Estrada vs.

Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses

and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the

RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting
for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been
living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband,
and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband,
who had lived with another woman, died a year before
she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and
is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.
According to the complainant, respondent should not
be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it
will appear as if the court allows such act.

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of

the administrative charge of gross and immoral
conduct and be penalized by the State for such
conjugal arrangement.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the

Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
After ten years of living together, she executed on July
28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation.
Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render
it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding
minister since 1991, testified and explained the import
of and procedures for executing the declaration which
was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in

HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity
of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in
the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator)
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to
present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by

the proper agency of the government which is the

Office of the Solicitor General.

Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer

scam.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is

essential that the government be given an opportunity
to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks
to uphold in opposing the respondents position that
her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish
her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it,
since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment
of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the
court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom but must also
apply the compelling state interest test.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various

officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005.
Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a
letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
afford said officials ample time and opportunity to
study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation. Senate refused the request.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the

Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General
is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be
given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and
practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's
"compelling interest" to override respondent's religious
belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the
state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The
rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from
the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.
Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) - Digest
Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464,

effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive
and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her
consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited,
attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal
for such attendance.
Issue:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in Congress.
Ruling:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the
Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of
the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid

of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during

question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is
recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The heads of departments may, upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
the request of either House, as the rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.
The objective of conducting a question hour is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed
on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads
appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as
those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to
Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:
The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in,
or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in
the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change. And where
the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information, recourse must be had to others
who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there
are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive
privilege. This is the power of the government to
withhold information from the public, the courts, and
the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types
of information of a sensitive character. When Congress
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by
the mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one official may be exempted from this power -- the
President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public

officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In
view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to
justify the failure to be present, such invocation must
be construed as a declaration to Congress that the
President, or a head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator
Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or
that the matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their
absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464,
they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes
that the invited official possesses information that is
covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress
has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to
merely declare that the President, or an authorized
head of office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that
the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a
matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered
by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable

time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary

of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
necessary to provide the President or the Executive
Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege.
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and
may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to
compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections
2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a)
are however valid.
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY
OF
PUBLIC
OFFICERS
AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to
be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the
NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push
the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify

before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the
NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three
(3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications
privilege

are

covered

by

executive

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials

and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.),
does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudences cited provide the elements of
presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited
and received by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in operational proximity with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains
a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita

premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three
(3)
questions
fall
under
conversation
and
correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy
decision-making process and, that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that,
indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions
are
covered
by
the
presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power
of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
received by a close advisor of the President. Under
the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant
of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to

information on matters of public concern.50 We might

have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing,
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not
only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to
answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Chavez v Public Estate Authority
GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Facts:
On November 20, 1973, the government through the
Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract
with the Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent
of the total reclaimed land.

On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture

Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom
Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation
without public bidding.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion
are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands,
the certificates of the title covering the Freedom
Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of
the JVA. The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA,
contrary to the conclusions of the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the
instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA.
Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of
lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec
3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of
alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin

the loss of billion of pesos in properties of the State

that are of public dominion.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to
bring the suit.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit
because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply
with its constitutional duties. These duties are
particularly in answer of the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern, and of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens.
Furthermore, the court considered that the petition
raised matters of transcendental importance to the
public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right.
Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or
orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if
the issues raise are of paramount public interest and if
they immediately affect the social, economic and
moral wellbeing of the people.
The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and
academic since this compels the court to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national

patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to

transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a
single corporation. The court does not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar
and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public. Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue
related to the case. The instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of
the Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal
duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions

for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is purely legal or constitutional question.
The right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement as
required by the constitution.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
permanently
enjoined
from
implementing
the
amended JVA which is hereby declared null and void ab
initio.