CARIO vs.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to
protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The
mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of
Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face
dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon
Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for
90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said
teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the
suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a
case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the
meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases
filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work
orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking
teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation
of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain
specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political
rights.
HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the

faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must

be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.

EPZA vs Commission of Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

Facts:
EPZA purchased land from Filoil Refinery Corp. and before petitioner could take
possession of lands, several individuals had entered the premises and planted
agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil.
EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and
signed quitclaims, amongst them private respondents(Valles, Aledia). Ten years
later, private respondents filed in the CHR complaints for violation of Human Rights.
CHR issued an injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such acts.
EPZA filed in SC this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Does CHR have the authority to issue an injunction order?

Ruling:
CHR does not have the authority to issue an injunction order. It is limited only to
investigation and not to try and resolve merits. The "preventive measures and legal
aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction by
Commission of Human Rights are annulled and set aside.

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed
this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is
being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec
13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President
may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and
(ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

NAACP vs Alabama
Brief Fact Summary: The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
held unconstitutional Alabamas demand that the NAACP reveal the names and
addresses of all of its Alabama members and agents.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: In the domain of indispensable liberties, whether of
speech, press, or association, abridgments of such rights, even though unintended,
may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. Compelled
disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute an
effective restraint on freedom of association.
Facts: The Respondent, The State of Alabama (Respondent), demanded that the
Petitioner, the NAACP (Petitioner), provide a list of all of the Alabama NAACP
members based on the states foreign corporation registration law made in the
course of an injunction action brought to stop the Petitioner from conducting
activities in the state. Respondent moved for the production of a large number of
the Petitioners records. The Petitioner produced almost all the requested data
except for membership lists. The trial court adjudged the Petitioner in contempt and
imposed a $100,000.00 fine.
Issues:
(i) Whether compelled disclosure of membership lists violates the Petitioners
members rights of freedom of association?
(ii) Whether Respondent has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the membership
lists, which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which releasing this lists would
have on the free exercise of the constitutionally protected right of association?
Held:
(i) Yes. Judgment of the lower court reversed. In the domain of indispensable
liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, abridgments of such rights, even
though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action.
Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute

an effective restraint on freedom of association. There is a vital relationship

between freedom to associate and privacy in ones associations. This production
order must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the
exercise by the Petitioners members of their freedom of association. Further, it is
apparent that forced disclosure would result in adversely affecting the members to
pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs, which they have the right to advocate.
Therefore, compelled disclosure of membership lists violates the Petitioners
members rights of freedom of association.
(ii) No. Judgment of the lower court reversed. The Petitioner has not objected to
divulging the identity of its members who are employed or hold office positions.
There is no justification for the interest of obtaining membership lists.

Kilosbayan vs. Janolo, G.R. No. 180543, July 27, 2010

Facts:
On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong, following the promulgation of the
Courts decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, filed a petition under Rule 108,
Rules of Court for the amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of
the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth over which public respondent
Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided. Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition,
petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four
orders and the decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case. The RTC
granted Ongs petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Can substantial corrections to the citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry
be effected through an ex parte application?
Ruling:
No. The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, stated that substantial
corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry
are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature or [o]ne
having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,
one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this case, impleaded as
defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person
having or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected, the interest
of the State was amply represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, while

petitioners interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a
responsive pleading.

VILLAR VS TIP
FACTS:
Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression against the respondents, in
their refusal to admit the said petitioners at the Technological Institute of the
Philippines. However, reference was made to some of the petitioners' school
records. Petitioners Rufino Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco, Venecio Villar, Inocencio
Recitis had failed in one or two of their subjectsin 1983-1985. However, petitioner
Noverto Baretto had five failing grades in the first semester in the first school year,
six failing grades in the second semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon
Jr. had three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first
semester of school year 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing
grade with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 school year.
Petitioners Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of
such failing grades.
SPECIAL CIVIC ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the TIP
Board.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain
students of the respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis
for their being barred from enrollment.

HELD:
NO, as is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the
right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right
to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of
freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which
`is not limited, much less denied, except on a showing * * * of clear and present
danger of substantive evil that the state has the right to prevent.' They do not, to
borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School
District, `shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.'
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners Venecio Villar, Inocencio
F. Recitis, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by
respondents in violation of their constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is
likewise granted to such petitioners to enjoin respondents from the acts of
surveillance, black listing, suspension and refusal to allow them to enroll in the
coming academic year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is dismissed as to
Noverto Barreto, Edgrado de Leon Jr. and Regloben Laxamana. No costs.