Milo vs Salanga

FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent (accused
Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by
hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds
and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent
and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging
and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the
investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial
Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not
a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted
the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of
Arbitrary Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or
order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be
chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the
powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio
captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same
duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

Astorga vs people
FACTS
On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and
SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team
found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at
Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who
turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the
DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed
men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to
petitioners house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention

Held: Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is
fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner
instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of
fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR
Team during their mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the
house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time.
Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was
unsafe for them to travel by boat.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to
whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired
are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the
private offended parties were taken to petitioners house and prevented from leaving until 2:00
a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his
hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them
to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains and ate
together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over
dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover,
considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left
the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral
certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration
be granted as a matter of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences,
as in this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is
better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.

Cayao vs Del Mundo

Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Fernando Cayao with the Office of the
CourtAdministrator charging Judge Justianiano Del Mundo with abuse of authority. Cayao, a
bus driverovertook another bus. As a consequence, Cayao almost collided head-on with an
oncomingowner-type jeepney owned by Judge Del Mundo. Cayao was brought by the
policemen in thesala of Judge Del Mundo and was compelled by Judge Del Mundo to choose

from 3 alternativepunishments: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide;

(b)revocation of his driverslicense; or (c) to be put in jail for 3 days. Cayao chose
confinementfor 3 days and was forced to sign a waiver of detention by Judge Del Mundo.
Cayao wasreleased after 3 days.
Issue:
Whether Judge Del Mundo is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and arbitrary detention.
Held:
Cayao was not accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. When Judge
DelMundo insisted on punishing him without a chance to air his side, Cayao was deprived from
thepresumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be
informedof the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an
impartial andpublic trial. Judge Del Mundo used and abused his position of authority in
intimidating thecomplainant as well as the members of the police force into submitting to his
excesses.Justice Del Mundo was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except
accruedleave credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office
includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations.

Miranda vs Arizona
Facts
The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving
custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police
officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside
world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights
at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral
admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police
station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by
two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial,
the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of
kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mirandas constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the
robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th
Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where
he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to
the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant district attorney
in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At
trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found
guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The conviction
was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.

Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a
suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was
also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California.
Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police.
Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours of
interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been
prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in
California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the
California robberies and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each count. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in
which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified
as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his
home. Police also arrested Stewarts wife and three other people who were visiting him.
Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on nine
different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had
robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the
four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any
of them with the crime. At trial, Stewarts statements were introduced. Stewart was
convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Issues
Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether procedures which
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself are necessary.
Supreme Court holding
The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their
freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves. As such, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.
The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise
do so freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona inMiranda,
reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

People vs Mengote
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to
run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live
ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and
they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed
before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified
that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police
including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm
or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on
him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue:

Whether

or

not

the

warrantless

search

and

arrest

was

illegal.

Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of
the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a
penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street
on
unexplained
suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

People vs Garcia
Facts:
Senior Inspector Oliver Enmodias and SPO3 Jose Panganiban arrested Garcia on the ground of
illegal possession of 5 kilos of marijuana. Thereafter, Garcia was taken to the CIS office
forfurther investigation. Garcia was charged with the crime of illegal possession of 5 kilos of
marijuana and was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death. Garcia claims that
theuncorroborated testimony of Enmodias was insufficient to establish his guilt. Furthermore,
Judgede Guzman, Jr. has filed an application for disability retirement on April 12, 1996. Judge
deGuzmans retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996. Hence, the decision in
Garciascase dated February 20, 1996 was said to be void and has no binding effect.
Issues:
- Whether the police officers were liable for arbitrary detention.
Held:
(1)Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a public officer who
shalldetain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for
36hours for crimes punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. The record bears that Garcia
wasin possession of 5 kilos of marijuana, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.

Sayo vs chief of police

FACTS
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committedthe crime
of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested thepetitioners on April
2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal'soffice of Manila. Until April 7,
1948, when the petition for habeas corpusfiled with thisCourt was heard, the petitioners were
still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscalhad not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts justice.This case has not been decided before this time
because there was not a sufficientnumber of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, and it had to
be transferred to theSupreme Court acting in division in Baguio for deliberation and decision.
SC has notuntil now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal
onthe complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners.
ISSUE
W/N the city fiscal of manila is a
judicial authority
within the meaning of the provisions ofarticle 125 of the RPC, or are the petitioners being
illegally restrained of their liberty
RULING
Petitioners release is ordered.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "thepenalties provided in the next
proceeding article shall be imposed upon the publicofficer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail todeliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours." Thesurrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a
person arrested without warrant by apeace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in
making an accusation orcharge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the
correspondingcourt or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release
or ofcommitment of the prisoner, because the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judgeand
the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. The judicialauthority
mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be construed toinclude the fiscal of
the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue awarrant of arrest or of
commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrenderedto legalize the detention of a
person arrested without warrant. For the purpose ofdetermining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hoursprescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as thehour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and thematerial possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the
necessaryinformation, must be taken into consideration.
If the city fiscal does not file the information within said period of time and the arrestingofficer
continues holding the prisoner beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not beresponsible for
violation of said article 125, because he is not the one who arrested andillegally detained the
person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the arrestingofficer to hold and not release
the prisoner after the expiration of said period.

Stonehill vs diokno
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the
persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for
personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank
Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same
on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.
Held:
1. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or
being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly

specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
2. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the
circumstances.
3. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken
from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality
different from that of the corporation.

Torres vs Gonzales
Facts:
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged
with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department
erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges
against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before
Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed

against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.

Enrile vs Salazar
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of
the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in
Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the

modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances,
the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed
as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating
its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking
the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was
denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even
then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available
there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied
with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

Umil vs Ramos
Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a

gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988
at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna
however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In
view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue:

Whether

or

Not

Rolando

was

lawfully

arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offensescommitted in furtherance
therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.

Defensor-Santiago vs Garchitorena
Facts:
On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the
Alien Legalization Program.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was intended
solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in
violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena,
which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the Sandiganbayan
(First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for
arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the
arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner
intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment.
More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis

Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft
charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the
permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which. The
letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no
exception, have to secure permission to leave the country.
The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena
"to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally
resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering
petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the
arraignment on
April 12, 1993.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or
"continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the
Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of
delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define and
more difficult to apply.
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been
applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the
charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v.
Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles
developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws.
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal
act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to
enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by
petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an
undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on
or about October 17, 1988.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is
modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402)
into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.

The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the
disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

People vs Umali
Facts:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have
been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in
the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning
down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content
valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one
Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio
Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one
house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the
town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime
of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?
Held:
Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of
prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the
appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum
of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the
buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or
more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the
window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the
lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy
penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and
impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however,
the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the
court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs.

Primicias vs fugoso

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a
permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the
government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that
there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace
and a disruption ofpublic order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local
government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public
peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession,
tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for
any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."
Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant
or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession
in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject
to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the
view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency.

The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonableground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.