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The Bhagvad Gita has been interpreted by its admirers in diverse
ways, and critical scholarship has estimated its worth in varying degrees. As a philosophico-religious document of ancient India it has
occupied a prominent place in the lives of millions. Scholars have
quarrelled over its central teaching. It is not the intention of this
paper to enter into that controversy. This paper has the modest aim
of examining critically the Gita doctrine of Niskama-Karma as propounded in the text and then to offer an alternative theory which, in
my view, will be better suited to meet the demands and challenges of
a changing social situation.
In the light of the context and the setting in which the doctrine is
preached it is well-nigh safe to say that the Gita is an exhortation
to duty and a stirring call to action. Krishna undertakes the task of
persuading Arjuna to shake off inertia and perform his duty in a
manly way. This is supposed to be a moral persuasion because it is
aimed at convincing Arjuna and converting him on rational grounds.
The actual arguments may have a mixture of reason and emotional
appeal, but the impression given is that of rational justification for
moral action. It is therefore set out as a philosophy of moral action.
However it is evident to any student of the Gita that moral action
there has not been conceived in isolation but is viewed in the larger
context firstly of a metaphysical commitment derived from protoSamkhya and Upanisadic doctrines and secondly of a theistic faith
in a personal God.
The Gita believes in status quo and sets a high value on social
stability. It accepts the established social order and derives the content of duty from the caste structure and from the notion of different stages of life. The ideal of lokasamagraha is held in high esteem
and Krishna appeals to Arjuna to act in its name. (111. 20). Its doctrine of Niskama-Karma or disinterested action can be understood
only in the light of the ultimate end which is conceived as Moksa.
Moksa means liberation of the empirical self from all bondage to
the not-self - a total emancipation from the phenomenal world cul*Section I of this chapter appeared in the Quest, no. 42 (1964), 23-25, Calcutta, India,
under the title "Doctrine of Niskama-Karma: An Alternative Interpretation." Reprinted
by permission of the editors of the Quest.
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and void. Thus the Gita, in effect, encourages a kind of spiritual selfconsciousness which is inimical to moral action.
Secondly it is said that the Gita's doctrine of ethics is deontological since it e x h ~ r t sus to do our duties because they are duties
without regard to any consequences they lead to. This would work
only when we assume, as the Gita does, that the content of duty is
derived from the social organization and is in strict conformity with
svadharma and svabhava. However, in actual life moral situations are
always problematic and for their solution the existing code of duties
offers very little, if any, guidance at all. Such a problem is faced by
Arjuna as the opening Chapter of the Gita so ably dramatizes. Hence
the main issue is how to solve a moral problem and how to act in a
moral situation. It appears to me that a rational appraisal and evaluation of the problem is called for in the light of the conditions
under which one is to act (here svadharma and svabhava are relevant) and in the light of the consequences which are likely to ensue
and which one thinks desirable or undesirable. If this is admitted
then in order to resolve a moral problem one should act after a
proper appraisal of the situation to achieve the end or the goal which
rational reflection shows to be most desirable. In other words one
should have a firm commitment to achieve the goal and should show
all the care and concern for its fulfilment. One would wonder what
exactly the Gita means by saying that one should not care for the
fruits of one's actions (phalasa) in the performance of duty (11. 47,
48). If it means that one should not be committed to the fulfilment
of the goal then it is almost asking for the impossible as it would
undermine the very need for moral action.
It should not be forgotten that the Gita purports to offer guidance in times of social and moral crisis. When one faces conflicting
obligations and is not able to decide between competing goods, and
in short, when one is confronted with a crisis of the spirit, one needs
to know what is the right thing to do. Arjuna faced such a crisis and
stood in need of enlightenment with respect to the right course to
follow in the specific situation portrayed in the Mahabharata. Now
it appears to me that while Arjuna's situation is revolutionary,
fraught with the gravest of consequences and is such that its moral
significance is uncertain and indeterminate, the advice given by
Krishna is in terms of a static code of duties determined by svadharma. Certainly such a static code of duties is unfit to meet the
dynamic situation faced by Arjuna otherwise he would not have
asked for any moral advice at all. One has a feeling that the whole
tenor of the advice given by Krishna is in terms of a transcendental
- which could not; it was supposed, be accounted for b y known factors in their present lives. And therefore, -the law of karma with a
belief in a succession of births and deaths was postulated to explain
the varying fortunes of various human beings. The Gita, not being a
systematic pMlosophica1 work, wavers between two possible interpretations of the doctrine of karma,Some passages (IV. 9 and VI. 4045) suggest that the bonds of karma produce their effects automatically by their own inherent potencies and that the present configuration of the world is due to the effect of karma. Other passages (XVI.
19) point out that it is God who reward's and punishes bad deeds of
persons and brings out the good and bad births associated therewith.
The doctrine, shorn of its metaphysical overtones; derives its plausibility from some obvious emyirical observations and considerations.
It is commonplace to find that our words, thoughts, and d d s l a v e
an impress on our character and shape our destiny in some form. Nobody remains the,same for having said, thought, or done something.
Knowingly or unknowingly, wittingly or unwittingly, we are forging
our habits of thought and action. In this manner one cannot escape
the effect of one's thoughts and actions on one's life, and it is pure
fancy to think otherwise. Secondly, though all thoughts and actions
are personal and individual, they are embedded in a social situation
and have social consequences - some of which are determiaable
while others remain nebulous and ambiguous. Therefore, in this
sense also our. deeds bring about natural and social consequences
including responses from other human beings. It may be legitimate
to hold that the consequences of our deeds, in these two senses, follow us as naturally as the night follows the .day.
The question is whether these obvious empirical considerations
constitute an adequa'te ground for sue$ a belief. In the absence of
decisive empirical evidence for remembering the experiences of one's
previous existence it is difficult to answer the question in the affirmative.' Moreover, the supposed existence in previous births runs
into the difficult conceptual problems of the nature of the self, personal identity, and the mechanism of carrying memories from one
birth to another together with the problem of their mutual relationship. This is not all. The hypothesis of karma has to sort out the
notions of good and bad deeds, right and wrong actions and relate
1 I am aware of the empirical research being done in various countries-of the world
on the alleged hypothesis of reincarnation. In connection with the whole field of psychical research a recent book, Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain by Sheila
Ostrander and ,Lynn Schroeder makes interesting reading. It has been published by
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., in 1970.
them to the jays and sorrows, pleasures and pains, and the various
ups and' downs of life. It has to disentangle and illuminate the intricate web of human existence with its tragedies and comedies, and its
well-nigh unintelligible contingencies and vicissitudes. Faced with
such a stupendous task the Indian thinkers of the ancient past (including the author of the Gita) adopted, on the one hand, a static
concept of right action in terms of conventional class duties and
caste duties (svadharma and svabhava), and on the other hand,
resorted' to a metaphysical explanation for the gross inequalities and
manifest injustices of human life in terms of the operation of a mysterious "law" of karma. Even the historical Buddha who rejected
traditional caste-ism and broomed away the mystical lore of Vedic
sacrifices, accepted uncritically the so-called law of karma. We can
therefore discern in traditional Indian thought and culture a peculiar
combination of static social morality with an individual quest for
transcendence of the whole social order for the attainment of ultimate freedom (moksa or nirvana) which is supposed to terminate
the whole cycle of births and' deaths(samsara). Historically speaking
such a combination led to the total neglect of a historical and dynamic analysis of society and morals. The sages of the Upanisads, the
author of the Gita and the historical Buddha truly recognized change
and flux as a pervasive feature of natural and social reality. But instead of analyzing these changes in terms of natural and socioeconomic and historical factors so as to guide these towards consciously adopted desirable goals, they ridiculed and devaluated the
whole flux of natural and social order as mere phenomenon to be
transcended by the attainment of ultimate freedom - thus leaving
the changing world without an intelligent control and guidance. No
wonder they discovered the cause of man's varying fortunes and misfortunes in his ignorance (avidya) of ultimate reality, of the transcendent self or of nirvana. Thus a metaphysical cause (Ignorance of
reality) was substituted for a slow, careful, and painstaking analysis
of economic, political, social, and historical factors which determined
the fate of millions. They adopted a wholesale metaphysical remedy
for the evils of the temporal world of change - namely, a withdrawal of personal involvement in social affairs together with the performance of fixed static caste duties in a mechanical but nonattached
manner. This heightened and intensified awareness of one's own
transcendental freedom (moksa) meant in practica either sheer hypocrisy or a passive acceptance of one's fate according to the mysterious operation of the law of karma. Was such an attitude caused by
the tropical climate of India or by an inveterate metaphysical trait
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of the Aryan mind in search of ultimate intelligibility, or by a combination of these factors? Or was it after all a result of a "failure of
nerve" in the face of rapid social and political changes involving millions of human beings? However it may have come about it gave to
Indian thought and culture an unhistorical, static, and a transtemporal character. The alleged individual pursuit of the ideal of a transtemporal freedom has diverted much-needed attention from the urgent task of intelligent and cooperative action for bringing about desirable social change. No wonder, the pace of social change in India
has remained to this day terribly and exasperatingly slow. This might
have given rise to its social backwardness and economic poverty which in turn should have confirmed a fatalistic belief in the law of
karma to explain away the miseries and misfortunes of an untold
number of people. Such a circular c a u s a 1i t y has become almost
chronic and vicious.
It will be seen that the foregoing analysis is justified in the light
of the concepts of self, action, and freedom as put forward by the
Gita. The Gita borrows from the Upanisads2 the concept of two selves
- the empirical and the transcendental (11. 17, 20, 22, 24, 25; XIII.
32). It holds that the empirical self (Jiva) is caught up in the causal
nexus and is subject to the cycle of births and d e a t h s (samsara)
while the "real" self remains eternally free, transcendent, pure, and
unaffeoted by the temporal concerns of the former. While the Gita has
not worked out the theoretical problem of the relation between these
two selves (indeed it is doubtful whyther this problem in its traditional formulation can ever be solved satisfactorily) yet it says that
one should lift oneself by one's own efforts and should not degrade
oneself because one's own self is one's friend and one's own self is
one's enemy (VI. 5-6). The Gita, however, repeatedly points out that
though the ultimate ideal is the attainment of transcendent freedom,
yet there is no escape from the performance of one's social duties.
Traditional class duties cannot be circumvented and the social order
is a sine qua non of any quest for transcendence. In this manner the
Upanisadic ideal of pure, and uncompromising transcendence has
been toned down by a recognition of the unavoidable importance of
the performance of social duties. As pointed out above it suggests
tha; one can attain such a freedom by performing one's class duties
in a spirit of nonattachment to the personal and social consequences
of the action. Whether such a combination of the contemplative and
the active ideals is possible or not is a practical question. But the adz Cf. Katha, 11. 18-20, 20-5; 111. 3, 4, 7-8, 10-15; also Mundaka, 111, 1. 1-3.
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D. C. MATHUR.