ANFO TRUCK BURN TRIALS

B. von Rosen and E. Contestabile

Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory (CERL)
Ottawa, On
Canada

ABSTRACT
Recently, the Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory (CERL) completed its investigation of a truck
accident, which involved 18,000 kg of commercial explosives, 13,000 kg of which was ANFO. Over the
three years of the investigation unconfined burns of piles of ANFO were performed. In its final phase of
the investigation, two burn trials were performed in an attempt to recreate the accident and the ensuing
fire, to identify probable mechanisms that led from burning to detonation.
Two full-scale tests were performed using complete tractor-trailers. In each test, the trucks were placed
in a jack-knifed position with the majority of the explosives located on the ground in front of the trailer.
The explosives were placed in a manner to provide maximum confinement and to maximize the
possibility of explosion/detonation while remaining as faithful as possible to the perceived accident
geometry. The tests were instrumented using thermocouples and video cameras and observations were
made on the burning characteristics of the explosives, tractor-trailer and tractor-trailer components.
In each test the explosives burned calmly for approximately 80 minutes. There was no evidence of
explosion or of unstable burning. The heat caused several truck components to rupture violently. These
included the tires, some engine components, the spring brake chambers and possibly the fuel tanks. Of
these, the most violent were the truck tires. Although no quantitative data was gathered on rupture
violence or fragment velocity, it is speculated that several truck components might produce fragments
with sufficient energy to initiate heat-sensitised explosives under favourable circumstances.

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INTRODUCTION
On August 5th 1998 a truck carrying approximately 18 tonnes of explosives struck a rockcut near
Walden, Ontario. A fire ensued, which burned for approximately 30 minutes, ultimately resulting in the
detonation of the load. As a consequence of the accident, the Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory
(CERL) undertook a three-year test program designed to gather data to aid in determining the suitability
of the existing explosive transportation regulations. This report discusses the two final tests of the
program, involving the burning of two tractor-trailers loaded with explosives, in an effort to recreate the
accident and better understand the conditions, which led to the detonation at Walden.
EXPERIMENTAL
Approach
Two tests were performed using slightly differing configurations. In both cases the test configurations
were designed to maximize the integrity of the explosive mass, maximize the interaction of the
explosives with the truck components and infrastructure, and remain as faithful to the perceived accident
geometry as possible. To maintain the integrity of the explosive mass, the mass was kept as
hemispherical as possible, thereby optimizing the conditions for detonation by maximizing the inertial
(confining) effects of the explosive on itself. The roughly hemispherical mass was positioned near the
fifth wheel, i.e. between the tractor and the trailer, thereby involving the fuel tanks, the batteries, the
truck brake components and the tires.
Explosives
The two tests differed primarily in the amount and type of explosive. The first test was performed using
ANFO (ammonium nitrate with fuel oil) only, in an effort to determine its response to thermal stimulus,
the probability of it detonating or exploding, and its burning characteristics in such a large mass. The
second test was performed to recreate the accident. Therefore three types of explosives were used:
ANFO, a slurry and an emulsion. Table 1 contains the name, UN classification and the mass of each
explosive that was used in these two tests.
Table 1 Description of the explosives used in the Truck Burn Tests
Test 1
Explosive
UN
Mass
Description
Classification
/kg
AmexTM
1.5 D
20,000
Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil
Test 2
TM
Amex
1.5 D
13,000
Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil
CANAMEX
1.5 D
4,500
TNT-sensitised slurry
TM
Magnasplit
1.1D
750
Sensitised emulsion (microballoons
and Ethylenediamine Dinitrate
(EDDN))
It should be noted that the second test was performed with CANAMEX 550 as opposed to AquamexTM
(which was present at the accident site). CANAMEX, a TNT-sensitised slurry produced by DYNO, is
similar to AquamexTM with the exception that the TNT content is only 10% as opposed to 25%. This
substitution was necessary as AquamexTM is no longer produced and was not available for testing.

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Truck Details
Table 2 contains a brief description of the two trucks that were used in the tests.

Test
#
1

Tractor

Table 2 Description of tractor-trailers as tested

Trailer

Make: Ford
Body : Fibreglass
Condition: Not-operable
Fuel Tanks: Aluminium, full
Batteries: Discharged
Tires: 10, worn, one flat
front left, others inflated
Axles: 3
Make: White
Body : Steel
Condition: Fully operable
Fuel Tanks: Aluminium, full
Batteries: Charged
Tires: 10, reasonable amount
of tread remaining, inflated
Axles: 3

Type: Insulated
Length: 14.6 m
Floor: Steel
Frame: Steel
Walls: Aluminium, fibreglass, Styrofoam
Condition: Missing leg-jacks
Tires: 8, worn, inflated
Axles: 2
Type: Standard (non-insulated)
Length: 14.6 m
Floor: Wood
Frame: Steel
Walls: Aluminium, wood-lined
Condition: Good
Tires: 8, reasonable amount of tread remaining,
inflated
Axles: 2

Positioning of the Truck

The testing was performed in the fall of 2001 at the DRDC-CCDR Suffield test site near Medicin Hat
Alberta.A flat, vegetation-free area was selected as ground zero for the test program. The area was
scraped and dished slightly using a backhoe before each test to clear the area of debris and prevent
excessive run-off of molten explosive during the tests.
Prior to positioning the tractor-trailer in each test, a bobcat, outfitted with a trencher, was used to cut a
10 cm wide by 40 cm deep trench, approximately 30 m long, from the centre of the test area towards the
instrumentation bunker. Coaxial signal cables were laid in the trench and connected to 10
thermocouples, which were used to monitor the flame temperatures during the tests. Once the cables
were in place, the trench was back-filled with soil to protect the signal cables.
The trucks were placed in a jack-knifed position (90) in the centre of the test area with the fifth wheel
located over the thermocouples. In the first test the fifth wheel was not engaged, the front end of the
trailer was merely supported on the rear of the tractor. Furthermore, as the trailer had no leg-jacks, a
stack of pallets was used to support the front of the trailer to prevent it from accidentally falling during
the positioning of the explosives. In the second test the trailer was lowered onto its leg-jacks, then the
tractor was backed under the trailer and the fifth wheel was engaged.
Once a tractor was positioned, the fuel tanks were filled. In both tests it was necessary to remove a
portion of the wall near the front of the trailer. This served two purposes, it simplified the process of

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loading the trailer, and it simulated the damage that was conjectured to have occurred at the Walden
accident. Such damage would have allowed convective heating from outside the trailer to pass into the
trailer, thereby increasing the heating rate inside.

Figure 1 - Test configurations for the two tractor-trailer burn tests. Test 1 is shown on the left, and Test
2 is shown on the right.
The trailer in the first test was further modified by stripping the fibreglass and Styrofoam insulation
from the front 3 metres of the trailer and replacing it with 6 mm plywood. Again, this was done to
simulate the perceived accident configuration.
Positioning of the Explosives
The explosives were positioned to maximise the likelihood of a detonation (or explosion) while
remaining consistent with the perceived accident geometry. Three parameters were considered when
placing the explosives:
-

The mass of explosives was kept as consolidated as possible, hence a form that was as
hemispherical as practical
The explosives were positioned around the truck components which were considered to be
potential contributors, whether chemically or mechanically, to ignition
The explosive considered to be most thermally sensitive was placed in the centre of the mass,
such that the less sensitive material would act to confine the more sensitive material (Test #2
only)

The truck components considered to be of primary importance during these tests were:
-

Fuel tanks
Batteries and electrical wiring
Cab and trailer wall materials (aluminium and fibre glass)
Brake components (spring brake chambers)
Tires

All of these components may be found near the junction of the tractor and the trailer, therefore the
explosives were placed in front of the trailer, but in such a manner as to encompass all of the listed
components.

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Sixteen pallets of ANFO were used in Test 1, eleven of these were placed in front of the trailer, one was
placed adjacent to the passenger side fuel tank and four were placed inside the trailer against the front
wall.
Figure 2 shows the explosive placement in Test 2, where six and a half pallets of ANFO were used to
surround nine pallets (much smaller pallets) of CANAMEX. What is not evident in the figure is that the
CANAMEX surrounds 750 kg (33 boxes) of MagnasplitTM. Fifty bags of ANFO (one pallet) were
individually placed on top of the CANAMEX to provide confinement in the vertical direction. Finally,
one pallet of ANFO was placed on the ground adjacent to the fuel tank on the passenger side of the
truck, and two pallets of ANFO were placed in the front of the trailer.

Figure 2 Placement of the explosives for Test 2. Note that the CANAMEX was surrounded with
ANFO. Similarly, the CANAMEX was used to surround the MagnasplitTM (which is not visible).
Instrumentation
Each test was instrumented with three free-field blast gauges, four standard video cameras and one highspeed video camera. The tests were also instrumented with 10 thermocouples, however, due to
instrumentation failure, temperature data was collected only for Test 2. As such, thermocouple locations
are reported for Test 2 only. Refer to Table 3 and Figure 3 for thermocouple location details.
The tests were observed on a television monitor 2 km from ground zero. The video signal was sent via
transmitter from a camera positioned near ground zero to the remote television monitor.
Ignition Train
A layer of wood chips, roughly 8 cm to 15 cm deep, was spread around the explosive, under the tractor
and under the front of the trailer. Approximately 400 litres of diesel fuel were sprayed onto the wood
chips. Four, 4 L plastic jugs were filled with a 50/50 mixture of diesel and gasoline and placed at
approximately equidistant locations on the perimeter of the wood chips. A length of safety fuse (burning

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time approximately 5 minutes) was inserted into each jug. The lengths of safety fuse were ignited
remotely using electric matches.
Table 3 Positioning of the thermocouples in Test 2
Thermocouple Placement
Number
TC 1
Ground level, 23 cm in front of front drive axle of truck, along the
centre line of truck
TC 2
Centre of rear face of fuel tank, drivers side
TC 3
Between tires on front drive axle, drivers side
TC 4
On rear drive axle, centre of truck
TC 5
Ground level, in the centre of the explosives in front of trailer
TC 6
Top of cab on door post, drivers side
TC 7
On the 5th wheel
TC 8
Outside front end of trailer, 1.3 m above floor, 5 cm from wall, drivers
side
TC 9
Inside front end of trailer, 1.3 m above floor, 5 cm from wall, drivers
side
TC 10
On top of the explosives in front of trailer, 1.3 m above TC 5

Figure 3 Position of the thermocouples during truck burn tests.

The dashed lines indicate that the thermocouple is behind a truck component and not visible from this
point of view. Thermocouples 5 and 10 were positioned in the bulk of the explosives on the ground in
front of the trailer (i.e. in the foreground).

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RESULTS
Tables 4 and 5 contain lists of notable events that occurred during each test as observed from the
videotape records. Some of the events are only distinguishable as a jet of flame, a fountain of sparks or
a sudden cloud of dense black smoke. It is often necessary to infer the cause of these events from their
location because smoke and flame obscure the event.

Time
/min
0

Table 4 List of notable events during the Truck Burn Test 1

Event
Comments
Ignition

Four jugs ignite virtually simultaneously

followed by a gradual build up in flame
intensity over the first minute

1
4

First pile collapse

Flame jet

5
6
22
44
46
90

Single tire rupture

Trailer collapse
Flame Jet
Single rear trailer tire ruptures
Single rear trailer tire ruptures
Burn essentially completed

Possibly due to drivers side fuel tank

rupture
Rear axle of tractor
Possibly from fuel tank or cooling system
Shakes entire trailer
Small amounts of material still
decomposing, this would continue for
hours

The test area was inspected 24 hours after each test. In general these post-test inspections led to similar
observations. The most notable of these are listed in Table 6. In both tests only a small amount of AN
was recovered. Most of the fuels available on the truck had been consumed, i.e. the tires, hoses,
fibreglass components and some of the aluminium. It was observed that the trailer in Test 1 was more
completely and more quickly consumed than the trailer in Test 2. This may be due to the fact that the
Test 1 trailer was insulated, causing the trailer to act as an oven and reducing the temperature gradients
along its length. It may also have been due to wind speed and direction.

Time
/min
0

5
6
15
60
70

Table 5 List of notable events during the Truck Burn Test 2

Event
Comments
Ignition

Flame flare near front of trailer

Two tires rupture on tractor
Flame jet near driver side door
Flames low
Burn essentially completed

Four jugs ignite virtually simultaneously

followed by a gradual build up in flame
intensity over the first minute
Probably due to tire rupture
At one of the rear axles
Possibly due to fuel tank
Small amounts of material still decomposing,
this would continue for hours

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Table 6 List of notable post-burn observations common to both tests.

Event
Comments
Spring brake chambers
The spring housing, which was aluminium, was
ruptured
weakened by the heat to the point of failure, resulting in
the escape of the spring. This event was obscured by
smoke.
Tires ruptured
Tire rupture as early as 5 minutes (tractor tires) into the
test and as late as 45 minutes (trailer tires) into the test.
Aluminium components
These include the fuel tanks, some of the trailer walls,
melted
the spring brake chambers, etc.
No evidence of explosion or
No craters evident at ground zero, no loud reports were
detonation
heard, and no blast pressures were detected or recorded.
A very small amount of
Some explosives were insulated either by the ground or
explosive was recovered after by other materials and survived the test. These
each test
explosives remained in the original state, i.e. they did
not melt during the test. However, the quantities were
negligible. In addition a larger quantity of recrystallised
AN was recovered after each of the burns.
Figures 4 and 5 show the temperature records from Test 2. The figures indicate that the maximum burn
temperature was approximately 1200C, which is 200C hotter than the maximum temperatures recorded
earlier in this project.1

1400

1200

1000

TC 1
TC 2
TC 3
TC 4
TC 5

Temperature /C

800

600

400

200

0
11:31:12

11:45:36

12:00:00

12:14:24

12:28:48

12:43:12

12:57:36

13:12:00

-200
Time

Figure 4 Temperature record of Test 2 for thermocouples 1 to 5.

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1400

1200

1000

Temperature /C

800
TC 6
TC 7
TC 8
TC 9
TC 10

600

400

200

0
11:31:12

11:45:36

12:00:00

12:14:24

12:28:48

12:43:12

12:57:36

13:12:00

-200

-400
Time

Figure 5 Temperature record of Test 2 for thermocouples 6 to 10.

Both the video records and the temperature records indicate that most of the explosive was consumed
within 75 minutes of ignition. The remainder of the explosives continued to burn for several hours. The
burn time of tires exceeded that of the explosives, as can be seen by the record of TC 3 in Figure 4 (Note
that TC 2 indicates the temperature of hot metal). There appears to be a correlation between some of the
observed events and the thermocouple records. For example, TC 2, TC 3 and TC 4 indicate that there
was some disturbance approximately 5 to 6 minutes after ignition. This coincides with the observation
of rupturing tires. Furthermore, at about 15 minutes after ignition TC 2 shows a large temperature drop.
This coincides with the observation of a flame jet in the vicinity of the drivers side fuel tank.
The thermocouple data show some major fluctuations in the form of sudden temperature rises and drops.
These are probably due to movement of the explosive, covering and uncovering the thermocouples. The
movement of the explosive may also have dislodged some of the thermocouples. For example, TC 10,
which measured the temperature at the top of the mass of explosives in front of the trailer, was held in
place by the explosives. As these burned down the flame front receded from the tip of the
thermocouple, resulting in reduction in the temperature at this point. At some time however it is
probable that the explosive was no longer capable of supporting the thermocouple, and the thermocouple
fell onto the hot ground. This supposition is supported by the TC 10 trace in Figure 5. At approximately
12:43 the slope of the line flattens and the line becomes smooth indicating that the thermocouple is
measuring the temperature of something with a larger thermal mass than air.

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DISCUSSION
While the primary objective of the two tests described above was to simulate the Walden accident, there
were also three other objectives:
1. To observe the burning characteristics of a full load of explosives.
2. To observe the burning characteristics of a tractor-trailer with the aim of determining how it
contributes to a fire involving explosives, and to observe how individual key components of the
truck respond to the fire.
3. Finally, to attempt to identify a probable mechanism which led from burning to detonation.
Considering the difference in ambient conditions and the slightly different composition of the mass of
explosives, the duration of the two burns was quite similar, 70 and 90 minutes. Determining when a burn
was complete, however, was difficult, as there was no possibility of measuring the remaining explosive
mass at any particular time, and visually the explosives tended to be obscured by white clouds of
decomposition products, which persisted for hours. This made the decision as to the end of the test
subjective and somewhat arbitrary. Therefore the two events, lasting 70 minutes and 90 minutes
respectively, are considered to be essentially equal.
When the duration of these two tests are compared to the duration of the Large Scale Burn Tests
performed in a previous phase of the same study1, it is evident that the rate of consumption of explosives
in the Truck Burn Tests exceeds that of the earlier tests. Table 7 shows that the time required to burn a
large mass (=5000kg) of explosive (assuming that the mass is predominantly ANFO) is approximately
80 10 minutes and is independent of mass.
Table 7 A comparison of burn durations of the Truck Burn Tests and the Large Scale Burn Tests.
Mass
Explosive
Temp
Wind Speed
Burn time
/kg
/C
/km/hr
/min
5000
ANFO
4
16
80
5000
ANFO
7
21
75
10000
ANFO
-3
17
90
10000
ANFO
-28
5
90
20000
ANFO
30
~10
70
13000
ANFO
0
~15
90
4500
CANAMEX
750
MagnasplitTM
It has already been established, in the Phase 1 report (of this study), that the relationship between burn
duration and initial mass is non-linear.2 However, the non-linear nature of this relationship does not
account for the fact that the larger mass of explosives in the truck burn tests was consumed in a shorter
period of time than the smaller mass in the earlier tests. The discrepancy may be due to other factors
such as, a different explosive geometry, higher flame temperatures due to fuel contributions from the
tractor-trailer, and ambient conditions such as temperature and wind velocity. What role these factors
may have played, or whether they are related to the burn rate discrepancy between the two sets of test is
unclear, but temperature records indicated that the maximum flame temperature in the truck burn tests
was approximately 1200C, whereas the maximum temperature in the earlier Large Scale Burn tests was
1000C, (with a few brief spikes up to 1100C). This indicates that flame temperature may have played

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a role, i.e. that the presence of the truck may have influenced the burn rate. Furthermore, the geometry
of the explosive in Truck Burn Tests was quite different from the earlier tests, having a larger exposed
surface, which would definitely result in higher consumption rates.
The alternative is that the difficulty in determining when the test is complete is the dominant factor. It
may be the case that the 5000 kg tests (as an example) were completed after 60 minutes, but the smoke
from burning tires and the decomposition products of AN that had melted and run-off from the main pile
obscured the fact that the test was over.
In both of the Truck Burn Tests the explosives burned calmly and evenly without any evidence of
popping or sputtering. The flame colour ranged from orange to bright yellow, approaching a white
in the most intense portions of the fire. Based on a review of the video records, there was no obvious
difference in the burning characteristics of the explosives in Test 1 and in Test 2. The fact that the
explosives burned without sputtering or popping is relevant to the eyewitness accounts at the Walden
site, some of which included statements to the effect that the explosives were popping and shooting in a
manner similar to that of roman candles.3 This behaviour was not observed during any of the testing in
either Phase 2 or Phase 3. The obvious inference from this is that it was not the explosives that were
popping but something else, possibly some component of the truck.
When considering the possibility that a fragment(s) from the rupture of a truck component caused the
initiation of the explosive (i.e. caused the detonation), one must take into account the following factors
1.
2.
3.
4.

The kinetic energy of the fragment

The cross-sectional area of the fragment
The proximity/trajectory of the source of the fragment to the molten explosives (i.e. the
probability of a fragment striking the molten explosive)
The timing with respect to formation of the fragment and the sensitisation of the explosives.

Items 1 and 2 have been discussed in an earlier report1, and Item 3 is self-evident. The last item requires
further investigation. The event path to initiation by fragment impact must go through the following
stages:
1.

2.

3.

The process starts with a fire; the most probable initial fuel is the diesel on the truck. The fire
eventually ignites the explosives, which melt and burn. Various truck components contribute to
the heat of the fire, primarily aluminium and fibreglass body parts and rubber tires.
The explosive becomes more sensitive as it is heated. Above 220C the AN begins to
decompose rapidly, resulting in the formation of gas bubbles within the liquid AN. The gas
bubbles greatly increase the shock sensitivity of the AN. In its molten state the explosives may
form pools by flowing into depressions. Similarly, the TNT contained in the slurry explosive will
melt above 80C. It has been previously demonstrated that the TNT contained in AquamexTM
can separate out when the slurry is heated.4 Molten TNT could pool in a similar manner to AN.
The fire also heats up various truck components to the point of rupture causing the formation of
fragments. The timing of the rupture depends on the particular component and its proximity to
the heat source. The mass and velocity of the fragments also depend on the component in
question.

For a detonation to occur, the actions 2 and 3 must occur with the correct timing. That is, the explosives

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must be sufficiently sensitised and in the appropriate position and geometry, at the time that a truck
component ruptures forming a fragment of critical surface area and velocity, to result in initiation of the
explosives due to fragment impact.
A review of the test videos indicates that the following truck components ruptured violently:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Tires
Spring brake chambers (emergency brake)
Engine cooling system
Fuel tanks

Of these four components, the rupture of the tires appears to be the most probable source of initiation
stimulus. The fact that there are eighteen tires on a tractor-trailer means that there are eighteen
opportunities for a tire rupture to cause an impact, which results in a detonation. This means that there
are eighteen opportunities for the formation of a fragment of sufficient energy, at the critical time, to
cause initiation of the explosive. Furthermore, as indicated by the observed results, the rupture of the
tires appears to be the most energetic of the component failure events, resulting in shaking of the entire
trailer. Finally, relating to the actual accident, the noise associated with the rupturing of several tires
could account for the popping noises heard just prior to the detonation at Walden.
The other major components, which must be considered as potential initiation source, are the spring
brake chambers. These have already been shown to have sufficient energy to cause the initiation of
molten TNT and potentially, molten ANFO.1 Figure 6 shows components of a spring brake chamber
after the first truck burn test. The image verifies that spring brake chambers rupture under conditions
similar to those of during the Walden accident. Unfortunately the maximum velocity achieved by the
components such as that shown in Figure 6 could not be determined because smoke and flames obscured
the events. Figures 7 and 8 show the trucks after the tests had been completed.

Figure 6 Spring Brake Chamber components after Truck Burn 1.

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Figure 7 Post-test view of Test 1. AN still decomposing in background

Figure 8 Post-test view of Test 2.

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CONCLUSIONS
Neither of the two truck burns resulted in a detonation, in spite of the fact that the test was configured to
maximize this possibility. In both tests the explosives burned relatively calmly for a period of
approximately eighty minutes, and continued to smoulder for 24 hours.
The fire did result in the violent rupture of various truck components including, the tires and the spring
brake chambers. It has been shown in a previous test program that the spring brake chambers may be
capable of initiating molten TNT and molten ANFO.1 It has not yet been demonstrated that exploding
tires have this capability, although they may be the most likely cause of the initiation of the explosives
(and thus the detonation) in the Walden incident.
In spite of these two failed attempts at generating a detonation, it is still believed that the most likely
cause of the detonation at Walden was a fragment impact. Earlier testing has demonstrated that ANFO
cannot be heated to its critical (for detonation) temperature, by heat sources similar to a diesel fire,
without heavy confinement.2 The mass of adjacent explosive appears to be insufficient confinement, that
is, the explosives do not appear to be capable of self-confinement. Furthermore, no truck/explosive
configuration can be realistically conceived of providing sufficient confinement.
Conversely, it has been demonstrated that there are several fragment impact scenarios that realistically
could lead to the detonation of molten explosives. However, these scenarios are extremely difficult to
recreate.

REFERENCES
1

von Rosen, B., Contestabile E., and Lightfoot, P., Investigation of ANFOs Behavior Under
Various Conditions, Phase 2 Report, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, Natural Resources
Canada, CERL Report # 2002-27, Ottawa, July 2002.

von Rosen, B., Contestabile, E., Lightfoot, P. and Barker, D., Investigation of ANFOs Behavior
Under Various Conditions, Phase 1 Report, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, Natural
Resources Canada, CERL Report # 2000-12, Ottawa, April 2000. Transport Canada Report, TP
13602E.

Page, A., Walden Truck Incident, August 5th, 1998: Onsite Investigation Assessment of Post
Detonation Effects, Explosives Regulatory Division, Natural Resources Canada, November, 1998.

Lightfoot, P., Fouchard, R., Segregation of TNT following the Thermal Breakdown of AquamexTM
Implications for the Walden Investigation, CERL Report # 2001-15(CF), June 2001.

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