IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF STOWE

STOW, OHIO / SUMMIT COUNTY

Case: 2015TRD11042
2015CRB4111
Village of Boston Heights
Plaintiff

Judge: Lisa L. Coates

v.
Defendant's Motion for
Disqualification of private attorney
for violation R.C. 2938.13; Violation
D.R. 8.4; Sanctions

Eric J. Brewer
Defendant

The Defendant moves the Court for disqualification and removal of private attorney Thomas DiCaudo
as the alleged prosecutor of the Village of Boston Heights' mayor's court for violation of R.C. 2938.13, and
for misconduct pursuant to Disciplinary Rule 8.4.
All the acts combined together within this pleading describe constitutional, statutory and rule violations
knowingly committed by private attorney DiCaudo, who has been retained by the Village of Boston Heights as a
private lawyer to prosecute the Defendant and other Ohioans who are unaware his law firm is also contracted to
perform legal counsel services that are incompatible with the duties of a prosecutor.
The acts described within have created an extreme prejudice against the Defendant and deprived him of
the opportunity to interact with an appointed official who has been duly-authorized; and one who has sworn
allegiance to performing the office of prosecutor's administration of justice duties.
Statement of Facts and Law
Defendant alleges that Attorney Thomas DiCaudo is operating in violation of R.C. 2938.13 as a private
attorney prosecuting the Defendant for allegedly violating village ordinances and the state of Ohio's general
laws. His law firm of DiCaudo, Pitchford & Yoder is also under contract to perform legal counsel duties.
The two lawyer positions are incompatible and operate in conflict with each other. The prosecutor is
supposed to administer justice pursuant to Disciplinary Rule 3.8 and serve as a reviewing official of citizen
complaints against government officials and other citizens pursuant to R.C. 2935.09.
The legal counsel described under R.C. 733.48 goes to great lengths, as Mr. DiCaudo's firm advertises,

to launch vigorous attacks against allegations of police misconduct.

The same person administering justice also has a contract to obstruct it. Mr. DiCaudo, as the the village
of Boston Heights' mayor's court prosecutor and legal counsel law firm owner, doesn't tell Defendants he's
wearing two hats that conflict with each other when he's meeting with citizens police have cited who want to
plead not guilty. This Defendant only learned DiCaudo didn't consider himself to be a sworn official on
February 1, 2016 during a pre-trial hearing when he asked the private lawyer for public records.
I'm not an official he told the Defendant as he refused to cooperate in delivering the public records he'd
requested.
The private attorney has presented himself to the Defendant and the Court as the Village of Boston
Heights' mayor's and municipal court prosecutor. The assumption has been that he's duly-appointed, sworn and
bonded to perform the duties of a public office created under Ohio's constitution and general laws.
The Defendant's undenied January 19, 2016 motion to compel the private attorney to deliver evidence
shared several captioning and party inconsistencies in the form of pleadings. The form of pleadings are
styled as if the law firm is operating on behalf of the village in a private, not public, capacity.
R.C. 2938.13 is clear and unambiguous as an instruction to the Court.
... the magistrate or judge shall not permit prosecution of any criminal case by private
attorney employed or retained by a complaining witness.
The Defendant believes evidence proves Mr. DiCaudo should be taken at his word, and this Court should
acknowledge that he is a private attorney, not a public official as he's claimed.
The Defendant also wants the conflict on the record as it pertains to Mr. DiCaudo's dual and incompatible
roles as prosecutor and legal counsel. There's no possible way for any defendant to have confidence that a
prosecutor is administering justice when his law firm advertises the following justice-obstructing services.
When a law enforcement officer, correctional facility or municipality is facing potential
liability in a claim involving alleged unreasonable search and seizure, cruel and unusual
punishment, excessive police force, police misconduct, inadequate public policy or other
wrongdoing, our team of trial lawyers evaluates the case for qualified or absolute
immunity, timeliness or other strategic defenses. If such immunities are unavailable, the
lawyers at DiCaudo, Pitchford & Yoder go to great lengths to ensure our clients' interests
are preserved through vigorous attacks against the allegations and preparing our client
for litigation.
The examples of the private attorney's justice obstructing misconduct is even more abundant than the

information in this pleading.

The private attorney, as an example, told this Defendant on December 12 that he'd reject any R.C.
2935.09 complaint filed against a police officer sight unseen. He's refused to examine the Defendant's evidence
in the light most favorable to him, or to examine it in the light that Boston Heights police officers deprived him
of his constitutional rights and violated state and federal laws.
The Defendant's encounter with village police was on October 23, 2015. The private lawyer has known
in writing the type of records the Defendant was seeking from a 6-page letter he received by email on December
2. Another 3-page January 5, 2016 Brady request for information spelled out the specific records he sought, as
well as a January 19th motion to compel. Even the Defendant's motion in limine identified records he sought.
The Defendant couldn't understand why the private attorney would knowingly fail to disclose evidence
for more than 104 days, and would claim discoverable evidence was non-discoverable knowing he was lying to
the tribunal in a pleading. It made no sense to the Defendant that a prosecutor administering justice would
threaten him with additional criminal charges twice for including claims of misconduct against the village's
police officers in all his writings and pleadings.
The private attorney didn't even cite the 5 objections in Cr. Rule 16(D) when he filed a sham pleading
stating that the dash cam, body cam, vehicle inventory and audio recordings of the conversations between police
were not discoverable evidence. He just offered the lame excuse to the Court that he was gonna give the
Defendant the evidence he'd just described as non-discoverable; thus far without sanctions.
The only times the private attorney has responded is when the Defendant has been forced to file
pleadings with the Court exposing his Disciplinary Rule 8.4 misconduct. Nothing about his performance is
consistent with the duties of a prosecutor. His acts are, however, compatible with the shocking and justice
obstructing language in his law firm's marketing brochure for the services he provides as legal counsel.
Defendant believes a Court review of the statutes that create and define the duties of the offices of
solicitor, city director of law, prosecutor of the mayor's court and the role of legal counsel, in comparison to the
acts Mr. DiCaudo has performed, will confirm that he is operating privately as an attorney under rules of his
own construction, and has not performed the statutory duties of the office of prosecutor.

I. Ohio law makes the solicitor and city director of law the mayor and municipal court prosecutor
Mr. DiCaudo advertises himself as the prosecutor for the Village of Boston Heights on the law firm's
website. He is not the village's solicitor or city director of law. That job belongs to his law partner, Marshall
Pitchford.
R.C. 2938.13 is an unsuspended general law that instructs the magistrate or judge on which attorney is
authorized by general law to prosecute violations of municipal ordinances and statutes.
In any case prosecuted for violation of a municipal ordinance the village solicitor or city
director of law, and for a statute, he or the prosecuting attorney, shall present the case for the
municipal corporation and the state respectively, but either may delegate the responsibility to
some other attorney in a proper case, or, if the defendant be unrepresented by counsel may with
leave of court, withdraw from the case. But the magistrate or judge shall not permit prosecution
of any criminal case by private attorney employed or retained by a complaining witness.
R.C. 705.11 is under the heading, Village solicitor or city director of law duties.
The village solicitor or city director of law shall act as the legal advisor to and attorney for the
municipal corporation, and for all officers of the municipal corporation in matters relating to their
official duties. He shall prepare all contracts, bonds, and other instruments in writing in which the
municipal corporation is concerned, and shall indorse on each his approval of the form and the
correctness thereof. No contract with the municipal corporation shall take effect until the approval
of the village solicitor or city director of law is indorsed thereon. He or his assistants shall be the
prosecutor in any police or municipal court, and shall perform such other duties and have such
assistants and clerks as are required or provided.
R.C. 733.52 further instructs the Court on which attorney is authorized by general law to prosecute
mayor's court cases.
"The city director of law as prosecuting attorney of the mayor's court shall prosecute all cases
brought before the court, and perform the same duties, as far as they are applicable thereto, as
required of the prosecuting attorney of the county. The director of law or the assistants whom
he designates to act as prosecuting attorneys of the mayor's court shall receive such
compensation for the service provided by this section as the legislative authority of the city
prescribes, and such additional compensation as the board of county commissioners allows."
II. Prosecutors and assistants are appointed
The Defendant acknowledges that R.C. 733.621 authorizes Mr. Pitchford, in his official capacity as the
statutory village's chief legal officer to appoint a law partner as an assistant.
All statutes point to the relationship between the Village and the private lawyer holding an office
authorized under the constitution and state laws as being an appointment that comes with a requirement to be
administered an oath of office.

Under R.C. 733.621, Appointment of assistants or employees.

As used in this section, "chief legal officer" means a city director of law, village solicitor, or
similar chief legal officer of a municipal corporation. Subject to section 2921.421 of the Revised
Code, a chief legal officer of a municipal corporation may appoint, as an assistant legal officer,
prosecutor, clerk, stenographer, or other employee, a person who is an associate or partner of, or
who is employed by, the chief legal officer, assistant legal officer, or prosecutor in the private
practice of law in a partnership, professional association, or other law business arrangement. In a
municipal corporation having an official who is designated as prosecutor and who has authority
to appoint assistants and employees, the prosecutor may appoint, as an assistant prosecutor,
clerk, stenographer, or other employee, a person who is an associate of, or is employed by, the
chief legal officer, the prosecutor, an assistant legal officer, or an assistant prosecutor in the
private practice of law in a partnership, professional association, or other law business
arrangement.
In the heading and within the body of R.C. 733.621 above are the words appointment and appoint.
There are more duties imposed upon the person holding office as prosecutor, which is at least a claim
that exists on the private lawyer's website as a description of his relationship with the village.
The Defendant notes that R.C. 701.01(A), General provisions definitions, defines person. The definition
applies to all references to person in the appropriate sections of R.C. Title 7.
In the interpretation of Title VII of the Revised Code, unless the context shows that another
meaning was intended: (A) "Person" includes a private corporation.
III.

An appointment to prosecutor comes with an oath of office and bond requirement

After an appointment to an office R.C. 3.22 instructs the Court on what shall take place before the
person begins performing the office's duties.
"Each person chosen or appointed to an office under the constitution or laws of this state,
and each deputy or clerk of such officer, shall take an oath of office before entering upon
the discharge of his duties...
R.C. 3.23 is under the heading "Contents of oath of office" and instructs that,
"...the oath of office of every other officer, deputy, or clerk shall be to support the
constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, and faithfully to discharge
the duties of the office."
R.C. 309.03 requires the "person" appointed prosecutor to obtain and sign a bond, and be administered an
oath of office pursuant to R.C. 3.22 and 3.23. R.C. 733.52 specifically names R.C. 3.22 and 3.23 as additional
mandatory duties imposed upon the "office" of prosecutor.
Mr. Pitchford or Mr. DiCaudo's bonds and oaths are supposed to be deposited with the county treasurer.
The heading is identified as "Bond of prosecuting attorney oath" and remains unsuspended by the general

assembly since October 1, 1953.

Before entering upon the discharge of his duties, the prosecuting attorney shall give a bond,
signed by a bonding or surety company approved by the court of common pleas or the probate
court and authorized to do business in this state, or, at his option, signed by two or more
freeholders having real estate in the value of double the amount of the bond over and above all
encumbrances to the state. Such bond shall be in a sum not less than one thousand dollars, to be
fixed by the court of common pleas or the probate court and conditioned that such prosecuting
attorney will faithfully discharge all the duties enjoined upon him by law, and pay over all
moneys received by him in his official capacity. The expense or premium for such bond shall be
paid by the board of county commissioners, and shall be charged to the general fund of the
county. Such bond, with the approval of such court and the oath of office required by sections
3.22 and 3.23 of the Revised Code indorsed thereon, shall be deposited with the county
treasurer.
The duty upon the "solicitor" as an "officer" of the municipal corporation to give bond is also found in
R.C. 733.69 under the heading, "Bond of municipal officers."
Each officer of a municipal corporation required by law or ordinance to give bond shall do so
before entering upon the duties of the office, except as otherwise provided in Title VII [7] of the
Revised Code. The legislative authority thereof may at any time require each officer to give a
new or additional bond. Each bond except that of the municipal auditor or municipal clerk, upon
its approval, shall be delivered to the auditor or clerk, who shall immediately record it in a record
provided for that purpose and file and carefully preserve it in his office. The bond of the auditor
or clerk shall be delivered to the municipal treasurer, who shall in like manner record and
preserve it.
The city director of law is an "officer" of the Village under R.C. 733. The authority, qualifications and
duties of the office are found in R.C. 733.49 through 733.54. The village solicitor's duties have previously been
discussed.
It appears this state's general laws required Mr. DiCaudo to be "appointed" as an assistant to Mr. Pitchford,
and to have been administered an "oath of office" before he began performing the duties of an appointed
prosecutor.
IV. State law would have made DiCaudo the solicitor's assistant prosecutor
The Defendant sees other statutory violations which affirm his allegation that Mr. DiCaudo is operating
privately as an attorney in obstruction of the duties of the office of prosecutor created under the constitution or
laws of this state.
The title of solicitor and director of law are interchangeable and are higher in rank than what should
have been an appointed assistant prosecutor's job being performed by Mr. DiCaudo. Though Mr. DiCaudo
may be the supervisory lawyer in the firm since his name comes first, Pitchford in his capacity as the

village's solicitor performs the statutory role of supervisory lawyer over DiCaudo as the statutory
prosecutor of the mayor's court.
Mr. DiCaudo is officially solicitor Pitchford's assistant pursuant to R.C. 705.11, R.C. 733.51, R.C.
733.52, so his claim of being the prosecutor without also being the solicitor on the law firm's website is a
misrepresentation. Disciplinary Rule 5.1 better defines the official and conflicting supervisory relationship
between the two lawyers.
A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyers violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional
Conduct if either of the following applies: (1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable
managerial authority in the law firm or government agency in which the other lawyer practices,
or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
The Court should take note that R.C. 733.52 required Mr. Pitchford, in his capacity as the Village's
prosecutor, to perform the same duties, as far as they are applicable thereto, as required of the prosecuting
attorney of the county."
V. The "solicitor" hasn't endorsed a single document DiCaudo filed with the Court
R.C. 705.11 requires that the solicitor prepare all ... instruments in writing in which the municipal
corporation is concerned, and shall indorse on each his approval of the form and the correctness thereof.
The statute further instructs this honorable Court that, No contract with the municipal corporation shall
take effect until the approval of the village solicitor or city director of law is indorsed thereon. He or his
assistants shall be the prosecutor in any police or municipal court.
None of the instruments in writing Mr. DiCaudo has filed with the Court were prepared or indorsed
[sic] by supervisory lawyer Pitchford in the official capacity of solicitor as required by R.C. 705.11.
Even if R.C. 733.51 more aptly applies to the Village under the statutory plan of government upon which
it's organized, the city director of law prepares all instruments in writing, serves as mayor's court prosecutor
and can designate assistants.
All statutes governing the city director of law or solicitor prescribe the R.C. 2938.13 duty for that
appointed official to present the case for the municipal corporation and the state respectively.
A review of the pleadings Mr. DiCaudo has filed with the Court aren't captioned in the name of the

municipal corporation and the state respectively, nor do they indicate the involvement of the solicitor in his
capacity as prosecutor as required by R.C. 2938.13.
All captions point to either the state and DiCaudo, Pitchford & Yoder, respectively, instead of
identifying Pitchford as the appointed solicitor and supervising attorney, and DiCaudo as his appointed
assistant pursuant to R.C. 705.11, R.C. 733.51 and R.C. 733.52.
The form of the documents make no reference to the Village of Boston Heights as the complaining witness
or Pitchford as the solicitor and prosecutor, or DiCaudo as his assistant. Obviously, the law firm cannot be the
complaining witness or substituted as the prosecutor.
VI. Conclusion
This Defendant can find no constitutional amendment, federal or state law that resembles the acts Mr.
DiCaudo is performing while he holds a public office this state's authorized lawmakers created and gave
specific mandatory duties for persons holding it to perform.
From his knowing failure to disclose evidence, to his sham pleadings, to his lying before the tribunal, to
his claim to the Defendant that he is not an official of the village of Boston Heights, though he claims to hold
a statutory office that belongs to the municipal corporation; Mr. DiCaudo operates like a rogue private lawyer
going through great lengths to launch a vigorous attack against a citizen's claim that Boston Heights police
violated laws and his constitutional rights instead of as an administrator of justice.
The private attorney has complied with no constitutional mandate, no federal nor state law, nor the
criminal or civil rules governing this official proceeding; nor the applicable disciplinary rules and local rules of
court. None of his pleadings have been supported with a reference to a single law pursuant to Rule 11, as he
operates in complete disregard to anything that resembles a statute. In violation of the local rules he
contemptuously fails to identify the judge by her full name.
All the statutes cited above cannot be suspended by errant public officials and corrupt private lawyers, or the
Court.
Article 1.18 of Ohio's constitution under the heading Suspension of laws, sets forth the following.
No power of suspending laws shall ever be exercised, except by the General Assembly.
None of the laws, procedural and disciplinary rules, and the mandatory duties associated with them, have

been suspended by the General Assembly of this state. The Defendant cites Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy
Dist. (1971), 27 Ohio St. 2d 102, 56 O.O. 2d 58, 271 N.E. 2D 834. The Supreme Court of Ohio stated,
"... that "the word 'shall' shall be construed as mandatory unless there appears a clear and
unequivocal legislative intent that [it] receive a construction other than [its] ordinary usage."
Accord State v. Golphin (1998), 81 Ohio St. 3d 543, 545-546, 692 N.E. 2d 608.
The Defendant moves this honorable Court to disqualify private attorney Mr. DiCaudo in his capacity as
an alleged prosecutor for the Village of Boston Heights, and to declare the office void. This renders all his acts
ultra vires and ab initio as he and other judicial officers have failed, from the beginning of his alleged
appointment, to perform the mandatory duties of the prosecutor's office.
The Defendant believes this will be the Court's first step in addressing the harm that has come to thousands
of Ohio motorists who were deceived into believing the village's judicial officers were duly-authorized.
Mr. DiCaudo must be charged with violating Disciplinary Rule 8.4 and obstruction of official business for
his knowing and reckless violation of R.C. 2938.13.
Respectfully,

_________________________________________
Eric Jonathan Brewer, Pro Se
11903 Lenacrave Street
Cleveland, OH 44105
Tel: 216-310-1110
Email: ejon1953@gmail.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The Defendant's motion for disqualification and sanctions was delivered by email to
tdicaudo@dpylaw.com, Village of Boston Heights Prosecutor Thomas DiCaudo on this 22nd day of
February, 2016.

Signed __________________________________
Eric Jonathan Brewer
11903 Lenacrave Street
Cleveland, OH 44105
Tel: 216-310-1110
Email: ejon1953@gmail.com