For Academic Purposes Only

Elizabeth (Betsy) Miller, SEST 561, Fall 2011

UNCLASSIFIED

February 10, 2012

ACTION MEMO FOR ROSE GOTTEMOELLER,

Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verifications and Compliance (AVC)
FROM:

T/AVC/NSP/NMA Elizabeth H. Miller,

Director, Office of Multilateral and Nuclear Affairs

SUBJECT:

Updated U.S. Draft Submission of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

Recommendation: The Department of State should spearhead U.S. efforts to submit an updated
draft of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to the Conference on Disarmament. The new
draft should reflect the following changes:
A requirement for ratification by all nuclear powers, including non-signatories of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
A provision for the elimination of weapons-grade fissile materials produced prior
to the ratification of the treaty.
The creation of a working group dedicated towards the global elimination of
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for any civilian purposes.
Approve __________ Disapprove __________
Background: On October 29, 2011, the United Nations First Committee passed a measure
requiring that members of the international Conference on Disarmament (CD) return to
negotiations on a variety of multilateral nuclear issues. i These arms control measures include the
ratification of a FMCT to ban the production of uranium enriched to more than 20% in U-235 or
U-233 or plutonium containing less than 80% P-238.ii Your speech to the First Committee earlier
this month reestablished the need for a FMCT to eliminate the production of weapons-grade
materials to impede proliferation efforts and prevent the spread of nuclear materials to non-state
actors and terrorist groups. iii Beyond providing the U.S. and its allies with a heightened sense of
security, the FMCT represents our best hope for global disarmament by diminishing the
likelihood that countries rapidly decreasing arsenals can ever be recreated with existing
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.
Despite the U.N.s efforts to revitalize negotiations on the FMCT, it is unlikely that members of
the CD will quickly reach an agreement on global limitations related to fissile materials. The
United States 2006 draft of the FMCT is the only proposal received by the CD after almost
thirty years of continued disagreement on the provisions of the treaty.iv The Department of State
should submit an updated draft for U.S. representatives to present to the CD for immediate
consideration. This submission of the FMCT should include the following:
1) Ratification by all nuclear powers: The 2006 draft of the FMCT only requires initial
ratification by the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China. It is illogical that the
treaty includes states that already refrain from enriching uranium and plutonium for weapons use

instead of well-known proliferators like Pakistan and Israel. v The FMCT would be most effective
in limiting the fissile material production of the nuclear states that are not allowed to join the
NPT due to weapons testing violations. vi Pakistan, a non-NPT member and the most vocal
opponent of the FMCT, is rapidly producing fissile material and positioning itself to surpass the
United Kingdom and France in the size of its arsenal. vii Although the U.S. has long expressed
concern over the growth of Pakistans arsenal, its reliance on Pakistan in the war in Afghanistan
and the fight against al Qaeda limits Americas ability to pose a unilateral threat. If Pakistan
decides to ratify the FMCT, all treaty members will impose limitations on its government
production of weapons-grade materials, and by extension, reduce opportunities for al Qaeda or
other non-state actors to cultivate nuclear capabilities. However, in order to convince Pakistan
and other non-NPT nuclear states to join the FMCT, the revised draft must address their concerns
related to existing fissile materials for both military and civilian purposes.
2) Gradual elimination of all weapons-grade fissile material: There is little incentive for nonnuclear powers to support the FMCT in its current format. By solely limiting post-ratification
production of weapons-grade materials, the FMCT allows the current nuclear powers to maintain
their capabilities without making progress towards the NPTs goal of global disarmament. viii
Non-NPT nuclear powers also find fault with the treatys failure to impose a draw-down on
existing weapons-grade materials because this approach freezes disparities in nuclear
capabilities. Representatives from Pakistan are opposed to the FMCT for this reason, claiming
that the treaty traps their country in a permanent position of inferiority in the arms race against
India.ix The U.S. Fissile Material Working Group (FMWG) has formulated a strategy to
gradually eliminate all fissile materials which focuses on reducing the number of locations that
fissile material is stored and blending HEU to lessen the global supply. x The new draft treaty
should include these recommendations to secure and reduce materials with additional provisions
to be evaluated at designated dates agreed upon by all ratifying parties.
3) Reduction of HEU for civilian purposes: The responsible use of fissile materials for civilian
nuclear activities can only be guaranteed by eliminating weapons-grade HEU in naval and
research reactors. xi While ratification of the FMCT should not be dependent on the complete
elimination of HEU for civilian use, a working group should be formed to evaluate short-term
and long-term goals to eliminate all global weapons-usable fissile materials. This working group
should be comprised of one representative from each nuclear weapons state and three rotating
representatives from non-nuclear states. In order to ensure the success of the FMCT, the working
groups focus would eventually transcend the elimination of HEU from ships and submarines to
explore ways to stop spent fuel reprocessing and rid the world of plutonium. xii When the FMCT
goes through the ratification process again in fifteen years, the committee should present their
findings and suggest amendments pursuant of eliminating all global weapons-grade materials for
military and civilian use.
Summary: The FMCT has the ability to achieve disarmament goals that have eluded the NPT,
but only if it avoids the discriminatory provisions inherent to the latter treaty. The FMCT should

adhere to an inclusionary mindset by requiring that all nuclear states ratify the treaty and
providing incentives to join with the assurance of greater parity among both nuclear and nonnuclear powers.
i

"Global Security Newswire - U.N. Panel Presses for Action at Conference on Disarmament." NTI - Global Security
Newswire. October 31, 2011. Accessed October 31, 2011.
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/siteservices/print_friendly.php?ID=nw_20111028_4756.
ii
"IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials - FMCT." IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials - Mission.
Accessed October 30, 2011. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/fmct/fmct/fmct.php.
iii
Gottemoeller, Rose. "Remarks by Delegation of the United States of American First Committee." Speech, United
Nations General Assembly, New York City, October 4, 2011.
iv
"FMCT: Chronology." Federation of American Scientists. Accessed November 02, 2011.
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/armscontrol/fmctchron.html.
v
U.S. Congress. Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT). By
Sharon A. Squassoni, Andrew Demkee, and Jill Marie. Parillo. Cong. Rept. RS22474. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006.
vi
International Panel on Fissile Materials. "The Security Benefits of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty." Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, October 31, 2008.
vii
Sanger, David E., and Eric Schmitt. "Pakistani Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy." The New York Times,
February 1, 2011, A ed., sec. 0.
viii
Banning the Production of Fissile Materials: Country Perspectives on the Challenges of a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty. Report. Princeton, NJ: International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2008.
ix
DeYoung, Karen. "Pakistan Doubles Its Nuclear Arsenal." Washington Post, January 31, 2011, A ed., sec. 01.
x
"Policy Recommendations to the Obama Administration." Fissile Materials Working Group. September 2009.
Accessed November 2, 2011. http://www.fissilematerialsworkinggroup.org/SiteFiles/FMWG%20%20Final%20Recommendations_1.pdf.
xi
Maerli, Morten B. "A Pragmatic Approach for Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty." International
Negotiation 6, no. 1 (2001): 124.
xii
Mian, Zia. "Charting a Path toward Elimination Nuclear Weapons." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September
27, 2010.