CASE #1.

JOSE LAGON VS. HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC.

G.R. No. 135657 January 17, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is a businessman and owner of a commercial
building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Respondent HOOVEN on the other is a
domestic corporation known to be the biggest manufacturer and installer of
aluminum materials in the country with branch office at E. Quirino Avenue, Davao
City.
Sometime in April 1981 Lagon and HOOVEN entered into two (2) contracts, both
denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00
HOOVEN agreed to sell and install various aluminum materials in Lagons
commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Upon execution of the
contracts, Lagon paid HOOVEN P48,000.00 in advance.
Lagon, in his answer, denied liability and averred that HOOVEN was the party
guilty of breach of contract by failing to deliver and install some of the materials
specified in the proposals; that as a consequence he was compelled to procure
the undelivered materials from other sources; that as regards the materials duly
delivered and installed by HOOVEN, they were fully paid. He counterclaimed for
actual, moral, exemplary, temperate and nominal damages, as well as for
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
Issue: Whether or not all the materials specified in the contracts had been
delivered and installed by respondent in petitioners commercial building in
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.

Ruling: Firstly, the quantity of materials and the amounts sated in the delivery
receipts do not tally with those in the invoices covering them, notwithstanding
that, according to HOOVEN OIC Alberto Villanueva, the invoices were based
merely on the delivery receipts.
Secondly, the total value of the materials as reflected in all the invoices is
P117,329.0 while under the delivery receipts it is only P112, 870.50, or a
difference of P4,458.00.
Even more strange is the fact that HOOVEN instituted the present action for
collection of sum of money against Lagon only on 24 February 1987, or more
than five (5) years after the supposed completion of the project. Indeed, it is
contrary to common experience that a creditor would take its own sweet time in
collecting its credit, more so in this case when the amount involved is not
miniscule but substantial.
All the delivery receipts did not appear to have been signed by petitioner or his
duly authorized representative acknowledging receipt of the materials listed
therein. A closer examination of the receipts clearly showed that the deliveries
were made to a certain Jose Rubin, claimed to be petitioners driver, Armando
Lagon, and a certain bookkeeper. Unfortunately for HOOVEN, the identities of
these persons were never been established, and there is no way of determining
now whether they were indeed authorized representatives of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April 1997
is MODIFIED. Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is ordered to pay respondent Hooven

Comalco Industries, Inc., P6,377.66 representing the value of the unpaid

materials admittedly delivered to him. On the other hand, respondent is ordered
to pay petitioner P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P46,554.50 as actual damages and litigation expenses.
CASE #2.
ATIENZA V BOARD OF MEDICINE
G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011
J. Nachura
Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro
Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
She underwent kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is
non-functioning and non-visualizing.
3. Private respondents husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of
Edithas fully functional right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray
request forms where interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the
purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Edithas formal offer of exhibits,
alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, intended to establish
matters which are hearsay, and incompetent to prove the purpose for which they
are offered.
6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted
by the BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied
on the ground that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that it
can determine its probative value when it decides the case, and later on
determine whether the evidence is relevant or not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence
Ruling:

No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are
not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM.
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, it is the safest
policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the
reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the
probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an
issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his
substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of
Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of
Procedure. As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits
did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact
sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection
with Edithas medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the
results of the examination. The fact sought to be established by the admission of
Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations
at the time of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory
judicial notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the
anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys because the position and removal may
still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable.
Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM
are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha
instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of
Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of
Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not
only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is
allowed, especially as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of
RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the
previous building, x x x to the new building and ultimately, the originals cannot
be produced.
CASE #3
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA
G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent
DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from
State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The
loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month
on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due dateJanuary 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private
respondent LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand
letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment
was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner
contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action
was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet outof-court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached,
but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the
defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and
that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in
this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC
Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of
even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito
Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of
P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the
defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of
said witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the
instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but
each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally
declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of
SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of
SIHI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondents witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as
required by law.
3. Whether the best evidence rule should be applied.
RULING:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal
knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.

Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except
as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative
value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to
object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The rationale for this
exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that
it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters
testified to by a witness are hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine may be
waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an
implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the
trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed
to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the
respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late
for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it

through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the
question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial
admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof.
3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents
as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the
execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too
late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the
existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner
failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms
of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by
the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation

CASE #4:
PEOPLE v. CALUMPANG
454 SCRA 719
Facts: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were charged with two counts of
murder, committed against the spouses Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay. The
trial court dismissed the defense of alibi interposed by the defendants because it
was weak and then convicted the defendants, relying on the testimony of Magno
Gomez who allegedly eye witnessed the killing of the two victims. The
defendants appealed, contending that the testimony of Magno is unreliable and
inconsistent, and that the trial court erred in dismissing their defense of alibi.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of alibi is sufficient to cast doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.
Ruling: Yes. Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were
corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was
impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an
accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift
the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness
of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption
of innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no sufficient
evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands. The Supreme Court found
that the testimony of the lone witness Magno is full of inconsistencies. While
Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show that
serious discrepancies attended Magnos testimony in court and his sworn
statement executed during the preliminary examination. Well settled is the rule
that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the common experience and

observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances stand.

Magnos testimony failed to satisfy such rule, hence, the presumed innocence of
the accused must be upheld.
CASE #5:
UBALES v PEOPLE
FACTS:
On 30 October 2001, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed an Information against
petitioner Ubales for the crime of homicide allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about October 17, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, armed with a .38 caliber paltik revolver marked Smith and Wesson, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one MARK TANGLAW SANTOS y
ORPIANA by then and there shooting the latter on the head, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal gunshot wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.
On 19 November 2001, petitioner Ubales, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
of the offense charged.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Eduardo Galvan, SPO1 Eduardo E. Ko,
Laila Cherry Cruz, SPO2 Rosales M. Fernandez, P/Chief Inspector Carlos G.
Mendez, and Efigenia Santos. The prosecution also presented as evidence
Medico Legal Report No. W-737-2001 and the receipt of the funeral expenses
incurred.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
PROVES THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
RULING:
After a meticulous review of the records of the case at bar, we are constrained to
agree with petitioner Ubales.
Petitioner Ubales was arrested on 25 October 2001, eight days after Marks body
was found. Ubales arrest was made by SPO2 Rosales Fernandez at the
insistence of Laila Cruz, who approached SPO2 Fernandez for assistance in
apprehending Ubales. Up to the time of this arrest, the only piece of evidence
which remotely links Ubales to the killing of Mark Santos is the recovery of a gun
resembling a gun allegedly seen by Laila Cruz in his (Ubales) possession the
night Mark was killed. This gun found several meters away from where Marks
body was found but was never identified as the gun where the bullet that killed
Mark came from. All that the forensic firearm examiner testified to about this gun
was that this is a .38 caliber paltik revolver with three bullets and one empty
shell. The slug found in the head of Mark was never subjected to a ballistic
examination, either.
It was at this point, when Angel Ubales had already been arrested despite the
lack of evidence clearly linking him to the crime, that Mark Santos best friend,
balut vendor Eduardo Galvan, appeared and executed a sworn statement that he
was an eyewitness to the killing of Mark Santos. He proceeded to identify Angel
Ubales without the benefit of a police line-up. Thereafter, he became the star
witness in the prosecution of Angel Ubales.Upon reading Galvans testimony; we

do not find the same sufficient to prove Ubales guilt beyond any reasonable
doubt. While the correctness of a Decision is not impaired solely by the fact that
the writer took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, it is the
bounden duty of appellate courts to even more closely examine the testimonies
of the witnesses whose deportment the writer was not able to observe.
The prosecution seeks to establish Ubales motive in killing Mark by the alleged
altercation between the two during their drinking spree. However, as testified by
Laila Cruz herself, the argument was soon apparently resolved, with Ubales
patting the shoulders of Mark Santos.
Furthermore, in both versions of the facts, Mark had been gracious enough to
accompany Ubales after their carousal, clearly showing that whatever
misunderstanding they had during their drinking spree was already resolved. If
Galvans version of the facts is to be believed, Ubales and Mark had even been
together for a several hours more before Mark was killed. We have ruled that
though the general rule is that motive is not essential to a conviction especially
where the identity of the assailant is duly established by other competent
evidence or is not disputed, the absence of such motive is important in
ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or versions of the
killing. Proof as to motive is essential when the evidence on the commission of
the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. Verily, the dominating rule is
that, with respect to the credibility of witnesses, this Court has always accorded
the highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial court, unless there is
proof of misappreciation of evidence which is precisely the situation in the case
at bar.
We also take note of petitioner Ubales stance when he was confronted by Laila
Cruz and SPO2 Fernandez. Ubales told SPO2 Fernandez that he would
voluntarily join him to prove to him that he was not in hiding. Ubales then
cooperated fully with SPO2 Fernandez, allowing himself to undergo a medical
examination, which apparently yielded nothing as the findings thereof was not
presented as evidence, and going with the SPO2 Fernandez to the PNP
Malacaang Field Force. Flight evidences guilt and guilty conscience: the wicked
flee, even when no man pursues, but the righteous stand fast as bold as a lion. In
all, we find it hard to lend credence to the testimony of the lone alleged
eyewitness.
We have said that it is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one
innocent person. Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must
be considered. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is
consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given
the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted. In the instant case, while it is
possible that the accused has committed the crime, there is also the possibility,
based on the evidence presented, that he has not. He should be deemed to have
not for failure to meet the test of moral certainty. Finally, an accused should not
be convicted by reason of the weakness of his alibi. It is fundamental that the
prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and must not rely on
the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Since there are very serious
doubts in the testimony of the lone eyewitness to the killing of Mark Santos, we
have no choice but to acquit petitioner Angel Ubales on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Having ruled that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond
a reasonable doubt, the second issue, which relates to the temperate damages

which petitioner would have been liable for had he been found guilty, is now
mooted.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28813
dated 30 November 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Angel
Ubales y Velez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide on account of
reasonable doubt.
CASE #6:
TATING v MARCELLA
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
FACTS:
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter,
herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a
duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.
Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of
Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real
estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.
However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she
had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her
and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the
latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that
Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in
the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated
March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered
the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares
over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle
the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, her son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower
courts.
RULING:
The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take
the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have
given
probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity
to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created
between them.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
CASE #7:
PNOC SHIPPING TRANSPORT CORP v CA
G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998
FACTS:
September 21, 1977 early morning: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with
the vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N.
Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the
Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00
representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V
Maria Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorneys fees and
later on amended to add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance and
unrealized profits and lost business opportunities.
During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel
Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing
boat with interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit CA: affirmed in toto
ISSUE: Whether or Not the damage was adequately proven

HELD:
YES. affirming with modification actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for lack of
evidentiary bases therefor. P2M nominal damages instead.
In connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or
incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court.
If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding or ignoring them two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages: loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente) failure to
receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him in the case of profitearning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner
as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in
the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements

If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually
certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in
respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate
the plaintiff twice over.
if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only
in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the
value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement
which it was unable to fulfill.
Damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out
specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne proven through sole testimony of general manager
without objection from LSC.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. On the other hand, the
probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an
issue.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is `entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered awarded in every
obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions
punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has
been invaded. damages in name only and not in fact
amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the
concept and purpose of such damages.
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of
the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that such
payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation.
Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the
lower courts jurisdiction since the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a
lien on the judgment.
CASE #8
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. v. CIR
GR 151857, April 28, 2005
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel
blanks for use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial
and household appliances. In it's amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return
on June 4, 1996 it declared a net taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of
P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount of P3,311,559.00. It also reported
uarterly payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of
P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively. It is the contention of the
petitioner in this case filed in 1997, that it is entitled to a refund. The refund was
purportedly due to income taxes witheld from it, and remitted in its behalf, by the

witholding agents. Such witheld tax, as per petitioners 1997 return, were not
utilised in 1996 since due to it's income/loss positions for the three quarters of
1996.
ISSUE: Whether or not a tax refund may be claimed even beyong the taxable
year following that in which the tax credit arises.
Held: Yes, however; it is still incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it is
entitled to such refund. Tax refunds being in the nature of tax exemptions such
must be construed strictissimi juris against the taypayer-claimant. Under the
NIRC, the only limitation as regards the claiming of tax refunds is that such must
be made within two years. The claim for refund made by Calamba steel was well
within the 2 year period. As regards the procedure taken by counsel of Calamba
Steel in submitting the final adjustment returns (1996) after trial has been
conducted, the Court said that although the ordinary rules of procedure from
upon this jurisprudence mandates that the proceedings before the tax court's
shall not be governed by strictly technical rules of evidence. Moreoover, as
regards evidence, the court further said that Judicial notice could have been
taken by the cA and the CTA of the 1996 final adjustment return made by
petitioner in another case then pending with the CTA.
CASE #9
PEOPLE v BARAOIL
G.R. No. 194608, July 9, 2012.
On October 20, 2004, the accused-appellant was charged in two
Informations for the crime of rape allegedly committed, as follows:
Criminal Case No. T-3682
That on or about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 8, 2004, inside the
comfort room adjacent to the Apo Rice Mill at Brgy. San Maximo, [M]unicipality of
Natividad, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously insert his penis into the
vagina of [AAA], a minor[,] 5 years of age and thereafter finger the vagina of said
[AAA], against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said [AAA].
Criminal Case No. T-3683
That on or about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of August 8, 2004, inside the
comfort room adjacent to the Apo Rice Mill located at Brgy. San Maximo,
[M]unicipality of Natividad, [P]rovince of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously suck the vagina of said [AAA], a minor, 5 years of age,
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said [AAA].
ISSUE: Whether or not Antonio Baraoil is guilty of the crime of Rape.
HELD:
Antonio Baraoil was found guilty by the lower courts for two crimes of rape
defined and penalized under RA 8353 and the Revised Penal Code. Courts use
the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be

made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime,
conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainants testimony provided
it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. The Supreme Court (SC) held in the instant case that
the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution proved the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The SC finds no cogent reason to
disturb the trial courts appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
testimony.
CASE #10
Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa
G.R. No. 152807
Facts: The heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
with damages against respondents Alberto Comorposa, et al. The MTC ruled in
favor of the heirs, but the RTC reversed such decision. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment, ruling that respondents had the better right
to possess the subject land; and it disregarded the affidavits of the petitioners
witnesses for being self-serving. Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending that the Rules on Summary
Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits and that the failure of respondents to
file their position papers and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an
admission by silence.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavits in issue should have been considered by the
Court of Appeals.
Ruling: No. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question
of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses'
respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso
facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the
burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.