NEDMUN III

Page 1

Topic A: Private (covert) Funding of Non-State Actors

Threat to International Security
Introduction
Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the concept of sovereign nation states has dictated
the discourse on international law between nations. This is true to the extent that International
Law is itself defined as the rules and principles of action that are binding upon states in their
actions and relations with another. Even in cases where individuals are charged for international
crimes, they are recognized primarily as representative or part of a state and thus the
responsibility to tackle their actions lies primarily with their state. The current United Nations
Charter, in article VII, also lists international conflicts as the only occasions for UN intervention.
This definition of international law leaves room for groups and individuals to operate inside the
boundaries of a state without representing any sovereign state themselves. Over the past century
many non-state entities have proliferated across the world with cataclysmic results, referred to
colloquially as international terrorism. These entities today dominate the international discourse
yet responsibility for their actions has still not been adequately fixed. Many of these groups are
sponsored in one way or another by individuals, private groups and even by other sovereign
states. This creates a complicated mosaic of states that have found new avenues to intervene
across international boundaries without contravening international laws. This sponsorship of
non-state armed groups has essentially overridden the central aims of the United Nations
Organization which were based on preventing transgressions across state borders and
maintaining international peace.

A Spectrum of Sponsorship
State sponsorship can be broken up into several categories and sub-categories, ranging from
direct control to support through incapacity. Analytically, it is worth separating active from
passive sponsorship even if they posit the same operational challenges. Also, it is very important
to distinguish deliberate state support for terrorism from support provided by non-state actors
acting as a component of the state or without the states opposition.
Categories of Active Sponsorship:
Active state sponsorship is traditionally conceived of as a deliberate regime decision to provide
critical support to a terrorist group, typically in the form of weapons, money, propaganda and
media, or a safe haven. This rather straightforward description, however, masks tremendous
variety:

Control: Some states directly control the terrorist groups they support: the group is in
essence a cats-paw of the state.
Coordination: Absolute control is rare, but states often try to coordinate the activities of
terrorist groups to best serve the states interests
Contact: States are regularly in contact with terrorist groups, at times engaging in minor
tactical coordination or simply trying to keep channels open for possible future
coordination. Often, a states set of contacts are vast, even if its level of coordination is
limited.

NEDMUN III
Page 2

Categories of Passive Sponsorship

Even more confusing is the variety of activities within passive sponsorship, which can be defined
as when a regimes deliberate inaction allows terrorist groups to flourish. As terrorism today is
often self-funded, and as the international arms market has seen a proliferation of small arms,

passive sponsorship is an increasingly important category of state support. Types of passive

sponsorship include:

Knowing toleration: Some governments may make a policy decision not to interfere with
a terrorist group that is raising money, recruiting, or otherwise exploiting its territory. In
essence, the regime wants the group to flourish and believes that by not acting it can help
it do so
Unconcern or ignorance: Some states may not seek to further a terrorist groups activities,
but they may not bother to stop it, either because they do not believe its activities are
extensive or because they do not believe the groups activities affect the states interest.
Incapacity: Some states do not fully control their territory or the government is too weak
vis--vis key domestic actors that do support terrorism to stop the activities.

Variation on the State

The united, coherent state is an ideal rarely reached in reality. Even advanced industrialized
countries have bureaucracies that act on their own and key interest groups that become major
foreign policy actors independently of central government policy. This variation is far more
acute in the developing world, where state power is usually weaker and almost invariably less
institutionalized. Conceptually, the actors can be broken down into three categories:

The central government: What is usually referred to as state support refers to deliberate
decisions by recognized leaders of the state to support a terrorist group. These leaders
may be elected or unelected, but in general their position is one that is seen as being part
of the official government.
Independent bureaucracies: At times components of a government may act without the
knowledge of the state leadership. The leaderships ignorance may be deliberate (i.e. it
may choose not to know) or the leadership may be unable to exert control over nominal
subordinates.
Key social actors: Some interest groups in a state religious organizations, professional
associations, or even wealthy individualsenjoy tremendous autonomy and at times may
act in opposition to their government, even to the point of supporting terrorism.

Properly understanding state sponsorship today requires recognizing the variety of levels of
support and, just as importantly, the many different actors involved.

Overview of Main Sponsorship

The subsections below examine sponsors whose activities have changed significantly in recent
years or which have come to the attention of international policymakers. Many states though are
engaged in significant forms of passive sponsorship as well as occasional active sponsorship.
Pakistan:
Pakistan is perhaps the worlds most active sponsor of terrorist groupssponsorship that
includes aiding groups that pose a direct threat to both its direct neighbors and the international
community. Pakistan has therefore been involved in actively backing some groups, maintaining
contacts with others, turning a blind eye to yet more groups, and in some cases lacking the
NEDMUN III
Page 3

capacity to shut down radicalism it opposes; many government and non-state actors have been
thought to be involved.
Islamabad has worked, either openly or allegedly, alongside many of the terrorist groups and
successors of such terrorists organizations with active support from the government. After 9/11,
President Musharraf supposedly cut ties with terrorists group after extreme pressure from the
U.S. However numerous evidences exist pointing to the contrary. Currently all four of Pakistans

neighbors - India, Afghanistan, Iran and China have accused the country of either passive
active sponsorship of terrorist activities on their soil.
A less immediate but potentially greater long-term concern, is the various schools, both religious
and state in particular, that breed anti-west extremism. Despite repeated Pakistani promises to
control madrassahs and turn them away from jihadist groups, their number has grown since 9/11,
and many schools have not registered with the government. Some of the schools openly
encourage recruits to join jihadist organizations, but the greater problem is that they breed
sectarianism; teaching dissemination that seek to indoctrinate a broader audience.
While being involved in sponsoring different terrorist groups across the world, Pakistan also
suffers from this phenomenon as a number of militant groups currently plaguing the country
obtain funding from Middle Eastern states.
Iran:
The U.S. government has long branded Iran as the worlds most active state sponsor of terrorism.
Pakistan holds that dubious title is arguable, Tehran does have ties to a range of extremist
groups, some of which regularly use terrorism. Many of the groups that Iran supports are hostile
to the United States and are active in regions critical to U.S. national security.
Irans policies are also heavily shaped by changes in U.S. policy since 9/11. Iran initially
cooperated with Washington with regard to al-Qaida and to a degree in Afghanistan. Iranian
leaders, however, believe that the United States rebuffed its gestures. In addition, Iran exploited
the chaos that followed U.S. regime change in Iraq to expand its influence there.
Today, Irans closest ties may be to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI). Yet ISCI is not simply an Iranian
puppet. ISCI has distanced itself from Tehran, dropping Revolution from its name and
suggesting that it does not follow Irans governing doctrine of velayat-e faqih (rule of the
jurisprudent). Thus ISCI is able to work with the United States in its capacity as part of the Iraqi
government and, together, they have gone after ISCI rivals such as Muqtada as-Sadrs Jaysh alMahdi (JAM), itself an Iranian sponsored group. Currently Iran is accused of sponsoring the
Hezbollah militia and political group in Lebanon, the US and EU designated terrorist group
Hamas in Palestine and Houthi rebels fighting the Yemeni government.
Overall, Irans motivations for backing radicals are primarily strategic, though ideology does
play a role and many states have accused Iran in the past of sponsoring groups to spread
revolutionary ideas. Unlike Pakistan, domestic politics is not an important driver of Irans
support for terrorism. Ties to militant sub-state groups and terrorists groups in general give Iran
several strategic advantages:
1. Power Projection
2. Coercive Power
3. Deterrence
NEDMUN III
Page 4

4. Options of Flexibility
Iraq:
In contrast to active sponsors like Iran and Pakistan, Iraq represents an unusual mix of two
different types of sponsorship: incapacity and sympathetic toleration. Large swathes of Iraq are
not under effective government control. This weakness has been exploited by an array of groups
that are active outside Iraq. Most notable of these groups is the Islamic State but jihadists
operating from Iraq have also conducted or facilitated attacks in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
elsewhere. The self branded Islamic State has essentially become a state-within-a-state
occupying Iraqi territory and carrying out international acts of terrorism.
In Kurdish areas government capacity is higher, though it is at a sub-state level. The Iraqi central
government is exceptionally weak in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Regional Government,
however, is able to counter terrorism, as it has demonstrated in its efforts to pursue Arab jihadists
who try to operate in Kurdish areas. Part of the Kurdistan Regional Governments support may
come from genuine sympathy for the aspirations of Turkeys Kurds and hostility toward Ankara.
Domestic politics, however, are even more important particularly given reports of hostility
between Iraqi Kurdish leaders and the PKK leadership. Despite this tension, Iraqi Kurdish
officials fear angering Iraqi Kurds if they clamped down. Even more troubling, Kurdish leaders
have at times threatened to increase support for the PKK should Turkey raise the level of military
pressure on Iraqi Kurdistan.
Eritrea:
Eritreas links to terrorist groups have come under scrutiny due to the increased emphasis the
United States has placed on counterterrorism since 9/11. Eritrea has backed the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU) in Somalia primarily for geo-strategic reasons: to hurt its archenemy, Ethiopia. U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer criticized Eritrea for backing
the ICU and declared that it would be listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. Her view has not
prevailed. Eritrea also reportedly backs the Ogaden National Liberation Front in its struggle
against Ethiopia, providing its fighters with arms and other support. In addition to backing these
groups, Eritrea also tolerates various guerrilla groups fighting from the Darfur region of Sudan
and even provides some financial support for several of them. Eritreas role exemplifies the
complexity of countries supporting combatants in a civil war. Because Ethiopia is intervening on
behalf of the more internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in
Somalia, its support is typically portrayed (including by U.S. officials) as bolstering a friendly
government. Ethiopia invaded Somalia to topple the ICU and ensure that the TFG retained
power. Had the Ethiopian intervention not occurred, and the ICU administration became a
recognized government, then Eritreas support could be characterized as simply aiding a friendly
government. Although both countries are supporting political rivals in Somalia, the fact that one
faction controls the government while the other was ousted means that the same activity can be
described as support for terrorists.
Syria:
Syria has long been accused of sponsoring terrorism. Although Damascus is far less supportive
of terrorism than in the past, like Iran it supports various groups that directly oppose U.S.
interests. Like Pakistan, Syrias support also spans the gamut from active backing of some
groups to relatively passive support for other causes.
Syria has long backed an array of Palestinian groups, including the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. All of these groups have an official presence in Syria. Syria
NEDMUN III
Page 5

also is linked to a number of assassinations in Lebanon. A UN investigation found that Syrian

officials were involved in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The
UN report noted that the assassination could not have been taken without the approval of topranked Syrian security officials.
Syria also appears to have played a role in allowing some Sunni jihadists to set up shop in
Lebanon, where they took on their own agenda. Syrias relationship with Hezbollah has shifted
since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Until that time, Syria exploited its
relationship with Hezbollah to put pressure on Israel. Hezbollah is the strongest and most
organized political and military force in Lebanon. Finally, U.S. officials had regularly criticized
Syria for not policing its border with Iraq and allowing various insurgent groups to enjoy de
facto haven in parts of the country, however currently the Syrian-Iraqi border is effectively out of
the control of both states and under IS control.
Syrias support for Hezbollah historically was for strategic reasons, but this has shifted
considerably. Strategically, Hezbollah is far more important to Damascus as a means of gaining
influence in Lebanon than it is in fighting Israel. In addition, Hezbollahs legitimacy and prestige
now bolster the Syrian regimes power at home rather than the other way around.
The last few years have proven transformative for Syria with regard to support for terrorism.
Syria was once a strong sponsor of terrorism, openly backing an array of groups and, just as
importantly, exercising tight control over its proxies. Today its relationships are more balanced,
and much of its support consists of looking the other way rather than directly providing
government resources to terrorist groups. In several casesnotably Hamas, various Iraqi jihadist
groups, and Hizbollah to some degree Damascus ability to rein in its proxies is limited.
Lebanon:
Lebanon represents a curious mix of sponsorship: incapacity explains part of the problem, but so
too does the presence of Hezbollah, a US designated terrorist group, in the Lebanese
government. Hezbollah is the most militarily powerful of any Lebanese faction. The group
fought credibly against the far stronger IDF in July 2006.
It is unlikely that the Lebanese Army Forces would be able to defeat Hezbollah in the event of a
confrontation. In addition to hosting Hezbollah, Lebanon is suffering an emerging problem from
Sunni jihadists, particularly those linked to Fatah al-Islam, which has ties to Al-Qaida in Iraq and
embraces Bin Ladens ideology. Although the problem did not receive recognition until the
battle at the Nahr al-Bared camp that began in May 2007, jihadists had already established a
presence in several Lebanese cities and in particular within various Palestinian refugee camps.
The battles between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the jihadists were a welcome unifying force
for many Lebanese as the jihadists were not popular with any major segment of the Lebanese
population.
Palestinian Territories:
The Palestinian territories are under two different administrations. Hamas has controlled the
Gaza Strip since it won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. The Hamas administration is
not internationally recognized. However, Hamass grip tightened in mid-2007 after it expelled,
killed, or arrested Fatah members in bloody clashes. The Palestinian Authority, headed by
Mahmoud Abbas since 2005 and internationally recognized, controls the West Bank. The
situation in Gaza is complex, and characterizing it with regard to state sponsorship depends as
much on semantics as anything else. If Hamas is viewed as a legitimate government (albeit a
hostile one), then much of its activity (such as rocket attacks on Israeli cities) is best viewed as
acts of war, as opposed to acts of terrorism.
NEDMUN III
Page 6

Making this even more complex is the question of the degree of control Hamas exercises. Some
of the individuals involved in the attacks on Israel are tied to Hamas rivals, such as PIJ. . It
therefore seems accurate to characterize Hamas at the very least as a passive supporter of
terrorism.
In the West Bank, the situation is best characterized by incapacity. For domestic political
reasons, Abbas is often hesitant to embrace Israeli or U.S. efforts to fight Hamas.
Saudi Arabia:
Saudi Arabia epitomizes a complex passive sponsor. Before 9/11 (and, indeed, before the May
2003 attacks on the kingdom by jihadists), Saudi Arabia tolerated considerable jihadist activity,
particularly fundraising and recruitment. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States reported that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now locked in mortal combat
with Al Qaeda.. Today the Saudi regime regularly arrests or kills terrorists who are plotting
attacks from its soil.
The kingdoms indirect support for jihadists is largely driven by capacity limits and domestic
political issues. Although the popularity of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State is at best mixed, many of the causes the organization affiliates with are quite popular. Thus
when the Saudi regime tries to crack down on fundraising and recruitment, it risks being seen as
indirectly supporting brutality against Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, or elsewhere. Sectarian
strife in Iraq has bolstered the always-strong anti-Shii prejudice in Saudi Arabia, bringing this
issue directly into the public eye.
The net result is that Saudi Arabia in recent years has strongly opposed Al-Qaida operations
directed at it but has been less aggressive against operations abroad, such as in Iraq. Some of the
clerics it has embraced, such as al-Awda and al-Farraj, have condemned attacks against Saudi
targets but called for jihad against the Americans in Iraq and proclaimed that armed jihad against
Christians and Jews is a duty. The Saudi government has also been accused of being the
ideological sponsor of the Islamic State. In general, Saudi regime efforts to curtail fundraising
have focused far more on activities in the kingdom than on those abroad, and indeed the regime
still at times encourages proselytizing that embraces an anti-U.S. and anti-Shii agenda.
Venezuela:
Although the Venezuelan government does not appear to directly arm and train groups such as
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejercito de Liberation Nacional
(ELN), it does little to stop them from raising money through drug trafficking and otherwise
exploiting Venezuelas territory as a sanctuary. Part of the problem is capacity: terrain on the
Colombia-Venezuela border is rugged and difficult to police. Smuggling has always been a
problem.
Venezuelas motivations are largely driven by domestic politics with a touch of ideology.
Chavez, the countrys former President, himself embraced a vague left-wing agenda and had
some sympathy for the FARC. With the death if Hugo Chavez and the defeat of his party in
recent elections it remains to be seen what role the Venezuelan government plays in sponsoring
terrorism going forward.

NEDMUN III
Page 7

Statement of Problem
As is evident from the cases mentioned above and many other current situations around the
world, state sponsorship of terrorist groups is a major threat to international security. There are
clear UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions obliging states not to cooperate
with terrorists. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the UN Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted a mandatory decision calling upon states to refrain
"from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist
acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the
supply of weapons to terrorists". However support for terrorist activities continues unabated. In
many cases it is almost impossible to ascertain the extent to which a certain group is being
sponsored by another state.

The situations highlighted also raise important questions with regards to the level of complicity
of states in the actions of these terrorist groups. Can weak states such as Iraq be held responsible
for the actions of groups operating from their soil? And can the arguments of states such as
Pakistan, which have previously sponsored terrorist activity on foreign soil, be accepted with
regards to their inability to curb such groups? Furthermore what mechanisms can be evolved to
truly place responsibility for the actions of such groups on the sponsoring states and what forum
is best suited to this task.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

What activities constitute sponsorship of terrorism?

Are passive and active sponsors of terrorism equally responsible?
How to distinguish between active and passive sponsors?
Does a country lose some of its sovereign rights when a group uses its territory to attack
another sovereign state
What mechanisms can be created to investigate cases of international sponsorship of
terrorism?
What would be the correct forum to solve such issues?
Is there a need for new law to deal with the modern reality of non-state terror groups?

NEDMUN III
Page 8

Topic B: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

One of the primary goals of the United Nations Organization is the maintenance of international
peace and security. An important way in which the original framers of the United Nations
Charter sought to strive towards this goal was to seek international disarmament. This is the
fundamental purpose of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) of the
United Nations General Assembly. While efforts towards disarmament across the globe have
been met with few successes and many failures today the world is faced with a new threat. The
specter of weapons systems and armaments in space presents a new arena for DISEC to pursue
its goals of disarmament and perhaps ensure that outer space remains free from the weapons that
have plagued international peace.
The steadily emerging issue of space weaponization has been garnering the attention of global
community to itself. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space also known as PAROS
refers to preventing the utilization of outer space for military purposes and storage of weapons.
Arms in outer space can be further subdivided into two categories:

Militarization of Outer Space:

Military forces all around the world rely on satellites for covert coverage, communication and
surveillance through Global Positioning System (GPS). Such uses are already common and are
not generally considered as weaponization of space, however they can be used for controlling
missiles and bomb raids and other such motives that can turn out to be a serious threat to global
peace and security. As the use of technology and remote controlled weapons systems becomes
more common in warfare, the use of outer space based resources for the purpose of war is
predicted to increase as well.

Weaponization of Outer Space:

By implanting weapon controlling satellites, ballistic missiles and such machineries that can not
only destroy other space assets but deploy or aid in deploying destructive forces upon the planet,
corroding the mass of global peace can be referred to as weaponizing the outer space.
Note that majority of the states may favor militarization of Outer Space for the sake of a nations
defense needs, but most nations still stand against the weaponization of Outer Space due to the
relatively greater potential of the latter to pose a serious threat to global security.

Concerns Regarding Arms Race in Outer Space:

1. Overcrowded Space and Space Debris:
The continuous increase in space satellites and the deploying parties is leading to an
overcrowded space; since in space a collision of normal impact from the already existing
space debris could lead to potentially destructive consequences, overcrowding the outer
space especially with weaponry of massively destructive capacity is indeed a risky move.
2. Nuclear Weaponry in Reference to PAROS:
In the race towards a better security and defense system, nations are busy in designing
more and more accurate defensive yet extremely caustic range of weaponry. If the
NEDMUN III
Page 9

weaponizing of outer space is left unresolved and such weapons are deployed into outer
space, it could lead to nuclear powered countries refusing to sign treaties to regulating
nuclear technologies in order to justify their stance in steadying their defense.
3. Deployment of Arms in Outer Space:
Although there is no evidence or proof of deployment of actual weapons in outer space,
yet China in 2007 and the U.S. in 2008, successfully demonstrated their capabilities in
anti-satellite ballistics (ASAT). This progress of a countrys capacity to destroy or
decapitate satellites for military purposes can lead other nations to step up a notch to
develop more lethal weaponry to counter these technologies. Such advancement could
ultimately lead to unregistered deployment of weaponry in outer space and therefore lead
to damage to space assets and in extreme conditions, disastrous consequences.

UN Actions on Arms Race in Outer Space:

The United Nations has been concerned about the security of outer space since as early as the
1950s. The first established committee which regulated outer space issues and made sure of its
uses were scientific and peaceful, was the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1959. COPUOS has been keenly encouraging scientific space
exploration and safeguarding outer space. Over the years, COPUOS has put up five treaties
which have been negotiated, which are:
1. The Outer Space Treaty: It takes into account the space activities, limitations and
boundaries of exploration and uses of outer space.
2. The Rescue Agreement: This agreement focuses on bringing back the objects launched in
space to assure minimizing space debris. It may not directly be related to weaponization
of the outer space but excessive space debris can lead to collision with other space assets
with disastrous consequences.
3. The Liability Convention and The Registration Convention: This treaty also focuses on
the importance of minimizing the space debris in order to avoid detrimental significances.
4. The Moon Treaty: The Moon Treaty regulates the activities and safeguarding measures of
the Moon, being the closest celestial body to Earth. Note that it has been the least
successful one since very few countries signed this treaty and the signatories are the ones
which oppose the militarization and weaponization of the outer space.
In the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, The Outer Space Treaty was signed between the US and The Soviet
Union which banned the deployment of nuclear weaponry and assets in the outer space and also
using any celestial body as a military base and purposes. This treaty serves as the basis for the
international space Law.
The Anti Ballistics Treaty limited each nation to two anti-missile launch sites: One to defend the
capital city and the other to defend the site from which the ballistic was launched. Yet like the
Outer Space Treaty it did not restrict any nation from space exploration and investigation.

Current Situation
The current treaties and agreement do create certain impediments to the deployment of weapons
of outer space. However many states fear that the current provisions are limited and cannot
prevent the start of an arms race in outer space. This topic has been on the agenda for DISEC for
NEDMUN III
Page 10

a number of years however certain key issues have made a comprehensive agreement hard to
reach. The very definition of a weapon in outer space remains up for debate as even debris can
be used to damage satellites and act as potential weapons. This explanation was used as recently
as 2015 by the United States to block a Russian resolution to restrict space based weapons. The
policy of the United States regarding its activities in space has fluctuated between the Bush
Administrations hawkish stance of preserving its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in
space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities
intending to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to
interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US
national interests to the Obama administration more multilateral stance. Little has changed
however in their actions.
Considering the issue being discussed is hypothetical therefore there is no current stance of the
situation. However, the issues that can be discussed during the debating session can be subdivided into the following three main categories:

Military use of Outer Space

Scientific use of Outer Space & Development through space-based means
Commercial use of Outer Space

Military Use of Outer Space

As stated earlier, there is a difference between the two statements of weaponizing and
militarizing the outer space. Since both of them are different, the distinction between the two can
be made the basis of a topic of discussion. Whether the country opposes or favors PAROS, it
should, in the discussion, address the issues that related to PAROS and emphasize on why they
hold such significance. It is important to decide the limits of what constitutes weaponization of
Outer Space and which weapons systems fall out of the purview of PAROS.

Scientific Use of Outer Space & Development through Space-Based Means

The scientific use of outer space depends on how your country interprets the meaning of
scientific exploration, its limitations and restrictions as well as its relation to the PAROS. A
stance will therefore be established either favoring PAROS or opposing it in correlation to
scientific exploration. It takes into account using outer space for military purposes since
influential countries like US and the Russian Federation have a strong hold on space program
initiatives for outer space exploration. A proper examination of these space programs can help
you find the correlation of these with the military uses of outer spaces.
Space based means refer to the technological development witnessed over the years in the
communication section. Advancing technologies and utilizing the outer space for more enhanced
communication experience no doubt has been a very innovative step towards minimizing the
differences and distances between countries and continents but it has also led to an overcrowded
outer space and an increase in space debris as mentioned earlier, which leads to weaponization of
Outer Space. Assessing your countrys progress in the space based development will help you
establish a stance against or in favor of PAROS; a single statement can shape and reshape your
countrys military stance and policies regarding space based developments.

Commercial Use of Outer Space

Commercial use of outer space has a direct relation with the above mentioned reasons. It greatly
contributes to the overcrowding outer space and lead to an increase in space debris. This is yet
NEDMUN III
Page 11

another limitation that ought to be considered, when rummaging through the issue of PAROS. It
is of major significance that a way to deal with PAROS without jeopardizing the commercial,
scientific and in general, a nonthreatening use of space is found.
On the whole, if a country opposes arms race in outer space, opposing both weaponization and
militarization for that matter; that would impact upon the use of space in order to develop
scientifically and non-scientifically. It is important to make sure that limitations are set up
regarding the above uses of space, and methods of implementation are defined rather than simply
establishing a stance for or against PAROS. It is evident, that in an issue as complex as this, all
the branches are interwoven and interconnected.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer

What can be characterized as a space weapon and what is its value?
Through which evidence can we draw information about the effects of arms race?
What more could be done to expand The Outer Space Treaty
What would the overall effect be on the global community?
What could be the potential culminations of PAROS?
To what extent will monitoring activity in space, if any required, be limiting spatial activity?
How will the monitoring of space or any other measure proposed, be financed?

Further Reading:

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outers pace.asp
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros /parosindex.html
http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/new sen/dc04033e.htm
http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Arms Control/Space.asp
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace.asp
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/paros/index.html
http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/dc040 33e.htm
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/aspace.htm
http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsControl/Spa ce.asp
http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/dc040 33e.htm
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches0 2/chiruswp_062702cd.html
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/
http://mathaba.net/0_index.shtml?x548968
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/3180618.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/688779.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/503761.stm

NEDMUN III
Page 12