Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
199067
check and gave her five (5) days from receipt within which to
replace it with cash or managers check. Despite receipt of the
demand letter, Purificacion refused to replace the check giving the
reason that she was not the one who purchased the vehicle. On
January 6, 1998, Nissan filed a criminal case for violation of BP
22 against her.7
During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City
Prosecutor, Purificacion gave P200,000.00 as partial payment to
amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. Thereafter, however,
no additional payment had been made.
After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Purificacion
of the charge, but holding her civilly liable to Nissan. The
dispositive portion of the judgment states that:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING
accused PURIFICACION FELIPE of the crime of Violation of
Batas Pambansa 22. However, accused PURIFICACION FELIPE
is ordered to pay private complainant Nissan Gallery Ortigas the
amount of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P675,000.00) with legal interest per annum, from the filing of the
information until the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.8
Purificacion appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch
105 thereof affirmed the MeTC decision on December 22, 2008.
The RTC ruled that Purificacion was estopped from denying that
she issued the check as a "show check" to boost the credit
standing of Frederick and that Nissan agreed not to deposit the
same.9 Further, the RTC considered Purificacion to be an
accommodation party who was "liable on the instrument to a
holder for value even though the holder at the time of taking the
instrument knew him or her to be merely an accommodation
party."10
Purificacion moved for a reconsideration, but her motion was
denied.
The CA, before whom the case was elevated via a petition for
review, granted the petition on May 20, 2009.1avvphi1 In so
deciding, the CA reasoned out that there was no privity of contract
between Nissan and Purificacion. No civil liability could be
adjudged against her because of her acquittal from the criminal
charge. It was Frederick who was civilly liable to Nissan.11
It added that Purificacion could not be an accommodation party
either because she only came in after Frederick failed to pay the
purchase price, or six (6) months after the execution of the
contract between Nissan and Frederick. Her liability was limited to
her act of issuing a worthless check but by her acquittal in the
criminal charge, there was no more basis for her to be held civilly
liable to Nissan.12 Purificacions act of issuing the subject check
did not, by itself, assume the civil obligation of Frederick to Nissan
payment for his obligation with Nissan. Her claim that she issued
the check as a mere "show check" to boost Fredericks credit
standing was not convincing because there was no credit
standing to boost as her son had already defaulted in his
obligation to Nissan. Had it been issued prior to the sale of the
vehicle, the "show check" claim could be given credence. It was
not, however, the case here. It was clear that she assumed her
sons obligation with Nissan and issued the check to pay it. The
argument that it was a mere "show check" after her son was
already in default its simply ludicrous.
The Court shall not be belabored with the issue of whether or not
Purificacion was an accommodation party because she was not.
Granting that she was, it is with more reason that she cannot
escape any civil liability because Section 2924 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law specifically bounds her to the instrument. The
crux of the controversy pertains to the civil liability of an accused
despite acquittal of a criminal charge. Such issue is no longer
novel. In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in
issuing a check is immaterial. The law has made the mere act of
issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act prescribed by the
legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only
inquiry is whether the law has been breached.25 The lower courts
were unanimous in finding that, indeed. Purificacion issued the
bouncing check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she remains civilly
liable because the act or omission, the making and issuing of the
subject check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently exists.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011
Decision and the October 21, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-08151734, dated December 22, 2008, affirming the Judgment of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City, for Violation of
B.P. 22 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION with respect to the
legal interest which shall be reduced to 6% per annum from
finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.26
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC
GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for
acquittal on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome
(BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the
proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration
because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and
unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she
shot him.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house
appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her
close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her
house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a
pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her
motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was
waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out
of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag,
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where
he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas
rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same
bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that
appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him
about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by
Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the
stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not
have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock
with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the
kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook
that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom
where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the
lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a
blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his
head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to
the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day,
Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as
that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin,
then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a
report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house.
Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina
Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside
the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his
side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of
Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one
corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2)
meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal
pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a
diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end
without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom
was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of
its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before
the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the
presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte
responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had
been dead for two to three days and his body was already
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded
the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed
against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death
was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home
after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her
husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since
it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look
for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not
find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the
Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants request for
her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even
challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead
attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the
light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television
antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to
appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom,
but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on
the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point,
appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave.
Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly
flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom
towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might
as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant testified that
she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since
Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade
cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with
a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant
then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to
pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the
bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her
husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer
where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot,
though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November
19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San
Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her
husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc
City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre
and Marie Bianca.
one Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas
testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by
him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben
replied Why kill me when I am innocent. Basobas thought they
were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road
from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben
were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He
claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken with a
bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben
would always take her back after she would leave him so many
times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it
was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben even
had a wound on the right forehead. He had known the couple for
only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben
became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he
provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her
down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run
home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out,
promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said
after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr.
Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would
enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports.
Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he
was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to
Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the
hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the
Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a
quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help
and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling
with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do
anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this
was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of
Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic
shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through
the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house
and saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa
was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic
Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate
he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went
back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at
8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas
while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located
about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he
knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the
couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben
would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One
time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was
so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He
testified that while Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he
became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, Teody
because that was what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which
means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified
that Ben would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time
she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right
breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr.
Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He
said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of
Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995,
Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben.
They searched in the market place, several taverns and some
other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic
home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house
because she might be battered by her husband. When they got to
the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said
that her husband was already there and was drunk. Miss Arano
knew he was drunk because of his staggering walking and I can
also detect his face. Marivic entered the house and she heard
them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified
that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in
the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband
would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over,
she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived
because the couple were very noisy in the sala and I had heard
something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her
room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a
chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the window grill
and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no
one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left
Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still
quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were
co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his
patient many times and had also received treatment from other
doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November
9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted
upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient
Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and
hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of
Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations
made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist,
he could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the
crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified
to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, whether she
is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the
Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben
died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She
sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were
experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the
morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed that
they might have settled with each other or they might have
forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home
that night it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic
said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as
she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby
was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave
her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always
follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason
why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x
Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun;
she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be
heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his
testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16,
1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a
room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias
Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving
Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and
that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw
the gun away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe
she used to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on
her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was
whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the
drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
10
killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial
court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless
when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed
him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated
to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa
and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had
killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports
in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or,
in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting
in part appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for
the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court
to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as
to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the
examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs.
Natividad Dayan[10]and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on
domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their
documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by
the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form
part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for
this Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to selfdefense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and
Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore
liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by
beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding
evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that
Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the
children of Marivic Genosa.
11
12
the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation,
she is defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low
self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the
female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male;
the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and
false hopes that the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized
by the so-called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1)
the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and
(3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it
could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile
behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his
way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be
abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she
wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the
batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because
her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he
has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to
placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or
physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss
of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from
the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws
emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable,
the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive.
Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of
control and leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by
brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered
woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put
an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the
time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The
battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him,
and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and
the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every
detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it
is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or
intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may
show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it,
begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her
again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and
caring man is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of
the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and
despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth,
though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she
remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he
seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in
this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly
tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a
battered womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are
indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his
nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner
may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither
one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without
the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the
defense presented several witnesses. She herself described her
heart-rending experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent
year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your
husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this
abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and
sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat
me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
13
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are
found in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty
and abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see a
doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
A Yes, sir.
14
Q For what?
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the
patient had hypertension?
A Tension headache.
A Yes, sir.
15
where was his father, then my second child said, he was not
home yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my
eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for
him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this
time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at
Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to
sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was again
drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I
requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because
she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with
you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November
15, 1995 in the evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not
allow her because of Ben.
16
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because
they were scared and he was already holding the bolo.
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben
was carrying that bolo?
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at
you? What else did he do if any?
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the
bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was
going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their
reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry
with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the
bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
17
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look
like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify
as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a
battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five
sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the
former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as
follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife?
Could you in laymans term describe to this Court what her life
was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten
years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot
of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and
to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she
was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family.
The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with
barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight
and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical
abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the
husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying
was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same
time very depressed because she was also aware, almost like
18
xxxxxxxxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of
her husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who
are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she
stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and
battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in
that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about
being battered, it really happened.
19
she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They
had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than
eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and
mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were
in vain. Further quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the
advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in
spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But
incessant battering became more and more frequent and more
severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt
in the Courts mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely
abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the
abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining
her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly
pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant
and necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant be
appreciated without it? The average member of the public may
ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love
a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization?
We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is
her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life
for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted
with the so-called battered wife syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint
should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person.
What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar
experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute
common myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her
research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the
United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with
the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own
interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no
means of escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found
that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and
battered women are in greater danger of dying then.[47]
20
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of
violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In
relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the
death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tensionbuilding phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate
detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single
incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other
words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up
prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to
Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try
to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more
violent) stage?
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and
the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the
following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between
her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope
for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent
was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their
relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?
21
22
23
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
flexed forcibly in her front neck)
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look
like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
COURT INTERPRETER
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe
and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open
the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the
key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3
inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I
smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
24
Epilogue
25
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
December 13, 2011
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to
prove all that it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide
from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals
may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court.
The Facts and the Case
26
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did
not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking selfdefense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime
of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the
penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC
decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of
evidence to support it.[3] Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court
on petition for review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required
Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions
on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum,
he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be
entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new
penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The
language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a
stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under
the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained
once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck
Rufino on the head with a stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is
guilty of frustrated homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower
offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he
may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court.
The Courts Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him
first and that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino
back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of
showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting
injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of selfdefense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the
otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on
the lack of criminal intent of the accused.[4]
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, selfdefense requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or
injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender
employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending
himself did not act with sufficient provocation.[5]
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the
accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other
two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being
appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such
attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical
force or with a weapon.[6]
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element
of unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias
rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab
him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who
started it. Arnels only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified
that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the
middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to
prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and
his companions.[7]
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and
Ananiastestified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their
versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract
from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did
and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnels testimony, the
prosecutions version is more believable and consistent with
reality, hence deserving credence.[8]
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the
aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the
wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could
not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the
accuseds intent to take his victims life. The prosecution has to
prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible
doubt regarding homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill is often
inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used
and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his
victim.[10]
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The
blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the
great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location
of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is
convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of
attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we
27
ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown
by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but
the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the
crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims
wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or
attempted homicide.
xxxx
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the
wounds actually are not fatal on that very day?
28
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals from the judgment of conviction is disqualified from
availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens,
two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now
set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard
position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial
courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to
probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment
imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have
to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for
the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right
to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit
ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where
is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[16] that the probation law requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference
between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found
the accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to
a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight
months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable
penalty.Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal,
seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for
probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted
probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him
right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly
could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail himself of probation. This requirement outlaws the element
of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of
his appealthat when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal,
the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape
hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of
his conviction.[17]
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would
have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice
between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, By
taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that
choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not
dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will
appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option
to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of
correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the
evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable
penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to
bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him
to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the
right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of
probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of
the statutory provisions.[18] As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in
his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded
as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a
criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that
allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the
trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with
the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be
interpreted to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a
penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a
judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct
judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the
wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess
of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a
crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only
committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2
years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight
behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead
29
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was
right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and
four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have
availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The
idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the
penalty he got was not probationable.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accusedappellants for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case
No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal Case No. 21908).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision
dated 29 November 2005 (RTC Decision),1 found accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate,
and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment plus payment of fines and damages. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) in Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated
26 February 2010 (CA Decision),2 affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision. The accused-appellants appealed to this Court by filing
a Notice of Appeal3 in accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court.
The Facts
The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the
CA, are as follows:
BRION,
xxx
SERENO,
30
to Hadja Jarma Lalli who will bring her to Malaysia. Ronnie sent a
text message to Lalli but the latter replied that she was not in her
house. She was at the city proper.
On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening,
Ronnie Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Caete arrived on board a
tricycle driven by Ronnie at the house where Lolita was staying
at Southcom Village. Ronnie asked if Lolita already had a
passport. Lolita said that she will borrow her sisters passport.
Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to Buenavista where Lolitas other
sister, Gina Plando was staying. Her sister Marife Plando was
there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to let her
use Marifes passport. Marife refused but Lolita got the
passport. Marife cried. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita proceeded
toTumaga. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house
of Hadja Jarma Lalli just two hundred meters away from the
house of Ronnie in Tumaga. Ronnie introduced Lolita
to Hadja Jarma, saying Ji, she is also interested in going to
Malaysia. Lolita handed a passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that
it belongs to her sister Marife Plando. Hadja Jarma told her it is
not a problem because they have a connection with the DFA
(Department of Foreign Affairs) and Marifes picture in the
passport will be substituted with Lolitas picture.
Nestor Relampagos arrived driving an owner-type
jeep. HadjaJarma introduced Nestor to Lolita as their financier
who will accompany them to Malaysia. x x x Lolita noticed three
other women in Hadja Jarmashouse. They were Honey, about 20
years old; Michele, 19 years old, and another woman who is
about 28 years old. The women said that they are
fromIpil, Sibugay Province. Ronnie told Lolita that she will have
many companions going to Malaysia to work. They will leave the
next day, June 6, and will meet at the wharf at 2:30 in the
afternoon.
31
32
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accusedappellants over the candid, positive and convincing testimony of
complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The accused, likewise, tried to
prove that Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the
Philippines with four children fathered by four different men.
However, the trial court found these allegations irrelevant and
immaterial to the criminal prosecution. These circumstances,
even if true, would not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of
the accused. The trial court found that the accused, without a
POEA license, conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as
a prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a syndicate.6 The
trial court did not pronounce the liability of accused-at-large
Nestor Relampagos (Relampagos) because jurisdiction was not
acquired over his person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
RTC Decision and found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and
Trafficking in Persons.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in affirming in toto the RTC Decision.
The Ruling of this Court
We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
33
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issu
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the tr
(8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evi
(9)
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the a
contradicted by the evidence on record.37
34
reason, the Court adopts the findings of fact of the trial court, as
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there being no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower courts.
Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal
recruitment, as follows:
[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includesreferring, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
xxx
xxx
35
36
37
December 3, 2014
38
LEONEN, J.:
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their
conversation with accused went as follows:
"Chicks mo dong?"1
With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of
many of our cities, the fate of many desperate women is sealed
and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in the rescue of
two minors from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will be
more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is
committed even though the minor knew about or consented to the
act of trafficking.
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that
they found a prospective subject.13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private
complainants in this case.14 Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo
ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 oclock
A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a
minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different
customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in
Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. (a), of R.A.
9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a
nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in
order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu
City.6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe
Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso
composed the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides
looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with
marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and
25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was
designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of
the police team.10
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street
in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu Citys red light district. Accused
noticed them and called their attention by saying "Chicks mo
dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?).11
39
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed inthe taxi, while she and BBB
went to Room 24. It was in Room 24 where the customer paid
Shirley. The police rushed in and toldAAA and BBB to go to the
other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she
was rescued and not arrested.25
SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but
modified the fine and awarded moral damages. The dispositive
portion of the decision33 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant
appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10 August
2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private
complainants Php150,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the
Court of Appeals noted and gavedue course in its
resolution36 dated January 6, 2014. The case records of CA-G.R.
CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court on March 17,
2014.37
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to
notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental
briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to
confirm the confinement of accused.39
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor
General41 filed their respective manifestations, stating that they
would no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all
issues had been discussed in the appellants brief and appellees
brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated
June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed
accuseds confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women
since October 27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused iswhether the prosecution was
able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accuseds brief, the
sole issue may be dissected into the following:
(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police
was valid, considering that there was no prior surveillance and the
police did not know the subject of the operation;43
40
Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she
was instigated into committing the crime.46 The police did not
conduct prior surveillance and did not evenknow who their subject
was.47 Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged
victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should
be acquitted because the prosecution did notpresent evidence
that would prove she had a history of engaging in human
trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp and
asserted that she was a laundry woman.48 In addition, AAA
admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her
decision to display herself to solicit customers.49
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee
The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee
People of the Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in
convicting accused because witnesses positively identified her as
the person who solicited customers and received money for AAA
and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been
recognized by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto is
valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused
had "fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . ."53
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casios conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (UN CTOC) was "adopted and opened for signature,
ratification and accession"54 on November 15, 2000. The UN
CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and
Components and Ammunition.55
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations
"Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children" (Trafficking Protocol).56 This was
ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The
41
42
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the
crime of trafficking in persons is qualified.
III.
43
44
45
46
47
clauses of P.D. No. 1990 did not specify a period of fifteen (15)
days for perfecting an appeal. 3 It is also urged that "the true
legislative intent of the amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not
apply to petitioner who filed his Petition for probation at the
earliest opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal." 4
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice
Bellosillo in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then asks us to have
recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory construction" that "penal
laws [should] be liberallyconstrued in favor of the accused," and
to avoid "a too literal and strict application of the proviso in P.D.
No. 1990" which would "defeat the manifest purpose or policy for
which the [probation law] was enacted-."
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated
arguments of petitioner's counsel and the dissenting opinion. We
are unable to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands,
in authorizing the trial court to grant probation "upon application
by [the] defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal" and
in reiterating in the proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appealfrom the judgment of
conviction.
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established,
as indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and
Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, but rather to some vague and undefined
time, i.e., "the earliest opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's
appeal. The whereasclauses invoked by petitioner did not, of
course, refer to the fifteen-day period. There was absolutely no
reason why they should have so referred to that period for the
operative words of Section 4 already do refer, in our view, to such
fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute,
strictly speaking; they are not part of the operative language of
the statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the
extent they articulate thegeneral purpose or reason underlying a
new enactment, in the present case, an enactment which
drastically but clearly changed the substantive content of Section
4 existing before the promulgation of P.D. No.
1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific
terms of the statute; in the instant case, the whereas clauses of
P.D. No. 1990 do notpurport to control or modify the terms of
Section 4 as amended. Upon the other hand, the term "period for
perfecting an appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish
specification for the loose language "first opportunity" employed in
the fourth whereas clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course,
a term of art but it is a term of art widely understood by lawyers
and judges and Section 4 of the Probation Law addresses itself
essentially to judges and lawyers. "Perfecting an appeal" has no
sensible meaning apart from the meaning given to those words in
our procedural law and so the law-making agency could only have
intended to refer to the meaning of those words in the context of
procedural law.
48
49
apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal from
the judgment of conviction.
[6]
SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL PADUA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated April 19,
2005 and Resolution[2] dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively
dismissed Michael Paduas petition for certiorari and denied his
motion for reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11,
2004[3] and July 28, 2004[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for
probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan
Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of
violating Section 5,[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
50
SO ORDERED.[20]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same
was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but
the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005,
dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises
the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION
WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH
THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE
RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED
OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.[22]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public
respondent, opted to adopt its Comment[23] as its Memorandum.In
its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE
LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A.
9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME
LAW.
51
II.
SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW HAS
NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.[24]
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in
dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts
order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right
under Rep. Act No. 9344,[25] the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006, violated? and (3) Does Section 32[26] of A.M. No. 02-118-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law have application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[27]
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack
of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
[28]
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction
is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says.[29] If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plainmeaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index
animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.[30] Furthermore,
there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.[31]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the
intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to
provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons
convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a
sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections
11[32] and 15[33] of the Act. The law considers the users and
possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers
and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and
pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing
the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and
possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.[34] The
Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the
intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of
Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and
first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.[35]
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers
and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a
person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only
a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as
minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No.
9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous
drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his
right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law has application in this case. Section
68[36] of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38[37] of Rep.
Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for
petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that
once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
52
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence. Section 40[38] of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides
that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
and thus, could no longer be considered a child[39] for purposes of
applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and
40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO,
Petitioner,
SO ORDERED.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner, former
Congresswoman Luwalhati R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First
Congressional District of South Cotabato which includes General
Santos City (city), assailing that portion of the Resolution[2] dated
January 20, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
dismissing the case against private respondents, former city
Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez (Mayor Nuez), Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive
Director for Region XI Augustus L. Momongan (Momongan),
53
Applicants
Area applied
1. Mad Guaybar
54
2. Oliver Guaybar
3. Jonathan Guaybar
4. Alex Guaybar
5. Jack Guiwan
6. Nicolas Ynot
8. Jolito Poralan
9. Miguela Cabi-ao
- 999 sq.
Them.;following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo,
as Deputy Land Management Inspector, recommended for the
approval of the survey authority requested by the above-named
private respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418).
- 999 sq. m.;
Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private
- 999 sq. m.;
respondents by public respondent CENR Officer Renato Rivera
(Record, p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X was subdivided into
16 lots (refer to subdivision plan, Record, p. 32).
- 999 sq. m.;
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez,
assisted by respondent City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III
issued 1stIndorsements (refer to application documents, Record,
- 999 sq.
pp.m.;
421-500) addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X
applied by private respondents and stated therein that this office
interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings your office
may
- 999 sq.
m.;pursue on application covering portions thereof after the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded
Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the Compromise
Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said courts order dated July 22,
- 999 sq.
m.;
1997.
Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor
Leonardo Dinopol, together with recommendation for approval
- 999 sq. m.;
from respondent Rivera, submitted an appraisal of lots X-1 to X16 stating therein the appraisal amount of P100.00 per square
meter and existing improvements of residential light house per lot
withm.;an appraised value ranging from P20,000.00
- 999 sq.
to P50,000.00 (refer to application papers, Record, pp. 421-500).
Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo
- 999 sq.
m.; a letter-report addressed to the Regional Executive
prepared
55
Name of Owner
1. Mad Guaybar
OCT No.
P-6395-A
X-15
P-6394
X-16
P-6393-A
2. Oliver Guaybar
P-6392
3. Jonathan Guaybar
P-6389-A
4. Alex Guaybar
P-6393
5. Jack Guiwan
P-6399
6. Nicolas Ynot
P-6388-A
P-6389
8. Jolito Poralan
P-6391
9. Miguela Cabi-ao
P-6392-A
P-6388
P-6396
P-6395
P-6390
P-6394-A
Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X7, X-15 and X-16, the above-named registered owners sold their
lots, through their attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano,
to the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFPRSBS) in the amount of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven
Thousand Pesos (P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp.
127-150). Then, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-81051 to
81062 were issued in the name of the vendee on September 25,
1997 (Record, pp. 151-173).
On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and
X-7 executed a Deed of Exchange with AFP-RSBS, represented
by respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of
lots X-6 and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the
latter two lots being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175178). While lots X-15 and X-16 were exchanged with one office
unit or condo unit to be given or ceded to respondent Nilo
Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).[3]
Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaintaffidavit[4] before the Ombudsman against the respondents
together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad
Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack
Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela
Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny
Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose
Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal,
Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo
Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e),
(g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[5] as
amended, and for malversation of public funds or property
through falsification of public documents.
The Ombudsman's Ruling
In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the
Ombudsman held that Mayor Nuez and Nalangan, among others,
entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the city and
pursuant to the authority granted to them by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the
sole responsibility of Mayor Nuez and Nalangan but of the
entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the Ombudsman
opined that the validity of the Compromise Agreement had been
settled when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
RTC found it to be in order. The Ombudsman also ruled that the
Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of the
56
57
2.
Mayor Nuez and Nalangan knew or ought to have
known, by reason of their respective offices and as administrators
of the properties of the city, that Lot X of the Magsaysay Park is
owned by the city and reserved as health and recreation site. Yet,
Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the assailed
RTC Order, stated that per verification, there was no existing
donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city. Likewise, in
their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing
the applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor
Nuez and Nalangan endorsed the same and interposed no
objection thereto. Said Indorsement was part of the grand
conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the resale of the said
property to AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the city. Petitioner submits
that Mayor Nuez and Nalangan also violated Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
3.
After Mayor Nuez and Nalangan issued their
1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997 and after Jonillo submitted his
falsified report onAugust 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same date,
scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad Guaybar and his companions
on September 5, 1997. Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the
subdivided lots of Lot X on September 5, 1997 without public
auction and at the disadvantageous price recommended by
Rivera. Therefore, Diaz, as a co-conspirator, should be similarly
charged with Jonillo and Rivera for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and for falsification of public documents.
4.
Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9,
1997 the Motion for Issuance of a Clarificatory Order before
Judge Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the assailed
RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera likewise represented to the RTC
that upon verification, they did not find in the records any deed of
donation executed by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should
be held liable as an active participant in a grand scheme to
defraud the city.
5.
Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot
X is not disposable and alienable and is, therefore, not a proper
subject of a sales patent application. Despite such knowledge and
based on the falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan
allowed Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his
companions by approving their miscellaneous sales application
and issuing the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) covering the
subdivided lots of Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own
the false reports, and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage
to Mad Guaybar and his companions, to the injury of the city.
6.
While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of
documents and titles may be considered as ministerial, the
circumstances under which the titles were issued in the names of
Mad Guaybar and his companions and eventually, in the name of
AFP-RSBS, indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of the
grand conspiracy to defraud the city. Each of the sixteen (16)
OCTs was transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on September 22,
1997. On the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the
58
4.
Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint
Resolution[15] of the Senate Committees on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and National
Defense and Security, dated December 23, 1998, not one of the
respondents was recommended for prosecution in connection
with the irregularity involving the Magsaysay Park. Judge Adre
claims that he acted properly, and even sought the opinion of the
OSG before the Compromise Agreement was approved.
However, Judge Adre narrated that due to the vagaries of politics,
the judgment lay dormant, as no motion for execution was filed by
then Mayor Adelbert Antonino, husband of petitioner, after Mayor
Nuez lost in the elections. Subsequently, the writ was not issued
as the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not execute any deed of
donation in favor of the city. He declared that the RTC did not lose
jurisdiction over the case when the Motions for Clarification and
Exclusion were filed; thus, the issuance of the assailed RTC
Order excluding Lot X and enjoining the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop
from donating the same to the city in keeping with the intent and
spirit of the compromise agreement, was proper.[16]
5.
Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual
findings need not be disturbed, as they are not attended by grave
abuse of discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance
with law; that as the Regional Technical Director is not required to
go to the premises of the land subject of miscellaneous
applications, and he may rely on the data submitted by the
CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.[17] Moreover, Borinaga
argues that the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner assailing
the Ombudsman's Resolution was filed out of time.[18] The
Certification[19] dated October 1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto,
Records Officer IV of the Office of the Ombudsman, shows that
petitioner was personally served with a copy of the assailed
Resolution on February 24, 1999 by Jose Ruel Bermejo, Process
Server, and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on
February 4, 2000.
6.
Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to
prove that he participated in a grand scheme to unlawfully
dispose of the lots covered by Lot X. He vouches that when he
issued the notice of sale, he did so on the basis of the requisite
documents submitted to his office.[20]
7.
Mayor Nuez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuez
did not violate the Charter of the City, because when she entered
into the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop,
she was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under
Resolution No. 87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of
committee and public hearings. The same was also referred to
the OSG, which recommended its approval. When the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had
no recourse but to tell the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of
donation made in favor of the city. While they admit to have
issued Indorsements, they made it clear that the DENR shall
undertake only what is legally feasible. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan
asseverate that they had no intention of giving up the claim of the
city over Lot X, as they even filed a case against Mad Guaybar
and his companions.[21]
Our Ruling
The instant Petition lacks merit.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
[22]
provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any
of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects
the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial
to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall
be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only
one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner
claimed that she received through counsel the assailed
Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to
establish that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on
time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents
based on the aforementioned Certification that petitioner was
personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on February
24, 1999. There are a number of instances when rules of
procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in this
case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late
filing of the motion for reconsideration. After the respondents
made such allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond and
meet the issue head-on. We find no justification why the
Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at
59
the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed
Resolution was already final.
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant
Petition ought to be dismissed. And on the substantive issue
raised, the petition is likewise bereft of merit.
60
G.R. No. 1
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
AUSTRIA
Acting Ch
TINGA,**
CHICO-NA
OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V.
NACHURA
PERALTA
Promulgat
Respondents.
January 3
x---------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
61
62
63
64
- versus -
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
xxxx
CARPIO,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
NACHURA,
REYES,
xxxx
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
BRION, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 3, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
65
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
66
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute
undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject
to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of
the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform;
no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.[9]
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v.
Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department
of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of
each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may
dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]
67
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165
for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and
safeguard in the process the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous
drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of
the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an
intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and
use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of
planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse
policies, programs and projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is
not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug
use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated
as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or
any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the
drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring
forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant
be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results
in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she
shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the
Voluntary Submission Program.A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under
Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
68
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most
vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically
impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art.
III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long
come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the
validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium
of mandatory random drug testing among students and
employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the
issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first
impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive
jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school
children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et
al. (Board of Education),[18] both fairly pertinent US Supreme
Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of
governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to
address the drug menace in their respective institutions following
the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After
consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis
drug testing for the schools athletes. James Acton, a high school
student, was denied participation in the football program after he
refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith
sued, claiming that the schools drug testing policy violated, inter
alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues
raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in
loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not
shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less
privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than nonathletes since the former observe communal undress before and
after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes
voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not
invade a students privacy since a student need not undress for
this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing
because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the
young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th
Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy
constitutional.
69
school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire
student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea
that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual
students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes
in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have
made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug
tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a
citizens constitutional right to privacy and right against
unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
hereinbelow.[25]
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context,
the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are
agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount
rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police
power.[29]
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone
of the validity of a government search or intrusion.[30] And whether
a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged
by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest.[31] In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing
policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is
in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred
to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the
70
71
death penalty.
The antecedents are:
On February 18, 1998, upon the complaint of Sally Idanan, an
information was filed against appellant under the name Canor
Sabeniano. Appellant, however, filed a motion for reinvestigation
on the ground that his name is Nicanor Salome and not Canor
Sabeniano.
An amended information was filed on August 26, 1998 accusing
CANOR SABENIANO also known as NICANOR SALOME, of
the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659,
committed as follows:
That on or about or within the period comprised between July 1,
1997 to July 31, 1997 in the morning, in [B]arangay Lourdes,
[M]unicipality of Pandan, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused,
by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a bladed
weapon, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, did lie and succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of SALLY IDANAN, a minor who was
then 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169077
against thirteen-year old Sally Idanan, and imposing upon him the
versus
NICANOR SALOME, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on
June 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR. No.-H.C. No. 00767, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Nicanor Salome, affirming the
decision, dated April 3, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 2536, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
72
According to Sally, she just closed her eyes while appellant had
inflicted.[6] Due to the fact that the vaginal canal was still narrow
his way with her. She did not call for help because she was afraid
with prominent rugosities, Sally has not yet given birth although
that nobody would be in the next house which was about 800
meters away.[3]
her menstruation which was on July 5, 1997. On crossexamination, Santos declared that she was uncertain as to the
but before he left, he reiterated his threat to kill her and her family
Sally, and that said act may have occurred days before or after
July 5, 1997 on account of the fact that the life span of an average
Fearful for her life and for her familys safety, she did not inform
corroborated the fact that they went fishing with appellant in July
after that.
the arraignment.
73
that she did not have any improper motive against appellant other
than her desire to tell the truth and obtain redress from the
criminal act.[12]
(1)
(2)
punished.[16]
SO ORDERED.[10]
up with appellant poking a knife at the base of her neck. The act
AND,
II
AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
The fact that the accused did not shout or resist when her shorts
As a rule, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
and panty were removed because of fear (TSN, Oct. 21, 1999, p.
respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
who was then barely thirteen (13) years old, the threat
testifying.[11]
frustrate the bestial desires of the accused, she and her family
would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim
and is, therefore, subjective. It must be viewed in the light of the
victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of
the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. The workings of the
74
situation, some may shout; some may faint; and some may be
shocked into sensibility; while others may openly welcome the
for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code is
those dear to her, in this case, her family. Where such degree of
The defense offered by the accused that he could not have raped
eight (28) days of the month. In any event, a probe into the
for some time the assault against their virtue because of the
settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
destroy the truth per se of the complaint nor would it impair the
Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996) In the instant case,
and delay in reporting the crime of rape has not always been
that he could not have committed the crime on any of the thirty-
75
(TSN, February 28, 2001, p. 6) and that every time they went
home from fishing, they parted ways as each went to his own
home, and would not know what the accused would be doing
while he was at his own home (Idem, p. 9). Thus, even in those
days when the accused went to fish out at sea, the accuseds
presence in the house of the complainant where the subject
1.
unconscious; and
knife during the commission of the rape. This Court sustains the
finding that the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of the
3.
demented.
can attest to its occurrence and that is why courts subject the
Appeals noted:
As the Court of
dwelling the fact that the crime was committed inside the house of
the offended party. Accused-appellant does not dispute that the
The fact that the weapon with which complainant claimed she was
by Sally.
that she was sleeping inside her house when appellant came and
thirteen (13) year old barrio girl cannot possibly give any kind of
persists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat
76
(a)
Penal Code; or
The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that in all cases in which the law
(b)
domestic helper, was inside the house of her employer when she
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the
The Court, therefore, has no recourse but to apply the law and
affirm the trial courts imposition of the death penalty. This is
the Office of the President upon the finality of the death sentence.
[32]
imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim
awarded without the need of proof other than the fact of rape
sexual abuse.
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous
On the other hand, the automatic appeal in cases when the trial
imposed:
court imposes the death penalty will henceforth not apply, since
its imposition is now prohibited, so that there is a need to perfect
an appeal, if appeal is desired, from a judgment of conviction for
77
lieu of the death penalty pursuant to the new law prohibiting its
imposition.
without parole.
No costs.
CR.
No.-H.C.
No.
00767,
2005,
is
SO ORDERED.
Adolfo Azcuna, J.
78