Article 13 Mitigating Circumstance: Passion and obfuscation

People vs fontalva
Facts:

while Diosdado Tormon was inside a vehicle, at the front seat of a public
vehicle, the appellant, who was then carrying weaving materials of a lady
passenger, threw them on the ground, approached the deceased, and
stabbed him in the stomach with a butcher's knife.
The victim uttered a cry of pain, "Araguy." Appellant ran away, leaving the
butcher's knife stuck into the stomach of the deceased.
The driver shouted to a policeman directing traffic nearby that somebody was
stabbed. 5 The policeman, who turned out to be Pat. Yance of the Maasin
Police Force, responded upon hearing the shout.
He intercepted the fleeing accused, held him tight as he was struggling to get
away, took from him the scabbard of the butcher's knife, brought the
accused, who had already ceased struggling, to the municipal building, and
turned him over to the Chief of Police.
The deceased was taken to the Iloilo Mission Hospital. The butcher's knife was
still stuck in his stomach, so Dr. Salvador G. Aguirre, who attended to him,
pulled it out, and saw that seven and three-fourths (7-) inches of its blade
had penetrated into the body of the deceased.
He died the next morning in the said hospital. Dr. Aguirre issued a medical
certificate on his finding, viz.: "Iloilo Medical Center, Inc., Palmares Bldg.,
Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, Dec. 7, 1968
because of a stab wound in the abdomen. Exploratory laparotomy was done.
He expired on December 3, 1968.
Findings on Exploration: 1. The abdomen is filled with about 2-3 liters of
blood.
2. Thru and thru perforation in the jejunum 4 in number.
3. The momentum cut into half.
4. The transverse colon has 4 lacerations at one point and at another point
the colon is cut into half. There is a small wound in the left lateral pentoneum
level of splenic flexture. Salvador G. Aguirre, MD." 11 Dr. Aguirre also issued
the death certificate of the deceased in which he stated that the deceased
died as a result of the stab wound inflicted on him.
There was a previous incident that caused the bad blood between the
accused and the deceased.
On the evening of November 16, 1968, a fight ensued between them. The
deceased, who was taller and bigger than the accused, slapped the accused
and ordered him to kneel down.
However, before the accused could kneel down, Justino Rosano, a barrio
councilman, intervened, separated the protagonists, and ordered the
deceased to go home.

The deceased went home but the accused stayed awhile. Upon leaving the
place, he was heard to remark that for what was done to him, he would not
let a month to pass before he would retaliate. So it did come to pass.

Issue:

w/n the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation

should be appreciated.

Held:

What was done to him on that fateful day of November 16, 1968 when he
was subjected to treatment offensive to his dignity, having been slapped
and asked to kneel down in the attitude of a supplicant, certainly could
give rise to the feeling of passion or obfuscation.
There is a host of cases from United States v. Ferrer, 26 a 1901 decision,
to People v. Pareja, 27decided in 1969, that so attests. Conduct of that
character, in the language of United States v. Salandanan, would
ordinarily be expected to have produced such powerful excitement as to
overcome reason and self-control.
" Unfortunately for appellant, however, this mitigating circumstance
cannot be invoked because the killing took place one month and five days
later.
The language of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Sarikala is relevant:
"As to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation we likewise
cannot agree that it can be taken into consideration because more that
twenty-four hours elapsed after the insults of Cotton to the
accused and the criminal act. "In the relatively recent case of People v.
Constantino, such a plea was likewise rejected. There the killing took place
after four days.
As pointed out by Justice Romualdez in People v. Alanguilang: "in order
that the circumstance of obfuscation can be considered, it is necessary
to establish the existence of an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and that said act which
produced the obfu cation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity."
Reference may also be made to People v. Dagatan, where this Court could
not consider the presence of this mitigating circumstance as the act that
caused the resentment "took place long before the commission of the
crime." People v. Gervacio had another way of putting it, "a time not far
removed from the commission of the crime." The lower court,
therefore, did not commit any error in refusing to credit appellant with the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

Issue:

sentencing appellant Aurelio Mojica to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua as well as to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Diosdado
Tormon in the amount of P12,000.00, is affirmed. No costs.

Article 14 morada and disregard of age

People vs. Butag
Facts:
Around 8:30 o'clock on the evening of September 23, 1987, while coming
from the Kingdom Hall of the Jehovah's Witnesses at Cavite City, Violeta
Parnala and her common-law husband, Clark Din, knocked on the main
door of their two-storey house at 8790 Bautista St., Dalahican, Cavite City,
but got no response.
Clark Din then went to the back of the house and stoned the window of
the room occupied by Violeta's son, six-year old Jay Vee Parnala Custodio,
and the housemaid, Teresita Rosalinas.
As Violeta continued knocking on the front door, Manley Reginaldo
suddenly opened it and hurriedly went out, followed by two others,
namely Nonoy Bracamonte and appellant.
Caught by surprise, Violeta started shouting, prompting the intruders to
run away. She then called her husband who immediately ran in pursuit.
Failing to catch up with the three, Clark Din returned to the house. He saw
Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal standing at the gate, and both accompanied
him to the house.
Inside, the lights were off but the television set was on. They opened the
lights as they searched for the housemaid Teresita and Jay Vee .
They discovered that the bathroom door upstairs was locked when they
tried to open it, so Clark Din went down to his wife to get the key.
When the door was opened and the light turned on, they saw Teresita, feet
and hands tied and mouth gagged, lying dead on the floor, bathed in
blood.
Jay Vee was found in the washroom, his dead body immersed in a water
container. Per autopsy report, Teresita suffered one (1) incised and six (6)
stab wounds, and Jay Vee sustained three (3) incised and fourteen (14)
stab wounds.
Trial court =guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with double
homicide- reclusion perpetua

w/n the trial court erred in not considering the aggravating

circumsrtances present in the case.

Held:

The lower court, however, erred in not considering the age of the deceased
as an aggravating circumstance. Jay Vee Parnala was barely six years
old when ruthlessly stabbed fourteen times before his body was
submerged in the pail.
Likewise, the trial court erred in disregarding morada which
aggravated the offense inasmuch as the crime took place and was
committed by the accused-appellant in the house of the victims. The
accused-appellant showed greater perversity in his deliberate invasion of the
tranquility and privacy of the Parnala's domicile.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, finding the
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and
considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances, morada
and disregard of age, the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor to Twenty (20)
Years of Reclusion Temporal for the death of Jay Vee Parnala and another
indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor to Twenty (20)
Years of Reclusion Temporal for the death of Teresita Rosalinas and to
indemnify the heirs of deceased Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas in the
amount of P50,000.00 each in line with recent jurisprudence.

Art. 15 alternative circumstances

People vs. Balondo
Facts:

From the records and varied written admissions of the accused, Diego
Balondo, that on Sept. 29, 1966, at about 6:00 o'clock a.m., he was in his
farm in the barrio of Balacson, Kawayan, Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte.
That he stayed in his farm for about three hours clearing his camote
plantation; that at about 9:00 o'clock in that same day, he went home to take
his breakfast; that at about 1:00 o'clock, he saw Gloria Bulasa going to the
direction of the nipa grooves of the Ayono Asilo, behind the Aglipayan church;
that upon seeing her, he followed behind surreptitiously; that upon seeing
her cutting the banana leaves he told her, "why, you are here again to cut the
banana leaves?",
that the late Gloria Bulasa answered, 'it is none of your business for it's the
property of the government'; that he got furious and immediately grabbed

her by his left hand strangled her by the neck and pushed her violently to the
ground face downward;
that he firmly held her left arm and neck; rode on her back and pinned her
down with his knees and then continuously lifting her head and smashed her
face against the mud; that he choked and buried her face in the mud for
about an hour until she died.
And that when she was already dead, he lifted her from the mud and laid her
flat on her back, and then he held her by the feet, dragged her to a place
from where he killed her, at a distance of thirty brazas;
that he covered the body with nipa leaves to keep her from the sunlight; that
the deceased was carrying a knife for cutting the banana leaves, and she was
a niece of the accused from a second degree cousin;
that he sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulder by the
use of the knife of Gloria Bulasa because his bolo was dull, after which he
threw the knife away;
that he cut away also the feet; that he intended to slice all the flesh of the
cadaver but he was caught by the darkness of the night;
that he put the sliced flesh with a piece of rattan, tied it and brought it to his
farm; that upon reaching his farm, he started to build a fire and barbecued
the sliced pieces of human flesh (roasted it) and he ate the barbecued pieces
of human flesh and used it as a viand for the roasted banana fruits;
that the taste of the human flesh was bitter and poignant like a gall bladder;
that he killed Gloria Bulasa first to taste the human flesh if its good; that after
doing all those atrocious acts, he went home at about 7:00 o'clock in that
evening.
The Court of First Instance of Leyte found the defendant Diego Balondo guilty
of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death.

Issue:

w/n The trial court erred in declaring that 2 other aggravating

circumstance are present namely, that means employed or
circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act, and that the victim was the niece of the
accused.

Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the alternative

circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration
only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degree of the offended (U.S. vs.
Insierto, 15 Phil, 358).

Held:

One mitigating circumstance can be considered in favor of the

defendant, namely, the circumstance of his having made a voluntary
plea of guilt in court before the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution.
We, therefore, find that the defendant had committed the crime
of murder, with two aggravating circumstances that should be
counted against him, and one mitigating circumstance in his
favor. However, for lack of the required number of votes by the members
of the Court, for the imposition of the maximum penalty of death, the
Court has resolved to modify that portion of the judgment of the trial court
which imposes the penalty of death, by imposing on the defendant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is modified. The
defendant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Gloria Bulasa in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the
costs. It is so ordered.