Limbona vs.

Mangelin (170 SCRA 786)

Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional

Autonomous Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly. Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the recent and present political
developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully resulting to
chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod
the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission.
Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there
shall be no session in November as our presence in the house committee hearing
of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook
.
In defiance of Petitioners advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the
Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare
the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative.

Issue: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of

Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

Held: Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the
past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined,
should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with
the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the
discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their
acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that
such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
the Decree PD 168 established internal autonomy in the two regions [w]ithin the
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the

Philippines and its Constitution, with legislative and executive machinery to

exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments more
responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises general supervision over them, but
only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.

(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it
and accepted principles on the effects and limits of autonomy. On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation.
Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that [t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In
the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services

Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

Posted on November 18, 2012
GR 135962
March 27, 2000

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the
former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter
separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of
the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic
and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory
(LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code
and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the
Code.

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of
authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a
development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an
LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is
not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA
is illegal.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELECFacts:

During the 12
th
Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of theLocal
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipalityinto a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush of
municipalities to convert into citiessolely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapableof fiscal
independence.Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in Congress.Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11

th
Congress.During the 12
th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29.
ThisResolution reached the Senate. However, the 12
th
Congress adjourned without the Senate approvingJoint Resolution No. 29.During the
13
th
Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved JointResolution
No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective
sponsors inCongress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as
follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009
. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the incomerequirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates
from March to July 2007 after PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign
them.Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as
for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitionersalso lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existingcities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internalrevenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the
Local Government Code.
Issue:
W
hether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and
the equalprotection clause
Held:
Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause
Ratio:Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

p
rovides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or itsboundary substantially altered,
exce
p
t in accordance with the criteria established in the localgovernment code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in thepolitical
units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)The Constitution is clear. The creation of
local government units must follow the
criteriaestablished in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the
people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended
RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a

component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law
passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was
the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga,
together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of
Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.

G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines
Norte,
petitioner,vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.FACTS:Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
in the Province of Camarines Norte to becomposed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa,
Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa,
Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.Pursuant to said
law, the COMELEC issued a resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite. The said
resolution providesthat the plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units affected,
namely the barangays comprising he proposedMunicipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.In the
plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, majority of the votes cast were
against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.Thus, petitioner as
Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted
throughout theMunicipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken.
It is the contention of petitioner that theplebiscite was a complete failure and that
the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, asmandated by
COMELEC, should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected,
i.e.
the 12barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely TulayNa-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, PagAsa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebisciteshould not have
included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte. Insupport of his stand, petitioner argues that where a local unit is
to be segregated from a parent unit, only thevoters of the unit to be segregated
should be included in the plebiscite.Was the plebiscite conducted in the areas
comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and theremaining areas of
the mother Municipality of Labo valid?Yes.When the law states that the plebiscite
shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means thatresidents of
the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof havea right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," isthe plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be
included in suchpolitical areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well asthose living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was concluded that respondent
COMELECdid not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the resolution.
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Deed of Absolute Sale is made and entered into in Quezon City this _____ day of
_________ by and between:

____________________, of legal age, Filipino, with residence address at

______________________________ hereinafter referred to as SELLER;

- and -

____________________, of legal age, Filipino, with residence address at

________________________________ hereinafter referred to as BUYER;

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the SELLER is the absolute and registered owner of the following motor
vehicle, more particularly described as follows:

MODEL/MAKE : ___________________
COLOR : ________________________
BODY : _________________________
MOTOR NO. : ____________________
SERIAL/CHASSIS NO. : ____________
PLATE NO. : _____________________

WHEREAS, the SELLER desires to sell the aforesaid motor vehicle and the
BUYER is able, willing and ready to purchase the same under the terms and
conditions herein below set forth;

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum total of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PHP50,000.00), Philippine currency, VAT Inclusive and receipt hereof is
hereby acknowledged by the said SELLER, the SELLER hereby SELL,CEDE,
TRANSFER and CONVEY unto the BUYER, in a manner absolute and irrevocable the
above-described 1 Unit of 1997 MITSUBISHI L-300 Motor Vehicle, free from any and
all liens and encumbrances whatsoever and on an AS IS WHERE IS BASIS.

The SELLER warrants that the Motor Vehicle is free from any liens and
encumbrances and that said SELLER shall defend the title and rights of the BUYER
from any claims of whatever kind or nature from third persons.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their signatures on the
date and at the place first above-written.

______________________
Seller

______________________
Buyer

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

______________________

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

______________________

Republic of the Philippines)

Quezon City, Metro Manila ) S.S.

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, for and in Quezon City, this _______ day of
_________________________ personally appeared:

Name

Identification Card

Issued On/At

____________________

________________

_____________

____________________

________________

_____________

all known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and
hereby acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntary act and deed.

This instrument consisting of two (2) pages, including this page on which this
acknowledgment is written refers to a DEED OF SALE of 1 Unit of 1997 MITSUBISHI
L-300 and has been signed by the parties and their witnesses and sealed with my
notarial seal.

WITNESS MY HAND AND NOTARIAL SEAL.

Doc. No. ____

Page No. ____
Book No. ____
Series of 2013.