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1. STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO. VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CO. (GR L-5203, 18 APRIL
1956)
Facts: Standard Vacuum Oil Co. entered into a contract with Luzon Stevedoring Co. Inc. to transport
between the ports of Manila and Nin Bay, Sagay, Iloilo, 2,916.44 barrels of bulk gasoline belonging to the
former. The gasoline was delivered in accordance with the contract but Luzon Stevedoring failed to
transport it to its place of destination. It appeared that the tugboat towing barge L-522 which was laden
with gasoline, among others, stalled due to a broken idler during the morning of 4 February 1947. The
barges that tied to it broke off due to the rough condition of the sea during the afternoon. The tugboat and
the barges were dashed against rocks, the tugboat sunk, and barge L-522 was so badly damaged that the
gasoline leaked out.
Standard Vacuum Oil brought an action in the CFI of Manila to recover the sum of P75,578.60 as
damages. Luzon Stevedoring, in its answer, pleaded that its failure to deliver the gasoline was due to
fortuitous event or caused by circumstances beyond its control and not to its fault or negligence or that of
any of its employees. The court, after receiving the evidence, rendered decision finding that the disaster
that had befallen the tugboat was the result of an unavoidable accident and the loss of the gasoline was
due to a fortuitous event which was beyond the control of Luzon Stevedoring and, consequently,
dismissed the case with costs against Standard Vacuum Oil.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from; and ordered Luzon Stevedoring to pay to
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. the sum of P75,578.50, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint, with costs.
2. PLANTERS PRODUCTS vs. CA
FACTS
Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation (MITSUBISHI) of
New York, U.S.A., 9,329.7069 metric tons (M/T) of Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter shipped in bulk
on 16 June 1974 aboard the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent Kyosei Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from Kenai, Alaska, U.S.A., to Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union,
Philippines, as evidenced by Bill of Lading No. KP-1 signed by the master of the vessel and issued on the
date of departure.
On 17 May 1974, or prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel M/V "Sun Plum" pursuant to
the Uniform General Charter was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as
shipowner, in Tokyo, Japan.
Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, four (4) of her holds were all presumably inspected by the
charterer's representative and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk pursuant to par. 16 of the charterparty.
After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the
shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with three (3) layers of tarpaulin, then
tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage.
Upon arrival of the vessel at her port of call on 3 July 1974, the steel pontoon hatches were opened with
the use of the vessel's boom. Petitioner unloaded the cargo from the holds into its steelbodied dump trucks
which were parked alongside the berth, using metal scoops attached to the ship, pursuant to the terms and

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conditions of the charter-partly (which provided for an F.I.O.S. clause). The hatches remained open
throughout the duration of the discharge.
Each time a dump truck was filled up, its load of Urea was covered with tarpaulin before it was
transported to the consignee's warehouse located some fifty (50) meters from the wharf. Midway to the
warehouse, the trucks were made to pass through a weighing scale where they were individually weighed
for the purpose of ascertaining the net weight of the cargo. The port area was windy, certain portions of
the route to the warehouse were sandy and the weather was variable, raining occasionally while the
discharge was in progress. The petitioner's warehouse was made of corrugated galvanized iron (GI)
sheets, with an opening at the front where the dump trucks entered and unloaded the fertilizer on the
warehouse floor. Tarpaulins and GI sheets were placed in-between and alongside the trucks to contain
spillages of the ferilizer.
It took eleven (11) days for PPI to unload the cargo, from 5 July to 18 July 1974 (except July 12th, 14th
and 18th). A private marine and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI), was hired
by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped, by taking draft readings of the vessel prior to and
after discharge. The survey report submitted by CSCI to the consignee (PPI) dated 19 July 1974 revealed
a shortage in the cargo of 106.726 M/T and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating 18 M/T was
contaminated with dirt. The same results were contained in a Certificate of Shortage/Damaged Cargo
dated 18 July 1974 prepared by PPI which showed that the cargo delivered was indeed short of 94.839
M/T and about 23 M/T were rendered unfit for commerce, having been polluted with sand, rust and dirt.
Consequently, PPI sent a claim letter dated 18 December 1974 to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA),
the resident agent of the carrier, KKKK, for P245,969.31 representing the cost of the alleged shortage in
the goods shipped and the diminution in value of that portion said to have been contaminated with dirt.
Respondent SSA explained that they were not able to respond to the consignee's claim for payment
because, according to them, what they received was just a request for shortlanded certificate and not a
formal claim, and that this "request" was denied by them because they "had nothing to do with the
discharge of the shipment." Hence, on 18 July 1975, PPI filed an action for damages with the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
The defendant carrier argued that the strict public policy governing common carriers does not apply to
them because they have become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the charter-party.
The trial court however sustained the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant carrier for the value of
the goods lost or damaged.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and absolved the carrier from liability
for the value of the cargo that was lost or damaged. Relying on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co. v.
American Steamship Agencies, Inc., the appellate court ruled that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum"
owned by private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time
charterer-party. Accordingly, the Civil Code provisions on common carriers which set forth a presumption
of negligence do not find application in the case at bar.
ISSUE
W/N a charter-party between a shipowner and a charterer transform a common carrier into a private one
as to negate the civil law presumption of negligence in case of loss or damage to its cargo?
RULING
It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary course of business, operates as a common carrier,

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transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun
Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and
therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can we charge the
charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer
did not have any control of the means in doing so. This is evident in the present case considering that the
steering of the ship, the manning of the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage and other
technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened,
chosen and hired by the shipowner.
It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the
whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in
the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its
crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the
particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or
voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the
property of the charterer.
In an action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped, the shipper or
consignee should first prove the fact of shipment and its consequent loss or damage while the same was in
the possession, actual or constructive, of the carrier. Thereafter, the burden of proof shifts to respondent to
prove that he has exercised extraordinary diligence required by law or that the loss, damage or
deterioration of the cargo was due to fortuitous event, or some other circumstances inconsistent with its
liability.
Although it is considered a common carrier, respondent has sufficiently overcome, by clear and
convincing proof, the prima facie presumption of negligence.
The master of the carrying vessel, Captain Lee Tae Bo, in his deposition taken on 19 April 1977 before
the Philippine Consul and Legal Attache in the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, testified that before
the fertilizer was loaded, the four (4) hatches of the vessel were cleaned, dried and fumigated. After
completing the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship's holds, the steel pontoon hatches were closed and
sealed with iron lids, then covered with three (3) layers of serviceable tarpaulins which were tied with
steel bonds. The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of
the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the ship's boom.
It was also shown during the trial that the hull of the vessel was in good condition, foreclosing the
possibility of spillage of the cargo into the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the vessel. When
M/V "Sun Plum" docked at its berthing place, representatives of the consignee boarded, and in the
presence of a representative of the shipowner, the foreman, the stevedores, and a cargo surveyor
representing CSCI, opened the hatches and inspected the condition of the hull of the vessel. The
stevedores unloaded the cargo under the watchful eyes of the shipmates who were overseeing the whole
operation on rotation basis.
Verily, the presumption of negligence on the part of the respondent carrier has been efficaciously
overcome by the showing of extraordinary zeal and assiduity exercised by the carrier in the care of the
cargo.
3. MECENAS VS. CA (GR 88052, 14 DECEMBER 1989)
Facts: At 6:20 a.m. of 22 April 1980, the M/T Tacloban City, a barge-type oil tanker of Philippine
registry, with a gross tonnage of 1,241.68 tons, owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC)
and operated

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by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC Shipping), having unloaded its cargo of
petroleum products, left Amlan, Negros Occidental, and headed towards Bataan. At about 1:00 p.m. of
that same day, the M/V Don Juan, an inter-island vessel, also of Philippine registry, of 2,391.31 tons
gross weight, owned and operated by the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. (Negros Navigation) left Manila
bound for Bacolod with 750 passengers listed in its manifest, and a complete set of officers and crew
members. At about 10:30 p.m., the Tacloban City and the Don Juan collided at the Talbas Strait near
Maestra de Ocampo Island in the vicinity of the island of Mindoro. When the collision occurred, the sea
was calm, the weather fair and visibility good. As a result of this collision, the M/V Don Juan sank and
hundreds of its passengers perished. Among the ill-fated passengers were the spouses Perfecto Mecenas
and Sofia Mecenas, whose bodies were never found despite intensive search by their children, Jose,
Romeo, Lilia, Orlando, Violeta (Acervo), Luzviminda, and Ofelia (Javier).
On 29 December 1980, the Mecenas filed a complaint in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City
(Civil Case Q-31525), against Negros Navigation and Capt. Roger Santisteban, the captain of the Don
Juan without, however, impleading either PNOC or PNOC Shipping. The children prayed for actual
damages of not less than P100,000.00 as well as moral and exemplary damages in such amount as the
Court may deem reasonable to award to them. Another complaint (Civil Case Q-33932), was filed in the
same court by Lilia Ciocon claiming damages against Negros Navigation, PNOC and PNOC Shipping for
the death of her husband Manuel Ciocon, another of the luckless passengers of the Don Juan. Manuel
Ciocons body, too, was never found. The 2 cases were consolidated and heard jointly by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82. On 17 July 1986, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision,
ordering (a) Negros Navigation and Capt. Santisteban jointly and severally liable to pay the Mecenas, the
sum of P400,000.00 for the death of their parents, Perfecto A. Mecenas and Sofia P. Mecenas; to pay the
Mecenas the sum of P15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; plus costs of the suit; (b) each of Negros
Navigation PNOC/PNOC Shipping to pay Ciocon the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Manuel
Ciocon, to pay Ciocon jointly and severally, the sum of P15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, plus costs
of the suit.
Negros Navigation, Capt. Santisteban, PNOC and PNOC Shipping appealed the trial courts decision to
the Court of Appeals. Later, PNOC and PNOC Shipping withdrew their appeal citing a compromise
agreement reached by them with Negros Navigation; the Court of Appeals granted the motion by a
resolution dated 5 September 1988, subject to the reservation made by Lilia Ciocon that she could not be
bound by the compromise agreement and would enforce the award granted her by the trial court. In time,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dated 26 January 1989, affirming the decision of the lower court
with modification with respect to Civil Case 31525, wherein Negros Navigation and Capt. Santisteban are
held jointly and severally liable to pay the Mecenas the amount of P100,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. The Mecenas filed a
petition for review in light of the reduction of the amount of damages awarded.
The Supreme Court granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari, reversed and set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it reduced the amount of damages awarded to the Mecenas to
P100,000.00; restored the award granted by the trial court and augmented as follows: (a) P126,000.00 for
actual damages; (b) P60,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful death; (c) P307,000.00 as moral
damages; (d) P307,000.00 as exemplary damages making a total of P800,000.00; and (e) P15,000.00 as
attorneys fees. The Court also ordered the Mecenas to pay the additional filing fees properly due and

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payable in view of the award made, which fees shall be computed by the Clerk of Court of the trial court,
and shall constitute a lien upon the judgment awarded; with costs against Negros Navigation and Capt.
Santisteban.
4. BRINAS VS. PEOPLE
Facts: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in
Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo.
The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon.
They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at 8pm,
the train slowed down and the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brinas, shouted Lusacan, Lusacan!
The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with
the other. When they were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and the child
stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an oncoming train, causing their
instant death.
A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant
conductor and Clemente Brinas for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted
Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant was negligent?
Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn from the
findings.
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses that before
reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a
matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and
proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of
a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark; there is no
way to stop it as a bus may be stopped. The appellant was negligent because his announcement was premature
and erroneous, for it took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. The premature
announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement,
the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked and picked up speed.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitionerappellant.
5. BLTB Co. v. IAC
Facts: On an ascending curve at a highway in Tayabas, Quezon, a bus operated by BLTB and driven by
Armando Pon overtook a Ford Fiera, which resulted to its collision with a Superlines bus coming from the
opposite direction. Such caused the death of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri, and several
injuries to Nena Rosales and Baylon Sales, all passengers of BLTB. The injured passengers and the surviving
heirs of the ones who died instituted a complaint against the 2 bus companies. The trial court exonerated

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Superlines and held BLTB to be solely liable. The decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court;
hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the action of the respondents is based on culpa contractual
Held: A reading of the respondent court's decision shows that it anchored petitioners' liability both on culpa
contractual and culpa aquiliana, to wit:
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned by his employer, appellant Armando Pon is
primarily liable. On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer, appellant BLTB, is also primary, direct and
immediate in view of the fact that the death of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its
employee, and such liability does not cease even upon proof that BLTB had exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation
to carry its passengers safely to their destination. That obligation is so serious that the Civil Code requires
"utmost diligence of very cautious person (Article 1755, Civil Code). They are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Article 1756,
Civil Code). In the present case, the appellants have failed to prove extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this legal
presumption was confirmed by the fact that the bus driver of BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the
driver and the owner must answer for injuries or death to its passengers. The liability of BLTB is also solidarily
with its driver even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while that of the bus company
from contract.
It is settled that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of the
passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the BLTB Bus, who recklessly operated and drove
said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed by Traffic Rules and Regulations. Such negligence and
recklessness is binding against petitioner BLTB, more so when We consider the fact that in an action based on
a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract
of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that
might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.

6. Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal, G.R. No. L-22985, January 24, 1968
Facts: Caguimbal who was a paying pasenger of Batangas Transportation Company (BTCO) bus died
when the bus of the Bian Transportation Company (Binan) which was coming from the opposite
direction and a calesa managed by Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Bian bus met an accident.
A passenger requested the conductor of BTCO to stop as he was going to alight, and when he heard the
signal of the conductor, the driver slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at
this juncture, a calesa, then driven by Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus
coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Bian bus was about 100 meters away

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likewise going northward and following the direction of the calesa; that upon seeing the Bian bus the
driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other
from the opposite directions, the Bian bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass
between the BTCO bus and the calesa; that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70)
kilometers an hour, the Bian bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting
first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and struck the
calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed; that
the second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely
smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open. The BTCO bus suffered damages for the
repair of its damaged portion.As a consequence of this occurrence, Caguimbal and Tolentino died, apart
from others who were injured.
The widow and children of Caguimbal sued to recover damages from the BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed
a third-party complaint against the Bian and its driver, Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended
their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan.
CFI dismissed the complaint insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to
sue Bian and Ilagan. CA reversed said decision and rendered judgment for Caguimbal. BTCO appealed
to SC.
Issue: Whether BTCO is liable to pay damages for failure to exercise extraordinary diligence?
Held: YES. BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part.
The recklessness of the driver of Binan was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the accident
which resultedin the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Bian bus, he overtook
Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed between the same and the BTCO bus despite the fact
that the space available was not big enough therefor, in view of which the Bian bus hit the left side of the
BTCO bus and then the calesa.
Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides the general rule that extraordinary diligence must be exercised by
the driver of a bus in the vigilance for the safety of his passengers.
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, the BTCO bus driver drove partly to
the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have and should
have seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" that his bus was completely outside the
asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than
sufficient to accommodate the bus. When the BTCO bus driver slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said
passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Bian bus would overtake the calesa at
about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of
the asphalted portions of the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not
be enough to allow the Bian bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus should have
slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations
toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike the BTCO bus driver whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or
"extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which

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would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Bian
driver.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the
passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the
fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule
that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has
exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code.

7. Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals (324 SCRA 147)

Facts: Mallari Jr. was the driving a passenger jeepney owned by his father, co-petitioner herein. The jeep
collided with the delivery van of Bulletin Publishing Corp. while travelling on the National Highway in
Bataan. Mallari Jr. proceeded to overtake a fiera which had stopped in front of him. He negotiated the
curve and moved in the opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. As he passed the vehicle he saw the
delivery van of Bulletin and the vehicles collided. The points of collision were the and the left rear
portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van. The 2 right wheels of the
delivery van were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found
scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger
jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its
passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.
The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from Mallari, Jr. and Sr. and Bulletin as well.
The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the
Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped
the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney. On appeal, the court reversed the decision of the lower court
and held that it was Mallari Jr. who was negligent. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the death of Reyes.
Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that Mallari Jr. and Sr. who are
responsible for the death of Reyes. The collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the
highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by
Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and
(b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The rule is
settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in
safety. Article 2185 of the NCC, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving a
motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Petitioners herein failed to

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present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. Therefore they shall be liable for the
loss of Reyes life.
8. PAL vs. CA

9. Abeto vs PAL