Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
EXTINGUISHMENT
ASIATIC PETROLEUM CO V. HIZON 1923
923
A material alteration of the principal contract, effected
by the creditor and principal debtor without the
knowledge and consent of the surety, completely
discharges the surety from all liability on the contract
of suretyship
The appellant obligated himself as surety to answer for
any indebtedness which his principal might incur as
selling agent of the plaintiff in a designated
municipality. Subsequently the contract of agency was
changed, without the knowledge and consent of the, in
such manner as to extent the agency to various other
than that mentioned in the original contract. Held: That
the surety could not be held for the indebtedness
incurred by the agent under the changed contract.
STREET, J. :
civil action
was instituted
Asiatic Petroleum Company (Philippine Island), Ltd., to
recover of Justico. A. David, as principal, and of
Francisco Hizon y Singian, as surety, the sum of
P51,560.12, an alleged balance due upon liquidation of
accounts between the plaintiff and said David, and for
which Francisco Hizon y Singian is alleged to be
obligated as joint and several surety with the principal
debtor
judgment
in favor of the plaintiff to recover of Justico A. David, as
principal, the sum of P40,7
David did not appeal, and his obligation, as principal
debtor, to the extent adjudged by the trial court, is not
now in question.
plaintiff contending that the court should have held
Hizon jointly and severally responsible for the entire
sum adjudged against the principal debtor, while Hizon
claims that he should have been wholly absolved
plaintiff is a corporation lawfully engaged in the selling
of petroleum products in the Philippine Islands
plaintiff made a contract (Exhibit B) with Justico A.
David, whereby the later became the selling agent of
the plaintiff at San Fernando in the Province of
Pampanga, with authority extending not only over the
municipality of San Fernando but over the neighboring
places of Guagua, Angeles, San Simon Capas,
Magalang, and Mabalakat, in the same province. In
accordance with this contract and in conformity with
the practices of the contracting parties thereunder
Justico A. David from time to time over a period of
about five years received for sale and distribution at
the places mentioned various consignments of
kerosene,
relation thus established was continued without
interruption until in the year 1921
it was found that David was indebted to the plaintiff
P40,786.98,
From the time demand was first made upon the present
appellant, Hizon, for the satisfaction of the balance due
to the plaintiff upon liquidation of the account of David,
the appellant has insisted that he had obligated himself
to answer for indebtedness to be incurred by David as
selling agent at and for the town of San Fernando and
that he had been given to understand, at the time he
contracted the obligation, that the indebtedness so
incurred would not be in excess of P5,000.
On May 18, 1968 the petitioner filed his
rejoinder to respondent Mobil's aforesaid addendum
and opposition.
Issue
: W/N the contract was a chattel mortgage so that PNB
cannot take possession of the chattels until after there
has been default.
Held:
No. Pledge.
Ratio:
The parties stipulated as a fact that Exhibit "A" & "1Bank" is a pledge contract. Necessarily, this judicial
admission binds Yuliongsiu. Without any showing that
this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset it.
PNB as pledgee was therefore entitled to the actual
possession of the vessels. While it is true that
Yuliongsiu continued operating the vessels after the
pledge contract was entered into, his possession was
expressly made subject to the order of the pledgee."
The provision of Art. 2110 of the present Civil Code
being new, cannot apply to the pledge contract here
which was entered into on June 30, 1947. On the other
hand, there is an authority supporting the proposition
that the pledgee can temporarily entrust the physical
possession of the chattels pledged to the pledgor
without invalidating the pledge. In such a case, the
pledgor is regarded as holding the pledged property
merely as trustee for the pledgee.
Yuliongsiu also urge Us to rule that constructive
delivery is insufficient to make pledge effective. The
type of delivery will depend upon the nature and the
peculiar circumstances of each case. The parties here
agreed that the vessels be delivered by the "pledgor to
the pledgor who shall hold said property subject to the
order of the pledgee."Considering the circumstances of
this case and the nature of the objects pledged, i.e., a
vessel used in maritime business, such delivery is
sufficient. Since PNB was, pursuant to the terms of
pledge contract, in full control of the vessels thru
Yuliongsiu, the former could take actual possession at
any time during the life of the pledge to make more
effective its security. Its taking of the vessels therefore
was not unlawful. Nor was it unjustified considering
that Yuliongsiu had just defrauded the PNB in the huge
sum of P184,000
CALTEX PHILS V. COURT OF APPEALS 1992
Facts:
On various dates, defendant, a commercial banking
institution, through its Sucat Branch issued 280
certificates of time deposit (CTDs) in favor of one Angel
dela Cruz.
One time Mr. dela Cruz delivered the CTDs to Caltex
Philippines in connection with his purchase of fuel
products from the latter. However, Sometime in March
1982, he informed the Sucat Branch Manger that he
lost all the certificates of time deposit in dispute. New
CTDs were issued after the execution of affidavit of
loss.
Subsequently, Angel dela Cruz negotiated and obtained
a loan from defendant bank and executed a notarized
Deed of Assignment of Time Deposit, which stated,
among others, that he surrenders to defendant bank
"full control of the indicated time deposits from and
after date" of the assignment and further authorizes
said bank to pre-terminate, set-off and "apply the said
time deposits to the payment of whatever amount or
amounts may be due" on the loan upon its maturity.
In 1982, Mr. Aranas, Credit Manager of plaintiff Caltex
(Phils.) Inc., went to the defendant bank's Sucat branch
Aside from the fact that the CTDs were only delivered
but not indorsed, the factual findings of respondent
court quoted at the start of this opinion show that
petitioner failed to produce any document evidencing
any contract of pledge or guarantee agreement
between it and Angel de la Cruz. Consequently, the
mere delivery of the CTDs did not legally vest in
petitioner any right effective against and binding upon
respondent bank. The requirement under Article 2096
aforementioned is not a mere rule of adjective law
prescribing the mode whereby proof may be made of
the date of a pledge contract, but a rule of substantive
law prescribing a condition without which the execution
of a pledge contract cannot affect third persons
adversely.
On the other hand, the assignment of the CTDs made
by Angel de la Cruz in favor of respondent bank was
embodied in a public instrument.
Respondent bank duly complied with this statutory
requirement. Contrarily, petitioner, whether as
purchaser, assignee or lien holder of the CTDs, neither
proved the amount of its credit or the extent of its lien
nor the execution of any public instrument which could
affect or bind private respondent. Necessarily,
therefore, as between petitioner and respondent bank,
the latter has definitely the better right over the CTDs
in question.
CHU V. COURT OF APPEALS 1989
e 1980, the petitioner, Victoria Yau Chu, had been
purchasing cement on credit from CAMS Trading
Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter "CAMS Trading"
To guaranty payment for her cement withdrawals, she
executed in favor of Cams Trading deeds of assignment
of her time deposits in the total sum of P320,000
Except for the serial numbers and the dates of the time
deposit certificates, the deeds of assignment, which
were prepared by her own lawyer
Cams Trading notified the Bank that Mrs. Chu had an
unpaid account with it in the sum of P314,639.75. It
asked that it be allowed to encash the time deposit
certificates which had been assigned to it by Mrs. Chu
It submitted to the Bank a letter dated July 18, 1980 of
Mrs. Chu admitting that her outstanding account with
Cams Trading was P404,500. After verbally advising
Mrs. Chu of the assignee's request to encash her time
deposit certificates and obtaining her verbal conformity
thereto, the Bank agreed to encash the certificates.It
delivered to Cams Trading the sum of P283,737.75
only, as one time deposit certificate (No. 0048120954)
lacked the proper signatures. Upon being informed of
the encashment, Mrs. Chu demanded from the Bank
and Cams Trading that her time deposit be restored.
When neither complied, she filed a complaint to
recover the sum of P283,737.75 from them
trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Chu appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV
which affirmed the dismissal of her complaint.
she alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:
In not annulling the encashment of her time deposit
certificates as a pactum commissorium; and
2.
In not finding that the obligations secured by
her time deposits had already been paid.
We find no merit in the petition for review.
The Court of Appeals found that the deeds of
assignment were contracts of pledge, but, as the
collateral was also money or an exchange of "peso for
peso," the provision in Article 2112 of the Civil Code for