, the northern tier of states would experience conditions roughly equivalent to the
II conditions now experienced by the central tier of states, the central tier of states would
12 e~perience conditions roughly equivalent to those of the southern tier of states, and the southern
13 tier of states would experience conditions atypical of those now experienced within the US
14 (Figure 6.1).
15
16 Recent analyses of the number of days that minimum temperatures fall below freezing indicate
17 that the frequency is decreasing, except in the southeastern US where the increased presence of
18 sulfate aerosols, changes in atmospheric circulation regimes, and/or changes in cloud cover may
19 have counterbalanced the wanning tendency. Over the 20th century, averaged over the country,
20 there has been a decline of about two days per year (i.e., -2 days/l 00 years). This change has
21 been most apparent in winter and spring, with little change in the autumn. Changes in the timing
22 of the last spring frost reflect a similar pattern, with earlier cessation of spring frosts contributing
23 to a lengthening of the frost-free season over the country. Model projections suggest that
24 minimwn temperatures are likely to continue to rise more rapidly than maximum temperatures,
25 extending the trend that started during the 20 th century. Although winter temperatures are
26 projected to increase somewhat more rapidly than summer temperatures, the summertime heat
27 index is projected to rise quite sharply because the rising absolute humidity will make summer·
28 conditiol}s feel much more uncomfortable, particularly across the southern and eastern US.
29
30 Observations for the 20 th century indicate that total annual precipitation is increasing, both
31 worldwide and over the US. For the conterminous US, the increase in average precipitation is
32 estimated to have been 5-10% over the past 100 years. With the exception of leeali:z:eldecreases
33 in the upper Great Plains, the Rocky Mountains, and parts of Alaska, most regions have
34 experienced increased precipitation. Recent analyses suggest that much of this increase in
35 precipitation has been the result of both an increase in the types of heavier precipitation events
36 now experienced in each region and an increase in the number of rain-days (Figure 6.2a). These
37 increases in precipitation have caused increases in peak streamflow in some river basins across
38 the eastern half of the country, but not in the western US where peak flows are dominated by
39 snow melt. Models project an increase in global precipitation during the 21 51 century, again with
40 much of the increase occurring in the types of heavier rainfall events that increase streamflow
41 (see Figure 6.2b). Estimates of regional changes vary widely, however. While there are some
42 indications that wintertime precipitation in the southwestern US may increase due to warming of
43­ the Pacific Ocean, changes across the key forest and agricultural regions of the US remain
44 uncertain. Whether any increase in precipitation will be sufficient to overcome the increased rate
45 of evaporation caused by the warmer conditions also remains uncertain. Because precipitation is

3
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200t-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 .Jli.tal to many sectors of society;- and beefttlsc increased preCIpItatIon tends to Umil the
2 temperature increase (and yice-vetSa), d~v~lef'iRg b~tteF estmlates off)Fejeetee ehang~s is
3 partieHlaFly i~8rtant ane water resonrces research is ~ ke~r eOfflI'c:lftent ee the US r0s~;u:ch
4 -program,
5
6 As a highly developed nation, US communities and industry have made substantial efforts to
7 reduce their vulnerability to normal weather and climate fluctuations. For this reason, there is
8 significant interest in potential changes in weather extremes and climate variability.
9 Unfortwlately, projections ofchanges remain quite uncertain, especiallybecause variations in
10 climate differentially affect different regions of the country. Perhaps the most well-known
11 example of a natural variation of the climate is the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which
12 h~s had a periodicity of about 2-7 years over the past 100 years. ENSO has reasonably well­
13 established effects on seasonal climatic conditions across the US. For example, in the EI Nifio
14 phase, unusually high sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the eastern and central equatorial
15 Pacific suppress the occurrence of Atlantic hurricanes and result in higher-than-average winter­
16 time precipitation in the southwestern and southeastern US and above average temperatures in
17 the Midwest. During a strong El Nino, effects can extend into the northern Great Plains. During
18 the La Nina phase, which is characterized by unusually low SSTs off the west coast of South
19 America, higher-than-average winter-time temperatures prevail across the southern half of the
20 US, more hurricanes occur in the tropical Atlantic, and more tornadoes occur in the Ohio and
21 Tennessee valleys (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). In the summertime, La Nifia conditions can
22 contribute to the occutfence of drought in the eastern half of the US. Given these interactions,
23 research is being intensified to improve model simulations of the ENSO cycle and to evaluate
24 climate model projections suggesting wider swings in the and an overall warming of the eastern
25 Pacific Ocean.
26
27 Other factors that affect the interannual variability of the US climate include the Pacific Decadal
28 Oscillation (PDO) and the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO). The PDO is a phenomenon similar
29 to ENSO, but apparent in the SSTs of the North Pacific Ocean. The PD~ has a periodicity that is
30 on the order of decades, and like ENSO, has two distinct phases, a warm phase and a cool phase.
31 In the warm phase, oceanic conditions lead to a deepening of the Aleutian Low, higher-than­
32 average winter temperatures in the Pacific Northwest, and relatively high SSTs along the Pacific
33 coast. Tl}e PDO also leads to dry winters in the Pacific Northwest, and wetter conditions both
34 north and south of there. Essentially, the opposite conditions occur in the cool phase. The NAO
35 is a phenomenon that displays a seesaw in temperatures and atmospheric pressure between
36 Greenland and northern Europe. However, the NAO also includes effects in the US. For
37 example, when Greenland is warmer than normal, the eastern US is usually colder, particularly in
38 winter, and vice-versa. Research is underway to better understand the PDO and NAO, thus
39 improving short-term predictions of fludu<1iions and long-term projections of changes.
40
41
42 III. Potential Consequences of and Adaptation to Climate Variability and Change
43.
44 Since the late 1980s, an increasing number of studies have been undertaken to investigate the
45 effects of climate variability and change on society and the environment. These activities have

CEQ 00767~
 Draft for Review-October 22, 20ot-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 ranged from focused studies on particular topics to broader syntheses of potential consequences
2 across th'e US, including reports prepared by the US Government (e.g., EPA, 1989; U.S.
3 Congress, 1993) and as components ofintemational assessments (e.g., IPCC, 1996, 1998,
4 2001 b). In 1997, to provide a more in-depth analysis of the potential consequences of climate
5 variability and change for the US, and to contribute to fulfilling obligations Ul.Jer sections 4.l(b)
6 and (e) of the UNFCCC, the interagency US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP, see
7 chapter 8) initiated a National Assessment process to evaluate and synthesize available
8 information about the potential impacts of climate change, to identify options for adapting to
9 climate change, and to summarize research needs for improving knowledge about vulnerability,
10 impacts,'and adaptation. This assessment was carried out recognizing that climate change is ml1y
11 one among many stresses that are faced by society and the environment, and that in many cases
12 the challenges posed by climate change can be adapted to along with efforts being made to deal
13 with other stresses.
14
15 'Fe bring e)emct fueas to bow climate ehange might affl!ct the US, the National Assessment
16 pt'Oeess eegan with 20 r:egional wor:kshops in 1997 and 1998 that exploted tire environmental,
17 rOSO\:IfG@, eeoftemic, and health related issues coupled with climate yzuiabiliLy mid change.
18 Gaining insight Will Lltese werksoops, the National Assessment process initiated preparation of
19 an initial set of regional, sectoral, and national assessment reports that is nearing completion (see
20 Table 6.1). The key findings from the recent national level snapshot of potential consequences
21 and adaptation options are summarized in Table 6.2; regional findings are discussed later in this
22 chapter. ~eat €lEfon is planned jn coming y€lafS te gain bettel Wlti~
23 aad Gover additional regions and s0cteFS.
24
25 The following sub-sections of this chapter present results for a few key areas based on current
26 underst~ding, covering both potential consequences and the types of adaptive steps that are
27 underway or could be pursued to moderate or deal with adverse outcomes. While not all regions
28 and sectors have been covered, a wide range of insights has emerged.
29
30 A. Climate Change Interactions with Agriculture
31
32 Agriculture is a major activity within the US and the productivity of US agriculture is important
33 both for the US and for the world. Croplands, grassland pasture, and range occupy about 900
34 million acres, or nearly ha1fofthe land area of the US, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. The value
35 of agricultural commodities (food and fiber) exceeds $165 billion at the farm level and o,:,er $500
36 billion after processing and marketing, meaning food production and distribution amount to
37 about 10% of the US economy. Because of the productivity of US agriculture, the US is a major
38 supplier of food and fiber for the world, accowlting for more than 25% of the total global trade in
39 wheat, com, soybeans, and cotton.
40
41 Agricultural productivity has improved at over 1% per year since 1950, resulting in a decline in
42 production costs that has become a major concern for producers and about a two-thirds drop in
43 real commodity prices that has been very beneficial to consumers. In addition, less land is now
44 used for agriculture in the US than in the past, allowing regrowth of some forests and grasslands
45 and enhancing wildlife habitats. Continuation of these trends is expected, with continuing

CEQ 007673
 •
Drart for Review-October 22, 2001-CommeDts to M. MacCrackeD 0~ ,"Jf!.j,r.~.~
Do Not Cite or Quote (Q~~, <­
I pressures on individual producers to further increase the productivity of their farms and reduce ~:J'~lP
2 costs ofproduction.
O1~v- r
3
't.
4
5
6
As a result of this competitive economic environment, producers consider anything that might (j)
~w~~ 0
increase .costs or limit their markets as a threat to their economic well-being. Issues of concern

include ~egulatory actions', such as efforts to control the off-site consequences of soil erosion, ;
/}Jw- U
rr J:U II

7 agricultural chemicals, and livestock wastes; genetically modified crops; extreme weather or
1

8 climate events; new pests; and the development of pest resistance to existing pest control '~ff;L
9 strategies. Future changes in climate are expected to interact with all of these issues. In r;::::--.... .J.rF
10 particular, the rising concentration of carbon dioxide (C02)and continuing climate change §. L. J.
II expected @ on averag~contributeto the long, upward trend crop yields,it9thange supplies of Cor~~'dJ
12 and requirements for irrigation water, Mlead to changes in surface water quality, td'Decessitate -::;
13 increased use of pesticides or other means to limit damage from pests, and to"alter the variability ( ~<? ­
14 of the climate to which the prevailing agricultural sector has become accustomed. ' <:,e.e
15 e.G\ )
16 Assuming technological advances continue at about the same rate (and biotechnology may l:;
17 influence this rate), that there are no dramatic changes in federal policies or in international J-,.vJ,
18 markets, that there are adequate supplies of nutrients and no prolonged droughts in major ~).
19 agricultural regions, our analyses (National Agriculture Assessment Group, 2001) indicate that it
20 is unlikely that climate change will imperil the ability of the US to feed its population and to
21 export substantial amounts of foodstuffs. Under the changing climatic conditions, studies
22 indicate that, at the national level, overall agricultural productivity is likely to increase as a result
23 of changes in the CO2 concentration and in climate projected for at least the next several decades,
24 although analyses done to date have not yet considered all of the consequences of possible
25 changes in pests, diseases, insects, and extreme events that may result. In the evaluations that
26 have been made, crops showing generally positive results from the anticipated changes in CO2
27 concentration and climate include cotton, corn for grain and silage, soybeans, sorghum, barley,
28 sugar beets, and citrus fruits (figure 6.5). The productivity of pastures may also increase as a
29 result of these changes. For other crops, including wheat, rice, oats, hay, sugar cane, potatoes,
30 and tomatoes, yields are projected to increase under some conditions and decrease under others.
31
32 The studies also indicate that all agricultural regions of the US are not affected to the same
33 degree by the projected changes in climate that have been investigated. In general, northern areas
34 such as the Midwest, West, and Pacific Northwest show large gains in yields, while influences on
35 crop yield in other regions vary more widely depending on the climate scenario and time period.
36 For example, projected wheat yields in the southern Great Plains could decline if the warming is
37 not accompanied by sufficient precipitation. The crop models that were used in these studies
38 assume that the CO 2 fertilization effect will be strongly' beneficial and they allow for a limited set
39 of 011 form adaptation options, including chci.iiges in planting dates and changes in varieties, to be
40 taken in response to the changing conditions. These adaptation measures contribute small
41 additional gains in yields of dryland crops and greater gains in yields of irrigated crops.
42
43 Market-scale economic models were then used to evaluate the overall economic implications for
44 various crops. These models allow for a wide range of adaptations in response to changing
45 productivity, prices, and resource use, including changes in irrigation, use of fertilizer and

A CEQ d07t)j4
 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 pesticides, crops grown and the location of cropping, and a variety of other fann management
2 options. Based on studies to date, unless there is inadequate or poorly distributed precipitation,
3 the net effects of climate change on the agricultural segment of the US economy over the 21 s1
4 century are generally positive. These studies indicate that, economically, consumers benefit more
5 from lower prices than producers suffer from the decline in profits. Complicating the analyses,
6 however, our studies indicate that producer versus consumer effects will depend on how climate
7 change affects production elsewhere in the world. For example, for crops grown in the US, losses
8 to farmers due to lower commodity prices are offset under some conditions by an increased
9 advantage of US fanners over foreign competitors, leading to an increased volume of exports.
10
11 Because food variety and food supplies within the US depend not only on foodstuffs produced
12 w~thin the US, the net effect of climate change on US consumers will also depend on the effects
13 of climate change on agriculture around the world. These effects will in turn depend not only on
14 international markets, but on how farmers around the world are able to adapt to climate change
15 and other factors they will face. While there are likely to be many regional variations, experience
16 indicates that research, sponsored by the US and other nations, has been able to playa role in the
17 ongoing, long-term increase in agricultural productivity around the world. Further research
18 efforts, covering efforts from genetic design of crops to special efforts such as improving the salt
19 tolerance of key crops, is likely to be able to continue overall global production of foodstuffs.
20
21 Within the US, a key determinant ofagriculrural productivity will be the ongoing availability of
22 sufficient water where and when it is needed. The variability of the US climate has provided
23 many opportunities for learning to deal with a wide range of climatic conditions, and the regions
24 where many of our crops are grown have changed over time without disrupting production. In
25 addition, steps to build up the amount of carbon in soils, which is likely to one component of a
26 carbon mitigation program, will enhance the water-holding capacity of soils and decrease
27 vulnerability to drought, thereby helping improve overall agricultural productivity. For areas that
28 are insufficiently moist, irrigation has been used to enhance crop productivity. We expect that
29 climate change will lead to changes in the demand for irrigation water, and, if water resources are
30 insufficient, to changes in the crops being grown. Although there will likely be substantial
31 regional differences, at the national level, model projections indicate that agriculture's need for
32 irrigation water is likely to slowly decline. At least two factors are responsible for this projected
33 reduction. One is increased precipitation in some agricultural areas. The other is that faster
34 development of crops due to higher temperatures and a higher CO2 concentration results in a
35 shorter growing period and consequently a reduced demand for irrigation water. Also, in our crop
36 models, shorter crop growing periods reduce plant water use, and this compensates for the
37 increasea plant and soil water loss due to higher air temperatures. However, a decreased period
38 for crop growth is also associated with decreased yields, although it may be possible to overcome
39 this through crop breeding.
40
41 Potential changes in surface water quality as a result of climate change is an issue that has only
42 started to be investigated. For example, the Chesapeake Bay is a highly valuable natural resource
43. that has been severely degraded in recent decades as a result, primarily, of soil erosion and
44 excess nutrient runoff from crop and livestock production. In simulations for the National
45 Assessment, loading of excess nitrogen into the Bay due to com production is projected to

CEQ 007675

 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
1 increase due both to the change in average conditions and to the effects of projected changes in
2 extreme weather events such as floods or heavy downpours that wash large amounts of fertilizers
3 and animal manure into surface waters. Across the US, changes in future fann practices, such as
4 no-till agriculture and better matching of the timing of a crop's need for fertilizer with the timing
5 of application, are examples of approaches that could possibly reduce projected adverse impacts
6 on water quality. Climate change is also projected to lead to increases in pesticide use for crops
7 in most regions in order to sustain current performance. The increase in pesticide use is projected
8 to result,in slightly poorer overall economic performance, but this effect is quite small because
9 pesticide expenditures are a relatively small share of production costs. The potential change in
10 environmental costs as a result of increased pesticide use have not yet been evaluated.
11
12 Based on past experiences, US agriculture is also very likely to be affected ifthere are changes in
13 climate variability and extreme events. The vulnerability of agricultural systems to climate and
14 weather extremes varies with location because of differences in soils, production systems, and
15 other factors. Changes in the form (rain. snow, or hail). timing, frequency, and intensity of
16 precipitation and changes in wind-driven events (e.g., windstorms, hurricanes, and tornadoes) are
17 likely to 'have significant consequences in particular regions. For example, heavy precipitation
18 events cause erosion, water-logging, and leaching of animal wastes, pesticides, fertilizers, and
19 other chemicals into surface and groundwater.
20
21 A major source of variability within the US is the EI Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The
22 effects of ENSO events vary widely across the country, creating wet conditions in some areas
23 and dry conditions in others. Better prediction of such variations is a major focus of US and
24 international rese,arch activities (e.g., through the International Research Institute for climate
25 prediction) because, in part, such infonnation could greatly increase the range of adaptive
26 responses available to fanners. For example, given sufficient warning of climate anomalies (e.g.,
27 of conditions being warm and dry, cool and moist, etc.), crop species and crop planting dates
28 could be optimized for the predicted variation.
29
30 To ameliorate the deleterious effects of climate change generally, adaptation strategies such as
31 changing planting dates and varieties are likely to help to significantly offset economic losses
32 and increase relative yields. Adaptive measures are likely to be particularly critical for the
33 Southeast because of the large reductions in yields projected for some crops ifsumrner
34 precipitation declines. To achieve the fertilization effect assumed in the crop studies under the
35 wide range of growing conditions across the US, breeding for response to CO2 may be necessary.
36 Breeding for tolerance to climatic stress has already been exploited and varieties that do best
37 under ideal conditions usually also out-perform other varieties under stress conditions.
38
39 While indications are that many types ofchangc:;~ c,;an be adapted to, some adaptations to climate
40 change and its impacts may have negative secondary effects. For example, an analysis of the
41 effect afclimate change on water use from the Edward's aquiferregion near San Antonio, Texas,
42 found increased demand for groundwater resources. Increased water use from this aquifer would
43­ threaten endangered species dependent on flows from springs supported by the aquifer. Pesticide
44 and herbicide use may also increase with warming. These increases may increase the potential
45 for chemically contaminated run-off into prairie wetlands and groundwater, which, ifnot

CEQ U07575
 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001---Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 controlled by on-site measures, could threaten rivers and lakes, drinking water supplies, coastal
2 waters, recreation areas, and waterfowl habitat.
3
4 Overall, uncertainties in projections of climate change, in regional variations of the climate, and.
5 in interactions of the environment, economics, and fann policy suggest that there are no simple
6 and widely applicable adaptation prescriptions. As they have in the past, fanners will need to
7 adapt broadly to changing conditions in agriculture, of which changing climate is only one factor.
8 Presuming this will be done well, the US agricultural sector should remaIn strong.
9
10 B. Climate Change Interactions with Forests
11
12 Forests cover nearly one-third of the US, providing wildlife habitat; clean air and water; carbon
13 storage; recreational opportunities such as hiking, camping, and fishing. In addition, harvested
14 products include timber, pulpwood, fuelwood, wild game, ferns, mushrooms, and berries. This
15 wealth of products and services depends on forest productivity and biodiversity, which are in
16 tum strongly influenced by climate. Across the US, our native forests are adapted to the local
17 climates in which they developed; examples include the cold-tolerant.boreal forests of Alaska,
18 the summer-drought tolerant forests of the Pacific Northwest, and the drought-adapted pinon­
19 juniper forests of the Southwest. Given the overall importance of our forests, the potential
20 impacts· from climate change are receiving close attention, although it is only one ofthe factors
21 meriting consideration.
22
23 A range of human activities cause changes in forests. For example, significant areas of native
24 forests have been converted to agricultural and urban uses, and expansion of urban areas has
25 fragmented forests into smaller, less-contiguous patches. In some parts ofthe US, intensive
26 management and favorable climates have resulted in development of highly productive forests,
27 such as southern pine plantations, in place of the natural land cover. Fire suppression,
28 particularly in southeastern, mid-western, and western forests has also led to changes in forest
29 area and in species composition. Harvesting methods have also changed species composition,
30 while planting of trees for aesthetic and landscaping purposes in urban and rural areas has
31 extended the natural ranges of species. However, large areas, particularly in the northeastern US,
32 have become reforested as forests have taken over abandoned agricultural lands, allowing
33 reestablishment of the ranges of many wildlife species.
34
35 Changes in climate and the carbon dioxide concentration are new human-induced influences that
36 will affect forests. These factors will interact with those already causing changes in forests to
37 further affect the full range of goods and services provided by forests, including affecting the
38 extent, composition, and productivity of forests, the frequency and intensity of such natural
39 disturbances as fire, the level ofbiodiversity, and the socioeconomic benefits provided by forests
40 (National Assessment Forest Group, 2001). Figure 6.6 shows the types of changes that climate
41 change could have on forests in the eastern US.
42
43. The global increase in the atmospheric CO2 concentration is the best-documented influence
44 related to, climate change that is affecting forests, although, in some areas, other important
45 atmospheric constituents are also increasing, including nitrogen oxides (a direct product of fossil

CEQ OOru)
 Draft for Review--october 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 fuel combustion that causes acid rain) and ground-level ozone ("smog,'~ a product of chemical
2 reactions between hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides in the presence of sunlight). A synthesis of
3 laboratory and field studies and modeling indicates that the fertilizing effect of atmospheric CO 2
4 will increase forest productivity, but these increases are likely to be strongly tempered by local
5 conditions such as moisture stress and nutrient availability. Across a wide ran~e of scenarios,
6 modest warming is likely to result in increased carbon storage in most US forests. Yet und~r
7 some warmer scenarios, forests in the Southeast and the Northwest could experience drought­
8 induced losses of carbon, possibly exacerbated by increaSed fire disturbance. These potential
9 gains and losses of carbon will be in addition to changes resulting from changes in land-use, such
10 as the conversion of forests to agricultural lands.
11
12 Other components of environmental change, such as nitrogen deposition and ground-level ozone
13 concentr~tions, are also affecting forest p·rocesses. Models suggest a synergistic fertilization
14 response between CO2 and nitrogen enrichment, leading to further increases in productivity.
15 Ozone, however, can suppress these gains. Current ozone levels, for example, are estimated to
16 decrease production in northeastern forests by 10% and in southern pine plantations by 5%.
17 Interactions among these physical and chemical changes and other components of global change
18 will be important in projecting the future state ofUS forests.
19
20 Natural disturbances having the greatest effects on forests include insects, disease, introduced
21 species, fires, droughts, hurricanes, landslides, wind storms, and ice storms. Tree species have
22 developed adaptations to some of these disturbances. For example, some tree species have
23 developed very thick bark to protect them from repeated ground fires. Over millennia, local,
24 regional, and global-scale changes in temperature and precipitation have influenced the
25 occurrence, frequency, and intensity of these natural disturbances. These changes in disturbance
26 regimes are a natural part of all ecosystems. However, forests may soon be facing more rapid
27 alterations in the nature of these disturbances as a consequence of climate change. For example,
28 unless there is a large increase in precipitation, the seasonal severity offrre hazard is projected to
29 increase during the 21'1 century over much ofthe US, particularly in the southeastern US and
30 Alaska.'
31
32 The consequences of drought depend on annual and seasonal climate changes and whether the
33 current adaptations of forests to drought will offer resistance and resilience to new conditions.
34 The ecological models used in the National Assessment indicated that increases in drought
35 stresses are most likely to occur in the forests of the Southeast, southern Rocky Mountains and
36 parts of the Northwest. Hurricanes, ice storms, wind storms, landslides, insect infestations,
37 disease, and introduced species are also likely to be climate-modulated influences that affect
38 forests; projection of changes in the frequencies. intensities, and locations of such factors and
39 their influences are, however, difficult to project. What is clear is that, as the climate changes,
40 alterations in these disturbances and in their effects on forests are possible.
41
42 In addition to the very large influences of changes in land cover, changes in the distribution and
43· abundance of plant and animal species reflect the birth, growth, death, and dispersal rates of
44 individuals in a population. When aggregated, these processes result in the local disappearance or
45 introduction of a species, and ultimately determine the species' range. Although climate and soils,

10

. CEQ 0076/8

 Draft for Review-October 22, 20ot-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
1 exert strong controls on the establishment and growth of plant species, the response of plant and
2 animal species to climate change will be the result, of many interacting and interrelated processes
3 operating over several time and space scales. Movement and migration rates, changes in
4 disturbance regimes, and interactions within and between species will affect the distribution of
5 plants arid animals. Analyses of ecological models for plausible climl\t~ scenarios indicate that
6 the i\.lcation and area of the potential habitats for many tree species and communities are very
7 likely to shift. For example, potential habitats for trees favored by cool environments are very
8 likely to shift north. Habitats of alpine and sub-alpine spruce-fir could possibly be eliminated as
9 their mountain ranges warm. Aspen and eastern birch communities are likely to contract
10 dramatically in the US and largely shift into Canada.
11
12 PQtential habitats that could possibly expand in area in the US are oakJhickory and oak/pine in
13 the eastern US, and Ponderosa pine and arid woodland communities in the West. How well these
14 species track changes in their potential habitats will be strongly influenced by how rapidly they
15 can disperse to other locations and the disturbances to these environments. Because of the
16 dominance of non-forest land uses along migration routes, some native species are likely to have
17 difficulty dispersing to new habitats if rate of climate change is high. For example, sagebrush and
18 aspen communities are currently being reduced by conifer encroachment, grazing, invasive
19 species, and urban expansion. The effects of climate change on the rate and magnitude of
20 disturbance (forest damage and destruction associated with fires, storms, droughts and pest
21 outbreaks) will be an important factor in determining whether transitions from one forest type to
22 another will be gradual or abrupt. lfthe rate and type of disturbances in New England do not
23 increase, for example, a smooth transition from the present maple, beech, and birch tree species
24 to oak and hickory may occur. Where disturbances increase or are severe, however, transitions
25 are very likely to be abrupt. As these changes occur, invasive (weed) species that disperse rapidly
26 are likely to find opportunities in newly forming ecological communities. As a result, the species
27 composition of these communities will likely differ substantially from those occupying similar
28 habitats today. These changes, in turn, may have important effects on wildlife.
29
30 Forests ~re also the major source of wood products, and North America is both the world's
31 leading producer and consumer of wood products. US forests provide for substantial exports of
32 hardwood lumber, wood chips, logs, and some types of paper; coming the other way, the US
33 imports, for example, about 35% of its softwood lumber and more than half of its newsprint from
34 Canada. The market for wood products in the US will be highly dependent upon the future area
35 in forests, the species composition offorests, future supplies of wood, technological changes in
36 production and use, the availability of substitutes such as steel and vinyl, national and
37 international demands for wood products, and competitiveness among major trading partners.
38 Analyses indicate that, for a range of climate scenarios, forest productivity gains are very likely
39 to increase timber inventories over the next 100 years. Under these scenarios, the increased wood
40 supply leads to reductions in log prices, helping consumers, but, in tum, decreasing the profits of
41 producers. The proj ected net effect on the economic welfare of participants in timber markets
42 increases about 1% above current values.
43·
44 Uses ofland will likely shift between forestry and agriculture as these economic sectors adjust to
45 climate-induced changes in production. Although total forest pr<?duction in the US is projected to

11

'.$
CEQ 007679
 Draft for Review-October 22, 20ot-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 generally increase, the projections under moderate warming suggest that hardwood output will be

2 higher but softwood output will increase. Timber output is also projected to increase more in the

3 southern than in the northern US, and sawtimber volume is projected to increase more than

4 pulpwood volume.

6 It is also very likely that outdoor, forest-oriented recreation will be altered by the projected

7 changes jn climate. For example, changes in benefits, as measured by aggregate days of activities

8 and total economic value, are likely to be affected, and these changes will vary by type of

9 recreation and location. In some areas, higher temperatures are likely to shift summer recreation

10 activities, such as hiking, northward or to higher elevations. In winter, downhill skiing

II opportunities are very likely to decrease because of fewer cold days and reduced snowpack.

12 Costs to maintain skiing opportunities are therefore likely to rise, especially in marginal climate

13 areas. Effects on fishing are also likely to vary; for example, wanner waters are likely to increase

14 fish production and opportunities for some warm water species, but decrease habitat and

15 opportunities for cold water species. .

16
17 Even though the projected changes in climate are likely to have effects on forests, the motivation
18 for adaptation strategies is likely to be most strongly influenced by the level 9f economic activity
19 in the US intercoupled with the rate of population growth, changes in taste, and general
20 preferences, including society's perceptions about these changes. Market forces have proven to
21 be powerful when it comes to decisions involving land use and forestry, and, as such, will
22 strongly influence adaptation on private lands. For those forests valued for their current
23 biodiversity, practical strategies to maintain plant and animal speciesin·tfie mae of climate
24 change remain to be developed. 1'N.* ""'''':1 ~ ;""'1'<.vk~t L1
25
~ . ,... '­
(,...~ .:l~. "fY'<.I'"...~
26 Because markets for forest products adjust through altering prices for timber, wood, and paper
27 products, changes in climate and the consequent impact on forests are very likely to change the
28 market incentives for investment in intensive forest management (such as planting, thinning,
29 genetic conservation, and tree improvement) and the incentive to develop and invest in wood­
30 conserving technologies. Although these price changes are likely to alter consumption patterns
31 (for example, lead to substitutions between wood and non-wood products), it is very likely that
32 the overall increase in the consumption of wood products will be predominantly influenced by
33 population growth, the level of economic activity in the US and internationally, and personal
34 preferences. _____
35
36 lfnew technologies and markets are recognized in a timely manner, timber producers could
37 possibly adjust and adapt to climate change under plausible climate scenarios. One possible
38 adaptation measure could be to salvage dead and dying timber and to replant species adapted to
39 the changed climatic conditions. The extent and pattern oftimber harvesting and prices in the US
40 will also be influenced by the global changes in forest productivity and prices of overseas
41 products'.
42
43· Potential climate-induced changes in forests must also be put into the context of other human­
44 induced pressures, which will undoubtedly change significantly over future decades. While the
45 potential for rapid changes in natural disturbances could challenge current management

12

CEQ UOJMD
 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote

1 strategies, these changes will co-occur with human activities such as agricultural and urban

2 encroachment on forests, multiple use of forests, and air pollution. Therefore, these changes

3 should be manageable if planning is proactive.

4
5 C. Climate Change Interactions with Coastal Areas and Marine Resources
6
7 The US has over 95,000 miles of coastline and over 3.4 million square miles of ocean within its
8 territorial waters. These areas provide a wide range of essential goods and services to society.
9 Some 53% of the total US population lives on the 17% ofland in counties bordering the coast.
10 Because.oftheir many attractions, populations in these areas are growing more rapidly than
11 elsewhere in the US. Asa result ofthe population growth, as well as because of increased wealth
12 and affluence, demands on coastal and marine resources for both aesthetic enjoyment and
13 economic benefits are rapidly intensifying while at the same time exposure to coastal hazards is
14 increasing.
15
16 Coastal and marine enviromnents are intrinsically linked to the prevailing climate in many ways.
17 Heat given off by the oceans warms the land during the winter, and helps to keep coastal regions
18 cooler i1'l: summer. Moisture evaporated from the oceans is the ultimate source of precipitation,
19 and the runoff of precipitation carries nutrients, pollutants, and other materials from the land to
20 . the ocean. Sea level exerts a major influence on coastlines, shaping barrier islands and pushing
21 salt water up rivers and into aquifers. For example, along the Pacific Coast, cycles of beach and
22 cliff erosion have been linked to the natural sequence of El Nino events that alter storm tracks
23 and temporarily raise average sea levels in this region. During the 1982-83 and 1997-98 El Nino
24 events, erosion damage was widespread along the Pacific Coastline.

an€li~t0
25
26 Climate change will affect these interactions. Warming will alter coastal weather
27 intensitY severe storms. Melting of glaciers and thermal expansion of ocean waters ~use sea
28 level to rise, which will intensify erosion and endanger coastal infrastructure. Rising seaIeVerl""o......-\J..
29 and higher temperatures Wift ilso impact the health of estuaries and coastal wetlands. Higher
30 temperatures coupled with the increasing CO~ concentration ~everely stress coral reefs and
31 the changing temperature patterns will force relocation of fisheries and alter fish migration
32 patterns. While quantifying these consequences is difficult, indications of the types of outcomes ~~ ~
33 have emerged from our assessments (National Coastal Assessment Group, 2000). r°!>~, jJ~,
34
35 Global sea level rose by about 4 to 8 inches (10-20 Col) during the 20111 century; models project an
36 increase of from 4 to 35 inches (9 to 88 cm) during the 21 5 ' century, with further rise continuing
37 for several centuries after global warming is limited. These global changes are, however, only
38 on~in what determines sea level change at any particular coastal location. For example,
39 along the Mid-Atlantic coast where land levels are subsiding, relative sea level rise will be
somewhat greater; conversely, in New England, where land levels are rising, sea lexsl rise will
be somewhat less. Not s~rprisingly, an increased rate of global sea-level rise)/f ~xpect~ to have
the most dramatic impacts in regions where subsidence and erosion problems already exist.
Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines are especially vulnerable, particularly ifthere is an increase in
4 the frequency or intensity of stonn surges or hurricanes, because the slope of these areas is so
4~, gentl~ that a small rise in sea level produces a large inland shift of the shoreline. If increases in

tfo'''hr 13

CEQ 007681

 Draft for Review-October 22, 20ot-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
1 the frequency or intensity ofEI Nino events occur, they would also likely combine with 10ng­
2 tenn sea-level rise to exacerbate damaging impacts. When coastal erosion occurs, this increases
3 the threats to coastal development, transportation infrastructure, tourism, freshwater aquifers, and
4 fisheries (many of which are already stressed by hwnan activities). Coastal cities and towns,
5 especially those in stonn-prone regions such as the southeastern US, are particularly vulnerable
6 and intensive residential and commercial development in such regions puts life and property at
7 risk. Figure 6.7 indicates the current vulnerability of US coastlines as compiled by the US
8 Geological Survey.
9
10 In addition to threats to coastal communities, threats to the natural coastal environment could be
11 quite important. Of these environments, estuaries are extremely productive ecosystems. These
12 ecosystems are likely to be affected in numerous ways by climate change; for example, winter
13 temperatures are projected to continue to increase more than summer temperatures, resulting in a
14 narrowing of the annual water temperature range of many estuaries. This is likely, in tum, to
15 cause species' ranges to shift and to increase the vulnerability of some estuaries to invasive
16 species. Changes in runoff are also very likely to adversely affect estuaries. Increased rates of
17 runoff are likely to deliver increased amounts of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorous to
18 estuaries, while simultaneously increasing the stratification between freshw!ter runoff and
19 marine waters. Increased nutrient input and increased stratification .a,pe1~~ct;rto increase the
20 potential for blooms of algae that deplete the water of oxygen, and increase stresses on sea
21 grasses, fish, shellfish, and other organisms living in lakes, streams, and oceans. Decreased
22 runoff~ likely reduce flushing, decrease the size of estuarine nursery zones, and increase the
23 range ~:~:tuary habitat susceptible to predators and pathogens of shell-fish.
24 "'.......J
25 Coastal wetlands (marshes and mangroves) are also highly productive ecosystems, particularly
26 because they are strongly linked to the productivity of fisheries. Estuaries provide important
27 nursery and habitat functions for many commercially important fish and shellfish populations.
28 Dramatic losses of coastal wetlands have already occurred along the Gulf Coast due to
29 subsidence, alterations in flow and sediment load caused by dams and levees, dredge and fill
30 activities, and sea-level rise. Louisiana alone has been losing land at rates of24 to 40 square
31 miles pe~ year for the last 40 years, accounting for as much as 80% of the total US coastal
32 wetland loss. In general, coastal wetlands will survive ifsoil buildup equals the rate of relative
33 sea-level rise or ifthe wetland is able to migrate inland. However, if soil accumulation does not
34 keep pace with sea-level rise, or if wetland migration is blocked by bluffs, coastal development,
35 or shoreline protective structures (such as dikes, sea walls, and jetties), wetlands may be .
36 excessively inundated and thus lost. The projected increase in the current rate of sea-level rise
37 will very likely exacerbate coastal wetland losses nationwide, although the extent of impacts will
38 vary among regions.
39
40 Coral reels playa major role in the environment and economies ottwo states (Florida and
41 Hawaii) as weil as most US territories in the Caribbean and Pacific. Coral reefs are valuable
42 economic resources for fisheries, recreation, tourism, and coastal protection. In addition, reefs are
43. one of the largest global storehouses of marine biodiversity, with untapped genetic resources.
44 Some estimates of the global cost oflosing coral reefs run in the hundreds of billions of dollars
45 each year. The demise or continued deterioration of reefs could have profound implications for

14
 Draft for Review-october 22, 2001--Comments to M.MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I thc US. The last few years have seen unprecedented declines in the health of coral reefs. The
2 1998 El Nino was associated with record sea-surface temperatures and associated coral bleaching
3 (when coral expel the algae that live within them and that are necessary to their survival); in
4 some regions, as much as 70% of the coral may have died in a single season. There has also been

t
5 an upsurge in the variety, incidence, and virulence of coral diseases in recent years, with major
6 die-offs in Florida and much of the Caribbean region. In addition, increasing atmospheric CO 2
7 concentration e expecte decrease the calcification rates of the reef-building corals,
8 resulting in weaker etons, reduced growth rates and increased vulnerability to erosion. Model
9 results s~ggest that th se effects would likely be most severe at the current margins of coral reef
10 distribution, meanin that it is unlikely coral reefs will be able to migrate northward to reach
II cooler waters. lI-I-.tJ. ~~
12
13 The total economic contribution of recreational and commercial fishing in the US has been
14 estimated at approximately $40 billion per year, with total marine landings averaging about 4.5
15 million metric tons over the last decade. Climate change is very likely to substantially alter the
16 distribution and abundance of major fish stocks, many of which are a shared international
17 resource.' Along the Pacific Coast, impacts to fisheries related to the El Nifio/Southern
18 Oscillation illustrate how climate directly affects marine fisheries on short time scales. For
19 example, elevated sea-surface tempcratures associated with the 1997-98 El Nino had a
20 tremendous impact on the distribution and abundance of market squid. Although California's
21 largest fishery by volume, landings fell to less than 1,000 metric tons in the 1997-98 season,
22 down from a record-breaking 110,000 tons in the 1996-97 season. Many other unusual events
23 occurred during this same El Nino as a result of elevated sea-surface temperatures. Examples
24 include widespread sea lion pup deaths in California, catches ofwann-water marlin in the
25 usually frigid waters off Washington State, and poor sa!!pj>n returns in Bristol Bay, Alaska. The
26 changes in fish stocks resulting from climate change ~arso likely~ have important
27 implications for marine populations and ecosystems. Changes over the long term that will affect
28 all nations are likely to include poleward shifts in distribution of marine populations, and
29 changes in the timing, locations, and, perhaps, the viability of migration paths and nesting and
30 feeding areas for marine mammals and other species.
31
32 With changing ocean temperatures and conditions, shifts in the distribution of commercially
33 important speCies are likely, affecting US and international fisheries. For example, model .
34 projections suggest that several species of Pacific salmon are likely to have reduced distribution
35 and productivity, while species that thrive in wanner waters, such as Pacific sardine and Atlantic
36 menhaden, are likely to have increased distribution. Presuming that the rate ofclimate change is
37 gradual, the many efforts being made to better manage the world's fisheries should provide the
38 framework for steps needed to adapt to climate change along with the many other pressures on
39 these resources.
40
41 Because climate variability is currently a dominant factor in shaping coastal and marine systems,
42 projecting the specific effects of climate change over the next few decades and evaluating the
43. potential effectiveness of possible response options is particularly challenging. Effects will surely
44 vary greatly among the diverse coastal regions of the nation. Human-induced disturbances also
45 influence coastal and marine systems, often reducing the ability of systems to adapt, so that

15

cEQ UUT583
 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001--Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 systems that might ordinarily be capable of responding to variability and change are less able to
2 do so. In this context, climate change is likely to add to the cumulative impact of both natural
3 and human-caused stresses on ecological systems and resources. As a result, considering
4 adaptation strategies for the potential consequences of long-term climate change in the overall
5 context of coastal development and management is only beginning to be considered.
6 to~t..:k~
7 It is, however, especially urkent for governing bodies 1 levels to begin to take into
8 consideration the projecte4hanges in the coastal climate an ea level as further plans are made
9 for development of land in the coastal zone. In areas where bea es or wetlands must migrate
10 inland to survive, it has been shown that implementing protection or retreat strategies for coastal
II developments can substantially reduce the prospective economic i pacts of inundation and
12 sl~oreline movement. For example, coastal management programs n Maine, Rhode Island, South
13 Carolina, and Massachusetts have implemented various forms of' rolling easement" policies to
14 ensure that wetlands and beaches can migrate inland as sea level ses, and that coastal
15 landowners and conservation agencies can purchase the required asements. Other states have
16 modified regulations on, for example, beach preservation, I ation, and inward
17 migration of wetlands and beaches. Wider consideration 0 otential onsequences is especially
18 important, however, because some regulatory programs continue to pennit structures that may
19 block the inland shift of wetlands and beaches and in some locations shoreline movement is
20 precluded due to the high degree of coastal development.
21
22 In support of more detailed planning across the country, the EPA, for example, is developing
23 data bascs of the .probability distribution for various levels of sea level rise around the country,
24 and maps of areas where land will and will not be protected for various levels of rise in about ten
25 states. [Need sentence or two on NOAA coastal programs.] FEMA is also working with many
26 coastal citiesto encourage steps to reduce their vulnerability to storms and floods [be nice to
27 have details]. University and state programs are also underway across the country, which is
28 particularly important in that most coastal planning in the US is the responsibility of state and
29 local governments, with the federal government interacting with these efforts through the
30 development of coastal zone management plans.
31
32 D. Climate Change Interactions with Water Resources
33
34 Water is a central resource supporting human activities and ecosystems, and adaptive
35 management of this resource has been an essential aspect of societal development. Local to
36 global aspects of the hydrologic cycle, which determines the availability of water resources, is
37 likely to be altered in important ways by climate change. Because increased concentrations of
38 CO2 and, other greenhouse gases tend to warm the surface, aU models project that the global
39 totals of both evaporation and precipitation will cviltinue to increase, with increases particularly
40 likely in middle and high latitudes. The regional patterns of the projected changes in precipitation
41 remain uncertain, although there are some indications that changes in atmospheric circulation
42 brought on by such factors as increasing Pacific Ocean temperatures may bring more
43. precipitation to the US Southwest and more winter precipitation to the western US. Continuing
44 trends evident during the 20th century, the model simulations project that increases in

16

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CEQ oo7M~

 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
1 precipitation are likely to be most evident in the heaviest rainfall categories typical of various
2 regions, suggesting an increased potential for flooding in some areas.

mt:~;~hangeS
3
4 The in the amount, timing, and distribution of rain and snowfall are likely to
~
lead to changes in the amount and timing of high and low water flows. These changes in runoff ~J.
6 wH'1 affect water quality and the avail~bility of water resources for irrigation, hydropower,
7 communities, industry, and to sustain natural habitats. Snowpack provides a natural reservoir for
8 water storage in mountainous regions and northern portions of the US, gradually releasing its
9 water in'spring and summer. Model simulations project that snowpack in western mountain
10 regions is likely to decrease as the climate warms (see Figure 6.8), despite increasing overall
II precipitation, because (a) a larger fraction of precipitation will fall as rain as compared to snow,
12 and, (b), the snowpack is likely to develop later and melt earlier.
13
14 Potential impacts of these changes include increased competition for water supplies, stresses on
15 water quality in areas where flows are diminished, adverse impacts on groundwater quantity and
16 quality, an increased possibility of flooding in winter and early spring, a reduced possibility of
17 flooding later in the spring, and more water shortages in summer. In addition, although the rising
18 CO 2 concentration is expected to improve the water use efficiency of plants, and so decrease
19 demands for irrigation water, this will be helpful mainly where the water demands of natural and
20 managed vegetation systems do not increase. Because the warmer temperatures will also lead to
21 increased evaporation, soil moisture is likely to 'be reduced during the warm season, creating a
22 greater susceptibility to fire and loss of the vegetation that helps to control erosion and sediment
23 flows. However, moving to no till agriculture may, in some regions, improve the water holding
24 capacity of soils and reduce susceptibility of agricultural lands to erosion from intensified heavy
25 rains.
26
27 In considering adaptation mechanisms, it is important to point out that humans have exhibited a
28 significant ability to adapt to different amounts of water, whereas experience with natural
29 ecosystems indicates that they are more vulnerable. For example, the present natural ecosystems
30 ofthe US Arctic, Great Lakes, Great Basin, Southeast, and the Great Plains appear to be
31 particularly vulnerable to projected changes in climate. Model projections indicate that it is likely
32 that changes in temperature and moisture availability ~d to significant changes in
33 vulnerabJe ecosystems over time (see Figures 6.6 and 6.1 0). v-....l.~
34
35 Although changes in climate will be occurring, there are many types of water basins across the
36 US, and many approaches are already in use to ensure careful management of water resources.
37 For example, more than 80,000 dams and reservoirs in the US, and millions of miles of canals,
38 pipes, and tunnels have been developed to store and transport water. This infrastructure can also
39 be used in many cases to manage river systems in ways that provide opportunities to dampen the
40 effects of climate-induced changes in flow regimes, although such measures can lead to
41 environmental impacts in some situations. While significant adaptation is likely to be possible,
42 adapting'to existing stresses such as aging infrastructure and inadequate water supplies for
43 growing areas is requiring significant investment even in the absence of climate change.
44

17

4
CEQ 66}685
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200t-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I Strategies for adapting to climate change and other stresses range from changes in the operations

2 of dams and reservoirs, to re-evaluating basic engineering assumptions used in facility

3 construction, to building new infrastructure, although for a variety of reasons, large dams are no

4 longer generally viewed as a cost~effective or environmentally acceptable solution to water

5 supply problems. Options also include water conservation, water pricing, use ofreclaimed

6 wastewater, water transfers, and development of markets for water, which can lead to increased

7 prices that discourage wasteful practices. Because some unanticipated impacts may occur, more

8 flexible institutional arrangements may be needed in order to allow easier adaptation to changing

9 conditions resulting from the full set of stresses. For example, although social, equity, and

10 environmental considerations must be addressed, market solutions appear to have great potential

II for resolving supply problems in some parts oflhe US. However, because water rights systems

12 vary from state to state and even locally" the responses will need to occur at various levels, with

13 those currently having water management responsibilities taking the lead (see Table 6.3 for types

14 of approaches that might rove useful).

15
16
17
18
In considering our s adaptation measures, the US will also need to work cooperatively with
Canada and Mexico with whom we share water resources. If the levels of the Great Lakes drop,
as is projected in climate model simulations, close coordination with Canada will be needed
J~
~

19 to ensure that the levels of these vital water resources are managed to ensure adequate water
20 supplies for bordering communities, safe water quality, continuing transportation routes,
21 extensive recreation opportunities, needed hydroelectric power, and more. The joint US-Canada
22 Great Lakes Commission provides the framework for addressing issues that arise. Similarly, the
23 US shares water resources with Mexico along our southern border. Joint commissions and
24 agreements concerning the Colorado and Rio Grand rivers again provide the framework for
25 adapting to climate change.
26
27 (USGS, COE, etc.: A few detailed examples of programs to reduce vulnerability to water
28 sbortages and floods and to adapt to cbange generally would be helpful.]
29
30
31 E. Climate Cbange Interactions with Human Health
32
33 Although the overall susceptibility of Americans to environmental health concerns has been
34 dropping, certain health outcomes are stillrecognized to be associated with the prevailing
35 environmental conditions. These adverse outcomes include illnesses and deaths associated with
36 temperature extremes; storms and extreme precipitation events; air pollution; water
37 contamination; and diseases carried by mosquitoes, ticks, and rodents. As a result, it is possible
38 that projected climate change will have measurable impacts, both beneficial and adverse, on
39 health. However, projections of the extent and direciivn of potential impacts of climate
40 variability and change on health are extremely difficult to make because of the many
41 confounding and poorly understood factors associated with potential health outcomes, population
42 vulnerability, international movement of disease vectors, and adaptation. In addition,
43 uncertainties remain about how the climate will change and how associated environmental
44 conditions may change. Forexarnple, not enough is yet known about processes determining
45 ozone levels and particulate matter concentration and composition to project how levels ofthese

18

"

CEQ 007686
 Draft for Review-October 22,200l-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I air pollutants might change in the future. Basic information on the sensitivity of human health to
2 aspects ofweather and climate is also limited, and it is difficult to anticipate what adaptive
3 measures (e.g., vaccines, improved use ofweather forecasting to reduce exposure to severe
4 conditions) might be possible and be taken in the future to reduce the risks of adverse health
5 outcomes.
6
7 While a wide range of health-climate interactions are possible, projections oflikely health
8 outcomes remain highly uncertain (see National Health Assessment Group, 2000, 2001; NRC,
9 2001). A variety of negative health impacts have been the focus of much of the public health
10 research on climate change, including illnesses and deaths related to extreme temperatures and
II other extreme weather events such as stonns, health effects from possible increases in air
12 pollution, water- and food-borne diseases, and diseases from insects, ticks, and rodents, the
13 prevalence of which may vary with climatic conditions. Even in the absence of improving
14 medical care and treatment, some positive health outcomes, notably reduced cold-weather
15 mortality, are also possible, although the balance between increased risk of heat-related illnesses
16 and death and changes in winter illnesses and death. cannot yet be confidently assessed.
17
18 At present, as a result of our health care system and community design, among other factors,
19 much of the US population is unlikely to suffer adverse health outcomes associated with weather
20 and/or climate, although certain demographic and geographic populations are at greater risk.
21 Adaptation offers the potential to reduce the vulnerability of the US population to adverse health
22 outcomes, including possible outcomes of projected climate change, primarily by ensuring strong
23 public health systems, improving their responsiveness to changing weather and climate
24 conditions, and expanding attention given to vulnerable subpopulations. While the costs,
25 benefits, and availability of resources for such adaptation must be found, and further research
26 into key knowledge gaps on the relationships between climate/weather and health is needed, to
27 the extent that the US population can keep from putting itself at greater risk by where it lives and
28 what it does, the potential impacts of climate change on human health can largely be addressed
29 through agaptation. These steps can also be part of US efforts to address current vulnerabilities.
30
31 Episodes of extreme heat cause more deaths than any other category of deaths directly
32· attributable to extreme weather in the US (Changnon et ai, 1996). In one of the most severe
33 examples of such an event, the number of deaths increased 85% during a five-day heat wave in
34 1995 in which maximum temperatures in Chicago, Illinois ranged from 93 to 104°F and
35 minimum temperatures were nearly as high. At least 700 excess deaths (deaths in that population
36 beyond those expected for that period of time) were recorded, most of which were directly
37 attributable to heat. Studies in certain urban areas show a strong association between increases in
38 mortality and increases in heat, measured by maximum or minimum daily temperature and by
39 heat index (a measure of temperature and humidity).
40
41 Heat stroke and other health effects associated with exposure to extreme and prolonged heat
42 appear to be related to environmental temperatures above those to whieh the population is
43 accustomed. Thus, the regions expected to be most sensitive to projected increases in severity
44 and frequency of heatwaves are likely to be those in which extremely high temperatures occur .
45 only irregularly. Within heat-sensitive regions, experience indicates that populations in urban

19

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -.. 'CEQ 007687

 Draft for Review-October 22, 200t-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
1 areas are most vulnerable to adverse heat-related health outcomes. It is just these urban core areas
2 where daily average heat indices and heat-related mortality rates are higher than in surrounding
3 areas, and this is likely because urban areas remain wanner throughout the night compared to
4 outlying suburban and rural arcas. The absence of nighttime relief from heat for urban residents
5 has been identified as a factor in excessive heat-related deaths. The elderly, young children, the
6 poor, and people who are bedridden, on certain medications, or who have certain underlying
7 medical conditions are at particular risk.
8 ~~ ,...,', c..Jr ~'r" vlcw.l.J.l...
9 ;fhe frequency and severity of heat waves ere-very likely to increase along with the increase in
10 average temperatures. Plausible climate scenarios show significant increases in average summer
11 temperatures, leading to new record highs. Tbe size of US cities and the proportion ofUS
12 residents living in them are also projected to increase through the 21 51 century, so it is possible
13 that the population at risk from heat events will increase. While the potential risk may increase,
14 heat~related illnesses and deaths are largely preventable through behavioral adaptations,
15 including use of air conditioning, increased fluid i,ntake, and community warning and support
16 systems. The degree to which these adaptations can be even more broadly made available and
17 adopted t~an in the 20 th century, especially for sensitive populations, will determine if the long­
18 term trend toward fewer deaths from extreme heat can be maintained.
19
20 Death rates not only vary with sununertime temperature, but also show a seasonal dependence,
21 with more deaths in winter than in summer. This relationship suggests that the relatively large
22 increases in average winter temperature could reduce deaths in winter months. However, the
23 relationship between winter weather and mortality is not as clear as for summertime extremes.
24 While there should be fewer deaths from shoveling snow and slipping on ice, many winter deaths
25 are due to respiratory infections such as influenza, and it is unclear how influenza transmission
26 would be affected by higher winter temperatures. As a result, the net effect on winter mortality
27 from milder winters remains uncertain.
28
29 Injury and death also result from natural disasters such as floods and hurricanes, both from direct
30 bodily harm and from secondary influences such as those mediated by changes in ecological
31 systems (such as bacterial and fungal proliferation) and in public health infrastructUres (such as
32 reduced availability of safe drinking water).
33
34 Projections of climate change for the 21'1 century suggest a continuation of the 20 th century trend
35 toward increasing intensity of heavy and extreme precipitation events, including precipitation
36 during hurricanes. Such events, in addition to the potential consequences listed above, pose an
37 increased risk of floods and associated health impacts. However, much can be done to prepare for
38 extreme storms and precipitation events, both through community design and through warning
39 systems. As a result of such efforts, although the tivlrar amount of danlage has been increasing in
40 recent decades, the loss of life and the relative amounts of damage have been decreasing or
41 staying the same. For the future, therefore, the net health impacts of extreme weather events such
42 as floods alld storms hinge on continuing efforts to reduce societal vulnerabilities, for example
43 through FEMA's safe communities program and improved warming systems, and on the
44 recovery capacities of the natural environment and the local population, which are also being
45 dealt with through disaster assistance programs.

20

CEQ 007688
 Draft for Review-october 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I
2 Current exposures to air pollution exceed health~based standards in many parts of the country.

3 Health assessments indicate that ground-level ozone can exacerbate respiratory diseases and

4 cause short-tenn reductions in lung function. Such studies also indicate that exposure to

5 part' .;ulate matter can aggravate existing respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, alter the body's

6 defense systems against foreign materials, damage lung tissue, lead to premature death, and

7 possibly contribute to cancer. Health effects of exposure to carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and

8 nitrogen dioxide have also been related to reduced work capacity, aggravation of existing

9 cardiovascular diseases, effects on breathing, respiratory illnesses, lung irritation, and alterations

lOin the lung's defense systems.

11 ~
12 Projected changes in climate change~ likely tc.affect air quality in several ways, some of
13 which are likely to be dealt with by ongoing changes in technology and some of which can be
14 dealt with, if necessary, through changes in regulations. For example, changes in the weather that
15 affect regional pollution emissions and concentrations can be dealt with by controlling sources of
16 emissions. However, adaptation will be needed to changes in natural sources of air pollutant
17 emissions that result from changes in weather. Analyses show that higher surface air
18 temperatures tend to increase the fonnation of ground-level ozone, other conditions being the
19 same. This creates a risk of higher concentrations of ground-level ozone in the future, especially
20 because higher temperatures are frequently accompanied by stagnating circulation patterns.
21 However, without knowledge of future emissions in specific places, the success of air pollution
22 control policies and health wanning systems, and local and regional meteorological scenarios,
23 more specific projections of exposure to air pollutants and health effects cannot be made with
24 confidence.
25
26 In addition to affecting exposure to air pollutants, there is some chance that climate change will
27 playa role in exposure to airborne allergens. For example, it is possible that climate change will
28 alter pollen production in some plants and change the geographic distribution of plant species.
29 Consequently, there is some chance that climate change will affect the timing or duration of
30 seasonal allergies. The impact of pollen and of pollen changes on thc occurrence and severity of
31 asthma, the most common chronic disease of childhood, is currently very uncertain.
32
33 Exposure to water-borne disease can result from drinking contaminated water, eating seafood
34 from contaminated water, eating fresh produce irrigated or processed with contaminated water,
35 and from activities such as fishing or swimming in contaminated water. Water-borne pathogens
36 of current concern include viruses, bacteria (such as Vibrio VUlllificus, a naturally-occurring
37 estuarine bacterium responsible for a high percentage of the deaths associated with shellfish
38 consumption), and protozoa (such as Cryptosporidium, associated with gastrointestinal illnesses).
39 Changes in precipitation, temperature, hun1idity, salinity, and wind have a measurable effect on
40 water quality, so future changes in climate have the potential for affecting exposure to water­
41 borne pathogens. In 1993, for example, Cryptosporidillm contan1inated the Milwaukee,
42 Wisconsin, drinking water supply, and as a result 400,000 people became ill. Of the 54
43 individuals who died, most had compromised immune systems because ofHIY infection or other
44 illness. A contributing factor ill the contamination, in addition to treatment system malfunctions,
45 was heavy rainfall and runoff that resulted in a decline in the quality ofraw surface water

21

CEQ 007689
 Draft for Review-october 22, 20ot-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 arriving at the Milwaukee drinking water plants. As another example, in Florida during the
2 strong EI Nino winter of 1997-1998, heavy precipitation and runoff greatly elevated the counts of
3 fecal bacteria and infectious viruses in local coastal waters, and in Gulf Coast waters, Vibrio
4 vlilnificus bacteria are especially sensitive to water temperature, which dictates their seasonality
5 and geographic distribution. In addition, toxic red tides proliferate as sea-water temperatures
6 increase. Reports of marine-related illnesses have risen over the past two and a half decades
7 along the East Coast, in correlation with EI Nino events. Climate changes projected to occur in
8 the next several decades, in particular the likely increase in extreme precipitation events,
9 therefore, raise the risk of contamination events.
10
11 Malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever, and other diseases transmitted between humans by blood­
12 feeding insects, ticks, and mites were once common in the US. The incidence of many of these
13 diseases has been significantly reduced in the US, mainly because of changes in land use,
14 agricultural methods, residential patterns, human behavior, and vector control (e.g., see Figure
15 6.9). However, diseases that may be transmitted to humans from wild animals continue to
16 circulate in nature in many parts of the country. Humans may become infected with the
17 pathogens that cause these diseases through transmission by insects or ticks (such as Lyme
18 disease, which is tick-borne) or by direct contact with the host animals or their body fluids (such
19 as hantaviruses, which are carried by numerous rodent species and transmitted to hwnans
20 through contact with rodent urine, droppings, and saliva). The organisms that directly transmit
21 these diseases are known as vectors. The ecology and transmission dynamics of these vector­
22 borne infections are complex, and the factors that influence transmission are unique for each
23 pathogen. Most vector-borne diseases exhibit a distinct seasonal pattern, which clearly suggests
24 that they are weather sensitive. Rainfall, temperature, and other weather variables affect both
25 vectors and the pathogens they transmit in many ways. For example, epidemics of malaria are
26 associated with rainy periods in some parts of the world, but with drought in others. Higher
27 temperatures may increase or reduce vector survival rate, depending on each specific vector, its
28 behavior, 'ecology, and many other factors. In some cases, specific weather patterns over several
29 seasons appear to be associated with increased transmission rates. For example, in the
30 midwestern US, outbreaks ofSt. Louis encephalitis (a viral infection of birds that can also infect
31 and cause disease in humans) appear to be associated with the sequence ofwann, wet winters,
32 cold springs, and hot dry summers. Although many possibilities exist, both the US National
33 Assessment (National Health Assessment Group, 2000, 2001) and a special report done by the
34 National Research Council (NRC, 2001) agree that significant health consequences as a result of
35 climate change are unlikely as a result of US health and community standards and systems,
36 although it is not likely that the continued occurrence oflocal, isolated incidences of such
37 diseases can be eliminated, especially because such diseases can be brought into the US from
38 outside the country in the normal course of travel and \r;.....~c.
39
40 We also recognize that, although the US has been able to reduce the incidence of such
41 climatically related diseases as dengue and malaria, those residing in the US cannot be isolated
42 from diseases occurring elsewherein the world. Of significant importance, the potential for
43 disease vectors to spread into the US via travel and trade is likely to increase just as the natural,
44 cold-winter conditions that have contributed to protecting us in the past are moderating. Not only
45 will climate change affect the situations of places to which our citizens and others travel, but

22

CEQ 007690
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I deteriorating health conditions in any part of the world could lead to both increased disease
2 pressures within the US as travelers come to the US and expose residents to diseases present in
3 other nations in the course of travel for business and pleasure. Because of these international
4 connections, it is in the US interest for there to be improved health for all of the world's peoples,
5 and our efforts to develop vaccines and treatments for various diseases are thus a critical adaptive
6 step that will benefit both Americans and me peoples of the world.
7
8 As indicated by review of these many types of health situations, the future vulnerability of the
9 US population to the health impacts of cliinate change will largely depend on our capacity to
10 adapt to potential adverse changes through legislative, administrative, institutional,
11 technological, educational, and research-related measures. Examples include building codes and
12 zoning to prevent stonn or flood damage, severe weather warning systems to aIJow evacuation,
13 improved disease surveillance and prevention programs, improved sanitation systems, education
14 of health professionals and the public, and research addressing key knowledge gaps in
15 climatelhealth relationships.
16
17 Many of these adaptive responses are desirable from a public health perspective irrespective of
18 climate change. For example, reducing air pollution obviously has both short- and long-term
19 health benefits. Improving warning systems for extreme weather events and eliminating existing
20 combined sewer and storm water drainage systems are other measures that can ameliorate some
21 of the potential adverse impacts of current climate extremes and oCthe possible impacts of
22 climate change. Improved disease surveillance, prevention systems, and other public health
23 infrastructure at the state and local levels are already needed. Because of this, we expect
24 awareness of the potential health consequences of climate change to allow adaptation to go on in
25 the normal course of social and economic development.
26
27 F. Climate Change Impacts in Various Regions of the United States
28
29 While some appreciation can be gained about potential consequences of climate change for the
30 US by looking at sectors such as the five considered above, the US is a very large and diverse
31 nation. There are both important commonalities and important differences in the climate-related
32 issues and potential economic and envirorunental consequences faced by different regions across
33 the country. Therefore, there are many different manifestations of a changing climate in terms of
34 vulnerability, impacts, and the potential for adaptation. As examples, all coastal regions are at
35 risk, but the magnitude of the vulnerabilities and the types of adaptation necessary will depend
36 on particular coastal conditions and development, and water is a key issue in virtually all regions,
37 but the specific changes and impacts in the West, in the Great Lakes, and in the Southeast will
38 differ.
39
40 To gain an appreciation of the regional texture of potential consequences and how best to
41 respond to the changing climate the US will face in the coming decades and beyond, twenty
42 regional workshops that brought together researchers, stakeholders, and community, state, and
43 national leaders were used to help identify key issues facing each region and to begin the
44 identification of potential adaptation strategies. These workshops were followed by the initiation
45 of sixteen regionally based assessment studies, some of which are already completed and others

23

- CEQ 007691

 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MllcCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote

1 of which are nearing completion. The results reported below provide highlights of what has been

2 learned about the regional mosaic of consequences that are possible due to climate change and

3 variability. A much more comprehensive presentation of the results is included in the National _\~

4 Assessment reports (see http://www.usgcrp.gov). ~ ~r~

6
T
To provide an indication ofth
presents key issues
~ of the findings across the US, Table 6.4 [Alternate IJ '"Y/

selected for study. Among the most important findings [Table 'z, "\.~eJ'

8 6.4 (Alternate 2) presents regional findings in an alternative tabular fonnat]: --=T ~'f';
9

10 • Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest: Rising temperatures are very likely to incr se the heat ~

11 index dramatically iIi summer, with impacts to health and comfort. Warmer mters are likel ;<-~\'.~

"'~ j~

12
13
14
•
to reduce cold-related stresses.
Appalachians: Wanner and moister air will very likely lead to more int se rainfall events in
mountainous areas, increasing the potential for flash floods.
~
~

15 • Great,Lakes: Lake levels are likely to decline due to increased eva ration, leading to

16 reduced water supply and more costly transportation. Shoreline age due to high water ~

17 levels is likely to decrease. ~

18 • Southeast: Under warmer-wetter scenarios, the range of so em tree species is likely to S.LI I

19 expand. Under hotter-drier scenarios, it is likely that sout astern forests in many areas will .,,,

20 eventually be displaced by grasslands and savannas, wi the transformation likely ~

21 accelerated by increased occurrence of large fires. (f. _.

22 • Southeast Atlantic Coast, Puerto Rico, and the Vir 'n Islands: It is very probable that rising ~ ;
23 sea levels and higher stonn surges will cause los fmany coastal ecosystems that now '
provide an important buffer for coastal develo eot against storm impacts. Presently and

·~~~;:r: ::~n::::::~::ike~~ti::~:ed:::::::s::::::::::n:::o/o~@
24
25
26
27
28 temperatures on forests and agricultur for several decades, increasing productivity and Lt
I .

29 thereby reducing commodity prices r the public. c;r ,

30 • Great Plains: Prairie potholes, who provide important habitat for ducks and other migratory
31 waterfowl, are likely to become lUch drier in a warmer climate.

32 • Southwest: With an increase i precipitation, the desert ecosystems native to this region are

33 likely to be replaced in man areas by grasslands and shrublands, increasing both fire and

34 agricultural potential (fi e 6.10).

35 • Northern and Mountain egions: It is very probable that wann weather recreational

36 opportunities such as . ing will expand while cold weather activities like skiing contract.

37 • Mountain West: Hig er winter temperatures are very likely to reduce snowpack. This will

38 cause peak runoff t be lower and shin the peak" to earlier in the spring while reducing

39 summer runoff complicating water management for flood control, fish runs, cities, and

40 irrigation.

41 • Northwest: I reasing river and stream temperatures are very likely to further stress

42 migrating h, complicating restoration efforts.

24

"

cEQ 007692
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200t-Comments to M. MacCrackeo
Do Not Cite or Quote
I • Alaska: Sharp winter and springtime temperature increases are very likely to cause continued
2 meltback of sea ice and thawing of pennafrost, further disrupting ecosystems, infrastructure,
3 and communities.
4 • Haw~ii and Pacific Trust Territories: More intense El Nino and La Nina events are possible
5 and are likely to create extreme fluctuations in water resources for island citizens and the
6 tourists who sustain local economies.
7
8 In summarizing potential consequences for the US, it is important to recognize that the US
9 Government represents not only the 50 states but also has trust responsibility for a number of
10 Caribbean and Pacific islands and for the homelands of Native Americans. In particular, the US
II has responsibilities of various types for Puerto Rico, the American Virgin Islands, American
12 Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and for more than 565 tribal
13 and Alaska Native governments that are recognized as "domestic dependent nations." For the
14 island areas, the potential consequences are likely to be quite similar to those likely to be
15 experienced by nearby US states.
16
17 With regard to Native Americans, the relationships between these tribes and the federal
18 government are detennined by treaties, executive orders, tribal legislation, acts of Congress, and
19 decisions of the federal courts. These agreements cover a range of issues that will be important in
20 facing the potential consequences of climate change, including, for example, use and
21 maintenance of land and water resources. Although the diversity of land areas and tribal
22 perspectives and situations makes generalizations difficult, a number of key issues have been
23 identified for closer study concerning how climate variability and change will affect Native
24 peoples and their communities. These issues include: tourism and community development;
25 human health and extreme events; rights to and availability of water and other natural resources;
26 subsistence economies and cultural resources; cultural sites, wildlife, and natural resources.
27 Closer examination of the potential consequences for tribes in the southwestern US is the topic of
28 one of the regional assessments now underway.
29
30 IV. Federal Interagency Coordination and Related Activities
31
32 Global climate change and, even more generally, global environmental change and sustainability,
33 are topics that have ties to many agencies across the US Government. To ensure coordination
34 across the very diverse set of agencies, the US Congress passed the Global Change Research Act
35 of 1990 (public Law 101-606). This law provides that global change activities, including both
36 research and assessment, should be coordinated in an interagency manner under the guidance of
37 the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). To implement coordination of natural
38 resource and environmental issues, the interagency Committee on Environment and·Natural
39 Resources (CENR) was established under the auspices of the National Science and Technology
40 Council, which is made up of department and agency heads and is chaired by the President.
41 Under CENR, five subcommittees have been established. These subcommittees focus on air
42 quality, ecological systems, global change, natural disaster reduction, and toxics and risk.
43 Because these areas are interrelated, coordination is provided for by interlocking participation
44 and activities.

25

.IS
CEQ 007693
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1
2 The rese'arch activities organized by the Subcommittee on Global Change Research are described
3 in Chapter 8. A number ofthe activities ofthe other subcommittees are also related to the issues
4 of vulnerability and adaptation to global climate change, including:
5
6 • l.atural Disaster Redllction: This subcommittee promotes interagency efforts to assemble
7 and analyze data and information about the occurrence and vulnerability ofthe US to a wide
8 range of weather- and climate-related events. Through its participating agencies, the
9 subcommittee is also promoting efforts by communities, universities, and others to increase
10 their preparation for, and resilience to, natural disasters. In that climate change may alter the
11 intensity, frequencY,duration and location ofsuch disasters, enhancing resilience and
12 flexibility will assist in coping with climate change.
13 • Air Quality: This subcommittee promotes interagency efforts to document and investigate the
14 factors contributing to sub-continental to inter-continental air quality issues, focusing
15 particularly on tropospheric ozone and particulate matter, both of which contribute to climate
16 change as well as are affected by it.
17 • Ecological Systems: This subcommittee promotes interagency efforts to assemble
18 information about ecological systems and services and their coupling to society and
19 environmental change. This subcommittee is sponsoring assessments to document the current
20 state ofour ecosystems, providing a baseline for the National Assessment studies concerning
21 how ecosystems are likely to change over the long-tenn.
22
23 In addition to the organized interagency activities, various of the USGCRP agencies have very
24 active programs relating to assessment of consequences and consideration of responses and
25 means for coping and adapting. For example: [Note: these bullets are placeholder comments­
26 brief summary inpu.t is needed directly from agencies):
27
28 • Department of Agriculture: The US Forest Service gathers information on and manages
29 substantial forest areas across the country, carrying 011t forest assessments that consider
30 issues ranging from forest productivity to biodiversity and recreation potential.
31 • Department of Commerce: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
32 supports research, assessment, and management activities relating to the coastal regions and
33 river watersheds. (fisheries, coastal zone management, etc.)
34 • Department of Health and Human Services: _
35 • Department ofInterior: The US Geological Survey gathers and evaluates information about
36 water, land, and biological resources across the United States. Working with water resource
37 organizations, for example, it conducts studies to assist in the effective and sustainable use of
38 water. The Bureau of Land Management __. The i'!~~lOnal Park Service _ _
39 • Department of Transportation: The DOT has recognized that many of the nation's
40 transportation facilities and networks, which are now generally exposed to weather extremes,
41 are also likely to be exposed to such influences as rising sea level and increased streamflow.
42 An ?ssessment of the potential significance of changes for the US transportation system and
43 of guidelines for improving resilience is envisioned.

26

H
CEQ 007694
 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1 • Environmental Protection Agency: The EPA is responsible for many aspects of
2 environmental protection, including air and water quality, ecosystem protection, and human
3 health. Increased attention to assessments of the potential influence of climate change on
4 these areas is planned.
5
6
7 V. Summary
8
9 The initial sets of impacts that have be n identified across America suggest that it is vital that
10 people everywhere start to learn about limate impacts and consider these impacts in their short-
II and long-tenn decisions about infrastructure, land use, and other planning. To accomplish this.
12 th~ US government sponsors a wide range of outreach and educational activities (see Chapter 9)
13 in addition to the ongoing research and assessment program designed to improve the knowledge
14 base (see Chapter 8).
15
16 Already, a number of local, state, and regional activities are underway, many of which have
17 developed from the various regional assessments that have taken place. In addition, the US has
18 been a leader in organizing the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which is organized
19 wlder the auspices of the eight-nation Arctic Council to "evaluate and synthesize knowledge on
20 climate variability. climate change, and increased ultraviolet radiation and their consequences....
21 The ACIA will examine possible future impacts on the environment and its living resources, on
22 human health, and on buildings, roads and other infrastructure (see http://www.acia.uaf.edu/ )."
23
24 [A FEW MORE EXAMPLES COULD BE ADDED HERE-INPUT FROM AGENCIES IS
25 REQUESTED] .
26

27

CEQ 007695

 Draft for Review-October 22, 200t-Comments to M. MacCracken

Do Not Cite or Quote
1 References

3 Agricultural Resources and Environmental Indicators, 2000: U.S. Department of Agriculture,

4 Economic Research Service, Resource Economics Division, Washington, DC, 2000 (see

5 http://www.ers.llsda.gov/emphaseslharmcay/issues/arei2000/ )

7 Changnon, S. S., K. E. Kunkel, and B. C. Reinke, 1996: Impacts and response to the 1995 heat

8 wave: A call to action. Bulletin o/the American Meteorological Society, 77, 1497-1506.

10 EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 1989: The Potential Effect olGlobal Climate Change
l i o n the United States, J. Smith and D. Tirpak, editors, EPA-230-05-89-050, U.S. Environmental
12 ·Protection Agency, Washington, DC.
13
14 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 1996: Climate Change 1995: Impacts,
15 Adaptations and Mitigatio1t a/Climate Change: Scientific-Teclmical A1talyses, R. T. Watson et
16 a1., editors, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 878 pp.
17
18 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 1998: The Regional Impacts a/Climate
19 Change: An Assessment 0/ Vulnerability, R. T. Watson et al., editors, Cambridge University
20 Press, Cambridge UK, 5]7 pp.
21
22 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2001a: Climate Change 2001: The
23 Scielltific Basis, J. T. Houghton et at. (editors), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 881
24 pp.
25
26 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 200tb: Climate Challge 2001: Impacts,
27 Adaptation, and Vulnerability, J. H. McCarthy et a1., editors, Cambridge University Press,
28 Cambridge UK, 1032 pp.
29
30 McCabe, G. J., and D. M. Wolock, 1999: Gencral-circulation-model simulations of future
31 snowpack in the western United States, Journal a/the American Water Resources Associatioll,
32 35, 1473-1484.
33
34 NAST (National Assessment Synthesis Team), 2000: Climate Change Impacts all the United
35 States: The Potelltia(Collsequences a/Climate Variability and Change: Overview, U.'S. Global
36 Change ~esearch Program, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 154 pp.
37
38 NAST (National Assessment Synthesis Team), 2001: Cliri:ci::: Change impacts Oil the United
39 States: The Potelltial Consequences a/Climate Variability and Change: Overview, U. S. Global
40 Change Research Program, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 612 pp.
41
42 National Agriculture Assessment Group, 2001: Agricultllre: The Potential COflsequences 0/
43 Climate Variability and Change, US Department of Agriculture for the US Global Change
44 Research Program, to be published as Reilly, J. et a!., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
45 UK, 136 pp.

28

CEQ 007696
 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MaeCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I
2 National Coastal Assessment Group, 2000: Coastal: The Potential Consequences ofClimate
3 Variability and Change, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Department of
4 Commerce for the US Global Change Research Program, Washington'DC, 163 pp.
5
6 National Forest Assessment Group, 2001: Forests: The Potential Consequences ofClimate
7 Variability and Change, US Department of Agriculture for the US Global Change Research
8 Program; Washington DC, 8 pp. (summarizes peer-reviewed articles representing chapters of the
9 national forest assessment that appeared in The Science ofthe Total Environment, November
10 2000; Ecosystems, April 2001; and BioScience, September 2001).
II
12 N~tional Health Assessment Group (patz, J. A., M. A. McGeehin, S. M. Bernard, K. L. Ebi, P. R.
13 Epstein, A. Grambsch, D. J. Gubler, P. Reiter, I. Romeiu, J. B. Rose, et al.), 2000: The health
14 impacts of climate variability and change for the United States: Executive summary of the report
15 of the health sector of the U.S. National Assessment, Environmental Health Perspectives, 108,
16 367-376.,
17
18 National Health Assessment Group, 200 1: Health: The Potential Consequences ofClimate
19 Variability and Change, Johns Hopkins University, School of Public Health and the US
20 Environmental Protection Agency for the US Global Change Research Program, Washington DC
21 (includes reprints of six peer-reviewed articles making up the chapters of the national Health
22 Assessment and that appeared in Environmental Health Perspectives, Supplement 2, 109, 175­
23 233,2001).
24
25 National Water Assessment Group, 2000: Water: The Potential Consequences ofClimate
26 Variability and Change, US Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, and Pacific Institute
27 for the US Global Change Research Program, Washington DC, 151 pp.
28
29 NRC (National Research Council), 2001a: Climate Change Science: All Analysis ofSome Key
30 Questions, Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Academy Press, Washington
31 DC, 29 pp.
32
33 NRC (National Research Council), 2001b: Under the Weather: Climate, Ecosystems, and
34 Infectious Disease, Committee on Climate, Ecosystems, Infectious Disease, and Human Health,
35 National Academy Press, Washington DC, 146 pp.
36
37 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1993: Preparingfor an Uncertain Climale­
38 Volumes I and II, aTA-O-567 and 568, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 359
39 pp. and 383 pp.
40

29

CEQ 007697·
 Draft-for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I Table 6.1: Listing 'of regional, sectoral, and national reports prepared under the auspices ofthe
2 US National Assessment process, and the date of release of the summary reports. Additional
3 materials relating to research and assessment activities are available at http://www.usgcrp,gov .
4

National Synthesis

!
Overview Report (2000)

Foundation Report (2001)

R~gional Assessment Reports Sector Assessment Reports

Alaska (1999) Agriculture (expected late 2001)
California (expected early 2002) Coastal Areas and Marine Resources
Central Great Plains (expected latc (2001)
2001) Forest (2000, 2001)
GreafLakes (2000) Human Health (2000)
Gulf Coast (expected early 2002) Water Resources (2000)
Metro 'East Coast (2001)
Mid-Atlantic (2000)
Native PeopleslNative Homelands­
Southwest (expected late 2001)
New England and northern New York
(2001)
Northern Great Plains (expected early
2002)
Pacific Islands (expected late 2001)
Pacific Northwest (1999)
Rocky Mountains/Great Basin
(expected late 2001)
Southeast (expected late 2001)
Southern Great Plains (expected early
2002)
Southwest (2001)

5
6
7
8
9

30

CEQ 007698
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I Table 6.2: Key nationa) level findings from the US National Assessment (NAST, 2000)1
2 ~
3
4 1. Increase warming: Assuming continued growth in world greenhouse gas emissions, the
5 primat}; limate models drawn upon for the analyses carried out in the US National Assessment
6 '6aJfettltmld that temperatures in the conterminous US would rise 5-9°F (3-5°C) on average
7 during the 21 5t century. It was concluded that a wider range of outcomes, including a smaller
8 warming, is also possible.
9 2. Differing regional impacts: Climate change will vary widely across the US. Temperature
10 increases will vary io~ewhat from one region to the next. Heavy and extreme precipitation
II events are ~ftffretfome more frequent, yet some regions will get drier. The potential
12 impacts of climate change will also vary widely across the nation.
13 3. 'vulnerable ecosystems: Many ecosystems are highly vulnerable to the projected rate and
14 magnitude of climate chan e A few, such as alpine meadows in the Rocky Mountains and
IS some barrier islands disappear entirely in some areas. Others, such as forests of
16 the Southeast, to experience major species shifts or break up into a mosaic of
17 grasslands, woodlands, and forests. ~ ~~ and services lost through the disappearance or
18 fragmentation of certain ecosystems """ to be costly or impossible to replace.
19 4. Widespread water concerns: Water is an issue in every region, but the nature of the
20 vulnerabilities varies. Drought is an important concern in every region. Floods and water
21 quality are concems in many regions. Snowpack changes are especially important in the West,
22 Pacific Northwest, and Alaska.
23 5. Secure food supply: At the national level, the agriculture sector is likely to be able to adapt to
24 climate change. Mainly because of the beneficial effects of the rising carbon dioxide levels on
25 crops, overall US crop productivity, relative to what is projected in the absence of climate
26 change, is very likely to increase over the next few decades. However, the gains will not be
27 unifonn across the nation. Falling prices and competitive pressures are very likely to stress
28 some farmers, while benefiting consumers.
29 6. Near-term Increase in forest growth: Forest productivity is likely to increase over the next
30 several decades in some areas as trees respond to higher carbon dioxide levels. Over the longer
31 tenn, changes in larger-scale processes such as fire, insects, droughts, and disease will possibly
32 decrease forest productivity. In addition, climate change is likely to cause long-term shifts in
33 forest species, such as sugar maples moving north out of the US.
34 7. Increasedr2~e in coastal and permafrost areas: Climate change and the resulting rise in
35 sea level ~ exacerbate threats to buildings, roads, powerlines, and other ..
36 infrastructure in climatically sensitive places. For example, infrastructure damage is expected
37 to result from permafrost melting in Alaska, and from sea-level rise and storm surge in low­
38 lying coastal areas.
39 8. Adaptation.determines health outcomes: A range of negative health impacts is possible
40 ITom climate change, but adaptation is likely to help protect much of the US population.
41 Maintaining our nation's public health and community infrastructure, from water treatment
42 systems to emergency shelters, will be important for minimizing the impacts ofwater-bome

I With minor editing to improve clarity.

31

r:
CEQ 007<199
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I diseases, heat stress, air pollution, extreme weather events, and diseases transmitted by insects,
2 ticks, and rodents.
3 9. Other stresses magnified by climate change: Climate change will very likely magnify the
4 cumulative impacts of other stresses, such as air and water pollution and habitat destruction due
5 to human development patterns. For some systems, such as coral reefs, the combined effects of
6 climate change and other stresses are "~lY to exceed a critical threshold, bringing large,
7 possibly irreversible impacts.
8 10. Uncertainties remain and surprises are expected: Significant uncertainties remain in the
9 science underlying regional climate changes and their impacts. Further research would improve
10 understanding and our ability to project societal and ecosystem impacts, and provide the public
11 with additional useful information about options for adaptation. However, it is likely that some
12 !lSpects and impacts of climate change will be totally unanticipated as complex systems
13 respond to ongoing climate change in unforeseeable ways.
14
15

32

CEQ 609700
 Draft for Review-October 22,2001-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
1
2 Table 6.3: Potential Adaptation Options for Water Management in Response to Climate Change
3 and Other Stresses
4
5 • Improve capacity for moving water within and between water use sectors (including
6 agriculture to-urban).
7 • Use pricing and market mechanisms proactively to decrease waste.
8 • Incorporate potential changes in demand and supply in long-teml plalllung and
9 infrastructure design.
10 • Create incentives to move people and structures away from flood-plains.
11 • Identify ways to manage supplies, including groundwater, surface water, and effluent,
12 sustainably.
13 • Redtore and maintain watersheds (e:g., restoring watersheds that have been damaged by
14 urbanization, forestry, or grazing can reduce sediment loads and nutrients in runoff, limit
15 flooding, and reduce water temperature.)
16 • Reuse municipal wastewater, improve management of urban storm water runoff, and
17 promote collection of rainwater for local use.
18 • Increase the use of forecasting tools for water management. Some weather patterns, such as
19 those resulting from El Nino, can now be predicted, allowing more efficient management
20 of water resources
21 • Enhance monitoring efforts to improve data collection for weather, climate, and hydrologic
22 modeling to aid understanding of water-related impacts and management strategies.
23

33
 I.~~
Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken tJ~ .~~ S·
Do Not Cite or Quote (l S f rO )ev4!
~1 ~ ';~ ~(~~
1 Table 6.4 (Alternate 1): Key vulnerability and consequenc~~uesthat were identified aero
2 the set of regions considered in the US National AssessmenjfNAST, 2000, 2001).
3

REGION KEY REGIONAL ISSUES IlJENTI ~........~

Northeast • Increase in Weather Extremes

• Stresses on Estuaries, Bays, and Wetlands
• Multiple Stresses on Urban Areas
• Recreation Shifts
• Human Health
• Species Changes

Southeast
• Weather-related Stresses on Human Populations
• Agricultural Crop Yields and Economic Impacts
• Forest Productivity Shifts
• Water Quality Stresses
• Threats to Coastal Areas

Midwest
• Reduction in Lake and River Levels
• Health and Quality of Life in Urban Areas
• Agricultural shifts
• Changes in Semi-natural and Natural Ecosystems
Great Plains • Alteration in Timing and Amount of Water
• Changes in Climate Extremes
• Invasive Species Effects on Economy arid Ecology
• Stress on Human Communities
• Conservation of Soil Organic Matter
West • Changes in Water Resources.
• Changes in Natural Ecosystems
• Effects on Agriculture and Ranching
• Shifts in Tourism and Recreation
Pacific Northwest • Changes in Timing of Freshwater Resources
• Added Stresses on Salmon
• CO 2 and Summer Drought Effects on Forests
• Sea-level Rise Impacts on Coastal Erosion
Alaska • Pennafrost Thawing and Sea Ice Melting
• Increased Risk of Fire and Insect Damage to Forests
• Sensitivity of Fisheries and Marine Ecosystems
• Increased Stresses on Subsistence Livelihoods
Islands in the Caribbean and the • Freshwater Resources
Pacific • Public Health and Safety

34

CEQ 00 JJti2
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote

• Ecosystems and Biodiversity

• Sea-level Variability
Native Peoples and Homelands • Tourism and Community Development
• Human Health and Extreme Events
• Rights to Water and Other Natural Resources
• Subsistence Economies and Cultural Resources
• Cultural Sites, Wildlife, and Natural Resources
I
2

35
 Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Commenm-to-M:'"Mi
Do Not uote
1 Table 6-4 (Alternate 2): Examples 0

2 particular areas of the United States

3 listed at http://www,usgcrp.gov ) A

Examples of Key Consequences Affectin •

US Regions and

Supregions

The The People's

Environment Economy Lives

Northeast Reduced opportunitie for Rising summertime heat

winter recreation ch index will make cities
New England and
as skiing; incre ed less comfortable and
upstate NY opportunities r wann­ require more use of
Metropolitan NY season recre .on such air-conditioning
Mid-Atlantic as hiking d camping Reduced snow cover
Coastal in tructure will
need to e buttressed

Southeast Increased los ofbarrier Increa ed productivity of Increased flooding along

islands and \\ tlands, ha wood forests, with coastlines, with
Central and Southern
affecting coas rthward shift of increased threat from
Appalachians ecosystems ber harvesting stonns

Gulf Coast
Changing forest char cter, ncreased intensity of Longer period ofbigh
Southeast with possibly greater coastal storms threaten heat index, forcing
fire and pest threat coastal communities more indoor living

Higher lake and river / Inc asing agricultural .Lowered lake and river
Midwest
temperatures caust( pro ctivity in many levels, impacting
Eastern Midwest
trend in fish pop~(ations region ensuring recreation
Great Lakes away from trouyroward overall fo d supplies opportunities
bass and catfis but possibly wenng Higher swnmertime heat
commodity pri index reduces urban
quality oflife

Great Plains Rising wi'n rtime Increasing agricultural Altered and intensified
tempera res allow productivity in north, patterns of climatic
Northern
il:tcrea ng presence of more stre~sed in the extremes, especially in
Central in\!astve plant species, south summer

Southern
affecting wetlands and Swnmertime water Intensified springtime
Southwest/Rio Grande other natural areas shortages become more .flood and summertime
Basin Disruption of migration frequent drought cycles
routes and resources

36

1.
CEQ 007704
 Draft for Review-October 22, 200l-Comments to M. MacCrackeo
Do Not Cite or Quote
West Changes in natural
ecosystems as a result
California
of higher temperatures
Rocky Mountains/Great
and possibly intensified
Basin win.ter rains
Southwest/Colorado
River. Basin
Pacific Northwest Added stress to salmon
populations due to
wanner waters and
changing runoff
patterns
Alaska Forest disruption due to
warming and increased
pest outbreaks
Reduced sea ice and
general wanning
disrupts polar bears,
marine mammals, and
other wildlife
,
Increased stress on natural
Coastal and Islands
biodiversity as
Pacific Islands
pressures from invasive
South Atlantic Coast and
species increase
Caribbean Deterioration of corals
reefs
Shifts in ecosystems are
Native People and
likely to disrupt access
Homelands to medicinal plants Bnd
cultural resources
2
-"".. _-----------------------------------------­
CEQ b07705
Rising wintertime Shifts toward more warm
snowline leads to earlier season recreation
runoff, stressing some activities (e.g., hiking
reservoir systems instead of skiing)
Increased crop yields, but Greater fIre potential
with need for greater created by more winter
controls of weeds and rains and dry summers
pests Enhanced coastal erosion
Earlier winter runoff will Reduced wintertime
limit water availability snow pack will reduce
dUring warm season opportunities for
Rising forest productivity skiing, increase
opportunities for
hiking
Enhanced coastal erosion
Damage to infrastructure Retreating sea ice and
due to pennafrost earlier snowmelt lIlter
melting traditional life patterns
Disruption ofplant and Opportunities for warm
animal resources season activities
supporting subsistence increase
livelihoods
Increased piessure on Intensification of flood
water resources needed and landslide-inducing
for industry, tourism precipitlltion during
tropical storms
and communities due to
climatic fluctuations, More extreme year-to­
storms, and saltwater year fluctuations in the
intrusion into aquifers climate
The shifting climate is Disruption of the
likely to affect tourism, religious Bnd cultural
water rights, and interconnections of
income from use of Native people and the
natural resources environment
37
 Draft for Reviel~-October 22, 200t-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I Figure Captions
2
3 Figure 6.1: Illustration of how the summer climate of Illinois would shift WIder tWo plausible
4 climate scenarios. For a hot-dry scenario (Canadian model), the summer climate would become
5 more like the climate of southern Missouri by the 2030s and more like the current climate of
6 Oklahoma by the 2090s. For the warm-moist scenario (Hadley model, version 2), the swnmer
7 climate would become more like the climate of the central Appalachians by the 2030s and more
8 like the current coastal climate of North Carolina by the 2090s. (Source: D. 1. Wuebbles,
9 University oflllinois Urbana-Champaign)
10
11 Figure 6.2: Bar chart showing (a) the observed changes in rainfall intensity and runoff during the
12 20 th century (1939-99) and (b) the projected changes as calculated by two models for the 21 at
13 century. Both historic trends and future projections indicate that larger fractions ofprecipitation
14 will be occurring during the heaviest categories of precipitation events. (Source: NOAA National
15 Climatic Data Center)
16
17 Figurc 6.3: [To be completed] Map showing the tendencies of temperature and precipitation
18 anomalies across the US as a result ofthe occurrence of El Nino and La Nina conditions in the
19 Pacific Ocean.
20
21 Figure 6.4: Chart showing the frequency at which various numbers of hurricanes struck the US
22 during the 20u, century, subdivided by whether an El Nino or La Nina event was occurring.
23 Changes in the frequency and intensity of such events can thus affect the potential for damaging
24 hurricanes. (Source: NOAA National Climatic Data Center)
2.5
26 Figure 6.5: Projections of average change in crop yields for 16 crops, given as the percentage
27 differences between future yield for two periods (2030s and 2090s) and current yields. The
28 results consider the physiological responses of the crops to future climate conditions under either
29 dryland or irrigated cultivation, assuming reasonable adaptive response by producers. Climate
30 scenarios are drawn from two different climate models that are likely to span the range of
31 changes of future conditions, ranging from the wann-moist changes projected by the Hadley
32 model (version 2) to the hot-dry changes projected by the Canadian model. (Source: National
33 Agriculture Assessment Group, 2001)
34
35 Figure 6.6: Map showing the current distribution of forest types for the eastern US based on.the
36 climate experienced from 1960-1990 (panel a), to be compared with maps showing the altered
37 distribution of dominant forest types for the late 21'1 century if thc climate becomes like the
38 warm-moist climate projection of the Hadley (version 2) climate model (panel b) or like the hot­
39 dry climate projection of the Canadian climate model (panel c). All cases were calculated using
40 the DISTRIB tree species distribution model. (Source: A. M. Prasad and L. R. Iverson,
41 Northeastern Research Station, USDA Forest Service, Delaware, Ohio)
42
43 Figure 6.6: Preliminary classification of annual shoreline erosion along US coastlines. The areas
44 that are most vulnerable to future increases in sea level are those with low relief and that are

38

CEQ 007706
.'
Draft for Review-October 22, 2001-Comments to M. MacCracken
Do Not Cite or Quote
I already experiencing rapid erosion rates, such as the Southeast and Gulf Coast. (Source: USGS
2 Coastal Geology Program)
3
4 Figure 6.8: Projections of percentage change from the 1961-90 baseline in the April 1 snowpack
5 for four areas in the western US as simulated for the 21'( century for the wannings projected by
6 two different climate models: (a) for the case ofwanning toward the upper end oftIle set of
7 IPCC models; and (b) for the case of warming near the middle of estimates from the set of IPCC
8 models. (Source: redrawn from G. J. McCabe and D. M. Wolock, 1999)
9
10 Figure 6.9: Incidence of dengue in the Texas-Mexico border region. Dengue, a mosquito-borne
11 viral diseflse, was once common in Texas, where there were an estimated 500,000 cases in 1922,
12 an.d the mosquito that transmits it remains abundant. The striking contrast in incidence in Texas
13 versus incidence in three Mexicari states that border Texas (64 vs. 62,514 over the period 1980­
14 99) provides a graphic illustration of the importance of factors other than climate in the incidence
15 of vector-borne diseases. (Source: National Institute of Health, Mexico; Texas Department of
16 Health; US Public Health Service, unpublished data analyzed by the National Health Assessment
17 Group and presented in NAST, 2001)
18
19 Figure 6.10: Panels showing (a) the present distribution of vegetation types in the southwestern
20 US, and the projected distributions of vegetation at the end of the 21 11 century in the event
21 climate change is similar to that calculated by (b) the Canadian climate model, or (c) the Hadley
22 model (version 2). Both of these models project increasing wintertime precipitation in this region
23 and a conversion ofdesert ecosystems to shrub and grassland ecosystems. (Source: R. P. Neilson,
24 USDA Forest Service, Corvallis, OR)
25

39

CEQ 007707
 '.

Figure 1

1:) Canadian Model Hadley Model

10"

- - Summer "'ocfl>l\Jli••
- - &_Aftl'IilI'_1tIn

Illustration of how the summer climate of illinois would shift under the Canadian and Hadley model scenarios. Under the Canadian
scenario, the summer climate of Illinois would become more like the current climate of southern Missouri In 2030 and more like
Oklahoma's current climate'ln 2090. The primary difference In the resulting climates of the two models relates to the amount of sum.
mer rainfall.
 Observed Changes In Streamflow and Precipitation (1939-99)

22.5 I , , ',' , ' . ".', " .,'.' , ' I

-
' ••>

'..
~ 20 ~ -,-_.' >, _ _ . ,~__ _
,. -". . ". 'A":"" .... ~~::,~":h ~-'
_)
:: 15 ' ,. ""?'

ClJ
a.
~
o
•
12;: I­ ._E
eu
CD
c
C'Cl
.c
o 7.5
~ 51
f­
mPrecipitation f..&-l

~Strea.m flow ~
'0
eu
CD
C'Cl
1:ClJ
UIo tJ U b '''8 ill'~ ",I
-= . . t .. ~;;:
~~
,
.
_ A I ;toW
R ._
. . ,.
d
.!1'.

~
eu
a. -2.5
o 20 40 60 80 100
Light/Low Moderate Heavy/High

Figure 6-2a.,

o
'-0
 Projected 21st Century Change in US Daily Precipl~atlon
60
~
oSc: 50

.''""
u

D­ 40
c
0

~
.ueo 30
eD­
..
0>
20
em
:>
10
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.
C

.",
c
0
e
I-
-10

Lightest 5%
60
Moderate 60
95
1:1 HadCM2 11 CGCM1
Percentiles Heaviest 5%

These projections by the Hadley and Canadian models show the changes In precipitation over the 21st century.
Each models' projected change In the lightest 5% of precipitation events is represented by the far left bar and the
change in the heaviest 5% by the far right bar. As the graph Illustrates, both models project significant Increases
in heavy precipitation events with smaller increases or decreases In light precipitation events.

Figure 6.2b

n
tTJ
,()
o
o
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o
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bl)

CEQ Ou' tJ 1
 Figure 6.4

EI Hlfio and La NIna Effects on the Chance of

Landfalllng Hurricanes over-the 20th Century
90% ('l]T---- _
II ~HI _
60% IQD -.,
~ 70%
£
g 60% UJEINiiio 1':llaNiila
~
50%
~
a
rl
~
u

. .
0%~'4'
~,. JW~
5 •
or""", or""", -'''''' ........ 0'"",

Number 01 HUrrlcanes peryear

or""",
Of7_

N
 Irrigated Yields in 2030 • 2090
With Adaptation
Colton 11tl
t~~
liiiili!ii Ii;;; ==-- =: I

Com (\
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r~
n
Soybean f"~3 iiiii="" .. Hadley Scenario 2090

Figure 6.5 Spring wlleat e

~
..,p- • Hadley Scenario 2030
.Canadlan Scenario 2090
Winter wheat ~
Jj ~ • Canadian Scenario 2030

Sorgllum ",t iii!:

',"'
Rice ~l

'~ F'
Barley
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oats A
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Hay
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Sugarcane H
SugarbeelS ~
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:~

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Orange
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Grapefrutt ~] ~~~".
ttr:z!i!:!L -4 , • ..

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i.J
t:
-40 ·20 o 20 40 60 50 100 120 140
Percent

w
 Figure 6.6a
Dominant Forest Types

Current· 1960·1990

These maps show current and

projscted forest types for the east·
em US. The current distribution
of forest types reflects tempera-
ture and moisture gradIents In this
part of the nation. The simulated
changes in forest types by the end 1m While-Red·Jack Pine
of the 21st century are In
response to the Hadley and
11 Spruce-Fir
Canadian climate scenarios using [] Longleaf-Slash Pine
the D1STRIB model, a tree species • Loblolly·Shortieaf Pine
distribution model. PlnlH1omlnat· Ij Oak·Pine
ed types decline In the Southeast II oak.Hickory
under both climate scenarios. 1m Qak.Gum-Cypress
Oak·plne and oak·hlckory forest
types are projected to expand
1m Elm.Ash-Cottonwood
• Maple-Beech·Birch
northward.
~ Aspen·Blrch
IE No Data

+>.
 F.igures 6.6b and 6.{)c

Dominant Forest Types

Hadley Scenario - 2070·2100 CanadiC1n Scenario· 2070-2100

Vl
 l-

.j

Figure 6.7

This map is a preliminary Annual Shoreline Change

classification or annual
shoreline erosion
throughout the US, In
coarse detail and resolu·
tlon. The areas most yul·
nerable to future
sea-level change are i
those with low relief .:
whieh are already experJ. ~

enelng rapid erosion .

rales, such as the
Southeast and Gulf Coast.

.0
.".a
.......
~
~

Ell Severely eroding Moderately eroding o Relatively stablE

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~
~.
~
0\
00

Percentage Change from 1961 • 1990 Bne

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2003 :z: 2003 • :r
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2011 ii'
2007 :
i = la

2015 '<
2011 ! ~
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2019 :c
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2015 :
2019 '
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.....
2023 Co I
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2027 2027 I Co III
2031 2031 :
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2047
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2055
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II II n
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2059 [;J~ '1](1)

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2071 I 2011. \
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2015
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2079 !!l.;c
2019 I o
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=/ k
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2095 . .•..._ .••.. ._. ....._ •.•. _J 2091
2095 " .•._.__ ~.._ ... __...._. ' '''_'.''
 Reponed Cases of Dengue 1980-1999

Figure 6.9

Figure 8: Dengue along the US-MexIco border. Dengue, amosquito-borne

viral disease, was once common in Texas (where there were an estimated
500,000 cases In 1922), and the mosquito that transmIts it remainsabundanl
The striking contrast In the Incidence of dengue in Texas versus three Mexican
states that border Texas (64 cases VB. 62,514) In the perIod from 1980·1999
provides a graphic illustration ofthe Importance of factors other than tempera·
ture, such as use of air conditioning and window screens, in the transmission
of vector·borne diseases. National Institute of Health, Mexico; Texas
Department of Health; US Public Health Service. Unpublished data.

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CEQ 007720