30. Ilaw at Buklod vs.

NLRC 219 SCRA 536 Bob Ryan Diator

Gani
Petitioner,
duly-registered labor union
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all daily-paid
workers of the Metro Manila
petitioner and SMB entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement
National Council of petitioner called a general meetin
ratification of the CBA
the National Council held a special meeting wherein the
members present unanimously passed "Resolusyon
agreed at said meeting to submit the resolution to the
general membership for approva
members attended the general meeting. Said
voted in favor and thirty six (36) voted against the resolution
CBA was ratified by the members.
Under said resolution, each member of the union was
assessed P1,098.00 to be deducted from the lump sum of
P10,980.00 which each employee was to receive under the
CBA
Private respondents protested the deduction and refused to
sign the authorization slip for the deduction. Petitioner
passed a resolution
expelling private respondents from the union. SMB held in
trust the amount of P1,098.00 pertaining to each private
Respondent.
private respondents Antonio Magsipoc and Abundio Ibasco
filed a complaint
before the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region,
National Labor Relations Commission for illegal and
exorbitant deduction and illegal expulsion from the union
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
ground of lack of jurisdiction of NLRC
respondent Labor Arbiter
denying the motion to dismiss. It appears that the two cases
were consolidated, and respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded
to take cognizance
Only private respondents filed their position paper with
petitioner continuing to refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter.
espondent Labor Arbiter
finding the questioned assessment illegal and ordering
petitioner and SMB to return the amount of P1,098.00 to
each of private respondents; declaring the expulsion of
private
respondent National Labor Relations
affirming the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter and
dismissing the appeal
The NLRC committed reversible error in assuming jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner union;
The NLRC committed a reversible error in assuming
jurisdiction over the nature of the action;
central issue of jurisdiction
It is fundamental that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law
perusal of the complaint
a) the assessment and deduction of 10% from private
respondents CBA differential pay which were denounced by
private respondents as illegal and exorbitant and made
against their will, and (b) private respondents expulsion
from the union. The assessment and deduction of 10% from
each employees differential pay were imposed by petitioner
through Resolusyon Blg. 265 and the expulsion was adopted
by petitioner through Resolusyon
Clearly this is an intra-union dispute
dispute between a labor union and its members.
Internal Union Dispute" includes all disputes or grievances
arising from any violation of or disagreement over any
provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including
any violation of the rights and conditions of union
membership provided for in the Code
Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the
Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions
jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-union conflict
ARTICLE 226.
Bureau of Labor Relations
original and exclusive authority to act,
intra-union conflict

subject of which is an intra-union dispute, fall under the

original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, and respondent Labor Arbiter and NLRC have no
jurisdiction over said cases
WHEREFORE
the order
issued by respondent Labor Arbiter
said respondent
NLRC
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
without prejudice to private respondents filing the same
with the Bureau of Labor Relations
31. Sampaguita vs. NLRC Pre Uy Villaverde
subject of the two cases is theft,
committed by private respondent Emilia B. Santos, an
employee of petitioner Sampaguita Garments Corporation.
Santos attempted to bring out of the company premises,
without authorization or permission, a piece of cloth
belonging to the petitioner
Sampaguita dismissed her on this ground. She filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal but the labor arbiter sustained
the company
his decision was reversed by the NLRC, which ordered her
reinstatement with back wages from the time of her illegal
suspension until her actual reinstatement.
petitioner had also filed a criminal action against Santos for
the same offense in the Municipal Trial Court
she was found guilty
Court dismissed the petition for certiorari against the
decision of the NLRC for lack of a showing that it was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion
Court saw no reversible error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the petitioners conviction by the
Municipal Trial Court as affirmed
decisions in both cases became final and executory and the
corresponding entries of judgment were eventually made
Santos moved for the execution of the NLRC decision. The
petitioner opposed, invoking her conviction in the criminal
case. However, the NLRC sustained her on the ground that
its decision had been affirmed by this Court and had long
become final and executory. Sampaguita then came to this
Court for relief
asserted by the petitioner that, in view of the private
respondents conviction, the decision of the NLRC calling for
her reinstatement and the payment to her of P63,908.00 in
back wages should not now be enforced. Otherwise, she
would in effect be undeservedly rewarded when she should
instead be punished for her offense.
private respondent argues that the decision of the NLRC is
independent of the criminal case and in any event can no
longer be modified or reversed after having become final
and executory
We hold for the petition
is true that once a judgment has become final and
executory, it can no longer be disturbed except only for the
correction of clerical errors or where supervening events
render its execution impossible or unjust.
interested party may ask the court to modify the judgment
to harmonize it with justice and the facts
NLRC ordering the private respondents reinstatement with
back wages had indeed become final and executory
NLRC was not correct in sustaining the implementation of
that decision.
power of the NLRC to issue a writ of execution carries with it
the right to look into the correctness of the execution of the
decision and to consider supervening events that may affect
such execution."
firmance
respondents conviction for theft is justification enough for
the NLRC to exercise this authority and suspend the
execution of its decision
is a supervening cause that rendered unjust and inequitable
the decision mandating the private respondents
reinstatement, and with back wages to boot
Solicitor General agrees that reinstatement is no longer
feasible in view of the subsequent conviction of the private
respondent and the already strained relationship between
her and the petitioner
suggests instead the grant of separation

We disagree
award is not justifiable because Santos was found guilty of a
crime involving moral turpitu
separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct
Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is
granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is
not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next
employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency
if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is
not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage
the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the
protection and concern of the Constitution.
only award to which the private respondent may be entitled
is for the amount of P1,000.00, to be paid to her by the
petitioner as a penalty for effecting her dismissal without
complying with the procedural requirements laid down
private respondents conviction of the crime of theft of
property belonging to the petitioner has affirmed the
existence of a valid ground for her dismissal and thus
removed the justification for the administrative decision
ordering her reinstatement with back wages. Nevertheless,
the
petitioner is still subject to sanction for its failure to accord
the private respondent the right to an administrative
investigation in conformity with the procedural requirements
of due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
32. Abbot Laboratories vs. ALEU 323 SCRA 392 Shelly Ann
Miranda Samoy
ABBOTT is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of pharmaceutical drugs
Abbott Laboratories Employees Union (hereafter ALEU
represented by its president
filed an application for union registration in the Department
of Labor and Employment
ALEU alleged in the application that it is a labor organization
with members consisting of 30 rank-and-file employees in
the manufacturing unit of ABBOTT and that there was no
certified bargaining agent in the unit it sought to represent,
namely, the manufacturing unit.
ALEU's application was approved by the Bureau of Labor
Relations, which in due course issued Certificate of
Registration
ALEU became a legitimate labor organization.
ABBOTT filed a petition for cancellation of the Certificate of
Registration
Regional Office of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
ABBOTT assailed the certificate of registration since ALEU's
application was not signed by at least 20% of the total 286
rank-and-file employees of the entire employer unit; and that
it omitted to submit copies of its books of account.
Regional Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations decreed
the cancellation of ALEU's registration certificat
ruled that the union has failed to sliow that the rank-and-file
employees in the manufacturing unit of ABBOTT were bound
by a common interest to justify the formation of a bargaining
unit separate from those belonging to the sales and office
staff units. There was, therefore, sufficient reason to assume
that the entire membership of the rank-and-file consisting of
286 employees or the "employer unit" make up the
appropriate bargaining unit. However, it was clear on the
record that the union's application for registration was
supported by 30 signatures of its members or barely
constituting 10% of the entire rank-and-file employees of
ABBOTT.
Regional Director found that for ALEU's failure to satisfy the
requirements of union registration under Article 234 of the
Labor Code; the cancellation of its certificate of registration
was in order.
ALEU appealed said cancellation to the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, which referred the
same to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
ureau of Labor Relations rendered judgment reversing t
appeal is GRANTED
justify the reversal
Article 234 of the Labor Code does not require an applicant
union to show proof of the "desirability of more than one

Ibargaining unit within an employer unit," and the absence of

such proof is not a ground for the cancellation of a union's
registration pursuant to Article 239
appropriateness of a bargaining unit cannot be raised in a
cancellation proceeding but may be threshed out in the
exclusion-inclusion process during a certification election
one-bargaining unit, one-employer unit policy" must not be
interpreted in a manner that shall derogate the right of the
employees to self-organization and freedom of association as
guaranteed by
the 1987 Constitution
ABBOTT appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
Secretary of Labor and Employment refused to act on
ABBOTT's appeal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to
review the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations on
iappeals in cancellation cases emanating from the Regional
Offices. The decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations therein
is final and executor
since your office has already filed a motion for
reconsideration with the BLR which has been denied in its
Order dated 09 July 1997, your recourse should have been a
special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ABBOTT premised its argument on the authority of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment to review the decision of
the Bureau of Labor Relations and at the same time raised
the issue on the validity of ALEU's certificate of registration
We find no merit in this petition.
, it is just appropriate to limit the issue on the power of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment to review the decisions
of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Regional
Director in cases involving cancellations of certificates of
registration of labor unions. The issue anent the validity of
ALEU's certificate of registration is subject of the Bureau of
Labor Relations decisio
said decision is not being assailed in the present petition;
hence, we are not at liberty to review the same
there has been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Its refusal to take
cognizance of ALEU's appeal from the decision of the Bureau
of Labor Relation
The Bureau or the Secretary shall have fifteen ( 15) days
from receipt of the records of the case within which to decide
the appeal. The decision of the Bureau or the Secretary shall
be final and executory
Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate
jurisdiction of the Secretary .of Labor and Employment is
limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided
by the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor
and Employment has no jurisdiction over decisions of the
Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its
appellate power to review the decision of the Regional
Director in a petition to cancel the union's certificate of
registration, said decisions being final and inappealable.[16]
We sustain the analysis and interpretation of the OSG on this
matter
Office of the Secretary correctly maintained that it cannot
take cognizance of petitioner's appeal from the decision of
BLR Directo
provide for two situations
first situation involves a petition for cancellation of union
registration which is filed with a Regional Office. A decision
of a Regional Office cancelling a union's certificate of
registration may be appealed to the BLR whose decision on
the matter shall be final and inappealable.
second situation involves a petition for cancellation of
certificate of union registration which is filed directly with the
BLR. A decision of the BLR cancelling a union's certificate of
registration may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor
whose decision on the matter shall be final and inappealable
Respondent Acting Labor Secretary's ruling --that the BLR's
decision upholding the validity of respondent union's
certificate of registration is final and inappealable --is thus in
accordance with aforequoted Omnibus
ti
The cancellation proceedings initiated by petitioner before
the Regional Office is covered by the first situation

Hence, an appeal from the decision of the Regional Office

may be brought to the BLR whose decision on the matter is
final and inappealable.
respondent union incorrectly appealed said decision to the
Office of the Secretary. Nevertheless, this situation was
immediately rectified when the Office of the Secretary motu
proprio referred the appeal to the BLR However, upon
reversal by the BLR of the decision of the Regional Office
cancelling registration, petitioner should have immediately
elevated the BLR decision to the Supreme Court in a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
petitions for cancellation of union registration may be filed
with a Regional office, or directly, with the Bureau of Labor
Relations. Appeals from the decision of a Regional Director
may be filed with the BLR Director whose decision shall be
final and executory. On the other hand, appeals from the
decisions of the BLR may be filed with the Secretary of Labor
whose decision shall be final and executory .
the finality of the BLR decision is dependent on whether or
not the petition for cancellation was filed with the BLR
directly. Under said Rules, if the petition for cancellation is
directly filed with the BLR, its decision cancelling union
registration is not yet final and executory as it may still be
appealed to the Office of the Secretary. However, if the
petition for cancellation was filed with the Regional Office,
the decision of the BLR resolving an appeal of the decision of
said Regional Office is final and executory
Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to seasonably
avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court
Even if we relaxed the rule and consider the present petition
as a petition for certiorari not only of the letter of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment but also of the decision
of the Bureau of the Labor Relations which overruled the
order of cancellation of ALEU's certificate of registration, the
same would still be dismissable for being time-barred.
33. Duyag vs. Inciong 98 SCRA 522 Justin Mikhael Abraham
This case is about the removal of private respondents as
union officers due to alleged irregularities and anomalies in
the administration of the affairs of the union.
five petitioners, who are arrastre checkers of E. Razon, Inc. in
the South Harbor, Port Area, Manila as well as bona fide
members of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers
Union, filed with Regional Office
Department of Labor a complaint containing several charges
against the four private respondents, who, respectively, are
the president (for more than twenty years), treasurer, vicepresident and auditor of the union.
nauthorized increases in union dues. for arrastre checkers,
the monthly union dues amount to ten peso
The monthly union dues were increased by two pesos in the
resolution of September 1, 1970 and by five pesos in the
resolution of March 14, 1972. However, those two resolutions
are void because they were not approved by three-fourths of
all the members of the board of directors, as required in
article VII of the union's constitution and by-laws, dealing
with amendments.
the respondents without the benefit of any board resolution
caused to be collected an additional one peso, thus
increasing the union dues to eighteen pesos.
respondents caused to be collected monthly union dues
amounting to nineteen pesos or another increase of one
peso.
, a deduction of eight pesos and fifty centavos was made
from the mid-year bonus without any board resolution
authorizing such deduction. In prior years, no deduction for
union dues was made from the mid-year bonus.
med-arbiter concluded that the increases in union dues and
the deduction from the mid-year bonus are void because the
same were collected in contravention of the constitution and
by-laws.
Moreover, their collection was not covered by any check-off
authorization nor evidenced by any receipt and was in
contravention of the Labor Code
For such unauthorized collection of union dues, the
responsibility of respondent Ricardo R. Manalad, as union
president, is not denied
Withholding of union members' share in the profits
amounting to P18,640.09. E. Razon, Inc., the arrastre

operator, paid to the union on December 18. 1973 the sum

of P25,684.61 as its share of the profits (profit-share) for the
period from May to October, 1973. Instead of distributing the
whole amount to the union members, the dents paid to them
only P19,974 and retained the of P5,710.61 which had not
been accounted
Labor Arbiter found that other amounts were withheld by the
respondents from the union's profit-shares for subsequent
periods. The total amount withheld is P18,640.09
With specific reference to the profit-share amounting to
P22,559.50 paid by E. Razon, Inc
the respondents withdrew the said amount, distributed
among the union members the sum of P20,848 and withheld
the balance of P1,711.50
The med-arbiter found that the modus operandi resorted to
by the respondents with respect to the profit-share
amounting to P22,559.50 was followed by them as to the
deductions from the profit-shares for the other periods.
that the union officers must have deducted a considerable
amount from the profit-shares because they started that
practice in 1966 when E. Razon, Inc. and Guacods Marine
Terminals, Inc. commenced the profit-share program
pendency of the case in this Court
private respondents submitted a resolution dated November
25, 1977 wherein more than ninety percent of the union
members allegedly ratified the deductions from the mid-year
bonus and profit-shares and authorized future deductions
The deduction of union dues from the mid-year bonus and
the withholding of part of the profit-shares were illegal and
improper at the time they were made.
Disbursements exceeding P500 which were not authorized
by the board of directors
board of directors may "authorize and approve all
disbursements from union fund where the amount involved
is more than P500 and without that authorization or approval
in due form, no such disbursements will be allowed by the
Treasurer
Respondents Manalad and Leao, also without prior board
authorization, withdrew on twenty-three occasions union
funds in the aggregate sum of P43,026.80 deposited in
Savings Account
sum of P3,500 was paid to respondent Amparo pursuant to a
resolution
approved by only six members of the board of directors,
instead of fourteen members, as required in the constitution
and by-laws of the union
Maladministration of welfare fund. Respondent Manalad
allowed the application of the funds of the union's Welfare
Plan to the following extraneous purposes
loaned to the same cooperative for organizational expenses.
for advance representation expenses of Manalad.
those disbursements were not authorized by the board of
directors.
Membership in another union. Respondents Manalad,
Amparo and Puerto are also officers of the Philippine
Technical Clerical Commercial Employees Association,
another labor union.
Their membership in the latter union is manifestly violative
of section 9, article III of the constitution and by-laws of the
arrastre checkers' union which provides that an elected
officer shall be deemed disqualified if he becomes a member
of another organization.
onflict of interest on the part of Manalad. Respondent
Manalad organized a family corporation known as the Comet
Integrated Stevedoring Services, Inc. whose rank-and-file
employees are also members of the arrastre checkers' union.
The complainants contend that such a situation has involved
Manalad in a conflict of interest: if he favors his stevedoring
firm, he is bound to jeopardize the interests of the arrastre
checkers' union of which he is the president.
med-arbiter in his decision of
ordered the removal of the private respondents as officers of
the union and directed them to reimburse to the members
thereof the amounts illegally collected from them.
The private respondents appealed to the Director of Labor
Relations
The Director held that resort to intra-union remedies is not
necessary and that the five complainants have the rights
and personality to institute the proceedings for the removal

of the respondents, to recover the amount illegally collected

orwithheld from them and to question illegal disbursements
and expenditure of union funds
Director ruled that the power to remove the union officers
rests in the members and that the Bureau of Labor Relations
generally has nothing to do with the tenure of union officers
which "is a political question".
Director further ruled that his office has jurisdiction to look
into the charge of illegal disbursements of union funds.
The case has been simplified by the admission of the private
respondents in page 13 of their memorandum that the
Bureau of Labor Relations has unquestionably the power to
remove erring union officers under the last paragraph of
Article 242 of the Labor Code.
Nevertheless, the private respondents qualify their
admission with the opinion that the Bureau of Labor
Relations should remove the guilty union officers only when
the members could not do so under the union's constitution
and by-laws and that the removal should be subject to
review by the Minister of Labor.
Director of Labor Relations maintains his view that the power
of removal belongs to the union members, since the power
to choose the officers belongs to them, and that the medarbiter and the Director should simply assist the union
members in enforcing its constitution and by-laws.
e hold that the Labor Arbiter did not err in removing the
respondents as union officers. The membership of Manalad
and Puerto in another union is a sufficient ground for their
removal under the constitution and by-laws of the union. In
Manalad's case, his organization of a family-owned
corporation competing with. the union headed by him
renders it untenable that he should remain as union
president.
Med Puerto and Leano violated the rights and conditions of
membership in the union within the meaning of Article 242.
Hence, on that ground their expulsion from office is also
justified.
petitioners are entitled to the refund of the union dues
illegally collected from them. The union should be the proper
refund.
Director of Labor Relations erred in holding that, as a matter
of policy, the tenure of union office being a "political
question is, generally, a matter outside his Bureau's
jurisdiction and should be pa upon by the union members
themselves.
Director should apply the law and not make policy
considerations prevail over its clear intent and meaning
labor officials should not hesitate to enforcement strictly the
law and regulations governing trade unions even if that
course of action would curtail the so-called union autonomy
and freedom from government interference.
is necessary and desirable that the Bureau of Labor Relations
and the Ministry of Labor should exercise close and constant
supervision over labor unions, particularly the handling of
their funds, so as to forestall abuses and venalities.
Hence, the Director acted correctly in ordering an
examination of the books and records of the union. The
examination should include a verification of the charge that
the petty loans extended by the union to its members were
usurious and that the fee for the issuance of cheeks is
unwarranted since the loans were made in cash.
WHEREFORE, (1) that portion of the decision of the medarbiter, removing respondents Manalad, Leano and Puerto as
union officers, is affirmed. (Respondent Amparo is no longer
an officer of the union.)
34. Olayvar vs. NLRC 237 SCRA 819 Lorelie Jamelah Galindez
Dema-ala
Petitioners were regular employees of private respondents
Orient Marine and Fishing Resources, Inc., when they were
dismissed on the ground of retrenchment. Contesting the
legality of their retrenchment, petitioners lodged separate
complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice
before the Regional Arbitration Branch
Labor Arbite
dismissed the complaints but ordered respondent Orient
Marine and Fishing Resources, Inc., to pay petitioners
P4,005.00
petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission

2 petitioners executed separate affidavits stating, among

others, their intention to withdraw their appeal since they
had already received
Said affidavits were subscribed and sworn to before Labor
Arbit
These affidavits were not, however, submitted to the NLRC.
In other words, for some inexplicable reason, neither
petitioners nor private respondent brought to the attention
of the Labor Tribunal the crucial fact that they had already
amicably settled their dispute and that petitioners had been
given their severance pay.
Unaware of the joint affidavits, the NLRC rendered a decision
in favor of petitioners. 3 Private respondent Orient Marine
and Fishing Resources, Inc., was ordered to reinstate
petitioners and to pay their full back wages
Petitioners moved for execution which private respondent
opposed on the ground that
has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact
that the (petitioners) have already claimed their separation
pay in conformity with the decision (dated March 4, 1991) of
Labor Arbiter
Petitioners went up to the NLRC, this time questioning the 7
January 1992 order
NLRC nullified the aforesaid order and directed Labor Arbiter
Sideno" to issue a writ of execution enforcing the decision .
NLRC held that the dismissed employees were deemed to
have accepted the 4 March 1991 decision of the Labor
Arbiter because they voluntarily received their award as
directed therein. Consequently, its decision and resolution of
16 July 1991 and 14 July 1992 respectively became moot and
academic since the 4 March 1991 decision had been fully
satisfi
petitioners sought the instant recourse
contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring that its decision and resolution of 16
July 1991
They also denounced their "joint affidavits" pending appeal
as violative of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
protection to labor.
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the NLRC.
Necessarily, the petition must fail for lack of merit
Court has acknowledged the binding effect of agreements
and compromises between the parties.
be sure, the Labor Code recognizes the conclusiveness of
compromise settlements as a means to end labor dispute.
Art. 22
shall be final and binding upon the parties
National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not
assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in
case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie
evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation or coercion."
Consequently, when the NLRC rendered its decision on 16
July 1991 ordering the reinstatement and back wages for
petitioners, it unknowingly adjudicated a case which, for all
intents and purposes, had already been closed and
terminated by the parties themselves when they agreed on a
settlement. This is the clear import of the rule that
compromises and settlements have the effect and
conclusiveness of res judicata upon the parties.
we are appalled at the volte-face and flagrant opportunism
of petitioners. As adverted to earlier, the separate affidavits
representing the intention of petitioners to withdraw their
appeal from the NLRC since they have been recompensed
were voluntarily and knowingly made in the presence of
Labor Arbiter Cordova, Jr., who rendered the award in their
favor
economic difficulties and financial crises" allegedly
confronting petitioners prior to their separate affidavits is not
an acceptable ground to annul the agreements since it has
not been convincingly established that petitioners were
forced to execute them
present petition is nothing but an obvious ploy on the part of
petitioners to backtrack on their undertakin
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public
policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

35. Jag vs. NLRC 241 SCRA 635 Jeanne Caroline M. Vertido
Lakas Manggagawa sa Jag (Union) composed of the rankand-file employees of Jag & Haggar Jeans and Sportswear
Corporation, petitioner herein, staged a strike. Petitioner filed
a petition to declare the strike illegal.
, Labor Arbiter Eduardo Madriaga rendered a decision,
declaring the strike illegal and ordering the dismissal of the
officers, as well as the members of the Union who took part
in the illegal strike
rest of the striking workers are hereby ordered
return to work within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
copy of this Decision
affected officers and members of the Union appealed the
decision to NLRC. On August 31, 1989, NLRC rendered its
decision setting aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and
ordering the reinstatement of the affected employees
NLRC, on May 31, 1990 modified its earlier decision
declared to have lost their employment;
Union Board Members and Shop Stewards may be dismissed
by respondent-appellee
both parties agreed to negotiate a settlement and to defer
the enforcement of the decision.
a compromise agreement was executed and signed by
petitioner and the Union represented by its officers
parties agreed that:
Company shall pay to the officers and members of the Union
named in the aforesaid decision separation pay equivalent to
one-half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service.
pay to the officers of the Union mentioned in item No. 2 of
the Decision, namely the Union Board members, and Shop
Stewards financial assistance in the amount of One
Thousand
Company shall also pay to the members of the Union
mentioned
Out of a total of 114 affected employees, 90 of them
24 of the affected employees moved for the execution of the
May 31, 1990 Decision of NLRC
Petitioner filed an opposition, citing the Compromise
Agreement, which had been availed of by 90 of the affected
employees
Labor Arbiter
issued an order, denying the motion for execution
The remaining 12 employees appealed to NLRC from the
denial of their motion for executio
NLRC set aside the order of Labor Arbiter Nambi and directed
petitioner to accept the union members to their former or
equivalent position with back wages from July 30, 1990 until
they were reinstated
petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a restraining order
the petition was dismissed by the First Division
failure to comply with the Revised Rules of Court
whether or not the Compromise Agreement entered into by
petitioner and the Union is binding upon private
respondents.
Petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement was
deemed ratified by the union members considering that 102
out of the 114 affected employees already availed of and
received the benefits under the said agreement
the "will of the majority should prevail over the minority
private respondents allege that for a compromise agreement
to be binding upon them, a special power of attorney or their
express consent was necessary for what was being waived
or surrendered under the agreement was their right to an
employment. Such right is protected under the security of
tenure provision of the Labor Code of the Philippines and
cannot be lost without due process of law
New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission, which provides:
Authority to bind party.
Attorneys and other
representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their
clients in all matters of procedure
The Decision dated May 8, 1990 ordered the reinstatement
of the union members to their former or equivalent position
while in the case of the Union board members and shop
stewards, petitioner was given the option to dismiss them
subject to the payment of separation pay. However, in the
Compromise Agreement, not only the union officers, board

members and shop stewards were considered dismissed

from the service but also the union members subject to the
payment of separation pay and financial assistance.
waiver of reinstatement, like waivers of money claims, must
be regarded as a personal right which must be exercised
personally by the workers themselves
We have ruled that ". . . when it comes to individual benefits
accruing to members of a union from a favorable final
judgment of any court, the members themselves become the
real parties in interest and it is for them, rather than for the
union, to accept or reject individually the fruits of litigation
authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed and
should be duly established by evidence
We also find no reason for the union members to enter into a
compromise when the decision of NLRC ordering their
reinstatement is more advantageous to them than their
being dismissed from their jobs under said Compromise
Agreement.
Compromise Agreement does not apply to private
respondents who did not sign the Compromise Agreement,
nor avail of its benefits
However, while respondents Domingo Namia and Rizalde
Flores are not bound by the terms of the Compromise
Agreement, they are bound by the amended decision of
NLRC rendered on May 3, 1990 which provides that members
of the board of directors of the union may be dismissed by
petitioner subject to the payment of separation pay. The two
respondents did not appeal the amended decision after the
denial by NLRC of their motion for reconsideration thereof
36. Associated Labor Unions v. CAlleja 173 SCRA 178 Dea
Ballesteros

FACTS: May 7, 1986 Associated Labor Union (ALU) informed

GAW Trading that the majority of its employees have
authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining
representative. It likewise requested for the execution of a
CBA.. May 9, 1986 Southern Phils. Federation of Labor
(SPFL) and Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW)
undertook a strike when GAW did not accede to their own
demands. GAW recognized ALU as exclusive bargaining
representative. A conference for the execution of CBA was
thereafter set on the same date. May 13, 1986 ALU
presented copies of the proposed CBA for comment or
signing. May 15 1986 the CBA was signed by ALU and GAW
May 19, 1986 GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU) filed a
Petition for Certification Election which was dismissed for
noncompliance with the subscription requirement. May 27,
1986 CBA between ALU and GAW was filed with the
Ministry of Labor. May 28, 1986 SPFL filed a Petition for
Direct Recognition where GALLU likewise participated as an
intervenor. Notwithstanding, the Med Arbiter ordered the
holding of a Certification Election. ALU appealed. BLR
Director Trajano reversed the Med Arbiter on the ground that
the CBA had been effective and the contract bar rule was
applicable. BLR Director Calleja, who succeeded to the
position, reversed and ordered the holding of a Certification
Election on the following grounds: (1) Contract Bar Rule does
not apply since the CBA was defective; (2) No proof that CBA
had been posted in at least 2 conspicuous places in the
establishment at least five days before its ratification and
that it had been ratified by the majority of the employees in
the bargaining unit.
ISSUE: WON the CBA was valid such that it would constitute
the bar to the holding of a Certification Election under the
Contract Bar Rule?
HELD/RATIO: No. It suffers from infirmities: There was failure
to post the CBA in at least 2 conspicuous places places in the
establishment at least five days before its ratification.
Petitioner's rationalization that the failure was due to the
illegal strike staged by SPFL in all the stores of GAW Trading,
Inc. which made it impossible to comply with the posting
requirement in so far as the realization of its purpose is
concerned as there were no impartial members of the unit
who could be apprised of the CBA's contents is untenable.
The posting of the CBA is the employers responsibility which
requires a mere mechanical act. That there were no impartial
members is immaterial because precisely the purpose of
posting is to inform the employees of the contents of the
CBA such that they can intelligently decide whether or not to
ratify it, regardless of whether they already have their own
opinion regarding the same. The assembly of the members
of ALU wherein the agreement in question was allegedly
explained does not cure the defect. The contract is intended
for all the employees and not only for the members of the
purported representative alone. It may even be said that the
need to inform the non-members of the terms thereof is
more exigent and compelling since, in all likelihood, their
contact with the persons who are supposed to represent
them is limited. This requirement becomes all the more
important in this case where there was an apparent and
suspicious hurry in the formulation and finalization of said
CBA. In the aforementioned letter where GAW required
petitioner union to present proof of its support by the
employees, the company already suggested that petitioner
ALU at the same time submit the proposals that it intended
to embody in the projected agreement. This was on May 12,
1986, and promptly on the following day the negotiating
panel furnished respondent company final copies of the
desired agreement which, with equal dispatch, was signed
on May 15, 1986. Another potent reason for annulling the
disputed collective bargaining agreement is the finding of
respondent director that one hundred eighty-one (181) of the
two hundred eighty-one (281) workers who "ratified" the
same now "strongly and vehemently deny and/or repudiate
the alleged negotiation and ratification of the CBA.
37. Buklod ng SAulog vs. Calleja 99 Phil 16 Crisanto Ando
NATURE Petition for review
FACTS -The respondents, 65 in number, employees of the
Saulog Transit, Inc., filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a
petition for a certification election, alleging that the total

number of employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. was 583;

that there were two labor organizations which represented
the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc., to wit: the Buklod
g Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit Employees Union;
and that the certification election prayed for was for the
purpose of determining the sole bargaining representative of
the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. -The president of
the Buklod g Saulog Transit filed its answer stating that a
collective bargaining agreement had been entered into by
and between the Buklod g Saulog Transit, a duly registered
union with the Department of Labor, on the one hand, and
the Saulog Transit, Inc., on the other; -An election was held
peacefully and orderly, the result thereof having been
forwarded to the Department of Labor, against which
election and the result thereof no protest as regards the
legality thereof was lodged; that having acquired a juridical
personality from the time of its registration, the Buklod g
Saulog Transit entered into a collective bargaining contract
already referred to covering the well-being of the members
of which the respondents were still members. -The Saulog
Transit, Inc. filed a pleading entitled "Appearance and
Manifestation" averring that the allegation that the
respondents constituted 10 per cent of the total number of
employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. was for the Court to
determine; and that it had dealt and had been dealing with
the Buklod g Saulog Transit in accordance with a collective
bargaining agreement entered into by and between them,
the Buklod g Saulog Transit representing the employees of
the Saulog Transit, Inc. as an industrial unit. the Court
rendered judgment directing . . . that a certification election
be held
ISSUE WON an order of certification election shall issue on
the basis of the evidence established
HELD YES. The trial court found that the collective
bargaining agreement entered into by and between the
Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit "does
not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, and other conditions of employment of all
the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely
a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors
who are members of the Buklod g Saulog." And even in the
supplementary agreement, there is no clear-cut stipulation
as to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions or employment." In their reply the respondents
claim that such an agreement and the supplementary
agreement have not been identified and offered in evidence
and should not be taken into consideration. The trial court
took, however, into consideration both agreements and
found that the first agreement being incomplete does not
bar a certification election; and as to the supplementary
agreement the Court held that it having been entered into
after the filing of the petition for a certification election the
same cannot and does not bar a certification election. The
affidavit filed by the President of the Buklod g Saulog
Transit is not mentioned in the order and resolution appealed
from. It is clearly an effort on the part of the petitioner to
supply what was lacking in the two agreements already
mentioned. The contention that as section, Republic Act No.
875, does not require that the agreement be in writing
unless either party request that it be reduced to writing,
thereby insinuating that there had been a verbal
understanding before the written agreement was entered
into, has no bearing and effect in a case where there is a
written agreement which the Court of Industrial Relations
found incomplete. In these circumstances we are of the
opinion that the collective bargaining agreement entered is
no bar to a certification election at the instance of at least 10
per cent of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit, pursuant to section 12, paragraphs (a), (b)
and (c), Republic Act No. 875. Disposition order and
resolution AFFIRMED
39 Associated Trad. vs. NOriel 88 SCRA 96 Wilson Morano
local chapter of the Federation of Free Workers (Synthetic
Marketing and Industrial Corporation Chapter) filed a petition
for certification election among the regular rank-and-file
employees of the Synthetic Marketing and Industrial
Corporation. The petition alleged, among others, that it
commands the great majority of the rank-and-file employees
of the bargaining unit, and that more than 30 % of the total

work force supported its petition, attaching the signatures of

said union members. The petition admitted the existence of
another union in the establishment, the Associated Trade
Unions (ATU-KILUSAN) and the existence of a CBA to expire
on October 31, 1977
there has been no certification election in the company for
the last twelve months preceding the filing of the petition.
Both the Company and the Associated Trade Unions opposed
the petition on the ground that it is contract-barred by virtue
of the existence of a duly registered CBA with the BLR
entered into between the parties on May 10, 1977.
Petitioning union, on the other hand, assailed the validity of
the said CBA on the ground that the same had been
executed five (5) months and twenty-one (21) days prior to
the expiration of the old CBA which was supposed to expired
October 31, 1977 and was not ratified by the members of
the bargaining unit
the Med-Arbiter
lling for a certification election
(ATU-KILUSAN) appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. I
BLR Director Carmelo C. Noriel affirmed the Order of the
Med-Arbiter calling for an election, at the same time setting
aside its certification of the CBA concluded between the
Synthetic Marketing and Industrial Corporation and the
Associated Trade Unions
ATU-KILUSAN) filed the instant petition for last-mentioned
resolution of the BLR Directo
lack of merit of this petition is thus quite manifest. It calls for
dismissal.
challenged order of labor officials could be shown to be
tainted by unfairness or arbitrariness, whether in the
procedural or substantive sense, a due process question
arises. Clearly, then, the corrective power of this tribunal to
assure that an administrative agency adheres to such
cardinal primary right 7 comes into play.
is quite futile then for petitioner Union to hope that this
Tribunal, contrary to a long line of decisions 9 notable for
their unanimity, would now gratify an aspiration devoid of
legitimac
contract-bar rule would preclude a certification election. That
was to ignore the decertification of the collective bargaining
agreement which was hastily and prematurely entered into
precisely for the purpose of avoiding the holding of the
certification election
The only issue to be determined in the instant case is
whether or not the renewed CB forged between the
respondent company and petitioner union constitutes a bar
to the holding of a certification election.
record shows that the old CBA of petitioner ATU-KILUSAN
with respondent Synthetic Marketing and
Industrial Corporation was to expire on October 31, 1977.
However, 5 months and 21 days before its expiry date, or on
May 10, 1977, ATU-KILUSAN renewed the same with the
consent and collaboration of management. The renewed CBA
was then submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations for
certification
before the expiration of the old CBA on October 31, 1977), a
petition for certification election was filed by respondent
union, the Federation of Free Workers. Meanwhile, the
renewed CBA between petitioner ATU-KILUSAN and
respondent company was certified
is quite obvious that the renewed CBA cannot substitute a
bar to the instant petition for certification election. In the
first place, the said CBA was certified after the instant
petition for certification had been filed by herein respondent
union, and its certification was conditioned upon the fact
that there was no pending petition for certification election
with the Bureau of Labor Relations
Hence, said new CBA was not yet in existence when the
instant petition for certification election was filed on
September 13, 1977. Said new CBA was to become effective
on November 1, 1977 after the old CBA expire
Clearly, therefore, the contract-bar rule does not apply to the
case at bar
petitioner herein proceeded with such indecent haste in
renewing their CBA way ahead of the 'sixty-day freedom
period' in their obvious desire to frustrate the will of the
rank-and-file employees in selecting their collective
bargaining representative. To countenance the actuation of

the company and the petitioner herein would be violative of

the employees' constitutional right to self-organizatio
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of
meri
40. Far Stone vs. Estrella SCRA 49 Lyrah L. Devanadera
National Labor Relations Commission certified a three-year
collective bargaining agreement between respondents
Associated Labor Union (ALU) and Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company of the Philippines. Said collective bargaining
agreement was to be effective from February 1, 1973 to
January 31, 1976.
respondents entered into a "Supplemental Agreement"
extending the fife of the collective bargaining agreement for
one year,
extension was not ratified by the covered employees nor
submitted to the Department of Labor for classification.
sixty-day period prior to the original expiry date of the
agreement, some 233 out of about 400 rank-and-file
employees of respondent Company resigned from
respondent ALU. subsequently, the number of these
employees who resigned from the union was increased to
276 and, by way of letter to the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, they requested for the issuance of a
certificate of registration in favor of petitioner Firestone Tire
& Rubber Company Employees' Union
Registration Permit
issued to petitioner FEU.
petitioner FEU filed a petition with the Bureau of Labor
Relations for direct certification or certification election, 1
with the written consent of 308 employees, or 77% of the
400-man bargaining unit
respondent ALU filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition for the cancellation of the registration certificate of
petitioner FEU, 2 alleging that at the time of FEU's
registration, respondent ALU was the recognized and
certified collective bargaining agent in the unit, and that FEU
had not submitted the required sworn statement that there
is no recognized
respondent ALU prayed for the dismissa
roun
pending petition for the cancellation of FEU's registration
certificate and that there is an existing collective bargaining
agreement, due to expire on January 31, 1977, which
constitutes a valid bar to the holding of a certification
election.
Respondent Company likewise opposed the holding of a
certification election on the ground, however, that the
petition therefor was filed late, considering that it was filed
ten (10) days after the expiry date of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Med-Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition for
certification election,
Respondents ALU and the Company filed separate appeals
from the order before the Bureau of Labor Relations
affirmed by the Honorable Director
Carmelo C. Noriel
, respondent Acting BLR Director Francisco L. Estrella issued
a Resolution reversing the Order of the Med-Arbiter which
was affirmed by Director Noriel, and holding:
that there indeed exists a prejudicial question involving the
very legal personality of the petitioner union. In BLR Case
No. 210676, the validity of the registration certificate of
petitioner is at issue. It is therefore obvious that the present
representation question should wait for the final disposition
of the issue on petitioner's legal personality, if only to
forestall what may prove to be unnecessary proceedings
whether or not there was an existing collective bargaining
agreement which serves as a bar to the holding of a
certification election was not resolved by respondent Acting
Director Francisco L. Estrella.
respondent Acting Director Franco L. Estrella entered a
Resolution reversing the decision of Director Noriel and
revoking the certificate of registration of petitioner FEU.
ruled that
no union may be registered when there is in the bargaining
unit a or certified collective bargaining agent. The Acting
Director found that there was such a bargaining agent in the
unit (ALU), and that there was in fact a collective bargaining
agreement which was yet to expir

FEU's application for registration was premature, and that it

should have waited for the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement.
petitioner's contention that the issue of whether or not there
was an existing contract or collective agreement to validity
bar the holding of a certification election should have been
resolved by respondent Acting Director
'if the petition for certification election in this case is not
barred by the contract in question, then the registration
certificate of petitioner, acquired as it was within the sixtyday freedom period of such contract must, of necessity, be
likewise not barred or denied as premature." Likewise,
petitioner alleges that 'there being no pronouncement on the
applicability of the 'contract bar' rule in this case, the
cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner is
devoid of legal basis, hence it was done by the respondent
BLR Acting Director in grave abuse of discretion."
The expiry date of January 31, 1977, according to petitioner,
was unauthorized because the extension of the contract for
a period of one year was not certified by the Department of
Labor and was "used to foil the constitutional right of the
workers to self-organization and to engage in collective
bargaining."
Respondent Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the
Philippines filed its Comment
petitioner FEU had no legal personality as a union because
its non-compliance with
Labor Code is sufficient ground for the cancellation of its
registration certificate
FEU had no legal personality to ask for a direct certification
or certification election because its certificate of registration
was obtained fraudulently and has, in fact, been cancelled.
e find this petition meritorio
Director Carmelo C. Noriel, resolving the pivotal issue of
whether or not the failure of FEU to submit "a sworn
statement ... to the effect that there is no recognized or
certified collective bargaining agent in the bargaining unit
condemned warrants the revocation of its registration,
This Bureau answers in the negative.
... notwithstanding the existence of a certified or recognized
collective bargaining agent, the policy of this Office
sanctions a registration of new union during the freedom
period especially if it has become apparent that a substantial
number of union members has decide(, to form a new labor
organization, as aptly illustrated in the case at bar.
Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the
delay of the right to select representatives can be justified
only where stability is deemed paramount. Excepted from
the contract bar rule are certain types of contracts which do
not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the
Identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability
derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the
employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish
the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law. 5
the case at bar, it is doubtful if any contract that may have
been entered into between respondent ALU and respondent
Company will foster stability in the bargaining unit, in view of
the fact that a substantial number of the employees therein
have resigned from ALU and joined petitioner FEU. At any
rate, this is a matter that must be finally determined by
means of a certification election.
The important factor here is the true choice of the
employees, and . the most expeditious and effective manner
of determining this is by means of the certification election,
as it is for this very reason that such procedure has been
incorporated in the law. To order that a separate secret ballot
election be conducted for the purpose of determining the
question of policy, i.e., whether or not the majority of the
employees desire to disaffiliate from the mother union,
should be merely a circuitous way of ascertaining the
majority's true choice.
It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if
given in an honest election with freedom on the part of the
voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device
can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the
two parties to a business enterprise, management and labor,
establishing a regime of self-rule.
once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond
doubt, a certification election is the most expeditious way of

determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive

bargaining representative.
extension of the life of the collective bargaining agreement
for a period of one year was not certified by the Bureau of
Labor Relations, it cannot, therefore, also bar the
certification election. Only a certified collective bargaining
agreement would serve as a bar to such election
petitioner's application for registration was not premature, as
it need not have waited for the expiration of the one-year
extension, the agreement having expired o
WHEREFORE the instant petition for certiorari is granted
Calalang vs. William, GR 47800 Twinkle Rodriguez
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530
pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18,
1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No.
548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from
the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the
Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila
and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned
to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire
to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints

and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health,

and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail
over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely
the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus
populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
2. Garcia vs. PAL G.R. 164856, Jan 20, 2009 Omni Gruba
FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and
Dumago after they were allegedly caught sniffing shabu at
the PAL Tool Room. After due notice, they were dismissed for
transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. The petitioners filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in
favor of petitioners with an immediate reinstatement. A writ
was issued to such effect pending appeal with the NLRC.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of
appeal from the Labor Arbiters order up to the final decision
of the higher court?
HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore
labor as a primary social and economic force. In short, with
respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has
determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its
execution pending appeal. Therefore, the petitioners can
collect wages from the period of the execution of the
decision of the labor arbiter to the time of the final decision
of the higher court.
3. Capitol Med v. Merris, G.R. 155098, Sept. 16 2005 Bob
Ryan Diator Gani
Work is a necessity that has economic significance deserving
legal protection. The social justice and protection to labor
provisions in the Constitution dictate so. On the other hand,
employers are also accorded rights and privileges to assure
their self-determination and independence, and reasonable
return of capital. This mass of privileges comprises the socalled management prerogatives. Although they may be
broad and unlimited in scope, the State has the right to
determine whether an employer's privilege is exercised in a
manner that complies with the legal requirements and does
not offend the protected rights of labor. One of the rights
accorded an employer is the right to close an establishment
or undertaking
4. Jamer v. NLRC GR 112630,Sept 5, 1997 Daryll Generyn
Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who
were dismissed for having accumulated shortages.
Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor arbiter
ruled them having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC
reversed the ruling.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?

HELD: Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the
management the irregularities constitute "fraud or willful
breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or
duly authorized representative"--one of the just causes of
valid termination of employment. The employer cannot be
compelled to retain employees who were guilty of
malfeasance as their continued employment will be
prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law, in
protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
The cause of social justice is not served by upholding the
interest of petitioners in disregard of the right of private
respondents. Social justice ceases to be an effective
instrument for the equalization of the social and economic
forces by the State when it is used to shield wrongdoing.[29]
While it is true that compassion and human consideration
should guide the disposition of cases involving termination of
employment since it affects ones source or means of
livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benefits
accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to
retain the services of an employee who has been shown to
be a gross liability to the employer. It should be made clear
that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it
is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality
between labor and management. The intent is to balance the
scale of justice; to put up the two parties on relatively equal
positions. There may be cases where the circumstances
warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but
never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice
to the employer, Justicia remini regarda es
5. Garcia vs. NLRC, GR 110518, August 1, 1994 Shelly Ann
Miranda Samoy
ain issue before the Court in this petition for certiorari is the
validity of the retrenchment of the fifty-one petitioners by
private respondent National Service Corporation (NASECO)
as upheld by the Labor Arbiter and later by the National
Labor Relations Commissio
It is now asserted in this petition that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in holding that the petitioners were
validly dismissed on the ground of retrenchment; that
NASECO is not guilty of unfair labor practice; and that their
monetary claims for increases under Republic Acts 6640 and
6727, as well as for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, should be denied.
The petitioners assert that NASECO failed to show with
convincing evidence that the incurred losses, if any, were
substantial. The claimed losses were belied by the fact that
NASECO hired new personnel before and after the dismissal
of the petitioners. NASECO also failed to pursue other
measures to forestall losses, short of dismissing the
petitioners. It did not follow the "first in, last out" rule that in
cases of retrenchment, employees with long years of service
with the company, like the petitioners, should not be the first
to be retrenched. They attribute their dismissal to their
participation in the strike of November 19, 1988. Thus, their
dismissal was an act of unfair labor practice for being
discriminatory and violative of their rights to selforganization and to engage in concerted activities.
We have to disagree
sses incurred by NASECO for the year 1989 amounted to
P1,457,700.42 and were adequately proved by it.
e also hold that the increases in the petitioners' minimum
wage under RA 6640 and RA 6720 should be granted since
they became effective before the petitioners' retrenchment.
Said increases should be considered in the computation of
their separation pay in accordance with Art. 283 of the Labor
Code.
The constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor
is not intended to oppress or destroy management. The
employer cannot be compelled to retain employees it no
longer needs, to be paid for work unreasonably refused and
not actually performed. NASECO bent over backward and
exerted every effort to help the petitioners look for other
work, postponed the effective date of their separation, and
offered them a generous termination pay package. The

unflagging commitment of this Court to the cause of labor

will not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in
the right, as in this case.
6. Ledesma vs. NLRC GR. 110518, Aug1, 1994 Lorelie
Jamelah Galindez Dema-ala
whether the petitioner was illegally dismissed from
employment.
Petitioner, therefore, is now before this Court assailing the
Decisions handed down by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, and insisting that he was illegally dismissed from
his employment. Petitioner argues that his receipt of his
earned salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000, and
his 13th month pay, is neither inconsistent with nor a
negation of his allegation of illegal dismissal. Petitioner
maintains that he received his salary and benefit only from
the guardhouse, for he was already banned from the work
premises.
We are not persuaded.
Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a
case before judicial and quasi-administrative bodies, it is
necessary that allegations must be supported by substantial
evidence.28 Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.29
In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record
so as to meet the quantum of evidence required, i.e.,
substantial evidence. Petitioners claim of illegal dismissal is
supported by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated
and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are also incoherent,
inconsistent and contradictor
While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of
illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to
prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause in the case at bar, however, the facts and the
evidence did not establish a prima facie case that the
petitioner was dismissed from employment.31 Before the
private respondent must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service.
Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no
question as to the legality or illegality thereof
It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor,
and that in light of this Constitutional mandate, we must be
vigilant in striking down any attempt of the management to
exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not
mean that we are bound to uphold the working class in every
labor dispute brought before this Court for our resolution.
The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It
should be made clear that when the law tilts the scales of
justice in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent
economic inequality between labor and management. The
intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put the two
parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases
where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the
interests of management but never should the scale be so
tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer. Justitia
nemini neganda est -- justice is to be denied to non
7.People vs. Pomar, GR 2208, Nov. 3 1924 Justin Mikhael
Abraham
Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a
Tobacco factory. She was granted a vacation leave, by
reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of
July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time, she was
not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of
Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on
Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the
tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on
the other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not
constitute an offense and further alleges that the
aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was
unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides that,
Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be
obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer
who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before
and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That
the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just

cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her

wages equivalent to the total of two months counting from
the day of her discharge. Section 15 of the same Act
provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The
latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its
supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding the
health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place
of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a
certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and
one month after their delivery. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay
the fine of fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is
unconstitutional;
(2) Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned
provision was a valid exercise of Police Power.
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to
be unconstitutional for being violative or restrictive of the
right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their
affairs. It has been decided several times, that the right to
contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of
the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem
advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or
public policy
The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding
power. The police power may encompass every law for the
restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of
the public peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot
grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor
transcend or violate the express inhibition of the
constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled
by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state,
and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or
guaranteed by the latter.
8. PASEI v. Drilon 163 SCRA 386 Vinz Sia
acts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally
in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity
of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females," that it 'does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills," and
that it is violative of the right to travel. It was likewise held to
be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of
Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." In addition, it was contended that Department Order
No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It
was claimed to be in violation of the Charter's nonimpairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable
injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further
enforced.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary
of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
Issue: Whether or not deployment ban for female domestic
helpers is valid under our Constitution.

Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. The concept

of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has
been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1)
an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that
men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of
Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's will." It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number.
8. Alalayan vs. NAPOCOR, GR-L 24396, July 29 1968 Tophz
Patulay
n 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as
Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and
Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of
NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA
3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed
an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their
customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing
contracts with franchise holders for the supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and
Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first,
it was not included in the title of the amending law nor was it
included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of
RA 3043 was to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR
hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not
germane to RA 3043.

are the objects of solicitude in the legislation now

complained of. The police power as an attribute to promote
the common weal would be diluted considerably of its reach
and effectiveness if on the mere plea that the liberty to
contract would be restricted, the statute complained of may
be characterized as a denial of due process. The right to
property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable
extreme.
9. ECOP vs. NWPC GR 96169, Sept. 24, 1991 Jeanne Caroline
M. Vertido
Facts:
On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National
Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the
minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital
Region. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP)
moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel
Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP
opposed.
On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No.
NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No. NCR-01. It provides that
all workers and employees in the private sector in the
National Capital Region already receiving wages above the
statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and
twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an
increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.
ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity
Commission contending that the board's grant of an "acrossthe-board" wage increase to workers already being paid
more than existing minimum wage rates (up to P125.00 a
day) as an alleged excess of authority. ECOP further alleges
that under the Republic Act No. 6727, the boards may only
prescribe "minimum wages," not determine "salary ceilings."
ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to
promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of
settling wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not
preempt collective bargaining agreements by establishing
ceilings.
On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an
Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November
14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. ECOP
then, elevated the case via petition for review on certiorari
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether Wage Order No. NCR01-A providing for new wage rates, as well as authorizing
various Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to
prescribe minimum wage rates for all workers in the various
regions, and for a National Wages and Productivity
Commission to review, among other functions, wage levels
determined by the boards is valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.

Ruling:

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the

Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill,
and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislators.
There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to
ensure the well-being and economic security of all the
people,28 as well as the pledge of protection to labor with
the specific authority to regulate the relations between
landowners and tenants and between labor and capital.29
This particularized reference to the rights of working men
whether in industry and agriculture certainly cannot preclude
attention to and concern for the rights of consumers, who

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and

Productivity Commission and Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines and denied the petition of ECOP.
The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was
intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-time
boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by
giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective.
The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards
to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages
without labor and management knocking on the legislature's
door at every turn.
.
The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the
boards alone to set floor wages, the Act would have no need
for a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest
consumer price index, or better, would have Congress done
it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has
done so for years. The fact of the matter is that the Act

sought a "thinking" group of men and women bound by

statutory standards. The Court is not convinced that the
Regional Board of the National Capital Region, in decreeing
an across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of
legislation. It is true that wage-firing, like rate-fixing,
constitutes an act Congress; it is also true, however, that
Congress may delegate the power to fix rates provided that,
as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient
standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that
the above-quoted standards are sufficient, and in the light of
the floor-wage method's failure, the Court believes that the
Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the
National Capital Region.
he concept of "minimum wage" is, however, a different
thing, and certainly, it means more than setting a floor wage
to upgrade existing wages, as ECOP takes it to mean.
"Minimum wages" underlies the effort of the State, as
Republic Act No. 6727 expresses it, "to promote productivityimprovement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent
standard of living for the workers and their families; to
guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production; to enhance employment generation in the
countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow business
and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion
and growth," 25 and as the Constitution expresses it, to
affirm "labor as a primary social economic force." 26 As the
Court indicated, the statute would have no need for a board
if the question were simply "how much". The State is
concerned, in addition, that wages are not distributed
unevenly, and more important, that social justice is
subserved.
10. Brew Master vs. NAFLU, GR 119243, April 17, 1997 Dea
Ballesteros
ACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the
respondent labor union. He did not report forwork for 1
month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted
him and nobody was there to lookafter his children. He
was required to explain. Finding his reasons to be
unjustified, the petitionerterminated him, since according
to company rules, absence for 6 consecutive days is
consideredabandonment of work.
ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on
some company rules?
HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from
prescribing rules and regulations to govern theconduct of his
employees, these rules and their implementation must be
fair, just and reasonable. No lessthan the Constitution looks
with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights
not only under ageneral statement of a state policy but
under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus
placinglabor contracts on a higher plane and with greater
safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and capitalare
not merely contractual. They are impressed with public
interest and labor contracts must, perforce,yield to the
common goo
11. Gandara v. NLRC, GR 126703, Dec 29, 1998 MJ Gonzales
FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report
for work because his wife delivered their first child. He did
not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the
business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work
he was surprised upon knowing that someone has been hired
to take his place.
ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally
dismissed. While a prolonged absence without leave may
constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems
from the non-observance of due process. Applying the
WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was not
preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the
illegality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds
and therefore illegal.
12. Insular Life vs. NLRC 179 SCRA 459 Wilson Morano
whether, as Basiao asserts, he had become the Company's
employee by virtue of the contract invoked by him, thereby
placing his claim for unpaid commissions within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under the

provisions of Section 217 of the Labor Code, 8 or, contrarily,

as the Company would have it, that under said contract
Basiao's status was that of an independent contractor whose
claim was thus cognizable, not by the Labor Arbiter in a labor
case, but by the regular courts in an ordinary civil action.
The Company's thesis, that no employer-employee relation
in the legal and generally accepted sense existed between it
and Basiao, is drawn from the terms of the contract they had
entered into, which, either expressly or by necessary
implication, made Basiao the master of his own time and
selling methods, left to his judgment the time, place and
means of soliciting insurance, set no accomplishment quotas
and compensated him on the basis of results obtained. He
was not bound to observe any schedule of working hours or
report to any regular station; he could seek and work on his
prospects anywhere and at anytime he chose to, and was
free to adopt the selling methods he deemed most effective.
Without denying that the above were indeed the expressed
implicit conditions of Basiao's contract with the Company,
the respondents contend that they do not constitute the
decisive determinant of the nature of his engagement,
invoking precedents to the effect that the critical feature
distinguishing the status of an employee from that of an
independent contractor is control, that is, whether or not the
party who engages the services of another has the power to
control the latter's conduct in rendering such services.
Pursuing the argument, the respondents draw attention to
the provisions of Basiao's contract obliging him to "...
observe and conform to all rules and regulations which the
Company may from time to time prescribe ...," as well as to
the fact that the Company prescribed the qualifications of
applicants for insurance, processed their applications and
determined the amounts of insurance cover to be issued as
indicative of the control, which made Basiao, in legal
contemplation, an employee of the Company. 9
e respondents limit themselves to pointing out that Basiao's
contract with the Company bound him to observe and
conform to such rules and regulations as the latter might
from time to time prescribe. No showing has been made that
any such rules or regulations were in fact promulgated,
much less that any rules existed or were issued which
effectively controlled or restricted his choice of methods
or the methods themselves of selling insurance. Absent
such showing, the Court will not speculate that any
exceptions or qualifications were imposed on the express
provision of the contract leaving Basiao "... free to exercise
his own judgment as to the time, place and means of
soliciting insurance."
The Labor Arbiter's decision makes reference to Basiao's
claim of having been connected with the Company for
twenty-five years. Whatever this is meant to imply, the
obvious reply would be that what is germane here is Basiao's
status under the contract of July 2, 1968, not the length of
his relationship with the Company.
The Court, therefore, rules that under the contract invoked
by him, Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a
commission agent, an independent contractor whose claim
for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an
ordinary civil action. The Labor Arbiter erred in taking
cognizance of, and adjudicating, said claim, being without
jurisdiction to do so, as did the respondent NLRC in affirming
the Arbiter's decision. This conclusion renders it unnecessary
and premature to consider Basiao's claim for commissions on
its merits.
13. Tongko vs. Manufacturers Life G.R. 167622, June 29,
2010 Lyrah L. Devanadera
FACTS:
Taking from the November 2008 decision, the facts are as
follows:
Manufacturers Life Insurance, Co. is a domestic corporation
engaged in life insurance business. De Dios was its President
and Chief Executive Officer. Petitioner Tongko started his
relationship with Manulife in 1977 by virtue of a Career
Agent's Agreement.

Pertinent provisions of the agreement state that:

It is understood and agreed that the Agent is an independent
contractor and nothing contained herein shall be construed
or interpreted as creating an employer-employee
relationship between the Company and the Agent.
a) The Agent shall canvass for applications for Life
Insurance, Annuities, Group policies and other products
offered by the Company, and collect, in exchange for
provisional receipts issued by the Agent, money due or to
become due to the Company in respect of applications or
policies obtained by or through the Agent or from
policyholders allotted by the Company to the Agent for
servicing, subject to subsequent confirmation of receipt of
payment by the Company as evidenced by an Official
Receipt issued by the Company directly to the policyholder.
b) The Company may terminate this Agreement for any
breach or violation of any of the provisions hereof by the
Agent by giving written notice to the Agent within fifteen
(15) days from the time of the discovery of the breach. No
waiver, extinguishment, abandonment, withdrawal or
cancellation of the right to terminate this Agreement by the
Company shall be construed for any previous failure to
exercise its right under any provision of this Agreement.
c) Either of the parties hereto may likewise terminate his
Agreement at any time without cause, by giving to the other
party fifteen (15) days notice in writing.
Sometime in 2001, De Dios addressed a letter to Tongko,
then one of the Metro North Managers, regarding meetings
wherein De Dios found Tongko's views and comments to be
unaligned with the directions the company was taking. De
Dios also expressed his concern regarding the Metro North
Managers' interpretation of the company's goals. He
maintains that Tongko's allegations are unfounded. Some
allegations state that some Managers are unhappy with their
earnings, that they're earning less than what they deserve
and that these are the reasons why Tonko's division is unable
to meet agency development objectives. However, not a
single Manager came forth to confirm these allegations.
Finally, De Dios related his worries about Tongko's inability to
push for company development and growth.
De Dios subsequently sent Tongko a letter of termination in
accordance with Tongko's Agents Contract. Tongko filed a
complaint with the NLRC against Manulife for illegal
dismissal, alleging that he had an employer-employee
relationship with De Dios instead of a revocable agency by
pointing out that the latter exercised control over him
through directives regarding how to manage his area of
responsibility and setting objectives for him relating to the
business. Tongko also claimed that his dismissal was without
basis and he was not afforded due process. The NLRC ruled
that there was an employer-employee relationship as
evidenced by De Dios's letter which contained the manner
and means by which Tongko should do his work. The NLRC
ruled in favor of Tongko, affirming the existence of the
employer-employee relationship.
The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the NLRC's ruling. It
applied the four-fold test for determining control and found
the elements in this case to be lacking, basing its decision on
the same facts used by the NLRC. It found that Manulife did
not exert control over Tongko, there was no employeremployee relationship and thus the NLRC did not have
jurisdiction over the case.
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals and ruled in favor of Tongko. However, the Supreme
Court issued another Resolution dated June 29, 2010,
reversing its decision. Tongko filed a motion for
reconsideration, which is now the subject of the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in issuing the June
29, 2010 resolution, reversing its earlier decision that an
employer-employee relationship existed.

HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.

LABOR LAW Agency; Employer-employee relationships
The Supreme Court finds no reason to reverse the June 29,
2010 decision. Control over the performance of the task of
one providing service both with respect to the means and
manner, and the results of the service is the primary
element in determining whether an employment relationship
exists. The Supreme Court ruled petitioners Motion against
his favor since he failed to show that the control Manulife
exercised over him was the control required to exist in an
employer-employee relationship; Manulifes control fell short
of this norm and carried only the characteristic of the
relationship between an insurance company and its agents,
as defined by the Insurance Code and by the law of agency
under the Civil Code.
In the Supreme Courts June 29, 2010 Resolution, they noted
that there are built-in elements of control specific to an
insurance agency, which do not amount to the elements of
control that characterize an employment relationship
governed by the Labor Code.The Insurance Code provides
definite parameters in the way an agent negotiates for the
sale of the companys insurance products, his collection
activities and his delivery of the insurance contract or policy.
They do not reach the level of control into the means and
manner of doing an assigned task that invariably
characterizes an employment relationship as defined by
labor law.
To reiterate, guidelines indicative of labor law "control" do
not merely relate to the mutually desirable result intended
by the contractual relationship; they must have the nature of
dictating the means and methods to be employed in
attaining the result. Tested by this norm, Manulifes
instructions regarding the objectives and sales targets, in
connection with the training and engagement of other
agents, are among the directives that the principal may
impose on the agent to achieve the assigned tasks.They are
targeted results that Manulife wishes to attain through its
agents. Manulifes codes of conduct, likewise, do not
necessarily intrude into the insurance agents means and
manner of conducting their sales. Codes of conduct are
norms or standards of behavior rather than employer
directives into how specific tasks are to be done.
In sum, the Supreme Court found absolutely no evidence of
labor law control.
14. Calamba Medical vs. NLRC GR. 176484, Nov. 25, 2008
Jaymart Ibay Manalili
Ronaldo Lanzanas and Merceditha Lanzanas are doctors
employed by Calamba Medical Center, Inc. They are given a
retainers fee by the hospital as well as shares from fees
obtained from patients.
One time, Ronaldo was overheard by Dr. Trinidad talking to
another doctor about how low the admission rate to the
hospital is. That conversation was reported to Dr. Desipeda
who was then the Medical Director of the hospital.
Eventually Ronaldo was suspended. Ronaldo filed a case for
Illegal Suspension in March 1998. In the same month, the
rank and file employees organized a strike against the
hospital for unfair labor practices. Desipeda eventually fired
Ronaldo for his alleged participation in the strike, which is
not allowed under the Labor Code for he is a managerial
employee. Desipeda also fired Merceditha on the ground that
she is the wife of Ronaldo who naturally sympathizes with
him.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no Illegal Suspension
for there was no employer-employee relationship because
the hospital has no control over Ronaldo as he is a doctor
who even gets shares from the hospitals earnings.
The National Labor Relations Commission as well as the
Court of Appeals reversed the LA.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee

relationship?
HELD: Yes. Under the control test, an employment
relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the
hospital controls both the means and the details of the
process by which the physician is to accomplish his task.
There is control in this case because of the fact that
Desipeda schedules the hours of work for Ronaldo and his
wife.
The doctors are also registered by the hospital under the SSS
which is premised on an employer-employee relationship.
There is Illegal Dismissal committed against Rolando for
there was no notice and hearing held. It was never shown
that Rolando joined the strike. But even if he did, he has the
right to do so for he is not a part of the managerial or
supervisory employees. As a doctor, their decisions are still
subject to revocation or revision by Desipeda.
There is Illegal Dismissal committed against Merceditha for
the ground therefor was not mentioned in Article 282 of the
Labor Code.
15. Felix vs. Buenaseda GR 109704, Jan 17 1995 Pasinabo
Thur
FACTS:
This is a petition assailing the petitioners dismissal as
Medical Specialist I of the National Center for Mental Health
as illegal and violative of the constitutional provision on
security of tenure. Petitioner joined the NCMH as a Resident
Physician in June1979. Shortly, he was promoted as Senior
Resident Physician until the Ministry of Health reorganized
the NCMH pursuant toE.O. 119. Under the reorganization, he
was appointed to the position of Senior Resident Physician in
a temporary capacity. On August 1988, he was elevated to
the position of Medical Specialist I (Temporary Status) which
was renewed the following year. The Dept. of Health issued
Department Order No. 347 which required board certification
as prerequisite for renewal of specialist positions in various
medical centers and it also extend appointments of Medical
Specialist positions in cases where the termination of
medical specialist who failed to meet the requirements for
board certification. On August 20, 1991, after reviewing
petitioner's service record, non-renewal of petitioners

appointment as Medical Specialist I was recommended. He

was, however, allowed to continue in the service, and
receive his salary, allowances and other benefits even after
being informed of the termination of his appointment. Soon,
he was advised by the hospital authorities to vacate his
cottage. The petitioner filed a petition with the Merit System
Protection Board alleging harassment by respondents;
however, it was later dismissed for lack of merit. Said
decision was appealed to the Civil Service Commission which
dismissed the same including the Motion for Reconsideration
the petitioner has filed after which brought this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed from his
position and that it is not a violative of his constitutional
right of security of tenure.
RULING:
NO. The petitioner was not illegally dismissed. The Solicitor
General is correct in contending that the petitioners
temporary appointment after the reorganization were valid
and did not violate his constitutional right of security of
tenure. Petitioner is guilty of estoppels or laches. Stringent
standards and requirements for renewal of specialist-rank
positions or for promotion to the next post-graduate
residency year are necessary because lives are ultimately at
stake. Petitioners insistence on being reverted back to the
status quo prior to the reorganizations would therefore be
akin to a college student asking to be sent to high school
and staying there. He is estopped from insisting upon a right
or claim which he had plainly abandoned when he, from all
indications, enthusiastically accepted the promotion. It bears
emphasis that at the time of petitioner's promotion to the
position of Medical Specialist I (temporary) in August of
1988, no objection was raised by him about the change of
position or the temporary nature of designation. The failure
to assert a claim or the voluntary acceptance of another
position in government, obviously without reservation, leads
to a presumption that the civil servant has either given up
his claim of has already settled into the new position. Finally,
it is crystal clear, from the facts of the case at bench, that
the petitioner accepted a temporary appointment (Medical
Specialist I). As respondent Civil Service Commission has
correctly pointed out, the appointment was for a definite and
renewable period which, when it was not renewed, did not
involve a dismissal but an expiration of the petitioner's term.